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***Henri Bergson: A Study in Radical Evolution.* Emil Carl Wilm, Ph.D., LL.D. Sturgis & Walton Co., New York. 1914. Pp. xviii, 193.**

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Harvard Theological Review / Volume 9 / Issue 04 / October 1916, pp 466 - 467
DOI: 10.1017/S0017816000004983, Published online: 03 November 2011

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How to cite this article:

R. F. Alfred Hoernlé (1916). Harvard Theological Review, 9, pp 466-467
doi:10.1017/S0017816000004983

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tendencies so cosmopolitan in its scope and so scrupulously fair in its representation of conflicting views.

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HENRI BERGSON: A STUDY IN RADICAL EVOLUTION. EMIL CARL WILM, Ph.D., LL.D. Sturgis & Walton Co., New York. 1914. Pp. xviii, 193.

Of its kind this is an excellent little book. Professor Wilm has successfully achieved, I should say, the task which he has set himself, viz., to give "a brief and comparatively non-technical statement of Bergson's philosophy which shall be intelligible to the general reader who wishes to know something of this much-talked-of philosopher" (Preface, p. xi). It is always hard for a professor to write, and for another professor to judge, a book intended for a non-professorial audience; but among popular expositions of Bergson I should rank this book by the side of Dr. Wildon Carr's well-known little volume. Where Dr. Carr, however, writes with the enthusiastic zeal of a prophet, Professor Wilm writes with a calm detachment which makes for perspective and critical balance. He has a deft touch in exposition, and the happy knack of apposite quotation both from philosophy and poetry. Nothing could be more felicitous than the illustration of Bergson's intuition from Browning's *Paracelsus* (p. 80).

The book consists of an introductory section, followed by twelve expository and four critical sections. The expository sections deal with such topics as Change and Duration, Bergson's criticism of the Intellect at work in the conceptual analyses of Psychology and Physics, Intuition as the true method of Metaphysics, Evolution and Creation, Mechanism and Design, Freedom. That hardly any use should have been made of Bergson's most technical work, *Matière et Mémoire*, is due, no doubt, to the non-technical aim of the book. Otherwise the exposition is, within its self-imposed limits, accurate. There is only one point on which I am tempted to dissent strongly from Professor Wilm's interpretation. It appears to me that he altogether overshoots the mark when, in discussing Bergson's account of intuition as intellectual sympathy, as a viewing of the object "from within" instead of "from without," he suggests that Bergson's position is "distinctly reminiscent" of that of Leibniz's *Monadology* (p. 72). The pluralism of discrete, self-contained monads is as foreign, I should say, to the monism of Bergson's *élan vital*, as the suggestion that Bergson's intuition reflects the inner life of objects in the same way in which each Leibnizian monad

reflects the entire world because it is the world in miniature. There are no doubt ambiguous passages in Bergson which *prima facie* justify Professor Wilm's statement that "intuition appears to involve an ascription to nature of a psychical life similar to our own" (p. 71). But when one follows the main drift of Bergson's thought, it is clearly seen to be always focussed on the difference between the "outside" view of the intellect, which decomposes the continuous and ever-changing flux of creative life into a rigid pattern of static concepts, and the "inside" view of intuition, which experiences (and lives) life directly as it really is. The problem is everywhere to intuit the *élan vital*. The distinction of self and object-other-than-self is here strictly irrelevant. When it is said that intuition is most easily practised on "one's own" inner life, the meaning is, I take it, that the inadequacy of concepts is most easily realized in Psychology. But once it has been seen there, one's eyes are opened to it everywhere. There is now no question of reflecting within the inner life of one's own self the inner life of some object other than one's self, for such a statement still retains the fatal distinctions proper to the intellect. Emancipated from the intellect, experience coincides again with the cosmic *élan vital* itself, for which, as such, there is no self and no not-self, no inner and no outer.

Professor Wilm, by the way, is quite right in holding that James misinterpreted Bergson in claiming him as a fellow-apostle of "sensation, that flesh-bound thing which rationalism has always loaded with abuse." The most interesting point in the critical sections is, to my mind, the enquiry how far Bergson's philosophy might supply the framework for "a truly modern theology." I do not myself discover in Bergson's view of evolution any provision for creative novelties which can fairly be said to be "ideally demanded" (p. 143). Indeed, the absence of any "ideal demands" is for me precisely the chief defect of Bergson's conception of creation. But Professor Wilm's discussion of Death and Immortality in section xvii seems to me sane and frank.

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