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ART. VIII.—*On Buddhism in its Relation to Brāhmanism.*

By Professor Sir MONIER MONIER-WILLIAMS, C.I.E.,
D.C.L., M.R.A.S.

THE recent annexation of Upper Burmah will probably give an impulse to the study of Buddhism. At any rate, the fact that the sacred books of the Southern Buddhists are being made accessible through Professor Oldenberg's edition of the Vinaya-piṭaka,—through the works of Professor Rhys Davids and other scholars,—and more especially through the valuable publications of the Pāli Text Society, is likely, I hope, to cause a considerable accession to the ranks of Pāli scholars.

Rightly or wrongly, and in my opinion wrongly, Buddhism has always excited more attention and interest in this country than Brāhmanism, and the relationship of the one to the other is not yet generally understood.

I may therefore perhaps be held excused if I venture to come before this Society to-day, not with any new theory or discovery, either in the science of language or religion, but with a contribution towards setting forth more clearly the debt that Buddhism owes to Brāhmanism, and Brāhmanism to Buddhism, and the inter-relationship between two systems which together influence the creed, conduct and social condition of more than one-third of the population of the world.

I need scarcely say that I am here using the term Buddhism in a restricted sense. I am applying it to that moral and philosophical system first taught in India about 2350 years ago, of which the Sacred Books of the Southern

Buddhists are the best exponent, not to those highly developed forms of so-called Buddhism which prevail as popular religions in other parts of Asia in the present day.

And at the outset I may remark that philosophical Buddhism bears much the same relation to its various later outgrowths that pure Brāhmanism bears to Hindūism.

In speaking on former occasions before this Society, I have striven to point out what I conceive to be the difference between pure Brāhmanism and Hindūism.

Pure philosophical Brāhmanism may fairly be identified with the Vedānta system, which again is closely connected with the Sāṅkhya.

It is a creed built up on the doctrine of an impersonal, universally present, unconscious spirit called Brahman—a kind of spiritual element or vital principle pervading all space, and underlying equally every material object, whether organic, or inorganic, whether stones, animals, men or gods.

It postulates the eternal existence of that impersonal elementary spirit as its starting-point—denies the real existence, not only of all material objects, but of the separate human soul, as distinct from the universal soul; and ends where it began in a pure impersonal entity, which it is difficult to distinguish in its unconscious state from pure nonentity. If this be Pantheism, as commonly alleged, it is a kind of spiritual Pantheism very different from the ordinary Pantheism of European philosophy.

Hindūism, on the other hand, is a system built up on the doctrine of devotion to the personal gods Śiva and Viṣṇu. It postulates the eternal existence of those personal gods as its starting-point, and ends in simple polytheism and idolatry.

If we compare in the same way philosophical with popular Buddhism, the difference seems to lie in this:—

Philosophical Buddhism—or at least the truest form of it—is a system built up on the doctrine of the utter unreality and undesirableness of life in any form or state, and the non-existence of any spiritual essence, as distinct from material organisms. It postulates the eternal existence of

Nothing¹ as its starting-point, and ends in simple Nihilism. Impermanence is written on the whole visible universe, including man. Even the most perfect human being must lapse into non-existence.

Popular Buddhism, on the other hand, is a system built up on the worship of certain perfected human beings converted into personal gods. It affirms the eternal permanence of such beings in some state or other, just as Vaishṇavas affirm the eternal existence of Viṣṇu. It gives them divine attributes, and ends like Hindūism in polytheism and idolatry.

With this popular doctrine we have at present nothing to do. Our only concern is with that form of philosophical Buddhism which is set forth in the sacred books of the Southern Canon, and was once current in India.

And at first it might seem that for a Brāhman, who is a Brahma-vādī, that is to say, who asserts that Brahman—the one Spirit—really exists and nothing else, and for a Buddhist, who is a Śūnya-vādī—that is, who affirms that a blank or void must be substituted for Brahman—there can be no common meeting-ground.

But a careful examination of the two systems proves that they were not only closely related in their origin, but that the separation and antagonism which afterwards took place between them were never so great as to exclude the prospect of their ultimately drawing towards each other again by mutual sympathy and attraction, and even actually blending; the result of this final union being, in my opinion, the production of the later forms of Vaishṇavism and Śaivism. Indeed, the worshippers of the god Viṣṇu, in their ideas of liberty, fraternity and equality, in their abstinence from injury, and benevolence towards all creatures, in their hero-worship, deification of humanity and fondness for images, have always seemed to me to be more than half Buddhists.

Perhaps, then, the very first point made clear by the study of the original documents is that the Buddha never seriously thought of founding a religious system in direct

¹ Except it be *Karma* 'act,' but Buddhism does not undertake to explain how the first act originated.

opposition to Brāhmanism. He himself was a Hindū of the Hindūs, and he remained a Hindū to the end.

And it is remarkable that just as the Founder of Christianity, being Himself a Jew, never required his followers to give up their Jewish creed or usages, so the founder of Buddhism, being himself a Hindū, never required his adherents to make any formal renunciation of their ancestral religion, as if they had been converted to an entirely new faith.

Nor had the Buddha any idea of ostentatiously courting popularity as a champion of universal social equality and denouncer of all distinctions of rank¹—a kind of Tribune of the people, whose mission was to protect them from the tyranny of caste.

What he rather aimed at was to form a caste of his own, that is to say, an order of monks which had in its constitution much of the character of a caste, though not a priestly one—a vast association of persons who were all to be equals in rank—a brotherhood in which all were equally under the triple vow of celibacy, poverty and mendicancy—a society in which all were equally dominated by one idea—an idea very prevalent before Gautama's time—that life was not worth living under any circumstances, whether on earth or in heaven, whether in present or future bodies.

The founding of such a monastic Order was, without doubt, the Buddha's principal aim; and when founded, it contained within itself potentialities for expansion of which its founder probably never dreamed.

Its growth soon surpassed all anticipations, and its ramifications rapidly extended in all directions, spreading in the end to distant countries, where, like the Indian Fig-tree, they sent down roots to form vigorous plants even after the decay of the parent stem.

In point of fact, an organized monastic system, which opened its arms to all comers of whatever rank, and enforced on its members the duty of extending its boundaries by itinerancy,

¹ This, I admit, is not consistent with what I said in *Indian Wisdom* (p. 55), but when I wrote that work the Tripitaka was not so well known as it is now.

and by the constant rolling onward of the wheel of the Buddhist law, constituted from the earliest times the chief strength, the very backbone, of Buddhism, without which it could never have been propagated, nor even have held its own in the place of its origin for so many centuries.

But in this, his main design, Gautama was really no innovator; no introducer of new ideas foreign either to the spirit or practice of Brāhmanism.

Monasticism had always been an adjunct, or accompaniment of the Brāhmanical system. Thus, we find it laid down in Manu's Law-book (vi. 1) that every twice-born man was bound to be first a student living with a preceptor, next a married householder, and then, at a certain period of a long life, he was to abandon wife, family, and caste, and become in due course a hermit or anchorite, living in the woods, or a mendicant wandering from door to door.

In fact, it was through these very stages and states of life that Gautama Buddha himself must in all probability have passed.

And be it observed that ordinary Hindū monks were not necessarily Brāhmans. There were in India many monastic communities which included in them men of various castes and sects, and there were also numerous solitary monks and devotees. These took vows of different kinds, whether of self-torture, of silence, of fasting, of poverty, of nakedness, of mendicancy, of celibacy, of abandoning caste, rank, wife, and family.

Hence they called themselves by various names, such as Sannyāsī, 'one who has abandoned the world'; Vairāgī, 'one who is free from all worldly desires'; Yogī, 'one who seeks union with the Deity by abstract meditation'; Yati, 'one who restrains his passions'; Jitendriya, 'one who has conquered his organs of sense'; Śramaṇa, 'one who fatigues himself by austerities'; Bhikshu, 'one who lives by begging.'

The peculiarity of Gautama's monachism was that he made it a necessary qualification for all who wished to enter the path leading to final beatitude, and that he set his face against all solitary asceticism. His aim was to form a vast

well-organized fraternity of celibate monks, co-extensive with humanity itself; and although these were to be collected in local centres, they were nevertheless bound to move about from one place to another both to obtain their daily food and for the propagation of the Buddha's doctrine. It should always, indeed, be borne in mind that celibacy, poverty, and mendicancy were three essentials of *true* Buddhism, and not a mere accidental accompaniment of it.

It is to be noted, however, that Gautama did not think it necessary to distinguish the members of his Order by any new title, but preferred making use of some of the current Brāhmanical names.

His usual mode of designating them was by the term Bhikshu (Pāli Bhikkhu) 'beggars,' to indicate their poverty; though they were also called Śrāvaka 'hearers,' to denote their attitude of attention as hearers of the Law; and Śramaṇa (Pāli Samaṇa, Sanskrit root Śram), to indicate the labour and fatigue they had to undergo after their admission to the Order.

For although Buddhism has the credit of being the easiest and least burdensome religious system in the world, and its monks among the idlest of men—as having properly no rites and ceremonies to perform, and nothing to do in the way of working for a livelihood—yet in real truth the carrying out the objects contemplated by the Founder was no sinecure if earnestly undertaken.

It was not possible for men to be really idle who felt that their only mode of avoiding starvation was by begging their daily bread from place to place, and that as members of the Order they were bound to be constantly engaged in turning the wheel of the law, in bringing all their bodily desires into subjection, and in practising profound meditation for the attainment of true knowledge.

This last duty—the duty of meditation—the Buddha himself—as is well known—had set the example of performing for many years as a means of attaining true enlightenment. And it may be here pointed out that in doing so, he had merely conformed to the practice of Yoga, which, though

not formulated into a regular system of philosophy, was at that time common enough among the Brāhmins.

There can be little doubt that Dhāraṇā, Dhyāna, and Samādhi, three forms of abstract contemplation and mental concentration, were frequently resorted to by Brāhmins in Gautama's time with much the same object he had in view—perfect spiritual insight and true enlightenment of mind. Indeed this may be proved by a reference to *Manu* vi. 72.

The very Gāyatrī or ancient Vedic prayer—still used by millions of our Indian fellow-subjects at their daily devotions—was originally an act of meditation performed with the very same object:—"Let us meditate on the excellent glory of the divine vivifying Sun, may he enlighten our understandings" (*Ṛig-veda* iii. 62. 10).

Even the choice of the *Aśvattha* or sacred Pipal tree as the place under which the first stirrings of the divine afflatus—symbolized by the mysterious rustling of its tremulous leaves—were likely to make themselves felt, was quite in harmony with Brāhmanical ideas; for we know that in the *Kaṭha Upanishad* (vi. 1)¹ the root of this tree is identified with the Supreme Being Brahman, and that a passage in the *Muṇḍaka Upanishad* (iii. 1, 1), and a Mantra of the *Ṛig-veda* (I. 164, 20), point to the same conception. It is true that Gautama subsequently repudiated all idea of any divine inspiration coming from any external source, yet it is highly probable that when he first seated himself under the sacred Fig-tree, which is even now regarded as a form of *Brahmā*—he expected to be visited by some kind of supernatural communications.

Enough, then, has been said to show that, according to Gautama's original plan, every true Buddhist was bound to be a celibate monk. Let us not forget, however, that in practice Buddhism recognized laymen and married householders quite as much as Brāhmanism did.

Of course the Buddha knew very well that it was not possible to enforce celibacy on all his followers, however

¹ I do not mean by this to affirm as a certainty that the *Kaṭha Upanishad*, though ancient, was pre-Buddhistic. Its exact date is immaterial; it must be taken in conjunction with the Mantra in the *Ṛig-Veda* and other passages, as proving the great antiquity of the idea of this tree's sacredness.

desirable such an eventuality might have been. He was well aware that if every man and woman had been led through his example and teaching to remain unmarried, and go about from one place to another, either as a mendicant or preacher, there would have been no work done, no food produced, no children born, and in time no humanity—nay no Buddhism—left.

He had to take the Indian world as he found it, and the generality of people were in Gautama's day very much what they are in India now-a-days—bent on early marriage and resolute in devoting themselves to the task of earning a livelihood by honest work—aye and down right hard work too.

Without doubt celibacy in instances of extraordinary sanctity has always commanded respect in India; but in no country of the world has married life been so universally honoured, and the duty of toiling daily for self-support so universally admitted. It is not very likely, then, that the following sentiment from the *Sutta-Nipāta* could have met with very general approval among the Buddha's hearers:

“A wise man should avoid married life as if it were a burning pit of live coals” (*Dhammika-Sutta* 21, *Kumāra Svāmī*).

And indeed it seems to me that the very circumstance that the foundations of Buddhism were not laid, as those of Brāhmanism were—and as those of Christianity notably are—on the sacred rock of family-life, and that Gautama made abstinence from marriage essential to actual enrolment in his society, and to perseverance on the way of salvation, is sufficient of itself to account for the fact that Buddhism never gained any real stability or permanence in India.

At any rate it is clear that the Buddha, foreseeing the impossibility of converting the mass of the people to his anti-matrimonial views, very soon gathered round him an exterior circle of married laymen. These lay brethren were bound to Buddhism by very slender ties. They were required to conform to the simplest possible code of morality.

Probably the only test a layman had to undergo was his willingness to appear before an assembly of monks and repeat

the formula, "I take refuge with the Buddha, his Law and his Order." And indeed it seems to me probable that it was for this reason that lay adherents were not called disciples, but simply *Upāsakas*, that is, 'Servers,' or 'Honourers,' and in the case of women *Upāsikās*.

At all events they had to perform serving, and this chiefly consisted in the offering of food and gifts to the monks. If any lay brother failed in this act of reverence, the only punishment inflicted on him was that he was deprived of this privilege of presenting gifts, and so acquiring a store of merit necessary to his advancement in future states of being. In brief, lay brethren were not true Buddhists except so far as by supporting and serving the monks,¹ they qualified themselves for enrolment within the pale of the Monastic Order at some future time or in subsequent forms of corporeal existence. Nor were they, as I have already hinted, bound to be believers in the Buddha's doctrine, except as one part of their general creed.

What I mean is, that when a man presented himself before a body of monks and claimed to be admitted as a lay brother on the ground of his readiness to do homage to the Buddha, his Law and his Order, he was not thereby precluded from retaining a half or even whole belief in the old-established creeds and customs of his family. In short, he was not required to break with Hindūism, and as a matter of fact never did so, any more than the lay Buddhists of China broke with Confucianism and Tauism.²

This was only in keeping with *Asoka's* declaration in his twelfth edict: "The beloved of the gods honours all forms of religious faith—there ought to be reverence for one's own faith and no reviling of that of others."³

Doubtless, such toleration of the doctrines and ideas of

¹ Comparing Western with Eastern Monachism, I may remark that the chief duty of the lay brethren attached to the monastery at Fountain's Abbey in Yorkshire was to wait upon the monks, procure food and cook it for them; and we learn from an interesting article on the Charterhouse in the *Times* of December 24th, 1885, that the same duty devolved on the Carthusian lay brothers.

² In China at the present day the Emperor practises simultaneously Confucianism, Buddhism and Tauism.

³ See Wilson's and Burnouf's translations.

other systems had its advantages, especially in the early stages of the Buddhistic movement. It certainly had a prophylactic effect in warding off violent opposition, and helped to secure the permanence of Buddhism for many centuries in India. On the other hand, it had its *per contra* disadvantages, and the absence of any sharp lines of separation between Buddhism and co-existing creeds and superstitions makes it easy to understand how in the end it happened that on the destruction of Buddhist monasteries in India by hostile religionists, Buddhism seemed to melt away or become merged in Hindūism, while all its temples, symbols, idols, and sacred places became subservient to Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism.

Yet, as a matter of fact, Brāhmanism and Buddhism co-existed for about a thousand years after Aśoka's Council (about 245 B.C.). If conflicts took place, they were not general, but confined to particular localities, and I think it may be safely affirmed that if Buddhism was ever anywhere persecuted, it never anywhere persecuted in return. I myself was much struck in one of my visits to India by the evidence Ellora (in the Nizām's territory) affords of friendly tolerance between Brāhmins, Buddhists, and Jains. Brāhmanical, Buddhist, and Jain caves may be there seen side by side, and their inmates no doubt lived on terms of just as much harmony as the members of the Anglican, Roman Catholic, and Wesleyan communions do in Europe at the present day. It was only in the South of India that any violent crusade against Buddhism—like that instituted by Kumārila and Śaṅkara in the seventh and eighth centuries of our era—seems to have been carried on. In other parts of India, Brāhmanism crept up somewhat insidiously to its rival, and drew the heat out of its body by close contact. In brief, I hold that if it be true to say that Brāhmanism was the birth-place of Buddhism, it is quite as true to assert that in India at least Brāhmanism became its grave, and that the passing away of the Buddhistic system was, on the whole, peaceful and unattended with any violent pangs.¹

¹ No doubt there are places in the South of India where there is evidence

With regard to the Order of Nuns (*Bhikṣhunī*, in Pāli *Bhikkhunī*), it is generally believed that at the outset of his career Gautama refrained from imparting, or allowing others to impart his ideas to women, simply because he feared the danger of encouraging communication with the female sex. Tradition asserts that women were indebted to the intercession of Gautama's favourite cousin Ānanda for permission to form a Sisterhood of their own.

Certain it is, that no long period elapsed before the Buddha conceded to women the privilege of entering on the same path of deliverance as that opened to men.

It is well known that at the time when Gautama lived, women were not kept in actual seclusion. Yet we learn from Manu's law-book that they enjoyed little independence of action, and were regarded as inferior beings, incapable of the same form of religion as men.

It was not surprising, therefore, that Gautama, while admitting the justice of the plea for women's rights under a system of universal brotherhood and equality, and while actually instituting a sisterhood of nuns, should have placed them under the direction of monks, and made them subject to the male Order in all matters of discipline.

Whatever may be said about the theory of social equality between men and women in Buddhist countries, there can be little doubt that in India Buddhism effected little alteration in Brāhmanical ideas about women.

It is at any rate clear that men were regarded as possessing an advantage over women in respect of the more rapid attainment of *Nirvāṇa*, and that every nun cherished as an object of legitimate ambition the hope of being born as a man in some future birth.

of some violent persecution. I may instance among the places I visited the Temples of Tanjore and Madura. When I concluded the reading of this paper at the meeting of the Society on February 15, 1886, our President, Colonel Yule, very justly remarked that the members of two religious communions who hold very similar doctrines often on that account hate and oppose each other all the more; but my point is that the intense tolerance and eclecticism that characterized both Brāhmanism and Buddhism must have prevented mutual persecution, except under special circumstances. Brāhmanism was much more likely to have adopted Buddhism as part of its system than to have persecuted and expelled it. In point of fact, the Brāhmins, as is well known, turned the Buddha into one of Vishnu's incarnations, very much as they are ready to turn the Founder of Christianity also.

Such then was the monachism which lay at the root of true Buddhism. It was in no one particular openly antagonistic to Hindū caste. It was supported, as we have seen, by a large body of lay associates, and those lay brethren who refrained from enrolling themselves as members of the Order retained their caste-distinctions without any denunciations from Gautama. Nor did Gautama ever rail at the Brāhmans, or dispute their right to be regarded as men of higher social rank. On the contrary, he treated them with respect, and taught others to do so,¹ just as he admitted the superiority of the gods over men, and allowed men to worship them; merely denying that either gods or Brāhmans could alter a man's condition in a future life.

What he really opposed was priestcraft and priestly domination, not caste; for, be it observed, Buddhism recognizes no priests, and has properly no priests of its own, unless monks can be so called.

Other reformers and leaders of Hindū sects had done much the same before him, so that even in this respect it cannot be said that Gautama struck out any wholly original line.

But it was not merely in the establishment and organization of a universal monastic Order, by means of which he might propagate what he believed to be true knowledge, that the Buddha took care to avoid any direct or offensive opposition to the spirit of Brāhmanism: he was equally careful in regard to the form in which the knowledge so propagated was presented. It seems indeed as if the great Teacher to whom the majority of Asiatic races have for centuries looked as a kind of god-like example, if not as an actual god, was naturally so tolerant of the opinions of others, and so humble-minded in regard to his own, that he could not bring himself to pose in the attitude of an original thinker.

¹ He even asserted that birth in a Brāhman family would be a reward for merit. According to Burnouf "very little difference appears between the Buddhists and Brāhmans in the *early* Buddhist writings, and Buddha is often described as followed by a crowd of Brāhmans as well as of Bhikkhus." See *Journal R.A.S.* o.s. Vol. XII. p. 242.

Almost all the doctrines of Buddhism will be found on examination to be more or less amplifications or modifications of previously current Brāhmanical ideas, which again were afterwards modified by an interchange with Buddhist ideas. At any rate, it may be doubted whether Gautama himself during his whole life-time ever expressed opinions calculated to cause any serious offence to the most orthodox Brāhmins. He could not of course wholly dispense with dogmatic teaching of his own; but all his dogmas were more or less the result of a compromise with old-established doctrines.

And it is certain that the Buddha's method of clothing old truths in a new dress, or, to adopt another metaphor, of mixing new wine with old, had in it a fascination very attractive to most men. For Brāhmanism was in truth equally tolerant of other creeds, and equally eclectic. Even if a man were one of its most orthodox adherents, he was allowed to choose one of three ways or methods of securing his own salvation.

The first was the way of sacrifices, ceremonies and rites, as enjoined in the Mantra and Brāhmaṇa portion of the Veda.

The second was the way of devotion to one or other of certain commonly worshipped personal deities, leading in later times to Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism (as ultimately unfolded in the Purāṇas).

The third was the way of knowledge as set forth in the Upanishads.¹

Any one of these three ways, or all three together, might be chosen without fear of being charged with heresy, so long as the authority of the Veda was not impugned; but the third, or way of knowledge, which was incomparably the highest way, was not open to all.

It was the way reserved for the more intellectual and

¹ The three ways are usually expressed in Sanskrit by Karman, Bhakti, and Jñāna respectively; but the doctrine of Bhakti was not fully developed till after the time of Buddha, though the Upanishads prove that the practice of devotion (as expressed by Upāsana) must have existed.

philosophically-minded Brāhmins. The generality of men had to content themselves with the first and second ways. All that the Buddha then did was, in the first place, to institute an Order to which all classes were admissible; and in the second place to throw open the third or highest way—the way of true knowledge—to all who wished to enter upon it, of whatever rank or caste or mental calibre they might be. No human being, he declared, not even the lowest, was to be shut out from free access to the path of true enlightenment.

And here, of course, it will occur to most persons to inquire what was the nature of that knowledge which the Buddha thus made accessible to all?

Was it some deep spiritual truth? Some abstruse doctrine of philosophy, or physical, or metaphysical science? Was the Buddha's open way very different from the old, well-fenced-off and carefully-guarded Brāhmanical way? Was his knowledge opposed to Brāhmanical knowledge?

Unhappily we are here met by a difficulty. The Buddha promulgated a creed, but he never, like Muhammad, wrote a book or even a single line. He was, in some respects, the Socrates of India, and we are obliged to trust to his followers for a record of his sayings and doings. Still we have no reason to doubt the genuineness of what has been handed down in regard to the main doctrines he taught, and we are at once struck with the fact that Gautama called his own knowledge *Bodhi* and not *Veda*. Most probably he did so because he wished to imply that his own knowledge, as attainable by all through their own efforts and intuitions, was to be distinguished from *Veda* or knowledge obtainable through the Brāhmins alone, and by them through supernatural revelation only.

But it should be noted—as pointed out long ago by Professor A. Weber of Berlin, and recently by Professor Oldenberg—that even in the choice of a name derived from the Sanskrit root *Budh* 'to know,' the self-enlightened Buddha was only following the authors of the Brāhmaṇas. For example, the Śata-patha-brāhmaṇa called a

man prati-buddha¹ who had attained to perfect knowledge of the Ātman. It may be pointed out, too, that in Manu (iv. 204) the wise man is called Budha.

Moreover, the doctrines which grew out of his self-acquired knowledge Gautama still called *Dharma* 'law,' using the very same term employed by the Brāhmins—a term expressive of law in its most comprehensive sense, as comprising under it the physical laws of the Universe, as well as moral, political and social duties. And, further, the very first truth taught in the Buddha's Dharma was after all no new truth. It was in perfect harmony with Brāhmanical ideas. His way of knowledge, though—like that of the Brāhmins—it ultimately developed into many paths, had only one point of departure. It started from the old truth, taught long before, that all life—not merely some life—was pain and misery, and it indicated two cures for that misery.

The first cure was *the suppression of desire*, especially the desire for continuity of existence. The second cure was *the removal of ignorance*. When, however, we come to put the question—ignorance of what? we find ourselves brought round by the well-known twelve-linked chain of causality to the old truth, and the answer we receive is:—ignorance that all life is pain and misery and all craving for continuity of individual existence a mistake.

It would be easy to prove that this kind of pessimism—the pessimism of Schopenhauer, von Hartmann and other modern European philosophers—was taught by the Brāhmins in Buddha's time and has continued to be a thoroughly Brāhmanical idea even to the present day. Witness the following sentiment from the Maitrāyaṇi or Maitri Upanishad:—

“In this weak body, ever liable
To wrath, ambition, avarice, illusion,
To fear, grief, envy, hatred, separation
From those we hold most dear, association
With those we hate; continually exposed
To hunger, thirst, disease, decrepitude,
Emaciation, growth, decline and death,
What relish can there be for true enjoyment?”

¹ S'ata-patha-brāhmaṇa xiv. 7, 2, 17.

Also the following, from Manu (vi. 77) :—

“This body like a house composed of the (five) elements, with bones for its rafters, tendons for its connecting links, flesh and blood for its mortar, skin for its covering ; this house filled with impurities, infested by sorrow and old age, the seat of disease, full of pain and passion, and not lasting—a man ought certainly to abandon.”

Later writers chime in, thus (Vairāgya-śataka of Bhartrihari, iii. 32) :—

“Enjoyments are alloyed by fear of sickness,
High rank may have a fall, abundant wealth
Is subject to exactions, dignity
Encounters risk of insult, strength is ever
In danger of enfeeblement by foes,
A handsome form is jeopardized by women,
Scripture is open to assaults of critics,
Merit incurs the spite of wicked men,
The body lives in constant dread of death,
One course alone is proof against alarm,
Renounce the world, and safety may be won.”

And again (iii. 50) :—

“One hundred years¹ is the appointed span
Of human life, one half of this goes by
In sleep and night ; one half the other half
In childhood and old age ; the rest is passed
In sickness, separation, pain and service—
How can a human being find delight
In such a life, vain as a watery bubble ?”

Then we know that the removal of the pain caused by desire, ignorance, and bodily existence, was the chief aim of the Brāhmanical systems of philosophy, quite as much as of the Buddhistic.

The very first aphorism of the Sāṅkhya system defines the chief aim of man to be complete deliverance from the misery and pain incident to corporeal existence. The Nyāya,

¹ Centenarians (S'atāyus, S'ata-varsha) seem to have been rather common in India in ancient times, if we may judge by the allusions to them in Manu and other works. See Manu, iii. 186 ; ii. 135, 137.

too, in its second aphorism, declares that beatitude consists in complete deliverance from the pain resulting from birth, actions and false knowledge; while the Vedānta considers that ignorance alone fetters the soul of man to the body, and is therefore, of course, the cause of all pain and suffering. Then, again, as to the Buddha's so-called agnostic and atheistic ideas, it is said that he wholly repudiated the existence of a Supreme Being. And it is true that his highest being was the perfectly enlightened man, free from all ignorance, desire and suffering.

Yet, as already pointed out, he had great sympathy with Yoga ideas, and the Yoga philosophy not only asserted the existence of God, but defined His nature thus (ii. 24):—

“God is a particular Spirit (*purusha*, which also means man), unaffected by pain, acts, the result of acts, and desires.”

Surely this might equally serve as a definition for the Buddha's perfect man, and it is difficult to suppose that one was not suggested by the other.¹ It seems, also, difficult to reconcile the Buddha's predilection for Yoga with his disbelief in the existence of Spirit as distinct from bodily organism. But a little consideration will perhaps indicate how he was brought round to this disbelief.

Probably before his so-called enlightenment and attainment of true knowledge, he was as firm a believer in the real existence of one Supreme Spirit as the most orthodox Brāhman. He had become imbued with Brāhmanical philosophy while sitting at the feet of his two teachers Udraka and Alāra. At that time there were no definite or finally formulated systems of philosophy, separated from each other by sharp lines. But the Sāṅkhya and Vedānta systems were assuming shape, and the doctrines they embodied had been roughly enunciated in the Upanishads, and were orally current.

For instance, it was then believed, as had been repeatedly stated in the Upanishads, that nothing really existed but one universally present impersonal Spirit, and that the whole visible world was really to be identified with that Spirit.

¹ By this I do not mean to imply that the Yoga definition was necessarily the first in point of time.

Then it followed as an article of faith that man's spirit, deluded into a temporary false idea of separate personal existence by the illusion of ignorance, and maintained in that false idea through repeated births by the force of its own acts, was also identical with that One Spirit, and ultimately to be re-absorbed into it.

Now it is obvious that to believe in the ultimate merging of man's personal spirit in One impersonal unconscious spirit, is virtually to deny the ultimate existence of any human spirit at all. Nay more—it is virtually to deny the existence of a supreme universal Spirit also.

For how can a merely abstract universal Spirit, which is unconscious of personality, be regarded as possessing any real existence worth being called true life?

To assert that such a Spirit is pure abstract Entity or (according to Vedānta phraseology) pure Existence (without anything to exist for), pure Thought or even Consciousness (without anything to think about, or be conscious about), pure Joy (without anything to rejoice about), is practically to reduce it to pure non-entity.

All that Gautama did, therefore, was to bring common sense to bear in purging Brāhmanism of a dogma which appeared to him to be a mere figment and a sham.

He simply eliminated as meaningless and incapable of proof the doctrine of an impersonal incorporeal unconscious spirit, whether human or divine.

And this leads us to the important question how far the great central Brāhmanical doctrine of soul-transmigration formed the basis of the Buddha's theory on the same subject. It might seem at first that the teaching of the Buddha would differ materially from that of the Brāhmins in regard to this central dogma. The real fact was that the divergence of the Buddhist doctrine from the Brāhmanical theory of metempsychosis was not greater than was to be expected from the difference between the two systems in regard to the doctrine of soul and spirit. Of course Gautama was brought up to accept unreservedly the Brāhmanical theory as minutely described in Manu's Law-book (chapter

xii. 41, 50, and elsewhere). The great Brāhmanical law-giver there set forth a triple order of transmigration through lower, middle, and higher planes of existence, resulting from good, middling, and bad acts, words and thoughts. Thus—to instance only the lower—the soul of a man who spoke ill of his teacher was destined to pass into an ass or a dog (ii. 201), the soul of a thief might occupy a mouse (xii. 62), the soul of one who neglected his caste-duties might pass into a demon (xii. 71, 72); and greater crimes might lead to the soul's being condemned to occupy plants, stones, and minerals. Then there was an intermediate condition of the soul, as a departed spirit or ghost, which would be miserable but for the Śrāddha ceremonies—a source of constant profit to the Brāhmins who performed them.

This passage of the soul through repeated bodies was the terrible incubus which it was the great object of Indian philosophers to remove. It was impossible, however, for Gautama to accept such ideas, denying as he did the existence of any soul or spirit at all, as distinct from material organization. He therefore put forth a view of his own, which was no doubt afterwards amplified by his followers into something more Buddhistic than Buddhism, just as Darwin's followers of the present day develop his teaching into something more Darwinian than Darwinism.

And perhaps I may be pardoned for recapitulating here what so many Pāli scholars have already made clear, that every human being according to the Buddhist is composed of five constituents called Skandhas.¹ And that these are : 1. Form (*rūpa*). 2. Sensations (*vedanā*). 3. The faculty of perception (*saññā*). 4. The faculty of conformation (*samskāra*), that is of forming ideas, dispositions (leading to actions, etc.). 5. The faculty of thought or consciousness (*viññāna*). This fifth is the most important of the five, and is the only kind of soul recognized by Buddhists. Theoretically it perishes with the other Skandhas at death, but practically it is continued, its exact counterpart being reproduced in a new body.

¹ Sometimes a human being is said to be made up of the five elements—ether, air, fire, water, earth—with a sixth called *Viññāna*, consciousness.

For although it is true that when a man dies, all the Skandhas are dissolved, yet by the force of the merit and demerit (*kuśala* and *akuśala*) resulting from his actions (*karma*), a new set, of which consciousness (*vijñāna*) is still the dominant faculty, instantly starts into being. The process of the new creation is so instantaneous that it is equivalent to the continuance of the same personality, pervaded by the same consciousness, though it is only really connected with the previous personality by the force of acts done and character formed in that personality. In short (as Prof. Rhys Davids has well shown), to speak of transmigration of souls as a doctrine of Buddhism is misleading.

A true Buddhist does not believe in the passing of a soul from one body to another, but in the passing on of what may be called act-force or character-force: that is to say, in the constant perpetuation and transmission of the aggregate of merit and demerit resulting from a man's acts so as to cause a continuous and connected series or succession of separate forms and personalities. It is this act-force alone, commonly called Karma, which is the connecting link between each man's past, present, and future bodies.

In its subtle and irresistible operation this accumulated Act-force may be compared to stored-up chemical or electric energy. It is a force which continually creates and re-creates the whole man, and perpetuates his personal identity (even in the absence of recollection) through separate forms, whether it compels him to ascend or descend in the scale of being. Be it observed, however, that the scale of descent appears to be limited in true Buddhism to animal organisms. It is not extended, as in the Brāhmanical system, to plants and minerals, stocks and stones.

Enough then has been stated to make it clear that the only creator recognized by Buddhists is, so to speak, Act-force. It is Act-force that creates worlds. It is Act-force that creates all beings in any of the six classes into which Buddhists divide all beings,—namely, gods, men, demons, animals, ghosts and the dwellers in hell. We know that it is an axiom with modern European men of science that no

force can ever be lost, but must of necessity be transmitted onwards in some form or other. Now the Buddhist philosopher affirmed this very thing many centuries ago in regard to the force generated by a man's character and acts; and Brāhmanical philosophy affirmed much the same.

And what does the modern Positivist philosopher assert? He maintains that both body and mind are resolved into their elements at death. The only immortal part of us is what good deeds we have done, what good words or thoughts we leave behind us, to be made use of by our descendants and improved on for the elevation of humanity. And the aggregate of these, according to the Buddhist, constitute a force strong enough to re-create us.

Is was thus that the force of Gautama's own acts had constantly re-created him through a long chain of successive personalities terminating in the perfect Buddha. And it was a peculiar characteristic of the perfect Buddha that he was gifted with the faculty of recollecting these personalities and describing them. The stories of at least five hundred and fifty of his births (Jātakas) are even now daily repeated to thousands of eager listeners in every Buddhist country over the greater part of Asia, and are believed to convey important moral lessons, much in the same manner, if I may be allowed to say so with all reverence, that the stories of the Old Testament patriarchs, prophets, and heroes, who are held by Christians to be types of Christ, are repeated as lessons in our own religious services.

The close inter-relationship between Brāhmanism and Buddhism, and the interchange of ideas which took place between each, are again exemplified by the Buddhist birth-stories, many of which are obviously mere modifications or adaptations of old fables and folk-lore long current in India, while others have evidently been imported from Buddhism into the fables of Sanskrit literature.

In reading them one is constantly reminded of similar stories in the Pañcā-tantra, Hitopadeśa, Rāmāyaṇa, and Mahā-bhārata. The noteworthy point about the repeated births of the Buddha is that there appears to have been no

Darwinian rise from lower to higher forms ; no working of the way gradually and progressively upwards ; but, on the contrary, a mere jumble of metamorphoses. Thus we find him born twenty times as the god Indra, eighty-three times as an ascetic, fifty-eight times as a king, twenty-four times as a Brāhman, once as a gamester, eighteen times as a monkey, six times as an elephant, eleven times as a deer, once as a dog, four times as a serpent, six times as a snipe, once as a frog, twice as a fish, forty-three times as a tree-god, twice as a pig, ten times as a lion, four times as a cock, twice as a thief, once as a devil-dancer, and so on in an endless irregular series, without any apparent conformity to any rule or law of development.

Another wise man of the East, who lived long before Gautama, spoke of "the path of the just shining more and more unto the perfect day."¹ Of this kind of progressive advance towards higher planes of perfection, the Indian sage knew nothing. Nor to the Buddha, of course, would such a doctrine as that of "imputed Righteousness" have conveyed any meaning whatever. With Gautama, righteousness and unrighteousness, holiness and sin, were merely forces causing in the one case a man's rebirth either in one of the heavens or in higher earthly corporeal forms, and in the other his rebirth in one of the hells or in lower corporeal forms. "Not in the heavens," says the Dhamma-pada, "not in the midst of the sea, not if thou hidest thyself away in the clefts of the mountains, wilt thou find a place where thou canst escape the force resulting from thy evil actions."² And this Buddhist theory of every man's destiny being dependent on his own acts is quite in keeping with Brāhmanical ideas expressed here and there in Sanskrit literature. Take for example the following :—*Pūrva-janma-kṛitaṃ karma tad daivam iti kathyate*, "the act committed in a former birth that is called one's destiny"; and again, "As from a lump of clay a workman makes what he pleases, even so a man obtains

¹ Proverbs iv. 18.

² Dhammapada, 127, 219 (Dr. Oldenberg's *Buddha*, p. 243), with a slight variation of phraseology.

whatever destiny he has wrought out for himself" (Hítópadeśa, Introduction).

We are reminded too of a sentiment by a poet of our own—

"Our deeds still travel with us from afar,
And what we have been makes us what we are." ¹

And of Don Quixote's saying, "Every man is the son of his own works;" and of Wordsworth's, often quoted, "The child is father of the man;" and of Longfellow's, "Lives of great men all remind us, we can make ourselves sublime."

Nor can ceremonies and rites performed by priests avail aught, nor can any devotion to personal gods avail aught, nor can anything whatever, except a man's own works and deservings, possess the slightest efficacy.

Not that the gods and demons of the Hindū Pantheon were held by the Buddhists to be mere myths. They existed in more subtle corporeal forms than those of men, and were, moreover, powerful beings, capable of working good or evil, benefit or harm; among them the Vedic god Indra being particularly revered.

Yet they were not omnipotent, and were wholly powerless to help or hinder any one on the road to his own salvation. If we turn next to that division of the Buddhist system which seeks to explain the operation of physical laws in the creation and dissolution of worlds, we are again reminded of Brāhmanical ideas.

We have already noted that, notwithstanding the great difference between Buddhism and Brāhmanism in regard to the doctrine of Spirit, the disagreement in the end appears to be more apparent than real. The same may be said with regard to Buddhist ideas on the subject of matter as opposed to spirit. Here, again, the gulf between the two systems appears at first to be impassable. It might indeed have been supposed that since Gautama denied the eternal existence of Spirit, he would at least give eternal existence to matter.

¹ These lines constitute the text of the 70th chapter of George Eliot's "Middlemarch."

But no ; here, again, Buddhism allowed no permanence. Here, again, the only eternal thing is the Causality of Act-force.

The world around us, with all its visible phenomena, must be recognized as an existing entity, for we see before our eyes evidence of its actual existence. But it is an entity produced out of nonentity, and destined to lapse again into nonentity when its time is fulfilled.

For out of nothingness it came, and into nothingness must it return, to re-appear again, it is true, but as a wholly new creation brought into being by the accumulated force of its own acts, not evolved out of any eternally existing germ.

It is thus that the Universe is like an endless succession of countless bubbles which are for ever forming, expanding, drifting onwards, bursting and re-forming, each bubble owing its re-formation to the force generated by its vanished predecessor ;

“ Worlds on worlds are rolling ever
From creation to decay :
Like the bubbles on a river,
Sparkling, bursting, borne away.”¹

Or like an interminable succession of wheels for ever coming into view, for ever rolling onwards, disappearing and reappearing ; for ever passing from being to non-being, and again from non-being to being.

As to the question what force created the first world, the Buddha hazarded no opinion. He held this to be an inexplicable mystery.

Many of these speculations also may be traced back to a Brāhmanical source. We know that a fundamental doctrine of Brāhmanism is *Ex nihilo nihil fit*. The true Vedānta philosophy makes the Universe proceed out of an eternal illusion, and students of Manu are familiar with the doctrine of Kalpas, or immense intervals of time (lasting for 4,320,000 earthly years), during which every creation attains perfection, and then again deteriorates and decays till it is utterly dissolved, not indeed into nothingness,

¹ Shelley's *Hellas*.

but into Brahman or simple unconscious Spirit, to be again evolved with the inauguration of a fresh Kalpa.

Can it be affirmed, however, that pure unconscious spirit is virtually very different from pure nothingness?

What says the author of a well-known hymn of the *Rig-veda* (x. 120)?—

“In the beginning there was neither naught nor aught,
Then there was neither sky nor atmosphere above.
Then first came darkness hid in darkness, gloom in gloom;
Next all was water, all a chaos indiscreet,
In which the One lay void, shrouded in nothingness.”

Then as to the Kalpas or ages of the world, we know that the Brāhmanical notion of vast intervals of time exceeds the wildest dreams of modern geologists; yet the Buddhist conception is a mere exaggeration of the same notion.

Let it be supposed, say Buddhist writers, that a solid rock forming a vast cube 16 miles high, and the same in length and breadth, were lightly rubbed once in a hundred years with a piece of the finest cloth, and by this slight friction reduced in countless ages to the size of a mango-seed; that would still give you no idea of the immense duration of a Buddhist Kalpa.

Then again the Buddhist theory of numerous heavens and hells is nothing but an equally exaggerated expansion of the Brāhmanical.

One of the earliest doctrines of Brāhmanism was that earth, atmosphere, and heaven formed three worlds (*Manu* xi. 236), and we find Buddhist writers expanding these into three sets or groups of worlds, the first comprising the seven worlds of sensuous desire (*Kāma*), viz. the earth and six heavens of the gods, all the inhabitants of which are capable of those sensual feelings and desires which lead to re-birth and death, and are therefore presided over by *Māra*, the deadly spirit of evil, whose sphere is the atmosphere, and who, as Prof. Oldenberg has well shown, is the counterpart of *Mṛityu*, ‘god of death,’ in the *Kāthopanishad*. The second group are called ‘worlds of form’ (*Rūpa*), divided according to four

places of pure thought or meditation, and said to contain sixteen (or according to the Northern school seventeen or even eighteen) heavens. The third group are called 'formless worlds,' and contain four heavens, inhabited by beings who appear to exist in a highly sublimated transcendental state, untroubled by desires, feelings, or thoughts.

Similar hyperbole is used in describing the numerous Buddhist hells. Manu (iv. 88-90) reckons 21 hells or places of torment of various degrees, but these are expanded by Buddhists into 136, the eight principal of which are minutely described as terrible places of torture. The worst, called *Avīci*, is for unbelievers in and revilers of Buddha and his law.

And now, before I conclude, I feel rather like a foolhardy person rushing recklessly over thorny ground when I venture to speak of the culminating Buddhist doctrine of *Nirvāṇa*? I think, however, I may assert two things about this much controverted expression without fear of being contradicted.

The first is that the word *Nirvāṇa* is an expression common both to Brāhmanism and Buddhism. It was probably current in Gautama's time, and certainly occurs in the *Mahā-bhārata*, parts of which may extend back to the time when Buddhism first arose in India. Of course, like some of the crucial theological terms of Christianity, it is capable of being interpreted differently, according to the views of the interpreter and the point he wishes to establish.

The second is that it would be about as unreasonable to restrict the expression *Nirvāṇa* to one meaning as it would be to restrict both Brāhmanism and Buddhism—two most elastic, comprehensive and Protean systems—which have constantly changed their front to suit changing circumstances and varying national peculiarities at different epochs and in different countries, to one hard and fast outline.

Nirvāṇa, no doubt, properly means 'a state of extinction' like that of a blown-out flame, but such extinction may have at least three meanings. It may indicate first a complete extinction of the fires¹ of the passions and a total cessation

¹ The three chief fires are lust, infatuation and hatred.

of all desires,¹ especially the desire for individual existence—a state achieved by all Arhats while still living in the world, and notably by the Buddha himself, at the moment when he attained Buddhahood, forty-four years before his complete Nirvāṇa. Then, secondly, there is a form of Nirvāṇa insisted on by many, in which the leading idea seems to be a state of absolute release from all pain, accompanied by a sense of profound peace and rest, all fear of further bodily existences having terminated. This condition, implying as it does an actual consciousness of blissful repose, precludes the idea of utter annihilation. Then, thirdly, Nirvāṇa may stand for a state of entire cessation of re-births, with utter extinction of all conscious personal existence as attained by the Buddha, according to the orthodox view, at the moment of his death.

Now with regard to the first form of Nirvāṇa—the extinction of the fires of the passions—it must be borne in mind that a feeling of profound respect for such a condition was ingrained in the mind of every true Hindū, and that there was really nothing new in this idea.

Even to this day no one can have come in contact with the natives of India in their own country, without observing that for a genuine aristocratic Brāhman to allow others to see him give way to any passion, to exhibit any emotion or enthusiasm, is regarded as a proof of weakness.

We can easily understand, therefore, that when the Buddha exhorted his followers to strive after a wholly impassive condition, he addressed a sympathetic audience.

Long before his exhortations were heard in India, his fellow-countrymen held persons in the highest respect who claimed to have entirely suppressed their passions. The only peculiarity in Gautama's teaching was that he made this object incumbent on all true Buddhists alike, without exception. And this state of absolute impassiveness is well indicated to the eye by the usual attitude of the images which, after Gautama's death, were carved to represent him

¹ Prof. Rhys Davids holds that the Buddha did not advocate the suppression of good desires.

—an attitude of complete tranquillity, passionless composure, and dignified calm.

Then, with regard to the second phase of Nirvāṇa, in which the main idea is cessation of all pain, this seems to correspond very much to the Brāhmanical Apavarga, described in the Nyāya, and defined by a commentator, Vātsyāyana, to be *Sarva-duḥkha-śheda*. I trust I shall not shock my Indian friends if I illustrate this condition by an example from the animal creation. In crossing the Indian Ocean, when unruffled by the slightest breeze, I have sometimes observed a jelly-fish floating on the surface of the transparent water, apparently lifeless, but really drinking in the warm fluid in a state of lazy blissful repose.

No Buddhist at least could look at such a sight without being reminded of the second idea of Nirvāṇa—the idea of, so to speak, floating in perfect peace and cessation from all pain on a kind of ocean of conscious beatitude.

With regard to the highest form of Nirvāṇa—sometimes called Parinirvāṇa—absolute extinction of conscious personal existence and individuality, I have already shown that if this is to be distinguished from the Brāhmanical idea of absorption into an impersonal unconscious spirit—whereby the Ego of personal identity was utterly destroyed—it is a distinction without much difference.

We may be quite sure that although the highest form of Nirvāṇa is the ultimate goal, and great object of all the loftiest aspirations of a true Buddhist, it has no place in the aims, efforts, and even in the thoughts of the ordinary adherents of Buddhism.

The apex of all the desires, the culminating point of all the ambition of the most religiously-minded Buddhists of the present day, point to a life in one of the heavens, while the great mass of the people aim only at escaping one of the hells, and elevating themselves to a higher condition of bodily existence in their next birth on this earth, and perhaps on that very part of this earth which is the scene of their present toils, joys and sorrows.

And now, in conclusion, let me say a few words in regard

to the Buddhist Code of Morality. It may be well asked, "How can any scheme of morality find a place in a system which makes all life and action proceed from ignorance and error, and even virtuous conduct the product of a mistake as leading to continuity of life in higher states of being?"

The inconsistency seems difficult of explanation, but it must be borne in mind that notwithstanding the constant insisting on the misery resulting from every form of existence, Gautama taught that the life of a virtuous man and life in heaven were better than a wicked life and a life in hell.

Hence accumulation of merit (*kuśala* or *punya* or *dharma*) by good actions, by the practice of morality, self-renunciation, meditation and almsgiving, according to the example set by the Buddha himself, was made an absolutely indispensable factor in securing a man's re-birth in higher corporeal forms, with a view to the attainment of perfect knowledge, perfect self-renunciation, and perfect deliverance from individual being at some future period.

Indeed, both Buddhism and Brāhmanism might be well summed up in a few words as schemes for the intense accumulation of self-righteousness, with a view to getting rid of self; but let it be clearly understood that the self to be got rid of is not the self spoken of in Christianity, but the self of individuality and continued personal conscious existence.

And of the two systems Buddhism is certainly entitled to the palm as the most perfect art of merit-making. For every Buddhist is like a trader who keeps a ledger, with a regular debtor and creditor account, and a daily entry of profit and loss.

He is forbidden to store up a money-balance in a worldly bank, but he is urged to be constantly accumulating a merit-balance in the bank of Karma.

To be righteous in a Christian sense, a man must be God-like, and to be righteous in a Buddhistic sense, a man must be Buddha-like; but the righteousness of the Buddhist is not the perfection of holiness, nor even the perfection of

self-enlightenment by the dissipation of ignorance. It is the perfection of merit-making, whereby the complete extinction of individual existence is achieved.

I do not, of course, mean to imply that the Buddhist system of morality is not of a very high order.

Often, indeed, it rises to the highest plane of Christian teaching, but the same can be said of the moral code existing among Brāhmans and Hindūs before the Buddha's time, and in nothing is the close connection between Buddhism and Brāhmanism better shown than in the moral precepts of these two systems which are sometimes nearly identical.

There is scarcely a sentiment in the Dhammapada and Sutta-nipāta which may not be matched by something similar in either Manu, the Epic poems, or the Nīti-śāstras of Sanskrit literature.

Most certainly the highest morality of both Buddhists and Brāhmans has this in common, that both had an ultimate reference to their own interests, and that both inculcated doing good to others, with a view to laying up such a store of merit for themselves as might secure their own advancement in future states of corporeal existence.