character of the environment depends on the individual, there need be no scarcity of ends, and since the relation of the individuals to each other is so vital there is no occasion for conflicting interests. Consequently there is no 'struggle for existence' and therefore no natural selection as found in the organic world. However, the author disclaims any intention of implying a break in the continuity of the evolutionary process. He recognizes both the physical and teleological factors, but emphasizes the teleological factor in the higher grades of development.

Realizing certain difficulties of this position, the author raises and replies to a number of objections. Is not the adjustment of the individual to the environment imperfect because many of the ends sought are unattainable? In answer it is to be said that the environment is only responsible for the totality of ends. The choice of specific ends rests with the individual. But are not certain ends forced upon the individual, — life, for instance? Mere existence, by the majority, is given a subordinate place among the ends that govern them. Is not organic existence indispensable to the attainment of the ends of intelligence? The environment is sufficiently well adjusted to render existence possible, and furthermore the individual can transform his environment. In the extreme case where existence is cut off, we may say that the true significance of self-conscious life is not to be estimated by the length of physical existence. As to the relation of individuals to each other, the difficulties which arise on account of the fierce competition which actually exists in intelligent society are not discussed, but are declared to be not insoluble.

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Essai sur l'évolution psychologique du jugement. THÉODORE RUYSEN. Paris, Alcan, 1904. Pp. 382.

This title is misleading, for the book is by no means exclusively devoted to the study of judgment, but discusses all forms of consciousness, in the order of simple and early to complex and late, without in the least making good their claim to be considered forms of judgment. The thesis of the book is well formulated on page 242, where the author says: "In the preceding pages we have considered knowledge (*la connaissance*) as a process, no longer logical but dynamical, * * * as an adaptation of all the physico-mental organism to an external stimulus." Adaptation, the author teaches, implies both the initiation of novel reactions and the repetition of actions already performed. He defines judgment, for example (p. 48), as 'reaction, defensive or

offensive, of the organism against an environment more or less near; or else,' the author adds, 'it is the equally active attitude of the spirit towards its own internal modification.' And he describes belief (p. 328) as 'an adaptation or rather a readaptation, that is, an accommodation of hereditary or acquired habits to new cases proposed by experience.'

It should at once be granted that the book accomplishes, often very effectively, this main object. It shows, in other words, that most of the different modes of consciousness may be regarded as adaptations to environment, involving both initiation and habit. But this result has, strictly speaking, a biological rather than a psychological value. From the standpoint of analytical psychology, moreover, the shifting meaning assigned by the author to the key-word 'adaptation' renders the basal conception of the book a trivial one. Most often 'adaptation' is used in a sense purely biological and physiological to refer to motor reactions. Again, adaptation and attention are treated as if practically synonymous; more rarely, adaptation is regarded as the relation of one self to another. It is obviously futile to define the different modes of consciousness in terms of a unit of such diverse significations.

The confusion of the physiological with the psychical standpoint is shown in other ways. M. Ruysen often treats the physiological accompaniment or condition of consciousness as if identical with it. Thus, he says: "For the child to appreciate a distance is to renew the useful effort to run through it; to recognize a person is to hold its arms out to him" (p. 138). But recognition, so far as it is a psychic phenomenon, is not identical with the arm lifting, though accompanied or preceded by it, and though constituted in part by the consciousness of the lifted arm. Once, at least, the author is even guilty of arguing that because a physical condition is complex, therefore the corresponding psychic state is also complex (pp. 99-100).

Barring these fundamental criticisms, this reviewer has only commendation to offer. M. Ruysen is widely read in the literature of psychology, biology and philosophy. His book abounds in vivid description, often accompanied by keen analysis, of concrete psychic experiences. Almost at random one may cite, as of real value, the definition of the concept as the habitude of attention (pp. 148, 154); the vigorous disproof of the verbal theory of generalization (p. 151); and the decial of 'mental chemistry' (p. 142). The comparison of belief, faith and will, and the analysis of the æsthetic judgment, are particularly full of suggestiveness even to those who do not subscribe unreservedly to the author's conclusions. M. W. CALKINS.