tion, and obviously, from such observations as those here elaborated, it is one of the most difficult experiences for complete introspective analysis.⁶

The last paper of the series, by Dr. Burnett, deals with much the same problem as that taken up in Professor Woodworth's paper. The result is summarized by the author as follows: "The results of the foregoing experiments seem to indicate that in the limited field under consideration, that of voluntary movements of the back-and-forth type, the imagination of neither resident sensations from the limbs nor of remote sensations as from the eye, ear, or skin, showing how the moving part looks or sounds or feels, can furnish an adequate cue for the occurrence of actual movements at a maximum rate" (p. 401).

This conclusion is based on a series of tables in which the rate of imagined movements is compared with the rate of real movements. The rate of imagined movements is reported as slower than the rate of real movements; and this leads the author to the general conclusion that the imagined movements cannot serve as the cue to the real movement.

Unfortunately the statement of the method of the experiments is so curtailed and the meaning of units in the table so obscure that it is quite impossible to understand how the data were obtained. The experiments are on a subject of such importance, and the conclusions seem to be so fully established in the author's mind, that it is doubly desirable that the character of the experiments be made clear.

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PHILOSOPHY OF EXPERIENCE.

Avenarius' Philosophy of Pure Experience. NORMAN SMITH.
Mind, April, 1906.

While Avenarius discovered a genuine fallacy in the introjectionist argument, Mr. Smith believes that both his account of its origin, and the applications which he derived from it, are open to serious objections.

In *Der Menschliche Weltbegriff*, Avenarius attributes all the distinctions between inner and outer, self and not-self, subject and object, and soul and body, to the fallacy of introjection, and accordingly repudiates them in the interests of his own doctrine of 'pure experience.' In reply, it is maintained that these distinctions are not only legitimate, but that they do not owe their origin to introjection. The

distinction between objects and our perception of them must first have been present in our own consciousness, before we could have begun to infer it in others, and so started the process of introjection. These dualisms really owe their origin simply to the spatial externality of objects to our own bodies. Avenarius is not justified in finding an instance of introjection in the animism of children and savages. Tylor has satisfactorily explained the origin of animism in a much simpler manner, as the natural interpretation of certain concrete phenomena, viz., sleep, dreams, and death. Nor can animism be regarded as the cause of these dualisms, though it is a crude attempt to explain them, and leads to more fruitful and absolutely legitimate philosophical developments.

In some later articles published in the *Vierteljahrsschrift*, Avenarius charges the source of subjective idealism to the introjectionist fallacy. While Mr. Smith believes that subjective idealism logically presupposes some such fallacious alternation between an assumed realism and idealism, and that Avenarius has performed a valuable service to philosophy in showing this, he maintains that Avenarius is wrong in attributing the origin of subjective idealism to introjection. Its origin is a purely philosophical development, based upon the physical and physiological difficulties involved in explaining the relationship of matter and consciousness, and it did not appear until the age of Descartes, at least in an at all definite form.

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The Experience-Philosophy. WARNER FITE. Phil. Rev., 1906, XV., 1-16.

The chief purpose of this article is to show that the experience-philosophy, resting as it does upon the proposition that experience is immediately given and prior to the world of things, exhibits a serious fallacy. The series of experiences and the present experience are found to be intimately connected with and determined by things in space and time. (1) The *past* experience and the past fact not in experience are both mediated, the one by memory and the other by inference. Both processes, however, turn out to be objective; for the criteria of a true memory-picture are clearness, which stands for consistency of external detail, and the 'personal character,' consisting in definite bodily relations existing between the subject and the perceived object, to which the purely subjective element of experience is always subordinate. (2) The real *present* experience is distinguished from