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Two Passages of the *Republic*

H. W. Garrod

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words δύο τινὲ θεῶ κ.τ.λ. would be less appropriate to them than to the two deities of the Persian system. When Aristotle says (*Met.* i. 4, 984b) τρόπον τινὰ καὶ λέγειν καὶ πρῶτον λέγειν τὸ κακὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχὰς Ἐμπεδοκλεία, we must suppose that, unless he has for the time being forgotten the Magi, he means to distinguish between the good and evil *deities* of the latter and the good and evil *principles* which are the rational outcome of the Empedoclean doctrine considered πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ μὴ πρὸς ἃ ψελλίζεται λέγων (*ib.*). It seems, however, not improbable that Empedocles himself derived at least a suggestion, through whatever channel, from the same Persian dualism: certainly the view attributed above to the Magi of four successive stages in the conflict between good and evil offers a

remarkable parallel to the similar though not identical periods of Empedocles. However that may be, the reference in the *Politicus* to Zoroastrianism, if such it is, is merely a passing one; and, as already said, Plato rejects the doctrine involved as alien from his own system. Alien it is from the most characteristic stage of his thought. Yet it recurs in what is generally held to be his later doctrine of an evil world-soul in *Laws* x. 896–898, 904, 906, whatever the qualifications involved in these much discussed passages, and however the doctrine, as thus accepted in its final form, may be rather the resultant, as Zeller contends, of certain of Plato's own positions and of his life-experience, than a conscious adaptation of Eastern thought.

W. J. GOODRICH.

TWO PASSAGES OF THE *REPUBLIC*.

Republic 488 D :

... μὴδ' ἐπαίοντας ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι ἐναντιοῦ καὶ ὥρων καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἀστρον καὶ πνευμάτων καὶ πάντων τῶν τῇ τέχνῃ προσηκόντων, εἰ μέλλει τῷ ὄντι νεὼς ἀρχικὸς ἔσεσθαι, ὅπως δὲ κυβερνήσει ἑάντε τινὲς βούλονται ἑάντε μή, μήτε τέχνην τοῦτον μήτε μελέτην οἰόμενοι δυνατόν εἶναι λαβεῖν ἅμα καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν.

THE difficulties of this passage are as well known as they are numerous. And the solutions of them are as numerous as one could desire. A great number of these solutions are dealt with in Mr. Adam's first appendix to the sixth book of the *Republic*. Emendations of the text are less numerous than attempts to interpret it as it stands. And this is perhaps my best excuse for adding to the literature which has grown up about the passage: since my object is to suggest a correction of the text which is, I think, not violent, and which seems to me to get rid of much of the difficulty of the text as it stands.

In place of ὅπως δὲ κυβερνήσει I would write ὅπως δεῖ κυβερνήσειν, and after ἔσεσθαι insert καὶ which might easily have dropped out by a haplography especially if δεῖ had already become corrupted to δεῖ. With this correction I would translate: 'Not understanding that he must make weather and seasons and sky and stars and all else that belongs to seamanship his business, if he is

to be really master of the ship and to steer rightly whether they like it or not: thinking it possible that no acquaintance, either theoretical or practical, with this [*sc.* observation of the heavens etc.] can as its consequence achieve the art of piloting.'

With the correction which I have offered, the only clause which presents difficulties is the last one. Its difficulties are the same with my emendation as without it. I have given the translation of this clause which seems to me to be on the whole the most probable. The sense is, as I take it, 'they think it possible (it appears to them quite conceivable) that a man should have μελέτη and τέχνη in the matter of observing the heavens and yet not be a good pilot.' But no less than three other translations are, I fancy, possible. We may render: 'Thinking it impossible that either practical or theoretical acquaintance with this should achieve the art of piloting.' Or, again, we may translate: 'Thinking it impossible to achieve practical or theoretical acquaintance with this art at the same time as attaining the art of piloting' (*i.e.* thinking it impossible that the two things should go together). Or, lastly, we may render: 'Thinking it possible that absence of all acquaintance, whether theoretical or practical, with this should achieve as its consequence the art of piloting.'

Of these four possible translations the first and the last are those which most

commend themselves to my judgment: and it is surprising that nobody (as I think is the case) has suggested either of them. For both the second and the third involve our interpreting *μήτε τέχνη. μήτε μελ. οἰόμενοι δυνατόν εἶναι λαβεῖν* as equivalent to *οἰόμενοι ἀδύνατον εἶναι εἶτε τέχνη. εἶτε μελ. λαβεῖν*. The issue here is complicated by *οἰόμενοι*. If we had merely *δυνατόν ἐστι μήτε τέχνη. μήτε μελ. λαβεῖν* the words could only mean either 'it is possible for *τέχνη* and *μελέτη* not to acquire' or else 'it is possible not to acquire *μελέτη* and *τέχνη*.' But in the clause as it stands it may be urged that the negative in *μήτε . . . μήτε* really belongs to *οἰόμενοι*: for though there is no reason here that one can see for the use of *μή* rather than *οὐ*, Plato has already employed *μή* above in *μήδ' ἐπαίοντας*, and one may render by 'being the sort of persons who don't think.' I none the less think that if this were the meaning which Plato had wished to convey he would undoubtedly have written *οἰόμενοι ἀδύνατον εἶναι εἶτε τέχνη. εἶτε μελ. λαβεῖν*: and the more so because, as the clause is commonly translated, we have to carry on the negative in *μήτε τέχνη. μήτε μελ.* to *ἅμα καὶ τὴν κυβ.*

However we may prefer to translate this last clause, the emendation which I have suggested of the clause preceding has the advantage of absolving us from the necessity of construing *τούτου* with *ὅπως δὲ κυβερνήσει ἔαντε . . . ἔαντε μή. τούτου* is usually referred back to the idea of controlling men implied in *ἔαντε βούλωνται . . . ἔαντε μή*. Others connect it simply with the idea of steering, as e.g. Mr. Adam. With the correction which I have offered *τούτου* is naturally and properly referred back to *ἐνιαυτοῦ καὶ ὥρων κ.τ.λ.* The singular (instead of *τούτων*) is justified by the fact that *ἐνιαυτοῦ καὶ ὥρων κ.τ.λ.* form together a single conception—observation of the heavens. By *τέχνη* and *μελέτη* I then understand the same distinction as would ordinarily be conveyed by *ἐπιστήμη* and *ἐμπειρία*. The seaman may possess a knowledge of weather and the heavenly bodies, etc. which is a knowledge of causes and principles: or he may possess what we should call a 'working knowledge' of them, based on observation of particulars without much understanding of general principles.

A simpler correction than the one which I have offered would perhaps be *ὅπως δὲ δεῖ κυβερνήσειν*. Plato occasionally uses *δέ* where we should expect *καί*: e.g. *Rep.* 492. a. 6 *διαφθείροντας δέ*: and palaeographically this correction here involves only a very slight change. For a very similar loss of *δεῖ* cf.

Euthyphro 8. d. 5 *διδόναι* most MSS. for *δεῖ δίδόναι*. In the same dialogue, 8. c. 7. we may notice *οὐδέν*, b, for *οὐ δεῖν*.

Republic 585 c:

τὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου ἐχόμενον καὶ ἀθανάτου καὶ αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον ὃν καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ γιγνόμενον μᾶλλον εἶναι σοὶ δοκεῖ ἢ τὸ μηδέποτε ὁμοίου καὶ θνητοῦ καὶ αὐτὸ τοιοῦτο καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ γιγνόμενον; πολὺ, ἔφη, διαφέρει τὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου. ἢ οὖν ἀεὶ ὁμοίου οὐσία οὐσίας τι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπιστήμης μετέχει; οὐδαμῶς. τί δ'; ἀληθείας; οὐδὲ τοῦτο. εἰ δὲ ἀληθείας ἦττον, οὐ καὶ οὐσίας;

The passage stands thus in A, and the variants in the other MSS. are, I think, unsuccessful attempts to emend it. All modern attempts at emendation have been upon the lines of the inferior MSS. I wish to propose an emendation which, while it involves only minute changes, has the advantage of being nearer to A than to the later MSS. The sentences I have italicised I would correct thus:

ἢ οὖν ἀεὶ ὁμοίου οὐσία, οὐσίας τι μᾶλλον [[ἢ]] ἐπιστήμης μετέχει; οὐδαμῶς. τί δ'; ἀληθείας; οὐδὲ τοῦτο. εἰ δὲ ἀληθείας ἦττον, οὐ καὶ οὐσίας;

which I would thus translate:

'In so far then as being is concerned with an ever like (an unchanging), is there anything which partakes more fully of being than knowledge? No. Or than truth? Again no. And if there is less participation in truth there is less also in being?'

This emendation involves merely the addition of an iota subscript to *ἢ*, a change of punctuation, and the omission of *ἢ*. I imagine that *ἢ* crept into the text from a gloss *ἢ ἐπιστήμη* written over *ἐπιστήμης* to indicate that the genitive case in that word was not dependent, as that in *οὐσίας*, on *μετέχει*. Or someone possibly corrected *ἐπιστήμης* to *ἢ ἐπιστήμη* without immediately perceiving that the correction would leave *ἀληθείας* without a construction. When this difficulty was perceived *ἐπιστήμη* was no doubt corrected back again to *ἐπιστήμης*, while *ἢ* was by inadvertence not deleted.

I think it will be admitted that this emendation involves less change than any other that has been suggested. I believe also that with the aid of it we can restore to the passage the logical coherence which, without some emendation, it undoubtedly lacks. Logically the purpose of the whole passage 585 B 12 to D 24 is to induce Glaucon to admit that the things which are

concerned with the service of the soul are higher than those which have to do with the service of the body. Socrates first asks Glaucon whether he will allow (1) that the truest satisfaction comes from that which more participates in being. Glaucon assents. Socrates then asks whether (2(a)) the rational and moral side of our nature (δόξης τε ἀληθοῦς εἶδος καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ νοῦ καὶ . . . πάσης ἀρετῆς) partakes more of being than the nutritive and appetitive. He explains that this is another way of asking whether (2(b)) that which is concerned with the unchanging more partakes of being than that which is concerned with the changing?

Glaucon replies that that which is concerned with the unchanging partakes of being the more fully. Socrates proceeds (in the emended text) to ask (3) Is there anything which more partakes of being, in so far as being is of 'an unchanging,' than knowledge and truth? and (4) Does not a thing fail of being in proportion as it fails of truth? Glaucon returns to (3) a negative, to (4) an affirmative answer. And so in general, Socrates concludes, (5) the things which concern the service of the body are less real than those which concern the service of the soul.

The steps in the argument, then, are these:

(1) That most gives satisfaction which has most being.

2(a) and 2(b) are put as one question. But there underlies their identity the postulate that the moral and rational are concerned with the unchanging, as the nutritive and appetitive are not. This is tacitly allowed by Glaucon: so that 2a and 2b establish the result that (a) the moral and rational are concerned with the unchanging: (β) that which is concerned with the unchanging partakes more fully of being.

The conclusion from this necessarily follows that (γ) the moral and rational partake more fully of being. But instead of stating this conclusion (γ) in so many words, Socrates in questions (3) and (4) selects knowledge and truth as types of the moral and rational and obtains Glaucon's assent firstly (3) to the proposition that nothing more partakes of being than knowledge and truth—in so far as being is (as they have admitted it to be, 2b) of 'an unchanging' (ἢ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου οὐσίας): and secondly (4) to what is simply the converse of this proposition, that the further a thing is from truth the further it is from being. In other

words (3) and (4) merely formulate in a somewhat inexact way the conclusion γ ('the moral and rational partake more fully of being than anything else') and its converse ('the further anything is from the moral and rational the further it is from being'). All that has happened is that for 'moral and rational,' which at the end of 585 B (question 2a) was expressed by δόξης τε ἀληθοῦς εἶδος καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ νοῦ καὶ ξυλλήβδην αὐτῆς πάσης ἀρετῆς, Socrates substitutes in question 3 ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἀλήθεια and in question 4 ἀλήθεια alone. Accordingly in (5) Socrates summarises the result thus: οὐκοῦν ὅλως τὰ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος θεραπείαν γένη τῶν γενῶν τῶν περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς θεραπείαν ἥττον ἀληθείας τε καὶ οὐσίας μετέχει;

Of other suggested emendations and interpretations of the passage I cannot speak in detail. If the analysis of the argument which I have offered is a correct one, the text as it stands in A is an absurdity. It involves a *non sequitur* of this sort:

Major Premiss: That which is concerned with the unchanging partakes more fully of being: = β.

Minor Premiss: The moral and rational are concerned with the unchanging: = α.

Conclusion: The being of the unchanging does not partake more of being than knowledge and truth do.

Not only does the conclusion not follow, but Socrates proceeds as though he had not drawn it. As though he had drawn the true conclusion ('the moral and rational partake more fully of being') he proceeds by permutation to the corollary 'the non-moral and non-rational partake less fully of being.'

Mr. Adam reads for ὁμοίου, A, the ἀνομοίου of the inferior MSS. and for ἢ ἐπιστήμης he writes ἢ ἡ ἐπιστήμης. By this correction we avoid, certainly, the *non sequitur* of the text of A, but instead of the conclusion 'the moral and rational partake more fully of being,' we get by immediate inference from this suppressed conclusion this: 'The nature of the unlike (= the non-moral and non-rational) has { less not more } being than the nature of knowledge and truth (= the moral and rational).' The conclusion is quite just, and there would be no difficulty if it were not for what follows. But in what follows (εἰ δὲ ἥττον κ.τ.λ.) we have merely a meaningless repetition of this conclusion. Socrates, in fact, having drawn an inference from his suppressed conclusion

proceeds to draw it again. One cannot, therefore, escape the suspicion that in the words ἡ οὖν . . . to . . . οὐδὲ τοῦτο there must lie concealed the positive conclusion of which εἰ δὲ ἀληθείας κ.τ.λ. is the permutation. This positive conclusion my emendation furnishes. Mr. Adam's on the one hand postulates a suppressed positive conclusion, and on the other offers a permutation of it twice expressed. It also involves the use of the phrase ἡ τοῦ ἀνομοίου οὐσία as equivalent to τὰ τοῦ μὴ ὁμοίου ἐχόμενα.

Mr. R. G. Bury retains A's ὁμοίου, inserting after it the word σιτία, and for ἐπιστήμης writes ἐπιστήμη. But this is to go too fast. Plato is still arguing in purely general terms: and to introduce such a specification as σιτία at this point would tend only to hopeless confusion. Moreover instead of σιτία alone we should expect something like σίτος καὶ ποτὸν καὶ ὄψον καὶ ἡ ξύμπασα τροφή, or else perhaps τροφή alone. Nor can I think σιτία, in view of the character of A, an emendation which has any great palaeographical probability.

I add here notes on two other passages of Plato which do not involve any long discussion.

Euthyphro 10. d. 10:

ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ διότι γε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν φιλούμενόν ἐστι καὶ θεοφιλές. After θεοφιλές most editors add, with Bast, τὸ θεοφιλές. This gives the necessary sense: but it would,

I think, be simpler to write ἐστὶ τι for ἐστι, without any further addition.

Apology 27 E:

ὅπως δὲ σὺ τινα πείθοις ἂν καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα ἀνθρώπων, ὥς οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν καὶ δαιμόνια καὶ θεῖα ἡγέσθαι, καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μήτε δαίμονας μήτε θεοὺς μήτε ἥρωας, οὐδεμίαν μηχανήν ἐστιν.

'It is impossible that you should persuade anyone with a grain of sense that the man who believes in things-pertaining-to-deities (δαιμονία) must not also believe in things-pertaining-to-gods (θεῖα), and again that the man who disbelieves in either deities or gods or heroes must not disbelieve in all three; i.e. one must disbelieve in both δαιμονία and θεῖα (καὶ . . . καὶ) if one believes in either—the one implies the other:—and one must disbelieve in δαίμονες and θεοὶ and ἥρωες (all three) if one disbelieves in any of the three.

The translation here offered is substantially that offered by Keck in Fleckeisen's *Jahrbuch* 1861, and suggested independently by Münscher in 1865 (in the same journal). I call attention to it here for the reason that it has not found its way into any English edition. Mr. Adam refers to the two articles I mention, but does not give the translation or, apparently, think it worth discussing. The translation seems to me to be clearly right, and I should be glad to know what the objections to it are.

H. W. GARROD.

'DORIC' FUTURES. ARISTOPHANES AND PLATO.

In an article in the *Classical Review* (1894, p. 23)¹ I was able to shew that the Aristophanic future of φεύγω is φευξοῦμαι. This position appears now to be generally accepted.

In one passage only (*Vespae* 157) I had to admit that Aristophanes used the non-contracted future.

It now seems to me that that passage calls for an apparently radical, but still a simple, emendation.

It must be read in its context.

ΦΙ. τί δράσει; οὐκ ἐκφρήσει, ὃ μαιρώτατοι, δικάσοντά μ'; ἀλλ' ἐκφεύξεται Δρακοντίδης.
ΒΔ. σὺ δὲ τοῦτο βαρέως ἂν φέροις; ΦΙ. ὁ γὰρ θεὸς μαντευομένην μοῦχρησεν ἐν Δελφοῖς ποτε, ὅταν τις ἐκφύγη, μ' ἀποσκληῖναι τότε.

¹ I wrongly stated in that article that the future of πίπτω does not occur in Aristophanes.

'When anyone is acquitted' seems to go beyond all reason. Surely the impartial condemnation of all prisoners, on pain of being himself blasted the first time the jury acquitted a single one, is not the object that Philocleon set before himself. It is rather the condemnation of one individual, namely Dracontides, that we should expect the oracle to enjoin.

The Ravenna scholiast writes of Dracontides: πονηρὸς οὗτος καὶ πλείστοις καταδίκαις ἐνεχόμενος.

Do not these words give a hint? Why not read: ὅταν τρις ἐκφύγη, i.e. 'when he (Dracontides) has been thrice acquitted'? This would pave the way to a consequential emendation: δικάσοντά μ'; ἐκφευξέιτ' ἔτ' αὐτὸν Δρακοντίδης. In that case ΑΜΕΚΦΕΥΞΕΙΤΕΤΑΥ would have been corrupted into