A REPLY TO PROFESSOR BAILLIE.

Owing to my approaching departure from this country the Editor has kindly permitted me to make an immediate reply to Prof. Baillie's 'Notes' on my criticism of his book.

These 'Notes' make it quite clear that in philosophical matters Prof. Baillie and I do not see eye to eye. But I am distressed to find that our disagreement is largely due to the fact that we seem to attach different meanings to the same terms. At least—since I have no wish to return Prof. Baillie's charge about 'cursory attention to the argument'—that is the only assumption on which I can explain to myself the misunderstandings of my criticism of which Prof. Baillie has himself been guilty. In justice to myself I feel bound to point these out.

(1) In the second half of his reply, Prof. Baillie attributes to me the view 'that consciousness must be looked on as a bare form'. Now so far from my having suggested this view as a 'correction' of Prof. Baillie's own view, it is exactly the objection which I tried to raise against his view. This, I still maintain, is the clear meaning of the passage in MIND, N.S. xvi., 64, pp. 564-65. The statement which I there criticised, viz., that 'the diversity lies in the two elements distinguished, viz., consciousness and a somewhat or objects,' seemed to me to imply this false view of consciousness as a bare form, and therefore to be in contradiction to Prof. Baillie's own original definition of consciousness as essentially an 'awareness of somewhat'. I am glad to be told that Prof. Baillie does not commit the error in question, but I fail to see on what grounds he charges me with it. Apparently Prof. Baillie uses 'consciousness' as synonymous with 'subject'. But the subject, I take it, can distinguish itself from the object only in so far as it becomes an object to itself, so that the distinction between them would fall into the total objective content of consciousness.

(2) Prof. Baillie's footnote on my treatment of the 'general will' rests wholly on a misapprehension of the meaning of 'idea' in my statement that the general will is for the individual citizen 'an idea of which he is conscious as being pursued by himself in common with the majority of his fellow-citizens'. Perhaps I failed to make clear that I had in mind Mr. Bradley's definition of will as the 'realisation of an idea'. I was trying to describe the joint effort and co-operation of individuals for the realisation of the same idea,
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e.g., a certain piece of social reform. If the passage is interpreted in this light, it will be seen that Prof. Baillie's criticisms fall to the ground.

(3) As for the 'self-consciousness of society as such,' I do not deny either that society is an 'individuality' in the sense of being a 'system,' or that it is, as Prof. Baillie called it in his book, an 'order of self-conscious individual wills,' but—without pleading guilty to the charge of 'defective moral experience'—I still remain unconvinced that from this basis we can argue that society as such is a self-consciousness. The maintenance, e.g., of customs and traditions seems to me to depend solely on the obedience and recognition which they receive from the individual members of the society, though in most cases this obedience will rest on education and habit rather than on deliberate adoption and choice. However, on this point both Prof. Baillie and I have had our say, and now I would gladly see the discussion taken up by others.

In fact, it was in this hope of raising a fresh discussion of the fundamental doctrines of idealism that I wrote so elaborate a criticism of Prof. Baillie's book. I welcome Prof. Baillie's 'Notes' as the first beginnings of such a discussion, even though they have left me wishing that he had dealt with many other points besides.

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