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Interrogative Commands

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Can the neuter be justified? or is some word, e.g. *ιμάτια*, missing?

ιβ. 4 τῶν ἅπερ διαφέρει.

τῶν ὅσαπερ would be the regular expression and ought probably to be restored. Cf. 9. 8 τὰ ὅσα: 16. 1: and this chapter § 5 τῶν ὅσα.

ιβ. εἴπερ πάντως ἐβούλετο αὐτάρκη οὕτως θείναι.

The question is of a man putting something in rather homely detail instead of wrapping it up in a vague dignified expression. *αὐτάρκη* is inappropriate. Perhaps the conjecture *αὐτὰ ῥητῶς* (or *ῥητῶς οὕτως*) *θείναι* may be hazarded. *ῥητῶς* is *explicitly*, in so many words.

44. 2 *θρέψαι τε γάρ φασιν ἱκανῇ τὰ φρονήματα τῶν μεγαλοφρόνων ἢ ἐλευθερία καὶ ἐπελπίσαι καὶ ἅμα διελθεῖν τὸ πρόθυμον τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐριδος καὶ... φιλοτιμίας.*

ἐπελπίσαι may be right (in the sense of *encouraging*), but I rather suspect it should be *ἐπαλεῖψαι*. By a metaphor from the anointing of athletes, *ἀλείφω* and *ἐπαλείφω* are used in this sense and seem to me slightly more proper here. *διελθεῖν* is obviously wrong. It has been altered by various scholars, but not convincingly. *διαίθεσθαι* occurs to me, *αἶθω* being *inflame* metaphorically as well as literally, but I do not mention it with any confidence.

ιβ. 3. τοῖς αὐτῆς ἔθεσι.

αὐτῆς would be wrongly placed. Read *ταύτης*.

In the same § read probably *ἀγευστοι* <τοῦ> *καλλίστου*, though the article is not absolutely necessary.

ιβ. 5. οἱ Πυγμαῖοι, καλούμενοι δὲ νᾶνοι.

Sense seems to require *οἱ Πυγμαῖοι καλούμενοι δὴ* (or *δὴ καλούμενοι*) *νᾶνοι*. *νᾶνοι* is the more generic and ordinary name, *Πυγμαῖοι* the special one by which these particular *νᾶνοι* are called. *δὴ* is often added to *καλούμενος*, *λεγόμενος*, etc.

ιβ. 8. τοιούτων ἐν κύκλῳ should I think be *τοιούτῳ μὲν κύκλῳ*.

ιβ. 9. ἐλευθερόν τινα κριτὴν τῶν μεγάλων ἢ διηκόντων πρὸς τὸν αἰῶνα.

Perhaps *διεξόντων*, 'things that will endure.' But he may mean old things, that have already endured, or generically great things that do endure. *ἦ* seems odd and probably ought to be *καί*: cf. on 10. 3.

ιβ. 11. ὅλως δὲ δαπανῶν ἔφην εἶναι τῶν νῦν γεννωμένων φύσεων τὴν ῥαθυμίαν.

For *δαπανῶν* read rather *δαπάνην*, literally a *destruction*, *consumption*, than *δάπανον*. This sense is established in the verb.

H. RICHARDS.

INTERROGATIVE COMMANDS.

A new theory of οὐ μή (prohibitive) in the light of Latin quin with moods of command.

THE following suggestion is based upon a consideration of the constructions, common to Greek and Latin, in which an expression of command or desire appears in an interrogative sentence. These constructions have been generally held by grammarians to need some sort of apology, as being irrational; but to the Greek and Roman mind, at any rate, they presented no difficulty, as is shown by their wide distribution. And it really does not make much difference from the present point of view, whether we rationalize them on the principle of Professor Elmer (by postulating a meaning of 'ought' or 'should' for the moods in question) or regard the expressions of command as intrusive and due to analogical extension.

Current theories of the *οὐ μή* constructions have hitherto failed to explain certain points which imperatively call for explanation.

1. On Elmsley's interrogative theory, why does the future indicative take *μή*, not *οὐ*?

2. On Professor Goodwin's theory—

(a) What is the relation of *οὐ μή* with a single aorist subjunctive or future indicative to double-barrelled sentences like Eur. Hipp. 606 *οὐ μή προσοίσεις χεῖρα μηδ' ἄψῃ* (*ἄψει*) *πέπλων*; The number of instances of these double-barrelled sentences is large, and it is impossible to refuse them weight in any discussion of origins. In regard to the particular example just quoted, and the similar examples in Ar. Ran. 298, Eur. Bacch. 343, &c., Prof. Goodwin (M.T. § 298) recognizes that the *οὐ* goes with the *μηδέ*;

in his own words the 'μηδέ continues the original prohibition.' And I think Sir Richard Jebb is undoubtedly right in saying that the same treatment must be applied to Soph. Ajax 75 οὐ σίγ' ἀνέξῃ (ἀνέξει) μηδέ δελίαν ἀρῇ (ἀρεῖ); and also to sentences like Soph. O.T. 637 f., where we have καὶ μὴ instead of μηδέ. See his appendix to the Ajax, edition of 1896, p. 213 ff.

(b) What analogies can be quoted for οὐ (in a statement) meaning 'it is not the fact that'? For this is what Prof. Goodwin's theory involves; see his note on p. 394 of the Appendix to M.T., where he defends οὐ μὴ λάβωσί σε as the negative of μὴ λάβωσί σε in the sense of 'I suspect they will seize you.' At that rate οὐ μὴ-λάβωσί-σε = 'it is not the case that I suspect they will seize you.' This is a hard saying. In a question the prefixing of a negative involves no difficulty (τοῦτ' ἀληθές ἐστιν becoming οὐ τοῦτ' ἀληθές ἐστιν; 'is not this true?'); but when a statement is negated the negative is put before the predicate (τοῦτ' οὐκ ἀληθές ἐστιν or τοῦτ' οὐκ ἐστιν ἀληθές). Prof. Goodwin's distinction between negating the verb and negating the sentence 'absolutely' is no doubt a possible one in logic, but it is one which does not make itself felt in speech; cf. such instances as Eur. Tro. 982 μὴ οὐ πείσῃς σοφούς and Plato Crat. 436b ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχῃ, ὃ Σώκρατες, Apol. 39a, Meno 94e μὴ οὐχ ἧ διδασκὼν ἀρετή.

The following tentative explanation differs from Professor Jebb's and all previous theories based on Elmsley's in offering a solution of the first ἀπορία mentioned above, viz. why the second negative in these expressions should be μὴ and not οὐ.

(A) Greek is quite capable of putting an expression of command into a relative (quasi-interrogative) clause: οἷσθ' οὖν ὃ δρᾶσον; scin quid tibi faciendum sit? οἷσθ' ὡς ποιήσον; οἷσθά νυν ἃ μοι γενέσθω; etc. And, what is more, the imperative may be used in a simple interrogative sentence: τετάχθω ἡμῖν κατὰ δημοκρατίαν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ, ὡς δημοκρατικὸς ὢν; Τετάχθω, ἔφη (Plato Rep. 561e; cf. Politicus 295e). This 'interrogative imperative' I have compared in my Greek Grammar (§ 521, Obs.) with such English sentences as 'Have a glass of wine?' and I know of no reason why the 'have' should not be regarded as an imperative. The principle is fundamentally the same in every 'deliberative' question with the subjunctive, whether in Greek or Latin¹: εἰπωμεν ἢ σιγῶμεν;

¹ It is true that the negative in Latin is *non*, in Greek *μή*. But this does not concern us here. For

eloquar an sileam? (Verg. Aen. III. 39), τί φῶ; quid dicam?

(B). Latin sometimes puts an imperative or a subjunctive of command or desire after *quid*, which of course properly signifies 'why not?' and I see no reason why such sentences should not be punctuated with a note of interrogation—certainly those with the subjunctive and probably also those with the imperative, as in the analogous English equivalent 'why not attack?', 'why not go?' etc. A similar expression exists, I believe, in French and German, e.g. 'warum nicht angreifen?'—in which the infinitive seems analogous to the infinitive of command commonly found in military usage, e.g. 'angreifen!' 'anlegen!' etc. It may be worth while to add that the Latin interrogative command (*quid* with the imperative) is not peculiar to comedy, as grammarians have hitherto asserted or implied.² The reason, no doubt, why they have failed to see the identity of the half dozen Vergilian instances with those

the subjunctives in *loquamur an non loquamur?* are both expressions of desire, as in the Greek εἰπωμεν ἢ μὴ εἰπωμεν. The difference in the negative only shows that in Latin the subjunctive had developed somewhat in the direction of a statement, as distinct from a command, so that *loquamur* might mean 'we ought to speak,' as distinct from 'let us speak,' and *non loquamur?* 'ought we not to speak?' To suppose that we have here to do with two distinct kinds of subjunctive seems to me an exaggeration. But Prof. Elmer's treatment of this point aids in the logical analysis of these 'deliberative' questions, whether in Latin or Greek; for in Greek, too, the only way to rationalize μὴ εἰπωμεν; is to say that it means *nonne nobis loquendum est?* and the same treatment must be meted out to the interrogative imperative, Greek and Latin. I am glad of an opportunity of associating myself with the Editor of this Review (vol. xiii. p. 414 and p. 68, and vol. xv. p. 451) in a protest against the misleading term 'deliberative,' and the still more misleading 'dubitative,' as applied to these questions; I have found it a bar to understanding, because it leads to the inference that these questions must be addressed to the speaker himself; whereas, of course, they may be equally well addressed to another; and they may be questions expecting an answer just as well as rhetorical questions expecting no answer. Cf. Ter. Phorm. 540 *GE. Quid faciam?* *AN. Invenias argentum. GE. Cupio; sed id unde, edoce.* The so-called deliberative question is simply a question as to what is or was to be done, as Madvig taught us long ago.

² Dräger, for instance, in his *Historische Syntax* (I. 2, p. 327), after quoting the comedians (and, it is true, Cic. Mil. 29, 79) says 'scheint später nicht mehr vorzukommen' (!)—a statement which is the more inexplicable as he calls the *quid* a 'Steigerung' (i.e. strengthening) of the imperative; cf. his quotation of *quid redeamus* Ter. Eun. 811 among instances of hortative subjunctives in statements (p. 311).—Lewis and Short are mistaken in saying that the subjunctive with interrogative *quid* is found only in oratio obliqua, as the following table will show.

in Plautus and Terence is that they have been blinded by the translation of *quin* as 'nay more,' which, however convenient and necessary in some instances as a translation, is no analysis of the construction.¹

In the following table I have attempted to classify typical instances, and to show their relation to one another. They come from Plautus or Terence except where otherwise stated. Of the *Subjunctive* with *quin* in a simple sentence I have quoted all the instances that I know; it is strange that this construction should be so rare. *Quin* with the Imperative and Indicative are common enough in Plautus and Terence, and I have quoted only a few typical instances.

FIRST PERSON (side by side with *quin redimus*? Men. 247f, *quin abeo*? Phorm. 209, etc.):—*quin redeamus*? Eun. 811, *quin rogem*? Mil. 426, *quin feram*? Most. 614,¹ *quin ita faciam*? Capt. 856.² Doubtful instances are Poen. 1249 (A *quid*), Bacch. 1049 (MSS. *quid*).

SECOND PERSON (side by side with *quin is*? Most. 815, *quin dicis*? Men. 639, *quin tu taces*? Men. 561, *quin tu rogas*? Asin. 30, *quin curas*? Cas. 101, *quin respicis*? Men. 747, etc.):—

1. Subjunctive: *quin potius constituas*? Lucr. I 798, *quin tu aspicias*? Cic. de Rep. VI. 14 (MSS.; but Halm and Merguet read *aspicis*). Doubtful instance: Epid. 455 (A *proin*).

2. Imperative³: *quin tu i*? Cas. 755, *quin ite*? Poen. 511, *quin dic*? Andr. 45, *quin loquere*? Rud. 946, *quin tu tace*? Men. 416, *quin tu roga*? Merc. 185, *quin cura*? Mil.

¹ *Quin* in statements is simply a development of the interrogative *quin*: 'why not?' has passed into a meaning which may well be translated 'why' (not interrogative), which is equivalent sometimes to 'nay on the contrary,' sometimes to 'nay more.' The locus classicus for this usage is Plaut. Cas. 602–609, cf. Aul. 300, 302, 312; and the passage to the affirmative sense is well shown by such instances as Cas. 285 CH. *quin emittis me manus*? LY. *quin id uolo* ('why that is just what I want!'); in Merc. 764 *quin nego* may be taken either as a question with the deliberative present indicative ('why should I not deny it?') or as a statement ('nay on the contrary I deny it'): cf. ibid. 461, Capt. 589, 990. Note Merc. 322 *quin* (MSS. *qui*) *non obiurgo*, which is a negative statement.

² In these instances the verb has generally been regarded as future indicative (without note of interrogation), but I prefer the interrogative subjunctive in both passages.

³ I do not insist on the note of interrogation after these instances, though I think it suits the context in some at least of them. Still I have already admitted that *quin* loses touch with its interrogative origin in some sentences (see note ¹, *supra*, and it may do so to some extent here also.

951, *quin aspice*? Most. 172⁴: *quin sic attendite, iudices*? Cicero Mil. 29, 79, *quin tu hoc crimen aut obice aut iacere noli*? Cic. Rosc. Com. 9, 25. New instances from Vergil: *quin age*? Ecl. 3, 52, Georg. IV. 329, *quin agite et...exurrite*? Aen. V. 635, (*quin velare* Aen. III. 405?), *quin morere ut merita es ferroque averte dolorem*? Aen. IV. 547, *quin Decios...aspice*? Aen. VI. 824.

THIRD PERSON: *quin perlegerent* Aen. VI. 33, lit. 'why should they not have scanned?' is equivalent in sense to 'nay more they would have scanned.' Doubtful instances in Plautus: *quin abeat* Mil. 1125f, *quin mittat* Truc. 230 (perhaps interrogative). For instances in oratio obliqua see Lewis and Short.

(C). In the light of the above facts I imagine there can be no a priori objection to regarding a form of speech like οὐ μὴ σκώψῃς as an *interrogative prohibition* or a *question containing a prohibition*. The natural translation would then be 'why not abstain from jeering?' 'why not cease jeering?' This translation is almost a literal one if we may for the moment regard the 'abstain' or 'cease' as an imperative and 'why not' as a rough equivalent for an interrogative οὐ (= *nonne*). In Latin *quin noli illudere* is still more like the Greek. My view of the construction is perhaps confirmed by the fact that in one instance (Ar. Nub. 296) we actually find an imperative thrown in after a pair of such interrogative prohibitions: οὐ μὴ σκώψῃς (MSS.) μηδὲ ποιήσῃς ἀπερ οἱ τρυγοδαίμονες οἶδοι, ἀλλ' εὐφήμει; very much as we might have, in Latin, *quin noli illudere sed fave lingua*? I need hardly say that I do not claim οὐκ εὐφήμει standing by itself, as an actual form of interrogative speech in Greek. But I think the ἀλλά shows that the imperative is part of the sentence introduced by οὐ, as Prof. Goodwin himself says (§ 298); the sentence, in fact, is one of the double-barrelled or triple-barrelled kind, like the others with ἀλλά (Ar. Ran. 202, 462, Nub. 505, etc.); the ἀλλ' εὐφήμει comes in at the end very much as *ac suspende te*? does in the sentence beginning *quin quiescis* (or *quiesce*) Plaut. Capt. 636.

Apart from Latin analogies my theory that οὐ μὴ σκώψῃς, οὐ μὴ ληρήσῃς (MSS. Nub. 367), etc., are *questions* appears to me

⁴ In my note on this passage I wrongly followed previous grammarians in calling the construction 'peculiar to comedy.'—Among the numerous other instances of *quin* with the imperative in Plautus and Terence there are some in which the phrase is combined with *quin* and the indic., e.g. Capt. 636, Most. 815, Asin. 254 (according to the MSS.).

to justify itself. It regards οὐ μὴ σκώψῃς as simply the ordinary prohibition (μὴ σκώψῃς) thrown into interrogative form by the help of the negative οὐ (= nonne), very much as in English we may turn 'cease jeering' into 'why not cease jeering?' A certain tone of expostulation is thus given to the command. It only requires a little familiarity with this way of regarding the Greek to make it felt as a perfectly natural form of speech—just as natural as οὐ σῖγ' ἀρέξῃ; 'will you not keep silence?' as a way of expressing a *positive* command ('keep silence'). I may add that my theory fits in very well with the fact that the MSS. frequently punctuate after the οὐ (οὐ· μὴ σκώψῃς), which may show a feeling for the unity of the phrase μὴ σκώψῃς and its dependence on the οὐ. It is true that I am unable to quote any Latin or English parallel with a negative in it corresponding to the μὴ: *quin ne dixeris, quin ne dicas, quin ne dic* are, so far as I know, not found in Latin any more than 'why not not say?' is a familiar form of speech in English. But the reason may perhaps be simply this, that while Greek had its μὴ distinct in form from οὐ, Latin had formed its *quin* with a negative suffix (-*nē*) which was more similar in sound to the prohibitive negative *nē*; thus *quin ne* would be nearly as awkward in sound as the English 'why not not.' So Cicero had recourse to *quin nolī* with the infin. when he needed a prohibition (Roscoe. Com. 9, 25).

But, I shall be asked, how about the instances with the future indicative, like Eur. Bacch. 343 οὐ μὴ προσοίσεις χεῖρα βακχεύσεις δ' ἰὼν, μηδ' ἐξομώρῃ μωρίαν τὴν σὴν ἐμοί; It would be easy and justifiable to appeal to the principle of analogy: but I doubt whether it is necessary here. For there is such a thing in Greek as a future of command which may be negatived by μὴ: see examples in Goodwin, M.T. § 70: μὴ βουλήσεσθε εἰδέναι, 'do not wish to know' occurs in Demosthenes, following another future of positive command, ταύτην φυλάξετε τὴν πίστιν: so too in Lysias τοῦτο φανερόν ποιήσετε καὶ μηδεμίαν ἀδειαν δώσετε: cf. the 'deliberative' future indicative with μὴ in M.T. § 292 (πῶς μήτε ψεύσομαι:). Here the future denotes 'shall' as distinct from 'will.' In other cases Greek employs a future with οὐ to express a prohibition, and this future seems rather to denote 'will': χεῖρι δ' οὐ ψάψεις ποτέ Eur. Med. 1320. So too in English 'you will not do this,' and 'you shall not do this,' are both possible equivalents for 'don't do this.' It appears,

then, that οὐ μὴ προσοίσεις χεῖρα; may be treated on precisely the same lines as οὐ μὴ σκώψῃς; However, if anyone prefers an appeal to analogy in this case, there is nothing to bar the way. I will not labour this point; for the workings of analogy are manifold. I will confine myself to saying that inasmuch as οὐκ ἀπαλλάξῃ δόμων; with the future indicative and οὐ μὴ ἀπαλλάξῃ (or ἀπαλλαγῇς) δόμων; with the aorist subjunctive are both possible forms of speech to express a command and a prohibition respectively, they would inevitably be confused. Take, for instance, a sentence in which these two constructions stand side by side, as they well might, and let us put after οὐκ ἀπαλλάξῃ (future indicative) δόμων; the sentence καὶ μὴ πρὸς αὐλείοισιν ἔστηκὼς πύλαις ὄχλον παράσχῃς δεσπότηαι; It is obvious that the aorist subjunctive might be easily assimilated to the future indicative which precedes, and we should get the sentence as it actually stands in Eur. Hel. 437, with παρέξεις for παράσχῃς. It is possible that both analogy and the future of command may have contributed to develop this construction.

E. A. SONNENSCHIN.

P.S.—The late Mr. E. R. Wharton (*C.R.* vol. x. 1896, p. 239) regards the μὴ γένηται (or γενήσεται) in οὐ μὴ γένηται (or γενήσεται) as interrogative; but he does not take the μὴ to be the prohibitive 'not.' His translation is 'Shall it be? No,' and his theory, therefore, has little in common with mine. His μὴ is equivalent to *num*. My οὐ is equivalent to *nonne*. It is my hope that both Mr. Whitelaw and Mr. C. D. Chambers, who wrote in volumes x. and xi. of the *C.R.* on this subject, may find something to approve of in my article. Mr. Whitelaw also takes the οὐ as = *nonne* and, like Professor Jebb, insists on the importance of the sentences of the double-barrelled type; the difference between his theory and mine is well shown by his statement (vol. x. p. 240) 'If we admit the MS. evidence in Ar. Nub. 296 and 367, there is no more to say; the *interrogative theory breaks down*.' (The italics are mine.) Mr. Whitelaw may, however, be inclined to reconsider this; he himself makes no attempt to explain why the second negative should be μὴ, not οὐ. Mr. Chambers (*C.R.* vol. x. p. 150 f. and vol. xi. p. 109 f.) does not profess to advance any