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George G. Beazley

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SUGGESTIONS FOR THE LAND TRANSPORT SERVICE OF THE ARMY.

By GEORGE G. BEAZLEY, Captain 83rd Regiment.

"A veteran army indeed, kept constantly ready for marching is expensive, yet it gives a State the disposal of things among its neighbours, or at least procures it a great reputation in other respects."

"It was a just answer of Solon to Cræsus, who showed him all his treasure: 'Yes, sir, but if another should come with better iron than you, he would be master of all this gold.'"

LORD BACON.

So many schemes connected with the management of the Army have lately been proposed and discussed, that it would seem almost needless to bring forward another. They have, however, chiefly referred to the subject of recruiting. This has been pretty well exhausted. Most persons who have attentively considered the matter have probably arrived at the conclusion that we can only compete with the armaments of the Continent by the introduction of a modified conscription, and the gradual abolition of the militia, yeomanry, and volunteers for a really effective Reserve, composed of men who have served a few years in the regular Army.

The object of the present paper is not to treat of recruiting, but to deal with the equally important subject of transport, touching incidentally on the defence of this country—vital questions, on whatever system men may be raised for military service. The British Army, though in many respects well organized, stops short of completion. We have regiments perfectly drilled and equipped; yet beyond their clothes, arms, and accoutrements, they have little that they require in the field. To move them entails numerous returns and much correspondence. To collect and place even a small force in the field to meet the enemy would, as there is little or nothing ready in the way of transport, be a matter of some difficulty. To obviate this defect, and remove the attendant delay and uncertainty, is the aim of the following plan.

Any proposal connected with the organization of an Army divides itself into two distinct branches, namely, the organization required for war, and that required for peace.

Although the former is the really important branch, yet peace being the normal condition of armies, it is impossible to devise a plan for

the one without considering the other. The question then is, how to be prepared for war at a moment's notice, without unnecessarily depriving Officers and men, during peace, of the ordinary advantages and comforts enjoyed by the citizen.

The outline plan which follows, applies chiefly to the Infantry; but, with certain self-evident modifications, includes the other arms of the Service, and is intended, in a great measure, as the basis of a scheme to ensure this country against surprise by invasion.

Since the regimental system of the British Army has been pronounced perfect as far as it goes, and since it is the system the most suitable to our wants, why not, instead of engrafting upon it modifications of Continental plans, endeavour to render it complete?

The Unit.—It is therefore proposed that the regiment should be made the unit of efficiency. That all transport, certainly of the first reserve of stores, and second of ammunition, should be organized upon a system based on the requirements of a regiment, and not on the wants of a brigade or larger unfixed unit.

To carry out the above idea, a regiment must be a fixed, distinct, and independent body, self-reliant for (1) transport, (2) food, (3) shelter, (4) clothing, (5) regimental and first reserve of ammunition, and (6) hospital.

Regimental Train.—The first thing to be provided is transport. In this country waggons are the most suitable. These waggons should be so constructed that without unloading they could travel on the railway trucks. As they would be in charge of the regiment, they should be marked with its number, the letter of the company or companies, or name of the department to which they belong. On the march they would follow the regiment, brigade, or division, in charge of men of the regiment, who should walk or drive, but not ride.

The *minimum* amount of tentage, baggage of Officers, tools and implements, arm chests, squad bags, reserve ammunition and *impedimenta*, including regimental hospital equipment, *absolutely required in the field*, would have to be fixed as to size, shape, and weight. These points being settled, the number of waggons to be allotted to each regiment would be determined.

In time of peace, contractors would supply the horses and harness at fixed rates, and possibly the same arrangement might be the most economical in time of war. Cast artillery, and cavalry horses, which sell for little or nothing, might be made available, if it were considered desirable to maintain the nucleus of an independent system; one or two horses to a regiment, for instance. Oxen should not be overlooked; they cost less, require little harness, move fast enough, are easily conveyed by railway, and when old, or in case of emergency, could be eaten. How far the employment of traction-engines could be used with advantage might be worthy of experiment.

It has been urged that waggons would not be required in England, as the railroads would furnish all the necessary conveyance. Though railroads would greatly facilitate the movements and concentration of troops, it is clear that were the line, bridges, or viaducts destroyed, or the post to be occupied only a short distance from the station, it would

be absolutely necessary to have the baggage brought up. For real efficiency, therefore, it may be assumed that the waggons could not be dispensed with.

To diminish the baggage now carried about by Officers, barrack-rooms should be furnished with all the articles required beyond the ordinary field kit.

All private baggage in time of peace should be moved independently of the regiment, by private carriers, as at present.

Food.—Instead of butchers and bakers being formed into one corps under a civil department, each regiment should have its own, liable to do military duty when not required in the exercise of their trades. These men would work in regimental, brigade, or divisional abattoirs and bakeries, receiving while so employed substantial working pay. In the event of misconduct, or the departure of a corps, all men so engaged away from their regiments, would rejoice.

Regimental Clothing.—A moderate supply of the most essential articles (such as boots, gaiters, socks, and flannel shirts) should accompany the regiment, a minimum being fixed for field service. These would have to be replenished as opportunities offered. The bulk of the Quartermaster's stores, would, in time of peace, have to move with the private baggage, or be left in charge of the dépôt on the regiment going under canvas.

Regimental Ammunition.—The regimental reserve of ammunition (30 rounds per man), which might with advantage be considerably increased, should be divided among, and carried with the company's baggage, unless the regulation-means were provided.

The first reserve of small-arm-ammunition, now carried by the Royal Artillery, should be in a separate waggon, containing the necessary means for distributing it in difficult ground.

Regimental Hospital.—Medical Officers should be formed into one corps, and one, two, or three, according to the exigencies of the Service, attached to a regiment. The hospital should be entirely regimental, and all drugs, instruments, stores, and comforts should be drawn direct from the medical stores by the Surgeon doing duty with the regiment.

Though the Surgeon would not belong to the regiment, or adopt its uniform, he would be under the orders of the Commanding Officer, and in every way responsible for the thorough efficiency of his own department.

General Hospital.—Wounded men, and men too sick to travel, would, as now, be left in General Hospitals, established in garrison towns, or at the different dépôts on the lines of communication. Only the Regimental Hospital, with the simplest cases, should move with the troops.

The Army Hospital Corps should be disbanded, their duties being always performed in regimental hospitals by trained soldiers of the regiment; in General Hospitals in garrison towns (during peace) by similar men from the several corps serving therein; in war time, by civilians, men or women, supplemented by disabled and convalescent soldiers.

In order to obviate any inconvenience which might arise from sick-

ness, misconduct, or furlough, every regiment should have a considerable number of men trained as drivers, butchers, bakers, and hospital orderlies. The last, as well as all bandsmen, should be trained at Netley, and be thoroughly instructed in ambulance duties. All such men, when thus employed, should receive a moderate daily sum, in addition to their pay.

So much for the regimental arrangements. Should such a scheme, or a modification of it, ever be adopted, it is evident that the responsibility of Officers commanding regiments and companies would be materially increased. Every Officer commanding a regiment would be bound to keep it fully equipped, and up to the regulation standard of efficiency. For this purpose he should communicate *directly* with all the departments of supply in all matters not involving maintenance, exchange, or expenditure beyond the recognized equipment.

Supply Departments.—The Supply Departments are the Commissariat, the Store, the Paymasters, the Barrack, the Purveyors, and the Medical.

In view of the proposed plan, the union of the first four departments under what is termed the "Control System" would not be desirable; they should be kept separate. Their duties are perfectly distinct; they have nothing in common. A Controller is only acquainted with the department to which he originally belonged; consequently, when referred to on a subject out of that sphere, he would be obliged to forward the correspondence to the branch of the control concerned. Thus, in most cases, the control system would only add another channel of communication to those already in existence. The only real control required would be that exercised by the War Office on the part of the Treasury. The Officers of the supply departments, therefore, while under the authority of the senior combatant Officer for the correct discharge of their duties generally, should—both for the benefit of the public purse and their own support and security—be accountable to the War Office for their expenditure. To prevent unnecessary reference, a clear code of regulations should be drawn up for the guidance of each department, and the Army generally. Such rules would, however, be liable to be set aside by General or other Officers commanding independent bodies of troops during war.

Paymaster's or Accountant's Department.—The Paymaster's Department, representing, and communicating directly with the War Office, would have sole charge of the financial arrangements and the military chest. From it, as from a bank, all money required by Regimental Paymasters, or departments, should be drawn.

The Purveyor's Department.—The Purveyor's Department should be abolished, and the duties of these officers, as far as the care and distribution of medicines and comforts are concerned, be entrusted to medical officers of different grades, on additional or Staff pay. This would tend to the unity of the Medical Department.

The Barrack Department.—However opinions may differ as to the advisability of bringing several distinct departments under one head, there can be little doubt that, for such a scheme as the present, the

Barrack Department should be retained as a separate branch of the Service. Although barracks might, and indeed would be, frequently occupied in time of war by the regulars or reserves, they are, nevertheless, the natural home of the soldier during peace. Here the recreation-rooms, libraries, schools, workshops, and canteens are established. These cannot, even in a modified form, accompany the troops on active service; they, with the barracks, are stationary, and are pre-eminently adapted only to peaceful times. The Commissariat, Store, Medical, and Paymaster's Departments, on the other hand, must be with the troops, whether in barracks or in the field. This distinction seems to point clearly to the necessity of maintaining the integrity of the Barrack Department as a separate establishment. This principle admitted, it would be desirable that the Barrack-masters should be selected from Engineer or other Officers, who having a taste and aptitude for construction, might be willing, for the sake of a fixed home, to relinquish their military career—retaining, however, if they wished it, honorary rank.

They should have charge of all permanent military buildings and property, including hospitals, libraries, schools, books, recreation-rooms, canteens, furniture, and *all implements not required in the field*. The construction of new barracks, all additions to, improvements and repairs of old, should be carried out by them, either by contract or military labour.

Thus the Officer of Engineers would be relieved of all duties connected with the construction and repair of barracks, and be enabled to keep up the special knowledge required of him on service.

There should be a store in every barrack for the private baggage of Officers, and the surplus of Officers' and Serjeants' messes; so that when the regiment encamped for the periodical summer drill, the rooms might be handed over to the Barrack-master either for repairs or for the occupation of another regiment.

Departmental Trains.—The Regimental Trains having been provided for, we now come to the consideration of the transport required by the different departments attached to the Army. This should be divided into the following branches:—

1. The Store Train, including (a) Artillery reserve stores and ammunition; (b) second reserve of small-arm ammunition; (c) saddlery and harness; (d) spare tents; (e) spare carriages for all arms.

2. The Clothing Train (this might, perhaps, form part of the Store Train), with similar supplies to the Regimental Train.

3. The Engineer Reserve Train.

4. The Paymaster's Train.

5. The Medical Train, with all the medicines and appliances required to replenish regimental consumption and losses, and to establish temporary general hospitals in the event of an engagement.

6. The Commissariat Train.

The Trains above detailed (1 to 5) should always be kept up, and the waggons be more or less ready packed, on a plan based upon the wants of a regiment or battery. This portion of the train—which for the sake of distinction we will call No. 1—should be that

which would move with the column to which it might be attached. The train to supply it with stores and ammunition, as expended, should consist, as must ever be the case, of the civilian transport available at the theatre of war, such as railways, carts, mules, or water carriage. No great difficulty could be experienced in fixing upon the amount of carriage required for No. 1 train, so as to enable a force to fight one or two battles without replenishing.

Commissariat Train.—To estimate the transport required by the Commissariat Department is a more difficult problem. The daily necessity of supplying food and fuel, and that bulky requisite, forage, and their collection from the neighbourhood, or transport from the depôts in the rear to the point of issue, depending on inconstant data and varying circumstances, render even an approximate calculation uncertain. It may, therefore, be assumed that even No. 1 Commissariat Train would, on war breaking out, be supplemented more or less by contractors' and vendors' carts.

The Regimental Trains could always, when the men were encamped and their waggons consequently empty, convey their supplies from the Commissariat point of issue to the respective camps. If necessary, a special or spare waggon might be used for that purpose. In brigade, regiments should furnish one waggon or more daily, in turn, for the use of the whole brigade.

Paymaster's Department Train.—The strength of the Paymaster's train would vary with the nature of the money in circulation. Even if the latter consisted principally of gold or notes, a considerable sum would have to be in small coin, to meet the wants of the soldiers. In the United Kingdom this train might, from the facilities of obtaining money, be dispensed with, provision, of course, being made for the office books.

All these departments—essential as they are for the efficiency, and even the existence of the Army—require men of business, and not military men, to ensure the objects for which they are created. They should, therefore, be strictly civil in their nature. And here another difficulty presents itself—Who is to have the control and authority over the different trains? This is a question not easily answered, for if the men composing them were soldiers, how would military discipline and order be maintained?

That each department—especially the Commissariat—ought to have control over the whole of its own duties, both in collecting and delivering its supplies, cannot be doubted. If its Officers were to have the whole responsibility they would be more independent, more punctual, and efficient; they could time and arrange their measures so as best to meet the varying difficulties they would constantly have to encounter; and while much correspondence would be saved, the issue of food and forage would be far more satisfactory in the long run, than if the duty of delivery were performed by a separate branch of the Service. These remarks apply in a less degree to the other departments.

Assuming that the horses, or oxen, waggons, and harness (the two latter of the plainest pattern), would be in the charge of the different departments, it only remains to provide the drivers.

Drivers.—To meet this difficulty there would appear only one or two ways. One would be to have a corps of drivers, under Officers and Non-commissioned Officers, subject to the Articles of War, but non-combatant. These men should drive, or walk, but not ride; they should be dressed in a simple working suit; be bound to help load or unload; and make themselves generally useful. In time of war they should be armed with a revolver only. Though they would be quite distinct from the Army, discipline should be maintained on the Army system. The detachment of these men required by a department for No. 1 train, would be under an Officer or Non-Commissioned Officer, according to its strength; the Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and men, while so employed, being bound to obey the head of the department to which they were attached. In fact, the corps should be a body of useful, willing, working men, not above their work, with nothing whatever of the Dragoon about them—as unlike the present Military Train as light is to darkness. To compensate the Officers and men for their anomalous position in a military point of view, it would be necessary to pay them well. They should only be taught to drive, park, and pack their waggons—no drill or instruction beyond this would be necessary. The Officers, of whom there need be few, should be mounted. Non-commissioned Officers should drive, walk, or have a seat on the rear waggon, or, when there were more than one, on the front and rear waggons of the portion of the train in their charge. Such a corps should not consist of volunteers from other regiments, as they would at once bring into it the military element, which from its very nature and duties would be objectionable. A few sensible Non-commissioned Officers (who should be made thoroughly to understand that they would, on joining the corps, have to relinquish much of their “smartness”), might be necessary at first, to establish the interior economy of the barrack-room. Such a body in time of peace would probably be only a skeleton corps, but, the duties being simple, no difficulty would be found in augmenting it on very short notice, as the trained men would soon instruct the recruits. Men might be enlisted for such a corps for short periods, the pay being a sufficient inducement.

The other plan would be to have a similar corps under the command of the Officers, clerks, and issuers of the Supply Departments. These men, being simply drivers, would be interchangeable among the departments, according to the requirements of the different trains. Their distribution would be determined by the Transport-Director and Quartermaster-General's department. If, however, it should be considered advisable to keep the supply departments distinct, and complete in every respect, then each corps should have its own body of drivers. If the extra work thus entailed were not an insuperable objection, either of the plans, but especially the last, would probably prove the most efficient in practice, as each department, being complete and independent, all collision of authority would be avoided. It would also assimilate with the regimental system already proposed.

Transport Directors.—We have now provided for the regimental and departmental trains. To avoid confusion on the line of march, it would

be necessary to place them in charge of an executive Officer. With a large train, Brigade, Divisional, and Corps Transport-Directors would be required. The senior of these Officers with the force, would receive his orders direct from the Quartermaster-General's Department. Being invested with supreme authority during the march, he would be responsible for the correct movement of the whole. Officers so employed would require considerable tact and ability to deal efficiently with rival interests; and, while enforcing strictly the rules and customs necessary to secure the uninterrupted movement of the trains, ought to have the power as well as the judgment to know when to relax them. If a special and separate corps of drivers were established, the above duties would devolve on the Officers of that corps. The Transport-Directors should alone have the power to halt or move the line of waggons; the Officers commanding the escorts having nothing to do beyond defending them in case of attack.

No. 2 Train.—The train communicating with No. 1 and the base should be organized on a similar plan, but, with the exception of the Transport-Directors, should consist of civilians hired for the time being. It is not much more difficult to bring up stores and supplies for an Army than for a large city, as long as the communications are not threatened or attacked.

In the United Kingdom and in many other countries, the second train would be furnished by the railways; the regimental and No. 1 trains would be able to bring the supplies up to the front from the dépôts established at the railway stations.

Summary.—We thus have a transport system, where the regimental trains, driven by soldiers only, would be employed with the troops in the presence of the enemy, or where military discipline is most required; behind them would come the departmental trains, and their disciplined non-combatant drivers, while in the rear of all, and out of danger, would be No. 2 train, manned by civilians.

Each train while in camp would be comparatively independent, and at the disposal of the regiment or department to which it belonged. On the line of march all would be under the Transport-Directors. Thus would be combined the advantages in camp, which a certain amount of freedom would give, with the order and discipline on the line of march absolutely requisite to ensure the unbroken progression of the whole.

Districts.—Reverting to the defence of this country it would be necessary to re-divide the whole kingdom with reference to the railway system, into military districts, to be placed under General Officers, who should command the whole of the troops, both regular and reserve. The head-quarters and a fortified magazine should be at or near the chief railway station, or at an important junction, connected, if necessary, by a branch with the main line. At this secure point all the transport and stores for No. 1 Train of the regular troops, and the stores for the reserves of the district, should be accumulated, as well as a sufficient supply of all equipment, to make good regimental losses, breakages, and expenditure.

About eight or ten districts in Great Britain, and four in Ireland, would probably suffice. These being in direct communication with the Government arsenals, would be easily kept supplied with all the stores required. The districts should be so arranged that each should include a portion of the sea-board. Suppose, for example, that England were divided by radial lines, following the boundaries of counties, drawn from a point near Tamworth to the coast; or, for simplicity's sake, into four, by two lines, one from Hawick in the north to Southampton in the south, the other from Milford Haven to Holbeach. The respective head-quarters might be established at or near Chester, York, London, and Gloucester. This, though only intended as an illustration, would give each a portion of the sea-board to guard.

Provision has now been made for the active Army, or *first line*.

1st Reserve.—The *second line*, or first reserve, should be organized on a similar plan, substituting the agricultural carriage available. All such carriage should be apportioned (a law being enacted for this purpose), to the different Reserve regiments, so that each Commanding Officer should know to what farmer or job-master he would have to go for his transport. His stores he would obtain from the district magazine. Some delay would doubtless occur before the first Reserve would be ready to move, but in the mean time the active Army would be on the march fully equipped, giving the first Reserve ample time to prepare for the field.

2nd Reserve.—A similar scheme would hold good for the second Reserve. The remaining Reserve troops would be employed in holding the fortresses and towns.

Camps.—In the drill-season, regiments, both Regular and Reserve, should assemble at the different camps, and remain under canvas, during the periods allotted to brigade and divisional instruction. The present huts should, as they decay, be removed, and not replaced.

The regular regiments being in possession of transport, should assist the regiments of the Reserve in bringing their camp equipage to and from the railway stations; as it would not be desirable to call upon the agricultural carriage, except in case of danger from invasion. Failing this, one or two permanent buildings might be constructed at the camps, to hold sufficient camp-equipage to meet the usual summer demands of the Reserve forces.

In order to reduce expenditure, regiments, as a rule, should remain a year in their quarters, and only move out for their summer drills. The annual hire of horses for the regimental trains would not amount to much, provided the moves now so frequent, were limited to the above periods.

Whether it would be advantageous to extend the system proposed for the regiment, by forming a regimental unit, say of a wing, two companies, or even one, would depend upon the number of waggons a regiment would require, and the distribution of the equipment.

The more effectually to carry out the above plans, Commanding Officers of regiments should be relieved of a good deal of their present office work. The returns now rendered should be revised. All returns and

accounts of schools, canteens, and recreation-rooms, might stop at the regiment being, if necessary, periodically examined, either at the half-yearly inspection, or by some Officer or Department appointed to supervise the whole of these and analogous institutions.

Departmental Subordinates.—A certain number of men of superior attainments would be required as compounders, issuers, and storemen, for the medical and other departments. Such men should be subordinate to, and as a rule under the sole authority of the Officers of these departments. There would be no occasion to enlist them, simply because they would administer to the wants of the Army. They might be engaged on terms calculated to meet all that could be required of them in their civil capacities, and yet to secure a due amount of subordination to military authority.

Indeed it would appear advisable to organize the whole of the subordinates of the Civil Departments on a system adapted to their special duties, rather than on a military basis; the Officers of the respective departments being responsible for their efficiency, and for the maintenance of such discipline as might be expected and required. There is nothing military in providing food, clothing, pay, arms, and ammunition for an Army. Even in the treatment of a soldier either for disease or wounds, medical, not military science is required. All such men should therefore have no arms, except during war, when, in order to meet unforeseen dangers, they should be supplied with a revolver apiece. As such emergencies occur so seldom during a man's lifetime, they should not be trained as soldiers, beyond being taught the use of their weapon. It is not worth while to combine in one man two incongruous duties, one which he has to exercise daily, with another which he may never be called upon to perform.

Advantages of Proposed Scheme.—Such a scheme fully carried out would entail considerable expense at the outset, but it would ensure proportionate advantages and security.

If, however, the magazines were not fortified, or if their defences consisted simply of earthworks, thrown up by the troops, the outlay would be almost limited to the cost of the waggons.

The Store Department would be relieved of the main portion of their present charge, and their duties would be appreciably diminished, especially at the most critical moment, namely, the first alarm.

Every regiment would at all times be prepared, without a moment's hesitation, to march out of barracks, ready in every respect for a campaign. The dépôt, school, women and children would remain behind. All the private baggage (materially diminished by the furnishing of barrack-rooms) and *impedimenta* not required in the field, would be stowed away in one of the spare store-rooms.

On any emergency, a brigade could be told off from a division, a division from a corps, a corps from an army. Particular regiments might be selected if needful. With the exception of the Commissariat, —and they should be fairly ready,—the Supply Departments would at once furnish No. 1 train, simply on being informed of the number of Batteries, Companies of Engineers, Regiments of Cavalry and Infantry composing the force. The waggons would, if the point of assembly

were distant and approachable by railway, be run on to the railway trucks, starting at once for their destination, or awaiting the order to move. Draft animals would either accompany them, or be directed to meet them on their arrival at the given point. Here the advantage of having the waggons packed according to the wants of the *unit* will be at once apparent.

It would ensure the greatest elasticity, by facilitating the increasing, reducing, or detaching a force, since the order alone would furnish sufficient information for the Officers commanding regiments, and the heads of departments, without further reference or directions.

It would give great independence in the event of regiments or brigades being cantoned in separate villages, as then the butchers and bakers could act for their own regiments, or, combined, for the brigade.

The troops in each district would be at once able to present a front, and oppose any landing on their sea-board.

Regiments could embark without delay for foreign service. If to take the field, their waggons and draft animals depending on the scene of operations, would or would not, accompany them. If for an ordinary tour of foreign service, the waggons and animals might be left behind, and their places supplied on disembarking by a similar set, or by a set adapted to the new station. If, however, mules were the only available means of transport—though the same organization could be retained—the great increase in the number of animals would necessitate the employment of a certain number of natives, even with the regimental trains.

It would facilitate the instruction of the troops, by enabling them to encamp during the summer drill, free of all encumbrances, precisely as they would be in active service.

The sum now annually expended in the maintenance of the wooden huts in the respective camps would be saved, and a portion of it would cover all the expenses for the hire of draft animals during the drill season.

The regiments would have the advantage of spending a great portion of the year in towns, instead of in the wooden huts, isolated from the public.

After the harvest, brigades, or divisions of the active Army, could manœuvre over extended areas, encamping in the fields, thus realising and practising the strategical operations incidental to real war.

The division of labour and supervision, obtained by the separation of the regimental and departmental trains, would give to each that individual interest which always tends to real efficiency, and would more than compensate, in practice, for any advantages which might be gained by the centralization of the whole transport in a single department.

The men of the departments being relieved of all parades, care of arms and accoutrements, their whole time would be usefully employed in their special duties. In short, fewer men would be required, and the revolver would meet all that could be required of these as armed men in time of war.

Were the scheme confined to regiments, a most important establish-

ment would be at once created, as with such a train, without *an extra Officer or man*, an Army, especially in the United Kingdom, could, on the first outbreak of hostilities, shift for a considerable period, if not altogether.

If the departments were unprovided with waggons, the stores, materials, and implements might still be arranged in the magazines, according to the wants of a regiment, ready to pack on any carriage available.

Conclusion.—In conclusion, though the plan I have ventured to propose may be crude, present many difficulties, have many defects in detail, and be open to criticism, it is submitted that, while in the main simple and practical, it fulfils the conditions set forth in the beginning, namely, those of securing the advantages of constant preparation for war, with all the benefits pertaining to peace.