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LECTURE.

Friday, February 1st, 1867.

COLONEL SIR T. TROUBRIDGE, Bart., C.B., D.A.G., in the Chair.

ON THE BEST MODE OF RECRUITING FOR THE ARMY.

By Captain NOAKE, Adjutant, Scottish Borderers Militia.

I AM so deeply sensible of the extreme importance and difficulty of the subject on which I am to have the honour of addressing you this afternoon—How to Recruit our Army being, I may almost say, the problem of the day—that I must at the outset bespeak your indulgence for any shortcomings on my part. Nothing could have induced me to come forward on the present occasion but the deep interest I have for many years taken in the soldier's welfare, and the hope I entertain that my humble suggestions may be criticised and sifted, to the advantage both of the Army and of the State.

When we take a comprehensive view of the present crisis, we cannot but look upon it as a warning sent in the time of peace, so that we may deliberate and wisely determine how to be better prepared in war, with an efficient Army in the field and with a reserve of trained soldiers irrespective of the Militia. As a help to this end, I shall first go into those influences which, in my opinion, bear injuriously upon recruiting: viz., inadequacy of pay and pensions, our Good Conduct code, the abolition of bounties, and the operation of the Limited Service (or 'Ten Years') Act. I will then submit that which I consider the best mode of recruiting. I shall, of course, have to refer frequently to the recommendations of the Recruiting Commission, shortly to be laid before Parliament.

First then, I shall speak of those influences which have undermined the present recruiting fabric, and will, I feel confident, unless removed, do still further harm.

Pay.

I was induced to collect much of the information contained in this Lecture from reading a statement made in debate on the Army Estimates of 1865, viz.: "that, through the fixed price paid for his rations, the soldier had now more pay by one penny a-day than he had formerly." This statement—a thoroughly erroneous one, except so far as applied to a short period after the Irish famine—was unfortunately allowed to pass unchallenged by the then Secretary of State for War, and so went forth to the world, only to leave a false impression on the public mind. I proceed to refute it:—nay, more, to prove that the soldier has even less pay than formerly.

Out of the Infantry soldier's pay of 1s. 1d. a-day, his compulsory payments for bread, meat, vegetables, coffee, sugar, keeping up his kit, washing, barrack damages, sheet washing, blacking, soap, &c., average about	9 $\frac{3}{4}$ d.
The following payments are not compulsory, but the little luxuries they provide are within the reach of every hale and hearty young labourer: viz., tobacco; and butter, or cheese, or a herring, for breakfast and supper	2 $\frac{1}{2}$ d.
There will thus remain to the soldier, for pocket-money or for beer	$\frac{3}{4}$ d.
Total.....	1s. 1d.

Were we to examine, at this moment, the ledgers of any Infantry regiment in the service, we should find scores of instances where for one month, and probably, in some cases, two, or even three months together, men have only received 1d. a-day; so that if that penny were spent in tobacco—and I have known a man to give away his dinner for tobacco—they could only have had dry bread for breakfast and supper all that time. There are hundreds of men in the Army who will only receive 1d. a-day all this present month.

And here I would mention—to show how statements are made at random—that an Officer writing on recruiting, in the December number of *Macmillan's Magazine*, asserts that the soldier has substantial rations, consisting of three meals a-day, and is left with a balance in his favour of about 4d. a-day; the fact being, that two of the three meals consist, as I have shown, of dry bread and coffee, while the third stands condemned by the Commissioners as insufficient; and the "balance," when scrutinized, turns out to be the imposing sum of three farthings!

The following calculations were made from the Army Estimates of 1844 and 1865, and other reliable sources, to show what really has been done for the soldier in the last twenty-one years, the period of a soldier's service.

It would not be convenient to go more deeply into figures just now.

In 1814 the soldier paid for his ration of bread and meat $3\frac{1}{2}d.$	} Now he pays $4\frac{1}{2}d.$, or $\pounds 1\ 16s.\ 9d.$ a year more.
Then he paid $\frac{1}{4}d.$ for his pound and half of potatoes.	
Then he paid $\frac{1}{2}d.$ each for his two oz. of butter for breakfast and supper.	
	} Now he pays $\frac{3}{4}d.$, or $15s.$ a year more.
	} Now he pays $1d.$ each, or $\pounds 1\ 10s.$ a year more.

After deducting from the total of these sums ($\pounds 1\ s.\ 9d.$) his gain, through the reduced price of groceries, of $18s.$, we find his actual loss to be $\pounds 3\ 8s.\ 9d.$

Multiply this by 79,000 (the number of men serving in the United Kingdom), and we find that the Army is paying more for the common necessaries of life than it did twenty-one years ago by $\pounds 271,562$. Add to this the $\pounds 6$ a-year each to be deducted for the 15,000 men on the reduced pension, together with their loss through the difference in the value of money, and we find the Army a loser to the extent of $\pounds 361,562$ a-year.

Now how do the Commissioners propose making up this loss, in part, to the soldier? Not by a direct increase of pay, but by supplying him with articles in kind. This, at first sight, may appear quite an immaterial distinction; yet it is a point of vital importance, and the proposed plan would act, I think, most unjustly. It would still leave the Army, as a body, open to the taunting question of the civilian, "Who would work for $1s$ a day?" It would be unjust to the country, as this $1s.$ a day does more harm to recruiting, than showers of circulars, distributed through magistrates and parish-ministers, will ever remove. It would be unfair to the poor married soldier, as he cannot possibly afford to consume $1\ lb.$ of meat in his family daily. It would be unjust to the economical, steady soldier, as it would deny him the privilege of putting money in the Savings' Bank, by being careful of his clothing. (And, having mentioned clothing, I would remind you that, though it is well known that many men wear out their clothing half as fast again as others, we still cling to the periodical issue of clothing. Many officers; I know, approve of it from the laudable desire to see their men look smart; but it must be in the experience of many to have witnessed a particular regiment in garrison, or troop or company in a regiment, where the men have been more discontented than those around them—the cause frequently being that all men alike are compulsorily supplied with an expensive article of clothing whether they require it or not).

I have proved that the soldier is paying more for his subsistence, by nearly $2\frac{1}{2}d.$ a day, than he did twenty-one years ago. Pay him back this, and his pay would be $1s.\ 3\frac{1}{2}d.$ a day; the shoes and half trousers given him gratis since 1814, together with jacket, half cap, and the additional $\frac{1}{2}\ lb.$ of meat recommended by the Commissioners, represent a money value of $2\frac{1}{2}d.$ a day more—in all $1s.\ 6d.$ a day. Out of this $1s.\ 6d.$ let the soldier be charged $6d.$ a day for his ration, and also for every article of his extra clothing, the same as for his necessaries; this would encourage thoughtfulness and economy, and would be a

source of satisfaction and contentment. It would cost England no more, and would save her in appearance from driving so hard a bargain with her troops. For any sum less than 1s. 6d. a day it is hopeless to think of keeping our ranks complete.

Our Good-Conduct Code.

Our Good-Conduct Regulations, again, exercise a prejudicial influence on our recruiting. Those Regulations are, I think, in too many instances, open to the charge of being weak in conception, faulty in principle, and capricious in their working.

They are weak in conception, as they were designed to restrain the drunkard and absentee, the very men who would rejoice in extra pay could they get it; but who, practically, never try, and never hope to get it. Such men are kept in order by the power vested in the Commanding Officer, without any other aid whatever. The moderately good soldier, for whom the Regulations were not originally intended, and who did not require them, is the only one whom they benefit. They make the paymasters' accounts more intricate, give triple work in the orderly-room, and convert Captains and Commanding Officers into common clerks by obliging them personally to record the most trifling punishments.

They are faulty in principle. The man who aided in suppressing the Indian mutiny, perhaps fought seven or eight battles, wears the medal for distinguished conduct in the field, whom his captain knows to be a thoroughly good and brave though thoughtless soldier, sees his medal robbed of all its charm when, it may be, an incorrigible young scamp of three years' service is getting extra pay because he has just contrived to keep out of the regimental defaulters' book. A man may be thoroughly bad, yet get extra pay, and wear distinguishing marks for good conduct, nay, get extra pension, and a good character on discharge.

They are capricious in their working. Many men with three or four distinguishing marks for good conduct have returned from India, after suppressing the mutiny, to complete their service of two or three years, in the full hope of enjoying for life the benefits which these badges are said to convey, and which these same Regulations proclaim that every faithful soldier deserves. Yet from change of scene or circumstances, or from some other cause, they have committed themselves and lost their badges. They have thus paid in forfeited pension a fine of not less than £30 for each offence, their former nineteen or twenty years of exemplary conduct availing them nothing; and this in addition to undergoing the punishment necessary to enforce discipline. I have heard of men losing all four badges in the last year of their service, thus forfeiting £120. Will such men aid in the recruiting of our Army?

I would respectfully and earnestly ask the Officers of the Army, as a body, to consider the effect of protracted uncertainty upon the minds

and tempers of their men; the wrong inflicted upon the loyal heart, rough-hewn though that heart be; the effect of ignoring the noblest virtue that can animate a soldier's breast, true courage, by placing Routine in the front rank, chivalric dash and manly hardihood in the rear.

I witnessed the establishment of the Good Conduct Code, and for many years assisted in the orderly-room to carry out its provisions, and my opinion of it has never once changed.

I would here suggest—

That the soldier should have but one distinguishing mark: his medal for being in action.

That payment, as an indirect bribe to keep out of the defaulters' book, be at once abolished. Good behaviour is part of a soldier's duty; besides, the power vested in the Commanding Officer is sufficient to restrain the worst men in a regiment without the aid of such machinery.

That, instead, extra pay for length of service be granted: 1*d.* a day after seven, and 2*d.* after fourteen years' service.

That no man be deprived of his extra pay unless he be disgraced and passed to the second class.

That no man in the second class receive extra pay.

That time in the second class shall not count for extra pay, but previous service shall not be forfeited by being in the second class.

The advantages of this system would be that the soldier would be more contented while serving, knowing his extra pay to be a certainty.

Abolition of Bounties.

The advanced education of the day is, indirectly, another link in the drag-chain of our recruiting. The annual payment of wages in this country is over £300,000,000. It is now known, even by the fighting class, that the old household word "A veteran's shilling a day pension" is but a snare; and this knowledge keeps the thinking men from joining. The serjeant has not even bounty to offer. Yet bounty is but the earnest in the bargaining for life and limb, and a custom so old, so universal, and such a necessity in this profession of war, that I wonder how any one, even though regretting the system, could propose to abolish it. The Commissioners themselves, while opposed to the system, recommend bounties to induce men to re-engage in India. It may be argued that bounties are detrimental to discipline. Granted; but is not the tenderly-handled "Ten Years' Act," with its increased number of young soldiers and its striplings in stripes, still more so? Where 100 experienced non-commissioned officers left the Army in 1858, about 500 left in 1865. Will their successors, with much less experience, know so well *how* to command men; to study their varied tempers and dispositions; watch over, guide, restrain, and bear with follies and failings? Will they command the same respect, and be such stays to discipline?

The "Ten Years' Act."

The Limited Service (or Ten Years') Act is another, and perhaps the immediate, cause of our being so short-handed. For however thoughtless and reckless a man may be when he enlists, his spirit will inevitably be toned down by ten years of discipline; at the same time he will have learnt to set a higher value on his capabilities. Is he likely to re-engage for 1s. a-day, and only one-half the pension given to his comrade in 1854, when he can leave and share in the £300,000,000 paid for wages? No; so looking upon himself as an injured man, he turns his back upon the Service, resolved to persuade every young fellow in his neighbourhood to shun the Army, where, he says, there is not a fair wage for a fair day's work.

The injurious influence which these discontented men exercise on the recruiting can scarcely be estimated; and it is increasing daily, as they take their discharge. What else can we expect when England, not disdaining to take advantage of their thoughtless improvidence, their poverty, their ignorance, and the adventurous spirit which prompts them to break away from the dead level of a village life, dictates to them such terms as these:—"Our agreement shall be that you give me the best ten years of your life; that you be ready at all times, with your life in your hand, to do battle with my enemies, to guard my honour, and extend my trade; that all that time you shall follow no other occupation, or do anything to provide for a rainy day, to lay by anything for the time when your constitution is impaired, or the infirmities of age creep on you. In return for all this, I engage to feed and house you, but should you be cut off by battle, by shipwreck, or by disease, neither wife, nor child, nor mother shall have any claim upon me. Should you survive these dangers, I will keep you on the tenter-hooks of suspense, by not promising to take you on again. I may, or may not, give you at parting a good character; but in any case I shall send you back to your native village in regimentals, with 5s. in your pocket to provide food and lodging until you can get work: for clothes, you may find them as you can."

Now this is literally England's present agreement with the soldier; surely it is not to be the agreement of the future?

To remedy so great an anomaly, there must be a compromise: the country must make the advance. Can we call it an advance to add, as proposed, two years to the soldier's first period of service? To show the havoc made with the constitution, even with the present term: in the three years ending 1865, we had 42,457 recruits finally approved, while in the same period we lost by death, or invaliding, 24,971—more than 50 per cent.

I would suggest:—

1. *That the Ten Years' Act be repealed; and that in future all men be enlisted for twenty-one years; but—*

2. *That any man may claim his discharge at the end of fourteen years; it being at the same time imperative that he join an Army of Reserve, in*

which he shall serve fourteen years more ; then to be finally released with a pension of a shilling a day. It should be borne in mind that, owing to the difference in the value of money, 9d. a day twenty or thirty years ago was a better pension than 1s. is now.

3. *That soldiers who serve twenty-one years in the Active Army be finally discharged with 1s. a day pension.*

The soldier's pension is but a lottery, at best, as there are five chances to one against his living and serving twenty-one years, so as to get even the minimum rate. Before he can obtain the maximum rate, he must comply with the condition of keeping out of the defaulters' book. How much better to name a sum, though a less one, which every recruit's mind could grasp, and every soldier look upon as a certainty.

To confirm my statement that there are five chances to one against the soldier living and serving so as to be entitled to length of service pension, I would state that out of all the men who enlisted in the years 1842, 1843, 1844, only 2,000 were discharged in 1863, 1864, and 1865 respectively, after having completed their full service of twenty-one years. It would be an instructive return that would show how many of these 2,000 men annually receive the maximum rate, and how many of the recipients were Officers' servants, working men, bandsmen, and others, who have greater liberty, and are not so closely looked after. My own conviction is, that nine-tenths of them are of that class, and only one-tenth of the hard-working duty soldiers. Surely there need not be so much cavilling about the rate of pension when so few get the pension at all.

4. *That men be allowed to purchase their discharge freely, at such a price as shall pay back their enlisting and other expenses ; and, if at home, to find a substitute.*

By this system the soldier would have the option, which he has not at present, of taking on again ; and the services of every man, in one shape or another, would be secured for twenty-one years. We should, moreover, save the expense of bringing men home for discharge.

While paying the soldier a very moderate pension for his fourteen years' service, we should ultimately get an Army of Reserve (which a fortnight's drill would at any time render efficient) without its costing one farthing ; for the men need not even be clothed, the only necessary parade being their quarterly muster to receive their pensions—the Staff for their payment is already in existence. Finally, our discharged men would be examples to the youth of their villages of what the country does for the soldier, instead of, as now, being a standing warning against enlistment.

Pardon a short digression. It has often struck me that the cause of recruiting is not assisted by the disparaging tone in which some military men who contribute to the Magazines allow themselves to speak of the soldier. I am free to confess that the result of the system introduced by Charles II. and his immediate successors, jealous of the constitutional forces, of depending for support on foreign mercenaries, and the impressment into the ranks of the refuse of our jails, was that the character of the soldier fell to zero. The desperate nature of these men, and the terrible discipline necessary to keep

them in order, caused every mother to look upon her son as lost when he enlisted.

All this, however, has long since been changed considerably for the better. Why not then appeal to the patriotism and encourage the pride that lurks beneath the pluck of our fighting class; why not rouse the martial spirit of our Army by dwelling on its matchless prowess, rather than speak of our soldiers as the off-scourings of our cities? Such language not only degrades the Army in the eyes of foreign nations; it lowers it in the opinion of the community, and thus damages the recruiting.

The favourite cry of our military Magazine writers is "a better class of men." Now who is it that is dissatisfied with the soldier? It cannot be the country, now upon her knees soliciting his services. Is it a Napier, who pays him such a noble tribute in his regrets?—"I should have won my promotion by being first in the breach, had not a man of my own company dashed in before me." Is it a M'Gregor or a Florence Nightingale, both of whom dwell in language so eloquent on his affection and devotion? In what particular, then, is the soldier deficient? The stamp of men we have is the only one we are ever likely to get, and well they fulfil the conditions of their hire. Gauge them as you will, measure them by any continental standard, and they are giants clothed with victory.

With the same gallant Officers to lead and guide, would the Indian strife have been more nobly sustained or sooner terminated; would the basis of Indian prosperity have been more permanently laid, or the sword have bound her to England with a stronger tie, had the 30,000 in the ranks who accomplished that mighty task been taken from the upper educated million instead of from the lower?

To my countrymen I would say: If you are not prepared to pay substitutes to fight for you, you must fight yourselves. Your not being able to get men to risk their lives for you for 1s. a day need cause no wonder. Why deny the soldier the right to participate with you in the general prosperity of the country? One-third of your surplus revenue would meet the difficulty. Try the very moderate sum of 1s. 6d. a day; if that sum does not answer, increase it. Only make the enlisting mart as attractive as that for labour, and men will flow into it like a river.

The Report, with all respect be it spoken, places the Commissioners in the position of a witness who tells the truth, but not the whole truth.

They tell us of the gain to the soldier through the reduced price of his groceries; but they do not tell us that his loss is five times greater through the dearness of his other provisions.

To combat the strong opinion in favour of retaining the "ten years' men" which pervades the minds of the Officers of the Army, they give a return to show that, while the casualties from all causes in the five years ending 1865 were 93 per thousand, only 14 were limited service men. But they do not say that the Act would not be in full force for eleven years after the commencement of the return (*i.e.*, until 1870).

But what does this return really prove with regard to the working of the Act? Absolutely nothing: while it tends to create an impression unduly favourable to it. For, on reference to another return in the Appendix to the Report, we find that exactly one-half of the time-expired men took their discharge in India; *this* is the return to prove the working of the Act, and it confirms the opinions entertained by the officers of the Army. To show how gradually, yet how surely, the evil of the Act is progressing, in 1863 there were 1,927; in 1864, 3,592; and in 1865, 6,088 men who declined to re-engage. This, doubtless, will go on increasing until the climax is reached in 1870.

They tell us that there is a deficiency in the number of recruits; but they do not tell us that the deficiency is probably 18,000. This, I think, I shall make clear from returns which I hold in my hand. In the three years ending 1865 there were 42,497 recruits finally approved, while the casualties from all causes, in the same period, numbered 61,474, thus leaving a deficiency of 17,977. Should the same deficiency have occurred in 1866 as in 1865 (and doubtless it is even greater), we are wanting at this moment 26,000 men, and in the present year it will be 34,000. From this we have to take the late nominal reduction, provided there was no deficiency in 1862.

Nor is this the worst part of it. This 34,000 would be full 50,000 (or one-fourth of the whole Army) had we not, since the Indian mutiny, continued a war tax upon our manhood in taking men one inch, and for a short time, two inches lower in height than we have done in peace, for the last century, except when raising reserve or 2nd battalions. So that in case of war, we have not now the men between 5 ft. 5 in. and 5 ft. 6 in. to fall back upon. Nearly one-half of our recruits are now under 5 ft. 6 in., hence such a number of boys.

PROPOSED SYSTEM.

The best system of recruiting is that which shall procure the greatest number of men at the least cost per head. The foundation of the system must be, as at present, the giving and receiving the earnest or enlisting-money, and the completion of the agreement before a civil magistrate, in taking the oath of allegiance. I beg to call your attention particularly to this last point, that enlistment is not purely a military transaction—it is on a civil foundation that the superstructure must be built.

The Commissioners, after deploring the failure of the present system to develop the military resources of the country, go on to enumerate the advantages which a military career presents, and to recommend further privileges—scarcely one of which, however, can be appreciated by the recruit, and which, taken together, will probably fail to induce any more men to re-engage.

They then say that the high rate of wages is undoubtedly the obstacle to recruiting, to be removed only by higher pay; but, notwithstanding, they would seek a remedy in patching up the present organization. They would multiply almost indefinitely the number of commissioned Officers, back them up with non-commissioned

Officers and the Militia, and establish large depôts for the reception of recruits.

The appointment of the additional Officers would be a useless expense, the rather that their regiments would receive no benefit from their services; the depôts would be costly and almost useless, unless we had recruits in excess of the establishment.

As the Commissioners recommend having recourse to the assistance of the Militia, I shall here say a few words about that service in connection with recruiting.

For the information of the uninitiated, I may explain that for every man enlisted there is an allowance of 5s. to the subdivision Officer for clerking, postage, stationery, and other incidental expenses, and partly, perhaps, as a slight remuneration for extra duty.

As the Staff Officers of Pensioners and Adjutants of Militia act as Subdivision Officers, every recruit enlisted by their men reduces the allowance of some other Officer; for instance, I am myself an Adjutant of Militia, and were the recruits not enlisted by my serjeant, the recruiting party in the town would secure them, to the benefit of the district Adjutant. Some years ago the Militia did recruit, but long before the order was given to discontinue doing so, I had ceased to take any interest in the matter, from the want of that cordiality and support necessary to carry on my duties properly.

Nor do I think this will be wondered at when I relate the few following instances of the working of the present system, out of many that have come under my notice:—

Two of my own men enlisted for a regiment of the Line which had just completed its establishment; of this last fact I was not aware until I had reported their enlistment to the district and received for reply, "The men are not to be forwarded, as the corps is not open to recruiting." As the men's pay was running on, and I had no power to discharge them, I wrote for instructions, but was merely told there were no instructions to give. I was thus driven to commit the irregularity of writing direct to the Adjutant-General, who ordered the men to join their regiment.

Another man was rejected for being, as alleged, marked with the letter D, but having known him from a lad, I was convinced that he had never been in the Army, and on his return had him prosecuted before the civil court, where it was proved on oath that he was not marked and that he had never been in the service. I was obliged to take this step to recover the expenses.

Another man enlisted with the consent of the Commandant, but from the mistake of a clerk his printed "release" was wrongly dated; for this he was rejected at the district, although the writing of a letter would have set right the error, and although there is a general order saying that such an irregularity is of no importance provided the release is subsequently obtained. The Officer of Pensioners thinking the Inspecting Field Officer's decision final in such cases, never moved in the matter, and so lost the expenses, while the service lost a good soldier. This same Officer had a man rejected for being half an inch too tall: another man, on being rejected, went back home, was immediately picked up

by a guardsman, and is now serving. One man, enlisted by a pensioner, was rejected at one district for being marked for desertion, went to another district, and there was passed.

As such rejections almost invariably throw the expenses on the sub-division Officer, it need not surprise any one should he avoid running these risks by objecting to pass men whom he may all the time deem perfectly eligible, thus possibly obliging the recruit to tramp it to the head-quarters of the district before he can get enlisted, or causing his loss to the service altogether. A few days ago there were shown to me the orders from two districts to recruiting parties, and if I recollect right, they were worded thus:—"All regiments open for recruiting, except those detailed in the margin." How easy is it to imagine a serjeant stationed, for example, in Dumfries, recommending the recruit to go, we will say, to the 60th Regiment, which is stationed at Limerick, simply because he happens to have lain with the regiment, there being all the time a corps at Glasgow, to which the recruit would as readily have gone. It is within my own knowledge that of two men enlisted in Dumfries, not very long ago, one was sent north to Glasgow, round by Edinburgh, in order to get to Canterbury; the other sent south to Carlisle and Liverpool, in order to get to Glasgow.

Can we, in the face of such facts as these, refuse credence to the statement recently made in a military periodical, that each man obtained for the Army must cost, from first to last, nearly £20 before he is finally approved?

The system I am now about to submit in detail would, I venture to think, remove the antagonism between the services. It is this:—

1. That the recruiting be a separate department at either the War Office or the Horse Guards, and under the immediate supervision of an Officer of rank, as in the case of the Militia.

2. That all recruiting districts be abolished, as being expensive, unnecessary, and detrimental to the service.

[They are but relics of the ante-railway period, when recruits were collected in large numbers to be marched through the country by conducting serjeants, and when it took more time to communicate with the district than it would now take to communicate with the Inspector-General of Recruiting in London.]

3. That, instead of having recruiting districts, the Staff Officers of Pensioners and Adjutants of Militia be the recruiting Officers, corresponding direct with the Inspector-General.

[This would obviate the necessity of covering the whole country with Officers of the Line, taken from their regimental duties; while the fact of the Officers of Pensioners and Adjutants of Militia having served in, or now belonging to, the Army, and their sympathies being still with it, would ensure the duty being efficiently done. It would also release for other duties six Field Officers, Paymasters, Surgeons, and Adjutants. It would moreover save much useless expense, and simplify the service. One illustration of this: a few months

ago it was necessary to obtain a special authority to enlist a man at Dumfries. From the application having to go through the district, thirteen letters, including copies, had to be written. Had the application gone to the Inspector-General direct, the answer would probably have been received in two days, instead of a fortnight.]

4. That, as many men are lost to the service through living away in the country, all serjeants of Militia and all serjeant pensioners be allowed to enlist recruits; and that all other pensioners and all privates of Militia be allowed one-half of the enlisting money for bringing a recruit.

5. That, in London, where there are a number of parties, and duties for the paymaster irrespective of recruiting, there be a paymaster, surgeon, and adjutant as at present, to be under the immediate command of the Inspector-General.

6. That in our large cities and towns there be recruiting parties stationed as at present, at the discretion of the Inspector-General. These to be under the nearest recruiting officer, though he may be of a different service; a clause being inserted in the Mutiny Act to authorize it.

7. That any man be enlisted for his own country corps, if there be one, and he wishes it; if not, then for some corps near at hand, or as may be ordered from time to time, thus—Parties in Scotland to enlist for corps in Scotland; those in the inland portion of the north of England for corps at Preston; the midland counties for Weedon; those on the east coast for Chatham, as men can be sent even from Newcastle for 5s. each. The country would, of course, be divided into districts accordingly.

8. That all men be sent direct to their regiments.

[This would be an immense saving as compared with the present system, or the one proposed by the Commissioners.]

9. That all men be examined by a surgeon of the Line, if there be one, if not, the Militia surgeon to examine them before they leave their county; the examination in either case to be final.

10. That no recruit be rejected at his regiment, except by a medical board.

11. That should the head-quarters of a regiment of Militia be removed from its county, its place be supplied by parties from the Line at the discretion of the Inspector-General.

12. That the reward for enlisting be increased to £1.

13. That men be enlisted up to 30 years of age, except for the cavalry.

[This possibly may be objected to, as men of that age cannot generally be made so smart, and do not so readily take up their drill, as younger men. Still there are fourteen years' good service in a recruit of 30; constitutionally, too, he would be better able to battle with

the Indian climate. All men enlisting at that age might be transferred to the Army of Reserve at the end of fourteen years, at the discretion of their commanding officer. By this means we should have hundreds of additional recruits.]

14. That when a recruit offers himself through a bringer, it shall be lawful to enlist and attest him at once, if he wishes it; in other cases, forty-eight hours only to be allowed. The present "four days" favours desertion, and causes unnecessary trouble to the serjeant.

Such, I submit, would be the best mode of recruiting for the Army.

I cannot conclude without expressing my regret that the limited time at my disposal has not enabled me to allude, except incidentally, to that branch of the service with which I am at present connected—the Royal Militia—a force of which, after some years' experience, I have the highest opinion, an organization on which I feel we may entirely rely, and which I believe to be almost indefinitely capable of development. The system I have ventured to propose would give us an Army of Reserve independent of the Militia; but its services would, I think, be dearly purchased were it to be allowed to supersede, instead of supplementing, our old constitutional Army.

I would also say that if, in any of my remarks, I have let fall anything that may have sounded too strong—that may have been pitched in a key to which the ears of some of my audience are unaccustomed—I trust I may be pardoned. I have nothing extenuated; but I can conscientiously say that I have set down nothing in malice. If there is one subject more than another which, for its proper handling, requires us to look facts—even unwelcome facts—boldly in the face, I conceive it to be the subject of this Lecture:—the great and urgent question "How shall we recruit our Army?"