the psychical, and the two follow a similar process of development, in which three distinct stages may be noted. The first and inferior form of sanction is automatic in character, and arises where the systematization is but slight; the final form is also automatic, but superior in this that the systematization is far greater. There is an intermediary stage of a conscious form of sanction, where preparation is made simultaneously or successively for the superior automatism. This is accomplished by the growth and synthesis of the new elements which are to enter into the final stage, and by the coordination of the acquisitions already made, and also by the more active intervention of the social ego which has not regularly interposed in the first stage, and which in the final one is represented by the general solidity of the elements of the system. The sanction is more perfect in proportion as the good is more simply encouraged and the evil more simply restrained, and the greater, the precision, without employing intermediaries merely to apply the sanction. The penal sanction is therefore indirect and incomplete. The perfect natural sanction, without intention of reward or punishment, is the best and highest form. F. Paulhan, in short, regards the moral sanction as a particular case of natural selection, in the conservation of the good, and the elimination of the evil. It seems to me, however, that the conscious feature of the intermediate stage in the development of the moral sanction from inferior to superior automatism, implies a voluntary psychical factor which is quite foreign to natural selection. In this stage would appear reflection, deliberation, conflict of desires, the various manifestations of moral feeling, etc., all of which must either be explained away, or their importance unduly minimized if F. Paulhan's account is to stand. Moreover his designation of sanctions as just, or unjust, introduces ideas whose metaphysical implications are incompatible with a naturalistic ethic.


The author contends that there is a difference between a theory of morals and moral practice. The latter antedates the former and gives form and content to it. The early moral, and religious practices as well, have preeminently a social character. Even the conception itself of moral good implies the conception of a social good. Morality is not merely a matter of the intention; and even if it were, the intention must be regarded as having very complex antecedents, and as a part of an extended system showing a solidarity in the act and in the intention, and a still more complex solidarity
of act and intention taken together. Morality is rather the product of sociability, producing social instincts, appearing in the form of customs, moral practices, and finally a theory of morals. As health is the harmony of organic functions, morality is the harmonious manner in which the reciprocal relations of social beings is established. Immorality is social disease.

There is no intuitive moral law before experience, for there is experienced morality before the consciousness of moral law began to dawn. This is abundantly established by the marked sociability among animals and an unbroken line of development from the social instincts of the lowest order of animals to the reflective morality of the most highly civilized man. Morality is, therefore, the result of the social and moral evolution of the race. The unconscious solidarity of social animals, the morality of the Fuegians and Tasmanians, and the advanced morality of our age, all have the common elements of reciprocity and mutual dependence. Even in the life of to-day conscious morality is the exception, and automatic, instinctive morality is the rule. Reflection, questionings of conscience, deliberations of the will, all mark a derangement of the natural moral functioning. Therefore, since morality is developed, it is necessary to go to the simplest and earliest forms of its manifestation to discern its essential character. Beginnings of morality emerge in the necessities of hunger, defense, reproduction, etc.; this is true also for all social animals. In history morality develops parallel to social organization. The force of obligation and of moral sanction lie in the appreciation of the end—conservation of the species and the race. Intelligence becomes more and more aware of the necessity and advantage of solidarity. Moral sentiments are accounted for, inasmuch as the organic functional character of morality is such as to form an integral part of our social vitality, and cannot be disturbed or inhibited without results disturbing it and the unity of action of all our functions. The genesis of social conscience arises through a differentiation of the nervous system especially adapted to the reception of social excitations, as the sense of sight results from a nervous differentiation especially adapted to receive luminous vibrations. Morality is conformable to the same general laws of differentiation, and of coördination, and adaptation and organization, as our other forms of physiological and psychological activity.

Dr. Pioger, as it will be seen, takes a point of view similar to that of F. Paulhan. His article contains also several unwarranted inferences. While it is true that the lower order of animals, the
morality of the Fuegians, and that of the most highly civilized peoples, may contain the common element of sociability, still that common element represents a minimum which is quite inadequate to express completely the essential features of morality. Prof. Edward Caird's contention in reference to the evolution of religion has a similar application to ethic: "that we must read development backward and not forward, and that we must find the key to the meaning of the first stage in the last; for to trace a living being back to its beginning, and to explain what follows from it by such a beginning, would be simply to omit almost all that characterizes it, and then to suppose that in what remains we have the secret of its existence." While morality may be necessarily concerned with social relations, it may quite as well give law to qualify and transform these relations, as that these relations should determine wholly the character of the emerging laws. That moral practices existed before formulated laws does not prove that the laws were not existent, implicitly at least; nor can it be inferred that the laws were merely a classification or a summation of these practices.


The most fundamental ethical question is the following: What is the supreme Ideal of human life? An answer to this implies an answer to other questions dependent upon it,—the meaning and significance of moral authority; the ultimate criterion of morality in conduct, the connotation of the conception of right; and the proximate criterion, the denotation of right. The question of there being an ultimate ideal is an ontological one; it is the question of the nature and purpose of the individual life. The ideal is regulative, not in the sense of showing us what is to be done, but that *something must be done.* Ideas of the concrete forms of duty come from sociological and historical studies, which, however, belong rather to the sphere of practical or applied ethics. In the analysis of our judgments we find some depending on a standard of truth, but others depending upon a standard of value. The latter from two classes; one, which is formed independently of the will, aesthetic judgments; the other, are ethical judgments depending on a standard of right; that is, on a meaning or purpose in our lives. The motive which prompts us to seek for standards of value in these three respects is experienced under the form of feeling. The standard is felt as an obligatory ideal; in thought, as an ideal of truth; in conduct and character, of goodness; in (creative) art, of beauty. Natu-