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REVIEWS

HICKS'S ARISTOTLE, DE ANIMA.

Aristotle, De Anima, with Translation, Introduction and Notes. By R. D. HICKS, M.A., Fellow and Late Lecturer of Trinity College, Cambridge. Cambridge: University Press, 1907. Pp. lxxxiii + 626. 18s. net.

THIS is the most important contribution to Aristotelian scholarship that has appeared for several years; few indeed of Aristotle's works have ever been edited in so thorough and satisfactory a way. Mr. Hicks has the whole literature of his subject, from Theophrastus to Biehl, at his finger-ends, and to his great learning he adds sound judgment and the power of clear exposition. Scarcely a single important or difficult point in the text is left unnoticed in the notes. The possible interpretations will in almost every case be found set forth, and the view adopted nearly always commends itself as the best.

The Introduction falls into two parts, one dealing with the subject, one with the text. The first of these is a useful summary of the main topics dealt with in the *De Anima*. It does not aim at novelty, and it succeeds in doing what it does aim at. Perhaps the most interesting, certainly the most controversial, of the topics treated of is the active and the passive intellect. The main views that have been held are well summarised, and Mr. Hicks's own theory is added. He argues that active intellect must be held to be a genuine immanent part of human nature, since otherwise passive intellect could not be held to be so either; and he resists any tendency to identify passive intellect with mere *φαντασία* or *sensus communis*. So far the reasoning appears to be cogent; but, the active intellect being thus brought down to man, as it were, and the passive intellect thus raised above sense and imagination, the two intellects are brought nearer to one another, and it is argued that they are 'the same thing under two different aspects.' The 'potentiality' of the intellect is interpreted as latency, absence from con-

sciousness. The suggestion is not worked out, and it is impossible to feel that it really solves the difficulties of the Aristotelian doctrine. When we turn to the notes, we find ourselves somewhat buried under the load of detail, and it must be admitted that this puzzling problem still awaits its adequate discussion.

Occasionally one finds surprising statements, e.g. (p. xliii) that immaterial notions 'are described as being in time, in space and in conception separate or distinct.' 'In space,' at least, is evidently untrue, and the passage cited in support, *Met. Δ. 1016^b 1-3*, supports no part of the assertion, for it merely says that those things are one, which thought cannot separate in time, place, or definition.

The second part of the introduction deals judiciously with the relations of the various authorities for the text. STUVWX are shown to be descended from a single archetype other than E and not much inferior to E. Mr. Hicks follows E's readings almost, but not quite, as closely as Biehl. In dealing with the Greek commentaries, he points out with proper emphasis that the lemmata have been altered into agreement with late and bad readings and are of little value.

The translation is in the main extremely accurate, and steers with great success a middle course between bald literalness and what the translator calls 'a mere medley of spurious paraphrase and allusive subterfuge.' The additions necessary to make the English intelligible are boldly put in, and little is put in that is not absolutely needed. In a few passages the translation suffers by not having been brought into conformity with the commentary—e.g. 420^b 16, 425^a 25, 430^b 6, 434^b 25. As typically good notes on difficult passages may be mentioned those on 412^a 17, 425^a 15, 431^a 22, 25.

A few passages in which Mr. Hicks does not carry conviction to one reader, at least, may be mentioned.

402^b 5 n. (p. 186). One would like to know what is the distinction meant between *ἐν ἐπὶ πολλῶν* and *ἐν κατὰ πολλῶν*, in view of such passages as *Post. An.* 1. 77^a 5, 6, *Met.* A. 990^b 7, 13, B. 999^a 7, 1000^a 1. Is there any ground for such a distinction? Again, is it correct to describe (same page) the universal 'animal' as 'owing its existence to thought'? It is thought that treats it as *separate*; but surely the Aristotelian and the true doctrine is that thought grasps a universal character which is already present in the individuals.—In the next paragraph of the note the last two sentences are very obscure.

403^a 29. It does not seem sound to translate *διαλεκτικός* 'dialectician or philosopher.' To do this is to take the word in its Platonic rather than in its somewhat depreciatory Aristotelian sense. This is inconsistent with the (correct) account of dialectic given in the note on 403^a 2. The sort of treatment here ascribed to the dialectician is very different from that ascribed to the philosopher in 403^b 16. The one treats *ἀχώριστα* as if they were *χωριστά*, the other treats *κεχωρισμένα* as such. The citation of Maier in 403^a 29 n. seems pointless.

403^b 15 n. 1. The meaning of *Met.* M. 1077^b 10 must be 'by addition to "white" arises the concept of "white man,"' for 'white man' is being described as *ἐκ προοθέσεως* in comparison with 'white.'

403^b 17. It is hard to make out what Mr. Hicks's suggested reading is. Does he propose, for *ἀχώριστα, οὔτε χωριστά οὔτε οὔτε χωριστά οὔτε ὡς χωριστά*? The latter appears a good suggestion.

406^b 2. The arguments against the MS. reading are not convincing. Though not ideal in form, it seems readily enough to give the meaning wanted. At any rate, Mr. Shorey's suggestion, which is mentioned with approbation, gives an impossible meaning.

407^a 22. It seems better to read *νόησις* with a comma before it (as Rodier does) than to excise *νόησις*, against all the MSS.

407^b 1 n. 'Non-existence' should be 'non-substance.'

407^b 26. Is 'the right tools . . . the right body' quite a fair turn to give to the argu-

ment? There is no 'right' in the Greek. Perhaps we should say 'must use its tools . . . its body.'

408^a 12. 'With the rest' cannot be right. Rather 'what are the parts whose combination is the intellect?'

408^a 27. The sentence would be clearer if the commas after *ἔχει* and 'own' were omitted. As it is, we are not told whether the *εἰ μὴ* clause is to be taken with the *εἴπερ* clause or with the principal one.

408^b 18–29 n. It is true that both *διανοεῖσθαι* and *νοεῖν* may stand for *an* act of thinking in the individual, but it is not for the same act. The distinction between the former as discursive and the latter as intuitive thought goes back to the Divided Line, and is often, though not always, maintained in Aristotle.

408^b 34 n. Aristotle does not assume 'that what is true of the number is true of the component units.' Many attributes of the number evidently are not true of the units. The assumption he makes is a fair enough one, that if a number moves its units must move.

409^a 6. A comma rather than a full stop is wanted after 'having position.'

409^a 13, 15. 'Sum-total' seems a doubtful translation of *τὸ ποσόν*. It is rather 'quantitativeness.'

409^a 31, 32 nn. Is the view best represented by Diogenes and Heraclitus, or by Democritus?

410^b 21. It is worth while pointing out that *ὁμοίως* here is what answers to *οὔτε* in l. 18.

411^a 4. The view that contraries are not always related as *ἔξῃς* and *στέρησις* is not Aristotelian. The passage referred to, *Met.* 1. 1055^b 14, states that every *ἐναντίωσις* is a *στέρησις*, though the converse is not true.

412^a 26 n. 2. One does not see why Philoponus' explanation is rejected, since it is precisely what is implied in Mr. Hicks's own.

412^b 11 n. The explanation of *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ τοιῷδὲ σώματι* is defective. (1) No reason for the dative is given here, and that which is given in 412^b 13 n., that in *τὸ πελέκει εἶναι* the dative is used because the meaning is 'what essentially belongs to an axe as

such,' is manifestly wrong. (2) τί is translated rather as if it were ὁ. (1) The origin of the dative is seen most clearly in the phrase τί ἦν αὐτῷ τὸ αἵματι εἶναι (*De Part. An.* ii. 649^b 22, cf. *De Incessu*, 708^a 12). αὐτῷ is an ordinary dative of thing interested, and αἵματι is attracted into the same case. Generally the original dative is omitted, and only the attracted dative is left. (2) τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι is 'the answer to the question, what was being so-and-so seen to be.'

414^a 10. Though ὑγιεινόν may be either active or passive in meaning, it does not follow that ὑγιαστικόν, a word of distinctly active form, can have a passive meaning. ὑγιαστοῦ seems necessary.

414^a 12 n. The suggestion that the dry and hot substance which is the object of hunger is earth is made impossible by the fact that earth, in the Aristotelian system, is dry and cold. It is true that there is much heat in earth (*Meteor.* ii. 360^a 6, 16), but this is not its proper nature. It is fire that is dry and hot, so that in some sense fire must be the object of hunger. What A. is thinking of is that food must generally be ripened by the sun or cooked by the aid of fire. Cf. εἵπεπτον τὸ θερμότερον (*De Gen. An.* iv. 775^a 18), τὸ θερμὸν αὔξητικόν (*De Part. An.* iii. 669^b 3, *De Gen. An.* v. 789^a 8). See also *De An.* ii. 416^a 9, ^b 28.

414^b 18 n. τε indicates that διανοεῖσθαι and νοεῖν are distinguished rather than used 'as practically equivalent in meaning.'

415^a 19. Aristotle's meaning in saying that ἐνέργειαι are κατὰ τὸν λόγον prior to δυνάμεις must surely be interpreted by *Met.* Θ. 1049^b 12-17, where their priority λόγῳ is proved. κατὰ τὸν λόγον or λόγῳ means not 'in the order of our thought' but 'in the order of definition or intelligibility.'

418^a 14. ἀλλ' ἐκείνη seems to answer, though loosely, to μέν.

418^b 1. It seems a mistake to insert 'that is, in light' in the translation. Light is not precisely 'the actually transparent' but 'the actuality of this transparent qua transparent' (418^b 9), 'a sort of colour in the transparent' (418^b 11).

418^b 14. The translation should be 'that light is neither fire,' etc.

422^a 18. τὸ ἀλμυρόν is 'the salt.'

423^a 25 n. The interpretation of εἰ διερὸν διεροῦ ἄπτεται here is inconsistent with, and inferior to, that on p. 101.

424^a 13 n. Madvig proposed τῶν ἀπτομένων.

425^a 22-24. The punctuation in text and translation is inconsistent. τοῦτο—γνώριζομεν is taken as parenthetical in the translation. Neither text nor translation makes the reference of εἰ δὲ μὴ clear.

425^b 13 n. 2. Is the assumption 'that the sense which perceives sensation must perceive the object of sensation' self-evident even within 'the narrow limits laid down 418^a 14-16'?

426^a 27. We have the premises 'ἀκοή is φωνή, συμφωνία is λόγος,' and the conclusion 'ἀκοή is λόγος.' The remaining premise must be 'φωνή is συμφωνία,' and the first clause must be put in a form which gives this meaning. It seems better therefore to follow Priscianus, Sophonias, and Trendelenburg, and read εἰ δ' ἡ φωνή συμφωνία τις. Or may we read εἰ δὴ συμφωνία ἡ φωνή τις, τις going with συμφωνία? συμφωνία must be interpreted as Simplicius interprets it. The last sentence of the note, defending συμφωνία as subject against Torstrik's objection, appears pointless. Nor is the objection (l. 29 n.), that ἔστιν ὥς makes the syllogism invalid even with Trendelenburg's reading, a sound one. ἔστιν ὥς may well enough be understood with the conclusion, but the MS. reading introduces a sheer undistributed middle.

428^a 3. Should not τούτων be taken as = φαντασμάτων and depending on δύνανται ἢ ἔξισ? The reference to 'the various faculties already mentioned in this chapter' seems too vague.

428^a 25. οὐδὲ cannot be translated 'neither.'

429^b 16 n. Of the opposing views, Teichmüller's agrees better with the Greek. But need the simile be pressed? The bent line which may be straightened is an instance of a single thing with different aspects, and this is all that is wanted; we need not suppose that its two aspects answer exactly to the two aspects of the cognitive faculty.

429^b 31. Mr. Cornford's conjecture δυνάμει is much to be welcomed.

430^b 16-17. The proposed interpretation of this deserves sympathy as an attempt to interpret without emending. But it seems impossible to explain *κατὰ συμβεβηκός* as meaning *τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός διαιρετόν*, when *διαιρετόν* has not occurred in the immediate context. Mr. Hicks does not seem very clear about his own view, for he translates *οὐχ ἡ . . . ἀλλ' ἡ* 'not in the same way as . . . but in the same way as,' but says in the note 'not in the sense that . . . but in the sense that.' 'In the same way as' and 'in the sense that' are very different things. It seems much better to excise *ἀλλ' ἡ ἀδιαίρετα* with Torstrik, or *ὅ νοεῖ καὶ ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ* with Prof. Cook Wilson.

431^a 22. *οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὥς ὅροι* is not, and probably cannot be, satisfactorily translated.

433^a 29. *πρακτὸν δ' . . . ἔχειν* is mis-translated. *ἀγαθόν* is not to be supplied with *πρακτόν*. The point is not that practical good is 'something which may not be good under all circumstances,' but that the *πρακτόν* in general is that which need not *exist* in all circumstances. Cf. the passages quoted in the note.

433^b 21. *ὁργανικῶς* is not 'by means of organs' but 'as an organ.' Cf. l. 19.

434^a 13. It is very difficult to suppose that *καὶ κινεῖ* has nothing to do with *βούλησιν* and is purely parenthetical; it seems better to suppose that *ἐπιθυμία* is loosely said to move *βούλησις*. *κινεῖ* is really more prominent in the writer's mind than *νικᾷ*, as *ὥσπερ σφαῖρα* shows. The reasons for taking *σφαῖρα* as 'celestial sphere' rather than 'ball' are forcibly stated. But it is surely wrong to take *φύσει . . . κινεῖσθαι* as still part of the astronomical simile. The influence of one sphere on another is a good illustration of Aristotle's meaning, but any reference to the *number* of the motions of the spheres seems irrelevant. It is better to take *φύσει . . . κινεῖσθαι* as referring to the *ὁρέξεις*, following Simplicius on the first and Themistius on the second clause. The word *φορὰς* is, however, probably suggested by the astronomical simile.

434^a 17. 'Judgment or proposition' apparently (cf. p. 572, l. 6) means 'unspoken or spoken proposition.' But this distinction is expressly set aside, p. 572, l. 8, and is not implied in the Greek; *καί* is simply explicative.

W. D. Ross.

COROLLA NUMISMATICA.

Corolla Numismatica: Numismatic Essays in Honour of Barclay V. Head. Pp. vi+386. Portrait and 18 Plates. Oxford University Press: H. Frowde, 1906. 30s. net.

It would be superfluous to spend much time in praising this Festschrift. It is enough to say that it is a collection of articles by thirty of the leading numismatists of the world, and has been admirably edited by G. F. Hill. It is naturally full of tributes to the great position Barclay Head has filled for nearly half a century as a *νεωκόρος τῆς νομισματικῆς*, as Behrendt Pick has put it.

The most useful way of reviewing a collection of miscellaneous essays like this is to pick out points that are likely to be of interest to the general classical scholar, and the best

arrangement is the roughly chronological one.

(1) We begin earlier than any coin book has ever begun before with Arthur Evans's Minoan dump. I remember with pain that I described it fully in my *Discoveries in Crete* (pp. 15-17), and have delayed a year before reviewing the whole book. It is enough here to say that Evans believes he has found an actual coin, a dump of silver dropped while molten on to a marked surface.

(2) Earle Fox shows (pp. 34-5) that there is a change of animal on the coins of Aegina, the sea turtle being replaced by the land tortoise. The first he places before 431, the latter after 404, and treats the survival of the incuse reverse in these later coins as a piece of business conservatism. He draws a