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Delbrück's Comparative Syntax *Grundriss der vergleichenden Grammatik der indogermanischen Sprachen*. Von Karl Brugmann und Berthold Delbrück. Dritter Band. Vergleichende Syntax der indogermanischen Sprachen. Von B. Delbrück. Erster Theil. Strassburg. Karl J. Trübner. 1893. M. 20.

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supported by good arguments. Further Mr. Hatzidakis, discussing the etymology in a criticism of Krumbacher's paper (*Ἀθηνᾶ* iv. 466), completes the arguments of Krumbacher, showing that the contraction of *ea* to *η* (*νεαρόν*—*νηρόν*—*νερόν*) is attested by ancient authority. Moreover Hatzidakis

refers to Korais' *Ἀτακτα*, iv. 349 and Sophocles' well-known *Lexicon*. Both these writers suggest (though without arguing the question) that *νερό* may possibly be identical with the ancient Greek word *νεαρόν*.

ALBERT THUMB.

Freiburg-*i.*-B.

EUR. *ION* 1276.

ὁ δ' οἷκτος ὁ σὸς ἐμοὶ κρείσσων πάρα
καὶ μητρὶ τῇ 'μῇ.

These words should naturally mean 'But pity for thee is stronger in my heart and that of my mother,' a sense absolutely irreconcilable with the context. Ion is threatening Creusa with instant and certain death:

ἀλλ' οὔτε βωμὸς οὔτ' Ἀπόλλωνος δόμος
σώσει σ'.

are the words immediately preceding; and there is no sign of relenting in what follows.

In order to make the line fit into its context, editors are reduced to translating (as Paley) 'The feeling of pity for you is stronger for myself and my mother,' a rendering adopted also by Dr. Verrall in his poetical version. But it is hard to see how the words can possibly be so construed. I would suggest the Epic οἶτος, used by Sophocles (*El.* 167) and Euripides (*I.T.* 1091, where Dind. has οἰκτρόν) in lyric passages, with the sense 'But thy doom is present as a mightier desire (than reverence for Apollo) with me and my mother.'

FRANK CARTER.

DELBRÜCK'S COMPARATIVE SYNTAX.

Grundriss der vergleichenden Grammatik der indogermanischen Sprachen. VON KARL BRUGMANN und BERTHOLD DELBRÜCK. Dritter Band. *Vergleichende Syntax der indogermanischen Sprachen.* VON B. DELBRÜCK. Erster Theil. Strassburg. Karl J. Trübner. 1893. M. 20.

THIS is a book to which it is out of place here to apply the general language of eulogy. The time will come when it will be interesting and proper to call attention to the qualities which distinguish Delbrück among the great scholars who have built up the science of comparative grammar. At present our business is simply to give such an account of the work as will be of service to those who intend to study and use it.

The author begins with a sketch of the history of syntax. Three periods are distinguished. The first is that of the ancient Greek grammarians. The second begins with the twelfth century, when education in western Europe derived its substance

from the doctrines of the Church, and its formulas from a Latinized version of Aristotle. Here we find the early history of such terms as 'subject,' 'predicate,' 'governing,' 'concord,' &c. After the Renaissance the growth of philosophy led to the conception of 'universal grammar,' and to such theories as that of the derivation of the grammatical cases from local relations ('where,' 'whence,' 'whither'). The third period is that of the modern science of language, founded by Bopp, whose treatment of the infinitive in his *Conjugationssystem* (1816) may be regarded as the beginning of comparative syntax. Since that time the most marked change in the method of comparative grammar has been the limitation of its first aims. To Bopp and even to G. Curtius it seemed possible not merely to reconstruct the original or 'Indo-germanic' language but to explain the formation of that language from its elements. The latter of these aims is now recognized as hopeless: indeed the comparative method is inapplicable

able to it. We compare the members of the family of languages in order to arrive at the original mother-tongue: but when we have reached that mother-tongue we find no term of further comparison.

After this introductory matter the author addresses himself first to the problems of gender. Does the gender of nouns depend on their meaning? In Latin, for example, why are the names of rivers masculine, and those of trees feminine? On this point it appears that there is nothing to be learned from comparative grammar, since the phenomena in question cannot be traced back to the period of Indo-germanic unity. On the other hand the rule that stems in *-o* are masculine or neuter, and stems in *-ā* feminine, was originally an absolute one, numerous as are the exceptions in Greek and Latin. How then do we account for the gender of such words as *ταμίας*, *πολίτης*, *scriba*, *scurra*? Or again of such words as *ὁδός*, *ῥήσος*? The former question was touched upon in Delbrück's earlier *Grundlagen der griechischen Syntax*, but now receives a more complete discussion. The source of the change of gender, he points out, lies in a change of meaning. The commonest case is when a feminine abstract denoting an *action* comes to be used as a noun of the *agent*. Thus there was doubtless a noun *ταμία* which meant 'cutting up,' and so 'dispensing,' stewardship. In Homer we find a change of meaning, but not of gender, *γυνὴ ταμὴν* being used in the sense of a housekeeper. Finally, when the steward was usually a man, the further step was taken of making the word masculine and adding the characteristic *-s* to the nominative. Similarly *ναυτίας* presupposes a collective or abstract *ναυία*. Most of the Latin masculines in *-a* are either words expressing some action or employment, as *scriba*, *papa*, *auriga*, *lixa*, &c., or contemptuous terms, as *scurra*, *gumia*, &c. Some are borrowed from Greek, e.g. *nauta*, *poeta*, and these may point, as Delbrück suggests, to Greek forms *ναύτᾱ*, *ποιητᾱ́* (without final *-s*). This hypothesis may perhaps be supported by the Boeotian and Elean masculines in *-ā* (as to which see Meister i. 160); but we must reckon with the probability that the borrowed words would follow the analogy of the native Latin *scriba*, &c. The change of meaning from abstract to concrete may be illustrated within Latin by such uses as *magistratus* 'magistracy,' then 'magistrate.' Probably it began with the use of the word as a title or epithet: cp. the Greek *ἱππότα* Πηλεὺς, ἡπίτα κῆρυξ, &c., also *βίη* Πριάμοιο

and the like. Thus it is ultimately the same change of meaning that we see in *bahuvrīhi* compounds (*swift-foot* for *swift-footed*, &c.). Delbrück adds apposite parallels from the Balto-Slav languages. On p. 109, l. 24, 'das Lateinische' is surely a misprint for 'das Litauische.'

After *gender* comes *number*. In dealing with the dual the German language has the advantage of possessing in the words *beide* and *zwei* the same distinction as that which obtained between the dual and the plural as used of two objects. In Greek, however, even as early as Homer, the plural had begun to encroach on the province of the dual. Regarding the loss of the dual Delbrück makes the interesting suggestion that it was caused by the use of the words *ἄμφω* and *δύω*. These words expressed the dual idea in a clear and uniform manner, which was gradually adopted in preference to the complicated system of dual-endings.

In regard to the plural the chief interest is to be found in the words which show more or less difference of meaning between singular and plural. The reason usually lies in the nature of the object. It may be one which does not admit of a true plurality: as *aes* 'brass' (*aera* 'pieces of brass'), *κλέος* 'fame' (*κλέεα* 'deeds of fame'). Or it is composed of parts which may be treated as a plurality: hence *στήθος* or *στήθεα* 'the breast,' *τόξον* or *τόξα* 'a bow.' The difficulty is further illustrated by a class of nouns treated by Delbrück under the head of *gender*, viz. those which are masculine in the singular and neuter in the plural. This class, which appears to go back to the Indo-germanic period, may be exemplified by Greek *μηρός* *μήρα*, *κλεινός* *κλεινθα*, *τάραρος* *τάραρα*, Latin *locus* *loca*, *jocus* *joca*, &c. In these cases it is evident that the plural is a kind of collective noun, denoting a whole set or mass of things, not a true plurality: e.g. *loca* does not mean places (*loci*), but 'a region.' This is a shade of meaning by no means unknown with masculine and feminine plurals (cp. the Latin *finēs*, *sales*, *nugae*, *tenebrae*, *divitiae*), but it is especially noticeable in the neuter. It is needless to refer to the use which Joh. Schmidt has made of these facts.

Under the head of the 'elliptic plural' Delbrück notices the use of *γνάφुरās* = 'the father-in-law and those who belong to him.' The use, he observes, is a rare one. We may compare the Homeric *νῶς ἀνδρῶν αἰχμητᾶων* (*Il.* iii. 49), also Virgil's *hospitibus quondam socerisque vocatis* (*Aen.* xi. 105),

applied to the Latin nation in their relation to Aeneas.

The chapters dealing with the cases are introduced by a short statement of the doctrine of the Indian grammarians, with a comparison of their views with modern theory. The rest of the chapter treats of the process of development or rather decay which is called 'syncretism'—the amalgamation of two or more cases by the use of a common form. This is the process by which in Greek the ablative has been absorbed into the genitive, and the locative and instrumental into the dative; while in Latin the locative, instrumental, and ablative have formed one case. The same thing happened at a still earlier period to the nominative and accusative of the neuter. As Delbrück points out, the nominative probably was the case of the agent, and a neuter, which denoted an object without life, could not be regarded as an agent. In a more developed grammar, when the nominative might be used for a mere grammatical subject, the accusative neuter came to be employed as a nominative. For somewhat similar reasons in the dual and plural the nominative was used for the vocative.

The further steps by which in modern Greek the dative has been absorbed in the genitive had begun to be taken in the ancient Iranian language. In the pronominal declension the two cases agreed in some of their forms from a very early period. Delbrück [p. 482] would recognize traces of this in the Homeric use of *οἱ*, as in *Il.* xvi. 531 ὅττι οἱ ὦκ' ἤκουσε μέγας θεὸς εὐχαίμενιο. But the *dativus commodi* in Homer is surely elastic enough to cover such uses. In general it may be remarked that syncretism is confined in Greek and Latin to the three cases which have a distinctly local meaning, the locative, ablative, and instrumental. The reason of this is happily explained by Delbrück. These are the cases whose meaning can be at once expressed by simple prepositions—*in*, *from*, *with*: and whenever these prepositions are employed, the case-ending becomes superfluous, and is soon neglected. In the Aryan languages, in which the locative survives in full vigour, there is no preposition with the meaning 'in.' In Greek, on the other hand, the process of supplanting the case has gone so far that even in Homer the use of it is no longer free, but is confined to certain groups of words.

The treatment of the dative offers a good example of the changes of view which may be observed in the recent history of com-

parative grammar. Delbrück reminds us (p. 185) that a quarter of a century ago (*K. Z.* xviii. 100 ff.) he explained the fundamental meaning of the dative to be the quasi-local one of a leaning in the direction of an object, and traced this meaning back to the original formation of the case. He now confesses to a decided distrust of all 'glottogonic' hypotheses, and also to a freedom from prejudice in favour of local explanations of the cases. Looking simply at the facts, he regards the dative as probably the case of that for which something is done (*dem der Verbalbegriff gilt*). In this way he explains the circumstance that the dative is mainly used of *persons*, which would hardly be if it were the case of the *end* of action. It follows that in such a construction as *πεδίῳ πέσε* 'fell on the ground' he does not find a true dative, but a locative, as in the Latin *adveniēns domi*, or *procumbit humi*. He admits indeed that *caelo* in the phrase *it caelo clamor* is a dative of the end of motion, but regards it as modelled on uses like *mittere leto*. A nearer approach to the final dative is seen in some Attic inscriptions in which we find phrases such as *ξύλα καὶ ἀνθρακες τῷ μολύβδῳ* 'wood and charcoal for the lead,' i.e. for smelting it.

In dealing with the genitive it will be found that Delbrück is inclined to a view which is equally removed from the prevailing tendencies of the last few years and from the earlier local theory. The suggestion that the genitive ending did not originally express any such notion as that of the prepositions 'of' or 'from' appears to have been first made by Höfer (*Lautehre*, p. 92), who proposed to connect the ending *-osyo* with that of adjectives like *δημόσιος*, and thus to prove the genitive to be a sort of undeclined adjective. A similar view was put forward in a more subtle and plausible form by Curtius in his *Chronologie* (p. 69). According to him, the genitive ending being a pronoun, the whole word was a kind of compound, so that (e.g.) *ὄπ-ός* was literally *voice-that*, or 'that of the voice.' And even now that this hypothesis would generally, and doubtless rightly, be regarded as too 'glottogonic,' the view of the genitive as an 'adnominal' case, i.e. as expressing the dependence of a noun upon another noun, not (as with the other cases) upon a verb, may be said to be the generally accepted one. Delbrück now rejects this view. In the chapter which treats of the fundamental notions of the cases he points out (p. 186) that there is also an adnominal dative, which is generally regarded as having been de-

veloped from the 'adverbial' use. How then, he asks, if the adnominal genitive arose from a similar, only much earlier, change?

What was the fundamental notion of the 'adverbial' genitive? Delbrück accepts the definition given by C. Gaedicke (*Der Akkusativ im Veda*), according to which the substantive is put in the genitive when the notion given in the verb does not extend to or affect the whole of it. This account of the matter was originally put forward by Grimm, and was adopted by Delbrück in his earlier volume on Greek syntax. What is new in his present treatment is the disposition to regard this partial affecting of the substantive by the verb as the oldest meaning of the genitive, from which the ordinary possessive and other adnominal uses are derived. The question is not one which can be discussed here, especially as Delbrück himself does not put his arguments into a controversial form. Apparently he is influenced chiefly by the general analogy of the case-system, which would make it unlikely that any one case was formed in a wholly different way from the rest. He insists also with much force on the probability that the original conception of a case was not a vague and general notion, such as 'belonging to,' but a comparatively definite one—in this instance the partitive use—from which others were obtained by continued imitation and slight changes of usage (p. 333). In his treatment of particular uses we may notice the account of the genitive with verbs of *emotion* (χόωμαι, κοτώ, ἄχνυμαι, φθονέω, &c.), which he regards as probably ablative. The reason is that Sanscrit verbs of *fearing* take an ablative. It seems difficult however to separate verbs expressing emotion from those of *thinking, caring, &c.*, such as μέδομαι, ἀλέγω, κήδομαι (p. 313). Classical scholars will be interested by the Slavonic use of the genitive singular instead of the accusative when the object is a living being (p. 319). Delbrück's explanation of these as partitive genitives gives real support to his theory of the partitive sense as the original nucleus of the case.

In the numerous points which arise with regard to the other cases the reader will be chiefly struck by the care with which every possibility is duly considered and admitted. There is no trace of the feeling that some one solution of a difficulty must be chosen for the sake of a *finis litium*. Examples of this suspense of judgment will be found in the account of the Greek dative with verbs

of *ruling*, which may be a true dative, an instrumental, or a locative (p. 286), and with verbs of *trusting*, which is probably an instrumental, but may be a locative or (when the object is a person) a true dative. In phrases like μάχη (ἀγορῇ, &c.) νικᾶν it is duly noted that the dative may be locative or instrumental. Regarding the idiom in phrases of the type αὐτοῖσιν ὄχεσθαι 'chariot and all' there is a characteristic passage. Delbrück had noticed the difficulty of seeing why in this idiom the combination with αὐτός should have preserved the original instrumental or 'comitative' use. Various scholars expressed the opinion that αὐτός originally went with the governing word, and was drawn to the subordinate word by a kind of attraction (αὐτὸς τοῖς ὄχεσσι = the man with his chariot). But this, as Delbrück drily observes, is only a confession, clothed in historical form, that we are surprised to find αὐτός going with the subordinate notion when it ought to go with the principal subject of the sentence. The considerations put forward by the present reviewer (*Homeric Grammar*, § 144 note) are also insufficient, as Delbrück says, to explain the supposed attraction. But is there any such attraction? The point of αὐτός in the phrase (ἵπποι) αὐτοῖσιν ὄχεσθαι is that the horses were not separated from their chariot—that the chariot was there *as before*. So when a man returns αὐτὰ κέλευθα he goes his way *as before*. If this is the force of αὐτός, it belongs properly to the accompanying object.

Regarding the cases in -φι(ν) Delbrück has now satisfied himself that this form belongs properly and originally to the plural. The use of πασσαλόφι, ἐσχαρόφι, ζυγόφι, κεφαλῆφι, and a few others as instrumental singular is connected with the *archaic* character which the ending undoubtedly had in the time of Homer. We have also to reckon with the chance that some of these forms do not belong to the original text: it is probable (e.g.) that αὐτόφι has sometimes crept in in place of αὐτόθι.

In the chapters on the adjectives and pronouns it is peculiarly difficult to pick out topics for notice in a short review. On the interesting subject of the reflexive pronoun Delbrück is very reserved. He holds the balance impartially between the critical scholars who looked upon isolated forms as blunders to be corrected, and the comparative grammarians who treasure them as survivals. Perhaps some progress may be made by keeping apart the two questions: (1) what evidence is there in the Homeric

text of a wider use of the reflexive stem $\sigma\phi\omicron\text{-}\iota$ and (2) is the use for the first and second persons due to an original wide reflexive sense, or to extension of a narrower use? The possibility of such an extension is obvious enough: cp. the modern Greek $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\tau\acute{\upsilon}\pi\eta\sigma\alpha\ \tau\acute{\omicron}\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\alpha\nu\tau\acute{\omicron}\nu\ \mu\omicron\nu$ 'I struck myself.' And surely the use of a pronoun as a 'general reflexive' is less likely to be primitive than the narrower and more definite use for the third person.

The chapter on the adverbs is a kind of appendix to the discussion of the cases. Delbrück excludes words which have no recognizable suffix (e.g. $\chi\theta\acute{\epsilon}\varsigma$, *cras*), or have a suffix which belongs properly to the pronouns or numerals ($-\theta\epsilon\nu$, $-\theta\iota$, $-tus$, &c.). Consequently the essence of an adverb is that it is a case-form of a noun which has come to be used in a special isolated way—which is, so to speak, petrified (*erstarrt*). The process of *Erstarrung*—a word for which we have no good translation—is finely analysed, and the chief instances are enumerated. Much of this is now familiar, but a few points may be noted. Delbrück still explains the adverbs in $-\omega\varsigma$ as ablatives, notwithstanding the phonetic difficulties pointed out by Brugmann. The exact correspondence in use between Sanscrit $y\acute{a}d$, $t\acute{a}d$ and Greek $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$, $\tau\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ appears to him decisive. Thus he takes $\omicron\upsilon\tau\omega\varsigma$ as an ablative, $\omicron\upsilon\tau\omega$ as an instrumental. The meaning in both instances has been generalized so as practically to coincide (p. 559, 580). On the other hand the Doric forms such as $\acute{\epsilon}$ 'whence' are ablatival, answering in form (not in meaning) to the Attic $\omicron\iota$, the meaning 'where' being expressed in Doric by the forms $\acute{\epsilon}\iota$, $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\iota$, &c. The forms in $-\eta$ or $-\eta$ present a peculiar difficulty. Originally (as in the Cretan dialect of Gortyn) there were adverbs in $-\eta$ meaning 'where' or 'whither,' and adverbs in $-\alpha$ meaning 'how,' 'in what way.' With the Ionic change of α to η , and the tendency to omit ι subscriptum in MSS., it is no longer possible to distinguish these groups. In favour of the forms $\lambda\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta\eta$ and $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\eta$ Delbrück has taken from Joh. Schmidt an argument which unfortunately is not conclusive. It had been pointed out by Hartel (*Hom. Studien* ii. 5) that in the first four books of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* final $-\eta$ is shortened before a vowel forty-one times, and $-\eta$ only nineteen times. Joh. Schmidt

observed that the final vowel of $\lambda\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta\eta$ and $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\eta$ is frequently shortened in this way, and inferred that in Homer it ought to be written without ι subscriptum. He omitted to notice another table given by Hartel on the same page to show the relative frequency of different final vowels and diphthongs. From this table it appears that $-\eta$ is three times as frequent as $-\eta$. Consequently the shortening of $-\eta$ is relatively commoner than the shortening of $-\eta$, and the argument for $\lambda\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta\eta$, $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\eta$ falls to the ground.

The last part of the volume (pp. 643–774) is devoted to the prepositions. The space will not seem excessive when we consider the peculiar value which they have for the purpose of comparative grammar. In no other class of words have we such opportunities of observing original agreement in contrast to later growth and consequent divergence of usage. Delbrück arranges his matter from the points of view given by the distinctions (1) between 'pro-ethnical' and 'ethnical' grammar, and (2) between the use with the verb and the use with a governed noun. These uses he distinguishes by the words *Praeverbium* and *Praeposition*. It may be objected perhaps that terms of this kind would be more properly applied to two distinct classes of words than to two different uses of the same class. In his *Altindische Syntax* he assumed that every preposition was originally an adverb, and as such had a meaning which was 'free,' i.e. did not depend upon the verb of the sentence. For instance, $\acute{\alpha}\tau\iota$ meant 'beyond measure,' $\acute{\alpha}\delta\eta\iota$ meant 'besides,' &c. He has now retracted or at least modified this view, and holds that the free adverbial use is in all cases a later development from the use as a *Praeverbium*. Thus the use of $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\iota$ in the adverbial sense of 'exceedingly' is not original, but is due to the fact that with certain verbs ($\acute{\epsilon}\iota\mu\iota$, $\gamma\acute{\iota}\gamma\iota\nu\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$, &c.) $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\iota$ formed combinations meaning 'to be in excess,' 'to be superior.' The observation is an acute and important one; but it is hard to see how we can define a *Praeverbium* (not yet attached to a verb) so as to distinguish it logically from an adverb. The main point is to understand the profound gulf which historically separates the Indo-germanic prepositions from the case-forms out of which the adverbs were developed.

D. B. MONRO.