II.—THE NATURE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE.

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"It is evident," observes Mr. F. H. Bradley, "that both practical and theoretical knowledge of the human mind is possessed by those who are not metaphysicians." It is also possessed by those who are not psychologists, inasmuch as they know nothing of psychology as a science. The General Nature of Self-knowledge is the problem of this paper.

§ 1. This inquiry is not the same as an attempt to explain knowledge by something else. The self-contradictory character of such a task would be generally recognised at present. But self-knowledge is a relation involved in the essential nature of Intelligence, and hence its place in the organic structure of Intelligence can be analysed without self-contradiction. To insist merely that such a relation is "unique" and "unanalysable" would be futile. A sound maxim has been laid down by one of our modern writers: Whenever we find a "mystery" we are making an assumption; and it is our duty to probe the assumption to the bottom, before we fall down to worship the mystery.

No philosophical issue is of more fundamental importance than the problem of self-knowledge. It pertains to the root of every discussion as to the means by which the psychologist *arrives at the facts* which he is to explain. And again, it underlies such discussions as arise out of Mr. Bradley's and Prof. Münsterberg's recent contributions to the problem of the relation between truth in psychology and truth in reality.¹ Yet, fundamental as these issues are, to discuss the question of self-knowledge as though it had no existence outside their limits would be a serious mistake; and there is reason to fear that its importance is frequently missed because its different forms have not been brought together. Thus we find self-consciousness treated as a process of the "natural

F. H. Bradley, "Defence of Phenomenalism in Psychology," *MIND*, No. 33; H. Münsterberg, "Psychology and Life" (cf. R. B. Haldane in *MIND*, No. 34).

history of the individual mind," which is nothing more than a problem for psychology; while among the inevitable *prolegomena* to psychology, there is a perpetual lawsuit as to the method and limits of psychological knowledge, which is only another form of self-consciousness. Again, the Kantian "transcendental logic" is said to be a "complete analysis of self-consciousness, and the systematic evolution of all that is contained in the very notion of self-consciousness," while finally in some forms of philosophical theory we find self-consciousness treated as "consciousness of the Unity of the Universe". And none of these meanings of the term will cover the widely diffused knowledge of mind which has originated independently of psychology and philosophy as special studies.

The term "self-knowledge" is used in the present paper so as to include all that professes to be knowledge of some form of our inner life and has been founded on direct analysis thereof,—however concrete or abstract may be the terms in which it is expressed,—whether it is some one's statement of a personal characteristic of his own, or an intelligent "knowledge of human nature," or a psychological, logical, or philosophical generalisation. Self-knowledge is a fundamental function of our intelligence; and one and the same principle runs through and determines all its forms and degrees.

It will be useful to distinguish first a theory of self-knowledge which perhaps has not often been consciously held, but which is implied in many views and theories of the subject which have been widely supported.

The traditional account of knowledge recognises that it is always a relation or reference, involving a duality or distinction between the respective loci of the knowing and the known. That this is sound in principle is not to be denied; but a favourite way of describing the distinction is calculated to lead only to confusion. Knowledge, it is said, necessarily involves a duality of terms in the form of Subject knowing and Object known. Then in the case of self-knowledge there creeps in the assumption that knowledge is analogous to a light proceeding from the Subject and shed on the Object; the Subject is like an eye that is itself the source of the light by which it sees, and the knowing is like the seeing. This I will call the "eye-theory" of self-knowledge; and it may be worked out in different ways.

(a) It combines readily with another favourite doctrine: that we must make a sharp distinction between the "pure" and the "empirical" self; or, in other words, between the

mental *phenomena*, the changing temporal states, and the mental *noumenon*, the permanent substance or substratum "underlying" them. In the case of self-knowledge, the *noumenon* is the Subject which knows, the *phenomena* are the psychological objects known. Then the question arises, how can the Subject, as such, know itself? The reader will remember that Mr. H. Spencer, among many others, has vigorously contended for the *existence* of such a Subject as a necessary assumption. Combine with this the assumption that "the fundamental condition of all knowledge is the antithesis of Subject and Object," and we have the natural conclusion that the Subject, though it may know its phenomena to any extent, can never know itself: "The mental act in which self is known implies, like every other mental act, a perceiving Subject and an Object perceived. If then the Object perceived is Self, what is the Subject that perceives? Or if it be the true self which thinks, what other self can be thought of? Clearly the true cognisance of self implies a state in which the knowing and the known are one, in which Subject and Object are identified; and this is the annihilation of both. So that the personality of which each is conscious, and of which the existence is to each a fact beyond all others most certain, is yet a thing which cannot be known at all: knowledge of it is forbidden by the very nature of thought."

Two ways of avoiding this difficulty have been occasionally suggested. One is, to assume that Subject and Object are really identical in self-knowledge. This I suppose is the ordinary expression of the intuitionist view, that the soul simply knows itself to exist. But what meaning can "the *identity* of subject and object" have in this connexion? Apparently its only meaning can be to obliterate the relation or reference which is essential in all knowledge. So far, Spencer's rejection of it is justified. The other resource is to affirm that the Subject is known by inference. If so, it must be a postulate to account for changes in the field of psychological objects. But if our knowledge of it is only inferential or mediate, we could never know *what* to assume in order to account for these subjectively-initiated changes. How could we even conceive or think about self or any of its activities without some basis of immediate experience to account for the conception? Mr. Spencer saw this, and expressed it in a well-known passage which I will quote because it sets forth a fundamental truth with regard to the element of immediacy in all conscious experience: "In each mental act there is an element which persists. But the

persistence of this element under successive conditions necessitates the sense of it as distinguished from the conditions and independent of them. That which is common to all states of consciousness and cannot be got rid of, is what we predicate by the term existence. . . . There remains an indefinite consciousness of something common under all modes —of being apart from its appearances. . . . Our consciousness of the unconditioned being literally the unconditioned consciousness or raw material of thought, to which we in thinking give definite forms, it follows that an ever-present sense of real existence is the very basis of our intelligence. As we can in successive mental acts get rid of all particular conditions and replace them by others, but cannot get rid of that undifferentiated substance of consciousness which is *conditioned anew* in every thought, there ever remains a sense of that which exists persistently and independently of conditions, . . . an indefinite consciousness of an absolute reality transcending relations.”¹ We have here a recognition of the same truth which has been elaborated in Mr. Bradley's doctrine of Feeling, and Mr. Stout's distinction of “noetic” and “anoetic” consciousness. At present we note its particular implication, that we could never *infer* the existence of the Ego or any function of the Ego, such as Freedom, Volition, or pure Feeling, if that which we infer were not already present in consciousness but undiscriminated,—present by way of *experience*, immediate but not yet defined.

Both these attempts to remove the difficulty referred to by Spencer are, therefore, ineffective; but the difficulty is a fictitious one, for, as we shall see, the distinction of Subject and Object affords an altogether inadequate statement of the problem of self-knowledge. The perplexities that ensue are of our own making, and ought to be taken as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the “eye-theory”.

(b) The theory may of course be held apart from any agnostic bias. It assumes that introspection is essentially a certain direction of the attention, and may be compared to a direct inspection of the contents of consciousness. The latter are, therefore, the objects of psychological knowledge.² This is the traditional view in Psychology. But it is so unnecessary and so indefensible that it can scarcely be allowed even the relative validity of a working assumption.

¹ With the doctrine that thought by “conditioning” an object renders it “unknowable,” we have of course nothing to do.

² When we assume that all of what introspection reveals must belong to these contents, as elements in them or aspects of them, then we have what has been called the bias of “Presentationism”.

Its main defects may be expressed in various ways. It assumes psychological knowledge to be absolutely different in kind from all other knowledge. Without parallel in the world of knowledge is this process by which the contents of mind unroll themselves before the "inner eye," as soon as this mysterious organ turns its attention to them. More pregnantly expressed, our charge is that the theory separates the knowing from the known so that the connexion becomes a merely external one; the knowing becomes a formal process with no essential relation to what is known. And as it is the merely individual and merely finite sides of the mind, with the elements composing it, which are thus "observed," this theory prepares the way for mechanical and atomistic theories in Psychology, logic, and ethics. Everything which, on this merely external view which is misnamed self-observation, appears to exist independently, is forthwith treated as a positive self-contained existence. The initial principle is the same whether the outcome be sensationalism or intuitionism,—whether the isolated elements disclosed by "turning the mental eye inwards" are the particular "sensations" out of which the mind is supposed to be built up, or the particular "immediate perceptions" which are supposed to lie at the basis of logic and ethics.

(c) But the most fatal defect in this "eye-theory" remains to be noticed. On inspecting the contents of the mind we are supposed to see what is there and how it is arranged. The implication is that the *ultimate truth* can be attained by sufficiently careful observation, and that any act of self-knowledge has the highest kind of certainty and is valid in its own right. And since, again, the self whose processes are thus known with perfect accuracy is the individual self *as finite*, it is difficult to exaggerate the importance of the results to which this error leads. For it has a "counter-implication"; what we clearly and distinctly observe within us, is simply true, without qualification, and what we do not or cannot thus observe, is simply not true. It may be objected that this is the view of Common Sense: and it is so, in part. But Common Sense is before all things practical; it holds that a man may know his own mental life sufficiently for practical purposes, and it adds the important qualification that "self-deception" is extremely easy. This means simply that a man's ideas of his own inner life (particularly his desires, character and plans) may be partly illusory. From another point of view it may be objected that no one ever denied so obvious a fact. But principles which are not

denied in theory may be ignored in practical psychological investigation and discussion. For example, a theory may be quite defensible if understood as a reasonable, yet provisional, interpretation of certain complex psychological facts; reasonable, because it is the best interpretation that we can arrive at, yet provisional, because it is evidently incomplete compared with the facts as a whole, and lacks internal coherence. But we find that in many cases such a theory is attacked and defended as though it claimed to be the ultimate truth. The whole controversy regarding Liberty and Necessity has, I believe, been of this kind.¹ Incidentally, also, the foregoing considerations show why the old-fashioned "appeal to consciousness" in this and other similar vexed questions is so futile. To say "let consciousness decide" is idle, when in each case the whole complexity of the problem lies in the *interpretation* of consciousness.

§ 2. Let us now bring together the positive implications of the preceding critical remarks.

Both in psychology and metaphysics we must reject the notion of a "pure" or "transcendental" self. And the notion of an "empirical" self must go along with it, for the one is only conceived in antithesis to the other. The real self is that which is known and realised or lived in and through the actual process of conscious life. It is essentially manifested in this its content; its individual existence consists in gradually organising itself in certain explicit, definite forms. Hence if we use such terms as *Noumenon* and *Phenomena*, Reality and Appearances, we must say that the former is known *through* the latter and can be known in no other way. Similarly, with regard to the relation of Subject and Object; to say that for knowledge there must always be a Subject of knowledge, means that thought or knowledge exists only as the thought of a thinker,—it is always an activity, "an active-passive experience of an individual subject"; and to say that for knowledge there must be an object of knowledge, means that knowledge is always a reference beyond its actual place of appearance as the conscious function of a finite personality. Is it not of the essence of knowledge to be representative or symbolic of something whose existence transcends it,—something which is in a sense "other" or "more" than the knowledge itself? And what is referred to or known cannot be identi-

¹ That is to say: all that we can ask for is this—what is the least inappropriate and incoherent interpretation of the *fact* of Freedom? Upon the fact, as such, all but materialists are agreed.

fied with the process of reference, the knowledge itself. But all knowledge is *direct* in this sense—that it refers directly to the reality known, the object referred to; and not indirectly through some substitute intervening between this and the knower. When a man reflects on his own states, and when he reflects on something in the objective world—*e.g.*, the motives of another man's conduct, or the nature of a chemical combination—his attitude to the "object" is the same; the reference is equally direct, though the knowledge is necessarily imperfect, and may in some of its details be illusory.

On this general question of the validity of self-knowledge, we may say with Prof. Adamson: "Nothing is gained, as regards accuracy of observation, by the 'intra-subjective' character of both the observed and the observation. . . . If to know the processes of consciousness means to be able to determine accurately their characteristics and differences, I should be inclined to say that we can hardly claim such knowledge. What we do possess is painfully and laboriously attained, and wants every mark of 'immediate certainty' or 'absolutely self-evidencing' character. . . . I can be, in and through the process of knowing, no more certain of what is in my consciousness—if we allow for the moment that any definite meaning can be put into so metaphorical an expression—than of what is beyond my consciousness. That knowing is a process of mind, and that the known is in the one case likewise a fact of mind, lends no additional certainty to the resulting cognition."¹ And as in all knowledge, so in observation of the inner life; "the thoughts whereby we determine the nature of the observed are neither in fact nor in meaning identical with the observed."² This is evident because in observing some fact of our inner life we do not *isolate it*; the reflexion consists in relating it in manifold ways, according to the interest of the moment; the most fundamental being its relation to the idea of self—it is at least a mode of *my* mental life. And to identify all these relations with the thought of them as I observe the fact in question, would be absurd. Self-knowledge, therefore, also involves a reference. But though this reference is direct, it is indefinite and incomplete.

This is the primary implication of the view which is here defended. No conception which we can form of the constitution of the mind or of any factor therein can be an

¹ *MIND*, vol. xii, p. 128.

² On this point *cf.* also Stout, *Analytic Psychology*, i., 44.

adequate representation of the reality; we cannot adequately state in intellectual terms the nature of our inner experiences. This does not mean merely that we do not know all that we are; it is true of every piece of self-conscious reflexion in common life, and of psychological analysis both general and detailed. All the results so obtained are relative to the present state of our knowledge; they are necessarily held subject to a revision which may have to be so thorough as completely to transform them, and each in itself has many missing links of connexion, and exhibits a general want of satisfactory coherence. But such conceptions are not therefore false; we must accept them if they are the best account which we can now form of the realities to which they refer. The more complete truth does not destroy the less complete, but expands and transforms it. Truth is like a picture of boundless extent and infinite detail, which is obliterated for us and needs to be renewed, and of which we have only recovered different disconnected portions, and these only in vaguest outline. These portions can only be correctly estimated when they are treated as such; they are fragments of the whole and not illusions; but they are fragments of the whole, and not self-contained pieces of truth, each of which can stand on its own merits. These conclusions as to self-knowledge seem to follow necessarily from the very conception of truth as an organic whole; but they need to be applied to the detailed theories of psychology.

One of the chief causes of the difficulty in arriving at satisfactory inductions in psychology is, of course, that the facts are immediately accessible to one observer only; and in order to serve more than a private purpose, in order to have any scientific value, it is indispensable to raise the result of self-knowledge from an individual to a general fact. But the difficulty must not be put in the wrong place. As we are no longer ruled by Mill's *Logic*, I suppose it will not be denied that in Induction a single case, *examined with sufficient care*, can establish a universal law. The ideal of this principle of induction is seen in Geometrical reasoning. For example, to prove that "the three interior angles of any triangle are together equal to two right angles," I must have a "figure" before me, actually or in imagination: that is, I must have recourse to the perception of a particular case. This case may be that of an isosceles right-angled triangle with sides and angles of fixed magnitude. But when the conclusion is established by consideration of this case alone, I may be sure that it holds of every other triangle, because in the proof I have considered only the essentials

of the case, and have not referred to the above-mentioned particulars, nor to anything but what is stated in the definition of a triangle. In Geometry we may be certain that our investigation is sufficiently thorough—in other words, that it is based only on the essentials of the particular case with which we work—because we frame our own definition of what these essentials are. But in physical or psychological investigations, we have to *discover* the essentials; hence the inductive conclusion suggested by any one instance has to be carefully verified, or tested, and perhaps corrected, by many other instances. Still, it is only the difficulties or defects of our own investigation which prevent any one case from establishing a reliable universal; while it is a constant occurrence that one case may *suggest* the universal. Hence, although “every mental state is by hypothesis observable, introspectively, by one observer only,”¹ it may perfectly well suggest a universal law of mind. That introspection, by itself, will do more than suggest a possible law, is very unlikely, for as we have seen it is beset with innumerable possibilities of error. Hence the scientific psychologist has to verify the results of his introspective observations by “appeals to language, to pathology, to childhood, to mankind in general”. These objective expressions of mental life, to which he refers, would have no meaning for him, were it not for his previous introspective inductions, which give him the only key of interpretation. He is interested in such social facts as manifestations of mental states like to those upon which he has been reflecting; as such alone, not as “psycho-physical complexes,”² he appeals to them. He is no more concerned with the fact that they are mediated to his reflexion by means of physiological processes, than the student of a book is concerned with the operations of writing, printing, etc., which have made him aware of the author's thought.³ On the other hand, as we observed, the fact that the comparison and verification of the results of self-knowledge are thus indirect, adds to the difficulty of arriving at satisfactory inductions.

What, it may be asked, is the practical consequence of this conclusion? Is it simply to throw doubt upon all varieties of self-knowledge, by viewing them as infected with error to some undefined extent? This would indeed be futile. For practical life, its consequences are numerous and

¹ See Prof. Royce's observations in *MIND*, No. 23, pp. 388-90.

² On the other side see Royce, *ibid.*, p. 891.

³ Certain special exceptions which might be mentioned do not disprove this rule.

important; because the number of beliefs which are held, or denied, on the ground of appeals to "inner experiences" and "feelings," is not small. For psychology and philosophy, its chief consequence is this. Conclusions which will work if taken as containing truth in solution, as it were—or, as we may otherwise express it, which are symbolically true—become unworkable and even self-contradictory if taken as absolutely true. Criticism of any theory may be perfectly valid in the latter view of its truth, and yet be worthless in the former view of it, because an entirely wrong standard is employed. In psychology the standard of perfect coherence and clearness is an impossible one, and all criticism which implies it is a mere irrelevancy. If we insist upon attaining it, we do so at the cost of overlooking the complexity of mental life, and perhaps of doing violence to some of its essential features.

§ 3. That self-consciousness is a mode of knowledge which, like all knowledge, must have *degrees of truth*—is a brief and familiar way of stating the conclusion at which we have arrived. But its significance cannot be properly estimated apart from a closely related conception, with which indeed the former stands or falls. I mean the fundamental distinction and correlation (in all intelligible experience) of Thought with the element of Immediacy, which Mr. Bradley has called Feeling (after Hegel's *Gefühl*), and which Mr. Stout has called "anoetic consciousness". We must note carefully the implications of this conception in order to connect it with the question of self-knowledge. (a) The whole process of growth in our knowledge of the world points back to a sensuous *ἄνευρον*, which is the basis of external perception; knowledge begins with the definite articulation of this into intelligible fact. Sentience, so understood, is not a chaos of *data* received from a foreign agency; and it is not an absolutely homogeneous state of feeling; it contains *variations* which succeed one another in a regular order—"felt differences" which are not a chaos. Hence, as thought develops, it becomes possible for intellectual distinctions to supervene upon these felt differences; and not until this begins can knowledge and intelligent experience begin. (b) If we try to conceive a *purely* anoetic consciousness, as such, we can only think of it as a limit which may be gradually approached. In this limit there would still be "diverse aspects," though "not yet broken up into terms and relations"; some of these would be "features of what later becomes the environment," and would be indivisibly one with "the features of what later

becomes the self". (c) Self-knowledge involves the same element of immediate experience, which, as such, is not the knowledge in question, but on the basis of which alone is the knowledge possible. This distinction of *anoetic* and *noetic* consciousness has great significance at every stage of mental growth, though doubtless it is first suggested by the contrast of the earliest with the later stages. It means that not only in the beginning, but at every stage, there are whole regions of mental life which, though they may be truly said to be present in consciousness, are not present to consciousness in the sense of being *known*, i.e., intellectually discriminated and interpreted; but they may largely determine the character and contents of those regions of mental life which are known. Our self-knowledge grows in depth and truth whenever something more of what is present in consciousness becomes not only present in, but present to, consciousness. This, then, is the fundamental principle running through all forms of self-knowledge. We express it in very simple language. Before any fact can be known to any extent, or *thought* about, in the proper sense of the word, it must be felt; in the one case the feeling is there, but is not thought about, or only vaguely thought about; in the other case, the feeling is still there, but thought has begun to grasp and construct its meaning.¹ Our capacity for higher insight and knowledge grows as we pass from the former state into the latter.

Thus self-consciousness may be the most superficial or the most fundamental mode of knowledge, according to the degree of truth which we understand it to have attained. It is the result of the self-transcending tendency of thought through which thought always refers beyond itself. If we have regard only to that degree of truth which is necessary for the practical and theoretical purposes of everyday life and of physical science, we may say that this "reference beyond" is in two directions. By the "outer" direction of its intelligence the conscious self conceives (or is capable of conceiving) of the world as a whole with its dependent parts; by the "inner" direction of its intelligence it conceives of itself as an individual centre, having the unity of a personal life which is more than knowledge. Common Sense adopts a point of view

¹ From this principle it follows naturally that in the case of psychological analysis, we do not and can not analyse what is discriminated, or what is *present* to consciousness; but our thought reconstructs what *was present but undistinguished in* consciousness or in the results of previous analysis or discrimination. Cf. Stout, *Analytic Psychology*, vol. i., pp. 52-61.

from which this distinction of the "inner" and "outer" directions is regarded as practically ultimate. But analysis need not go far to show that it is a metaphor with only a limited applicability. Self-consciousness *includes* an awareness of the processes in us by which our consciousness of a world is realised and extended; or rather, it is capable in its higher degrees of including this awareness, but always includes fragments of it. When thus developed self-consciousness brings to light the fundamental presuppositions and ultimate ideals of physical knowledge (*e.g.*, the world as a systematic unity—within which general laws obtain). Similarly, by reflexion on the ethical and æsthetic consciousness (and its actual achievements), ideals of Goodness and of Beauty are brought to light. Whether we regard self-consciousness, when fundamentally developed, as finite or not, depends on considerations arising out of a general metaphysical position; but if we conclude that the human self has a finite and infinite side, then self-conscious is merely finite only in so far as we have not learnt to know the real constitution of our nature. The principle is throughout the same; there is always the general background of sentience, out of which arises thought itself and the experience which thought makes intelligible, and in this intellectual formulation of what was previously undistinguished, the process of knowledge consists.

§ 4. These conclusions may now be applied to certain questions affecting the position of Psychology as a science. I will take these questions in the form in which they are set forth in Mr. Bradley's suggestive and thorough-going "Defence of Phenomenalism in Psychology". I do not write as a mere critic of what is said in that paper, for I have been glad to find that, in what seem to be the most essential points, the views which I have been trying to defend are in harmony with those of Mr. Bradley. And it is clear that by "Phenomenalism" Mr. Bradley means something very different from what Prof. Seth, Prof. Ward and others have attacked as "Presentationism". The essence of this theory or method, as I conceive it, is to reduce all the contents of mind to complications of atomic sensations; the only function of the mind being sensation characterised by quality, intensity, and tone of feeling. No one thinks of denying that the subject may be thus treated when approached from the point of view of Physiology and of Psycho-physical Experiment; but such a procedure gives only a useful fragment of Psychology, and not the whole of it. What we protest against is the assumption that the

only "scientific" and non-metaphysical treatment must be of this kind. And I cannot see how this assumption can be dismissed as a "gross error," as "exploded in principle," as "a thing with which one need hardly trouble oneself,"¹ when it is openly made and defended by some of the foremost psychologists of the day. Hence it seems to need and to deserve more careful examination than Mr. Bradley is willing to give it.²

The points raised by Mr. Bradley, on which I should like to remark, are these: the correlation of the known with the experienced; the principle by which Psychology is to be separated from Metaphysics; and the validity of the "General Analysis of Mind".³

(a) Remembering that experience includes anoetic consciousness, which is present in every stage of mental life, and present most of all in our consciousness of Ideals, we must give an unqualified adhesion to the fundamental view that if anything is eliminated from the *experienced* world it is in fact banished from the world altogether: for there is no other world in which it could exist.⁴ Hence not only Pleasure-pain, Will, and Self, but also Reason, our highest rational Ideals, and the Absolute itself must be experienced if they are known. Mr. Bradley refers (p. 38) to a view that Self and its activities, including Pleasure-pain, "is not itself perceived, and does not itself enter into the experienced content, and is not and cannot itself be made into an object". If this means, strictly and literally, that it cannot be experienced, then such a view is "a thing with which one need hardly trouble oneself". But the statement that the Self "cannot be made into a psychological object," contains a subtle ambiguity, which requires mention, as such statements are frequently met with.⁵ Psychology is not bound, and as a particular science is not able, to discuss the ultimate nature of the Self, the Will, etc.; but if it is to

¹ MIND, No. 33, p. 37.

² Cf. *Studies in Philosophical Criticism and Construction*, ch. iv., pp. 200-224. As Mr. Bradley has referred to this book, I will say here that in ch. v., which deals with the question of Self-knowledge, the problem now seems to me to have been imperfectly stated and wrongly approached.

³ *Philosophical Criticism*, pp. 46, 58, 109.

⁴ MIND, No. 33, p. 41.

⁵ Cf. for example some of the views referred to by Mr. Haldane: "An absolutely final Subject . . . never itself capable of presentation as an object within experience"; "an activity that lies beyond experience and is determinable only as that which makes experience possible"; "the will as such . . . can never itself be an object in experience,—is not cognisable by psychological methods" (MIND, No. 34, pp. 206, 208, 210).

exist at all it must know something about them. And so far as Psychology knows anything about such factors of mental life, those aspects which it knows are "objects before the mind". If again we are able in metaphysics to revise and extend the partial, limited knowledge of Psychology, all that we do is to determine the object more truly. To be made an object in experience means to be discriminated and known; hence, with Mr. Bradley, we reject as unmeaning the doctrine that anything is *never* itself capable of presentation as an object within experience. On the other hand, that which is known is never identical with the knowing; hence, in this secondary sense, we have to affirm the doctrine that nothing is ever itself capable of being presented within experience as an object identical with the knowledge of it. And closely connected with this use of the term in question, is the view to which we shall have to refer immediately (c),—that Pleasure-pain and Conation are not merely elements or aspects of Presentation. This is what is usually meant by saying that they cannot be made into "objects".

(b) I regret to have to refer to the unprofitable and over-discussed question of the relation of Psychology to Metaphysics. Happily, Mr. Bradley has stated it in a fresh and pregnant form. He looks for a "clear principle" of division between the two, and finds it in this—that Psychology is confined to *phenomena* and the *laws* of phenomena; and, "since Psychology is not concerned with more than this, it is at liberty to use fictions, and the question of truth is not to be raised in it except so far as truth means whatever serves best to explain the course" of mere phenomena: the *course* of phenomena being strictly limited to their co-existence and sequence. But, whether the fault lie in myself or not, I am unable to see how this provides the *clear principle* which is desired. For in this view of the limits of Psychology, the conception of *phenomenon* is of fundamental importance; and, from the nature of the case, it must be a fluid conception,—apart from the restriction that "it is not for the purpose in hand taken as anything more than an adjective happening to and qualifying a particular soul" (p. 28), which, as Mr. Bradley says, is not by itself sufficient to exclude metaphysical questions (p. 27). What is a phenomenon? It is immediately experienced (p. 28); and "what is experienced is a whole with certain aspects which can be distinguished, but as so distinguished are abstractions" (p. 36); but "phenomena are not all perceptions, they are not all objects given to a self, they do not all come before the mind" (p. 37). In other words, they

are aspects of the experienced, which includes *feeling*. And feeling includes as much as can be discovered in it. Of course the previously undistinguished aspects of feeling become objects, but their extent must be left indefinite. For feeling is not limited to the "cœnæsthesia," which is present while life lasts; it is implied in mental analysis at every level,—as much in the analysis of thought itself by thought as in any other. In fact, "phenomena" in this sense are properly defined as fragments or partial aspects considered apart from the whole reality to which they belong: everything is therefore a phenomenon which falls short of the whole Truth and Reality, and this is most clearly true of all our psychological knowledge. But I cannot see how this fundamental truth can be so used as to give us a clear principle of division between Psychology and Metaphysics. Mr. Bradley's principle would be clear if phenomena were limited to objects, and then psychological phenomenalism would have close affinity with the metaphysical phenomenalism which he rejects. Phenomena would become, in both cases, facts which might be known to any extent without our knowing any more of the Reality of which they are phenomena. But is there the least affinity, as Mr. Bradley implies that there is (p. 26), between metaphysical phenomenalism, so understood, and the psychological phenomenalism which he defends? There are two fundamentally different conceptions of phenomena involved. In the latter case phenomena are partial aspects; and there is the closest relationship between phenomenalism in Psychology and in Metaphysics,—only that in the case of Psychology we are deliberately content to work with facts which are evidently fragments and with laws which are partly false, and in the case of Metaphysics we desire that our finite thought and will shall completely express the nature of Truth and Reality so far as it can be grasped by us *as a whole*. But as we know that the finite falls indefinitely far short of the Absolute, to that extent we are phenomenalists in Metaphysics.

Here I wish to suggest another question. Is there really much profit in discussing the division of *Psychology in general* from Metaphysics? It may be approached from the point of view of Physiology, Psycho-physical Experiment, Mental Pathology, Ethnology, Direct Analysis, and Genetic Explanation. We only need to raise the question of division from Metaphysics in the case of the last two of these branches; and the answer to it surely must depend as much on our conception of metaphysics and metaphysical method,

as it does on our conception of psychological method: but the method appropriate to Metaphysics can hardly be settled before we begin Psychology. And from the side of Psychology it seems impossible to find any principle which shall be theoretically satisfactory. In Metaphysics the explanations must be as true as we can make them,—the problems probed as deeply as possible. In Psychology, numerous questions, such as those mentioned by Mr. Bradley (p. 27), are deliberately excluded, not on any principle but by a practically necessary compromise. We see that as a matter of fact if Psychology raised such questions, it would commit suicide and be dissipated in Metaphysics,—it simply could not exist as a particular science. Experience shows which are the questions that Psychology can try to answer consistently with its own existence. For the rest it is in the interest of clear thinking not to stretch the separation of Psychology from Metaphysics, lest in the supposed non-metaphysical treatment certain metaphysical assumptions should be lurking unseen and so giving a subtle bias to "scientific" results. And it will not be denied that some problems proper to Analytic and even to Genetic Psychology may have important metaphysical and logical bearings.

(c) A large body of psychologists think that it is most convenient and also scientifically most useful to begin with a "general analysis of mind,"—a statement of the *typical form* of the psychologically complete mental function. Now it is a common experience that when a change takes place in our perceived environment, we are pleased or pained by the change, and we act accordingly. Hence it is affirmed that in the typical form of consciousness, we find a Subject (1) perceiving objects, (2) feeling the pleasure or pain which they excite, and (3) striving to them or away from them accordingly. The three-fold function thus consists in Intellection, Pleasure-pain, and Activity or Conation. It is also affirmed that Pleasure-pain and Conation are not simply elements in the presentation, so as to be constituent parts of it; they are not mere aspects of the presentation (as are quality and intensity); they are distinct enough from it to be thought as absent without the presentation disappearing with them. Mr. Bradley has criticised this view on the assumption that it regards Pleasure-pain and Conation as incapable of being experienced and as somehow known indirectly. If any one has ever held such an extravagant paradox, Mr. Bradley's crushing refutation of it is well deserved. What is maintained is that as a matter of experience consciousness means knowledge and more than

knowledge; and in this "more," we can as a matter of experience distinguish (a) a state of which the intensity appears in general to be conditioned by the presentations, and (b) one of which the intensity appears in general to condition the presentations.¹ Mr. Bradley contrasts this view with the one on which we have been dwelling above,—the implication of feeling, the anoetic element of immediacy, in all conscious life (pp. 40, 41); but to me they are so far from being inconsistent, that I could not maintain the former without the latter. When we assume that, in general, the Subject in being conscious of presentations is in a relation of activity and affection (pleasure or pain) to them, we are expressing in intellectual terms certain felt differences which pervade mental life. For this reason, and no other, I am able to estimate the significance of the expression which is adopted. Hence I cannot admit that either here or in the book to which Mr. Bradley refers, I have left a false view standing side by side with the true one, with which it is "radically discrepant" (p. 41). I maintain that there are no general grounds on which the relative validity of this General Analysis can be denied,² and that through a large part of the subject it will work. On the other hand, its limitations were fully recognised. It is only applicable where presentations have at least begun to be discriminated into distinct objects. We can prove to demonstration that it breaks down if applied to the beginning of consciousness in the order of time on the earth,³ and to the ultimate Ideal of consciousness;⁴ and as a matter of present fact, it will not work with those pleasures and pains whose exciting objects come nearest to being modes of anoetic consciousness.⁵

It is certain *a priori* that such limitations will pertain to any psychological theory, whether general or not. But this is no reason for its rejection, unless we have another theory to propose which is in itself logically more satisfactory,

¹The term Subject is used to emphasise the individualised or centralised character of every consciousness, with its unity at every moment and its continuity through successive moments. To this Mr. Bradley finds no objection (p. 30). The Presentations are modes of noetic consciousness,—perceptions, mental images, ideas, memories, opinions, knowledge, and so forth. The Conation is normally guided by the pleasure or pain which these arouse, and they are its object. I find myself that I certainly do not attend to the pleasure-pain but to its object; and this is especially marked if in order to maintain a pleasure in consciousness, I seek to maintain its object and there is difficulty in doing so.

²The general grounds on which it may be defended were fully set forth in *Philosophical Criticism*, ch. iv.

³*Ibid.*, ch. v., p. 275 ff.

⁴*Ibid.*, ch. vii., p. 874 ff.

⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 202, 203, 239 ff.

which has more explaining power over such *crucis* of psychology as are the problems of Emotion, Belief, Desire, Attention, Association, and above all, which goes further towards enabling us to regard all forms of mental life as modes of one fundamental function or type.

I will add a note in conclusion on a point connected with our general subject. If there is an ultimate relation in experience, we cannot say that it is the relation of Presentation, which implies the stage of noetic consciousness. A fact is not presented to me until I have begun to think about it. But in beginning to think about it, I am entering the region of uncertainty and indefiniteness as well as of knowledge,—for it is the nature of knowledge to be a process of gradual differentiation in which one “fact” always implies others and no fact is self-contained. We cannot get back to any presentation which is free of this process of thought, or which is ultimate in the sense of being a solid rock on which we can stand and start. We must rather say that the fundamental relation in experience is “fact thought about”. In speaking of “fact,” we draw attention to the place of sentience in the growth of knowledge; while the thought about it implies on the one hand the background of sentience to be reconstructed, and on the other an Infinite Organism whose functions are the laws and ideals of the thinking.