III.—ON CERTAIN OBJECTIONS TO PSYCHOLOGY.¹

BY T. LOVEDAY.

THERE is a remarkable difference between the attitude of philosophy towards the physical sciences and the attitude which, in England at any rate, it is still apt to adopt towards psychology. The physical sciences, so long as they do not attempt rashly to universalise their procedure or their results, are free to pursue their own business without interruption, but psychology is not so fortunate. Her claim to freedom is too recent, and her relations to the normative disciplines and to metaphysics are in fact too close for any expectation of peace. To some it may seem actually better so; such near relationship to philosophy must, it may be thought, cause danger of improper exaltation; if psychology's first business is to get on with her work, she must also bear in mind her own limitations, a task which involves clear apprehension, though not criticism, of her presuppositions; and it conduces to clear apprehension to be baited by metaphysicians. But as a matter of fact it does not appear that psychologists are particularly prone to exalt their special study into a metaphysic; in claiming vehemently to be free of philosophy they recognise explicitly that, as psychologists, they are not dealing with first principles. Moreover, it is curious to note that they are not accused so much of being as of failing to be metaphysicians; an incautious biologist will be charged with trying to be a philosopher when he ought not, but the psychologist with trying not to be a philosopher when he ought. The purpose of the following pages is to examine some objections of this kind more or less commonly advanced against psychology, and in part they have special reference to Mr. Prichard's interesting article in *MIND*, N.S., 61, where several of these objections are fully and adequately stated; but I

¹ This paper was already written before I had the benefit of reading Mr. Joachim's article on "Psychical Process" in *MIND*, N.S., 60, concerning which I have appended a few inadequately brief remarks at the end.

have also considered one or two criticisms which would not, if I understand him aright, commend themselves to Mr. Prichard.

Before one proceeds, however, to consider objections in detail, it is desirable to comment on certain difficulties due to the form in which they are taken. It might conceivably be argued (1) that psychology cannot, and therefore does not, exist at all, except as a tissue of deceptive and useless fictions; (2) that it cannot and does not exist as an empirical study or natural science, but only as a branch of philosophy; (3) that parts of it may constitute a science, but other parts are impossible or possible only as a branch of philosophy. I am not aware that any one actually holds the first position, but, as I shall try to show, it represents the conclusion which should follow from some of the objections actually taken if they were valid. The second position is Mr. Prichard's, if I follow him rightly, for though the limited purpose of his article prevents him from dealing with the empirical study of feeling and conation, his concluding sentences seem to show that he regards all psychology as properly a part of philosophy. Still it is worth noting that his case is not isolated; objectors almost always concentrate their attacks on the treatment of cognition and leave their attitude towards other parts of psychology, and especially towards the psychology of feeling, unbecomingly obscure. Mr. Prichard, it has further to be observed, has added to the preliminary difficulties by a peculiarity of method. A great part of his article is concerned with arguments to prove, not that a scientific psychology is impossible, but that conceptions employed by certain writers in their exposition of the subject are ill-judged and misleading. He raises a very difficult problem on which I shall make some hesitating remarks in the second part of this paper, but he confuses it almost inextricably with his primary problem. It is one thing to argue that scientific psychology is impossible and quite another to argue that M.'s or N.'s method is impossible. The confusion is due to the fact that Mr. Prichard, taking one work of Dr. Ward's and two of Dr. Stout's, has made them "represent the attitude of current psychology". Whether he has rightly interpreted the passages that he quotes is neither here nor there; he has forgotten that in psychology, as in some other sciences, the greatest disputes rage round fundamental notions and not round results; and so, assuming a fictitious "current attitude," he has confounded general objections to empirical psychology as such with objections to particular views held—if they are held—by certain eminent

psychologists.¹ It was necessary to remove this cause of obscurity before proceeding to consider objections in detail.

I. It has been argued that since the world as a systematic order is the work of knowing mind, psychology has no right to assume such a world in its attempt to trace the development of knowing. This argument, thus baldly put, is nowadays less often read than heard, and it is, of course, not put forward by Mr. Prichard. If it is accepted, the conclusion must be that all psychological statements about knowing are based on a fallacy, empty, and in the end meaningless; psychology is blotted out. For take one or two examples, putting them in any form you like, whether strict or loose: "The sense of smell is less acute in men than in dogs," "Recognition is facilitated by repeated perception," "If one looks at a white surface after looking at a strong red light, one sees the surface tinted green," "The child only gradually comes to distinguish even its bodily self from things external to its body"; all these statements involve a reference to the temporal order at least, and therefore on this view they ought to be, not perhaps partly or wholly incorrect, but simply without worth. They belong to a kind of statements that no one in his senses would make if he realised their lack of reasonable basis. But this conclusion seems to be not altogether free of absurdity, and the error in the argument is near at hand. The objection would be good only if psychology pretended to be metaphysics. If psychology forgets its own limitations—if, for instance, it attempts to explain knowledge in general—then the retort is possible that the conditions by which it explains broaden themselves out almost at a glance into a world which is what it is by reason of knowledge. But as it happens the psychologist is less often a headlong-plunging metaphysician than the biologist or the physicist or the journalist. He is generally quite well aware that he is looking at things from a "common-sense" point of view which is not final. His position is that of a spectator of what one may call Mental Behaviour. It is among the facts of the world as a systematic order that men and

¹ For my part I am in several places quite unable to follow Mr. Prichard's interpretation of his authors, and it is perhaps unlucky that he did not consult other writings of theirs. Anyhow, one cannot but agree with Mr. Herbart's comments on the severe limitations which Mr. Prichard has imposed on himself (*Zeitschrift f. Psych.*, 46, 276). If anyone thinks, for example, of Münsterberg's *Grundzüge*, then of Pfänder's *Endeitung*, then of any of Titchener's books, and then of those of Miss Calkins—I mention these authorities as being in every one's hands—he will hesitate before speaking of a "current" doctrine of psychological fundamentals.

beasts do mentally behave in various ways. As a "common-sense" person in the world of "common-sense" I am quite within my rights in observing Smith and his dog and noticing that the dog has the keener sense of smell (or at any rate makes more use of it), or that Smith recognises me more rapidly than he recognises Jones whom he has rarely seen. I am not less within my rights in observing my own mental behaviour, or in attempting to generalise about the mental behaviour of all men or even (perhaps) of all finite animates. I am not concerned with knowledge in general but with the mental behaviour of individuals—in the end of a typical individual or of typical individuals. This procedure does not give one an ultimate view of the universe; it involves presuppositions which are taken for granted, as does any special science; but, though the metaphysician may think the occupation dull and narrow, it is a legitimate and not a senseless way of passing the time.

II. It is argued that knowing, being "the relation in which a knower stands to" an object, cannot itself be an object, and therefore cannot be treated by psychology. The same odd conclusion ought to follow here as from the first objection; but Mr. Prichard, holding that it is possible to be aware of our knowing by reflexion, qualifies his conclusion to the effect that knowing cannot be an object "in the same sense in which anything else can be an object," and so (by some rather obscure connexion) is prepared to admit that it can be treated by a faculty psychology, but not in any other way. As I said before, it is not quite clear to what limbo he would relegate feeling and conation and also sense (to which he seems to attribute an unexpected independence); nor is it clear whether on his view reflexion is confined to being "aware of" knowing or can also qualify knowing by predicates. This latter point seems to be of some importance, for if we can judge about knowing, then (unless our judgments are by some unexplained necessity confined to predicating values) knowing can be an object in the sense in which psychology requires it to be an object. If I can reflect and judge about my knowings and their conditions, and Smith can judge about his, surely we may compare notes; and then we are beginning to psychologise. We do not require that our knowings should be objects in the sense in which our tongues or our words or the British constitution or the dishonesty of politicians are objects, but only that they should be convertible into objects of intelligent consideration; their essential subjectivity is itself one of the characteristics that we thus assign to them. We need not ask how many mean-

ings the words "reflexion on our knowing" may have, but certainly in one mode of reflexion we can and do regard ourselves and others as performing acts of knowing in time. These acts of knowing essentially involve the unique relation of subject to object; they are each the private act of an individual; they are inaccessible except by inference to any but the individual that executes them. In all these ways they are subjective, but they also take place in time. In ordinary life it is legitimate to ask, At what time did you see me pass? and to answer at 2.30, and to add, I took longer to recognise you than Smith did. We are all of us constantly treating knowings as events, and it is thus that the psychologist treats them. He is not concerned with the internal implications of knowledge in general, but with acts of knowing and their position in the series of acts and feelings that constitutes the history of the mental behaviour of individuals. He takes, as was said above, the "common-sense" spectator's attitude. Acts of knowing for him stand in temporal and conditional relations to one another, and to other psychical events, and to events that are not in the same sense psychical.¹ He takes the temporal order for granted, no doubt; so do we all in the common-sense world with which alone he is concerned.

III. It is objected that the instrument by which the psychologist investigates knowing is itself knowing. In principle this objection is the same as its predecessors, and the reply is the same. Psychology is not an attempt to explain or to evaluate knowledge, but is only concerned with knowings as acts of individuals in time. That the very act of reflecting on one's other acts of knowing is not at the moment of its occurrence in any sense the object of one's reflexion is of course true, and not at all to the point.

IV. We have already anticipated to some extent the answer to the contention that psychology, if it be at all possible, cannot be an empirical or natural science, and have indeed contended that just because it has this character it escapes the foregoing objections. At the same time I should not agree with those psychologists who, fearing the bondage of their study to particular metaphysical theories, speak as if it became non-metaphysical by merely starting from the common-sense view of things, for the common-sense view of things is extremely metaphysical, though it may not be very good metaphysics. The point is rather that psychology becomes non-metaphysical by recognising that the common-sense

¹ "Not in the same sense," because it may well be that whatever is real is in some sense psychical; but that is a metaphysical problem alien to the purpose of this paper.

assumptions from which it starts constitute a limited and partial position and are open to criticism by a more ultimate discipline. It is empirical because it deals with observed events, and non-metaphysical because it recognises that starting thus it cannot claim the last word about knowledge and the rest.

But Mr. Prichard argues that psychology cannot be a science (1) because it cannot have a subject-matter similar to that of any other science, and (2) because science involves explanation, and psychological explanation is impossible. With regard to the former of these points, as I have said already, he confuses the issue by confining himself to an attack on particular statements of two authors. It is not my purpose to attempt their defence, for it is really conducive to clearness to keep the issue as broad and free of detail as possible. The broad answer, it seems to me, is once more just this that mental behaviour does take place in time and can be observed,¹ and its development can be traced. We all of us constantly observe and argue about our own mental behaviour and that of others in ordinary life, and about the conditions under which it has this or that character; and it is difficult to see why the attempt to systematise our observations and arguments should be condemned as from the beginning unreasonable. However partial the truth it may reach—that is not for it to decide—psychology has in mental behaviour a peculiar subject-matter, no less than any other science.

Moreover, to pass on to the second point, this subject-matter admits of scientific treatment. Of course, if you limit your conception of science in an arbitrary way, you can deny this, but your denial is valuable only if you can justify the limitation you impose. Mr. Prichard appears to hold that if psychology is to be rightly called a science, it must aim at explanation of mental behaviour in the particular sense that it must derive the later stages of mental life from the earlier, and he objects that "the various terms of mental process" (by which I take him to mean what I should call modes of mental behaviour) are "ultimate" and "*sui generis*" and "incapable of being derived from or stated in terms of anything else". The argument is: "Empirical science = explanation = derivation of a later from an earlier stage of a process = showing that the later stage is not unique but only

¹ I do not mean to exclude inference from observation. All concrete observation includes some element of inference, at any rate in adult human beings, and of course observation of the mental behaviour of others is essentially inferential.

a complex or combination of more rudimentary processes. But every mental process is unique, and therefore not to be derived, and therefore not to be explained, and therefore incapable of scientific treatment." We need not be led away into a discussion of the exact meaning of explanation, or of the truth of the successive identifications which Mr. Prichard somewhat dogmatically asserts. The important question is what psychology does, not whether we should call what it does explanation.¹ It has been held that co-ordinated and systematic descriptive generalisations have a place in science, which does not seem to be always explanatory, and certainly not always explanatory in Mr. Prichard's sense; but the genuine problems that his argument raises are, whether every mental process is "*sui generis*" and "ultimate," and whether, if this is so, the very fact precludes both analytic and genetic treatment of mental behaviour. As to the former of these questions there is, I think, a lack of explicitness in the work of many excellent psychologists. The associationists' attempt to describe some processes (or, as they preferred to say, states) as simply congeries of other more elementary processes or states is now pretty generally discredited, and it is recognised that mental growth is not a coming together of mental atoms; but one is often left in doubt what conception is substituted, or whether any has been substituted at all. In what follows, therefore, though I could cite good authorities in my support, I shall not venture with Mr. Prichard to speak of a "current view". It seems to me not only that every kind of mental process, but that every moment in the history of every mind, is unique and ultimate; indeed one might, perhaps, go further than this and say that in a sense every mental process and every mental moment is simple. For as a direct experience it is a unity which cannot be re-constituted after analysis, although the least reflexion on it involves some amount of analysis of it. No doubt, reflexion is thus analytic of it partly in virtue of complexities which it presents to reflexion; but it is as characteristic of direct experience to be a unity before reflexion as to afford a grip to analysis when reflexion comes. Neither the uniqueness nor the simplicity of direct experience forbids analytic and genetic treatment of it. Analysis, which is necessarily the first step in psychology, depends upon this fact that what as direct experience is simple may yet to reflexion appear more

¹ I do not, of course, mean to deny that questions whether psychology can really "explain" or whether that power is reserved for a future cerebral physiology, and the like, are important in their place; but they are apart from my present purpose.

or less complex. I am annoyed by hearing a man crying milk in the street and am inclined to go out and address him profanely. Here is an experience simple in itself but extremely complex as soon as I begin to reflect on it and put it into words. One need not be a psychologist to perform so much analysis of it as is involved in thus stating it; every one performs psychological analysis to this extent, and the basis of the analysis is obviously resemblance. I can hear other noises than that of "milk-oo!" be annoyed in other ways, and so on; analysis rests on comparison of similar features in different experiences. And the case is not altered when we pass to the more precise and systematic analysis of psychology. The differences between psychological and physical analysis have been emphasised a thousand times and it is not necessary that the more "elementary" processes reached by analysis should be able to occur separately: still less is it necessary that they should be more primitive in order of development. If they do occur separately, then as thus occurring they are not the same as in the complex, though there is a resemblance; or in other words, when you have analysed a complex mental process, you have not got a number of separate parts which you can reconstruct into the whole. Thus perception of things is commonly held to involve sensation,—or for sake of peace let us say that perceiving is held to involve sensing, though not sensing alone,—and sensing, since it cannot be again analysed in a similar way (if that view is taken), is said to be an elementary process; but it is not implied that sensing is possible apart from perceiving, nor that it is prior to perceiving, and if those views are held, they have to be supported on other grounds than analysis. Still less is it implied that perception is a congeries of sensations or of these and other processes. Or take a case from the emotions. Every one speaks of some emotions as more complex than others; yet as immediate experiences they are all simple. "Reproach," says Dr. McDougall, "seems to be a fusion of anger and tender emotion,"¹ and, whether one agrees with his analysis or not, reproach seems to reflexion to be complex. Yet as directly experienced it is "*sui generis*" and, I should say, simple. In any case it is not merely anger *plus* tender emotion—this is expressed in the word 'fusion,'—but it is a condition distinct from both and yet resembling both. Anger as it occurs in reproach is not the same as anger unfused with tender emotion, and tender emotion fused with anger is not the

¹ *Introduction to Social Psychology*, p. 139.

same as tender emotion by itself, and reproach is not the two added together; and yet if we accept this particular analysis, we can recognise that reproach does involve both anger and tender emotion, and if we reject this analysis, it is because we think another preferable, or at any rate because we think this in some way inadequate, and not because we think analysis impossible. In this case it happens that anger and tender emotion can exist otherwise than in reproach, and it also happens that, according to Dr. McDougall, they are more primitive than reproach; but these points are accidental to, and not consequences of, the analysis. That we can thus reflectively recognise complexity in acts and feelings which as immediately experienced are simple, is a fact about them which has to be accepted, and there follow, of course, the two consequences that when we have broken up the immediate experience we have thereby passed from immediate experience to the use of conceptual 'counters' or 'symbols,' and that an enumeration of these 'counters' is not a reconstitution of the immediate experience but a substitute for it. An enumeration of all the processes involved in recognition and of their relations does not give us the original act of recognising; we have actually to recognise in order to get that: but it would give us a construction which for descriptive purposes we could substitute for the original act. Such a construction would, as against all less complete attempts, be and be recognised as adequate; it alone would be the correct description. Now the attempt to obtain such correct descriptions of the different kinds of mental behaviour seems to be both empirical and scientific.

It was convenient for simplicity's sake to speak as if in psychological method analysis always came first, for it seems to me that analysis is the most difficult part of psychology to justify, and that if it is justified, there is little room for further dispute. As a matter of fact too, analysis does come first, though it is afterwards reacted upon by the results of other lines of inquiry. Next it seems natural to consider the attempt to ascertain the conditions of the various mental functions. We may ask not only what processes are analytically involved in perceiving or recognising or in the emotion of reproach, but also under what conditions we perceive or recognise or feel reproachful. And again we may distinguish various kinds of perceiving and various degrees of recognition, and inquire about the conditions of each. These conditions need not all be in the ordinary sense mental, and whether mental or not they do not "explain" the function examined in the sense that it can be deduced from them.

When we push matters far enough, we come in the end to the fact that the soul (or mind, or consciousness, or whatever you like to call it) does behave in this or that way. But all the same the attempt to ascertain the laws of the conditions of different modes of mental behaviour, and to work from less to more general principles, appears to be a procedure rightly called scientific. Whether it should be called explanation or not is a question for logic that need not trouble psychology.

There remains the genetic problem, the attempt to trace the development of mental function in the individual, in the human species, and finally in all observed animate life. This is the aim which Mr. Prichard singles out as above all others "impossible". He ought strictly to have called it "meaningless," for what is in his mind is not that the conditions do not happen to allow of an answer, as most psychologists would agree is the case with regard to a great part of animal and child and savage life and perhaps with regard to some parts of adult human life, but that the problem itself is wrongly stated and is in effect not a problem at all. But plainly enough the problem is no problem only when it is mis-stated. Put the question very simply and ask: Is any development of mental behaviour observable as from beasts to man, from savage to civilised people, and in a single individual from child to adult? If so, and that it is so will not be denied, the attempt may surely be made to trace this development, both with regard to mental behaviour as a whole and with regard to selected features of it, and to discover where and under what conditions alteration, whether advance or degeneration, has taken place. But Mr. Prichard imagines that the problem is to show that the later processes are only the earlier in a more complex form, meaning by this that the later are to be reduced to the earlier. "In particular in the case of knowledge," he writes, "psychology seeks to show how it is that a life which begins with sensation and feeling comes to acquire the articulated knowledge of the world which we now possess." If we leave aside the assumption about sensation and feeling which is illicitly introduced, this sentence does express very fairly one side of the problem of genetic psychology, so long as the word "how" is taken to mean "under what conditions". Why then does it appear to Mr. Prichard to state a damnable heresy? His approving reference to faculty psychology, which he looks upon as particularly "philosophical," seems to provide the answer. He cannot, one imagines, mean to deny that in the temporal order a development does take place, but he wishes to insist

that the most important condition of the character of this development is the nature of the soul itself. If this is so, he has no doubt signalled the strong point in faculty psychology. As Pfänder well says, we may avoid the word faculty as meticulously as we can; "Jede individuelle psychische Wirklichkeit enthält ja doch tatsächlich die dauernden realen Bedingungen für bestimmte Arten psychischen Geschehens; oder, anders ausgedrückt, sie ist dauernd so beschaffen, dass unter bestimmten hinzutretenden Umständen immer bestimmte Arten psychischen Geschehens in ihr stattfinden".¹ Mr. Prichard's error is to suppose that this is generally denied. He is misled, perhaps, by the polemics against faculty psychology, which are really directed at the appeal to faculties as a veil for laziness, and by the fact that, since we can but say once for all that it is the nature of the soul to behave in certain ways, writers on psychology devote most of their space to the "hinzutretende Umstände". And after all, these remaining conditions are just as necessary as the nature of the soul. Take the perception of space, for instance, as Mr. Prichard does. It is no doubt ultimate, *sui generis*, an expression of the nature of the soul, not to be resolved into anything else. But it is also the outcome of a process of development which involves other conditions besides the soul's nature in general, and it is not a meaningless or impossible aim to trace the development and to determine these other conditions. And so throughout, the attempt is not to resolve the later into the earlier, but to ascertain the conditions necessary to actualisation of the later. Once more, it is a matter of indifference whether the procedure is called explanatory or not; but it does not seem to be unscientific.

The conclusion of the whole matter seems, therefore, to be that the philosophical objections to psychology are based upon a mistaken notion of what psychology attempts to do. The foregoing paragraphs, so far as they deal with Mr. Prichard's paper, have, I trust, done no injustice to his arguments. It is possible that, had one the advantage of an exposition by him of his metaphysical position, some points would have appeared in another light; but so long as that unfortunately is not the case, one can but deal with his arguments as they stand.² And indeed, although the state of

¹ *Einleitung in die Psychologie*, pp. 176-177.

² Mr. Prichard's work on *Kant's Theory of Knowledge* has come into my hands almost simultaneously with the proofs of this article. Had it appeared earlier, I should have expressed myself somewhat differently in one or two places; but I have left the text unaltered because neither knowledge of, nor agreement with, Mr. Prichard's metaphysical views

psychological fundamentals at the present time is seriously unsatisfactory, one may doubt whether it will rest with metaphysics to effect an improvement; for as there is no study so alluring as psychology, except metaphysics, so there is no line of thought so misleading as psychological metaphysics, except a metaphysical psychology.

II.

At the beginning of this article I pointed out that Mr. Prichard in effect devotes the greater part of his space, not to a general attack upon psychology, but to objections against a terminology which he finds in the works of Dr. Ward and Dr. Stout; and though he seems in several ways to misinterpret those authors, it cannot be denied that something more or less like the hypotheses and conceptions which he discusses may be found in the writings of most psychologists, though not without very important variations. It is admitted on all hands that the doctrine of representative perception and of what one may call representative cognition in general is false, and yet in psychology we are constantly using terms which seem to imply that between the mind and its object there intervenes some third thing which represents the object and which is indeed itself the immediate object of the mind. In what follows I do not propose to go into the details of Mr. Prichard's arguments, but merely to put forward some considerations suggested by his remarks.

Such limited justification as is possessed by the representative hypothesis is derived, I suppose, from the region of imagination in both its reproductive and its constructive forms. The radical error of the hypothesis lies in connecting with cognition the notion of "states of consciousness". A feeling may fairly be called a state of the self or subject or of consciousness, but cognition—I reserve the difficult case of sensation till the end of this article—involves a subject's act and a subject's object, and even if, as in imagination, the object is in a special way a mental product private to the particular imaginer, it is not properly described as a state of consciousness, and still less so the act of cognising it. The peculiar position of imagination is best seen in its purely reproductive form, as *e.g.*, in visualisation of a thing once perceived but not perceived at the moment. If in this sense I image to myself Table Mountain, the image is the object

would seem to invalidate the contention that the position and problems of psychology are genuine and that the objections to them depend for plausibility on misunderstanding their actual character.

of my act. No doubt I do more than image it, since imagination is normally accompanied by conception and judgment. Even when an image comes uncalled for into my mind and I cannot remember of what it is the image, I do nevertheless refer it vaguely to 'something,' and evidently my visual image of Table Mountain will be accompanied by a reference to Table Mountain itself. Still there does seem at first sight to be intervention of a third thing here in a way in which there is not in perception and conception. No doubt this is due to defective analysis. In perceiving my table, in conceiving any universal, I am dealing directly with the objective world; the object of my cognising act is some part or aspect of the real order of things, and as a plain man I take it to be so. Even in memory the same is true; my object belongs to the real order of things, even though not to that part of it which exists at this moment. But my object in visualising is my own image, which has to be referred to that of which it is the image; what I *quâ* visualising cognise is the image. So far what one may term the hypothesis of ideas is justified, but there is no intervention of a third thing. Nothing intervenes between me and the "real thing," because it is not *quâ* visualising that I cognise the real thing, but by an act of conceiving or judging I refer the image to the real thing as an image of it. An image, then, may be called subjective in one sense of the word, as being an object essentially private to a single subject; but it is a subjective object, and therefore not subjective in the same sense either as an act or as a state (*i.e.* a feeling) of the subject. Again, in the case of constructive imagination, the same limited justification of the hypothesis of ideas holds good, but there imagining and conceiving are as a rule so closely interwoven that the process is less easy to dissect.

Before passing on to consider the uses of the ordinary terminology, it may be worth while to consider very briefly certain other cases besides imagination in which the representative theory might seem to find some support, though by this time the ground has been trodden almost bare. Confusion arises in these cases, if it does still arise, either from unwillingness to accept a genuine distinction, or from undue readiness to accept an ambiguous one, or from both causes combined. The genuine distinction is that which Mr. Hoernlé noted in *MIND*, N.S., 61, page 87, between real and unreal objects. (I hasten to add, with Mr. Hoernlé, that I am not talking metaphysics.) My table, when I perceive it, is in this sense a real object of mine, and so is virtue when I think about it, whilst a fictitious object is unreal. But not

all objects fall into this division, for an image, as the object of an act of imagining, is neither real nor unreal, though as an object of psychological reflexion it is of course real. The obscure distinction, on the other hand, is between real and merely mental objects. My table, no doubt, as perceived will again be real, an image will certainly be mental, and there is an ineradicable tendency to class all conceived objects as mental, whether fictitious or not. But it seems difficult to find any ground for this division. In one sense all objects of mind as being objects of mind may be called mental. But how are some more mental than others? Some objects, it may be said, are private, others not. Certainly an image is private in a way in which a perceived object is not, but virtue is not a private object, and a fiction need not be. The notion at the bottom of this distinction can only be that presence to perception makes an object real and not merely mental, and what is not real in this sense tends to be considered as only a "state of consciousness". But this division is mistaken in principle, and if we can distinguish real from merely mental objects, it must be according as they are common or essentially private. This being so, there is no special difficulty in dealing with any instances that might seem to support the hypothesis of ideas. Take first the cognitive aspect of wishing what we do not expect to be realised, and thinking of what is fictitious, in both cases leaving out of sight any part that may be played by imagination in its narrow sense. We are here dealing with unreal objects, though to a greater or less extent we determine them by conceptions of the real world. But these unreal objects do not help the representative theory; for, whilst we may say that they are ideal, we cannot say that we know them by means of ideas. Or again, take illusion. In illusion I perceive a real object, only I perceive it "wrongly"; that is, the object of my present perceiving act fails in certain respects to correspond to the object that I normally perceive under the same external conditions, or to the object as others tell me they perceive it under the same external conditions, or to the object as I apprehend it in other kinds of perceptual experience in which I have reason to put greater trust. (It is necessary to say "in other kinds of *perceptual* experience," because the contrast of illusion and correct perception does not go as far as that of apparent and real even in respect of the world of possible perception. Thus you may account only primary qualities real; but it would be forced to call perception of secondary qualities illusion.) What illusion

brings out is not that there is a third thing between the subject and his object, but that the character of his object, as an object of actual perception, is partly determined not only by the character of the objective thing and by the general nature of the soul, but by mental bias, accidents of physiological structure, and other psychological conditions. The same holds good of all error. I need only quote a couple of sentences from Dr. Stout's incomparable article in *Personal Idealism*. "All error," he says, "consists in taking for real what is mere appearance. . . . But there is always mere appearance when and so far as the nature of a presented object is determined merely by the psychological conditions of its presentation. . . . It should be clearly understood that mere appearance is a qualification of the object apprehended and not of the mind which apprehends it" (pp. 15-17).

The representative theory, then, is doubtless to be rejected. At the same time it may fairly be maintained that Mr. Prichard greatly over-estimates the deleterious effect of its language upon psychology. One must admit that it has in the past led to serious misconceptions, such as the attempts to construct a mechanics of ideas, and to some troublesome absurdities, as, for instance, the notion that ideas when not consciously cognised retreat into a Hades of the unconscious, where they continue to exist and occasionally to gibber. But Mr. Prichard's contention that the psychology of cognition is vitiated by the "non-existence of the counters or units in terms of which it speaks" has force only if the psychologist is thus misled. A conception which is admittedly open to criticism may yet be convenient as a means of advance in many kinds of inquiry, and I should have thought that nowadays the majority of psychologists are quite well aware of the nature of their procedure when they speak in terms of the representative theory. It is obvious, for example, that "association of ideas" is really association of modes of mental behaviour or tendencies thereto; if on seeing Smith's dog I think of Smith himself, the association is between my acts of perceiving and thinking thus, and the "laws of association" are general statements of tendencies to behave in certain ways. But the terminology by way of ideas has been pretty well systematised, and it is at least open to question whether to revolutionise terminology would not do more harm than good. Moreover there are other advantages besides a systematic language in the customary way of speaking. In the first place, the psychologist is enabled to mark with sufficient plainness, if not with strict accuracy, the distinction between the object as it is in the objective order

and the object as it is an object of an actual cognition. By this form of words, to which I do not wish to commit myself, I am merely trying to indicate a distinction made by every one, but difficult to enunciate precisely because of the ambiguities of the word object. Every one believes that in perceiving this table he is dealing directly with the real objective world, but he also believes that, whilst his present object is this table in certain relations, the table really stands in many other relations which may or may not be "latently" known to him, but which are not actually cognised by him at this moment. Similarly with non-physical objects—virtue, or the character of Smith, or the comparative usefulness of a March Brown and a Red Spinner, or the tooth-ache which you are now enjoying; they do not exhaust their nature in being objects of any actual cognition of mine or yours.¹ Moreover, the nature of the object of an actual cognition may be determined to a greater or less extent, as the case of illusion showed, not by the character of the objective, but by subjective psychological conditions. Psychology therefore has to accept and insist on this distinction. It has not got to criticise or even to formalise it, or to develop its implications; it does not ask whether we should distinguish from the object of a particular act of cognition the reality as it is in itself, or the reality as the sum of possibilities of cognition, or the reality as common object, or whether all these phrases are unsatisfactory. But it has continually to signalise the distinction, and it does so conveniently enough by means of such terms as *percept*, *presentation* and *idea*.

In another way also the fiction is convenient. If it is granted that in cognising the mind has for its object in a narrower sense something objective in a wider sense, there is near at hand a danger of speaking as if the objective became such and such an actual object by its own virtue. It is in the abstract possible to conceive that all acts of cognition are homogeneous, and that differences lie wholly in the things that become actual objects, or in these and in the feelings accompanying the acts of apprehending. The psychology of cognition would then not correspond to the conception of psychology as the study of modes of mental behaviour, for on this side nothing could be said except that we do apprehend, and the only problem would be how things manage to be apprehended in this or that aspect. Even ordinary language so far avoids this error as to distinguish perceiving from conceiving, both from imagining, and so on ;

¹ Plainly this is equally true of what we have called unreal objects.

but once we are past these striking differences, further distinctions are for the most part named from the objects, and it is here that the danger comes in of forgetting that a difference of object means a difference of act. Within perception, for instance, there are such differences as are indicated when we speak of perception of sensory qualities, perception of space, perception of time, and so on, and these differences are named from the objects.¹ Now the main psychological problems about cognition are, as we have seen, (1) What processes can analysis detect as involved in perceiving, conceiving, etc.; and within perception in perceiving this or that kind of object or these or those aspects of objects; and within conception and the rest similarly? (2) Under what conditions do these kinds of cognising acts occur and how are they connected; and within each kind what are the conditions of its different forms? (3) What is the history of the development of these kinds of acts and their different forms? And in a sort of a way, one cannot but feel, the language of ideas does mark the fact that such are the psychological problems, for by placing ideas as the immediate object of the mind and insisting that these ideas are mental and largely determined by particular assignable mental conditions, it makes the problem mental. No doubt it does so in a wrong-headed way, but it serves as a safeguard against a worse error. The worst position is to suppose that we have for our problem nothing but differences in the modes of behaviour of objects, or in other words different appearances. The right position, it seems to me, is that we have our psychological problem in differences in the modes of mental behaviour: only thus, for example, can we appreciate the influence of "subjective selection". The hypothesis of ideas leads to the right position because it regards objects as mental states, and so it is not useless, though inaccurate.

I pass on now to certain problems connected with sensation, which of all difficult notions in psychology is certainly the most obscure, the cause of its obscurity being that the term is used to group together a number of kinds of "experiences"—I use this as a convenient general term,—not because of their likeness to each other as "experiences," but because of the likeness of their conditions. In Baldwin's *Dictionary* sensation is defined as "that mode of consciousness which

¹ I take perception merely as a striking instance. Some hold that the term is no longer very satisfactory or useful; and if that view is taken, because the differences between the kinds of perception are so marked that a single term including them all is misleading, this only emphasises the point of the present argument.

can only be accounted for by the present operation of an external stimulus upon the nervous system, or some equivalent condition," and, as its authors note, "this definition is not strictly psychological". Now let it be a good definition or not, it is so far right that it makes the test of sensation relationship to certain physiological conditions, and no doubt this test provides a useful and important means of grouping certain data; but we have no right to assume that there is an internal resemblance between all things that answer to this external test.

So long as we keep to sensory qualities actually perceived, we are not confronted by any special difficulties. I see a mass of scarlet lychnis. Scarlet is evidently a quality of the flower-heads as actually perceived by me; it is one aspect of the object of my perceiving act. Reflecting on the conditions under which one sees objects scarlet, the psychologist with the physiologist points out that certain definite physiological processes are constantly and necessarily required if scarlet is to be seen, and so he calls scarlet a *sensory* quality, and the apprehending of it sense or perhaps 'sensing' or sensation. The sensory-quality is thus an abstraction from the object of the perceiving act, and sense, sensing or sensation an abstraction from the act itself. So far the road seems plain enough; yet there are possible false turnings, and down one of them the psychologist is rather likely to turn his steps. I may notice for instance that though the mass of lychnis looks scarlet in a good light, it no longer looks scarlet when the light is very dim, and I may then be misled to inquire, Is the lychnis really scarlet? And I may answer, Impossible, since it does not always appear scarlet. And from this I may argue that since scarlet is not really a quality of the lychnis, and yet enters into my experience, it must be a state of my consciousness. And then I may talk of 'having' a sensation of scarlet, as if I could have the sensation in some other sense besides seeing scarlet. The fact plainly is that scarlet is a quality of my actually perceived object; it is not a quality of my act, of my mind, of me at all. I am no more scarlet from seeing the lychnis than round from seeing a cricket-ball. Sensations such as this scarlet must mean either aspects of my perceiving acts or aspects of the objects of these acts, i.e., they must be either sensings or sensory qualities; when they are given any third meaning it is a sign that the psychologist has deviated outside psychology. Lychnis seen in a bright light is really seen as scarlet and in a dim light is really seen with a duller hue, and the psychologist has to inquire into the conditions under which a real objec-

tive thing is now perceived as a scarlet object and now as otherwise coloured.' But it is not his business to ask whether lychnis as a real objective thing apart from being an object of perception is scarlet or another colour or no colour at all; he is concerned with it only as an object of perception and only from his interest in the act by which it is perceived as an object. With the distinction of primary and secondary qualities and suchlike problems he has no concern.

So far then sensations are either sensings and therefore subjective acts, or abstractions from such acts; or they are sensory qualities, and therefore objective in the narrow sense that they are aspects of perceived objects. Whether these sensory qualities can be attributed to objects apart from their being perceived, psychology says not and cares not. But sensations are not (so far) in any sense subjective states or states of consciousness. But now we come to a group of experiences also commonly called sensations which are neither abstractions from acts of perceiving nor qualities of perceived objects, but which have a right to be called states of the self or subject (or states of consciousness, if that term is preferred). I am not thinking of more or less discriminated organic sensations localised more or less definitely in some part of the body. If I cognise a bodily pain—a rheumatic twinge in my arm, say, or a sore throat—it is not a state of myself or of me as subject in the sense intended, but a state of my object—my arm or throat—though in another sense, in so far as I apprehend my arm or throat as mine, I apprehend their states as states of my self. It would, perhaps, be going too far to say that discriminated organic sensations are altogether on a par with the scarlet of the lychnis and with what we may call cognitive¹ sensations in general; but since it might be argued, for instance, that the difference is due to their setting, their relations to really subjective states, and the like, and it is not very germane to my present purpose to examine such contentions, I will class them with other cognitive sensations, to which they do belong in so far as they are the object of cognitive acts and these acts, if any one objects to calling them acts of perceiving, are at least on the same level as acts of perceiving. The case is not essentially altered when the organic sensations are not separately discriminated and not definitely localised, but are, separately or as a complex, apprehended vaguely as a state of some large region of the body or of the whole body,—as, for instance, with the shivering and general bodily malaise that mark the

¹ The word 'cognitional' would better express my meaning, if it were admissible.

onset of fever.¹ For they are still parts of an object of perception or some act akin to perception. But it is admitted by most writers that there are states of feeling which are not attributed to the body as its states, but are states of the self as subject, though they may be *made* into objects of reflexion; and it is commonly held that sensations enter into and at least help to constitute all concrete feelings. Here then we have sensations which not only are not separately discriminated but do not bear any direct relation to cognition. Now if the term sensation is used solely with reference to their physiological conditions, the presence of sensations in most or, I should agree, all concrete feelings cannot be denied. That is to say, if in mental malaise or vigour, mental depression, emotions and moods generally, you abolish the conditions of the "bodily resonance," as it used to be called,² you abolish or at any rate greatly alter the affective state itself. But it does not follow that we ought to group these affective sensations with cognitive sensations as "experiences". There is not the required similarity between the two groups, and it is no reply to say that if you turn your attention to this or that part of the body you will notice cognitive sensations there. No doubt, as soon as you try to attend to an affective state, you find more or less localised cognitive sensations; but in finding them you so far destroy the affective state. Granted that similar processes were occurring in certain afferent tracts and so on when you were not attending; you may justly say that such and such organic sensations were involved in the affective state, but they were not the cognitive sensations that you perceive now you attend.

We have now before us (1) cognitive sensations, i.e., sensory qualities, and (2) affective sensations, or feelings so far as

¹ The localisation of organic sensations is certainly at times very vague indeed when they are evanescent, but in my own case at any rate this is largely dependent on defective visualisation. As to the alleged localisation of certain pleasures and unpleasures, there is little use in contradicting trained observers (see Titchener, *The Psychology of Feeling and Attention*, p. 45). I will only say that in my own case again I am unable, after much searching, to find instances in my own experience of such localisation. I can find experiences which might be rashly described in this way, but they always divide on further observation into localised sensations and an unlocalised residuum.

² It is indifferent to this argument whether the organic sensations are involved in the feeling from the first or gradually reinforce it. Titchener (*op. cit.*, p. 38) argues, if I understand him aright, that concrete feelings are not to be distinguished from sensations by their subjectivity because they comprise organic sensations. This seems to me an exact reversal of the truth. Feelings are subjective, and the sensations they comprise are grouped with objective sensations, not because they seem like them, but because they have the same physiological conditions.

dependent on certain determinate physiological conditions. These groups ought not, as far as introspection goes, to be classed together, but neither of them presents any difficulties in the way of criticism of the hypothesis of ideas; for sensations of the former class are objective, and those of the latter, though subjective, have no direct concern with cognition. But there remains a third kind of sensations which, as is frequently said, are not themselves the object of cognition, but are means to the cognitive determination of the object. Size, shape, distance, extent of movements and so on, it is said, are cognised by help of sensations many of which do not become part of the object of the cognition. Are they then objective or subjective? If subjective, are they not so as states of the subject, and yet are concerned with cognition? Whatever be the right view of them, and it is difficult to get a satisfactory view, two points seem fairly clear. In the first place, they do not stand between the object and the subject in the same way in which on the representative theory percepts and ideas were supposed to stand between the mind and its perceived or conceived objects, for they are not like the objects. And, secondly, they do not require us to modify our conclusion about the objectivity of cognitive sensations. For cognitive sensations are admittedly in the object as sensory qualities (even if it be maintained that they are states of consciousness as well), but these other sensations, which may perhaps be called notificant, are not in the object at all. Once again we have a common name applied, not from immediate resemblance, but on the strength of similar physiological conditions, and we have no right to argue through the common name to anything but these conditions and their consequences, etc. No doubt by an effort of attention we can discriminate many (though not all) of these notificant sensations, but we do not discriminate them in the object which they enable us to cognise. We do not by discriminating them cognise the object more accurately; on the contrary, we turn away from it and make them our object. Thus they do not necessitate a review of our previous conclusions. But it still remains to ask what their position is when attention is not turned to them. The facts about the part they play seem to be these. In order that we may now appreciate size, shape and the rest, (1) we must previously have had, at any rate in most cases, cognitive experience of these sensations—that is, they must have been cognitive sensations and objective, just as they are now when we attend to them, and this past experience must be effective; and (2) the physiological condi-

tions of these sensations must now be realised. But have we any right to say that (3) the sensations must now be present as psychical experiences? It might be argued either that they are present as dimly cognised, and therefore still objective, though this position can be supported, I think, only in a certain number of cases; or that they are present as feelings, when they could hardly be effective; or that the physiological conditions suffice and the sensations are not present at all, a view which seems to me in many cases to be true; or that they are unconscious, a doctrine which must certainly mean a great deal if it means anything at all. If we leave aside this last hypothesis as a mere mystification, the result is that these sensations like all others must be either subjective as feelings (though this is here improbable), or objective as perceived, or psychically non-existent. If they are objective, they are, though not the central object of attention, yet not altogether outside the range of cognitive apprehension at the moment, so that, whilst relatively to the central object of attention they are merely notificant, they are at the same time to be grouped with cognitive sensations. But in a great many cases, it seems to me, they are probably non-existent psychically, or (if they are present in some feeling as affective sensations) it is not as psychical but as physiological processes that they perform their notificant function. The same general argument applies also to those obscure or altogether unnoticed sensations which are supposed to guide movements.¹

Note.—This paper is already so long that I can append only a few brief remarks on Mr. Joachim's valuable article, not hoping within such limits to do it adequate justice, but desiring to indicate roughly the relation of what has been said above to his criticisms of the notion of psychical process. The description of psychology as studying mental behaviour, which is a variant (adopted for reasons which need not be here discussed) from Dr. McDougall's definition of it as "the positive science of the conduct of living creatures,"

¹ It is, of course, possible to group together sensations by resemblance as experiences. In that case, as Dr. Boris Sidis has shown in two notable articles (*Psychological Review*, Jan. and March, 1908), we must class as sensations the elements in percepts which are generally said to be "re-produced" or "reinstated" by way of complication, and we must also class hallucinations with percepts as sensory objects and not images. There is much to be said in favour of taking this line, but if we do take it we must, it seems to me, throw affective and merely notificant sensations overboard and deny that they are sensations at all. We must keep to a single principle of classification: the attempt to combine two is bound to end in confusion.

is assailable by many obvious criticisms (though, as far as I can see at present, such criticisms would only impose limits, to be readily accepted, on the use of the conception, and would not impair its utility in the region for which it is intended); but it does not appear to be exposed to the particular objections so ingeniously developed by Mr. Joachim. And since most psychologists, whatever their language and however violent their disputes about fundamental notions, seem in the end to mean not altogether different things from one another, I doubt whether many have really held the view of psychical process which he condemns.¹ Their view is surely not as a rule so different as he assumes it to be from the view of such novelists as he mentions. It is not so much in the kind of their data as in the use that they want to make of their data that the psychologist and the novelist differ. For one thing, the novelist, wishing to give a relatively concrete sketch of a certain kind of character, has no need to simplify to the same extent as the psychologist, and the whole aim of analysis (with its concomitant synthesis) is simplification, as a step to the main problem of determining the conditions of occurrence or growth of mental behaviors. But the psychologist no more than the novelist supposes that he can catch a cognising act without a cognised object, —an act of seeing, for instance, without a seen object. On the other hand, it is equally impossible for him to catch a seen object without the act of seeing, and Mr. Joachim's phraseology at times seems to neglect this reverse side of the matter. The psychological interest, of course, lies not in seeing by itself or in a seen object by itself, but in the conditions of seeing objects.

Secondly, I cannot think that the difficulty extends as far as Mr. Joachim supposes. Surely it is in the main confined to cognition. For (i.) it does not apply to affective states as such at all. An emotion, of course, is complex and involves more than affective states; but, keeping to its affective side, does any one try to distinguish "the pain of parting from the psychical process of experiencing the pain"? And (ii.) as to conation, though I have purposely avoided the subject in this paper and do not wish to be drawn into it here, yet this much seems plain, that conation involves certain typical sequences of cognitions and affective states and that its course itself is felt, so that it always has an affective side which is free from the danger in question.

¹ The school which is best represented by Lipps comes, perhaps, nearest to this position; and it gives point to Mr. Joachim's criticisms that this school, by separating off activity from its conscious results, is driven to regard the former as unconscious.