but this must always be flexible, serving merely the tabulating of results or at most as a guide to the definite, actual study of causation.

The many factors that make for delinquency receive careful consideration and evaluation. The difficulty of distinguishing heredity from the influence of environment is plainly recognized. Inheritance is rather of constitutional predisposition than of definite criminal tendencies as such. Many factors enter into environment which are discussed under developmental conditions, antenatal, natal and postnatal and include family conditions, school life, companions, reading matter, influence of moving pictures, all the many elements which enter into the life of the developing individual forming his character and determining his behavior. Physical conditions are not overlooked nor the influence of drugs. The question of mental defect, mental aberrations, of all forms of mental abnormality are taken into account. The author never fails to see and emphasize that not one but many factors working together make for the delinquency, which only serves to enforce the need of individual work. It impresses us, moreover, with the necessity for carefully planned and wisely carried out effort directed toward the individual for prevention and cure of delinquency. What has been thus accomplished the cited cases convincingly show.

For the psychoanalyst's profound investigation of the determinants of thought and action this book offers fresh material for earnest consideration. Dr. Healy's principles of investigation and interpretation, his methods of work are largely those of psychoanalysis. Working to a great extent with younger delinquents he acknowledges that he has reached satisfactory results in healthful readjustment individually and socially without such extensive work as a long-established neurosis would require. He does not, however, commit himself fully to the fundamental discoveries of psychoanalysis. He has proved most fruitful in his work the consideration of mental conflict and repression as well as recognition of substitute reactions for repressed or even consciously disturbing elements. Yet to the student of the most fundamental elements of psychical life all his case studies are impressively suggestive of deeper conflicts due to profoundly hidden complexes symbolically manifested in these substituted reactions.

JELLIFFE.

MECHANISM, LIFE AND PERSONALITY. By J. S. Haldane, reader in physiology, Oxford. The E. P. Dutton Company. New York. \$1.00.

It is asserted by many that since philosophical systems vary hence they are vain and are not subjects for practical men. "Such teaching," our author tells us, "is unworthy of every tradition, which has helped to raise us from the level of primitive savages. Even if it were true that philosophical speculation has heretofore led to no definite results, we should not be men if we give up the quest after truth. It is only a shallow and ignorant mind that sees in the history of philosophy nothing but a series of systems, each as bad or as good as the others, and succeeding one another like the turns in a vaudeville performance."

"The progress of philosophy has been just as continuous as the progress of science, and the history of philosophy appears to be a meaningless succession of systems to those only who have never taken the trouble to understand them."

This little volume of four lectures and of 140 pages is a very delightful collection, which may be briefly summarized.

In the first lecture he states the arguments in favor of the mechanistic theory of life, and the fatal objections which may be urged against vitalism or animism. The second lecture is devoted to criticism of the mechanistic theory. The author has endeavored to show that the experimental evidence, which has been brought forward in support of this theory, will not bear critical examination, and that the popular idea that the progress of physiology is in the direction of confirming or supporting the mechanical conception of life is a complete illusion. He then proceeds to discuss, in the light of biological facts, whether by any possibility the mechanistic theory may not still be correct. The result of this discussion is that there is no such possibility. The physical and chemical conception of the world breaks down absolutely and hopelessly in connection with the phenomena of life, however useful it actually is in connection with inorganic phenomena. It is, therefore, nothing but a working hypothesis of limited useful application.

The third lecture begins with a brief discussion of the progress made by philosophy in discussing the ultimate validity of the physical and chemical conception of the universe; and it is shown that there is no ultimate validity in this account, so that we are quite free to employ another conception in interpreting biological facts. It is then shown that we do actually employ the fundamental working conception of living organisms as such, and that with the help of this conception we can bring order and intelligibility into biological investigation, and we are provided with a working hypothesis which is of the utmost practical value in biological work. This is illustrated by reference to the actual course of physiological investigation, and contrasted with the scientific impotence resulting from the adoption of the mechanistic theory, which is only capable of presenting the facts in a more partial or abstract manner.

It is also pointed out that the ultimate ideal of biology is to bring within the scope of biological conceptions even the phenomena which are at present interpreted as inorganic.

In the fourth lecture the phenomena presented by conscious organisms or persons have been considered. It is shown that the relation of a person to his surrounding world with which he is in contact through perception and volition is not a mere external relation, since his surrounding world is teleologically determined in relation to his organic life. It is a mere logical illusion to regard the world perceived as independent of its relations to us in perception and volition. The visible world around us is a world molded by our personality, and there is no other world. In scientific work we can abstract from, or disregard, the psychological aspect of things, but insofar as we do so we are dealing with abstractions. The relations of personality, mere organism, and matter are relations of increasing abstraction from reality. Just as the individual organism can only be understood as participating in a wider life, so the individual person exists only in participating in a wider personal existence. He can only realize his true personality in losing his personality as a mere individual. Personality is the great central fact of the universe. This world, with all that lies within it, is a spiritual world.

JELLIFFE.