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ART. V.—*The Book of the Apple, ascribed to Aristotle.* Edited in Persian and English by D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.

A PSEUDO-ARISTOTELIAN treatise called *de pomo et morte incliti principis philosophorum Aristotelis* has been printed several times in Europe, the earliest editions being without place or date.¹ This work is a Latin translation of a Hebrew tract bearing the name “The Book of the Apple,” the translator being Manfred, King of Sicily (ob. 1266), or, as Steinschneider suggests,² a Jew employed by him. The Hebrew text professes to be a translation from the Arabic made by R. Abraham B. Hisdai, an author who flourished at the end of the thirteenth century. There are MSS. of B. Hisdai’s work in the Vatican and at Oxford, and it has been repeatedly printed, first at Venice, 1519.³ It was republished with a new Latin translation and a copious but irrelevant commentary by J. J. Losius, at Giessen, in 1706.⁴ A German translation was issued by J. Musen at Lemberg, 1873, and an English translation by Kalischer at New York, 1885. An edition with a brief Hebrew commentary is said to have been produced by J. Lichtstein (Grodno, 1799).

¹ Hoffmann, *Bibliographisches Lexicon*, i. 347. Fabricius, *Bibl. Gr.* iii. 281 (ed. 2), mentions certain early Latin editions of Aristotle in which it is to be found.

² *Hebräische Übersetzungen*, p. 268 (advance sheets lent the author by Dr. Neubauer).

³ See Wolf, *Bibl. Hebr.* i. p. 57; Steinschneider, *l.c.*

⁴ *Biga dissertationum quarum prior exhibet ספר התפוח*, etc. Losius’ translation is very inaccurate, and his text very corrupt.

The Arabic work which served as the basis of the Hebrew translation is not known to be in existence, nor is it noticed by the Arabic bibliographers, although reference is made to it in the encyclopædic work *Ikhwān ul-Ṣafā*.¹ The Persian translation, however, which is here printed for the first time from a Bodleian MS.² will probably make up for the loss, and will show that the Hebrew translation is a very unfaithful abridgment, in which the original purpose of "The Book of the Apple" is entirely obscured.

That the Persian is more faithful than the Hebrew is proved by the fact that a quotation made from the Arabic by an author of the thirteenth century, and discovered by Steinschneider,³ corresponds exactly with a passage in the Persian, but has nothing corresponding to it in the Hebrew.⁴

The passage runs as follows in the Arabic :

لا سمع اذا علم المتعلم الا من قبل الفلاسفة ولا بصر ناظر الا من
قبل المصباح وقال لا تقبل النفس الفلسفة الا بصحة من طبيعته ولا
ينفذ بصر البصير الا بضوء المصباح فاذا اجتمع نفذ

In the Persian as follows (l. 182 *sqq.*) :

پس آموزنده الا از جهت حکمت نتواند آموخت و نگرنده الا
از چراغ نتواند نگريد ارسطو گفت نفس پذيرای حکمت نشود الا
بدرستی که طبع او بود و بينش بيننده گذر نيابد الا بچراغ چون
اينهمه بهم آيد بگذرد

¹ Dieterici, *Die Philosophie der Araber*, i. 106, cited by Steinschneider, *l.c.* This quotation is rather vague.

² MS. Ouseley, 95, viii. The dialogue is written on the margin of an analysis of the *de anima* of Aristotle.

³ *Catalogus Bibl. Hebr. quæ in Biblioth. Bodleiana asservantur*, p. 674, from MS. Uri, f. 19b.

⁴ The definition of "injustice" in Tebrizi's notes on the *Ḥamasa*, p. 7 (ed. Freytag), *قيل هو وضع الشئ في غير موضعه* corresponds closely with the definition given here, l. 272.

It has been the custom to assume that the author of the work was a Jew,¹ although Erasmus suggested that he was a Christian.² The passage from which these inferences were chiefly drawn was that in which Noah and Abraham are mentioned, a passage which does not occur in the Persian, and is therefore an interpolation. It would have been as reasonable to argue from it that the author was a Muhammadan, for the Qor'an is quoted there, although the quotation is concealed in Losius' edition by a gross mistranslation.³ The original work as represented by the Persian bears no trace of a Jewish origin.

It is not probable that the book ever existed in Greek: not only is there no vestige of any mistranslation of a Greek text, but also many of the phrases which cannot be banished from the argument show the influence of the Qor'an; such are *الآخرة, الملا الاعلى, عقاب* and *ثواب*. The expression "to mortify one self before death" seems borrowed from a tradition of the Prophet. On the other hand, the author must have possessed some acquaintance with Greek works. The passage in which Kriton warns Aristotle against making himself warm by talking is borrowed from the *Phaedo* of Plato (p. 63 d, e). From the same dialogue comes the discussion upon suicide (p. 62). The saying attributed to "Hermes," and quoted from Aristotle's "*Metaphysics*" (?), is not unlike the opinion of Empedocles explained in that work. The names Simmias and Kriton are borrowed from the *Phaedo*; Zeno and Diogenes from some history of philosophy; the source of Pindar and Lysias is less obvious. A Greek writer, choosing names for the interlocutors in a dialogue, would probably have chosen those of real disciples of Aristotle. In this respect Musen's text, which gives *Aristoreneus* as an interlocutor, is an improvement.

¹ So especially Losius, *l.c.*; Carmoly, *Revue Orientale*, iii. 49 (Brussels, 1843).

² Fabricius, *l.c.*

³ הנקרה עוז' בקרן *what is called 'Uzzā in the Qor'an* is rendered by him *excellētiōr bovium*. Musen's text is corrupt.

The author's purpose is philosophical, not religious. The last stage in the argument proves that philosophy is revealed through a chain of prophets, of whom the first was Hermes, who obtained his knowledge from the angels. Since the pseudo-Sabæans of Harran regarded Hermes as the founder of their religion,¹ and adopted the neo-Platonic idea of angel-mediators,² and since some of the most distinguished of the Arabic philosophers and translators of Greek philosophy emanated from this sect,³ it may be suggested that one of these Sabæans was the author of our treatise.

Many philosophical problems are discussed in the dialogue, but the various conclusions are ingeniously dovetailed into the leading argument, which may be briefly analyzed as follows:

The world of things is to be divided into knowledge and ignorance, and that to which they lead. Knowledge embraces both subject and object; the relation of the intelligent soul to philosophy being illustrated by that of the eye to the sunlight; while the relation of knowledge to virtue—all virtues being reducible to one—is similar to that of ice to water. Ignorance embraces all that is opposed to knowledge: this is, in the first place, the body and its passions; in the second place, the whole material world. If it be argued that the passions belong to the soul and not the body, since they disappear with the soul from the body, we answer, that they are an accidental result of the union. That they are not a necessary property of the soul is shown by the fact that the souls of the true philosophers are free from them. The existence of a result—*i.e.* a future world in which knowledge and ignorance are requited—is proved mainly by an *argumentum ad hominem*. Knowledge is incompatible with the enjoyment of the pleasures of this world, which are a hindrance to it. Yet the philosopher must pursue knowledge with some object—he who doubts this is asked why he doubts, if not for some object; and

¹ Chwolson, *die Sabier*, *passim*.

² Zeller, *die Philosophie der Griechen*, iii. 2. 420, etc.

³ Chwolson, *l.c.* bk. i. c. xii.

since that object is not to be realized in this world, it must be realized in another. That the future world will be like this in respect of the division into knowledge and ignorance may be argued from the analogy of the present. That knowledge and ignorance there will be respectively assigned to knowledge and ignorance is proved by *reductio ad absurdum*.

If, therefore, the future world is like this in respect of the division, since knowledge constitutes the happiness of the soul, and the power of acquiring knowledge increases as the bodily humours diminish, when finally freed from those humours the soul will have an unlimited power of acquiring knowledge and become perfectly happy. To the question why in that case suicide should not be committed, the answer of Socrates in the *Phaedo* must be given.

Although the dialogue is not free from obvious fallacy and self-contradiction, its ingenuity is no less apparent than the elegance of the Persian translator's style.

Of this argument the Hebrew translator has misunderstood or omitted almost every step, substituting for it much foreign matter, chiefly consisting in commonplaces of mediæval scholasticism about the three souls, the four principles, etc., and some legends embodied in the *Qor'an*. On the other hand, his answer to the question why suicide is not commendable is more original: any one who had reached the eminence of Abraham would be justified in perpetrating that act; but the ordinary philosopher needs time in which to perfect himself. The same reason is assigned by the commentators on the *Qor'an* for the precept "slay not yourselves."¹

The title, "Book of the Apple," has been adopted from the quotations in *Ikhwān ul-Ṣafā* and the *Uri MS.*; I have not ventured to translate it into Persian. The Hebrew translator evidently thought the Apple was not given sufficient prominence in the dialogue, and endeavoured to

¹ A characteristic interpolation is that in which the contents of the Book of the Soul are described in accordance with the Hebrew פסר הנפש, edited by Löwenthal.

supply this defect. Vague conjectures about this "Apple" are made by Losius in his notes; Fabricius in his *Bibliotheca* gives some more useful information.

The Persian text has been re-collated with the MS. (which is almost entirely without diacritic points, and in a difficult hand) and the translation revised by Mr. J. T. Platts, teacher of Persian in the University of Oxford, who, however, is not responsible for any errors that may remain. The editor begs to tender him sincerest thanks for his kindness, and also to the Council of the Royal Asiatic Society for allowing this work to appear in their Journal.

*Remarks on the Arabic version of the Metaphysics of
Theophrastus.*

The MS. from which this text has been copied (Ouseley 95) bearing the title "Translations from Greek Philosophers," among others, contains a variety of interesting matter, which has been catalogued by Dr. Ethé with his ordinary thoroughness.¹ Perhaps the only tract in the Miscellany which can properly be called a translation of a Greek philosophical work is No. xvi., consisting of four torn leaves which originally contained an Arabic translation of the fragment of Theophrastus ordinarily known as his *Metaphysics*. We learn from Wenrich's authorities that Yahya ibn Adi (ob. 363 A.H. = 973 A.D.) rendered this treatise into Arabic from Syriac; the present translation is probably by him, though it might seem to have come directly from the Greek. Although the MS. is perfect at the commencement—for the obverse page is blank—the copy from which it was made must have contained more; for the present MS. commences in the middle of a sentence, viz. at the word *ἐκάτερα*, p. 410, l. 15, ed. Didot, p. 308, § 2, Brandis, p. iv, a. 12, Usener. The fragments—counting any line in which a word or more has been preserved as a whole line; owing to the pages having been torn obliquely, very few of the lines are

¹ Persian MSS. of the Bodleian Library, pp. 861-875.

complete—cover the following portion of Usener's edition (Bonn, *Index Scholarum*, 1890-1).

Fol. 1. U. iv. a. 12, § 2 — v. a. 2, § 5, κρέιττονι.

2. U. v. b. 11, § 9, ἐπιζητήσειεν — vi. a. 19, § 11, Ἀρχύτας.

3. U. vi. a. 19, § 11 — vii. a. 16, § 15, λαμβάνουσιν.

4. U. viii. a. 8, § 17, πῶς ποτε — viii. b. 21, § 20, ἰδίῳν.

5. U. viii. b. 21 — i. b. 11, § 25, δυνάμεθα.

6. U. x. a. 25, § 28, ἄρξασθαι — xi. a. 10, § 31, οἰσοφάγον.

7. U. xi. a. 10 — end.

The following passage, which is fairly well preserved, will serve as a specimen of the translation (cf. U. p. xi. a. 2, § 31).

فان لم يكن هذه من قبل شى قصد به الامر الافضل فقد ينبغى ان
نقف على حدودها ولا نضع هذا القول على جميع الاشياء مطلقا
وذلك ان هذه الاشياء كانه [كان] القول فيها يميل الى الجهتين
اذا قيلت على الاطلاق واذا قيلت على واحد واحد اعنى بالقول
على الاطلاق ان الطبيعة فى كل شى تشوق الى الافضل وانها فيما
يحتمل ذلك تفيد النظام والدوام وكذلك يجرى الامر . .
والحيوانات وذلك انها حيث يمكن . . . ليس تقصر فى موضع
من المواضع ومثال ذلك ان الحائجرة جعلت من مقدم المرى
. وكذلك جعل كانت الشهوة تجرى هذا المجرى
الا انه قد يظهر ان ما لا يؤاتيهها ولا يقبل الامر الافضل كثير بل هو اكثر
كثيرا مما يقبله وذلك ان ذا النفس قليل وما لا نفس له ولا يحصى
كثرة واسرع تكونا مما له نفس واجود وجودا وبالجملته فان الجيد
يسير وفى اشياء يسيرة والردى كثير العدد وخروج هذا عن الحد

فقط هو بمنزلة ما يكون فى طبيعة غاية الجهل فان الذين تكلموا
فى الجواهر بأسره مثل سپوسيپس جعلوا الشريف فى الموضع الوسط
قليلا عزيزا وأما النهايات ما عن جنبتى الوسط فهى عندهم على ما
ينبغي فاما افلاطون وشيعة فوثاغورس فانهم باعدوا الامر بعدا كثيرا
بما راوه

Translation : "And if these things are not because of anything in which the better was intended, then it is necessary that we should understand its limits and not assert this proposition of everything absolutely. For in these things the statement as it were sways to two sides, when they are stated absolutely, and when they are stated individually. I mean by the absolute statement, that nature in everything desires the better, and that she, wherever possible, bestows order and persistence. The same is the case with . . . and animals. For where it is possible . . . she does not fail in any single place. An example of that is how the throat is placed in front of the œsophagus . . . and likewise there is placed . . . The desire follows the same course; only it appears that what does not obey it nor accept the better matter is abundant, nay, it is far more abundant than what does accept it. For that which is possessed of soul is of small number, whereas what has no soul is innumerable and comes quicker into existence than what has a soul, and is better in existence. And in general the good is little and in few things; and the bad large in number. And the fact that this only exceeds limit is like what is in the nature of the extremity of folly. For those who talked of substance as a whole like Speusippus made the honourable in the middle place small and rare, whereas the extremes on either side of the middle are according to them as they should be. Plato and the Pythagoreans however carried the matter very far in what they held."

It is to be regretted that the passage breaks off here.

The following readings would seem to be of some interest (cf. Usener, *Rheinisches Museum*, xvi. 264 sqq.).

iv. a. 16, § 2, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ αἰδία τῶν φθαρτῶν: the beginning of the line is lost; the Arabic, however, has كتقدم الاشياء

الازلية للأشياء القابلة للفساد

like the priority of eternal things to things which are corruptible.

iv. a. 20, § 3, οὐθ' ὅλως ἀξιόχρεα φαίνεται παντός:

ولا هي في الجملة مما يحتاج اليه وينتفع به في الكل

nor are they altogether such as are needed or can be useful in all or on the whole. This would represent πάντως.

23, αὐτὰ δὲ δι' αὐτῶν οὐδεμίαν ἔχει φύσιν:

انما هي بمنزلة ما اخترعه فنضعه واما هي في انفسها فليست لها طبيعة قائمة

They are merely likely what we invent and set up ourselves, and as for them in themselves, they have not any abiding nature.

Owing to the loss of the preceding words, it is difficult to say whether ἔχει or ἔχειν was read; nor can we be sure that *abiding* was a supplement of the translator.

The next words εἰ δὲ μή, οὐχ ὥστε συνάπτειν τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ὥστ' ἐμποιῆσαι καθάπερ ζῶν καὶ κίνησιν αὐτοῖς are represented by fragments:

وان لم تكن لها [طبيعة] قائمة فليس ... تتصل ... [طبيعة] حتى
تحدث فيها حياة وحركة مثلا

And if they have no permanent nature; the stroke that remains of the last word seems to me to point to point to ان يمكنها [they cannot] be connected with the [things appertaining to] nature so as to create in them life and motion as it were.

This would be in favour of the conjecture οἷά τε for ὥστε (Hoffmann). The Arabic continues: وذلك ان العدد نفسه فضلا عن غيره وهو الذى يعتقد [فيه الناس] انه ... ط ...

[طبيعة قائمة وان كان ههنا جوهر ما اخر اشد تقدما وفضلا فقد ينبغي ان نروم القول فيه هل هو واحد في العدد [او و] حد في النوع او واحد في الجنس والاولى اذا كانت طبيعتها طبيعة مبدا ان يكون وجودها في اشياء كثيرة زائدة للهم الا ان تكون اوائل وجودها

for even number itself, much less anything else, which people believe has not an abiding [nature]. And if there be here any other substance of greater priority and excellence, we should endeavour to speak about it, whether it be one in number or [one] in species or one in genus. And it is most probable, since its nature is the nature of a beginning, that its existence is in many, abundant things, unless the first parts of its existence

p. v. a, § 5, ἡ κυκλικὴ κίνησις. Usener's insertion of the word κίνησις is distinctly confirmed by the corresponding fragment,

هي طبيعته المسوب [التشوق] التي عنها تكون حركة الدور
the nature of . . . from which there comes the circular motion.

U. v. b. 18, § 10, ὥσπερ ἄδεκτόν τι καὶ ἀσύνθετον εἶναι.

Arab. fragment غير قابل ولا محتمل للارتباط
not receiving nor enduring to be tied together.

This confirms Usener's conjecture ἀσύνδετον which the Arabic exactly represents.

U. v. b. 23, συμβαίνει γὰρ οἷον κατὰ συμβεβηκός κτλ.

كانها عرض لزمها عن الحركة الدورية
it is like an accident which attends her from the circular motion.

The words καὶ εἰς τοὺς τόπους μεταβολάς were omitted by the translator.

U. v. b. 27, κάλλιον ἂν τι παρὰ τοῦ πρώτου δέοι τῆς κυκλοφορίας κτλ.

فقد يحتاج من ال م سى يلى الوسط الى شى هو افضل
من الحركة الدورية

It would require which comes near the middle something better than the circular motion.

U. vi. a. 14, § 11, καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ὥσπερ ἐτέρων λόγων κτλ.

واخلق لقائل ان يقول ان الكلام فى هذا المعنى ليس هذا موضعه
لكن ليت شعرى للانسان ان يعتقد من هذا المبدأ او من هذه
المبادئ او من سائر المبادئ معها تكون وقعة ... يتصل بها وليس
انما ... ثم ينقطع

And it is fitter for the speaker [i.e. any one] to say that this is not the place for the discussion of this subject. Only would I knew whether a man should believe from this beginning or from these beginnings or from the rest of the beginnings existing together at one time.

Wimmer conjectured in l. 17 ἄλλων ἀρχῶν, which is perhaps confirmed.

vi. b. 3, § 12, χρόνον δ' ἅμα καὶ οὐρανόν.

These words occur at the end of a line in the Arabic والزمان والزمانيات، which is not therefore in favour of Usener's *athetesis*.

vi. b. 5, οὐδεμίαν ἔτι ποιοῦνται μνείαν,

لم يذكره اصلا فضلا عن ان يشعروا فيه

they did not mention them at all, not to speak of dealing with them; شرع is used below for ἀπτεσθαι.

vi. b. 10, § 13, Πλάτων μέν — μόνον :

[واما] افلاطون فانه عند رده الى المبادئ قد يظن انه قد شرع فى
سائر الاشياء بانه رد الاشياء [الى] الصور والصور الى الاعداد وترقى

من الاعداد الى المبادئ فلما اخذ في الكلام في التولد بلغ الى
الصور

As for Plato, when reducing [things] to the beginnings he might be thought to have dealt with the rest of things, inasmuch as he reduced things to the forms and the forms to the numbers and ascended from the numbers to the beginnings; and when he began to discuss generation he reached the forms.

This does not seem in favour of Usener's emendation *κατάγειν* for *κατά*.

vii. a. 15, § 15. The words *على ما قال اروس* *according as Heraclitus said* appears as a solitary fragment. But the word *يستعملون* for *λαμβάνουσιν* shows that Yahya read the following paragraph.

viii. b. 4, § 18, *καὶ μέλαινα ἐν αὐτοῖς* : the remnant of a line begins *الاسود فيها* *the black in them*.

§§ 19 and 20 are fairly well preserved in the Arabic.

viii. b. 24, § 20, *ὅλως* is represented by the Arabic *بالجملة* *in general*.

viii. b. 26, § 20, *οἷον ἀριθμοῖς γραμμαῖς ζώοις φυτοῖς* :

بمنزلة ما يقال في الاعداد وفي النخطوط الخ

like that which is said about numbers and about lines, etc.

Usener's conjecture (Rh.M. p. 274) that *ἐν* should be inserted seems confirmed.

viii. b. 27, § 20, *τέλεος δ' ἢ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἔστιν δ' ἔνια* (*ἐνθα* Usener) *τῶν μὴ καθόλου τέλος κτλ* :

*والمعرفة الكاملة هي من الامور الكلية كالغاية والمقصود اليها [اليه]
فان السبب انما وجوده في هذه وهي من الامور الجزئية بقدر
القسمة الى اشخاص*

And perfect knowledge is in respect of universal things like the end and the goal ; for the existence of the cause is in these only ; but in respect of particular things it is to the extent of the division into individuals.

The translator might seem to have read τέλεος δὲ τῶν μὲν καθόλου τέλος, τῶν δὲ ἐν μέρει.

ix. a. 7, § 21, διὰ πλείστου δὲ τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν :

Usener's conjecture τῷ is distinctly confirmed :

الا ان اكثر ما يقف [نقف 1.] به على ذلك بالمقايضة

except that most of what we understand it by is by analogy.

ix. a. 14, § 22, τὰ ἐν ἀρχῇ καὶ τὰ ἐπόμενα :

وما من هذه في المبادئ وما منها لواحق

and what of these things are in the beginnings and what of them are following.

ix. b. 1, § 24, τοῖς πλεοναχῶς λεγομένοις ἢ καὶ τοῦτ' ἄπορον.

الاشياء التي تقال من جهات شتى ولعل هذا

the things which are said in different ways ; and perhaps this.

x. l. 4, § 29, ἢ αἱ μὲν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ κτλ.

The words *وكذلك نسل عما* and likewise we shall ask concerning what, correspond with the beginning of this sentence ; after a loss of two-thirds of a line then follows *اشياء اخر* [اشياء آخر] other things not a few = x. b. 6, καὶ ἕτερα οὐκ ὀλίγα. Yahya must have either read the passage bracketed by Usener, or some substitute for it.

x. b. 12, § 29, κινήσει καὶ παραιωρήσει is rendered في الحركة والا استقلال, the first of which represents κινήσει.

x. b. 13, § 29. The sentence καὶ ὡς ἔνια—τοιαῦτα is omitted.

x. b. 16, § 30. The words *καὶ τὸ μέγιστον δὴ καὶ μάλιστα δοκοῦν* are rendered :

واعظم ما يدخل الشك فيه من ذلك واخصه له

the greatest point of this into which the doubt enters and the point to which it especially belongs.

x. b. 19, § 30, *ἐπερ τούτων χάριν* :

Arab. *من اجل شئ* *on account of anything*, confirming Usener's conjecture *του χάριν*. The last word is almost obliterated, but can from the diacritic points have been nothing else.

The next sentence is

والانسان ايضا ان يبحث من امر النبات بل من امر الانفس عن
السبب الذى له صار

and a man may also inquire concerning plants, nay, concerning the souls [read the soulless] of the cause for which there became . .

For p. xi. a. 1, § 31 to xi. b. 1, § 33 see above. The place which would have corresponded to *μιμείσθαι γ' ἐθέλειν ἅπαντα* is unfortunately obliterated; the word which remains is apparently *يتقبله* *will receive it*. The text contains :

هذا على انهم وضعوا سببها بالتضاد للاثنوة الغير المحدودة وللواحد
يدخل فيه الخروج عن التناهى والنظام

although they made its cause to consist in the contrariety between the infinite dyad and the one, wherein enters infinitude and disorder.

xi. b. 5, § 33, *ἀνευ ταύτης* : *الرداوة* *free from this, i.e. mischief*; similarly after *ἐτέρας* a gloss *يعنى* *الخيرية* *meaning goodness*.

xi. b. 12, *ἐξ ἐναντίων γε καὶ ἐν ἐναντίοις οὖσαν*.

ἐν was added by Sylburg; Yahya must have read it, as appears from the rendering

من قبل انه من اشياء متضادة وفي اشياء متضادة
since it is of contraries and in contraries.

xi. b. 15, § 34, οὔτε γὰρ τὸ βέλτιον οὔτε τὸ τινὸς χάριν :

فان هذه تقصد . . . الافضل وان جعلت من . . . ويبعث اماما
 ضروريا

for these things intend . . . the better, and if they are regarded . .

The MS. represented by Yahya was clearly better than any existing.

Although the amount to be obtained from these fragments is not as great as might be wished, it is still interesting to find them confirm some scholars' conjectures.

No. xxiii. Plato's *de legibus* is of course wholly spurious ; the passages quoted by Dr. Ethé show this.

* کتاب التفاحة *

این ترجمه مقاله ایست از ان ارسطاطالیس که بوقت وفات
 املا کرده است چنین گفتند که چون ارسطاطالیس حکیم را عمر
 پایان رسید از شاگردان وی چندی بروی حاضر بودند چون نزاری
 تن و ناتوانی وی بدیدند و نشانه‌های مرگ از وی پیدا یافتند از حیاتش
 5 نومید گشتند مگر آنکه در وی میدیدند از سرور و نشاط و درستی عقل
 آنچه دلیل میکرد بر آنکه او از حال خود می یابد برخلاف آنکه دیگران
 از و میدیدند پس شاگردی بوی گفت که ما را جزع بر تو بیش از
 انست که ترا بر خود و از گذشتن تو غمناکتریم که تو از گذشتن خود
 اگر از انست که تو از خود چیزی می یابی بیرون از آنچه ما از تو
 10 می یابیم ما را نیز از آن آگاهی ده ارسطاطالیس گفت اما آنچه از
 خرمی من می یابید نه از انست که مرا در حیات خود طمعی
 مانده است ولیکن استواری منست بحال خویش پس از مرگ
 شاگردی نام وی شیماس گفت اگر ترا این استواری هست
 سزاوارتر که ما را نیز بنمائی سبب آن تا همچنانکه ترا وثوقست ما را
 15 نیز باشد ارسطو گفت اگر چه دشوارست بر من سخن گفتن اما
 رمجی برگیرم از برای شما نخست بشنوم از قریطون که در وی می
 بینم که در سخن یازد قریطون گفت اگر چه من نیکخواهانم شنیدن

سخن ترا و پیدا کردن دانش ای آموزنده بشرا لیکن طبیبی که
 متعهدست مرا فرموده است که او را بسخن گفتن میار که سخن
 20 گفتن او را گرم کند و چون گرمی بروی غالب گردد مداوات دراز تر
 گردد و دیرتر منفعت دهد ارسطو گفت من رای آن طبیب را
 بگذارم و از ادویه ببوی سیبی بس کنم که روان مرا چندان
 نگهدارد که من در سخن حق شما بگذارم و چون و چگونه سخن
 نگویم و بهترین امید من از دارو نیروی سخن گفتنست اکنون بیائید
 25 و مرا آگاهی دهید که شمارا یقینست فضل حکمت یا نه پاسخ
 دادند که گرامی داشتن حکمت از ما نبوده است الا از آنکه فضل
 وی دانستیم بر دیگر چیزها ارسطو گفت فضل این در دنیاست یا در
 آخرت گفتند فضل حکمت را منکر نه ایم و ناچار ما را بدان آرد
 که اثبات فضیلت و منفعت وی در آخرت کنیم ارسطو گفت پس
 30 چون شمارا مرگ ناخوش آید و شهرتی را که از آن زیان بشما رسد
 بخود بندید هر چند که از شما سزد که درنگرید که تا این مرگ که
 نزد عامه ناپسندیده است خود نیست الا از قالب [و] تن نفس
 جدا ماندن گفتند چرا بیش بدانیم گفت بدانچه یافته اید از
 دانش هیچ خرمید یا نه و بدانچه از شما در گذشت از دانش هیچ
 35 اندوهمندید یا نه گفتند بلی گفت بکدام یک از تن و روح دانش
 اندوزید بتن که مایه کرمی و کوری و سستی و ناسودمندیست هنگام
 جدا ماندن روح از وی یا بروح که جاوید مردم بدان شنوا و بینا
 و دانا و گویا بود تا با اوست گفتند بلکه بزندگانی روح و نیکی وی

دانش یافته شود و بگرانی تن ازان بازماند ارسطو گفت پس چون
 40 پیدا گشت که دانش ثمره روح است و ازان بازدارنده گرانی تنست
 و بیافتن دانش خرم شوید و بازماندن ازان غمناک گردید ناچار
 بود که جدا شدن روح از تن بر بودن روح با تن اختیار کنید و از تن
 جدا گشتن به آید روح را که با تن بودنش آخر نبینید که آرزوهای
 تن و لذات وی از زن و فرزند و مال و خورش و نوشش افزونی
 45 زیانکارند بحکمت جستن و نه شما چون این لذات را بگذاشتید
 برای نگاهداشت خرد و گرائیدن بدانش بگذاشتید گفتند آری
 گفت پس چون خستومندید که لذات تن ازان نیرو شود که
 تباهاکننده خرد است ناچار تن که پذیرای این لذاتست خرد را
 زیانکارتر بود گفتند ناچار رای ما را معترف کرد بدینچه از سخن تو
 50 درست گشت تا بدین سخن که رسیدیم لیکن چون کنیم وجه
 سازیم تا ما نیز بر مرگ همچین دلیر گردیم که توثی و همچین از
 حیات پرهیزیم که تو می پرهیزی ارسطو گفت سزاتر چیزی که
 جوینده دانش ازان بمقصود رسد کوشش گوینده است در آنکه
 نگوید الا راست و کوشش شنونده در آنکه نشنود الا درست
 55 اکنون من بکوشم در راست گفتن شما نیز بکوشید در راست و درست
 شنیدن و پذیرفتن نه شما دانید که معنی فلسفه دوست داشتن
 حکمتست و روان به اصل و ماده فلسفه است والا بدان خرسند نشود
 والا بدان آرام نگیرد گفتند آری گفت نه شما میدانید که سرور
 روان حکمتست و حکمت بنیکی نفس و روان توان یافت و نیکی

60 نفس بدرستی ویست و درستی روان بکمی بلغم و گش و خونست گفتند آری گفت اگر نیکی روان بدرستی ویست و درستیش بکمی این اخلاطست از نیست شدن اخلاط درستتر و نیکتر گردد گفتند ما را برگفته تو هیچ انکاری نیست و با اینهمه در خود این نشاط از مرگ نمی یابیم که از تو می بینیم ارسطاطالیس گفت

65 چون بینش بیننده را پیش روست بمنفعت و نگهدارنده ویست از مضرت بکوشید تا باشد که بینش شما را بیفزایم بمنفعت مرگ ای دوستان حکمت نه بینید که جوای حکمت که روان وی از گناه ویژه شده است خود را میرانیده است پیش از مرگ چه اهل و مال و جهانبانی را که حیات دنیا را از برای آن خواهند

70 ورنج بسیار و بارگران از جستن حکمت برگرفت چنانکه از آن هر رنج الا بمرگ آسایش نیابد پس چیست نیاز آنکه بلذت زندگانی سود نیابد بزندگانی و چیست گریز آنکه آسایش وی الا بمرگ نیست از مرگ بلی ستمکار شد هر که نام فلسفه جست بی آنکه سزاوار معنیش بود و نادان گشت هر که پنداشت که با راحت

75 و لذت و نعم دنیا راه تواند یافت بفلسفه هیچ تواند بود که شمارا تمنا بود که نام علم بر شما افتد با لذات اینجهانی از خورش و نوش و دیگر چیزها گفتند که ما را این طمع نیست و جوای این نه ایم و چون طمع بریم بفلسفه و کار اینجهان یابیم با آنکه دیده ایم که چون وقتی در طعام و شراب افزونی یا در دل جنبشی پیدا

80 آید از چیزی که ضد خرد بود چون شهوتی یا خشمی یا حرصی

وحسدی خرد بیکار ماند آن هنگام و اگرچه آن جنبش دل بعمل نیاید پس خون بود خود که بعمل آید و نیست هیچ چیز که نگه داشتن وی را سودمند ترست و پناهی بدو رسیده تر است از خرد ارسطو گفت نباشد شاخ چیز الا از بیخش و نه پاره چیز الا از جمله اش

85 اگر از آنست که در دنیا از شهوات پرهیز کنید و بدل بدنیا گزائید پرهیزکاری بتمام نبود و بیخ گزائیدن بدنیا دوست داشتن بقاست پس هرکه از لذات وی پرهیزد و بازماندن در دنیا دوست گیرد شاخ گرفت و بیخ را فرو گذاشت و تمام و رسیده آنست که او را با شاخ بیخ نیز بود شیماس گفت من بودم از نعمت دنیا خویشتن دار

90 و اکنون از آنچه از سخن تو یافتم برانم که هم برین نمانم و چون این در بر من نگشود جوای آن شوم که تمامتر کنم و برپی تو بروم و سیرت تو بگیرم ای آموزنده بشرا قریطون گفت اکنون بمن بنمود بینش دانش من که هیچکس نیست که نه او را مرگ زیانکارست الا فیلسوف را هرکه بدان برسد و تمام کرد گو مرگ را بجوی و بخواه

95 و هرکه ازان بازماند گو از مرگ بگریز هرچه دورتر و پرهیز هرچه سخت تر که بیای نماند مرگ را و از غم مرگ آسایش ندهد مگر حکمت زینون گفت که سخن ارسطاطالیس هیچ راه نداد ما را که با لذتی برخوردار شویم یا بازماندن در اینجا گزائیم و اینکه او بر مرگ از من دلیرتر است اگرچه من نیز سخت ترسان نیم از آنست

100 که او در حال و کار خود صلاح آوردن کوشیده تر از من بوده است و اگر من خود مجاز خود کرده بود می همچنانکه او کرده است و از

خود آزونياز وخشم رانده بود می همچنانکه او رانده است در من همان دلیری پدید آمدی که در وی می یابیم دیگری گفت من ازین پیش از تاختن مرگ می ترسیدم و امروز از پائیدن حیات میترسم

105 زینون گفت تو بر مرگ یافتن تواناتری که بر حیات دراز یافتن جوابش داد که سیر شدن من از عمر مرا بران نمیدارد که مرگ را بخود خوانم پیش از آنکه مرگ بمن آید زینون گفت ما دیده ایم که دوستان بسی کنند بدیدن آنکه ایشانرا ندیده باشد اگر مرگ را دوست داری چه چیز ترا از جستن وی باز می دارد پیش از آن

110 که او ترا جوید جواب داد که مرگ دوست نیست لیکن پلست که تا بران نگذرنند بدانچیز نرسند که همیخواهندش و دوستش دارند زینون گفت پس پائیدن تو چیست با آنکه میدانی درست که گرامی خواهی گشت بمرگ جواب داد که من همچون نگهدارنده ثغرم که اگر بیاید با رنج بیاید و اگر بگذرد و بگذاید بکرامت رسد

115 زینون گفت چیست نهاد این مثل گفت مقیم در ثغر نفس فیلسوف است و ثغرش تنست و آنچه تن ثغراوست آزونياز وخشمست و رنج بد هر نفسست در کار این اخلاق و دور کردن ایشانرا از خود و کرامت آنست که نفس در بازگشتن بدان رسد از سرور و فرح و چون مناظره ایشان بدینجا رسید دیگری گفت نام وی استافانس

120 که اگر نام فیلسوفی (را) همین فائده بودی که از نام نادانی بیرون برد اهل خود را کی در جستن آن بکوشیدی دیگری گفت اگر خود برای فرزاندگی این نام مجستمی این نام را زینون گفت اگر برای

هیچ چیز رغبت نکرد می بدین نام برای این بجستمیش تا از
 فزع و سهم مرگ امن یافته می قریطون گفت نزدیکترین منفعتهای
 125 این علم آنست که غمهای فراوان مرا یکی کرد قراماس گفت
 چون دریابجهان خود یک غم ماند سودمندتر چیزی که بدان
 غم خورند همت کسیست که غم چیزی باقی میخورد فندروس
 گفت مردم همه در کارزارند و سزاوارتر خصمی که کارزار جوی
 آهنگ وی کند نزدیکترین دشمنان ویست و آن غمهای سینه
 130 اوست ایلیطوس گفت چیستند دشمنان فیلسوف فندروس گفت
 نزدیکترین دشمنان او لذات سینه اوست که بحکمت جستن
 زیان دارند و چون سخن این طائفه اینجا رسید شیماس روی با ارسطو
 آورد و گفت بر فروز دلهای ما را بفروغ چراغ خود پیش از آنکه
 فروغش فرو نشیند ای پدر مهربان ارسطو گفت یابنده ترین علما در
 135 علم آنست که دانش نیند و خت الا پس از آنکه نفس را فرهنگ
 داده بود و خوی خود را ستوده کرده و راست گوینده ترین گویندگان
 آنست که بگفتار نیاز الا پس از اندیشه و استوارترین کارگران
 آنست که در کار نشود الا پس از انداخت و هیچکس با هستگی
 و حزم در عزم بکار آوردن نیازمندتر از فیلسوف نیست در آنچه
 140 پیش گیرد ازین کار که رنج آن بنقد است و منفعت آن باز پس
 گوی نگرستن در پیش دار پس چون نگرستن ویرا بدیدن رسانید
 گوی دیدنرا پیشوای کردن کن پس چون دیدن ثمره کردن بوی
 بنمود گوی رنج کار کردن برگیر پیش از رسیدن بثمره و چون از سر

دیدن اختیار کردن کار کرد بهنگام آنکه ثمره باید چید از کار کردن
 145 در اندوه نباید بود که هر آنکه نفس خود را از لذت باز گیرد و بار
 طلب علم بکشد برای خدا تا بپاداش آن برسد پس از مرگ و آنکه
 بهنگام مرگ غمگین شود خود را بدان باز آورد که برو خندند و بر
 کار او افسوس دارند و بجای خنده و افسوس بود آنکه دعوتی سازد
 و بنای کوشکی نهد و چون بدان رسد که مقصود دعوت و بنای
 150 کوشک بخواهد یافت اندوهمند و غمناک شود و من شناسم کسی
 را که این رنج بکشد و در پاداش آن بشک بود و چه عجب از
 کسی که بشک بود از پاداش پس از مرگ که خشم آیدش از مرگ
 و ناشاد بود بدان بل عجب دارم از کسی که از مرگ ناشاد بود با
 آنکه دعوی دارست در یقین بپاداش پس از مرگ و چون ارسطو
 155 این سخن بپایان رسانید قریطون گفت اگر تو آن خواستی که ما پس
 از تو خوش دل باشیم ای آموزانده شایسته بدین بیان خوب که
 کردی اندوه ما بیفزود بر مفارقت تو و اگر مرگ ترا سودمند است
 ما را باری زیانکارست در آنچه بر ما بماند از مشکلات مسائل که
 درین تو پناه جایی بودی دیوجنس گفت هیچ چیز سود بچیزی
 160 ندارد و زیان بدیگری الا که میان ایشان مخالفتی بود و اگر سیرت
 ارسطاطالیس او را سودمند است و ما را زیانکار از اختلاف ما و اوست
 قریطون گفت میان ما و او اختلافیست و اتفاقی بآرزو و هوا متفقیم
 و بماندن ما و رفتن او و مختلفیم دیوجنس گفت اندوه شما نه از
 انست که او بمنزل کرامت خواهد رسید ولیکن باز ماندن شماست

- 165 بمنزل خواری لسیاس گفت هر دو راست گوئید و شما ستون خانه بوده اید که در آن خانه چراغها بود ستون بزرگتر بیفتاد و بر [و بار آن بر 1] دیگر ستونها آمد و چراغ روشنتر را بنشانند خانه را روشنی کم شد و تاریکی افزون و شما نه از افتادن ستون و مردن چراغ غمگینید بلکه از تاریکی خانه و گرانی سقف پس شیماس روی بارسطاطالیس آورد و گفت
- 170 ای پیشرو حکمت ما را بیا گاهان تا چیست محسنترین چیزی که جوینده حکمت را آموختن آن بکار آید ارسطو گفت چون روان معدن حکمت بود محسنتر دانش که او را بکار آید دانش نفس است شیماس گفت چون بجوید ارسطو گفت بنیروی خودش گفت چیست نیروی خودش ارسطو گفت آن نیرو که تو خود را
- 175 از من بدان پرسی شیماس گفت چون تواند که چیزی خود را از دیگری پرسد ارسطو گفت چنانکه بیمار خود را از طبیب پرسد و چنانکه نابینا از آنها که پیرامن وی نشسته باشند رنگ خود پرسد شیماس گفت چون خود از خود کور بود واصل همه بینائی خود است ارسطو گفت چون حکمت در خود یعنی در نفس نهان
- 180 و پوشیده بود هم از خود کور بود و هم از دیگری همچنانکه چشم بیفروغ چراغ هم از خود کور بود و هم از دیگری شیماس گفت پس آموزنده الا از جهت حکمت نتواند آموخت و نگرنده الا از چراغ نتواند نگرید ارسطو گفت نفس پذیرای حکمت نشود الا بدرستی که طبع او بود و بینش بیننده گذر نیابد الا بچراغ چون
- 185 اینهمه بهم آید بگذرد (د) شیماس گفت اگر نفوس و چشمها بنیروی

خود بی یآوری حکمت و فروغ چراغ بروشنی کارها نرسند پس هیچ چیز بنفس اولیتر از حکمت نیست ارسطو گفت چگونه چیزی بدا آنچه پذیرد اولیتر بود از معدن خودش نه بینی که آموزگار بنام دانش سزاوارتر بود که آموزنده و نیرومند بنام نیرو لایقتر بود که نیرو¹⁹⁰ یاب چه آموزگارست معدن دانش که دانش ازو خیزد و نیرومندست معدن نیرو و چون سخن بدینجا رسید لسیاس گفت این سخن بپایان آمد و من باز سر میگیرم مرا بیاگاهان از چه شود که علم نفس سزاوارتر چیز است که آموزنده نخست آموزد ارسطو گفت برای آنکه دانش خوی اصل آموزگار و آموزنده است لسیاس گفت از چه دانیم¹⁹⁵ که دانش خوی نفس است ارسطو گفت از آنکه دانش با تن چندان بود که نفس با ویست و چون نفس از تن جداگشت دانش از وی پوشیده گشت لسیاس گفت باشد که از تن افتاده از روان ارسطو گفت اگر از تن بودی از تن مرده همچنان دانش پدید بودی که از تن زنده لسیاس گفت ما همچنانکه از دانش مرده²⁰⁰ بیخبریم از نادانی وی هم بیخبریم هیچ تواند بود که نادانی وی که نمیدانیم از آنست که نفس از وی جداگشت ارسطو گفت اگر نادانی نادیدنست در کارهایش نادانی و نادیدن تن پیش از مرگ پیدا ترست از نادانی وی پس از مرگ لسیاس گفت اگر نادانی کوری با تن است پس از مرگ نادانی بیپوده کاری²⁰⁵ باری نیست ارسطو گفت چه جدائیست میان نادانی کوری و نادانی بیپوده کاری لسیاس گفت وجه یکانگشت میان ایشان

ارسطو گفت هردو یکی اند در آنکه رُمجه دارنده اهل خردند اما نادانی بیهوده کاری چون ناخوشی و زشتکاریست و زشتگوئیست اما نادانی کوری چون بوی ناخوش است و گند که ازو بزاید لسیاس ²¹⁰ گفت من زشتکاری و هوا جوئی را چنان دانم که تا روان در تن نهاده شد هیچ تواند بود که این زشتکاری هم از روان خیزد نه از تن ارسطو گفت اگر زشتهای خوی اصل روان بودی با آنکه روان از کارهای گردنده دورست با همه روانی بودی و هیچ روانی بی زشتکاری نبودى و ما چون یافتیم روان فلاسفه را که از زشتکاری ²¹⁵ دورست و از ناپاکی شناختیم و دانستیم که پاکی روان ایشان بر هوا غلبه کرده است و دست بر آرزو و خشم یافته و این خویهارا مقهور کرده و هوا را همسان خرد کرده لسیاس گفت پس چون میان هوا و روان چندین میانه است از چه افتاد که هوا با روان از تن جدا شد ارسطو گفت روان فروزنده ایست و چون از اخلاط تن یکی ²²⁰ بر سرآید تن را بسوزد همچنانکه آتش همیشه را بسوزد و فروغ روانرا از تن بیرون کند چنانکه آتش روشنائی و تبش را از اندرون چوب بدر کند و هوا بیرون کردن آتش است روشنائی روانرا از تن لسیاس گفت هیچ تواند بود که روشنی خود از گرمی باشد ارسطو گفت اگر گرمی روشنی فزودی شب تابستان روشنتر از روز زمستان بودی ²²⁵ همچنانکه شب تابستان گرمتر بود از روز زمستان و چون کار مناظره ایشان بدینجا رسید لسیاس گفت روان مرا زنده کردی ای آموزاننده شایسته پروائی این گفتار و ناچار روان من بدان گرائید که میان

روان و هوا فرق کند و میان تبش هوا و فروزش روان و بر من روشن کردی هریکی هوا و تن و جدائی روان از هر دو بصفات اکنون میخواهم که

230 فرق میان سیرت هوا و سیرت روان بنمائی همچنانکه فرق میان ایشان بنمودی ارسطو گفت هیچ مخالفت میان کار هر دو یافتی لسیاس گفت هیچ دو مخالف گوهر را نیافتم الا مخالف کار لیکن دوست میدارم که تو فرق میان سیرت روان و سیرت هوا مرا بنمائی بنشانهای روشن که کار هریک از آن دیگتر جدا کند ارسطو گفت

235 هر چه بدست همه کار هواست و هر چه نیکست همه کار نفسست لسیاس گفت من فرق میان خوبکاری روان و زشتکاری هوا از فرق میان گوهر هوا و گوهر روان بهتر نمی دانم ارسطو گفت خوبکاری و نیکی آنست که چون بتو رسد ترا بصلاح آورد و بدی آنست که چون بتو رسد در تو تباهی آورد لسیاس گفت هیچ چیز بمن نرسید

240 که از من طرفی بصلاح آرد که نه طرفی دیگتر را تباه کند و چگونه او را خوب توانم خواند چون بی تباهکاری نیا فتمش ارسطو گفت چون بصلاح آورده آن طرف از تو بصلاح آرد که تو بدوست داشتن آن اولیتر باشی که بدشمن داشتن از آن خشم منگیر که گوشه را تباه کند که تو بدشمن داشتن آن سزاوارتر می باشی که بدوست داشتنش

245 لسیاس گفت آن چیست که باید که من آنرا دشمن دارم و آن چیست که باید که من آنرا دوست دارم ارسطو گفت تو سزاواری که خرد را دوست داری و بی خردی را دشمن لسیاس گفت پس چه آمد ازین ارسطو گفت پس در خردت

نیفزاید الا آنچه از بیخردیت بکاهد پس دوست دار هر آنچه
 250 خردت را بصلاح آرد اگرچه بیخردیت را بکاهد که فضل او با تو
 در تباه کردن بیخردی کم از فضل او نیست با تو در صلاح خرد لسیاس
 گفت جدا کردی میان روان و هوا بمیان تبش و نور که کردی و مرا
 بنمودی مخالفت کارهای ایشان بمخالفت بنیادشان و پس از تو
 پرسیدم که تا کارهای هر دو بمن روشن کنی بنشانی که جدا کند
 255 کار هریک از آن دیگر و تو مرا آگاه کردی که خوبکاری کار نفسست
 و بدکاری کار هوا و من فرق پرسیدمت کار خوب و کار زشت را تو
 گفتی هر آنچه در خرد بیفزاید کار خوب است اگرچه نادانی از او
 بکاهد و هر چه خرد را بکاهد کار بدست اگرچه در بیخردی بیفزاید
 و هیچ یک از خرد و جهل نکاهد الا از مخالف خود و نیفزاید
 260 الا از همسان خود لیکن من هنوز ناگزیرم از بیان آنکه چیست
 که خرد را بیفزاید و چیست که بکاهد ارسطو گفت هر آنچه
 بینش ترا در کارها روشنی فزاید خرد ترا بیفزاید و هر آنچه
 کارها بر تو بیوشاند خردت را بکاهد لسیاس گفت آن چیست
 که روشنی دهد و آن چیست که پوشش آرد ارسطو گفت
 265 راست گوئی و آنچه بدان ماند از روشنباست و شک و آنچه بدان
 ماند از پوششها لسیاس گفت روشنی راست گوئی میدانیم
 و پوشش شک همچنین میدانیم لیکن آن چیست که بدیشان
 ماند ارسطو گفت راستکاری که عدلست بر راستگوئی ماند و ناراستی
 که ستمست بدروغ و شک ماند لسیاس گفت عدل و صدق در چه

270 چیز بهم مانند ارسطو گفت هر دو کار را بر نهاد خود بگذاشتندست
 لسیاس گفت ستم و دروغ در چه چیز بهم مانند ارسطو گفت
 هر دو کار را از نهاد خود بیفکندندست لسیاس گفت ستم و داد
 کسی کند که کارگذار و قاضی بود و من ترا از همه کارها میپرسم ارسطو
 گفت مردم همه قاضی اند ازیشان برخی خاص اند و برخی قاضی
 275 عام اند هر که بینش او در کارها بلغزد و زبان او دروغ گوید و بدانچه
 او را نبود در آویزد ستمکارست و دروغ زن و هر آنکه بینش او بچیزها
 رسد و زبان او راست گوید و بدانچه او راست خرسند بود راستکار
 و دادگرست و راستگوی و ازین دو اندازه که گفتیم هیچکار مردم
 بدر نشود لسیاس گفت من چگونه بدانم که ازین دو اندازه هیچ بدر
 280 نشود ارسطو گفت باز جوی در کارهای که بر تو میگذرد و گذشت
 تا هیچ ازین اندازه بیرون شود اگر از انست که بیرون نشود آن
 کار را نیز که بر تو نگذشت هم در شمار آن گیر که بر تو گذشت
 لسیاس گفت من چگونه آنرا که بر من نگذشت در شمار آن گیرم
 که بر من گذشت و بروی همان حکم کنم ارسطو گفت اگر چیزهای اندک
 285 از چیزهای بسیارست و اجزای چیزها باصل خود مانده اند پس
 اندک آنچه می بینی از بسیار آنست که نمی بینی و بسیار آنچه
 نمی بینی دور نیست که بدان ماند که می بینی و اگر این سخن
 درستست پس تو خوب و زشتکارهای که هنوز بر تو نگذشت
 هم در آن حکم گیر از خوب و زشتکارها که بر تو گذشته است
 290 لسیاس گفت مرا چه بدان می آرد که من بر غائب همان حکم

کنم که بر حاضر ارسطو گفتم آنچه حاضر تست رای ترا ناچار بدان آرد که بر غایب حکم کنی و آنچه که ترا بدان آورد که از دانستن حضور حاضر غیبت غائب را بدانستی لسیاس گفت چه مرا از دانستن حاضر باز دارد اگر من غائب را ندانم یا چه 295 دانش من بیفزاید بغائب اگر من حاضر را بدانم چه من آن مایه از زمینی که می بینم آنرا که ورای آنست از زمین بمن نمی نماید و نه نادیدن آنچه ورای آنست که چشم من بدان نمی رسد بدیدن آنچه می بینم هیچ زیان میکند ارسطو گفت پس نه حکم می کنی که بیرون ازین زمین (که) می بینم [از] آن زمین است که نمی بینم همچنین واجب نشود که حکم کنی که ورای آنچه بر تو گذشت از کارها آنست که نگذشت همچنانکه حکم کردی که ورای آنچه دیدی از زمین آن زمینست که ندیدی لسیاس گفت مرا ناگزیر شد که بر غائب حکم کنم از حاضر اما مرا معلوم گردان که اگر از آن بود که بر غائب حکم نکنم از حاضر 305 دانستن حاضر را هیچ زیان کند که از دانستن این مرا فائده رسد بحکم کردن بر غائب از حاضر ارسطو گفت چیزی را نشناخت هرکه او را از مخالف آن جدا نتوانست کرد لسیاس گفت چونست این ارسطو گفت اگر سخن داریوس حکیم درستست که حق را نشناخت هرکه از باطلش جدا نتوانست کرد و صواب 310 را نیافت هرکه از خطاش باز نداشت پس تا بغائب خستو نشوی ترا راه نبود بشناخت حاضر لسیاس گفت این سخن گذر

یافت اکنون ای پیشوای حکمت از تو پرسم که آن کارهای که
 عامهٔ مردم اتفاق کرده‌اند بر زشتی آن از زنا و دزدی و مستی
 و خیانت و ناراستی و غدر و فریب و کینه و حسد و نادانی و عجب
 315 و بخود شاد بودن همه را در یکمعنی جمع توان آورد که بیرون
 نشود که من از آن بشناسم که ازین چیزها که بر من گذشت
 مانند آن هست که بر من نگذشت ارسطو گفت اهل این خصال
 اخلاق چون بدان یازد که او را نیست ستمکارست و دروغ‌زن
 و تباہ‌کننده بینش خود لسیاس گفت چونست این ارسطو گفت
 320 نه بینی که هیچکس ازین بدها پیش نگیرد که محست در وی
 آرزو و خشم و آرزو و مجنبد پس این کارها پیش گیرد و با آرزو و خشم و آرزو
 خرد بسامان نماند و چون خرد بسامان نبود راه راست نبرد
 و هرکه راه راست نبرد بیراه شود و هرکه بیراهست ستمکارست
 و ستمکار و دروغ‌زن در عذابست لسیاس گفت هرچه بدیهاست
 325 همه را در یکمعنی باز نمودی هیچ تواند بود که نیکوئیها را نیز در
 یکمعنی بهم آری ارسطو گفت باز گذاشتن ستم نیست الا بداد
 و راستی پیوستن و از باطل پرهیزیدن نیست الا بحق گزاینیدن و اگر
 ترا زشتی بدیها روشن شد ناچار بر تو روشن شد که بگذداشتن بدی
 نیکوئیست لسیاس گفت میان بدی و نیکوئی هیچ میانه هست
 330 که اگر آنکه من بدیرا بگذارم بنیکوئی نرسم و در آن میانه بمانم
 همچنانکه دروغ را بگذارم و بر خاموشی بمانم و نه راست گوید
 و نه دروغ و آنکه از ستمکاری باز آید و نه بیداد کند و نه داد ارسطو

گفت خامش خاموشی نگزیند مگر بردانائی یا برنادانی اگر
 بر دانائی خامش گشت راست گویست و اگر برنادانی خامش
 335 گشت دروغ زنست و متوقف یا بر راست متوقف گشت یا بر کژ
 اگر بر راست توقف کرد دادگرسست و عادل و اگر بر کژ توقف
 کرد ستمکارست و بیدادگر لسیاس گفت بر من روشن کردی فرق
 میان هر آنچه بر من گذرد از خوبی وزشتی در فرق روشن و مرا
 بنمودی که آنچه بر من نگذشت هم مانند آنست که بر
 340 من گذشت بخشنده این حکمت بتو و نگهدارنده برابر آن پاداشت
 کنا از من بخوبی که هیچ پدری بزندگان فرزند چنین پرورش
 نکنند و پس از مرگ هیچ میراث ازین گرامیتر باز نگذارد ارسطو
 گفت اگر از جواب سوال خود شفا یافتی قریطون را بگذار تا
 سخن گوید که در روی می بینم که در سخن می یازد قریطون گفت
 345 بار سخن بر تو نهادن رمجست و در گذشتن و سخن را فرو گذاشتن
 پس از امروز حسرتست ارسطو گفت هیچ سخن را از من فرو
 مگذار تا در من رمقی یابی که من خود را بران بپای آرم
 قریطون گفت شنیدم و یافتم هرچه بلسیاس دادی از جواب
 و خستو شدم بشناختن غائب از شاهد همچنانکه او شد لیکن مرا
 350 از ان شفائی تمام نیست بی آنکه بدانم که این غائب را که
 بدان اقرار دادم و خستو شدم بدانم که چونست صفات و کارهای
 غریب آن ارسطو گفت من هیچ نمیدانم در غایب و شاهد جز
 دانستن و نادانستن و پاداش این هر دو قریطون گفت من چگونه

اقرار دهم بدین در غایب و در حاضر چه هنوز مقرر نشدم بدان
 355 واگر از آنکه در حاضر تو مرا اقرار آوردی در غائب اقرار ندهم الا
 بحدود و برهان ارسطو گفت آن برهان که ترا در حضور بنماید
 همان در غیبت بنماید قریطون گفت چیست آن برهان ارسطو
 گفت هیچ مقرر شوی که رای درست در صواب جوی آنست
 که سقراطیس گفت قریطون گفت چیست آنچه او گفت ارسطو
 360 گفت او را یافته‌ام که میگفت هرآنکه که بر تو رای دشخوار گردد آنرا
 دو وجه بنه که آن بی یکی از آن دو وجه نتواند بود پس پیش گیر
 تا کدام یکی شکسته شود که در باطل گشتن یکی وجه بپای آمدن
 دیگر وجه باشد قریطون گفت بلی او را دیدم که در مطالبات
 مشکلات چنین کردی اکنون دلیل ما چیست از کار غائب و شاهد
 365 ارسطو گفت هیچ اقرار می‌دهی که نیست چیزی بیرون از علم
 و خلافش قریطون گفت ناچارست ارسطو گفت هیچ اقرار میدهی
 که چیزها را بصلاح باز نیارد الا همسان آن و تباه نگرداند الا خلاف
 آن قریطون گفت درین شک نیست ارسطو گفت پس نبینی که
 اگر پاداش علم نه همسان وی بود خلاف وی بود و اگر خلاف علم
 370 بود پس پاداش دانا بنادانی بود و پاداش بینا بنابینائی بود و پاداش
 خوبکاری زشتکاری بود و اینچنین نه پاداش بود بلکه نکال بود
 و هر آن که بار علم بکشد مقرر بودست که پاداش آن نخواهد یافت
 و چون این حکم باطل گشت خلاف این حق شد پس پاداش
 بینائی ببینائی رود و پاداش خوبکاری بخوبی و پاداش حکمت

375 جستمن بحکمت یافتن قریطون گفت مرا اقرار آوردی بر ثواب دانش و عقاب نادانی ارسطو گفت اگر پیش تو درست گشت که پاداش نادان بر خلاف پاداش دانا بود و اگر نه چنین بود پاداش کوری بینائی بود و پاداش خوبکاری بدکاری و پاداش دانش دشمنی یافتن حکمت و این مذهب و قول باطلست نزدیک آن کس که رنج طالب علمی بر گرفت بامید ثوابش و پرهیز از عقاب نادانی و در باطل شدن این مذهب حق گشتن خلافتش است 380 قریطون گفت این سخن بر من بهمانزور آید که من رنج طالب علمی بر گرفتم طلب ثوابش را و از نادانی پرهیز کردم از بیم عقابش ولیکن تو چه گوئی اگر من باز آیم ازین اقرار و انکار کنم که دانستن را ثوابیست و نادانی را عقابی ارسطو گفت پس چه ترا بر منازعت 385 و مناظره من میدارد رغبت بمنفعت دانائی و گریز از مضرت نادانی یا چیز دیگر قریطون گفت بلکه رغبت بمنفعت دانائی و گریز از زیان نادانی مرا برین داشت ارسطو گفت پس اقرار دادی بمنفعت دانش و زیان نادانی و ثواب ازان بیرون نیست که 390 نفعت و نه عقاب ازان بیرونست که زیانست قریطون گفت مقوم بمنفعت دانش بزندگانی نه پس از مرگ ارسطو گفت منفعت علم بزندگانی کدامست زیستن بکام یا افزایش دانش قریطون گفت مقرر گشتم بسود دانش و دیدم که دانش بلذات زندگانی زیانکارست ناچار بدان باز آید که سود منفعت دانش در آخرت بود ارسطو 395 گفت اگر تو در شکی از منفعت دانا در آخرت با آنکه لذت دنیا

نیست در دانائی پس هیچ راه نیست ترا که منفعت دانش را اثبات کنی نه در دنیا و نه در آخرت قریطون گفت بدیدم من که اگر اقرار دهم بمنفعت علم ناچار اقرار باید داد که در آخرت بود اکنون منکر میشوم که دانش را بمنفعتست تا انکار توانم کرد که 400 در آخرت سودمندست ارسطو گفت نه تو اختیار شنوائی و بینائی و خردمندی کنی بر کوری و کوری و احمقی قریطون گفت بلی ارسطو گفت برای منفعت اختیار کنی یا نه برای منفعت قریطون گفت برای منفعت ارسطو گفت دیگر بار مقرر شدی که منفعتی هست پس همانست لازم شود که در پیش لازم شد قریطون گفت منفعت 405 دانش را مقرر شدم پیوست تا زنده باشم از روح و آسایش دانائی که می یابم و غم نادانی که نبود و جز این هیچ منفعت دیگرش ندانم ارسطو گفت و بیرون ازین هیچ چیز دیگر هست که نه چنین است قریطون گفت چه دلیل بر آنکه بیرون ازین چیز دیگر هست و آن پس از مرگست و همچنین است که در حیات ارسطو گفت و مرگ 410 نیست جز از تن باز ماندن نفس قریطون گفت نیست جز ازین ارسطو گفت و کدام غایبست که در غیبت بصلاح ماندن الا هم بدانکه در حضور ازان بصلاح بود قریطون گفت جز ازین نتواند بود ارسطو گفت پس تو از کجا می پرسی که چیست که نفس منفعت ازان گیرد که در حال غیبت از تن بجز از آنچه 415 ازان منفعت گیرد در حال حضور یا چه برو زیان کند در حال غیبت که نه همان برو زیانکارست قریطون گفت بر است که هیچ

بیرون شدی نگذاشتی مرا در انکار منفعت دانش در دنیا و آخرت
 و زیان نادانی در دنیا و آخرت و بدین اقرار دادم ناچار و ترا راستگوئی
 داشتم بدانچه گفتی که من در حاضر و غایب چیزی نمی یابم جز
 420 دانائی و نادانی و کیفر این هر دو لیکن تواند بود که جز ازین
 چیزی دیگر بود و دیگر یافتست و من نیافتم ارسطو گفت هیچ
 جواب توان الا پس از سوال قریطون گفت نه ارسطو گفت هرگز
 سوال باشد الا پس از آنکه آنچه ازش پرسند در یاد بود قریطون
 گفت نه ارسطو گفت اگر تو یافتی آنچه ازش پرسیدی جواب آن
 425 یافتی در جواب آنچه پرسیدی از علم و جهل و کیفر هر دو و اگر تو
 در خود نیافتی آنچه ازان سوال توان کرد بر من هیچ جواب لازم
 نشد قریطون گفت بلی سوال من دران ثابت نشد و مرا بر تو هیچ
 جواب نماندست از آنچه پرسیدم جواب یافتم ارسطو گفت پس
 شیماس را مهلت ده تا نوبت خود را بدارد در سخن شیماس گفت
 430 شنیدم هرچه لسیاس پرسید از سخن تو و آنچه بقریطون دادی
 و همه بر من روشنست مگر یک کلمه که قریطون از تو پذیرفت و مرا
 هنوز درست نیست ارسطو گفت کدامست شیماس گفت
 شنیدم که تو گفتی که در غیبت و حضور هیچ چیز نیست جز علم
 و ضدش و کیفر هر دو و مرا این از کجا روشن شود که جز این نیست
 435 ارسطو گفت تو هیچ دیگر یافتی شیماس گفت من آسمان را یافتم
 و زمین و کوه و دشت و جانور را و هرچه در خشک و تر است که من
 نتوانم که آنرا علم خوانم و نه جهل و نه جزا هر دو بی برهان ارسطو گفت

هیچ اقراردهی بسخن هرمیس که در کتاب طبایع خلقی آورده ام
 شیماس گفت چیست آن سخن ارسطو گفت او خبر داده است
 440 که هیچ طبع نیرو نگیرد الا از پیوند همسان خویش وستی نیابد الا
 از پیوند مخالف خود شیماس گفت بلی چنین است که هیچ
 چیز نیست الا که تجریب در آن درستی سخن هرمیس بنماید
 ارسطو گفت پس اقرار دادی که جز علم و جهل و کيفر هر دو دیگر
 چیزی نیست شیماس گفت چرا ارسطو گفت ازینها که بر
 445 شمردی هیچ نیست که نه از دنیا است شیماس گفت که نه ارسطو
 گفت هیچ دانی که چه چیز فلاسفه را بران داشت که دنیا را
 فرو گذاشت شیماس گفت دانش ایشان بدید این چیزها که
 خرد را زیانکارست ایشانرا بران داشت ارسطو گفت پس
 تو ندانستی که هر چه خرد را زیان دارد مخالف خرد بود و مخالف
 450 خرد بیخردی بود شیماس گفت اگر آنچه گفتی که خرد را
 زیان دارد بر زمین درستست بر آسمان درست نیست ارسطو گفت
 و آسمان نیست الا همچو زمین درین کار شیماس گفت از چه روی
 آسمان زیانکارست همچنین بخرد که زمین ارسطو گفت کمترین
 زیان آسمان بدانائی آنست که بصرا از نفوذ و گذشتن باز داشته
 455 است پس دشمن بینائی دشمن خرد بود شیماس گفت این سخن هم
 درستست در حاضر در غایب چه گوئی ارسطو گفت غایب هیچ
 ازان بیرون نیست که یا موافق حاضر باشد یا مخالف وی شیماس
 گفت آری ارسطو گفت اگر موافقت هیچ تواند بود که (نه)

موافق را یاری کند و اگر مخالفست هیچ تواند بود که نه مخالفت
 460 و ضدی کند شیماس گفت اکنون ناچار اقرار دادنست بر الجملة
 که قریطون از تو قبول کرد اکنون مرا آگاهی ده از تفسیر یک کلمه
 که در ذکر افلاطون بزرگ یافته ام که هر نفع دهنده دفع کننده است
 و نه هر دفع کننده نفع دهنده است باید که فیلسوف از انچیزها
 که دفع کننده و نفع دهنده باشد بسیار اندوزد و از انچیزها که دفع
 465 کننده باشد نه نفع دهنده بکفاف خرسند شود ارسطو گفت افلاطون
 ترا خبر داده است که فیلسوف را سامان ندارد الا چیزی که نفع
 بوی میرساند و از وی دفع مضرت میکند و بدین چیز دانش
 میخواهد که بروح روشنائی برساند و دفع تاریکی جهل بکند و فرمود
 که باید که ازان بسیار اندوزد و بدفع کننده ناسودمند که خورش
 470 و پوشش و مسکنست چندانکه ناگزیر باشد اقتصاد فرمود و بدانکه از
 اندازه گذشتن درین چیزها زیانکارست دانش را و میانه جستن
 دفع کننده است و نفع دهنده نیست که هیچ روح دانائی ازان
 مخیزد و ازینست که فیلسوف را باید که نیک خرسند باشد بر
 اسباب حیات ساختن و نیک حریص باشد بآموختن شیماس
 475 گفت چیست که دفع کننده را ازان بازداشت که نفع دهنده بود
 و هر دو موافقند بدفع کردن ارسطو گفت نفع دهنده از دفع کننده
 بدان پیدا شود که هرچه دفع کننده است اگر دران افراط رود از
 دفع کردن نیز بیرون رود و زیانکار شود و نفع دهنده که دانش است
 چندانکه بیشتر بود نفع او بیش بود و دفع کننده چندان دفع

480 کننده بود که باندازه بود نه بینی که اگر تو در خورش باندکی
 خرسند شوی دفع مضرت گرسنگی بکند و همچنین آشامیدن و لباس
 و اگر افزون شود از آنچه باید همه زیانکاری کند و دفع کردن نیز
 از وی باطل شود چون سلاح گران که دارنده را بکشد و خسته کند
 و اما نفع دهنده دفع کننده که آن حکمتست بر خداوند نگراند
 485 چنانچه سلاح گران اگر چه بسیار بود پس افلاطون که فرق میان
 نفع دهنده و دفع کننده بنماید چنانکه از سخن وی شنیدی
 شیماس گفت ازین دو حد هیچ چیز بیرون شود یا نه ارسطو گفت
 یک حد دیگر مانده است که اگر با این دو جمع شود هیچ چیز
 از آن بیرون نشود شیماس گفت کدامست ارسطو گفت کارها بر سه
 490 گونه اند نفع رساننده ایست دفع کننده و دفع کننده ایست که نفع
 رساننده نیست و مضرت دهنده است شیماس گفت کدامست
 زیانکار ارسطو گفت دفع کننده که در آن افراط رود و زیان کار شود
 شیماس گفت این سخن تمام شد و از گفتار تو نفس جلا یافت
 همچنانکه نور دیده نگرنده از روشنی بروز جلا باید اکنون مرا آگاهی
 495 ده که میان آنکه جلا خرد دهد و میان آنکه جلا دیده دهد هیچ
 نزدیکی هست یا عقل و بصر هیچ بهم ماند ارسطو گفت ازین
 خوبیها هستند که بگوهرنه همچندان بیکدیگر مانند که بکار اگر
 از آنست که جواب سوال یافتی دیوجنس را مهلت ده تا سخن
 گوید شیماس خاموش گشت دیوجنس گفت ما از فلاسفه آنرا
 500 متورعتر یافتیم که رای او تیزین تر بود اکنون مرا خبر کن که صدق

وورع از روشنی رای خیزد یا نه ارسطو گفت هواها انواعند و خردها
 گوناگون و هر هوایی را خردی در برابرست که آن بعداوت آن هوی
 اولیترست نه شهوت عین جهالتست بخاصیت بلکه هریکی عین
 خود است اگرچه هر دو در زیان کردن بفیلسوف و منع ثواب
 505 کردن از وی یکسانند و نه نیز آن قوت و خوی که پرهیز فرماید عین
 آن قوت و خوئیست که جهل را باطل کند و دانش آرد و نه بر
 مخالف یکدیگرند بلکه میان ایشان موافقتی است و مخالفتی مثل
 موافقت و مخالفت آب روان و آب فسرده یکی تنکست و لطیف
 و یکی درشت و کثیف و همچنین دانش لطیف را جهل لطیف ضد
 510 بود و تقوی عظیم ضد شهوت عظیم باشد هر که خوی و رعش سست
 بود و خوی دانش نیرومند رای او در بینش درست آید و کار او در ورع
 سست و آنکه بعکس این بود کار و رای او بعکس این باشد دیوجنس
 گفت این سخن چون راست بود با آنچه در پیش گفته که
 نیست هیچ چیز بیرون از دانش و جهل و جزای هر دو اکنون دانش
 515 را اثبات کردی و نادانی و ورع و شهوت و دیگر چیزها ارسطو گفت
 نه بینی که آب روان و آب فسرده بهم نزدیکند همچنین است
 نزدیکی شهوت بنادانی و دیگر شذاعت همچنین و چون بهم نزدیک
 شدند در عمل بنام یکی گشتند دیوجنس گفت چگونه بدانم که
 نادانی بشهوت چنان ماند که آب روان با آب فسرده ارسطو گفت
 520 نه بینی که هر دو خرد را زیانکارند همچنانکه آب روان و آب فسرده
 تبش را نبرند دیوجنس گفت این سخن گذر یافت اکنون مرا

خبر کن که سزاوارترین علوم که بدان یازم کدامست ارسطو گفت چون طلب حکمتست بهترین کارهای دنیا و ثواب آنست که بهترین ثوابهای آخرتست سزاوارتر دانشی که بدان یازی حکمتست 525 دیوجنس گفت هیچ دانشی دیگر هست جز از حکمت یا نه ارسطو گفت عامه خلق راست بهره چند از دانش و علم و راستی و وفا و سخا و دیگر حسنات ضایع که از حکمت چندان میانه دارند که صورت جانور از تمثال و رقوم دیوار دیوجنس گفت چرا این خصال را ضایع خواندی در عامه ارسطو گفت از جهت بیخبری 530 عامه ازان دیوجنس گفت چونست این ارسطو گفت برای آنکه دانای عامه دانش خود را دران بکار برد که ورز او نیفزاید و حلیم ایشان بار آن بکشد که سزای نکال بود و راستگوی ایشان آسجا صدق بکار آرد که خود پسندد اگرچه ستنه بود و بخشنده ایشان بر ناشایست بخشیش کند و وقای ایشان بوعدهای تلفکننده بود 535 و شنوای ایشان بیموده شنود لا جرم این حسنات در ایشان ضایع باشد و حسنات اهل علم نماند الا همچندانکه نقش بر دیوار بجانور زنده ماند دیوجنس گفت این مثل را چه نسبت است با حسنات خاعه و عامه ارسطو گفت نه تو دانسته که دانش زندگیست و نادانی مرگ گفت بلی ارسطو گفت علم دانا کردهای ویرا 540 زنده دارد و جهل نادان کردهای ویرا بمیراند دیوجنس گفت این خوبکاریهای ایشان هیچ افزونی بزشتکاری ایشان دارد یا نه ارسطو گفت بلی گفت چگونه ارسطو گفت نیکوکار عامه عزم نیکوئی

دارد و طریق خطا میکند و بدکردار ایشان عزم بدی دارد و بکردار خطا
 ببرد و یکسان باشند و یکی را افزونی نیست البته دیوجنس گفت
 545 اکنون دانستم که حسنات ایشان از چه روی ضایعست اکنون فضل
 حکمت بنمای که کردها الا بدان سودمند نیست ارسطو گفت هر که
 خوبی را دید و زشتی را بگذاشت و بنیکوئی آمد موافق حکمت
 کرد و هر که عزم خوبی کرد و خطا کرد یا عزم بدی کرد و بجائی
 آورد از حکمت درگذشت دیوجنس گفت این گفتار جمله
 550 روشن گشت اکنون مرا بنما که این کار یعنی حکمت نخست بر
 که روشن شد ارسطو گفت خردهای مردم از آن دورست که بچنین
 کار بزرگ تواند رسید بی آموختن همچنانکه چشمهای ایشان
 دورست از دیدن بی روشنائی چراغ دیوجنس گفت فلاسفه از که
 آموختند آنرا ارسطو گفت پیوسته داعیان و رسل قرون در آفاق
 555 زمین مردم را بدین کار میخواندند و از زمین ما نخستتر کسی که
 این دانش بدو رسید بوچی هرمس بود دیوجنس گفت از کجا
 بهرمس آمد ارسطو گفت روان وی را بر آسمان بردند و از ملا اعلی
 بدو رسید و ایشان از ذکر حکیم گرفتند و از وی بر زمین آمد و علما از
 وی گرفتند دیوجنس گفت من چگونه بدانم که هرمس این علم
 560 از اهل آسمان گرفت ارسطو گفت اگر این علم حقست رسیدن آن
 از بالا تواند بود دیوجنس گفت چرا ارسطو گفت نه بینی که بالای
 هر چیز از شیب او به بود که بالای آب و زبرش صافتر بود که زبرش
 و جاهای بلند از زمین خوشتر و نزهتر بود که جاهای شیب و بهترین

اعضای مردم سر باشد و پاکترین درخت میوه باشد و در همه چیزی
 565 چنین است پس سزاوارتر چیزی که از بالا رسد حکمتست و دلیل
 برین آنکه گوهر حکمت و خوی وی بر همه بچربد و بلندتر آمد
 دیوجنس گفت ای پیشوای حکمت خرد ما از خرد تو هیچ باز
 نمیگیرید با ما پیمانی کن که ما را از مخالفت یکدیگر ننگه دارد
 ارسطو گفت اگر بر سیرت من خواهید بودن بکتب من اقتدا کنید
 570 دیوجنس گفت بسیارست کدام اولیتر بفصل میان ما اگر خلاقی
 افتد ارسطو گفت اما آنچه جوئید از علم اول و حکمت ربوبیت
 از کتاب هرمس جوئید و آنچه مشکل شود از علم سیاسیات و تعلیم
 خلق از کتاب طبایع خلق بجوئید و آنچه بر شما مشکل شود از
 خوب وزشتکارها از کتاب اخلاق بطلبید و آنچه از حدود سخن بود
 575 و شما را دران خلاف افتد از کتاب چهارگانه در منطق بجوئید کتاب
 اول قاطیغوریاس و دوم پاریرمنیاس و سیم امالوطیغا و چهارم اپوریطیغا
 کتاب برهان که فرق میان حق و ناحق کند و بدان برهان تواند
 انگیخت بر کارهای پوشیده

و چون سخن ارسطو بدینجای رسید روانش بیطاق شد و دستش
 580 بلرزید و سیب از دستش بیفتاد و حکما جمله بر خاستند و نزدیک
 وی شدند و سر و چشمش ببوسیدند و برو ثنا گفتند دست قریطون
 گرفت و بر روی خود نهاد و گفت روانرا سپردم بپذیرای روان حکما
 و خاموش گشت و درگذشت یاران برو زاری کردند
 سر آمد روزگار دانائی

THE BOOK OF THE APPLE.

This is the translation of a discourse which Aristotle delivered at the time of his death. It is said that when the life of the sage Aristotle approached its end, some of his disciples came to see him. When they saw the emaciation of his frame, and his weakness, and perceived about him the signs of death, they despaired of his life; only 5 the joy, alacrity, and clearness of intellect that they perceived in him showed them that he took a different view of his condition from that which was taken by others. Then one of the disciples said to him: Our grief over you is greater than your grief over yourself, and we are more vexed than you concerning your departure; if it be that you feel otherwise than we feel about you, tell 10 us also of this.—ARISTOTLE said: The joy that you perceive in me does not arise from my cherishing any desire for life, but from my confidence about my condition after death.—A disciple named SIMMIAS said: If you have this confidence, it were better that you should explain the ground of it to us also, that we may be as certain as you.— 15 ARISTOTLE said: Although it is difficult for me to talk, still for your sake I will endure some trouble: but first let me hear Kriton, for I can see that he wishes to say something.—KRITON said: Although I should much like to hear your conversation, and acquire knowledge thereby, O teacher of mankind, the physician whom you employ commanded me not to induce you to talk, on the ground 20 that talking would make you warm, and should the heat get the better of you the cure would be delayed, and the effect of the drugs impeded.—ARISTOTLE said: I will disobey

the advice of the physician, and will employ no drug but the scent of an apple; which will keep me alive till I have given you the lecture to which you have a right. Why should I not speak, when the best thing I hope to obtain from the drugs is the power to speak? Come now, tell
25 me, Do you grant the excellence of wisdom or not? They answered: Our only reason for honouring wisdom is the fact that we know it to excel other things.—ARISTOTLE said: Is its excellence in this world or in the next?—They said: We do not deny the excellence of wisdom, and necessity forces us to place its excellence and value in the
30 next world. ARISTOTLE: Then why do you abhor death and adhere to the notion that some detriment will accrue to you therefrom, when you ought to perceive that death, horrible as it is to the vulgar, is nevertheless nothing but the freeing of the soul from its bodily case?—DISC.: How so? Let us know more.—ARISTOTLE: Does the knowledge which you have acquired make you glad or not? And does the knowledge which has escaped you make you sorry
35 or not?—DISC.: The former is true in both cases.—ARISTOTLE: Through which then do you acquire knowledge—through the body, which is a blind, deaf, impotent, and useless mass when the spirit departs from it, or by the spirit whereby a man is continually rendered capable of learning, seeing, knowing and speaking, so long as it is with him?—DISC.: Doubtless through the vitality and goodness of the spirit knowledge is acquired, and by the dullness of the body
40 it is kept out of it.—ARISTOTLE: Since then it is clear that knowledge is a product of the spirit, and that the dullness of the body keeps it out, and that by the acquisition of knowledge you become glad, whereas by being precluded from it you become sorry, evidently you must prefer the separation of the spirit from the body to the persistence of the spirit in the body; and separation from the body must be better for the spirit than abiding in the body. Do you not see that the desires and delights of the body such as women
45 and children and wealth and eating and drinking still more impede the search after wisdom? and that when you abandon

those lusts you do so in order to protect the intellect and to devote yourselves to knowledge?—Disc.: Certainly.—ARISTOTLE.—Then, since you confess that lusts have the power to damage the intellect, surely the body which enjoys those lusts must be more detrimental to the intellect?—Disc.: Our judgment forces us to agree with what your discourse has
50 proved thus far; but what shall we do and how shall we act, in order to become as brave about death as you are, and as regardless of life as you are?—ARISTOTLE: The best means for a seeker of knowledge to attain his end is an effort on the part of the speaker to speak only what is true, and of the hearer to hear correctly. I will now endeavour
55 to speak truly; do you endeavour on your part to hear and receive correctly and truly. Do you not know that the meaning of the word ‘philosophy’ is ‘fondness for wisdom’? and that the mind in its substance and origin is philosophy, and only delights in it, and only obtains peace therefrom?—Disc.: Certainly.—ARISTOTLE: Do you not know that wisdom is the joy of the mind, and that wisdom can be obtained by goodness of soul and mind: now
60 goodness of soul consists in its adjustment, and the adjustment of the mind consists in diminution of phlegm, rheum and blood?—Disc.: Aye.—ARISTOTLE: If the goodness of the mind lie in its adjustment, and its adjustment in the diminution of those humours, when those humours altogether depart, it will become sounder and better?—Disc.: We cannot fail to admit the truth of what you say, but nevertheless we do not find in ourselves the same pleasure in death that we
65 perceive in you.—ARISTOTLE: Since sight guides the seer to his gain and preserves him from harm, try to let me increase your sight as to the advantage of death. O friends of wisdom! do you not see that the seeker after wisdom whose soul has become free from sin has mortified himself before death in respect of friends, and wealth, and empire, for the sake of which men desire the life of this world, and undertaken
70 much sorrow and a heavy burden in seeking wisdom—sorrow so great that it can only be relieved by death? What desire has he for life who enjoys none of the pleasures

of life: and why need he flee from death who can only rest in death? Nay! He does wrong, whosoever seeks the name of philosophy without being worthy of its meaning: and he is ignorant who fancies that in the comforts, 75 pleasures and delights of this world the road to philosophy can be found. Can you desire that the name of knowledge should be bestowed on you whilst you are enjoying the pleasures of this world, of eating, drinking, and so on?—

Disc.: We have no such desire, nor do we seek any such thing. How could we aspire to be philosophers while caring for this world, when we have seen that whenever there has 80 been any excess in food or drink, or there manifests itself in the heart any motion of something contrary to the intellect, such as lust, or anger, or covetousness, or envy, the intellect remains inactive all that time; whereas, if that motion come not into play, then the blood only is at work, and there is nothing which serves better to protect it, and from which protection is more sought than the intellect.—

ARISTOTLE: The branch of a thing does not come but 85 of the root, and the part is not but of the whole. If ye abstain in this world from lusts, but are attached to this world in your heart, your abstinence is not perfect. Now the root of attachment to the world lies in love of self-preservation. Hence every one who abstains from its lusts, but desires to remain in the world has caught the branch and neglected the root; whereas he is perfect and has reached the goal who has both root and branch.—SIMMIAS:

I have been abstemious in regard to the pleasures of this 90 world; but now from what I have heard you say, I am anxious to remain in it no longer. Should that not be granted me, at least I shall endeavour to walk in your footsteps, and adopt your way of life, O teacher of mankind!—KRITON: My mind's eye now shows me that there is no one to whom death is not detrimental except the philosopher. Whosoever has attained thereunto and become perfect, let him seek death and desire it; but whoso has 95 failed to attain thereto, let him flee from death his farthest, and avoid it his hardest. For nothing but

wisdom withstands death and gives peace from its pain.

—ZENO said: Aristotle's discourse leaves us no right to participate in pleasure or to endeavour to remain in the world, and the fact that he is more courageous about death than I—though I do not fear it very much—comes

100 from his having been at greater pains than I to set his affairs right; had I looked after myself as he has looked after himself, and banished from myself avarice, desire, and anger, as he has banished them from himself, as great courage would be perceptible in me as we perceive in him.—

ANOTHER said: Until this day I used to dread the approach of death; now what I fear is the protraction of life.—ZENO:

105 You are better able to attain death than to protract life.—

He answered: My weariness of life does not induce me to summon death myself, before it comes to me.—ZENO: We have known friends do much to see the friend who has not seen them; if you love death, what prevents your seeking

110 it before it seek you?—He answered: Death is not a friend, but a bridge which men must pass before they can arrive at that which they desire and love.—ZENO: Then why do you remain, although you know for certain that death will make you nobler?—He answered: I am like a guardian of the frontier-pass who, if he abide, abides with regret, and if he advance and conquer, will attain to honour.—

115 ZENO: What is the meaning of your parable?—He said: The soul of the philosopher is stationed at the pass, its pass being the body; on the other side are wants, lusts, and passions. Every soul has sore trouble in dealing with these enemies, and in keeping them away. The glory consists in the joy and pleasure whereto the soul attains at parting.

—When their discussion had reached this point, another named STEPHANUS (?) said: If the name of 'philosopher'

120 have no other use than to preserve its owner from the name of 'ignorant,' why should I make any effort to obtain it?—Another said: Merely for the sake of honour I would not seek this name.—ZENO said: Did I desire this name for nothing else, I should desire it for the sake of obtaining security from the fear and horror of death.—KRITON said:

- 125 The greatest of the benefits of that science is that it makes for us many cares into one.—KRAMAS (?) said: Since in this world one thing alone, sorrow, is permanent, the most profitable thing for us to sympathize with is the high aim of one who is concerned about a thing that is everlasting.—PINDAR said: All men are at war, and the fittest enemy for the warrior to attack is the enemy nearest home; and that enemy is the trouble of his own breast.—
- 130 ELETUS (Theaetetus?) said: Who are the philosopher's enemies?—PINDAR said: His most particular enemies are the pleasures of his breast, which hinder his search after wisdom.—When the discourse of these people had reached this point, SIMMIAS, turning to Aristotle, said: Enlighten our hearts with the rays of thy lamp ere its light be quenched, good father!—ARISTOTLE: The most acquisitive of scholars is he who acquires no knowledge
- 135 until he has disciplined himself and corrected himself; the most accurate of speakers is he who attempts not to speak save after meditation, and the soundest of workers is he who acts only after deliberation. And no one more needs deliberation and caution in carrying out a plan, than the
- 140 philosopher in undertaking matters of which the trouble is present and the reward prospective. First let him meditate; then, when meditation brings sight, let him make sight his guide to action; and if sight show that the action will be remunerative, then let him endure the trouble of doing before he reaps the fruit. And when after seeing he resolves to undertake the work, at the time when he should
- 145 reap the fruit he ought not to be vexed at the trouble he has endured. For he who weans his soul from pleasures and undertakes the labour of searching for wisdom for the sake of God, and to gain the reward therefor after death, if at the hour of death he exhibits melancholy, makes himself an object of laughter and derision. So too does he become an object of laughter and derision who makes a feast and lays the foundation of a palace, and when about
- 150 to attain the purpose of his feast and of the building of his palace becomes sad and gloomy. I have known

men who have undertaken this task while in doubt concerning the reward—nor is there any wonder that one who is in doubt concerning the recompense after death should be grieved and sorrowful about dying—but I do wonder at any one who is grieved at death while professing to believe in a recompense after death.—When Aristotle
155 had brought this discourse to a conclusion, KRITON said: If you desire us to be contented after your departure, O worthy teacher! the eloquent speech which you have made must increase our sorrow at your departure; and if death be profitable to you, to us it is most detrimental, on account of the unsolved difficulties remaining among us for which you were our refuge.—DIOGENES said: The
160 same thing cannot be profitable to one thing and detrimental to another unless there be some contrariety between the two latter; if Aristotle's departure be profitable to himself and detrimental to us, this must be because of some difference between us.—KRITON: There is both agreement and diversity between us and him; we agree in our wish and desire, and differ about our remaining and his departure.—DIOGENES: Your grief comes not of his being about to enter the house of honour, but rather of your remaining in the abode of
165 disgrace.—LYSIAS said: You both speak well. You were the pillars of a hall wherein were lamps; the greatest pillar has fallen, and the weight has come upon the other pillars; the most brilliant lamp is extinguished, the light in the hall is diminished, and the darkness increased. Nor is it the falling of the pillar nor the extinction of the lamp that troubles you; but rather the darkness of the hall and the weight of the roof.—SIMMIAS, glancing at
170 Aristotle, said: O guide to wisdom! tell us what is the first thing which it behoves the seeker after wisdom to acquire?—ARISTOTLE: Seeing that the soul is the source of wisdom, the first knowledge which is profitable for him is knowledge of the soul.—SIMMIAS: How should he seek it?—ARISTOTLE: By his own virtue.—SIMMIAS: What is his own virtue?—ARISTOTLE: That virtue whereby you asked
175 me about yourself.—SIMMIAS: How is it possible for any one

- to ask any one else about himself?—ARISTOTLE: Even as the sick man asks the physician about himself, and even as the blind man might ask those about him of his own colour.—SIMMIAS: How can the self be blind about the self,
- 180 when the self is the source of all sight?—ARISTOTLE: When wisdom is secreted and concealed in the self, that is the soul, it is blind to itself, and to others alike: even as the eye without the light of a lamp is blind both to itself and others. —SIMMIAS: Then the learner can only learn through wisdom, and the seer can only see with a lamp.—ARISTOTLE: The soul becomes capable of receiving wisdom only by its natural correctness, and the sight of the seer becomes penetrating only through a lamp. When the two come together, it can
- 185 penetrate.—SIMMIAS: If the soul and the eyes cannot attain brightness in their functions by their own virtue, unaided by wisdom and the lamplight, then nothing is nearer akin to the soul than wisdom.—ARISTOTLE: How can anything be nearer akin to that which it takes in than its own source? Do you not see that the teacher has a better right to the name of knowledge than the taught? and that the possessor of force has a better title to the name of force than one who
- 190 is acquiring it? For the teacher is the source of knowledge, seeing that knowledge flows from him, and the strong is the source of strength.—When the discourse reached this point, LYSIAS said: This subject is finished, and I will now begin afresh. Tell me how it is that knowledge of the soul is the worthiest thing for the acquirer to acquire first? —ARISTOTLE: Because knowledge is an essential property of teacher and taught.—LYSIAS: How am I to know that know-
- 195 ledge is a property of the soul?—ARISTOTLE said: Because knowledge is in the body only so long as the soul is in it; and when the soul is separated from the body, knowledge disappears from it.—LYSIAS: It may come from the body rather than the soul.—ARISTOTLE: If it were of the body, it would appear in the dead body as much as in the living body.—LYSIAS: We are as ignorant of the knowledge
- 200 of the dead, as we are of their ignorance. May it be that the *ignorance* of it which we do not know may come from

the fact that the soul is departed from it?—ARISTOTLE: If ignorance be blindness to one's own concerns, then the ignorance and blindness of the body before death are even more evident than its ignorance after death.—LYSIAS: Though the ignorance of blindness may be in the body after

205 death, the ignorance of folly is not there assuredly.—

ARISTOTLE: What is the difference between the ignorance of blindness and the ignorance of folly?—LYCIAS: Wherein is the identity?—ARISTOTLE: The two are identical in that they both afflict people of understanding. As for the ignorance of folly, it is like badness and evil-doing and evil-speaking; and as for the ignorance of blindness, it is like an evil smell and the fetid matter whence it proceeds.

210 —LYSIAS: I only know of the existence of foulness and sensuality while the soul is in the body: can it be that this foulness proceeds from the soul and not from the body?—

ARISTOTLE: If foul habits were of the original essence of the soul, while the soul was abstracted from accidental states, this foulness would appear in every soul, and no soul would be without it; how then could we have learned that the

215 philosopher's soul is free from foulness, and uncleanness?

Whereas we have learned and know well that the purity of their souls has gained the upper hand over lust and overcome desire and passion. They have subdued these inclinations and harmonized lust with reason.—LYSIAS: If then between lust and the soul there be so great a difference, how comes it that passion and the soul part together from the body?—ARISTOTLE: The soul is a flame, and when some

220 one of the humours of the body prevails, it kindles the body as fire kindles fuel, and causes the light of the soul to issue from the body even as a fire brings brightness and heat out of wood. And passion is as a fire that brings the brightness of the soul out of the body.—LYSIAS: Can it be that brightness itself comes from warmth?—ARISTOTLE:

If brightness varied with heat, a summer night should be

225 brighter than a winter day, even as a summer night is warmer than a winter day.—When the dialogue had reached this point, LYSIAS said: You have enlivened my mind,

O teacher ! this discourse is worthy of deep consideration. Most assuredly I must endeavour to distinguish between soul and passion, the heat of the latter and the brightness of the former. You have made clear to me each of the two, passion and the body, and the distinction of the soul from both, according to their attributes. Now, I would
230 have you show the distinction between the conduct of the soul and of the passion, even as you have shown the distinction between themselves.—ARISTOTLE : Do you know of any distinction between their functions ?—LYSIAS : I know not of any distinction between their substance, but only between their functions : but I would fain have you show me the difference between the conduct of the one and that of the other by signs clear enough to distinguish the work of the one from that of the other.—ARISTOTLE : All that
235 is bad is the work of the passion and all that is good is the work of the soul.—LYSIAS : I know the difference between the good conduct of the one and the foul action of the other no better than the difference between their substances.—ARISTOTLE : Good action or goodness is that which, when it comes to you, puts you right ; and badness is that which, when it comes to you, does you harm.—LYSIAS :
240 Nothing has ever come to me which has done good to a part of me but has damaged some other part. How can I call it “good” when I never have found it free from harm ?—ARISTOTLE : When the thing that is beneficial benefits that part of you which you are more bound to love than to hate, be not vexed if it harm some part of
245 you which you are more bound to hate than to love.—LYSIAS : What part of me is it which I am bound to hate, and what, that I am bound to love ?—ARISTOTLE : You should love your intellect and hate your unintelligent part.—LYSIAS : What comes of this ?—ARISTOTLE : Why, nothing increases your intellect but that which lessens your non-intelligence. Love therefore that which improves your
250 intellect, even though it lessen your non-intelligence. For the advantage done you by it in decreasing your non-intelligence is not inferior to that done you by the improve-

- ment of your intellect.—LYSIAS : You distinguished between soul and passion by your illustration of heat and light ; and you showed me the difference of their functions by showing the difference of their origin. I then asked you to make clear to me what they each do by some sign which should
- 255 sever the work of the one from the work of the other ; you then told me that well-doing was the work of the soul and ill-doing the work of the passion. I asked you the difference between good and bad actions. You answered that whatever increases the intellect is a good action even though non-intelligence is increased by it, and whatever causes decrease of intellect is bad, even though it
- 260 increase the non-intelligence. Neither intelligence nor non-intelligence is diminished except by its opposite, nor increased except by what agrees with it. Now, I still require an explanation of what it is that increases the intelligence and what it is that lessens it.—ARISTOTLE said : Whatsoever adds brightness to your vision of things increases your intelligence, and whatsoever makes things dark to you lessens it.—LYSIAS said : What is it that gives them brightness, and what is it that veils them?—
- 265 ARISTOTLE : Truth-speaking and whatever resembles it is an illuminator, doubt and whatever resembles it a cloke.—LYSIAS said : I understand how true-speaking illuminates and how doubt darkens ; but what are the things *which resemble them*?—ARISTOTLE : Right-doing or justice resembles true-speaking, and injustice or iniquity resembles
- 270 falsehood and doubt.—LYSIAS : In what respect do justice and veracity resemble each other?—ARISTOTLE : Each of them consists in leaving things in their own places.—LYSIAS : And in what respect do falsehood and injustice resemble each other?—ARISTOTLE : Each consists in removing things from their own places.—LYSIAS : Justice and injustice are the work of administrators and judges only ; whereas I am asking you concerning things in general.—ARISTOTLE : All men are judges, only some private, others
- 275 public. He whose judgment errs, and whose tongue speaks false, and whosoever appropriates what is not his,

such a man is unjust and a liar: whereas he who sees things aright, and whose tongue speaks the truth, and who is satisfied with what is his, is righteous, just, and veracious. Nor is any human action outside the two patterns which we have described.—LYSIAS: How am I to know that
280 nothing falls out of these two kinds?—ARISTOTLE: Enquire among the events which are passing and have passed over you, whether any of them lies outside these patterns. If none such be found, include those events which have not yet passed over you among those which have passed over you.—LYSIAS: How am I to include what has not yet happened to me with what has happened, and pass the same judgment upon it?—ARISTOTLE: If the few be part of the many
285 things, and the parts of a thing resemble the whole, then the few things which you see belong to the many things which you do not see, and it is probable that the many things which you do not see are like what you do see. If this reasoning be correct, then you may well pass the same judgment upon the good and evil which have not yet happened to you as upon the good and evil which have
290 happened to you.—LYSIAS: What should make me judge of the absent as of the present?—ARISTOTLE: That which is present must necessarily make you pass a judgment on what is absent; or the thing which makes you know the absence of the absent from knowing the presence of the present.—LYSIAS: What prevents my knowing the present without knowing the absent? Or how is my knowledge
295 of the absent increased by my knowledge of the present? That portion of the earth which I see does not show me the portion which is beyond; neither does my not seeing the portion to which my eye cannot reach hinder my seeing the portion which I can see.—ARISTOTLE: But do not you pass judgment that beyond the earth which we
300 see there is the earth which we do not see? Similarly must you not necessarily pass judgment that beyond those events which have happened to you are those which have not happened, even as you passed judgment that beyond the portion of the earth which you saw there was the earth

- which you did not see?—LYSIAS: I am constrained to admit that I must judge by the absent of the present. Only tell me this: If I pass no judgment from the present on the absent, does my knowledge of the present
305 suffer any detriment? By knowing which I may derive benefit in judging of the absent from the present.—ARISTOTLE: No one knows a thing who is unable to distinguish it from what differs from it.—LYSIAS: How so?—ARISTOTLE: If the saying of the wise DARIUS be true, that no one knows the truth who cannot discriminate it from the false, and no one knows what is
310 right who cannot sever it from what is wrong, then so long as you are not acquainted with the absent, you have no means of knowing the present.—LYSIAS: This subject is over. Now, O guide to philosophy! I would ask you this: Is it possible to embrace in one notion all those things concerning the baseness of which mankind are agreed, fornication, theft, drunkenness, deceit, injustice, treachery,
315 fraud, malice, envy, ignorance, pride, self-complacency, so as to exclude nothing, whereby I might know that the events which have not yet passed over me are like to those which have passed over me?—ARISTOTLE: The possessors of these qualities and characteristics are unjust, false, and self-blinding, insomuch as they strive after what is not theirs.—LYSIAS: How so?—ARISTOTLE: Do you not see
320 that no one sets about any of these iniquities before avarice, desire, or anger bestir itself in him, after which he sets about them. Now with avarice, desire, and passion reason cannot remain at peace. And the reason being out of order, it cannot take the right path, and whoso does not take the right path goes astray; he that goes astray is a wrong-doer, and the wrong-doer and the liar are in torment.
325 —LYSIAS: You have collected under one notion all the vices; could you do the same for the virtues?—ARISTOTLE: To abandon injustice is to adhere to justice and right; and to avoid the false is to strain after the true. If the foulness of the vices has been made clear to you, it must inevitably have been made clear that virtue consists in abandoning

vice.—LYSIAS: Is there any mean between vice and virtue?
330 so that having got rid of vice I might not attain to virtue,
but remain at the mean; like one who, abandoning falsehood,
stops short at silence and speaks neither truth nor
falsehood; or one who avoids iniquity and does neither
injustice nor justice?—ARISTOTLE: He who is silent elects
to be so either with ignorance or with knowledge; if he be
silent with knowledge, he is a speaker of truth; if with
335 ignorance he is a liar. So, too, whoso pauses does so
either for fraud or for right; if for right, he is just and
righteous; if for fraud, he is iniquitous and a doer of
injustice.—LYSIAS: You have made clear to me the difference
between all the good and the bad that may happen to me
by a clear distinction, and have proved to me that whatever
has not happened to me must resemble what has happened.
340 God, who gave thee wisdom, and who protects thee, give
thee therefor a meet reward! Never has father in his
lifetime tended his child better, or after death left him
a more honourable inheritance!—ARISTOTLE: If you are
satisfied with the answer to your questions, let Kriton speak,
for I can see that he wishes to do so.—KRITON: It is painful
345 to impose on you the burden of speaking, whereas it is
sad to be quiet and leave the subject to be finished on some
later day.—ARISTOTLE: Withhold nothing, so long as you
see a spark of life in me on which I can sustain myself.—
KRITON: I heard and understood all the answers you gave
Lysias; and I agreed as he did that the absent is to be
350 known from the present. But I am not quite satisfied
without knowing what are the qualities and unknown
operations of that "absent" to which I confessed and
agreed.—ARISTOTLE: I know of nothing in the present
or the absent, save knowledge and ignorance, and the
reward of the two.—KRITON: How could I acknowledge
this of the "absent and the present," when I have not yet
acknowledged it of the present? And though you should
355 force me to acknowledge it of the present, I will not acknow-
ledge it of the absent, save by definition and evidence.—
ARISTOTLE: The evidence which tells you it of the present

will also tell it of the absent.—KRITON: What evidence?—

ARISTOTLE: Do you not agree that the right way in seeking the truth is what SOKRATES said?—KRITON: And what did

360 he say?—ARISTOTLE: I am told that he said, Whenever you are in difficulty about a question, give it two alternatives, one of which must necessarily be true; then proceed till one of the two is refuted, for with the refutation of the one alternative will come the establishment of the other.—

KRITON: Yes, I have observed that he acted thus in difficult investigations. Now what evidence have you about the nature of the present and absent?—ARISTOTLE: Do you not

grant that there is nothing outside knowledge and its contrary?—KRITON: I must do so.—ARISTOTLE: Do you grant
365 that things are bettered only by their like, and damaged only by what is unlike them?—KRITON: Undoubtedly.—

ARISTOTLE: Then do you not see that if the recompense of knowledge be not like it, it must be the contrary of it? And, if it be the contrary of knowledge, then the recompense of

370 the wise will be ignorance, and the recompense of the seeing blindness, and the recompense of well-doing ill-doing? Now such as this would not be a *recompense* but a *punishment*. Then whoever bears the burden of knowledge must allow that he will gain no recompense for it. This judgment being false, the opposite of it is true. The recompense for seeing will be sight; for well-doing, good;

375 for seeking wisdom, finding wisdom —KRITON: You have forced me to agree that knowledge will be rewarded and ignorance punished.—ARISTOTLE: If you are satisfied that the recompense of the ignorant is the reverse of the recompense of the wise—otherwise the reward of blindness would be sight and that of goodness badness, and that of hating wisdom obtaining wisdom. Now such a view or

380 doctrine must be false in the eyes of him who has borne the labour of pursuing knowledge in the hope of the reward thereof, and in order to avoid the penalty of ignorance. This opinion being proved false makes the opposite necessarily true.—KRITON: This argument applies as forcibly to me, since I have borne the burden of the searcher.

- after knowledge with a view to the reward thereof, and have avoided ignorance fearing its penalty. But what will you say if I withdraw this concession, and deny that knowledge is rewarded and ignorance punished?—ARISTOTLE: Then what induces you to discuss and to argue with me? The desire for the benefit of knowledge and the endeavour to avoid the harm of ignorance or something else?—KRITON: Nay, desire for the benefit of knowledge and the endeavour to avoid the harm of ignorance induce me to do this.—ARISTOTLE: Then you have acknowledged that knowledge is beneficial and ignorance detrimental. Now a reward is not other than beneficial, and a penalty is not other than detrimental.—KRITON: I acknowledge that wisdom is beneficial during life, not after death.—ARISTOTLE: What is the advantage of knowledge during life? A pleasant life or increase of knowledge?—KRITON: I granted the value of knowledge, and I have seen that knowledge is detrimental to the pleasures of life; it necessarily follows that the advantage of knowledge must be in the next world.—
- 395 ARISTOTLE: If you doubt the benefits accruing to the wise in the next world, while knowledge precludes the enjoyment of this world, it is impossible for you to assert that knowledge is of value in either world.—KRITON: I see that if I grant that knowledge is beneficial, I must acknowledge that it is so in the next world. I will now deny that it possesses any advantage, in order to be able to deny that it is
- 400 of advantage in the next world.—ARISTOTLE: Do you not then prefer hearing, seeing, and understanding to blindness, deafness, and folly?—KRITON: Yes.—ARISTOTLE: Do you prefer them for the sake of some advantage or not?—KRITON: For the sake of some advantage.—ARISTOTLE: Once again then you have acknowledged that there is some advantage; and you have the same conclusion forced on you as before.—
- 405 KRITON: I have ever acknowledged the value of knowledge, so long as I live, in respect of the comfort and peace that I gain from it, and the pain of ignorance that I am freed from; but I know of no other benefit therefrom.—ARISTOTLE: Then is there anything else beyond this which is otherwise

than it?—KRITON: What evidence is there that there is anything else beyond this, which exists after death and is as it was in life?—ARISTOTLE: Now death is nothing else but
410 the soul surviving the body?—KRITON: It is nothing else.
—ARISTOTLE: Then is anything “absent” which is benefited in absence except by that whereby it is also benefited in presence?—KRITON: It must be so.—ARISTOTLE: Then why do you ask what it is from which the soul derives benefit in the state of absence from the body other than that
415 from which it derives benefit in the state of presence? Or, what can harm it in the state of absence that does not harm it likewise in the state of presence?—KRITON: You have left me no loophole to deny the value of knowledge in this world and the next, and the harm of ignorance in both; these I must acknowledge, and I allow that you are right in stating that in the present and the absent I know of nothing save knowledge, ignorance, and the recompense of the two.
420 It may be, however, there is something besides these which others have learned, though I have not.—ARISTOTLE: Can an answer be given but after a question?—KRITON: No.
—ARISTOTLE: Can a question ever be asked before that which is asked about comes into the mind?—KRITON: No.
—ARISTOTLE: If you have a clear notion of that about which you have asked, you have obtained the answer thereto
425 in the answer which you received to your question about knowledge, ignorance, and their recompense. But if you have no notion in your own mind of that about which you would ask, I am not bound to reply.—KRITON: True, my question was not justified, and no answer is due from you. I have obtained the answer to my question.—ARISTOTLE: Then give Simmias leave to speak in his turn.—SIMMIAS
430 said: I heard all that Lysias asked concerning your statements, and the replies you gave Kriton: and all is clear to me except one word that Kriton accepted from you, but which is not clear to me as yet.—ARISTOTLE: Which?—SIMMIAS: I heard you say that there is nothing either in “absence” or “presence” except knowledge, its opposite, and the recompense of the two. Now how can it be clear

to me that there is nothing save this?—ARISTOTLE: Do
435 you know of anything else?—SIMMIAS: I know of the
heavens and the earth, the mountains and the plains, the
animals, and all else that is on the dry and the moist,
which I cannot call knowledge, nor ignorance, nor the
recompense of either without proof.—ARISTOTLE: Do you
agree with the saying of HERMES, quoted by me in the
book of physics?—SIMMIAS: What is that saying?—
ARISTOTLE: HERMES states that no object acquires strength
440 except by union with its like; and that none acquires
weakness except by union with what is unlike it.—
SIMMIAS: Yes, it is so; there is nothing in which
experience does not show the truth of Hermes' saying.—
ARISTOTLE: Then you have acknowledged that nothing
exists except knowledge, ignorance, and the recompense of
the two.—SIMMIAS: How so?—ARISTOTLE: Of the things
445 which you have enumerated there is none that does not
belong to this world.—SIMMIAS: Certainly.—ARISTOTLE:
Know you what it is that induces philosophers to abandon
this world?—SIMMIAS: Their knowledge, by seeing that these
things are detrimental to the intellect, induces them to take
this course.—ARISTOTLE: Then have you not learned that
whatever harms the intellect is the opposite of the intellect,
450 and the opposite of the intellect is non-intelligence?—
SIMMIAS: If what you say, that these things harm the
intellect, be true of the earth, it is not true of the heaven.
—ARISTOTLE: Nay, the heaven differs not from the earth in
this matter.—SIMMIAS: In what respect are the heavens as
detrimental to the intellect as the earth?—ARISTOTLE: The
least detriment occasioned to knowledge by the heaven is
this, that it prevents the sight from penetrating and passing
455 through; now that which is inimical to sight is inimical to
intelligence.—SIMMIAS: This theory is true of the present;
what of the absent?—ARISTOTLE: The absent must either
be like or unlike the present, must it not?—SIMMIAS: Yes.
—ARISTOTLE: If it be like it, must it not help its like?
if it be unlike, must it not oppose it and thwart it?—
460 SIMMIAS: Now, indeed, I must certainly agree to all that

Kriton accepted from you. Now tell me the explanation of a single saying that I have met with in the works of the great PLATO: that everything that does good averts ill; but not everything that averts ill does good; and that the philosopher should amass a great quantity of those things
 465 which both avert ill and do good, and be content with a small number of those things which avert ill but do no good.—ARISTOTLE: Plato tells you that only those things suit the philosopher which bring him good and avert ill from him; and thereby he means knowledge which brings illumination to the mind and averts the darkness of ignorance; and he bids him acquire much of it. And of that which averts ill but is unprofitable, which is food,
 470 clothing and lodging, he bids him be content with as much as is absolutely necessary, because to exceed the limit in these things does harm to the intellect, whereas to seek the mean averts ill, but does no positive good, since none of the pleasures of knowledge proceeds therefrom to the mind. Hence it behoves the philosopher to be easily satisfied with obtaining the means of subsistence and very eager to acquire knowledge.—SIMMIAS: What is it that
 475 prevents that which averts ill from doing positive good when both agree in averting ill?—ARISTOTLE: That which does positive good differs from that which averts ill in this, that whatever averts ill only, if it be pursued to excess, ceases even to avert ill, and becomes detrimental; whereas that which does positive good, *i.e.* knowledge, the more there is of it the more beneficial it is; whereas that which averts ill only, does so, ^{only} so long as it is
 480 in moderation. Do you not see that if you are satisfied with a modicum of food, it averts the mischief of hunger? similarly drink and clothing; whereas all, if there be more of them than is necessary, become detrimental, and their power of averting ill even is annulled, like heavy armour which wounds or kills its bearer. Whereas that which both does good and averts ill (that is, wisdom), however much
 485 there be of it, does not, like heavy armour, weigh down its possessor. Thus did Plato distinguish between that which

does good and that which averts ill, according to what you heard of his sayings.—SIMMIAS: Is there any other term besides these two or not?—ARISTOTLE: One other term remains; if it be added to these others, nothing is left out.—SIMMIAS: What is that?—ARISTOTLE: Things are of three
490 sorts: the thing which both does good and averts ill; that which averts ill, but induces no good; and that which does harm.—SIMMIAS: What is it that does harm?—ARISTOTLE: A thing which averts ill, when carried to excess, so as to become detrimental.—SIMMIAS: This subject is concluded. My mind is as much brightened by your instruction as the eye of the seer by the light of day. Now tell me: Is there any affinity between that which gives brightness to the mind and that which gives brightness to the eye? Or,
495 is there any resemblance between the mind and the eye?—ARISTOTLE: They are things which do not resemble each other so much in substance as in function. If you have received the answer to your question, let Diogenes speak.—Simmius became silent.—DIOGENES then said: I have observed that those philosophers whose mental vision has been most
500 acute have been the most temperate. Now tell me: Do goodness and temperance spring from brightness of mental vision or not?—ARISTOTLE: There are different sorts of passions and divers sorts of intellects. Over against each passion there is an intellect best capable of opposing that passion. Lust in its nature is not the essence of folly, but each is a separate essence, though both are at
505 one in harming the philosopher and keeping him from his recompense. Nor again is that faculty and quality which recommends self-restraint identical with the faculty and quality which overcomes folly and brings knowledge; neither are they opposed to each other; rather is there resemblance and also diversity between the two, like the resemblance and diversity between running water and ice; the one being fine and rare, the other hard and coarse; just so is fine ignorance opposed to fine knowledge, and
510 strong piety to strong lust. And if a man's habit of temperance is weak and his property of knowledge strong,

his judgment sees aright, while his conduct, so far as continence goes, is weak; while the intellectual vision and the conduct of him whose case is the opposite are opposite.—

—DIOGENES: How can this be right, when you have said before that nothing exists except knowledge, ignorance, and the re-

515 compensate of each? *Now* you have acknowledged the existence of knowledge, ignorance, continence, lust, and other things.

—ARISTOTLE: Do you not see that running water and ice resemble each other? Similar to this is the resemblance of lust to ignorance, and the rest are like this too. Being similar in operation they become one in name.—

DIOGENES: How do I know that ignorance is to lust as running water to ice?—ARISTOTLE: Do you not see that

520 both hurt the intellect, just as running water and ice neither tolerate heat?—DIOGENES: This subject is over. Now tell me: Which science is the most proper for me to pursue?

—ARISTOTLE: Since the pursuit of philosophy is the best of the pursuits of this world, and the recompense therefor is the greatest of the recompenses of the next world, philosophy is the best science that you can pursue.—DIOGENES: Is

525 there any other knowledge besides philosophy or not?—

ARISTOTLE: The vulgar herd have a sort of knowledge and science and truth and honesty and generosity and other wasted virtues, which are as different from wisdom as the form of an animal is from a picture or sketch on a wall.—

DIOGENES: Why do you call those virtues of the vulgar

530 herd *wasted*?—ARISTOTLE: On account of the ignorance of the vulgar with regard to them.—DIOGENES: How so?

—ARISTOTLE: Because the vulgar wise man brings his knowledge into play there where it will not increase his gain, and their merciful man spares him who is worthy of exemplary punishment, and their veracious man brings his veracity into play when it pleases him, though the truth be obscene, and their liberal man is liberal to the unworthy, and their faithful man keeps his promises to people's

535 ruin, and their hearer hears to no purpose. Beyond a doubt these good qualities are wasted in them, and no more resemble the virtues of the wise than a painting on

a wall resembles a living animal.—DIOGENES: How does your illustration correspond with the virtues of the few and of the many?—ARISTOTLE: Have you not learned that knowledge is life and ignorance death?—DIOGENES:

Yes.—ARISTOTLE: The knowledge of the wise man vivifies

540 his actions, whereas the folly of the ignorant mortifies his.—

DIOGENES: Then are their good actions any better than their bad ones or not?—ARISTOTLE: They are not.—DIOGENES:

How so?—ARISTOTLE: The well-doer of the vulgar intends to do good, and takes a wrong path. The evil-doer among them intends evil and carries it out in the wrong way. They are just alike and neither has the advantage.—

545 DIOGENES: I know now in what way their virtues are wasted. Now show the superiority of wisdom without which no actions are profitable.—ARISTOTLE: Whosoever has seen good, abandoned evil, and entered into goodness has acted in accordance with wisdom; and whosoever has intended good and erred, or intended evil and carried it out, has departed from wisdom.—DIOGENES: This

550 whole subject is clear. Now tell me: To whom was this thing, I mean wisdom, first made clear?—ARISTOTLE: The minds of men are far from being able to attain to any thing so grand without teaching; just as their eyes are far from seeing without the light of a lamp.—DIOGENES: From whom did the philosophers learn it?—ARISTOTLE:

The heralds and ambassadors of the different ages in the 555 different regions of the globe were constantly summoning mankind thereunto; and the first person on earth to whom that knowledge came by revelation was Hermes.—DIOGENES:

Whence came it to Hermes?—ARISTOTLE: His mind was taken up to heaven and it came to him from the Archangels, who had got it from the record of God. From him it came to the earth, and was received by the sages.—

DIOGENES: How am I to know that Hermes obtained that 560 knowledge from the inhabitants of heaven?—ARISTOTLE:

If that knowledge be the truth, it ~~can~~ come from above.—

DIOGENES: Why?—ARISTOTLE: Do you not see that the upper part of each thing is better than the lower? The

upper part of water and its surface are purer than the lower; the higher parts of the earth are pleasanter and fairer than the lower parts; the best member of a man is his head, the purest thing in a tree is its fruit; and so
 565 on with everything. The fittest thing, therefore, to come from on high is wisdom. Another proof is this: the substance and nature of wisdom have overcome and out-topped everything else.—DIOGENES: O guide to wisdom! Our minds vary not the least from thine. Make a compact between us which will guard us from differing with one another!—ARISTOTLE: If you would follow my ways,
 570 imitate my books.—DIOGENES: There are so many. Which will settle differences between us best if any such arise? —ARISTOTLE: Questions concerning the “first science” and the science of theology you should seek from the book of Hermes; for difficulties in the way of politics [you should go to the Politics, and for] difficulties in natural science, to the Physics; for difficulties about good and bad actions, to the Ethics; whereas if any difference arise
 575 among you about the definitions of speech, you should refer to the four books of Logic, the first *the Categories*, the second *περὶ ἐρμηνείας*, the third *ἀναλυτική*, the fourth *ἀποδεικτική*, or book of Demonstration, which tells you how to distinguish between true and false. There you will obtain light on dark matters.

When Aristotle had spoken thus far, his soul became powerless; his hand shook, and the apple fell out of his
 580 hand. The philosophers all rose and came near to him, and kissed his hand and eyes and eulogized him. He grasped KRITON's hand and laid it on his face, saying, “I commit my spirit to the Receiver of the spirits of the wise.” Then he ceased and his spirit passed away. His friends lamented over him, saying, “The day of knowledge is over.”