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Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society / Volume 53 / Issue 04 / October 1921, pp 545 - 562

DOI: 10.1017/S0035869X00149299, Published online: 15 March 2011

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0035869X00149299

How to cite this article:

E. Denison Ross (1921). The Portuguese in India and Arabia between 1507 and 1517. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 53, pp 545-562 doi:10.1017/S0035869X00149299

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The Portuguese in India and Arabia between 1507 and 1517

By E. DENISON ROSS

IN the January number of this Journal there appeared a most interesting article by Mr. M. Longworth Dames on "The Portuguese and Turks in the Indian Ocean in the Sixteenth Century". The article furnishes an admirable introduction to this engrossing, if little known, subject; and it is only by way of supplement that I am writing the following notes.

The main sources of information on which we can draw are : Portuguese, Persian (Indian), Arabic, and Turkish. By far the most important are, of course, the Portuguese, and these have been fully utilized by Mr. Longworth Dames. He has also made use of such Persian histories as *Ferishta* and the *Mir'ât-i-Sikandari*, but the Arabic and Turkish histories have remained for the most part unexplored. Certain of these last throw much light on the history of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean in the sixteenth century, and I propose in this place to illustrate this claim. I wish, however, to state at the outset that the intimacy with which the early Portuguese writers disclose with the public affairs and private intrigues of the Moslems in Arabia and India is quite astonishing, and that the accounts that they give of the relations of the various Muhammedan states with one another is usually in striking accord with the narratives of Moslem historians.

In the present article it is my intention to deal only with the period of history covered by the years A.D. 1507-17, reserving for a future occasion the period of Indo-Portuguese History which terminated in the unsuccessful expedition of Sulayman Pasha against the Portuguese in Gujarat in 1538.

The ten years 1507-17 saw many happenings of historical importance in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, including

the partial conquest of the Yaman by the Circassian Mamluks, and the conquest of Egypt by the Ottoman Turks.

In the course of my researches on this period I have consulted upwards of twenty Arabic and Turkish works, chiefly in manuscript. I do not propose in this place to enumerate all these authorities, but will confine myself to the mention of those which appear to me the most important. I may mention that the two best Turkish Histories, namely, those of Munajjim Báshi and Colonel Aḥmad Ráshid, both of which have been printed, contain nothing that is not to be found in the local Arabic Histories of the period.

The most important writer on the History of the Yaman down to A.D. 1517 is undoubtedly Wajih ad-Dayba', who as an inhabitant of Zabíd had ample opportunity of obtaining first-hand information. He is the author of no less than five works dealing with the history of the Yaman, one of which is in verse. The best known of these is the *Bughyat ul-Mustafid fi Akhbár Zabíd*, of which an incomplete Latin translation was published by Johannsen in 1828.

Ad-Dayba' was born in A.H. 866 (A.D. 1461), and died in A.H. 944 (A.D. 1537), but none of his histories bring the narrative beyond A.H. 923 (A.D. 1517).

The next Arabic writer of importance is Quṭb ud-Dín al-Makki an-Nahrawáli, who wrote two important works. 1. A history of the Yaman called *al-Barq al-Yamání fi 'l-fath al-'Othmání*, of which a somewhat abridged translation was published by De Sacy in tome iv of *Notices et Extraits*. 2. A History of Mekka called *Kitáb ul-'Álam fi 'l-'Álam baytullah il-ḥíram*, which was edited and epitomized by Wüstenfeld in his *Chroniken der Stadt Mekka* (Leipzig, 1858).

Quṭb ud-Dín was born in Mekka in A.H. 920 (A.D. 1514), and died in A.H. 990 (A.D. 1582). For the first two decades of the Tenth Century he is not always reliable, and by an unfortunate chance certain statements of his which are misleading have been slavishly copied by later writers, as will be seen below.

The third writer I have to mention is 'Abdullah Muḥammed ibn 'Omar commonly known as Ḥájji ad-Dabír, who wrote an Arabic History of Gujarat called *az-Zafar al Wálih bi Muẓaffar wa álih*, of which the text is now being published in the Indian Text Series.

Ḥájji ad-Dabír was born in Mekka about A.D. 1540, came to India as a young man, and remained there most of his life, employed in secretarial duties by various leading notables of Gujarat and the Deccan. His History of Gujarat, which is brought down as far as A.H. 1014 (A.D. 1605), contains a vast amount of interesting historical matter outside his immediate subject, and incidentally he devotes a good deal of space to the affairs in the Yaman and the Red Sea during the first half of the Sixteenth Century. To his quotations from ad-Dayba' he adds not merely his own intelligent commentaries, but also the personal narratives of eye-witnesses. It is noteworthy that he makes no allusion to Qutb ud-Dín's Histories, though it is hard to believe that they were unknown to him.

With so much by way of introduction I will proceed with my notes on Mr. Longworth Dames' paper.

p. 8. *The battle of Chaul*.—I think this battle undoubtedly took place in January, 1508, ad-Dayba' tells us that Amir Husayn only reached Aden on his way to India in Rab'í ii, 913 (i.e. August, 1507). Castanheda, alluded to in the foot-note, is therefore correct.

p. 9. *Silence of the Gujarat Historians regarding the Victory of the Portuguese off Diu in 1509*.—There is only one Moslem historian who alludes to this victory, namely, Zayn ud-Dín, the author of the well-known *Tuhfat ul Mujáhidín*.

The silence of the Mir'at-i-Sikandari is very remarkable, and a passage in the Arabic History of Gujarat led me for a time to conclude that at any rate the Egyptian fleet under Amír Husayn did not take part in the battle: for Ḥájji ad-Dabír implies that after the combined victory of the Gujarati and Egyptian fleets off Chaul, Mahmúd, king of Gujarat, invited Amír Husayn to remain in his service, but

that Amír Ḥusayn excused himself and withdrew with his fleet to Hormuz. In view, however, of the very circumstantial and detailed account given by Goes¹ and others of Amír Ḥusayn's escape from the battle off Diu in 1509, I am inclined to think that Ḥájji ad-Dabír is guilty of *suppressio veri*.

As further evidence of the presence of Amír Ḥusayn and the Egyptian fleet at the battle, we are told that the banners of the Soldan (i.e. Qánṣawh al-Ghawri) and of Amír Ḥusayn were taken to Portugal and hung up in the Temple of Tomar, head of the illustrious military order of Christ. We are further told that among the spoils of victory were books in a great variety of languages showing the motley crowd of nationalities of which the Sultan's army was composed. It is, of course, quite probable that the ruler of Hormuz, like many other Moslem rulers, appealed to the Mamluk Sovereign for help in 1507, and Ḥájji ad-Dabír tells us that the king of the Yaman set out from Aden to attack the Portuguese near Hormuz in March, 1507. The Portuguese actually captured Hormuz in the following year. It is possible that after the Moslem victory off Chaul in January, 1508, Amír Ḥusayn, under orders from the Sultan, Qánṣawh al-Ghawri, took his fleet to Hormuz, and thence returned to India to take an ignominious part in the battle off Diu.

Goes (part ii, ch. 39) gives full details of the Moslem fleets present at the battle of Diu, and says that Amír Ḥusayn's fleet comprised more than 100 ships. This would imply that he had a far larger fleet than at the battle of Chaul,

¹ "Amir Husayn finding himself surrounded on all sides and finding that Malik Ayaz was holding aloof, watching the battle without entering it himself, and seeing that he had put his reliance on the Fustas, which now seemed to have abandoned him, and being himself wounded and many of his men being wounded or dead, he secretly slipped away through the rudder-hole of his ship and let himself down on to a barge which he had there in readiness for such an emergency, and escaped disguised to a village where he hid, and whence he took a horse and proceeded to join the Governor of Cambay, for he feared Malik Ayaz because he could not trust him, as much as he feared our people on whose account he had shed so much blood."

where, according to most Moslem authorities, the Egyptian contingent comprised only ten vessels.

The expedition which left Suez in May, 1507, is fully described by ad-Dayba', and even more fully by Hájji ad-Dabír. It is not, however, mentioned by Qutb ud-Dín in either of his histories, and the fact that the later writers have followed Qutb ud-Dín rather than ad-Dayba' has led to considerable confusion. Ad-Dayba' tells that in response to the appeals received from the King of the Yaman and several rulers in Western India, Qánṣawh al-Ghawri, the Mamluk Sultan of Egypt, appointed Amír Husayn Governor of Jedda, and ordered him to proceed with a fleet to India. Ad-Dayba' also says that Amír Husayn was accompanied by Salmán Ra'ís, who had been sent by the Ottoman Sultan, Salím, to help the Ghawri against the Franks. This detail is interesting in connexion with circumstances that (as Mr. Longworth Dames points out on p. 11) many historians, both Portuguese and Indian, speak of the Egyptian fleet as one sent out by the Sultan of Rum, or Constantinople. Goes, on the other hand (part iv, chap. 12), says that Salmán Ra'ís was a Turk by birth, who, after many years as a Mediterranean corsair, entered the service of the Grand Turk, and afterwards fled to the Sultan of Babylonia (i.e. Cairo). Hájji ad-Dabír also tells us that Salmán Ra'ís had been famous as a corsair in the Mediterranean, but he does not say specifically that he accompanied Amír Husayn on his first Indian Expedition.

The account given by Hájji ad-Dabír of this expedition and the sea battle in 1508 off Chaul is as follows :—

In the meantime, the Mamluk sovereign, Qánṣawh al-Ghawri, had been in correspondence with these Muhammedan rulers in India, of whom the principal was Maḥmúd Sháh Begara of Gujarat, through whom co-operation was established with the famous Governor of Diu, Malik Ayáz.¹

In response to the Gujarati and other invitations, preparations for the dispatch of an Egyptian fleet were made by

¹ He is said to have been a Russian by birth.

the Mamluk king, under the orders of Amír Ḥusayn, the Governor of Jedda.

In the month of Muharram, 913, May, 1507, the *Turkish Fleet* (possibly commanded by Salmán), consisting of two large vessels (*barshas*), and three small ones (*grabs*), set sail from Jedda. They passed by Jázán, Kamarán, Matína, and Mokhá, and finally reached Aden. They also made a landing at Abyan. Wherever they went the inhabitants fled from them. A few months after Amír Ḥusayn *set out after them* with two large vessels (ad-Dayba' says three large vessels (*barshas*)), and three small ones from Jedda, and anchored at Bab-al-Mandeb. Ad-Dayba' says no one knew what was his objective. (It is to be noted that the *Mir'at-i-Sikandari* (Bayley, p. 222) says that there were *ten* Turkish ships.) And when he finally came near Aden he sent out a small boat with a messenger carrying a request to the Amír *Mirján* (Barros says "Miramizan" was an Abyssinian converted to Islam) asking permission to enter the port. This was granted, and he entered Aden without a shot being fired. *Mirján* sent two of his officers to welcome him, and Amír Ḥusayn said to them: "Tell the Amír from me that if I had not received orders from the Sultan Qánṣawh not to enter Aden I should have entered Aden and gone to meet him: tell him, however, that I ask permission to take on board drinking water, firewood, etc." The Amír not only gave him permission to do so in return for certain concessions, but bestowed innumerable favours and robes of honour on his companions. Then the Amír sent him precious gifts and set out for *Diu to fight the Franks who had appeared there*.

On pp. 37 and 38 of the Arabic History of Gujarat we read:

"And in Ramazan 913 (January, 1508) took place the great engagement with the Franks on the coast of India, and the Sultan [Maḥmúd] set out from Champanir with the intent of making Holy War, and he travelled along the coast as far as Damman, where he halted.

“Now, he had written to Malik Ayáz, the Governor of Junagar and Diu, telling him to make ready to attack the Franks by sea, and the sortie of Ayáz from Diu coincided with the arrival of Amír Husayn, the Egyptian, at the head of two galleons and three fusts, which had been sent by the Lord of Egypt, Qánsawh al-Ghawri, to the Indian Ocean and Hormuz against the Franks, for he had heard of the mischief being wrought by the Franks in those two seas. And Ayáz went out to meet him with all ceremony, and expressed his great delight at his arrival, paying him every possible mark of attention and respect as was due—nay, even more than was due. Then these two captains took their fleets in the direction of Chaul to give battle: Amír Husayn acting as vanguard. The Franks appeared upon the coast of Chaul and had collected many men, but God Most High protected the True Faith, and many of the Franks were put to the sword and a number of their ships were broken, many of them were taken prisoners, while others, boarding such ships as remained seaworthy, fled from the sword to the shore, hotly pursued by Ayáz, who killed 7,000 of them, and took prisoners even more, so that the total of those who perished reached 10,000, while the number of the martyrs among Amír Husayn’s Turkish troops was 400, and the martyrs among the troops of Ayáz amounted to 600. (May God exalt their rank!). And Ayáz wrote to the Sultan announcing the victory, which he attributed to Maḥmúd’s good fortune, and Maḥmúd gave praise to God, and set out for the port of Bassein, where he encamped on the shore. And Melik Ayáz returned to him and cast anchor in that part, and when he and Amír Husayn reached the shore the Sultan rode out to meet them with great honour to celebrate the Holy War, and led them back to his pavilion, and honoured them with every kind of favour and mark of esteem, especially Amír Husayn, whom he desired to keep with him, offering him, if he remained, the command of Mahaim, but Husayn excused himself on the plea that his Sultan had ordered him to proceed to Hormuz to

attack the Franks, but that when he had accomplished this he would reconsider the matter ; and he remained in the enjoyment of favours and gifts until he was allowed to depart with all the stores required and set out for Hormuz."

Now, Qutb ud-Dín in both his histories has a good deal to say about Amír Husayn, and it is almost impossible to reconcile his statements with those of the two Arabic historians referred to above or with the Portuguese chronicles. He says in the *Barq al-Yamání* : " 'Amir ibn 'Abdul Wahháb, King of the Yaman, called on the Sultan of Egypt for help at the same time as did Sultan Muẓaffar of Gujarat. Amír Husayn was appointed to command an expedition with Salmán Ra'ís under him. Amír Husayn was appointed Governor of Jedda, where he arrived in A.H. 917 (A.D. 1511-12). He built a strong wall round Jedda, and then (according to the same author's *History of Mekka*, in A.H. 921 (A.D. 1515)), set out for India, entered the port of Diu and had an interview with Sultan Muẓaffar, but finding the Portuguese firmly re-established in Goa, he left India without doing anything, and returned to Kamarán. Now Qutb ud-Dín appears to be alone responsible for this story, which has been copied by later Moslem writers. The Gujarat historians and the Portuguese are both alike silent ; and it is hard to believe that such an expedition had it taken place would have been ignored by either. It is equally curious that Qutb ud-Dín should be ignorant of Amír Husayn's expedition in 1507-8, and he certainly seems to regard A.H. 921 (A.D. 1515) as the date of the Amír's first journey to India. Ráshid, the Turkish historian, has indeed noted the discrepancy in the various narratives, but offers no explanation. One detail in Qutb ud-Dín's narrative is worthy of notice. He says that an appeal for help was made to Egypt by Sultan Muẓaffar of Gujarat in 1511. It was in November of that year that Muẓaffar came to the throne, and this detail being correct, one wonders whether there may not be some truth behind the story after all.

It seems at any rate certain that Amír Husayn withdrew

to Kamarán at the end of 1509 and remained either there or in Jedda (of which he was Governor until his death in 1517), until 1515, when a fresh expedition to India was organized by Qánsawh al-Ghawri, at the request of several of the kings of India, including those of Cambay (Gujarat), and Calicut (Goes, part iv, chap. 12). This is, I fancy, the occasion which Qutb ud-Dín must have had in his mind, though the fleet which left Suez in October, 1515, under the command of Amír Husayn and Salmán Ra'ís never got beyond Aden.¹

p. 10. *The Fate of Amír Husayn.* According to the Portuguese Chronicles, Amír Husayn was thrown into the sea with a stone round his neck by the orders of Salmán Ra'ís.

The manner of his death is no doubt correct, but the Arabic historians give what were no doubt the actual circumstances.

Qutb ud-Dín tells us that no sooner did the victorious Sultan Salím reach Cairo than Sayyid al-Barakát, the Sharíf of Mekka, sent his thirteen-year-old son, Abú Numayy, to wait on the Sultan and offer his congratulations. Salím was highly pleased, and confirmed Barakát in the government of the Holy Towns and the land round about. Salím also sent by Abu Numayy orders that Amír Husayn should be put to death. No doubt the Sultan had heard of the cruelty and unpopularity of the Governor of Jedda. Husayn was, therefore, sent for by the Sharíf, and told that he was to report himself to the Sultan in Cairo. Secret instructions were, however, given to the captain to drop him overboard as soon as the open sea was reached.

p. 12. *Albuquerque's Attack on Aden in 1513.*—In the year 1513 the great Albuquerque set out towards Arabia "to look for the fleet of the Rumes", and his unsuccessful attack on Aden is one of the most romantic episodes in the history of Portuguese adventure. The account contained in his own Commentaries has long been accessible to the English reader,

¹ Qutb ud-Dín, however, says that when in A.H. 926 (A.D. 1519) Husayn Beg Rúmí was made Governor of Jedda he found there "a number of fully armed ships which Husayn Kurdí had taken to India and had brought back again for Qánsawh al-Ghawri.

but not so, I believe, that of Barros, and it may be of interest to see side by side the translation of salient passages from the description given in *Decada II*, with that given by the Arabic writers.

I am led to suppose that when Amír Husayn had heard that the Portuguese were about to enter the Red Sea he withdrew from the Island of Kamarán to Jedda, which he had fortified with great strength in anticipation of Portuguese attacks; and that he only returned to Kamarán when he learnt that the Portuguese had returned to India.

ALBUQUERQUE'S ATTACK ON ADEN.

(i) *According to Barros Decada II, Liv. VII, Chaps. 9 seq.*, Albuquerque having captured the fort of Benestarim, and having placed matters on a sound footing in Goa (he had also concluded a treaty of peace with the Samori (Samudri Rájá) by which he was allowed to build a fortress at Calicut), set out for the Red Sea with a fleet of twenty sail on February 7, 1513. His orders from Dom Manuel I, which he disclosed to his captains when they had reached the open sea, were to conquer Aden and then attack the Egyptian fleet in the Red Sea.

When he first reached Aden he received on board Mir Mirján, an Abyssinian by birth, who had turned Mussulman, Commander of the town, who came to inquire whether Albuquerque needed any supplies for his fleet; to which Albuquerque replied that he had come to look for the *Armada dos Rumes*, which was said to have been sent out from Suez by the Sultan of Cairo, and he wished to save them the trouble of going to look for him in India! Albuquerque, after an exchange of compliments, asked Mirján to acknowledge the suzerainty of the king of Portugal—which Mirján ultimately refused.

During the three days spent in the harbour Albuquerque was able to decide on his plan of attack, and eventually it was determined that his whole force should engage in a scaling assault on an arm of the city wall which ran along the sea

front. His forces numbered 1,400 men, one thousand Portuguese, and four hundred Malabar. The attacking party went to the shore in small boats, carrying with them scaling ladders so wide that six men could ascend side by side. The Aden garrison had decided to entice the Portuguese within the city walls and fight them there rather than outside, where they would be at the mercy of the superior artillery of the Franks. (This is borne out by the Arabic accounts.) There followed a very keen competition among the Portuguese for the honour of being the first to scale the town walls. We are told that the men, in their enthusiasm, jumped out of their boats into the sea, carrying their ladders and shouting "To the wall! To the wall!"

(The Arabic accounts say that Mirjân gave orders for no notice to be taken of the besieging force till they got into the town—we are, nevertheless, told that one of the first Portuguese to mount the wall, Fernandez de Beja, who was in charge of the ladder which Albuquerque was to use, was knocked down by a musket shot fired from the wall.) But their keenness was such that they broke the ladders with their weight. When Albuquerque saw this he sent the halbardiers of his guard to prop up the ladders with their spears, but many who were pushed back from the walls fell transfixed by these spears—*que foi cousa piedosa de ver!* The chief success of the attack lay in the occupation by Garcia de Sousa of a *cubello* (fortified turret or "pill box").

Meanwhile Mir Mirjân rode out, with others also, on horseback, and pressed down upon those who had entered the town. This the attackers could not resist, and most turned in flight back to the walls, while a few joined G. de Sousa in his turret. The Moors brought straw, and placing it below this turret, set fire to it in order to smoke the men out. Whereupon Albuquerque sent ropes by which they could let themselves down. Garcia de Sousa refused to use a rope, and when Albuquerque called out telling him to do so he made the spirited reply: "Senor, I am not the man to come down in

any other way than that by which I came up : and since you cannot help me except with a rope, God grant me His help, for I sorely need it." He died a true hero.

When the fighting had lasted four hours, Albuquerque decided to withdraw his men to their ships. A council of war was held, and though many of his captains were in favour of renewing the attack, Albuquerque decided that they should at once pass through the Straits as the season was late—and "leave the chastisement of that town for another time".¹

Employing Muhammedan pilots, since there were no Portuguese who knew the Red Sea, they set sail next day, and (at the beginning of April ?) reached the Island of Kamarán. Here Albuquerque captured four ships, one a richly laden merchantman belonging to the Sultan of Cairo which was bound for Jedda. (It seems that whenever Kamarán was attacked most of the inhabitants deserted it, going to Lohaya and elsewhere on the coast. Barros says : *e parece estarem alli mais por causa de algum proveito que recebiam das náos que vinham fazer aguada, que por folgar de habitar a terra.*) It is interesting to note that Albuquerque found the island governed by a slave placed there by the king of Aden with a garrison, from which the king derived a large revenue, principally from the fisheries. (*At this date we hear nothing of Mir Husayn in Kamarán.*)

Albuquerque wished now to proceed to Jedda, but the winds were unfavourable, and after coasting round on either shore of the Red Sea (John Gomes was sent on shore on the Abyssinian coast) they decided in the month of May to anchor in Kamarán.

On the 15th July Albuquerque, after utterly devastating Kamarán, "*sem ficas pedra sobre pedra, porque quantos*

¹ One of the bastions on the strip of land which ran into the sea was meanwhile working havoc among Albuquerque's ships. This bastion was captured by Manuel de Lucerda, who cruelly put the garrison to death.

edifícios dos antigos estarem em pé," levelled it with the ground, so that the Moors of Jedda should not build defences there to prevent future Portuguese fleets from landing. On his way through the Straits he sent Ruy Galvão and John Gomez to explore Zayla' with two ships.

When Albuquerque reached Aden he found it in a much stronger state of defence than when he had left it, for the inhabitants had directed their whole time and energies repairing the damage done, and to building large cannons. He remained ten days, waiting for the monsoon, nothing being achieved beyond the capture of a few vessels in the harbour, and certain foolhardy enterprises. See Barros II, viii, 4 pp., 294–301. Albuquerque left Aden on the 4th August, 1513.

He reached Diu after a journey of only twelve days; and having there entered into an agreement with Malik Ayáz regarding the establishment of a factory, he set out for Goa.

(ii) *According to Hajji ad-Dabír and ad-Dayba'.* When in Muharam A.H. 919 (March A.D. 1513) the people of Aden, the Yemenites, learnt that the Franks were about to attack them with *nineteen* (some writers give eighteen) vessels, 'Ámir sent a force to protect Aden frontier, and ordered prayers to be read five times a day in all the Mosques. 'Ámir having heard of their approaching attack, appealed to Qánṣawh for help. Qánṣawh sent an envoy and an agreement was reached by which 'Ámir was to make certain concessions in territory to Qánṣawh in return for his assistance. The Franks reached Aden on Friday night, the 17th Muharram (26th March, 1513), and nobody was aware of their arrival, and as soon as dawn came they were observed by the people in the town and the people on the shores, including Mirján, who commanded the town. He gave orders for the town to be put in a state of siege inside, but outwardly pretended to ignore their presence (and the Franks captured some of their cargo ships without opposition), and then made a landing with more than forty ladders, and

they thought it would be an easy matter to capture Aden as nobody appeared ; and they placed their ladders on the outer walls of the town and ascended the ladders, and some of the Franks entered the town. Thereupon Mirján (Muhammedan histories say that Mirján *alone* was on horseback, while Barros says (Decada II, liv. viii, chap. ix) “ ao qual tempo acudis mira mirzan a cavallo *com outras que o sequiam tembem a cavallo*”) gave orders to make a sortie against them from the broken gateway, and they attacked them and seized the ladders and killed many of the Franks, and captured four of them. The rest of the Franks who were able, escaped to their ships, and, hoisting sail, fled from the port, after sinking all the ships belonging to Aden, of which there were more than forty (*Compendio*, p. 191, says thirty merchantmen) so that they might not be followed. They proceeded to Bab-al-Mandab, and then to Mokhá and Matína, but in each of these ports the local garrison drove them off. The Franks next attacked Hodeida, but without success, so that they set out for Kamarán, which they entered at the beginning of the month of Šafar, A.H. 919, April, A.D. 1513, and which they plundered, killing a number of the inhabitants. They then put out to sea again, after destroying Kamarán so that no trace of it was left, and when they reached Aden a few weeks later with sixteen ships they dropped anchor where they had anchored before. They had, in the meantime, sent two ships to Zeyla‘ and destroyed all the craft in the harbour ; when all these ships reached Aden their arrival was warmly greeted by the others, who fired their guns for joy and spread their banners. And before the arrival of these two boats they had tried to capture Aden by ruse, but could not discover the best way of approach ; but after the arrival of the two ships they made ready for battle again, and burned everything they found in the way of timber. Then they disembarked on the shore by night in small boats, and the sea was very rough, and the people on the hill called Šíra saw them landing, and informed the people of Aden accordingly,

who thereupon got ready their arms and drew up in battle order on the shore and when they landed from their boats on the shore (and they were not aware that the Musulmans were awake), the Musulmans charged them from all sides and opened fire from the town batteries and from the Musulmans' ships, and a great battle ensued, and God gave victory to the Musulmans, who killed the advance party (?) of the Franks, including their commander and seven other captains. There were also many wounded. The rest fled back to the small boats, but the Moslems remained on shore, fearing the rising tide on the shoal. And on the second day the man who had taken command of the Franks ordered them to again make a landing, but they refused and despaired of capturing the town, or the warships which were on the shore, which they had desired, and certain of the merchant vessels, which were unarmed; and, meantime, the guns of the fort were destroying daily two or three of the big ships of the Franks, so they fled disappointed from Aden towards India.

p. 12. *The Egyptian Attack on Aden in A.D. 1516.*

The circumstances which led up to this expedition, though only indirectly connected with the Portuguese, are of considerable interest to the historian of the period. Although the attack was unsuccessful, it achieved what Albuquerque had been unable to do in reducing the defences of the place, and it was only the stupidity of his successor, Lopo Soares, which prevented the Portuguese from taking undisputed possession of that important harbour and city. Up to the last year of Qānsawh al-Ghawri's reign (A.D. 1516) the Yaman had been ruled by the independent dynasty of the Tāhirids (also called Āmirids). Their most important towns were the fortified ports of Aden and Zabīd.

On his first visit to Aden in 1507, Amīr Ḥusayn had been received in a friendly way and had obtained provisions. Some time between his return from India in 1509 and the year

1515 he had received a rebuff from the Governor of Aden, which made him resolve on the conquest of the Yaman. It is impossible, in view of the conflicting narratives, to determine in what year the Governor refused to send the supplies demanded by Amír Ḥusayn; some writers imply that it was immediately after his return from India, others that it was in 1515.

In 1513, when news reached Aden of the impending attack of the Portuguese, the King of the Yaman appealed to the Sultan Qáṣawh al-Ghawri for help, in return for which he agreed to make certain territorial concessions to the Mamluk Sultan, but ere such help could arrive the Portuguese had been driven off, and although the help was no longer required, the Sultan insisted on the fulfilment of the terms. This the King of the Yaman refused to carry out, and when this refusal was reported to the Sultan he lost his temper and ordered Salmán Ra'ís, who happened to be in Cairo, to go and conquer the Yaman with Amír Ḥusayn.

Since his return to Kamarán at the end of 1513, Amir Husayn had been busy making alliances with various Yamanite (chiefly Zaydi) chiefs, and had planned an attack on Zabíd without informing Qáṣawh al-Ghawri.

We have seen that according to both the Portuguese and Arabic sources a fleet had been got ready in Suez for a fresh expedition to India. According to Goes this fleet, under command of Salmán Ra'ís, sailed from Suez in October of that year; and we can only presume that a fleet which was originally intended to help the Muhammedans in India against the Portuguese was ordered by the enraged Mamluk Sultan to undertake instead the conquest of the Yaman before proceeding to India.

The gist of a most confused set of narratives seems that Amír Ḥusayn and Salmán Ra'ís finally joined forces at a place called Nakhl Wádi, near Zabíd, on the 15th June, 1516. They then advanced overland to attack Zabíd, which they captured after various engagements on the 20th June. Leaving

a Circassian officer in charge of Zabíd and the army, Amír Ḥusayn returned to his ships with Salmán, and they spent a month in Zayla' repairing their ships and replenishing their stores preparatory to an attack on Aden.

They reached Aden on 31st July, 1516, with a fleet of twenty-one vessels, and there they learned that the merchant ships of Aden had set out for India on the day of their arrival. We are told they actually saw the sails on the horizon.

Salmán Ra'is at once set out after these merchantmen, and overtaking one of the King of Yaman's own ships, replaced the captain and pilot by men of his own and sent a letter by them to the "Lords of India" announcing that he had conquered the Yaman, and that his fleet was about to sail for India. Salman Ra'is then continued the attack on Aden, which had been begun by Amír Ḥusayn during his temporary absence. The attack seemed unlikely to succeed from the first, and Amír Ḥusayn, after a few days, retired to Jedda laden with booty, leaving Salmán Ra'is to continue his hopeless task. Finally, on the 20th Rajab, 19th August, he abandoned the attack, thankful to escape alive.

We are not told what happened to Salmán after his withdrawal from Aden, but it may be presumed that he remained in the Yaman until the death of Amír Ḥusayn, whom he succeeded as Governor of Jedda in A.H. 923 (A.D. 1517).

More will be said about Salmán Ra'is in my notes on the following period.

Colonel Aḥmad Ráshid in his History of the Yaman and Ṣana'á considers it unlikely that Sultan 'Āmir appealed to Qánṣawh al-Ghawri for help, but that Amír Ḥusayn was possibly sent to the Yaman by the Mamluk Sultan in order to keep a check on the Franks and prevent their ultimately attacking the Egyptian coast (i.e. Jedda or Suez). The Turkish historian, however, seems to give preference to another view which would fully account for Amír Ḥusayn's attempted conquest of the Yaman. He points out that at this time (i.e. in 1516) the extensive foreign conquests of

Sultan Salím had filled the Mamluk Government with alarm, and that they ordered Amír Husayn to go and conquer the Yaman bit by bit in order that, in the event of Egypt being conquered by the Ottoman Sultan, the Mamluks might have in the Yaman a place of refuge whither in case of need they could withdraw and possibly again assume power.

(To be continued.)