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Fifth Prize Essay

Major J. F. Cadell R.F.A.

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FIFTH PRIZE ESSAY.

Subject:—

"IN THE EVENT OF WAR WITH ONE OR MORE NAVAL POWERS, HOW SHOULD THE REGULAR FORCES BE ASSISTED BY THE AUXILIARY FORCES AND THE PEOPLE OF THE KINGDOM?"

By Major J. F. CADELL, R.F.A., Secretary R.A. Institution.

"Union is Strength."

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CHAPTER I.

Introduction. The General Question of Policy and Ideals.

NO man and no nation should ever embark on, or even contemplate, war with a light heart; but every member of a nation should feel that every possible precaution has been taken during peace in order to make war successful should it become inevitable. Every individual should work towards this end to the best of his ability.

It is a thing which it is pitiable to contemplate, that the heart of a single Briton should really feel a hopeless dread of war. But the more that is known, the more will this dread be felt, especially by those who consider carefully the magnitude and organisation of the forces which may possibly be ranged against this country, the inadequate means of defence which it possesses, and the faulty organisation that it has adopted for the forces which are available for a war.

Politicians may happily shut their eyes to facts—they are fond of playing with fire—but soldiers and sailors who know the state of affairs must feel this dread. The more they know as to the actual steps taken for defence, the more they will appreciate what are the dangers to which an unprepared nation is every day exposed.

The subject of this essay is indeed of the very highest importance to the country—one which no one dare approach without the most serious reflections. Its satisfactory solution is of paramount importance to every man, woman and child who is proud to call him or herself British born, and to all who in any way feel themselves to be directly or indirectly members of the British Empire.

To some it may appear that the British Empire exists by sufferance and on account of the jealousies of her powerful neighbours. This is not the case. There is a life in the country which demands respect. The country which held its head high from 1800 to 1815 is not one which even after many years of riches and prosperity is to be neglected. Since the latter of these dates the Empire has been more than doubled, and not without the loss of blood. This expansion has been carried out by the restless energy of her sons. But all the personal and moral qualities of the population cannot assure the continuance of prosperity and peace without an organisation for war which is suitable to the period in the world's history that has been reached. No man would now risk a fight with bows and arrows against a man armed with a modern rifle; and yet that is exactly what we, as a nation, are at the present doing. The world has prepared for war, as an assurance for peace, to an extent which it has never done before, while we Britons have carefully neglected all the fundamental principles of defensive organisation.

The co-ordination of the existing forces of the Empire into a fighting machine is no small matter. Even if we omit from our consideration all the forces which do not have their origin in the parent islands, we find that there are a great many complex questions which push themselves forward, and which have to be solved before any definite solution can be obtained.

From the soldier's point of view the study of these questions is complicated by the fact that many of their elements are political and social, rather than military, and more dependent on commerce and finance than on pure efficiency of organisation. The soldier would

like to banish all these side issues from his mind, and only treat the elements which directly concern himself. He would then make up the theoretically perfect fighting machine, which was based on the units—the man, the horse and the gun. He might imagine that by the simple process of multiplication or commutation and permutations an ideal Army could be developed, which could be brought by regulation up to any required standard of strength and efficiency.

It is needless to say that things are not so simple, and that we must also consider the local conditions as they exist. This does not mean that everything is to be sacrificed to maintain the existing order of things. Order cannot be produced from chaos without altering the state of chaos. Nor can order be made without regulations, obedience to which is insisted upon by sufficiently strong authority. The soldier would like to start his organisation in a country where the spirit of the people was so developed that the one desire was the maintenance of the inviolability of the country at all costs. It is useless to imagine that such a spirit really exists in Britain; but it is perhaps possible that it may be gradually implanted in the majority of the population. This may be a vain hope, but to attain its realisation is worth any effort.

In discussing the subject before us, which from its very nature admits of such endless ramifications, it is probably as well to be very circumspect, and, as far as in us lies, start with a process of eliminating everything which is unnecessary, and thus to avoid some preventable complications. The first thing which we can safely cut out from our consideration is a war with a single Power; we have to treat of war with one or more naval Powers. Now, since the greater includes the less, it is only proposed to deal with the subject in a way to meet efficiently a powerful combination of naval Powers. It is not meant to minimise for one moment the dangers, difficulties, and responsibilities of arranging matters which would be inseparable from a war strictly limited to a contest with a single first-class Power. Even a third-class Power has given us much trouble and some uneasiness. The organisation which strained very badly at the gnat of the Boer Republics is in no way capable of swallowing the camel of a first-class Power. We know, and are informed by the best military authorities, that we are really no better prepared for war to-day than we were in the year 1899.

It would here be invidious to mention names, though it will be necessary later to refer to some specific combination of forces in order to explain certain necessary defensive measures. This of course will be done without the slightest wish to show animus towards the parties named. It can never be urged as impossible that any particular combination should be at war with us. It is the very things that are usually considered to be the most unlikely which do actually happen. No ties of blood or of sympathy can be relied upon as absolutely binding. In fact, close relationship often seems to be a cause of war, as in the case of the Northern and Southern States of America or in the war of 1866.

The elimination of the question of a war against one Power will be a considerable simplification throughout, and it is not proposed to refer to this case in parenthesis or otherwise; it being taken once for all as granted that the means essential for the existence of the nation against a powerful combination of forces, will also be the best to secure a speedy victory over any single adversary,

In the next place it is considered advisable to eliminate from this discussion the possibility of assistant contingents from abroad, *i.e.*, from India or the Colonies, to help the main issue, except of course that India will have her own Army, a portion of which would be placed on her frontiers should the enemies be those who have frontiers nearly co-terminous with her. In no case can any serious drain be made on India for home defence, because, if that were considered necessary, it is evident that the means of bringing the Army back would not exist. It is of course possible—nay, even probable—that the Colonies would render assistance; but then some might require reinforcements, so it is better to neglect both chances in our further treatment of the subject.

The alliance with Japan is a factor only for present consideration; it is binding for ten years. Precautions necessary for national defence should be such that the seed sown now should continue to bear fruit for a century or more; few alliances last as long. Germany is at present reaping the benefit of Prussia's organisation after 1806. Again, to many it would appear that our new obligations to Japan rather increase than reduce the necessity for military efficiency on the part of the British Empire.

Though this is a military essay, and the point in the title, that the required assistance is to come from the people and the Auxiliary Forces (which latter are distinctly military organisations), would rather incline me to believe that the framer of the problem wished the Navy excluded entirely from the subject under discussion, I have found myself driven to include it to a certain limited extent. I know I am not capable of discussing naval problems from a point of view of knowledge; still, it appears to me that any war waged by Britain must primarily be naval, and probably finally naval elements will have to enter into it to great extent. It is therefore to my mind clear that to treat this subject as if naval considerations did not weigh very heavily would be the greatest possible error. I shall therefore have to venture some opinions on naval subjects, but can only claim for them that consideration which a landsman can expect for what he believes to be common-sense.

The great central idea which must be the main-spring of the administration and organisation of the forces of this country for defence and offence is *unity*. It must be felt by all that national unity is the paramount necessity and the only source of power. Unless an organism is moved by one great single ideal, it will be a failure. History is simply full of the proofs of the power of the single ideal, be it in religious or secular matters. The greatest force in the world, Christianity, is the single ideal of love. Mahomet preached the unity of God and the one Prophet—hence his power. The French Revolution had for its keystone the single ideal of Liberty, which Napoleon transformed into an egotism with the watch-word "Glory." The German rise to power is built on the ideal of devotion to the Fatherland. No nation can ever afford to neglect the single ideal, as without some ideal, which is to it the soul of its endeavour, it can never be strong, great, and victorious.

We Britons have a great and beautiful ideal, which will bring all shades of opinion together; this is the burning desire for and love of freedom. It is born in us; it is always our watchword, and though often abused and misrepresented, as other ideals — especially the

Christian ideal—have been, it is well worthy of a nation's love and veneration.

It is alone by the virtue of this ideal of freedom that we can depend upon the ready assistance of the people, including the Auxiliary Forces, for the defence of the Kingdom against any combination of forces.

I purposely place the people before the Auxiliary Forces. The people can only help our Regulars in so far as they are Auxiliary Forces in a sense wider than (though including) any mere military one. The men in uniform, the Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers, are little use except as citizens spurred by the love for their ideal, and as such they may be well-nigh invincible.

The vigorous preaching of the true doctrine of real freedom of mind, body, and country should do more to make the country strong, healthy, and victorious in war than any purely military precautions, because if all men could be brought to feel that true individual freedom is gained by service to the State, there would be no difficulty in getting whatever was found to be necessary in the way of service from each individual. With such a spirit existing in the country, the service required would be found to be a very small tax indeed.

CHAPTER II.

The Strength of a Possible Alliance against us. Force which might be Landed. Points of Attack.

Up to this point I have only dealt with generalities, what may be called the spiritual side of the question; it is now necessary to turn to solid facts and figures and leave the poetry of the subject. It is advisable that we should discuss who are our possible enemies, and see of what offensive forces they are normally possessed, so that we may consider calmly what we may expect to have to meet some day, and what we must beat if we are to maintain our Empire and our freedom.

A serious combination of nations is possible, though it may not be very probable, because there are so many jealousies. History has also shown that where several forces combine on one side, almost automatically a counter combination is formed against it and thus a certain balance of power is created. This comes into being not so much on account of any love for the weak and the oppressed, but from a sense of fear and hatred of the too strong. For this reason, and for the sake of argument, I will suppose that the United States will remain at least neutral in any struggle, and perhaps benignly so; by which is meant that she will consider it a hostile act on the part of any enemy of ours to them, should she interfere with her commerce with us, except as regards real contraband of war. This is, perhaps, granting rather much in our favour, as it, to a certain extent, assures our food supply during a war; but without some such assurance, it is evident that we could make but a poor resistance under any system of organisation which we might adopt for our forces. This is a view which is, to a certain extent, confirmed by the committee specially appointed to deal with the subject of food supply during war, viz., that some Powers would find it to their pecuniary advantage to feed us during war, and would insist on doing so as their privilege.

The most unpromising combination which can be ranged against us, and which we should aim at being able to withstand, is that of France, Russia, and Germany. France and Russia being allies it is not very difficult to conceive that they might join against us. Our weakness and preoccupation would be Germany's chance. At the price of assisting the allies against us she might secure some of the many possessions which she covets, such as Syria. Of course, the object of all would be to make Britain pay with her possessions and the loss of her trade the cost of the war. The original cause of war would probably be the natural growth of Russia clashing with our interests.

The naval forces of this suggested coalition, and the Navy we have to bring against them, are roughly put down in the following table.

It will be noticed that I have been liberal to both Germany and Russia as regards naval strength, but it must be allowed that Germany is building a powerful fleet, and that Russia will rebuild her fleet as quickly as she can, and, when rebuilt, that the ships will all be first class.

Nature of Ship.	France.	Russia.	Germany.	Total.	Britain.	Remarks.
<i>Battleships.</i>						
I. Class	17	13	22	52	50	British ships have at least 2,000 tons greater size than the foreign ships.
II. Class	10	10	—	20	11	
III. Class	9	3	13	25	4	
<i>Cruisers.</i>						
I. Class	16	2	7	25	45	British total tonnage is double the foreign.
<i>Cruisers.</i>						
II. Class	15	11	6	31	33	
Smaller Vessels ..	26	5	21	52	54	
Destroyers	52	66	55	173	143	
T. Boats.....	300	140	100	540	200	Many of these are of little value.
Submarines	48	8	6	62	37	These are mostly experimental.

It is difficult to say exactly which of these two navies is the stronger. It is impossible to say which would be victorious in war. The absolute numbers favour the coalition, but they could not be brought into line with the same unity of action as the fleets of Great Britain. The strategical position of the British fleet should also be an advantage, so there is a fair chance of Britain coming out of the struggle victorious at sea. It would, however, be very unwise to consider that defeat is a thing which cannot happen to our Navy, little as we like to contemplate such a misfortune. There is no doubt that, whether victorious or beaten, the Navy would want continual assistance from the country. It will want coal, fresh armament, renewed supplies of ammunition, repairs, new ships, and above all,

an ample supply of men. The strain of war is enormous on the *personnel* of the fleet. In foreign navies they have at least two, and sometimes three, crews to each ship; doubtless, the reserve crews are not too well trained, but the actual men are available; while we have barely one crew for the whole of the ships of our Navy. Men will be killed and wounded in war, and the country must be prepared to replace them.

As the Navy may be defeated we must look to our land forces and see what they come to, also considering what strain is likely to be put upon them. In this connection we must not forget that we have a land frontier in India, and that if Russia is one of our enemies, she will not neglect to attack us in a sphere where no number of naval victories can make us invulnerable.

The action of belligerents on the outbreak of a war must be very much a matter of conjecture. But to plan some kind of hostile action may make it easier for us to grasp our requirements. We may assume that one of the most disadvantageous and perhaps the most likely beginnings of a war would be trouble on the Indian frontier with Russia. This would necessitate the despatch of reinforcements to India, and if France and Germany had not so far joined in the struggle, it would also draw a large portion of the British fleet to the East, to guard the Suez Canal, and to observe the Black Sea Fleet. The extent to which reinforcements might have to be sent to India is also a matter of conjecture, but it is evident that the more that are sent out of the country, the fewer Regular troops will be left at home for defence. If we take the limit of eight divisions mentioned by the President of the Defence Committee, there is not a complete division of Regular troops left in the British Islands. If, after this considerable force had been sent to the East, France and Germany joined in the war against us, there seems to be very little reason why their combined Navies should not be able to secure some portion of the Channel or North Sea sufficiently to ensure the passage of an army to England, capable of capturing London in a few days if our forces were what they are at present, and were organised as they now are. It is not so much the numbers that we lack, as it is both organisation and training. If our forces remain without higher organisation and proper training, there seems no reason why France and Germany should not place armies in London and dictate terms of peace at Buckingham Palace within a fortnight from the date of landing.

The President of the Defence Committee extracted some statement from Lord Roberts to the effect that 70,000 men would be the smallest army which could be landed in England with any chance of success. From some one else he heard that an army of this size could not come by sea from a single port in France for want of freight ships. But I think he must have neglected to read historical parallels. I can see no reason why 500,000 men should not be landed in England provided the situation I have supposed exists. The German mercantile marine, with 3,000,000 tons, is capable of transporting any necessary force to England in two days, the journey is only about eight hours. There are many other possible situations which would not be more favourable to us.

Let us hope, however, that the Anglo-Saxon race has still got its heart in the right place, the place where it was in 1804, when, out of a population of 14,000,000, it produced some 400,000 Volun-

teers, besides a large Regular Army. Now we have a population of over 40,000,000, what can we not do if we try?

There is not the slightest reason why the nation should not be able to place 2,000,000 men under arms. These men, if formed into armies and properly led and organised, should be able to sweep into the sea, even all the armies which two such Powers as France and Germany could place on our shores, and feed when there. But even 2,000,000 of men, be they brave as lions and swift as eagles, will do little against the trained armies of the Continent, unless they be led, trained, disciplined, and organised, so that they may become fighting bodies, not merely unwieldy masses of men. There we have our problem in a nut shell. How are we to utilise the population of the country so that it may be able to resist the invasion of the country by a large army?

It can scarcely be considered to come into the scope of this Essay to enter into details as to how the Regular forces are to be organised; what we have to arrange for is the assistance of such Regular forces as may be available, by the people and the Auxiliary forces. We have already explained that there may easily be less than a division of Regular troops in this country. For all practical purposes such a force may be neglected.

There is only one way in which the people can help the Regular forces in war, and that is by having a territorial Auxiliary Army at home and that territorial army being efficient. It would be easier to arrange for the assistance of the Regular Army if that were also territorialised, but perhaps there may be good reasons against this; anyhow, we have to take things as we find them, and we will neglect this army which may not be at home. To base our actions on its presence would be to build on sand.

Cardwell made a valiant effort to bring in a territorial organisation, and had a clear head followed him, and had the nation felt the necessity of strength, instead of believing in the fiction that weakness means peace and economy, we might have had to-day forces which would be in direct touch with the country, and which could have been easily assisted by the people.

Mutual interest and mutual trust go hand in hand. It must be the army of the people which is to defend the homes of the people. But it must be an army in a much more complete sense than the Auxiliary forces of to-day are an army. These forces must be ready for war in every way, and they must be organised in such a manner that their mobilisation will be interfered with as little as possible by actual invasion. There must be everything, men, horses, guns, transport, medical services, etc.

Invasion to be successful will either take place on the South Coast or in Essex. To start further West than Worthing, or further North than Lowestoft, would be throwing away the best chances. Therefore, in any scheme of organisation the fact must not be lost sight of, that the arrangements for concentration should be planned to meet landings in these two areas.

The Russian Army consists of some 907 battalions and 659 squadrons and about 3,000 field guns as a first line. The regular formations produce in Europe 19 army corps and 12 cavalry divisions, to which may be added 5 divisions of Caucasian troops and 3 Siberian army corps. The troops with the colours amount to nearly 1,200,000, and there are nearly 8,000,000 men trained to arms. With one line

of rail 500,000 men have been kept in the field in Manchuria. This number could easily be placed on the Upper Oxus with two lines of railway to supply them.

The Army of France is 20 army corps and 2,750,000 trained men, and that of Germany 20 army corps with 3,000,000 trained men. It would be quite easy for these countries each to mobilise 6 army corps as an expeditionary force to invade England. The only difficulties being questions of supply and transport when landed, these are made fairly easy by the network of British railways.

The North German Lloyd and the Hamburg American Lines have a fleet of 250 fast steam vessels, with a carrying capacity of nearly 1,200,000 tons. These unassisted can transport an army. They would be mostly in home ports at the outbreak of a war with Britain, if the German General Staff were not asleep.

CHAPTER III.

Our Regular Forces—Navy and Army. The Inadequacy of them both, especially the latter.

The position which this discussion has now reached is this: Supposing a combination equivalent to France, Russia, and Germany were to take up arms against us, we might suffer a serious naval defeat, or our fleet might be strategically ill-placed, and that as a result of either of these contingencies it would be possible that a force of about half a million men might be landed in England while a similar army was advancing across the Indian Frontier. And that with Germany as part of the coalition against us, the difficulty advanced by some, of transporting an army of that size to England vanishes.

The Regular Forces which we have to oppose to the Allies are the Navy and Army.

The Navy has been summarised as regards ships in Chapter II. It is a very fine list of ships, and they are very fine ships, as can be seen at a glance in Brassey's Naval Annual for 1905, but it has only got 129,000 men to man it, including marines. The crews necessary for the battle-ships of the first class is nearly 40,000; for second and third-class battle-ships, 8,000; first-class cruisers, 30,000; second-class cruisers, 15,000; third-class cruisers, 7,000; destroyers, 7,000; torpedo-boats, 2,000; and submarines, 400; or a total of 109,400 men. This leaves only a margin of 20,000, which will be found to vanish when we remember that coast-guard, boys under training, etc., are all included in the Navy Estimate total. The reserve available is very small; out of a total of a little over 60,000 men shown in the Estimates, certainly not more than 35,000 would be available, and these are but partially trained. The question of the supply of a reserve of naval officers is even more important, and seems to be more hopeless than that of the men. The existing reserve would all practically be absorbed on mobilisation. Suppose that the Navy receive a severe initial defeat, many men will be lost; arrangements must be made to replace them. Ships will be damaged, but they will not be lost in the same proportion as crews will be disabled.

As regards the Army, there are in India some 75,000 European troops and about 160,000 native troops. This portion of the Army

is well found, except that it is almost destitute of artillery. At home there are about 155,000 Regulars, and in the Colonies there are another 60,000 men. The whole of these Regular land forces is not far short of half a million men. If every Regular soldier were moved to India, there would then not really be sufficient force to hold that country, with its long lines of communications, and to successfully oppose an enemy advancing from the North-West Frontier. According to existing arrangements, practically every Reserve man joins the colours on mobilisation, and thus the only reserve to the land forces is the immature youths, who have to be replaced on mobilisation.

It may be some assistance to show the Army in a table:—

Table B.

	No. of Men.	No. of Units.	No. of Units abroad.	No. of Units available at Home.		Remarks.
				<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	
Cavalry ...	20,461	31	13	18	15	
Infantry ...	167,359	166	85	87	17	
Artillery—						
Horse ...	53,072	28	13	15	15	
Field ...		150	57	93	45	
Mountain ...		9	9	—	—	
Garrison ...		109	66	43	43	Required for Coast defence.
Engineers* ...	10,780	70	—	—	—	
A.S.C.* ...	7,147	80	—	—	—	
A.M.C.* ...	4,985	211	—	—	—	
Total ...	263,807	—	—	—	—	

The Royal Garrison Regiments have been omitted.

(a) Gives the units at home under normal conditions.

(b) Gives the units at home after 8 divisions have been mobilised and sent abroad.

*These corps are not sent to India; their distribution is not at present in accordance with scientific organisation.

When the Auxiliary Forces are called upon to assist the Regular Forces in the defence of the country or in some foreign expedition, they will find one of the two conditions, (a) or (b), shown above in the table B prevails, (a) being the normal peace conditions, and (b) when an army of say 8 divisions has been sent to India or elsewhere.

The difference between the two conditions is not so great as at first sight it might appear to be. The total force which our organisation and the youthfulness of our soldiers will permit us to send out of the country is from 80,000 to 90,000. The remainder has no real military value. The whole of the existing reserve is required for this army, and as mentioned above, most of it is called up on mobilisation. It is probably just as well to neglect such a small number when we come to deal with the two million men which should be in the Auxiliary Army. To assist the Regular Army in war in the twentieth century to any useful extent, this is the force which is necessary, and which should be available. It is therefore wise to consider (b) as the condition which will normally exist when Britain has to face a coalition. If we make our arrangements so as to be strong under these

conditions, we will only be better off if more favourable conditions prevail, and we will not be open to immediate defeat if what is very probable should actually happen.

The table given above showed roughly the strength of the Regular Forces. We have an idea that these Regulars are the best of our Army, and in some ways, perhaps, they are so; but there are at present several weak points in them:—

1. Nearly one-third of the entire force is under twenty years of age, and only partially trained.
2. There are a good many old soldiers in the ranks who have done good service abroad, but who are useless for war.
3. Though, taken all round, the men are fairly trained, they are not, as a class, intelligent, and a large number are not of good physique.
4. The men are bad marchers, and are never trained to carry a heavy pack.
5. The Army as a whole has no permanent organisation higher than the regiment, battalion, and brigade of artillery.

The bad points of the Regulars are all accentuated in the Militia. The men are younger, they are not so well trained; they have no higher organisation at all, while the officers are not all that they might be either as regards numbers or training.

In the Volunteers and Yeomanry things are very much reversed. The men are, on the whole, very intelligent, but they are practically untrained, both from a physical and military point of view.

These Auxiliary Forces have one great advantage: They are territorial; they belong to the soil. They are not, however, distributed evenly amongst the whole population.

What we want is that the standard of the Auxiliary Forces should be brought up to that of the Regular Forces as regards training and physique. Then it will not matter where the Regular Army is so long as the Auxiliary Forces are organised for war. If they are then sufficiently numerous, they will become the backbone of the nation during a war. The Regular Forces will be free to be sent wherever it is desirable, and they will become what eventually they must be—the Empire's gendarmerie during peace time and the advanced guard, or India's defence troops, in war.

There is, as we know, a Reserve to the Regular Forces of some 100,000 men. This should not be touched except to bring the Army up to strength and to keep it up. The Reserve is not a very efficient force, because it receives practically no training. The man, after he leaves the colours, is only kept in touch with the Army by receiving his pay. If the people of the country would insist upon this Reserve being trained, and see that money was voted for this purpose, it would be rendering a great assistance to the Army when war comes.

CHAPTER IV.

The nature of the Assistance required by the Regular Forces in the event of War against a Coalition.

The extent of the assistance which is required by the Regular Forces to render them capable of overcoming a coalition is evidently

enormous. They are in no way a match, as at present constituted, for the defence of the Indian Frontier, if unassisted by the Auxiliaries. No war can be successful unless the offensive can be taken. The arrangements therefore which we are about to propose should be such as will make success in war probable, not well-nigh impossible, as it is under existing conditions.

The assistance to be rendered falls under several heads:—

1. *Assistance to the Navy.*

Our Navy's chief need is well-trained crews. The people must insist upon the Navy being as efficient in officers and men as in ships. If the men are not obtainable for the ships, laws must be made to produce them. Not only must there be full crews for each ship, but every ship should have three crews available for war; that means that there must be a trained Naval Reserve, equal to the establishment, and a further reserve of men again behind that.

The supply of officers is in no way a simple matter. An enormous addition to the present numbers is required to mobilise the fleet and to provide a reserve. The small existing reserve of officers would all be absorbed in the mobilisation of the whole fleet. The whole fleet must all mobilise at once, as our paper equality with the coalition is dependent on the ships all being put into commission at the outbreak of war. Foreign countries do not have the same difficulties about crews; they are at least safe as far as the numbers are concerned. The first question for us is: Where can a further supply of officers be obtained. There are three kinds of officers; there are the sailors, the fighters, and the engineers. It is doubtless a mistake to separate these classes too widely; but it is a necessary evil, when we have to go to the country in a hurry for our raw material. The sailors can be found in the Mercantile Marine, and probably war would make even more available for service in the Navy. The fighters—that is, the naval tacticians—can only be made by training at sea in the naval school; during war these must be promoted to take command of ships. There is no other possible reserve in the country, unless it be made by taking garrison artillery officers from their forts, an artifice which can scarcely be considered practical or likely to lead to a satisfactory solution of the difficulty; and even if these were taken they would never be fit for the executive command of ships, though they might take command of the guns in action. For the engineers there is an enormous profession to draw reserves from. Arrangements should be made in peace time to have an engineer reserve for each ship. It would greatly strengthen the Navy if these men could have some actual experience on the very ships they may have to man. The engines of the ship require knowing thoroughly, and the knowledge of engines to be thorough must be personal. The people of the country should insist upon the training of a reserve of engineer officers, much greater than at present exists.

The men in like manner may be purely seamen, stokers, or gunners. In the Navy most men doubtless learn the details of each kind of work; but when drawing reserves hurriedly from the country, there are various classes which can be most suitably drained to meet the demand. It would, however, be found much more satisfactory if the Naval Reserve were made an institution on the lines of the

Army Reserve, only better. It must be understood that the reserve is to make up losses, and not to fill up ships when they are first put into commission. The peace establishment should do this.

In treating of the assistance required by the Navy, the necessity of a supply of coal or other fuel, and colliers to accompany the fleet must not be overlooked.

Then the dockyards and arsenals must be kept fully manned, as actions will damage ships and the ordnance will become worn out and will require renewal. The service of the arsenals and dockyards should not, however, interfere with the defence of the country. All the men employed in these places should either be under or over the military age, i.e., under 20 or over 40. It is of such extreme importance that the work in the dockyards and arsenals should not be interfered with or disorganised on mobilisation, that every precaution to avoid this happening should be taken. They are the very places where most work will have to be done, and which will be working overtime on things of the utmost importance to the nation. The places where this kind of work is being done will have to be guarded against raids and serious attack. This is a direct form of assistance for the Auxiliary Forces to the Regular Forces, both naval and military. Full provision will be made for this later in this scheme. The dockyards and arsenals are most important, but the commercial ports have also to be guarded, as they also may be of the greatest assistance to the Navy, while an invader might be tempted to land at a port in preference to an open beach.

2. Assistance to the Regular Army.

In the first place, the Regular Army should be relieved of all garrison duty at home. It is evidently waste of a force which has received thorough training in field duties to shut it up in a fortress, and therefore all the garrisons of our naval bases and fortresses should be found by the Auxiliary Forces. During war, gaps will have to be filled up in the Regular Forces, and these will be much more than can be met by the existing reserve, which is still inadequate. These gaps must be filled by men drawn from the people and not from the Auxiliary Forces. These drafts should be trained at the local depôts and passed direct into the Regular Forces. It is not the proper use of the Auxiliary Forces to make them assist in such matters. If they do they will become disorganised by losing much of their best material, and then not be able to carry out their proper functions, on which the safety of the nation must depend.

The Auxiliary Forces may have to supply the Regular Forces with complete units of some of the Auxiliary services to make up many of the existing deficiencies in the Regular establishment. These units should be provided complete for this purpose. There are signs that the Regular Army is being completed in these services, but the process is slow. It would of course be much better if the Regulars were self-supporting in all these respects; but until the organisation of the Regular Army is complete, the Auxiliary Forces must be prepared to meet the deficiencies on mobilisation, and at the same time not be found wanting themselves as regards these particular services.

Lastly, the Auxiliary Forces must be in a position to furnish a complete Territorial Army, organised in divisions, perhaps army

corps, ready for service wherever necessary. If any of these divisions be sent abroad, fresh formations to take their place must at once be raised from the population or the Auxiliary Reserve, so that the scheme for mobilisation for home defence may never be found to be an empty paper arrangement.

It is not possible for the Auxiliary Forces to do any of these things while the country enjoys its present state of military organisation. Later, I hope to be able to sketch an organisation of the existing forces which would enable them to come to the assistance of the Regular Forces and of the country in a most complete fashion.

It is necessary now to consider a little more closely what the quantity of the assistance will be. Firstly, as regards the land defences of the home fortresses and ports. They must be made secure by the Auxiliary Forces, or the fleet might be in danger during repair. These places all have some protection from the sea; but the land front is really the only danger. No ships will attack forts when they can be quickly taken by landing a few men to storm the works, such as they are, from the land side.

We all know that the unclimable fence is a myth, and that the only real protection for works are good parapets and ditches, defended by resolute men.

Ample garrisons are necessary. The following are roughly what is required:—

Plymouth—

Infantry	-	-	-	-	-	-	20,000
Artillery	-	-	-	-	-	-	6,000
Engineers	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,000
Supply, Transport, Ordnance, and Medical Services	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,000
							<hr/> 30,000

Portsmouth, a similar garrison	-	-	-	-	-	-	30,000
Dover, a similar garrison	-	-	-	-	-	-	15,000
Thames and Medway, a similar garrison	-	-	-	-	-	-	15,000
Harwich, 7,000 infantry; 3,000 Artillery; 1,000 Engineers; 1,000 Supply, etc.	-	-	-	-	-	-	12,000
Humber, 4,000 infantry; 2,000 Artillery; 750 Engineers; 750 Supply, etc.	-	-	-	-	-	-	7,500
Forth, a similar garrison	-	-	-	-	-	-	7,500
Clyde, garrison divided in the same proportion	-	-	-	-	-	-	8,000
Millford Haven	„	„	„	„	„	„	10,000
Ports in Ireland	„	„	„	„	„	„	15,000
							<hr/>

Total - - - - - 150,000

Of the above, not more than 10,000 might be Regular Garrison Artillery and Engineers, but probably it would be better to draft all Regulars at once to the coaling stations and ports abroad, which are ill provided for, and leave the defence of the home fortresses entirely to the local Auxiliary troops. With definite responsibilities the Auxiliary Forces will soon become very efficient.

The Auxiliary Army which should be immediately available for war, besides the garrisons, is 27 divisions, complete in every detail.

Arrangements will be suggested later for increasing this force should necessity arise.

CHAPTER V.

Strength and Organisation of the Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers. A Proposed Strength and Organisation for these Forces.

The Militia is composed of artillery, engineers, infantry, and medical corps. The artillery consists of 33 corps, of which one is field artillery and the others garrison artillery. These corps are practically independent of the Regular artillery. The engineers consist of two regiments of fortress engineers and ten submarine mining divisions (which latter seem to be about to cease to exist). The infantry is divided into 124 battalions, which are more or less independent, but are considered to form part of the territorial regiments of the Line. This link is more imaginary than real. The medical corps has twelve companies, and is attached to the Regular Army Medical Corps. The total strength is just under 100,000, while the establishment voted is nearly 140,000.

The Yeomanry consists of 56 regiments of four squadrons each. It is a kind of Volunteer cavalry. It is a new creation in its present form, and at present a fashionable corps, attracting a good class of youth. With an establishment of about 27,500 men it is practically up to strength. It forms the only cavalry available for the whole of the Auxiliary Forces. This force has no organisation beyond the regiment.

The Volunteers consist of all branches of the Service except cavalry. The artillery has 68 corps, most of which are garrison artillery, though there are several mobile batteries armed with old and nearly useless guns. The artillery is not organised either with the Volunteer infantry or with the Regular artillery. Some corps are allotted to fortresses on mobilisation. There are 32 corps of engineers, twenty-two of which are fortress corps, one is a railway corps, and there are seven submarine mining divisions (whose fate is likewise doubtful). There is an electrical engineer corps and a railway Volunteer staff corps. There is some attempt to weave portions of these corps into a scheme of national defence; but they have neither organisation nor cohesion. The Volunteer infantry is organised into 223 battalions, which are nominally part of the territorial regiments. The battalions vary in strength and efficiency. These Volunteer battalions are organised into 46 brigades of varying strength. There is not much power in the brigade tie, and the command is usually vested in someone who could not lead in war. There is a Transport company Volunteer A.S.C. to 37 of the brigades; there is also a Motor corps. The Medical corps has 26 companies and 32 Bearer companies. The latter are attached to 32 of the brigades and the former to the Royal Army Medical Corps in the same district. There are Cyclist companies and detachments in many of the Volunteer battalions and brigades.

As may be noticed from the above, there is absolutely no comprehensive scheme of organisation in the Auxiliary Forces. The few that are not hopelessly without aim are those detailed to fortresses in the defence scheme. As a whole, this force has only some 240,000

men on an establishment of 340,000, and is without any comprehensive military method. It is an expression of the martial spirit of the people and that is all. That so many men can be persuaded to join such a miserable service seems to be a standing wonder to outsiders. Yet it is a service which, with sympathetic treatment and management by the authorities, would save the country in the hour of need, and may still do much to save the country. War may produce an organisation out of the apparent chaos, and the Navy may give us time to weld the loose pieces into a fighting machine after war begins.

If, however, we wish to improve our chances of success in war we should make a complete plan of the way in which the Auxiliary Forces are to help the Regulars in a war, defeat in which may mean the end of the existence of the Empire. We cannot attempt to do this without first suggesting a clear and comprehensive organisation by which this assistance can be given with that degree of certainty which we may arrange. Without a complete organisation it is impossible to do anything thoroughly and efficiently.

In round numbers the following is what is at present provided by the Army Estimates for the Auxiliary Forces:—

Table D.

Portions of the Force.	Number of Units.	Average Strength of Units.	Total Strength.
Yeomanry - - -	56	473	27,000
Artillery Militia - -	{ 32 Garrison }	550	18,000
Artillery Volunteers -	{ 1 Field }	723	50,000
Engineer Militia - -	{ 2 Regts. }	700	2,400
	{ 10 S.M. Cos. }	100	
	{ 22 Fort. R. }	800	
Engineer Volunteers -	{ 7 S.M.D. }	100	21,000
	{ 1 Electric E. }	1,000	
	{ 1 Railway E. }	1,000	
Infantry Militia - -	124	800	100,000
Infantry Volunteers -	223	1,100	261,000
R.A.M.C. Militia - -	16	100	1,600
R.A.M.C. Volunteers -	{ 26 Companies }	150	6,800
	{ 32 Bearer „ }	90	
Total - -	...	...	487,800

From the force given on Table D. we must take the permanent garrisons of the fortresses before we attempt any further organisation of a mobile Auxiliary Army.

To the garrisons we gave a strength of 150,000 men, of these one-third should be Militia, and two-thirds Volunteers. The proportion of the various arms in the garrisons may be taken as follows:—100,000 infantry; 30,000 artillery; 10,000 engineers; and 10,000 supply, transport, and medical services.

This force allotted to garrisons should not be considered as available for any other duty, and it can only be removed from the fortresses under the most exceptional circumstances. The military

urgency of the situation can scarcely ever be so grave as to warrant the loss of freedom of movement to the fleet which these garrisons are intended to secure.

These garrisons are not to be organised or equipped for field operations.

The following Table E. shows what is left of the present Auxiliary Forces when the garrisons have been removed:—

Table E.

Portions of the Force.	Number of Units,	Strength.
Ycomantry (Imperial)	56	27,500
Artillery (Militia)... ..	14	8,000
Artillery (Volunteers)	41	30,000
Engineer (Militia)	—	—
Engineer (Volunteers)	15	12,000
Infantry (Militia)... ..	91 Bns.	66,000
Infantry (Volunteers)	157 "	195,000
R.A.M.C. (Militia and Volunteers)	—	—
Total		333,500

The above table is also worked out on the authorised establishments, not on the enlisted or enrolled strength. The only existing reserve for these Auxiliary Forces is, except a few thousand Militiamen, the population of the country, old Volunteers, etc. These join pretty freely when war takes place, but they are either young and untrained, or old, and probably as soldiers, worn out; in neither case is the supply of any very great immediate military value.

It will be noticed on studying Table E. that this remainder is practically cavalry and infantry, all the rest being used up in the fortresses. Of the 38,000 artillery a very small proportion of it would be of the least use with a field army. There are some few surplus field batteries from the Regular Army, *vide* Table B., Chapter III., but these are really all required for India, or the Regulars in the Colonies. The mobile artillery required for the armies for home defence will be found to be some 63 Brigades, and also a considerable force of heavy artillery.

The first, most important and essential step in any organisation of the Auxiliary Forces is, to divide the country into equal areas of population; the most convenient equal areas are those which leave Scotland and Ireland as units. This fixes the population of our areas at roughly $4\frac{1}{2}$ millions. England falls into seven such areas. I have shown on the map how I would propose to apportion the areas.

It will be noticed that there are two exposed areas, the Eastern and Southern. Only these areas would be liable to be disturbed by raids during mobilisation. Now, each area should produce a given number of men for the local defence of the country, and these men should serve in the Militia and Volunteers, but these services should consist of such units as would make the quota of each area an efficient fighting machine, and a fighting machine which is quite independent of the other areas and self-contained.

The following Table shows the proposed forces in each area:—

Table F.

Force in each Area.

Cavalry Staff	25	
6 Regiments Yeomanry at 500	3,000	
2 Batteries of Yeomen Horse Artillery ...	400	
	<hr/>	
	3,425	3,425
1 Militia Division.		
Staff	50	
8 Infantry Battalions	8,600	
Cavalry, Motorist, or Cyclist Company ...	150	
2 Brigades Field Artillery	1,600	
Company Royal Engineers	225	
Transport Company	150	
Medical Service (2 F.A.)	500	
	<hr/>	
	11,275	11,275
2 Volunteer Divisions, as above		22,550
Area Staff	150	
Heavy Artillery Volunteers	2,000	
Engineer Volunteers	1,000	
Other Services (mostly for Regular Army)	1,600	
	<hr/>	
	4,750	4,750
	<hr/>	
Total		42,000

	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Infantry.	Engineers, etc.	Staff, Medical and Transpt.
Two Cavalry Brig's...	3,023	400	—	—	—
Three Divisions ...	450	4,800	25,800	675	2,100
Area Troops	...	2,000	—	1,000	1,750
	<hr/>				
	3,475	7,200	25,800	1,675	3,850
	<hr/>				
	31,275	64,800	232,200	15,075	31,650

	Suggested totals.	Totals by present Establishments. Table E.	Surplus or Deficiency.
Cavalry ...	31,275	27,500	— 3,775
Artillery ...	64,800	38,000	— 26,800
Infantry ...	232,200	261,000	+ 28,800
Engineers ...	15,075	12,000	— 3,075
Staff, Medical } Service, etc. }	31,650	—	— 31,650
	<hr/>		
	378,000	338,500	— 39,500

There is thus only a deficiency of 39,500 men in the existing forces, after a proper adjustment of the arms has been made. A portion of the infantry should be reduced and cavalry and artillery corps formed of it, and then all that has to be provided fresh in each area is the staffs and the supply, transport and medical services, which do not at present exist.

In addition to the full garrisons previously arranged for, I have shown in Table F what I consider to be a fair force for each area. It will be noticed that it consists of a division of Militia and two divisions of Volunteers, with some additional necessary troops. There are to be nine such areas, and it will be noticed that the total number of men employed in making an Auxiliary Army of nine army corps is little more than what exists as the establishment of the present Auxiliary Forces. So there is no reason, as far as the men go, that there should not be a large and efficient Army. It is merely a matter of sound administration.

In the country there are about 6,500,000 men between the ages of 20 and 40; that is to say, that to produce an Army of 2,000,000 men we will take nearly one-third of the available material in the country. This is about 225,000 men from each area. The Navy, the Regular Army and their reserves have now nearly 540,000 men, that is, 60,000 men from each area. There are also some 42,000 from each area to fulfil the provisions of Table F, and 16,700 for the garrisons, which leaves us with 106,000 men who would not be with the colours or in either the Regular or Auxiliary Forces. These must be kept trained and held as a reserve for the latter.

It is a simple matter of calculation to determine how much service should be done to produce a certain reserve, and how many recruits are required annually. These figures do not seem to fall fairly into this essay, except as regards the Auxiliary Forces.

It is clearly not the business of this essay to suggest a reorganisation of the Regular Forces, much as it would simplify the whole scheme of defence; but the Auxiliary Forces who have to help them must have their organisation complete. We have therefore to decide upon some means by which the Auxiliary Forces can be kept up to strength. The only one which will have any hope of giving the required result is the application of the ballot to the Militia, and then making the following arrangements:—

Service in the Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers should be for a period of twenty years, from the age of 20, the first five years being with the colours, the next seven years with the 1st Reserve, and the last eight years in the 2nd Reserve. The required service to be the same for officers and men. Officers serving after twenty years to be the field officers in the branches of the Service to which they belong, being promoted by careful selection.

Each unit of the forces shown on Table F should have a 1st and 2nd Reserve unit, to which the men are drafted after they have passed the prescribed period in each class, the surplus numbers being available to fill vacancies in any of the other classes. In case of a lack of men in any Volunteer unit, a Militia unit to be raised by ballot in its place.

To train the available manhood of the country to fight, as they must fight, to face the Regular Armies of Europe, we must adopt some such system.

If we take for the Auxiliary Forces in an area 13,000 men each year out of the 37,700 who arrive at the age of 20, we will have, allow-

ing a waste of 4 per cent. per annum from death and other causes, 60,000 for the garrison and the army corps in five years; this out of a population of 186,000 men between the ages of 20 and 25. At the same rate of decrease we find that the 1st Reserve will be 75,770 on a male population of 249,000; the 2nd Reserve will be 55,550 on a population of 264,000. That is, for each area a total of 191,320 trained men from a population of almost 700,000 men of a military age. This gives for the United Kingdom as trained Auxiliary Troops, prepared and organised for war, 1,720,000 men out of a male population of 6,300,000 between the ages of 20 and 40.

If the nation will render this service, and keep the Navy and Army full of recruits, it will be in a condition to meet the coalition above referred to.

CHAPTER VI.

Assistance direct from the People to the Regular and Auxiliary Forces. Recruits, Stores, Arms, etc.

Having sketched a possible efficient organisation, it is necessary to take the next step in our argument, and see how the people of the country are to assist the Regular Forces, in the first place, directly, and secondly, through the Auxiliary Forces.

The keynote of assistance is sympathy; the feeling that the Navy and Army are part of the nation, and must be encouraged and given fresh life. While they are looked upon as organisms thrown off from the nation, which only return to it in the scrappy form of officers with pensions, and men either with pensions or semi-useless members of society, many of whom fill the workhouses, there can never be true sympathy.

The people—that is, the electorate—should insist that the defensive services of their country are the most honourable; if the most honourable, they will be the most sought after. Why can the finest men be obtained for the parochial defences, i.e., the police, while the national defences are often only given the inferior material? It is simply because the people do not look upon the soldiers and sailors as part of themselves. It is a feeling which has grown from the days of the press-gang, from the time when the prisons were emptied into the ranks of the Army, when we kept Armies of German mercenaries to fight our battles on land. It is a terrible and a shameful memory; but the mercenary idea is not as yet dead amongst us. The ideal of personal and public-spirited self-sacrifice has not yet sufficiently developed. There is always the feeling that a rich nation can buy men to fight, pay them 5s. a day, and that all will be well. While such views prevail, the people can never assist the Regular Force as they should be assisted, by the willing service of the best blood of the nation. This alone is the way in which every male individual member of the population can best help the Regular Forces, by offering to serve when he comes to the age of, say, 20. Then only the finest, most healthy, and best men would be taken for this most honourable duty. Only about one man in every ten would be taken, if the Service were left as it is in the various branches; for a large number of the remainder, places could be found in the Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers, if they were organised as suggested in the last chapter.

That is the way in which an ideal population would assist the Regular Forces of an ideal country, with which no other country would ever dare to make war, as it would only be courting certain disaster; but in this world we find greed, self-seeking, and self-interest everywhere, so that in almost every country legislation has made compulsory what in every nation should be voluntary, *i.e.*, the service of the man to the State.

It is only by the abnegation of many of what we call the dearest appendages of freedom, that the people of the country can really help the Regular Forces. But the people can be encouraged to serve by the proper use of this very self-interest which now drives them from the Service. If we cannot instil the higher instincts into men, we can at least with care use their lower instincts to serve our purpose.

If the finest men will not now enter the Services willingly, it is only because the people as a whole have treated them badly. Pay alone is not what is required to attract the desirable recruit in large numbers; it is future prospects that will secure them. At present the future prospects of the short-service man are not very bright. They are, unless he has some friends in civil life who will and can help him, that at no distant date he will assist to fill the great army of the unemployed and sink to the lowest places in that army, he having used the best years of his life in learning an unprofitable trade, and being, from the civilian point of view, unskilled. He may also have learnt the art of loafing and perhaps drinking, and possibly not altogether improved his connections.

But suppose we assure the future of the sailor or soldier, be it by legislation or by public spirit, and at once the whole state of affairs will alter, as it were, by magic. What need would there be for recruiting sergeants and ribbons if it were known as a positive fact no appointment in the police, the post office, on railways, in municipal tramways, gas and water works, and public buildings would ever be given to any man who had not a discharge certificate from the Regular Forces while any ex-sailor or soldier was available for the post? There are further inducements which might be given towards service, such as giving the right to vote only to those who had served in the defensive forces. There is no reason that the country should be governed by a man who will not do a hand's turn in its defence.

I am convinced, if you assure the future of the good man, that he will go into the Navy or Army. A short actual service with the colours will suffice; say three years and then reserve service for as long as is considered desirable. Every man would wish to qualify by service, to gain a first claim on the country. Until a man thus qualified had proved himself to be unworthy of trust, he should always find service to the country was repaid by work to hand when required.

That any man who had been a soldier was thereby for ever qualified for any post is of course not to be expected; but there are positions in which any man, even the most uneducated, can be employed. But there would only be a necessity to take for the Army the very best of the men who presented themselves. It is useless having a great choice without exercising judicious selection.

The next way in which the assistance of the people is required is land for training the existing troops. This in the ideal country would be done at once, but in a country where continual prejudice

has bred selfishness, legislation will be necessary to ensure the use of land for military exercises. An area sufficiently large for annual manœuvres is a good thing, but is not sufficient. What is wanted is the use of all ground without restrictions for any time in the year, so long as no damage is done, and if damage is done, that compensation is fairly made. If it were possible to use all ground, it would not be necessary to use any ground much. With properly constituted units fit for war there would be ample labour available to repair damage. If they could not do this, they would not be capable of carrying out the necessary constructive work in war. Of course, care should be taken in the selection of ground for annual manœuvres that the same areas are not used in successive years. The large manœuvres should take place late in the year, as the care of men is one of the chief duties of the staff. If at manœuvres good arrangements are not made for the accommodation and comfort of the troops, what is to be expected of the staff of the Army in actual war, when everything is so much more difficult? Billets should be the normal way of accommodating men at manœuvres, tents are an impossible encumbrance to modern Armies, and any extended use of the bivouac is detrimental to the efficiency of the Army.

The efficiency of the forces also depends upon the stores and arms being always ready to hand and of the best quality. It is of the utmost importance that the efficiency of the dockyards, and arsenals should not be impaired by the fact of mobilisation. It follows that the men employed in these places, as mentioned above, should not be reservists, who may be recalled to the colours on the outbreak of war. They should be manned by men who have passed the military age, say 40, but they should be as far as possible men who have served in the Regular Forces. Similar rules should apply to private firms which supply war stores, as the employment of men who have not served their complete time might prejudice the output of these places at the most important moment. It is by sensible regulations in this respect that the country can assure the efficiency of its Army in war.

Another very important thing is the maintenance of proper secrecy during war. No commander can be said to have a chance when his every move is reported as soon as it takes place. All news which is public will get into the hands of the enemy with the modern means of communication. It is only by the noble co-operation of the Press that a general's hands will remain free. Even the bare reports of casualties at a certain place may give the enemy valuable information as to which units were at a certain place on a certain day.

There are thus many ways in which the people can help the Regular Forces to be efficient for war, and so overcome the difficulties which at present stand in the way of enlistment, organisation, and training. These difficulties will really all disappear if a warm and generous feeling can be engendered into the people towards the Army, which should be a part of themselves.

The assistance which the people should render to the Auxiliary Forces is much the same as that to the Regular Forces. The desire to serve the State in order to make the country invulnerable, great, and free, should produce all the recruits necessary for each branch of these forces, be they Militia, Yeomanry, or Volunteers. The difficulty should again be to select the best recruits, not to get a sufficient number. The stream of men who pass through the necessary

training should be continual. The period of service provided for under the chapter on Organisation should be sufficient, and should furnish a sufficient reserve.

If there should be a lack of recruits, the ballot would have to be applied for the Militia. The existence of a ballot for the Militia would act as a spur to make men join the Volunteers, and should Volunteer units not fill, Militia units must be raised by ballot in their stead. It is by insisting upon some such provisions, and by seeing that the Auxiliary Forces are sufficiently trained, that the people can assure that they are efficient to help the Regulars in the case of need. Laws must exist to enforce what does not come voluntarily; but it is hoped that there will be no necessity to enforce these laws.

It must not be overlooked that to volunteer for 5 years' colour service in the Volunteers at the age of 20, and for 15 years' reserve service, is a much more serious engagement than what the present Volunteers undertake; but some such arrangements giving efficient units is necessary, and we cannot be said to have got thorough efficiency yet, without legislation.

Volunteer officers must be given a social status; this would come with the improvement of the force. They should receive some fixed annual pay, if passed efficient. Similar arrangements would be necessary for the Yeomanry and Militia. The question of officers presents difficulties, but it must be found to be an advantage to a man to be an officer, and then the dearth of good officers will cease to exist. Officers should be selected originally, and only promoted if thoroughly efficient.

CHAPTER VII.

The Individual Assistance of the People and that of Corporate Bodies.

In war, if each individual works for the benefit of the State, the ends in view will be attained easily. All the troubles which come from discontented communities arise from the acts of individuals. An enemy can do much less in a country where the dense population of the country is passively his foe. He can obtain no information; he can send no orders without large escorts; he cannot even trust the information which he does get; while the home army can go anywhere and knows everything which is to be known. This was the state of things in the South of France in the winter of 1870-71, and had the French Armies been what it is hoped an Auxiliary British army might be with efficient organisation, it seems unlikely that Von Werder or the Crown Prince would have had many successes to boast of. The bearing of the people towards an invader is most important, it must be absolutely negative, and not such as that of the French on the Moselle, where information was fairly easy to obtain. The amount of service which individuals can render to messengers, to keeping lines of communication open and to supplying food, etc., is enormous.

The reverse is also important. To what extent civilians can execute hostile acts is a question, and should England be invaded by two armies of 500,000 each, it would probably be politic for individuals to enlist in local corps and to become regular combatants, rather than to act in a hostile manner personally. A force will always want guides, men knowing the country should volunteer for such service,

while no information or guides should be forthcoming for the enemy.

Corporate bodies can render the greatest assistance to armies. Water-works can provide large forces in given areas with water. Corporations can arrange to supply food at moderate rates. They can arrange for all questions of housing the troops, and place public buildings at the disposal of the military authorities. They can provide supplies of food, fuel, etc., to the fighting forces, while, should it be necessary to relinquish a place, they must arrange for the destruction or removal of all supplies which can be spared.

They should arrange gangs of diggers to assist the military to make any necessary earthworks. They can arrange for transport over and above what is supplied by the Army Service Corps. The helpful work of local authorities may make a great deal of difference to the success of any plan. It must be remembered that the enemy will take what is often denied to our own men. It is, therefore, of the greatest importance that corporations should do all in their power, which is a great deal, to assist their own armies.

War requires the services of everybody. There must be no deserters, no skulkers. Each individual citizen of the country must, by his bearing towards them, make the life of such people a burden.

The Corporations must see to the registers of the areas over which they rule. The registration of the population and the provision of the necessary recruits, by ballot if necessary, is a duty which must be carefully carried out.

The individual employer of labour can assist the Auxiliary Forces by letting his men get well trained. There is no reason why his business should suffer. These things are always matters of arrangement. If one-half the time which is spent by crowds watching football matches were spent on healthy military exercises, there would be a trained division in every town of 100,000 inhabitants.

The whole thing amounts to this, that if the individual will but study the nation's needs, he will find that the first thing is to have men fit to be sailors and soldiers, and if he then carries out the precept learnt, he will make himself fit, his children fit, and insist that the local authorities study the development of the children who have not parents fit to look after them. This fitness, which is both mental and bodily development, is the mainspring of success. The man who is fit to fight is fit to have a free country, and is fit to rule wherever he goes. He will find few to fight him, and he will overcome those who are not as fit as himself.

We, as individuals, and as members of corporate bodies, must remember that our possible enemies, Germany, France, and Russia, at least the two former, study physical fitness and development, while the latter has an enormous well-developed rural population. It is obviously unjust to ourselves for us to nit ourselves against these foes unless we take the preliminary precautions of physical training and military organisation. It is the duty of every man to demand this training, and the more it is demanded, the more likelihood there is of our country having the means at hand to assist the Regular Forces when they are asked to fight the three armies which I have above-mentioned, which no Regular Forces, which any country can keep at practically a war footing as we do, can hope to do. To meet the coalition of the naval Powers of the Continent, Britain must be a nation in arms. It can be a nation in arms with little or no trouble if its people will only apply patriotism practically to themselves, and

develop the Auxiliary Forces on the lines which I have indicated in the chapter on Organisation.

CHAPTER VIII.

A Scheme to Further Increase the Power of the Auxiliary Forces.

In the fifth chapter an attempt was made to show that by means of a certain amount of territorial organisation, the present Auxiliary Forces, when distributed rationally to the different arms of the service, could, on mobilisation, be formed into a mobile force of nine Army Corps, or, if we prefer it, 27 Divisions. That, at the same time, very considerable garrisons were also available for the defence of all the fortresses and also for the protection of our principal commercial ports.

The scheme there suggested only took men between the ages of 20 and 25 in the forces above-mentioned, after that age they were passed into the reserve and would only be recalled to the colours therefrom to fill up vacancies in the units mentioned. These steps might produce a sufficient force for a purely defensive war, in which the only thought was to keep the enemy out of British possessions; hoping that the Navy could defeat our foes on the sea. But if we wish in any way to take the aggressive and strike at our enemies beyond the seas, making use of the Navy as a guard to our line of communications, we must be prepared to increase our forces still further. Whether offensive action against a coalition would be politic or not is another question, but it is an axiom of war that the passive defence cannot finally succeed.

The simplest way in which this increase can be carried out, is to arrange that in each area every unit calls up reservists to double its strength. The original units of the Auxiliary Forces can and should go to the front. It would be advisable, if possible, to concentrate them first in large bodies, so that they might receive some additional training if this had not been part of the peace programme. The newly-formed corps would, in the meantime, take their places in the home defence army. Should it be necessary to produce still further forces, the same process can be carried out a second time. This second levy would exhaust the first reserve, and a portion of the second reserve would have to be called up. It might be advisable to complete whole units from men belonging to the second reserve, and exchange these units with units detailed for the protection of the fortresses in the first instance, so that the younger and more active men should be taken for the mobile army.

When the drain of war had exhausted all the reserves, it would at once be necessary to take steps to train for war the eldest contingent which had not reached the military age, so that they might fill up gaps in the fighting forces. These youths should not be taken before the reserves are exhausted, as any drain on the contingents which have not reached the military age is spending national capital, and must weaken unduly the army of the future. As a last resource Volunteer Corps of men of over forty can be raised for the defence of the fortresses, and the units of the fortress defences assembled and organised.

During a war there should never be any question as to the terms of a man's service being fixed by any dates. That war service can be

completed before the end of a war is absurd. The three months' men at Bull's Run, and the one year men in the Boer War are shocking instances of the difficulty of keeping troops up to a pitch of war keenness when they are not bound to see the war through. It all comes to this, that it is no use playing at soldiers as we have done. A war conducted with inadequate means from the beginning, like the Boer War, lasts four times as long as is necessary, it also costs much more in both men and money to both sides; and I very much doubt if the defeated side has less bitterness afterwards, than would be the case if the sternest measures had been employed from the very beginning.

Success in war is always best attained by the most vigorous blows being given in the shortest possible time. If we wish to arrange to get the most out of our population, we must be prepared to arm them thoroughly with the best of everything. We have got enough rifles for the army sketched in the chapter on Organisation, but we want an enormous number of additional guns to make that army efficient. If, however, it be contemplated to increase the units to double or three times the present number, we shall have to provide arms for these forces, unless we are content to arm them with antiquated weapons, which means to court defeat.

Field guns for such a second army as suggested above would cost over £4,000,000, and the rifles about £1,000,000; so, if the policy which it is intended to follow, is to increase the number of the Army Corps or Divisions in war, we must face the expense of the extra armaments in peace time.

Horses are a necessity for any army, and the country must see that an ample supply is forthcoming. We have at present no statistics to show whether there are a sufficient supply of suitable horses in the country for nine Army Corps. If not, some arrangements must be made to supply the want. The horses are almost as much a necessity as men.

The registration and classification of every horse in each area should be most carefully carried out. Registration will not make horses, but it will show where they are and how they can be obtained. It will also show where there is the greatest deficiency and where there is a surplus, if any. No mobilisation can be rapid unless the arrangements for the supply of horses to the Regular Army and to the Auxiliary Forces is certain and has been fully arranged for during peace. Laws are necessary to enable the district authorities to complete their units for war in horses.

If the horse supply fails, much can be done by motor traction for all the necessities of the home defence army, other than actual bringing guns into action and supplying mounted troops. For all purposes, in connection with the supply of the territorial army, and whatever system of expansion is adopted, we must retain the area as the unit from which men, etc., are drawn. No good mobilisation and defence schemes can really be worked out on any other basis.

Of course, there are many other systems of dividing up the country possible; it would be easy to arrange for a much larger home defence army, but that would in no way be the present Auxiliary Forces. And I think that it is a better method of increasing the army to draw a second levy from each area, than to have smaller areas originally and nominally a larger peace army.

CHAPTER IX.

A Scheme for the Co-ordination of the whole of the Forces of the Kingdom for War, and Conclusion.

When we make preparations to meet a vast coalition at war with us, we have to use the forces which we have to the best advantage.

There may be good reasons for Army Councils and Boards of the Admiralty during peace. They are doubtless money-saving machines, but they must be servants, not masters, in war.

The war which is conducted by a Council has usually failed. The best way to victory is to give the general in the field in each theatre a free hand, but the authorities should decide what force is to go to each theatre. The only logical conclusion is, that for war the Sovereign shall name two Directors of War, one naval and one military. These men in war, acting together, direct from the War Office and the Admiralty as the Sovereign's directors. The office of Civil Head to Navy and Army must cease to exercise any authority the moment war is declared, unless we wish to see indecision and defeat awaiting our forces.

It is little more than ludicrous to ask a printer to direct an army or a bookseller to conduct the fleet. They have their uses as party butts, but defend us from attempting to meet a great coalition with such leaders.

A King may or may not be a great leader; he will at least get the best service out of his Directors of War that they are capable of rendering, and if they are men who think largely and are fit to take responsibility, there is a chance of success. They can direct their departments and must work in unison. They will not have to answer questions in the House of Commons when they should be attending to business. The naval and military means of offence and defence must have been arranged for in peace; it is not for them to manipulate what does not exist, but to make the arrangements for the disposal of what has been constructed into an army in peace time.

The subordination of those who know to those who do not know is unpleasant enough in peace time; in war time it is practically certain to lead to failure. To whomsoever the power is given to direct the war must be absolute. They can only apportion troops to spheres of usefulness, be it the defence of India or England, or the attack on some hostile possession.

The defence of each country must be invested in a local Commander-in-Chief, who, in the case of India, would command every soldier in India, and would make representations to the Director of Operations of War.

The Commander-in-Chief at home would command the passive defences and the area commanders. He would be responsible for the fortresses being in a proper state of defence, and would order the extent of mobilisation necessary, and would command the Home Defence Army.

In each area there would be a general commanding, whose duty would be to produce the men for the fortresses and for the local divisions raised in the area. He would make all arrangements for their mobilisation and carry it out when ordered by the Directors

of War. The fleet would similarly be under Admirals of the Fleet, who would be subordinate to the Directors of War.

When a country is at war with a combination of hostile forces, success hangs on the unity of the driving power of its forces. This unity can only be obtained by having war arranged for by fighting men, who understand that things must be done in order to destroy or resist the enemy, and for the good of the country, and not because it suits party politics. The soldier can never understand the whys and wherefores of the latter, but they are of such minor importance when the struggle is for national existence, that the usual means which they have been applying for centuries to raise forces in this country will not be found to be sufficient.

It will not be for the War Directors to say how any Commander-in-Chief is to carry out his aim, but only to give him his tools and his objective.

The commands of large Navies and Armies must be given to the best men available.

In a war such as has been suggested; half a million men must be placed on the Frontier of India; these are Regulars. If we are defeated at sea we must organise the nine Army Corps at home in the Field Armies, and mobilise our fortresses and nine reserve army corps and build a new fleet, and resist any attacks from without.

If we are successful at sea, the army corps must be moved to the Continent to do the maximum damage to the enemy. It may be found that we can only take islands and annex Colonies, destroy coaling stations, and ruin trade.. German and French trade would be worth very little if we had complete command of the North Sea and the Channel.

France and Germany might be induced to send armies to assist Russia in Central Asia, and to try and destroy us on land; but the size of the army which can be usefully employed in Central Asia against India is limited by other considerations than the supply of men. To my mind, the Continental coalition would gain more by accepting peace than by the continuance of the war after a naval disaster. Should they, however, gain temporary command of the sea, it would be necessary for them to strike a blow in England to gain their ultimate object. The blow in England would have to be met by the Auxiliary Forces, unaided, most likely, by a single Regular soldier. In case of British success at sea, the capture of foreign Colonies and islands would have to be undertaken by Auxiliary Armies.

The war which is suggested by the title of this essay is too awful to think of; but if England be true to herself, she need not fear. Her Regular Army may stand on the Indian Frontier and defy attack by attacking every Army which approaches; her Navy may sail the sea, and, if crippled, may come into safe anchorage, knowing that the Auxiliary Forces of the country have been so organised that the enemy dare not attack, and that the population of the country are fired with a spirit which will render any service to ward off defeat. If the Navy is triumphant at sea, the Auxiliaries can be transported to whatever spot it may be necessary for them to land on and to rob the jewels from the crowns of those who would rob us.

It at present seems impossible for the British civilian mind to grasp the splendour and passive repose of a country which is armed

and strong, which can fight and will fight as Germany can and will fight to-day.

To the military mind it appears to be little short of criminal to allow a country to remain in a condition in which its forces are not organised for war and in which no forethought is given to the necessities of war, and while millions are wasted annually. A country in which patriotism has never got to the first practical step of having a register of its male population and of its horses of military value must be weak. It also seems wonderful, in a country which is in very many ways truly patriotic, and where the love of freedom should be a watchword which will stir all hearts, that so little is done.

Organise, register and rebuild a military greatness on the bones of our Auxiliary Forces, and we will find that these forces can help us at every turn, and if they are not then successful, it is because the Lord of all nations so wills it, and not because the sloth of the nation has been so great that its people will not read the writing on the wall and prepare for what may and will happen.

We know what some foreigners think of us, namely, that if we were in absolute command of the sea, we could not place 100,000 men on the shores of the Continent, even as an auxiliary to a Continental Power, and yet our Army costs over £30,000,000 a year. These critics are not far wrong.

Truly (to quote) "a wonderful and horrible thing has been committed in the land." The leaders of the people preach to them vain soothing, and by blinding their eyes to the true military state of the country remain in power. And we must presume that the sloth and faint-heartedness of the majority of the people "loves to have it so." But, to again quote from the scriptural parallel: "What will ye do in the end thereof?"

My answer is: Awake, ye Britons, demand to render your lawful service to your land and keep her free thereby; keep her the prosperous defender of the right and the leader in the forefront of civilisation. Peaceful in all things, but armed and prepared so that none dare oppose our just cause, knowing the sword of the British people will never be drawn to support an unjust one.

If we do these things, then may we be sure that the words which Shakespeare makes the spirit of Cœur-de-Lion utter will be true:—

"Come the three corners of the world in arms,
And we shall shock them. Nought shall make us rue
If England to itself do rest but true."

But we must remember the sentence which preceded these lines:—

"This England never did nor never shall
Lie at the proud feet of a conqueror,
But when it first did help to wound itself."

And be quite sure that by our blindness to our necessities we are not wounding the nation in such a way that recovery is impossible.

Britons, stand together and demand your birthright of service

"UNION IS STRENGTH."

Area No.	Name of Area.	Population.
1	SCOTLAND	4,472,103
2	North Eastern	4,594,034
3	North Western	4,768,850
4	Eastern	4,541,203
5	LONDON	4,586,541
6	Southern	4,941,479
7	Central	4,714,254
8	Western	4,431,472
9	IRELAND	4,458,745

DETAIL OF COUNTIES IN EACH AREA.

1st Area—SCOTLAND						4,472,103
2nd Area—N.E.	Northumberland ...			608,119		
	Durham			1,194,590		
	York	800,000		2,796,325		4,594,034
3rd Area—N.W.	Cumberland			266,988		
	Westmoreland ...			64,409		
	Lancaster			4,487,518		4,768,850
4th Area—E.	York			800,000		
	Derby			491,032		
	Notts			596,705		
	Lincoln			492,994		
	Rutland			20,748		
	Huntingdon			46,750		
	Cambridge			200,680		
	Norfolk			467,754		
	Suffolk			361,900		
	Essex			1,062,645		4,541,203
5th Area—LONDON						4,586,541
6th Area—S.	Cornwall			918,591		
	Devon			664,697		
	Somerset			466,193		
	Dorset			199,968		
	Wiltshire			268,944		
	Hampshire			768,608		
	Surrey			718,549		
	Sussex			605,785		
	Kent			935,144		4,941,479

7th Area—C.	Gloucester	...	...	648,627	
	Worcester	...	...	500,819	
	Warwick	...	...	906,601	
	Oxford...	...	...	186,698	
	Berkshire	...	...	288,531	
	Middlesex	...	...	810,806	
	Northamptonshire	...	...	848,947	
	Leicester	...	...	440,932	
	Hertfordshire...	...	...	239,760	
	Bedfordshire	...	...	174,972	
	Buckinghamshire	...	...	178,061	4,714,479
8th Area—W.	Wales ...	...	...	1,698,148	
	Chester	...	...	792,918	
	Stafford	...	...	1,251,910	
	Shropshire	...	...	259,088	
	Herefordshire...	...	...	112,549	
	Monmouth	...	...	316,864	4,481,472
9th Area—Ireland	...	...	...	...	4,458,745