

serious study of the conditions of actual psychological experience than his present work contains any trace of.

EDITOR.

Die Phantasie als Grundprincip des Weltprocesses. Von J. FROHSCHAMMER, Professor der Philosophie in München. München : Ackermann. 1877.

The aim of Professor Frohschammer in this, his most recent, work is twofold—scientific or psychological and philosophical. So far as the work is *psychological* it deals with the faculty of imagination or “phantasy,” its functions in relation to the intellect, will, and emotions, and altogether, the part it plays in man’s individual subjective life. So far as it is *philosophical*, it seeks first to show that the plastic principle in nature, whose products are seen in the innumerable varieties of vegetable and animal organisation, so closely resembles the subjective phantasy in its modes of operation that it may be regarded as objective phantasy ; and *secondly*, to trace out the process by which this objective phantasy, acting on inorganic matter and force, has evolved the various forms of organic existence up to and including man with his powers of sensation, perception, reasoning, self-consciousness, emotions and will. He leaves untouched the question of the origin of the world and its immanent principle of phantasy. Just as Kant and Laplace assumed the existence of matter, its forces and laws in the construction of their mechanical hypothesis of the origin of the celestial system, so the author assumes the existence of the material world in the state in which geology tells us it must have been at the beginning, leaving the problem of the whence of the phantasy and that which it moulds to metaphysics.

Both in the general introduction to his inquiry and in a critical survey of the fundamental principles of the chief philosophies of ancient and modern times, the author tries to show that there have been decided tendencies towards a view of the imagination similar to his own. In the *νοῦς* of Anaxagoras, the archetypal ideas of Plato, the *νοῦς ποιητικόν* of Aristotle, the *λόγοι σπερματικοί* of the Stoics, the *λόγος* of Philo, the *νοῦς* and the *λόγοι* of the Neo-Platonists, the emanative principle of Scotus Erigena, the monads of Leibnitz, the productive imagination of Kant, Fichte and Schelling and the will of Schopenhauer, he finds *points d'appui* for his own view. At first sight his phantasy would seem to be most akin to the *Wille* of Schopenhauer, but he objects that it is blind, thought-less, idea-less and as such could never give rise to the thoughts and ideas, consciousness and reason, whose development from the phantasy he considers it possible to trace. “The Unconscious” of v. Hartmann will also suggest itself to some ; but our author urges that though it is quite true that his “objective phantasy” is primarily unconscious, to identify it with “The Unconscious,” is to identify a positive with a negative, a something we can recognise with a nothing—with an Unknown.

The discussion is distributed into three books. The first book is occupied with the specifically psychological inquiries already referred to and with the identification of the subjective phantasy with the objective teleologico-plastic power working in nature.

Starting from the common notion of the imagination and confessing it to be too frequently a source of delusions—delusions, however, due mainly to the circumstances in which humanity is placed and to the gradualness of its development, especially in the childhood of individuals and nations, he points out how the phantasy aids us in arriving at truth by enabling the soul to form an image of the object of thought. Whether it be, as he adds, "the properly active organ in the realisation of truth," may be doubted. Further he regards memory and recollection as rooted in the phantasy and shows finally how dependent on it is all that is true in the ideals of morality, science, art and even religious faith. He then goes on to deal with what to him is the cardinal question, namely, whether this important faculty of the soul is original or derived—whether it have an independent existence first in mind and then in nature or whether it be the product of some other power or powers.

In proof of its being an original power of the *mind*, he directs attention to the facts that whilst the understanding is essentially analytical, the phantasy is synthetical; that the reason as "the faculty of higher truth" can only supply material for the plastic activity of the phantasy after the manner of the sensuous organs; that the emotional nature is formless, pictureless, whereas the phantasy works by imagining forth; and, finally, that the will *per se* is an undeterminate motive power whose direction depends on other faculties.

In support of its independent existence in *nature*, he maintains that the mode of action of the phantasy differs so completely from that of the forces of the inorganic world, whether mechanical or chemical, that it cannot be supposed to owe its origin to them: whilst, on the contrary, there is the closest affinity between its action, in working up the material supplied by the senses and the reason into forms and images for consciousness, and the action of the organic principle, in working up the matter and forces of inorganic nature into the manifold forms of the vegetable and animal kingdom. The main difference between the two is, that whilst the latter works objectively, *realiter*, though unconsciously, the former works subjectively, *idealiter*, consciously.

The most important questions discussed in the second book—and to these we must confine ourselves—are, the rise of the organic, the development of sensation, and the first dawning of the properly psychical.

What has he to tell us about that *crux*, the genesis of the organic? Opposing the theory of *generatio œquivoca* on the one hand and its supposed alternative supernatural creation on the other, he conceives it to have originated in the action of a specific principle, intermediate between the inorganic and the organic, whose existence we are required to assume by facts which neither physics nor chemistry can explain—which principle is the "objective phantasy," to which refer-

ence has already been made. This principle, he thinks, must have had its vehicle or substratum, and an environment supplying the conditions of its productive activity; but when we eagerly ask after the "primal *modus operandi* of this universal plastic principle or objective world-phantasy," we are told—"it is impossible exactly to determine it". So that all the author does is to posit a something which is neither inorganic nor organic by way of bridging over the gulf—a something which he at first, as nearly as possible, if not quite, identifies with the organic member of the antithesis! Indications of the presence and action of this principle he discovers even in the sphere of the inorganic, *e.g.*, in the peculiar combinations of chemistry, which seem to imply more than the mere collocation of the atoms affected; and in crystallisation, where a power is at work that individualises and constitutes wholes. Analogy leads to the conclusion that its first products were of the very simplest kind; but that as the phantasy itself grew through its own activity, and as the environment acquired fuller congruity, higher and more complicated organisms were evolved. It seems, however, most probable to him that these simple organisms arose in different places at the same time; and that instead of the boundless variety of species having been evolved from one primitive cell, as the school of Darwin maintains, various species of primitive organisms arose contemporaneously in different places, or even in one and the same place. Nay more, he inclines strongly to the opinion that most of the species of plants and animals came into existence at the very commencement, though they owe their individual peculiarities to the influence of their environment, and especially to the struggle for existence.

With regard to the genesis of sensation, we shall do best to quote the author's own words—words, we may remark, which seem to us to lack his usual clearness. "As the rise of inwardness (*Innerlichkeit*) or of the psychical nature of sensation cannot be explained from without, it must needs be shown to arise from within, namely, out of an immanent potency and tendency which actualises and unfolds itself by means of action on, and reaction from, external surroundings. By the aid of the power of organic formation, the psychical power of imagination is evolved in the form, first, of the capability of perceiving the sensuous corporeality and the affections and states which are congruous or opposed to its idea. Between this inward, psychical, subjective side of the body (*i.e.*, the soul) and the body proper, the sensible nerves are the mediatory links." "When the objective phantasy has unfolded its essential nature up to a certain point in the development of a determinate kind of sensuous organisation, it arrives at or gains the inwardness of its own nature, and accordingly becomes psychical and subjective in its intercourse, on the one hand, with nature, on the other, with its own powers and needs." This seems to us to be rather a roundabout way of telling us that the genesis took place, than an elucidation of the actual manner of it. The author has grappled with what is perhaps to man now an insoluble problem—and with the usual result.

As far as men are concerned he thinks they may have arisen in two ways. Either one or several of the original organisms, or even the "primal organism itself," had the inherent tendency to develop into man, and the lower forms of organic life thrown off, as it were, in the course of the progress upwards, were subordinate and preparatory to the final outcome as the leaves of a plant are subordinate to the fruit; or some one or several primitive organisms were exclusively endowed with the tendency in question.

In tracing out the dawn of the psychical or, as it is termed, the subjective phantasy, he lays stress on the state of being awake as alternating with the state of sleep, which he characterises as "a great step towards the attainment of subjective *Geistigkeit*". This waking state he describes as "pure form, and, as it were, a shining of an inner, psychical sort". "Consciousness," again, "is the light which shines forth out of the waking state."

We must now, however, pass on to the third book, which aims at showing how the various so-called faculties of the human mind were developed out of the subjective phantasy, until this same phantasy differentiated itself into a distinct faculty alongside of the rest—distinct especially from the understanding. The psychological discussions of the second book are mainly animal; those of the third book are distinctively anthropological.

A point on which the author lays great stress, in this part of his inquiry, is what he terms the "psychical organism". As the objective phantasy, whilst still purely objective, forms for itself a corporeal organisation; so that same objective phantasy after having developed into subjective phantasy forms for itself a psychical organisation, distinct from, elevated above, and yet most closely interwoven with and conditioned by the corporeal organisation. In it the physical laws and forms of the corporeal organisation are transfigured into logical laws and categories. This higher organism is the sole direct object of self-consciousness, as distinguished from consciousness—which explains, he thinks, why man has so little direct knowledge of his own corporeal organism.

We should have liked to consider this idea of the psychical organism—which is one of considerable importance—more at length; further to give an account of the mode in which the development of the understanding and will in particular is worked out; and to criticise various points, as *e.g.*, the differentiation of the subjective phantasy into a separate faculty co-ordinate with other differentiations of itself; but we must hasten on to describe the general impression made by the entire work.

The author's style is in general unusually clear, direct, and interesting; but this work bears marks of haste, both of a formal and material kind. We refer, for example, to the frequent recurrence of clauses of sentences punctuated as complete sentences; to the numerous anticipatory expositions of points whose full discussion is given in a later connection; to the constant recapitulations of former arguments; and to the habit of turning aside for attacks on theology and the Church.

With respect to the substance of the treatise—whilst we cheerfully allow that there are numerous subtle observations and valuable hints anent the various problems passed in review, we cannot say that he has succeeded, to our satisfaction, in the task undertaken, namely, in bridging over the gulfs which for human thought still yawn between the various stages in the great process of mundane development. We are still unable to discover the links connecting the inorganic with the organic, the vegetable with the animal, life with sensation, sensation with self-consciousness. In each case he seems to conduct us first to the one edge of the gulf and then to the other, and we strain our eyes to see across, and put forth every effort to effect a communication between the opposing sides, but in vain. The problems to be solved are frequently put more exactly than by other writers—which is a great merit—but they are not solved.

With the effort to work out a theory of inward as distinguished from outward evolution, and to get at some principle immanent in, though distinct from, the inorganic bases of the cosmos, through whose action on those inorganic bases the marvellous cosmic development has been effected, according to laws congruous to the several stages in the inner growth of the principle—with this effort we have the greatest sympathy. Therefore, although we doubt the appropriateness of the designation “Phantasy” given by Professor Frohschammer to this principle, we thank him for his work, and commend it to the careful attention of all who are interested in the attainment of a true philosophy of nature.

D. W. SIMON.

VIII.—NOTES.

Some Questionable Propositions in Ferrier's 'Institutes'.—The questionable propositions of some men are more worthy of thoughtful consideration than the most unquestionable deliverances of some others. Ferrier's doubtful utterances on philosophic matters belong to the former class. Had I been less conscious than I am of the epoch-marking significance of the *Institutes*—of the remarkable originality of the book, of its rare philosophic insight, its fine dialectical skill, its eloquence, its manly robust vigour, and its moral courage in driving unpalatable truths to their last issues—I should have had some hesitation in making the following animadversions on several disputable points that turn up in the course of his argumentation. But he has so remorselessly laid bare, and has handled with such a fierce kind of philosophic horse-play, the contradictions involved in his opponents' Counter-Propositions, that an attempt, much more gently made, to expose the fallacies lurking in several of his own Propositions pitted against these will scarcely be considered ungenerous or unjust. He has triumphantly made good his master-thesis—the indissoluble relation of subject and object in all cognition and in all existence—and has thrown himself with overwhelming force on the