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THE MOTIVE OF INDIVIDUALISM IN RELIGION

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BLOOMINGTON, INDIANA

"We read in the Book of Genesis that, after our first ancestors had eaten of the tree of knowledge, the Lord God said, 'Behold, this man has become *as one of us*, to know good and evil.' . . . Before this first 'enlightenment,' the Lord God was alone to be considered, and the man could be regarded as a mere instrument for his satisfaction. But this was now forever out of the question. He might be managed by hope of Heaven or fear of Hell; he might even be destroyed; but as long as he retained the power to know, he constituted by that very fact an end in himself, an 'other' even for the Lord God, and he could be moved, or morally obliged, only by an appeal to his personal interests."

"No individual can, therefore, with a clear consciousness of what he is choosing, consent to be eternally damned—either for the glory of God, as the older gospel put it, or for the glory of society, as it stands in the gospel of today. If the glory of God is not also my glory and the salvation of society is not also my salvation, then God and society are necessarily strangers to me, and their good can be for me neither a moral obligation nor a psychologically conceivable motive."

These passages, which I have printed elsewhere,¹ I venture to reproduce on the ground that they state, if somewhat baldly, not indeed all that is important for an individualistic philosophy, but what is most distinctive and necessary. And thus they enable us to see the full dimensions of the question which I shall endeavor to answer, namely, whether the spirit of a free man is compatible with that reverence for the universe and desire for unity with the universe, conceived always as a personal universe—or, more concretely, with that worship

¹ Individualism, New York, 1911, pp. 90 and 27.

and love of God—which I shall assume to be implied in any genuine religion. I need hardly say that the usual answer to the question would be negative. Those who stand firmly enough for the right of self-assertion in the presence of our fellows would be likely either to deny the authority of religion or at any rate to hold that self-assertion has properly no place there. And traditional Christianity, while teaching the doctrine of a personal relation to a personal God and, in the doctrine of personal immortality, affirming, almost distinctively, the worth of the individual soul, treats this worth, hardly as a right, but as a gift, and holds that though a man may stand upright in the presence of his fellows, in the presence of God his attitude must be one of self-abnegation and self-effacement—of submission. On the other hand, in Mr. Bertrand Russell's essay, *A Free Man's Worship*,² in which I should say that the *motif* of the "free man" is rendered for the most part admirably, it seems to be implied that a free man's religion is necessarily a religion of self-sufficiency. This states my question: Does the individualistic motive imply a spiritual self-sufficiency?

I

The question carries us back, to begin with, to the meaning of individualism as a social and ethical motive. And here it is clear that most of the historic formulations of individualism, especially those of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, presuppose an exclusive and self-sufficient individual. Mind your own affairs—do as you please—every man for himself—*laissez faire*—that government is best which governs least—such expressions imply, upon their face at least, that no individual is directly interested in his neighbor. The same implication is contained in the conception of an original

² Philosophical Essays, London, 1910.

"state of nature" antecedent to the formation of society, whether we think of it as a state of warfare, with Hobbes, or as a state of moral purity, with Rousseau. While a more idealistic motive may be found for most of these expressions, the element of authority that is put forward and made prominent, even as a basis for "reason," is that of natural instinct. By nature the human individual is impatient of restraint; he is exclusive and self-sufficient; and, therefore, his good as well as his freedom consists in being "let alone." In such an exclusive being there appears to be no ground either for a love of God or for a love of his fellow-man.

Or for moral obligation. It is this "isolated individual" of the older individualism that accounts for the present tendency, both in popular philosophy and in the philosophy of the schools, to claim that the sum and substance of morality is to be "social." In this view "individualism" becomes a synonym for vice, the idea being that the essence of all immorality lies in the taint of self-regard. Yet for moral support this social conception of morality appeals, not less than the older individualism, to the authority of instinct; and even more distinctly in so far as it seeks the help of the biological doctrine of natural selection to prove, as Professor Dewey puts it, that all our instincts are directed outward—upon objects. Socially speaking, this means that in the order of nature our instincts are created for the welfare and preservation, not of ourselves, but of our kind. And from this is drawn the ethical inference that virtue consists in self-forgetfulness and self-sacrifice for the common good.

Such is the current antithesis between individualism and the social conception of morality. In my opinion both conceptions rest upon an incoherent, if not indeed a crudely materialistic notion of the relations of individuals in society. In both I should say that attention is

concentrated upon the irrelevant idea of a spatial group to the entire exclusion of the condition necessary to constitute a society, namely, the consciousness of individuals of one another. When we speak of the "isolated individual" (with the implication that individuality consists in isolation), and conceive that individual freedom consists in being let alone, we are thinking of society as a group or aggregate of mere bodies, of which each must be separated from the others by an interval of empty space if it is to be marked off, not indeed as an individual but as a unit; for no individual can be regarded as "isolated" who knows his fellows and is known by them. And when we conceive that social unity necessarily implies self-sacrifice, what we have in mind is not the unity of personal sympathy, but the kind of unity that is attempted when, for example, two bodies seek to occupy the same space or swallow the same food. If we remember that the essentially social relation consists not in spatial aggregation but in spiritual communication, we shall see that there is no necessary connection between social unity and self-sacrifice. The "rule of the road" should be enough to suggest that one of the first fruits of communication is freedom for each to go his own way.

Nor is there any implication of self-sacrifice in the fact that human beings are by nature social. When Aristotle says that man is a "political animal," he means simply that man above all other animals is so constructed as to find his good in the society of his fellows. And this is shown most conspicuously when men come together, not for purposes of commerce or protection, but for recreations and games. Here the "social" motive is pure and undefiled. Yet no one enters a game for the purpose of losing to his fellows; on the other hand, no one cares to play a game with any but his friends. And in calling man a distinctively "political" animal, what

Aristotle has prominently in mind is our possession of organs of speech—as well as of hearing. In other words, man above all other animals is fitted for *conscious communication* with his fellows. And this brings us again to the point that the significance either of the individual or of society is a question, not of units nor of groups, but of consciousness.

This I take to be the logical motive of individualism; this is the ground upon which I stand for the supreme worth of the individual. The right of the individual to assert himself rests, not upon natural instinct, not upon his bodily separateness from others, but solely upon the fact (and it is valid only so far as this is the fact) that he is a conscious agent, who not only acts but knows what he is doing, not only moves but knows whither he is moving, and is thus so far enabled to choose his own ends and to direct his own way. In a word, the logical basis of individualism is not “nature,” but self-consciousness. No authority resides in natural instinct. A heedless good nature is as valueless morally as a blind selfishness, and not more lovely. The moral question is not a question merely of how we are constructed; it is not a question of fact, but of value. But value is constituted by consciousness. To know is to evaluate; to be known is to be of value. A watch is of value only to one who knows what it is. If the watch knew itself it would have a value for self and the right to assert itself. Now man (so far as we know) is distinguished from all other animal species by the fact he alone is self-conscious to any considerable degree. Those who seek ethical illumination in the conception of man as a biological species seem to forget that man is the only species that can be said to have a history, a culture, a science, a society. In a word, man is the only animal who knows that he is an animal. Upon this ground, and upon this alone, rests the right, or the possibility, of regarding the wel-

fare of our race as an end. But this race self-consciousness is but the counterpart of an even more distinct individual self-consciousness which compels each of us to regard himself as an end.

To see that this logical motive stands for a genuinely ethical fact, we have only to turn our attention to the institution of marriage. From a biological standpoint the sex-instinct, with its peculiar intensity and pervasiveness, is simply an admirable arrangement of nature for the perpetuation of the species. The current "social" theory of ethics rests for the most part upon biological grounds; and these also are the grounds which underlie the programs of eugenics and the denunciations of "race-suicide." The assumption is that nature, like the stock-breeder, "so careful of the type she seems, so careless of the single life," cares nothing for the personal relation. And in animal marriage, in which personal choice may be supposed to play a rather small part and passing gratification the greater part, it must be admitted that the personal relation seems unimportant. Here indeed marriage may well be regarded as a means for the ends of others. But to any man or woman about to marry, the preservation of the race is a matter of last importance, and even the raising of a family is only secondary. For them marriage is first of all the realization of the demands of their personal lives. If this be dismissed as mere "self-absorption," then we may point out that the sacredness attached to this personal relation is widely regarded as a fair measure for estimating the status of any form of morality or religion. Not that other ends are excluded. On the contrary, I should say that there must be few persons for whom parenthood is not an important part of self-realization. The point is that the moment I become conscious of an instinct working within me, a new end has appeared; in the consciousness of self a new person is created; and whatever may

have been the purpose of the instinct for others, its purpose is now mine, to be fulfilled as I shall discover to be best for me. As a self-conscious person, I am no longer a means for alien ends but an end in myself.

Individualism stands, then, not for the license of unrestraint but for the dignity of the personal life. To be a person is to be self-conscious. As compared with any of the lower animals, every normal human being must be regarded as distinctively a person; and thus, with Kant, we should say that nothing is more intolerable than the subjection of one human will to another. But even within the range of human life there is a wide variation in the degree to which a will may be said to be personal rather than purely instinctive or animal. In the logic of individualism a will is personal so far as it is self-conscious, reflective, and thoughtful. To give a definite meaning to a much abused word, individualism stands for the rights of "personality." And thus it reflects the point of view of a humane culture as opposed to that of a naturalistic science. In the vocabulary of misuse "culture" is often associated with narrowness of sympathies, while "humanity" is identified with bare animality. We excuse our fellow who yields to sensuous impulse on the ground that he is "merely human." In the vocabulary of individualism "human" and "animal" are terms of contrast. And the point of contrast lies in the fact that the human being knows himself. His action is a matter, not of force but of motive, not of causes but of reasons. This is what I mean by culture. Not that an individualist claims to hold a monopoly of thoughtfulness. The issue lies between outer fact and inner meaning. Naturalistic theories of life are based exclusively upon the outer fact as *observed* in the behavior of others. Individualism takes its stand upon the meaning as *experienced* in the consciousness of living, and holds that the meaning is always personal and

individualistic. Culture is the development of that meaning.

Such I take to be the *motif* of self-assertion, the *motif* which in the end underlies all of the forms of individualism. The rationalism of Kant, the irrationalism of Nietzsche, the crude utilitarianism of *laissez faire* and "every man for himself," are only so many attempts to state the significance of a self-conscious being as an end in himself. How one such end is to be co-ordinated with another in a social order, would be a chapter in itself. Here I shall only suggest in passing that, while the world is full of the sacrifice of ends to ends, this sacrifice is nevertheless everywhere diminished to the extent that men clearly grasp their own ends and have a sympathetic insight into the ends of their neighbors. The development of such insight constitutes the meaning of culture and civilization. And except as our personal ends are completely realized, not merely treated each as one in a quantitative apportionment, the social problem is not solved.

Here, however, we are concerned chiefly with the individualistic motive. When we fix our attention upon the implications of self-consciousness, it becomes clear, I think, that while self-consciousness implies self-assertion, there is no implication of self-sufficiency or exclusiveness. Rather must we say that the *consciousness* of self involves necessarily a consciousness of outer realities and at the same time of personal needs that call for real satisfactions. And it is only in the deeper aspirations of *self* that we are able to conceive of greatness in our fellow-men. Hence I should say that there is nothing in a philosophy of self-assertion which is incompatible with modesty and reverence. As an intelligent man I do not pretend to know more than my physician, though before following his advice I may insist upon being convinced. Nor may I refuse to

respect Hegel because I fail to understand him, though I shall decline to accept as my own what I do not understand. These are feeble illustrations, but they may serve to suggest that an infinite reverence for wisdom and goodness is not incompatible with a sense of our own responsibility and worth.

Nor is self-assertion incompatible with a generous sympathy for our fellows. On the contrary, I should say that the need for sympathetic intercourse with our fellows is one of the foundation-stones of an individualistic philosophy. No one can satisfy himself, materially or spiritually, in an empty world. In an empty world no one can assert himself. It lies in the very nature of the individualistic motive that the "others" that we seek are personal. And, on the other hand, only an intensively self-conscious person can love with sincerity and conviction. Individualism rejects a self-effacing love and demands that love be reciprocal. But for an individualistic philosophy the very essence and quintessence of "life" is to be found in the responsive communication of mind with mind. In this lies the real significance and worth, the genuinely "social" value, of all co-operative activity.

Just for this reason, however, will an individualist refuse to commit himself to all the interests that are recommended to him as "social." And in this point lies the practical significance of individualism as against the current "social" conception of morality. It seems to me that much of what is called "social" at the present time is merely expansive. Individualism is intensive, and holds that, in any genuine sense, the relations of men are social only so far as they know one another, and therefore that a relation ceases to be social so far as it ceases to be personal. *Nil humani a me alienum*—this I may say truthfully and even longingly. But everything is alien to me which lies outside of my imagination.

I cannot be said truly to love a brother who is only a social unit; and to bestow a dispersive affection upon "humanity," filling my life with ends to which individually I can give but scant personal attention, is to dissipate the very essence of life and to make our human existence, full indeed of activity and bustle but spiritually mean. How one may best distribute one's attention is a matter of personal equation. From an individualistic standpoint, every extension of fellowship makes life only the richer. But no fellowship is genuine except so far as it is a meeting of minds.

II

I have pointed out that the development of self-consciousness is culture. In the deepest implications of self-consciousness we pass from culture to religion. From an individualistic point of view, religion is simply the further extension of that logic of self-importance which issues from the self-consciousness of the cultivated man. But here again it is all-important to remember that self-consciousness is not, and cannot be, self-absorption. To be self-conscious is only to be intensively thoughtful and reflective. Strictly speaking, I should hold, all consciousness is in its measure both a process of reflection and a consciousness of self. But we properly emphasize the *self*-consciousness of the deeper and more deliberate acts of reflection because here, in the more vivid sense of the presence of *realities*, we become more vividly aware of ourselves as contemplating these realities. There is a common tendency, however, to assume that a reflective attitude involves an absence of contact with reality. This was never more clearly exhibited than in the "social" emphasis of our time, which in countless ways expresses the idea that culture is the antithesis of life. I cannot but believe that this is

a superficial inference from the fact that a thinking man is committed to a certain degree of *physical* solitariness and is apt to be much occupied with books. Only a moment's reflection is needed to see that a man who reads books is in contact with men, and with a wider circle of men than he who does not read. And except in an irrelevant physical sense, no man can be said to be in contact with the men of his own time and place except as he knows them; nor does he know them deeply, except as (after the fashion of serious literary criticism) he knows them self-consciously. Now just as, upon the ordinary plane, our consciousness of our fellows is the counterpart of our consciousness of self, so, I should say, is the consciousness of the larger realities of philosophy and religion the fruit of those moments in which the consciousness of self is keenest and most vivid—when, for example, I pause to face the inevitable fact that I shall die, and that to future generations all that you and I find worth while will seem as ghostly and unreal as to us the life of the Dark Ages. No man, says William James, can steadily contemplate the fact of his own death. Indirectly, this may serve to remind us how rarely we really face the eternal realities, and at the same time how rarely our consciousness comes really “home.”

All religion is thus the outcome of a deeper self-consciousness; it is this deeper self-consciousness which brings us face to face with the eternal realities. I have pointed out that man alone among the animals may be said to have a history or a culture. It is an anciently accepted belief that he alone is capable of having a religion—because, we may now say, he alone is a self-conscious person. Animal life, so far as we can see, has a very limited range either of memory or of anticipation. We have only to think of this to see how remote from the stage of animal life must be, not only

the sense of personality, but any questions regarding either the significance of the person or the significance of the world. The significance of the world is a question only for one who can raise the question of his ultimate personal fate; and for him the world can have no meaning which does not include a full meaning for himself. In other words, not only are the belief in God and the belief in personal immortality generally found together as a matter of historical fact; they belong together in the logic of our self-consciousness. For, in the last analysis, religious belief is simply the largest implication to be drawn from ourselves as conscious beings. A religion of individualism rests upon the ground that consciousness is throughout personal.³

Hence I should say that an individualist would be bound to reject as unbelievable any form of religious belief which failed to provide an eternal, and an eternally distinct, meaning for his personal self. And thus he would reject the religion of absolute idealism of Professor Bosanquet's Gifford Lectures, in which "all that matters is the whole," and the whole is likewise the only genuine person or individual. This doctrine he would condemn as in contradiction to the meaning of that experience of personality from which absolute idealism is derived. Thus also he would reject those oriental religions which, upon grounds emotional or intellectual, place our highest good in the extinction of the self, or (with Mr. Bradley) conceive that the personal self is to be realized in a higher and superpersonal reality. In an individualistic philosophy there may be many degrees of the personal, but nothing higher than the personal; and whatever conception we may form of the

³ Scientific psychology to the contrary. In speaking, however, of "impersonal mental states," I should say that we are thinking, not of any fact of consciousness, but of some one of the several objects used by psychologists to "represent" consciousness, such as an image (in a mirror), a photograph, a book, or a piece of writing—something which can convey an idea or represent an object to a thinking person, but which itself knows nothing.

universe as a personal reality, monistic or pluralistic, whether God be one person or many, or many and also one, *this* person who has now emerged in self-consciousness, is, with all his ignorance and shortcomings, a person once for all, and any reality in which his distinctness is obscured will be, not higher, but lower. Finally, I should say that an individualist would be bound to reject any interpretation of Christianity in which the significance of the individual were conceived, not as a right, eternally won by the creative power of his self-consciousness, but as a matter of grace; any interpretation in which the individual is conceived to save his life by losing it—to gain eternal life by extinguishing his individuality; or any in which the individual is conceived as a means for the glory of God. After our first ancestors had eaten of the tree of knowledge, the Lord God said, "Behold this man has become as one of us, to know good and evil." *As one of us*—this seems to me to embody in a most striking way the logic of the situation. A being who knows can no longer be regarded as a means for the ends of any others. As a knowing being he holds an eternal place, as one of us, in the kingdom of ends.

Equally, on the other hand, would an individualist be bound to reject a religion of mere emotion, a religion of desirable experience, such as that commonly offered by the psychology of religion; or a pragmatic religion, as proposed by William James, which is content to accept God as a satisfying conception. In the logic of self-consciousness no experience is significant except as it is revealing, and no desire is satisfied except by an "other." In this sense an individualist is an "intellectualist," and holds that all that gives dignity to experience, and marks it off from digestion, is the illumination of idea. Immersion in mere "experience," even religious experience, is but one form of intoxication among others. Nor is "morality touched by emotion" better than, but only

rather worse than morality untouched by emotion—except as “emotion” stands for a cognitive contact, however vague, with a larger reality. “Intellectualism,” as I conceive it, does not compel us to deny that “emotion” may be cognitive. Intellectualism is merely a conscientious attempt to give to all of our experience a coherent meaning and a logical justification—to bring it to the test of truth. This is not to make light of religious experience, but only to insist that religious experience is meaningless except as it is a revelation of the divine.

And upon similar grounds an individualist would refuse to be satisfied with a religion which is merely sociological—a religion of humanity. In the church in recent years it seems that the trend of things has been in the direction of putting society in the place of God, of substituting social betterment for personal religion, and business management for other-worldliness. Precisely the same trend is indicated in the tendency of our colleges to substitute utilitarian and vocational ends for intellectual discipline and liberal culture. Both tendencies are the outcome of a view of life controlled by the point of view of naturalistic, positive science. And it is hard to escape the conviction that, in the church and the college no less than in the laboratory of research, this emphasis upon the social and practical covers a large measure of scepticism with regard to the more spiritual realities of culture and religion.

Individualism expresses the point of view of an intensive self-consciousness. Such a standpoint is not hostile to a generous humanitarianism, but it stands first for the spiritual significance of humanity, for human welfare as a spiritual rather than a barely economic fact, and for “life” as the activity of a self-conscious agent rather than a merely “vital process.” Traditionally, the church has expressed this point of view in assuming that its

special function was to focus the attention of its members not so much upon "life" as upon death—in other words, upon their eternal rather than their merely temporal significance. And a similar point of view has been expressed by the schools in assuming that their function was to introduce the men of here and now to the best thought of other places and other ages. I have already suggested that much that is presented as "social" might properly be called "expansive," and to a cultivated man much of it seems merely superficial. The very first attempt to find ourselves, through a process of reflection, shows us that the humanity to which we belong is far wider than the humanity of here and now, or of vaguely "future generations," upon which the attention is focussed in the so-called social standpoint. Any sympathetic insight into the meaning of the literature and philosophy of past times must lead one to feel that there is something peculiarly obtuse in the notion that the past is dead; or that a present unilluminated by the past (however determined by it) can properly be called life. In our own time we are confronted by a positivistic science which thinks that it has finally purged the world of fact from the taint of human motives. Nothing would more quickly disturb this belief than a study of its obligations to the logic and metaphysics of Aristotle; and nothing would do more towards revealing the significance of our science for life and for culture.

Passing from culture to religion, I need only point out that any stage of reflection which reaches the question of our ultimate fate as individuals must inevitably reveal to us that each of us is in the presence of a reality much greater in scope than the scope of humanity. To my mind the problem of religion is nowhere more clearly or decisively suggested than in the gulf between the two things which filled the soul of Kant with ever increasing wonder and reverence: "The starry heavens above me

and the moral law within me." In the logic of the situation these two stand at the opposite ends of the universe; and thus they enable us to grasp in our imagination the full scope of the problem known as the problem of religion and science. For the objects commonly studied by physics, chemistry, and biology, and even by geology, are all by comparison familiar and home-like, and many of them are our blood relations. It is the astronomical universe, yet not the universe as seen in the calm beauty of a star-lit night but the universe as pictured in the imagination of the astronomer, terrifying in its vastness, prostrating in its total impersonality and absence of reference to anything human—it is the contemplation of this picture that stirs the deepest questionings regarding the fate of the soul. Here we are bidden to remember that the earth, which is to us so vast, is but one of the minor planets in one of countless systems; that only very recently, geologically and astronomically speaking, has the earth supported life, and yet that the human race has existed for several hundred thousand years. But only for a few thousand years does the race seem to have been very human or to have had any clear consciousness of itself as a race; and of the millions upon millions of souls who have lived during this historic period, for each of whom doubtless, as for you and me, his own life and the fate of his own soul has seemed to be the central and important fact of the universe, the names of only a few survive. What, then, does the world know about you or me? What, indeed, is the whole realm of life but a fortuitous concourse of atoms at one point in an infinity of space and time?

And yet—"the moral law within us." For the sweeping impetus of this naturalistic point of view is suddenly checked before the fact that here alone (as we see it), in this small corner of the universe, do we find bodies that not only move but know that they move, and, in-

stead of yielding to alien "laws of nature," direct their own movements. In this fact of self-consciousness lies "the moral law within us." And before this fact the majestic vastness of the astronomical universe seems to fade into relative insignificance. For if we are to speak of *significance*, if the majesty of the universe is not merely a matter of size, then here alone, in the life of men, and most of all in the life of thoughtful men, lies the revelation of significance. This is the starting-point for all affirmations of significance; this alone reveals the "majesty" of the universe. And not only for significance, but for positive character. For it is not only the grandeur of the universe that reflects our humanity; a human point of view is equally implied in every detail of its description.

What, then, does the contrast mean? Is our self-consciousness a merely exceptional and fortuitous fact? Personally, I find it difficult to conceive what such a statement would mean. Or are we to say that our consciousness of self is a revelation, not merely of our own nature, but of the nature of the universe; in other words, that "nature," as apprehended by natural science, is but one manifestation of a universe which is essentially living and personal and takes account of us? This, I should say, is the problem for a religious belief. For individualism not less than for any other philosophy of life, the possibility of religion depends upon the answer to this question.

And therefore, with a hearty sympathy for the spirit of the "free man" expressed in Mr. Russell's essay, *A Free Man's Worship*, I am unable to see that his view of the universe furnishes any justification either for freedom or for worship. Mr. Russell, seeing in the universe nothing but pitiless force, calls upon man "to sustain alone . . . the world that his own ideals have fashioned," "proudly defiant of the irresistible

forces that tolerate, for a moment, his knowledge and his condemnation." But neither in politics nor in religion can freedom consist in walking alone. "Freedom of speech" would be only travestied by permission to print a newspaper which no one would read. The demand for freedom is a demand to be heard and to receive the response of a fellow. Even the Stoics, whose philosophy Mr. Russell's closely resembles, justified their freedom and their scorn of the (external) world on the ground that the universe is fundamentally rational. Through the rationality of the universe their freedom became effective. There is no freedom in an empty world, and no final freedom of the spirit in a world that takes no account of us. In a world of significance we may assert our significance, and each of us his own significance, without qualification; if anything is significant, I am significant. If, however, our human culture is but a passing cosmic phenomenon, then—then, indeed, the most rational attitude we can take (if any attitude be rational) is not to take ourselves seriously. We may find pleasure and profit in cultivating a kindly humanity, but to give to our social relations the dignity of religion is merely to remind ourselves that in the last analysis they are lacking in significance.

So much for the logic of the individualistic motive. I have made no attempt to present this motive in the warmer light of concrete personal experience. But I have tried to show that the motive fundamental to individualism is personal life. In religion individualism stands for the eternal and distinct significance of the personal self; but this very self-assertion expresses an infinite thirst for the kind of satisfaction that we get in living communion with personal "others." Religion expresses that infinite need of life which is inevitable to a self-conscious being. In the tumult of daily living the need may be forgotten in an eager absorption in the

present, or it may lose courage under the burden of dismaying responsibilities, when life seems an illusion and eternity unreal; but when in a quiet hour we are at home with ourselves, then I think that to each of us it seems nothing less than calamitous that there should be any part of the life of the universe which you and I, each in his own person, may not actively and self-consciously share. But life is at once knowledge and love. These two motives, which for Plato expressed the meaning of philosophy and made philosophy divine, are mutually implied in the consciousness of self; and both are contained in the motive of personality. In religion individualism seeks that infinity of personal knowledge and personal love which is expressed in the love of God.