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THE UNITED STATES AND THE FAR EAST.

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By MONS. A. GÉRARD, Ambassadeur de France,
in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* of February 15th, 1918.

I.

THE chief event which, since the opening months of the year 1917, stands out in the war, and which, when its full weight has been felt, will assist to ensure a victorious conclusion, is the entry of the United States of America into the lists. The Federal Republic, by ranging itself on the side of the Allies, has drawn along with it the great majority of the other Republics of Central and Southern America. It has shown those States which have remained neutral where their duty lies; the ideals which the Allies oppose to the German barbarism, the fate by which they are menaced if this barbarism be not overcome. Finally, as the Great Power of the Pacific, by reason of her central position between East and West, by the influence which her old-established relations with Siam, China, and Japan have conferred upon her, all these States have combined to make their cause that of the United States, and have formed to-day a *fascies* of the Powers of the Far East to oppose the common enemy of all.

It will be the purpose of this article to examine and to define the rôle of the United States of America in the Far East, noting how America came to be connected with the task she has assumed, what assistance she brings to the work upon which the Allies are engaged, and estimating what weight America will be able to throw into the war scales.

When, close upon a century ago—on December 2nd, 1823—President Monroe, in his message to Congress, and *à propos* of the French intervention in Spanish affairs and of the dispute with Russia about Alaskan territory, formulated the doctrine which ever since has borne his name and become the political and diplomatic doctrine of the United States, the Republic announced a firm resolution to hold wholly aloof from European affairs, and, on her part, not to permit European interference with trans-Atlantic concerns. "The American Continents," he wrote in this message, "by virtue of the free and independent attitude they have assumed and which they propose to maintain, may no longer be regarded by any European Power as lands to be colonized in the future." And, further on—"We have never taken part in the wars which European Powers have waged in settlement of questions which concern themselves alone, and it is no part of our future policy to do so." This is the doctrine of non-intervention, of "splendid isolation." America thus vowed herself to

seclusion; she established between herself and Europe an air-tight partition, one which became more firmly closed than ever as the years rolled by. When Washington bade adieu to Congress he solemnly warned his fellow-countrymen against foreign alliances. This advice was not disregarded by any of his successors; it had become a tradition, and President Grant went so far as to say in 1870: "The time is not far distant when, by the natural course of events, all political ties between this Continent and Europe will have ceased to exist."

On the other hand, on her immense western frontier, on the shores of the Pacific as long ago as prior to 1848—the year in which California and New Mexico were included in the territory of the Confederation, the United States, far from following the principle of exclusion and isolation adopted towards Europe, had taken steps to place herself immediately *en rapports* with the Far East, with Asia. The United States, indeed, has done more than any other Power to throw open to commerce, to establish international relations with, if not Siam and China, countries in which England, France, and Portugal had for a long time past maintained important trade centres, then in Corea and Japan. Trade with China by America began in 1784—that is to say, in the year of her independence. Export trade developed very rapidly in the south of China, through the port of Canton, where Major Samuel Shaw was appointed Vice-Consul in 1786. From this date the American merchants began to be serious rivals of the English; they, too, had their merchant princes. The Protestant missionaries from the United States did not hesitate to follow the same road. The commercial treaties and engagements made and contracted by the United States with China followed on the same lines as those concluded by England and France, and were practically contemporary in date. The English treaties of Nanking and Tientsin are dated August 29th, 1842, and June 26th, 1858, respectively; the French treaties of Whampoa and Tientsin, October 24th, 1844, and June 27th, 1858; those made by America are dated July 3rd, 1844, and October 18th, 1858. If the United States avoided contact or connection with the Powers of Europe, in the Far East, at least from this date, her policy was the same, cherishing two equal ideals—the development of trade and the security of the Christian faith.

In June, 1853, the United States made a bold departure. Commodore Perry, with a squadron composed of two frigates and two gunboats, entered the port of Uraga, at the mouth of the Bay of Tokyo. He was the bearer of a letter from President Fillmore to the Mikado, and in this the Head of the Federal Republic demanded the opening up of Japan and the conclusion of a commercial treaty between the two Governments.

At that period Japan was agitated by a party which, since the close of the 18th century, had aimed at substituting for the worn-out Tokugawa *régime* the ancient empire of the Mikado, and, above all, of the old-time national spirit. The arrival of the commodore synchronized with one of the most decisive moments of the internal uprising. The commander of the American squadron was a prudent, sagacious man, and did not present himself in the guise either of an enemy or

of a conqueror, but as a messenger of peace and friendship who was only anxious to establish good relations between two neighbours in the Pacific. He declared that he did not wish to force anything upon the Japanese authorities, and that he would give them time to think over the matter, returning in a year's time for a reply to the President's letter. Next year, when the commodore returned, Japan was quivering with revolt. The struggle between the defenders of the Tokugawa shogunate and the followers of the Imperial party was fiercer than ever, and the reappearance of the American squadron was like the spark which causes a smouldering fire to burst into flame. The President's representative understood well how to profit by a situation which permitted him to obtain from one of the parties—that of the shogunate which was then in the ascendant—the reply he wanted without himself taking sides in the quarrel. The treaty of peace, commerce, and friendship was signed at Kanagawa on March 31st, 1854, between Commodore Perry and the representatives of Japan. Two ports, one in the South, the other in the North—Simoda and Hakodate—were thrown open to American trade. In this manner was a new era inaugurated between the United States and Japan—an era which seems to have left no bitter memories for the latter. On the shore at Uraga a commemorative monument was erected in 1901, and the expenses in connection with it were defrayed by the Mikado himself and by the members of his Government. And when last autumn Viscount Ishii was sent to the United States as Ambassador Extraordinary, the city of New York considered that no better mark of its sympathy with him could be shown than by setting aside as his residence the house belonging to Mr. Perry Belmont, a descendant of the commodore.

Four years after the conclusion of this act, a new treaty was signed, on July 29th, 1858, between Mr. Townsend Harris, the United States Consul-General, and the Japanese authorities, under which four more ports—Kanagawa, Nagasaki, Niigata, and Hiogo—were opened to trade with America. Article 2 of this treaty stipulated that, when desired by the Japanese Government, the President of the United States should act as "friendly mediator" in any disagreement which might arise between Japan and any European Power. From this date the Government of the United States, far from desiring to perpetrate any violence against the peoples and governments of the Far East, has, on the contrary, posed as their friend and protector. Thus in China, Anson Burlingame, one of the Ministers of the United States, when his term of office had come to an end, agreed to become the representative of the Celestial Empire to the courts and governments of the West, and in this quality he signed at Washington, on July 28th, 1868, with the Secretary of State, William Seward, a treaty under the terms of which the United States Government, while confirming all the rights already ceded, agreed not to interfere in the internal affairs or administration of the country, and to leave full liberty of action to the Peking Government in such matters as railways, telegraphs, or other public works. And in regard later on to Japan, the United States were the first to agree, in 1878, to the revision of the earlier treaties and to the abolition of consular jurisdiction. The

friendly sentiments towards the Far East of the United States, her impartiality, the disinterestedness she had so far displayed from the political and territorial point of view, and of which the Monroe Doctrine seemed at once the expression and the pledge, were so firmly established and so generally appreciated that when the Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1894, the two belligerents, China and Japan, both begged the American Government to take charge of their interests and of those of their respective nationals in enemy territory.

II.

The Sino-Japanese War having come to an end, and the Peace of Shimonoseki having been signed, a change came over the scene. China, now defeated and her territory reduced, despite the amelioration effected in the consequences of her defeat through the intervention of Russia, France, and Germany, then abandoned the isolation in which she had hitherto maintained herself. The Viceroy, Li Hung Chang, sent as Ambassador Extraordinary to attend the coronation fêtes of the Czar Nicholas II., signed at St. Petersburg in May, 1896, with Prince Lobanoff, a treaty of alliance intended to protect China against any further aggressions. Japan, on the other hand, while in the spring of the same year she made an agreement with Russia in regard to Corea, did not fail to recognize that her interests and the general state of international affairs at that time pointed to a closer relationship with England and the United States. In any case, thenceforward the East had emerged from its seclusion : a bridge had been thrown between East and West. America, on her part, in accordance with the wise observations made just at this time by Captain Mahan, the well-known naval writer, began to realize that in regard to herself, to Europe, to the East, to the unique position occupied by the New World between the two Old Worlds and the two seas, she was obliged to look upon all these as one who stands without. The result of these reflections was to cause her to recognize that, between Asia now awakening from her slumbers and Europe engaged in seizing the last of the world's unoccupied lands, America's most pressing duty was to arm herself, to increase her navy, to see to her coast defences, to hurry on the completion of the Panama Canal, and to establish in both seas such points of *appui* as might be needed.

When, in 1898, after a few months of war with Spain, the United States emancipated Cuba, occupied Porto Rico and the Philippines, while having also in the course of the war possessed herself of Hawaii, she had thus taken steps to protect the shores of her double littoral, she became a great Power in the Pacific and in the Far East, and had taken her place among the World Powers. All this was a real and inevitable revolution coinciding with that of the two leading States of Eastern Asia, and causing her to become entangled in the struggle which the rival imperialisms of the Great Powers of the world were engaged in upon all the continents and in every sea. If the United States did not thenceforth hold themselves ready to take a part in this struggle, they were at least ready to make their weight felt, to

stand up for their rights, and not to permit the American continent to be threatened, or that in either of the two seas a Power should arise to disturb the existing situation or the peace of the Eastern or Western world. One last security had to be sought, one more rampart had to be raised before the United States could feel free and safe in the exercise of defensive rights; therefore a new treaty was substituted for the Clayton-Bulwer Convention which had been signed between America and England on April 19th, 1850, and this, while insisting on the maintenance of the neutrality of the Panama Canal, recognized that the Government of the United States reserved all rights of construction, of administration, and of sole control. All this, after a somewhat long series of negotiations, was provided in the treaty signed at Washington on November 18th, 1901, between Lord Pauncefort, the British Minister, and Mr. John Hay, Secretary of State of the United States of America. The relations between the two Governments during the war with Spain and the Boer War were re-stated and brought to such a point that, in regard to their mutual interests in the Pacific and in the Far East, the two Governments were enabled to consider, practically from the same point of view, the majority of the problems arising in the Pacific or in the distant regions of the Far East.

Thus the United States had in the course of a very few years organized and prepared themselves for the rôle which circumstances might suggest or impose; what, then, was this rôle to be?

III.

When Russia, France, and Germany, in the spring of 1895, tendered to Japan the friendly counsel that she should not insist upon the annexation of the Liao-Tung Peninsula or of Port Arthur, it was in the name of the principle of the maintenance of the integrity of China for the preservation of a lasting peace in the East. This principle was so much in keeping with the general wish and common interests of all the Powers, that it came to be universally adopted; it became the *leitmotiv* and the basis of all the many treaties, agreements, or declarations drawn up for regulating all Eastern questions. The United States, having discovered the essence of the Monroe Doctrine in its application to Asia, re-affirmed it when China ceded certain ports to some of the Powers, thus causing the United States Government to fear—if not the actual partition of China, at least her being divided up into zones of influence, thus destroying her unity. It was then that Secretary John Hay, in a memorable circular, dated September 6th, 1899, added to the principle, already recognized, of the independence and integrity of the Celestial Empire—that of the open door, of equal opportunities afforded to all nations of extending their commercial and economic relations with China.

After the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the *status quo* and the peace of the Far East seemed tolerably assured. Japan, which in 1895 had accepted the friendly advice of the three Powers which had intervened in favour of China, had not assumed any hostile attitude towards the

alliance concluded between China and Russia in the year following. After a diplomatic protest against the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands by America, she had resigned herself to the consequences which had altered the situation in the Pacific. The disturbing element whose action was now to agitate those quiet waters was Germany. After having insisted, in 1895, on the maintenance of the integrity of China, the contradictory and brutal decision which led her two years later, during peace, to seize the port and territory of Kiao-Chao, which she coveted, destroyed the confidence which China had felt in her protectors, and started in Shantung, and in the whole of North China, the Boxer insurrection, which all the Powers having any interests in Asia felt themselves called upon to combat and suppress. The United States, while joining the Defence League then formed, were careful to see that "defence" did not become a war of conquest resulting in the too thorough enfeeblement of China. From this time the United States Government saw more carefully than ever before to the measures necessary for maintaining not only the independence and the integrity of the Celestial Empire, but the principle of "the open door and equal opportunities."

But the occupation by Germany of Kiao-Chao, of Port Arthur, Dalny, and of the Liao-Tung Peninsula by Russia, and that by Russian troops of part of Manchuria, constituted a menace for the future. Japan, in order to be no longer left without some counterpoise to the alliance which had been formed between Russia and China, signed with England, on January 30th, 1902, the defensive alliance which on several occasions since has been renewed. This treaty, the preamble to which contained a repetition of the principles already admitted—the integrity and independence of China, the open door, etc.—was not calculated to disturb the United States, which, on the contrary, recognized therein a barrier against the encroachments of Russia. So far as concerns Germany, the revelations which came to light in the posthumous papers of Count Hayashi, formerly Japanese Ambassador in London, clearly exposed the double game which here, as on other occasions, the Kaiser's Government had played—always ready to cause division, to lay snares, to rise through the discomfiture or ruin of others. It was clearly shown in these papers that at the very time when Germany was inviting Russia to advance to the south of the Amur, she was pressing Japan to unite with Great Britain in order to check the advance of Russia. And when Count Hayashi, endeavouring to discover what were Germany's real intentions, inquired of his German colleagues in London if Germany would not one day be inclined to join England and Japan in mutual accord, the representative of William II. was careful to evade making any definite reply to an offer the acceptance of which would not have suited German duplicity.

Two years after the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty came the war between Japan and Russia, the defeat of the armies of the Czar, and the elevation of Japan to the *status* of a great Power. During the war the United States had afforded Japan moral support and financial assistance; they intervened as mediators in the cause of peace, a peace happily inspired by President Roosevelt at Portsmouth.

Japan thus became the paramount Power in the Far East, allied with England, united with America by a friendship of long standing to which the Peace of Portsmouth had fixed the seal, had inspired full confidence in the two Powers of the same blood and having the same views of policy, directed by principles to which Japan had herself subscribed. The Pacific and the Far East seemed thenceforth to form part of the triple constellation formed by England, Japan, and the United States. To this constellation another was speedily joined. The Treaty of Portsmouth, confirmed by the Treaty of Peking of December 22nd, 1905, between Japan and China, resulted almost at once in a *rapprochement* between the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the Franco-Russian alliance, the general principles and objects of which in regard to Eastern affairs were henceforth identical. Through the agreements of June 10th, July 30th, and August 31st, 1907, between Japan and France, Japan and Russia, and Russia and England, by the *entente* which therefrom resulted between the three Great European Powers and the Great Asian Power, the *status quo* in Eastern Asia, the independence and integrity of China, the policy of the open door, were each and all newly laid down as the basic law, the public right, as the Charter of the Far East.

IV.

But the disturbing Power, the intriguer, the wrong-doer, Germany, was by no means inclined to be satisfied. These last agreements in regard to the settlement of the Eastern questions irritated Germany; she regarded them as another net spread for her undoing. She therefore once again seized the weapon which was always ready to her hand—the weapon of discord, in order to try and undo the work of unity and of harmony against which her instinct and her interests were opposed. She turned to the United States and to China in the endeavour to persuade them that the *entente* between Japan and the three European Powers was a menace to the integrity of the Celestial Empire, to the doctrine of the open door, and that the designs of Japan, which had taken Russia's place in Manchuria, were infinitely more threatening than those which Russia and Japan had formerly entertained, and that they were pursuing the same course of progressive absorption. In America, by reason of the influence Germany there wielded, and thanks to the propaganda of the Hearst papers which were already enlisted in her service, she stirred up the peoples and the parliaments of the Far West against Japanese immigration, against yellow labour, against the competition thus made with European workers. From the very morrow of the Treaty of Portsmouth—from the year 1906—these tactics were in force. China and the United States began to ask themselves whether the Japanese menace were not more direct and more dangerous than the Russian menace had ever been. California and the Western States made use of the suspicion thus engendered to start a campaign against the Japanese, which was prolonged even up to the very commencement of the war of 1914.

During the years 1907 and 1908 the disquiet caused by this agitation, following upon a period of uninterrupted friendship, had become so acute, the expansion of Japan in Manchuria and in Corea had so seriously disquieted the United States, while, on the other hand, the treatment received by the Japanese in cities like San Francisco, where the municipal authorities refused to admit the children of Japanese to the schools, had so greatly disturbed public opinion in Japan, that certain over-keen observers, forgetting the past long period of cordial and intimate relations, went so far as to predict a serious coolness, if not indeed an actual rupture, between the two Powers and the two peoples. But the Imperial Government and President Taft were able to calm these emotions; happy arrangements were put in hand for the settlement of the questions in dispute, and when, in the autumn of 1908, the American squadron of twenty ironclads—whose departure for the Pacific had been at first regarded as something of the nature of a warning to Japan—came, invited by the Mikado, to visit the port of Yokohama, the welcome accorded to the squadron, the magnificent fêtes given on the occasion, speedily wiped out all traces of the late misunderstanding. A few days after these demonstrations an agreement was signed at Washington, on November 28th, 1908, between Baron Takahira, the Japanese Ambassador, and Secretary Elihu Root, in terms whereby the two Governments set forth their common policy, aspirations, and intentions in regard to the regions of the Pacific and Far East :—

1. The object of both Governments is the encouragement of the free and peaceful development of their trade in the Pacific Ocean.
2. Their policy, void of any idea of aggression, aims at the maintenance of the *status quo* now in existence in those regions, and at the defence of the principle of "equal opportunities to be afforded to the commerce and industry of all nations in the Chinese Empire."
3. The two Governments are consequently determined to respect the territorial possessions of each in these regions.
4. They are equally resolved on the preservation of the common interests of all the Powers by safeguarding by all peaceable methods the independence and the integrity of the Chinese Empire, and the equality of treatment, in regard to the pursuit of trade and commerce, of all nations.
5. In the event of anything arising to threaten the existence of the *status quo*, or the principle of equality of treatment above defined, the two Governments will put themselves in communication with one another in order to concert such measures as they may in combination consider best to adopt.

In 1909, 1910, and 1911 there were some alarms, provoked, the first by the arrangements come to between the Japanese and Chinese relative to certain railways—especially the line from Antung to Mukden—and by the proposal made by Mr. Secretary Knox to internationalize the Manchurian railway system; the second, by the Russo-Japanese

agreement of July 4th, 1910, in regard to the respective interests of Russia and Japan in Manchuria, and by the final annexation of Korea; and the third, by the conclusion, in April, 1911, on the initiative of the United States, of the great loan to China for the purpose of effecting a reform in the financial position of the Celestial Empire, and by the insertion of certain clauses concerning some items of revenue by which the loan was to be guaranteed. The restlessness and feeling engendered by these alarms were very real—not so much perhaps between the two Governments as between the two peoples, and especially among the Press of the two countries. On each occasion, however, after some weeks, or even months, of unrest, the feeling passed away and the atmosphere became once more clear. The Japanese Government, breaking away from its usual rule of conduct, had agreed on May 5th, 1908, to sign an arbitration treaty with the United States. At the time of the negotiations entered on by Japan in 1911 for the renewal of her commercial treaties on the basis of strict reciprocity, the treaty with the United States, which it was thought would have been the most difficult to conclude, was actually the first to be signed, and the Japanese plenipotentiary was able to cause to be eliminated from the new document a clause in the former treaty regarding certain rules as to emigration and police matters which had hurt Japanese *amour propre*. In the same year—1911—on July 13th, the Japanese Government renewed the treaty of alliance with Great Britain; a special clause was inserted at the express wish of the British Government, and herein it was stipulated that in the case of *one* of the two high contracting parties concluding an arbitration treaty with a third Power, *that* party should not be considered bound to join in warlike operations against that Power with which the arbitration treaty was in force. Great Britain thus, in agreement with Japan, notified her determination not to run the risk of any conflict with the United States, with which she was at that very time engaged in arranging an arbitration treaty.

If the revolution in China, of September, 1911, was something of a surprise for the United States and for Japan, as well as for the Western nations, it found the two Powers on the shores of the Pacific, the two signatories of the Agreement of November 30th, 1908, each determined not to allow this revolution to disturb the peace of the East. Both these Powers were as concerned as were France, Great Britain, and Russia to confine the disturbance within as narrow limits as possible, to hurry on the re-establishment of order, to help the new *régime* to exist and flourish directly it was properly and firmly installed. The United States exercised a dominating influence over the new Republic by reason of the similarity, nominal though it may have been, of their institutions, and by the traditional friendship which united them with China, and also by the moral influence they exercised in the Pacific. The United States contributed, more perhaps than any other Power, to the acceptance and recognition of the Government which had ousted the Manchu dynasty. And when serious difficulties arose between the different elements in the young Republic, when the first outbreaks of civil war occurred between North and South, between

Yuan-shi-kai and the followers of Sun-yat-sen, the United States bestirred themselves to allay these quarrels, and to reconcile the combatants.

In 1912, when Mutso-hito, Emperor of Japan, died at Tokyo after a short illness, the United States, in order especially to honour his memory, caused themselves to be represented at the funeral ceremonies by Mr. Secretary Knox. This homage, paid by the great Republic of the New World to the head of an ancient Empire, the ports of which only half a century before it had caused to be thrown open, was received throughout Japan with real feeling and gratitude.

The following year, however, was to witness the ebullition, from one shore of the Pacific to the other, of the most profound ill-feeling which had ever disturbed the relations between the two peoples. It arose from certain legislative acts passed by some of the western states of America. The Webb Bill, an act passed by the Parliament of California in regard to the rights of property of aliens, and which denied any right in landed property except to such aliens as acquired naturalization, and in fact excluded Japanese and Chinese—describing both races as Mongolians. Despite all efforts made by President Wilson and by Mr. Secretary Bryan to effect the withdrawal or amendment of the Bill, it was passed by the Government of the State of California, and aroused protest from the Japanese Government—a protest which, though expressed in the most diplomatically correct terms, evinced a very palpable bitterness. It must be stated, in justice to both countries, that in the conversations and correspondence which passed between their Governments in regard to this matter, and the gist of which was published in Washington and Tokyo on June 26th, 1914, both displayed generosity and nobility in leaving to time and to mutual good understanding a solution of the difficulty which it was as yet impossible to discover. The hour was, however, at hand when the two peoples were to find a union of spirit and heart, an alliance wherein all differences would disappear, in the acceptance of the same duties, in their common aspirations, in the great work which the future had in store for them.

V.

When on August 1st and 2nd, 1914, the Germanic Empires loosed the scourge of war upon the world, a war which they had premeditated and for which they had prepared, the United States, like the other Eastern Powers—Siam, China, and Japan—at first proclaimed their intention of remaining neutral. But when the United Kingdom entered the lists, when, that is, Germany violated Belgian territory, Japan, as an ally of Britain during the past twelve years, held herself in readiness to do what she held to be her duty. On August 15th Japan issued to Germany an ultimatum, which on the 23rd of the same month became a declaration of war. We have already described (see *L'Extrême-Orient pendant la Guerre* in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* of May 15th, 1917) all that the participation of Japan meant to the Allied cause on the Asian continent, in the Pacific, the Indian

Ocean, and in the Mediterranean, in regard to her arsenals and factories, in her loyal action, political and diplomatic, with her Allies. The rôle of the other Asiatic Powers, as that of the United States of America, was not determined until the war took on a more extended limit, occasioned by the character imparted to it by the mad frenzy of Germany.

It was the United States, it was President Wilson, who by careful observation and watchful examination, understood and discerned the full meaning of this war, so threatening and so decisive of the destiny of the human race, and who, having grasped the situation, formed the heroic determination to throw the weight of their powers, material and moral, into the scales. It was the Great Republic of the New World which, equidistant between Europe and Asia, realized, in face of the German menace, the absolute necessity, first, of placing themselves absolutely on the side of the Allies, leagued together in a good cause, and then openly to declare that in such a war there could no longer be any neutrals, while summoning to take part in the struggle those who had not yet declared themselves for either side, and especially those upon whom the United States, by their geographical position or by virtue of their political and moral influence, could exert a certain pressure. When, on February 4th, 1917, President Wilson broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, on the very same day he caused it to be made known to all the neutrals that he considered it their duty to act even as he had done. His voice resounded all over the American Continent, and one by one all the different republics began to follow the example he had set them. On the other side of the Pacific, and as far as the Straits of Malacca, was his voice heard. China and Siam responded to his appeal. While, in regard to Japan, which from the earliest moment had taken part in the war as the ally of England, she hastened to bear witness to the extent to which the action of the United States had cleared and strengthened the spirit and cause for which all were fighting, how the United States made the issue more certain, and enlarged upon the importance of all the Allies, and of Japan in particular, consulting with and uniting with the Great Republic in the conduct and general direction of the war, so as to employ all forces and resources for the common cause, for considering and executing the measures to be taken for assuring victory and liberating the world.

During the last twenty years Siam had allowed German enterprise and influence to flourish increasingly within her borders. The coasting trade, the development of railways, the working of mines, the patronage which the German Legation exercised over the Chinese in the country, everything became a vehicle for the gradual extension of German influence. The appeal made by the United States on the day of the breaking off of relations with the German Government had an effect which, if not indeed immediate, was profound and radical, so that when in August, 1917, Siam herself decided upon a break with the German Empire, she did it with a declaration of war. And at the same time, from the date when the German Minister and his subordinates were given their passports, everything that they had estab-

lished with so many efforts and with such perseverance, either at once collapsed or passed into the hands of others. At the same time Germany thus was dispossessed of one of the bases of action from which up to the very last she had engineered her intrigues against British India, French Cochin China, the Dutch possessions, the Philippines, Hong Kong, and all the possessions of the Western Powers in the Far East.

China had also been thoroughly exploited by Germany, in whose plans and projects she was intended to serve as an instrument and lever, not only against the Western Powers, but also against Japan. Although they were driven out of Kiao-Chao in November, 1914, and although from the same date their flag had disappeared from Eastern waters, the Germans had not even yet abandoned their manoeuvres; merchants, financiers, engineers, and journalists had been enlisted under the orders of Admiral von Hintze, German Minister at Peking, and they distributed the poison and the gold of their propaganda all over China. Against this dangerous warfare the United States, even before ranging themselves on our side, had not ceased to act in concert with Great Britain, France, Russia, and Japan for the maintenance of the *statu quo* in Asia. When in February, 1917, the rupture with Germany had actually occurred, the action of the United States had a direct and a very decisive result. Of all the Asian Powers, China was the first to follow the example of America. Wou-ting-fang, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had for many years been Ambassador at Washington and who cherished real admiration and sympathy for the genius and for the institutions of America, from the very first informed the Federal Government that China was ready to respond to the appeal which had been addressed to her. On March 12th the relations between China and Germany were definitely broken off.

By following America's initiative, and by placing herself under the ægis of the United States, China, who had in the first instance taken advice from Japan, now found herself allied, not only with Japan, with whom, since the death of Yuan-shi-kai, her relations had been satisfactorily re-established, but with all the Great Powers of the Western World, with all those at least whose friendship was of most value to her. At the same time she escaped from the yoke of that Power from which for twenty years past she had suffered the most; from that Germany which, having seized on lease the port of Kiao-Chao, had further humiliated her in 1900 through the apologetic mission of Prince Tchouen to Berlin; and since then had not ceased, in Germany's own interests, to raise up trouble for her on all her borders, with her neighbours on the north, south, east, and west. The Minister, Wou-ting-fang, asked nothing better, on the day when the rupture of diplomatic relations changed to a declaration of war by the United States, than to follow their example and finally destroy the last remnants of German activity.

The United States and Japan also did their best to urge China in the same direction. But at this moment the intrigue and the gold of Germany made their last bid. Although the Prime Minister, General Tuan-ki-joui, was determined upon declaring a state of war,

and both Houses of Parliament had agreed, the President, Li-yuan-hong, and the revolutionary leader of the South, adopted a contrary attitude. From this a crisis arose, in which the opposing parties—the generals, the influence—parliamentary and military—took different sides, and at the very height of the fray one of the generals of the old *régime*—General Chang-hinn—thought it a favourable moment to try and restore the Imperial family. For several days Prince Pou-yi, eleven years old, the heir to the old Manthu dynasty, was brought out of his retirement in order to head this insurrection. Neither the United States nor Japan wished to interfere in this national quarrel, believing that the good sense of the people would ultimately remedy the existing state of affairs. As a matter of fact, on August 4th, the troops of General Tuan-ki-joui entered Peking, the young Prince abdicated under an Imperial edict, the Vice-President, Feng-kuo-Chang, who had not left Nanking, became President of the Republic by reason of the retirement of Li-yuan-hong, and General Tuan resumed his duties as President of the Council. The very first act of the Republic thus restored was to proclaim war against Germany, and China was this time duly enrolled among the Allies. The whole of Eastern Asia, from Siam to Japan, formed a solid alliance with the United States against the Germanic Empires.

Of this edifice in the Far East the United States forms the corner stone and the binding cement; without them it would not have held together, it would hardly have been formed from so many different elements. In this manner America receives, for the benefit of the common cause, the recompense and the reward for the generous policy which she has always pursued in regard to Asia, and which has given her, at the critical hour in which we find ourselves, the confidence of the oldest nations of the ancient continent from which Europe itself claims issue.

VI.

In order more solemnly to mark her recognition of the decisive rôle played by the United States, and gratefully acknowledged by all the Allies, and in order more clearly to define and consecrate her union and alliance with the great Federal Republic, Japan resolved to send to President Wilson a special embassy, as had been done by France, by Great Britain, and by Italy. It was placed under the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador at Paris, Viscount Ishii, who was accompanied by leading representatives of the Army, Navy, and the Diplomatic Service.

The mission of Viscount Ishii continued during August and September, 1917. It was everywhere given a most warm reception—from the President, the Government, from all the people in the East and in the West, at San Francisco and at Washington. In the great cities Viscount Ishii was acclaimed as had been M. Viviani and Marshal Joffre, Mr. Balfour, and Lord Northcliffe. Long interviews were held between the Ambassador Extraordinary at Washington and the President and Secretaries of the Government. The delegates from the Army, Navy, and Diplomatic Service had interviews with the heads

of the great naval, military, and administrative services of the Confederation. Disclosure was made of one only of the outcomes of all the conferences and interviews—that of the agreement arrived at by both Governments in regard to their policy concerning China. But many other matters were touched upon, and an understanding as to the main points of their collaboration in the operations of the war was arrived at. The embassy of Viscount Ishii was followed by a special economic mission, attended, under the presidency of Baron Megata, member of the Upper House, by several highly-placed functionaries of the Imperial departments of commerce, industry, finance, and by representatives of the leading financial and industrial firms in Japan.

The agreement come to in regard to China was set out in two letters exchanged on November 2nd, 1917, between Viscount Ishii and Mr. Secretary Lansing. Like the earlier agreement of November 30th, 1908, it defined the principles and views of the two Governments in regard to their dealings with China. The two Governments recognized that their territorial proximity made for very special relations between these nations; and the United States recognized that Japan had particular interests in China, notably in those regions where the two countries' possessions are immediately adjoining. They added that this fact did not adversely affect the territorial sovereignty of China, and the United States affirmed their entire confidence in the assurances repeatedly made by the Japanese Government, that in the special sphere of Japanese interests there was no desire to create any difference of commercial treatment in favour of Japan, or to interfere in any way whatever with the rights which, by treaty, the Chinese Government had accorded to other Powers. The two Governments denied that they entertained any design whatever of in any way diminishing the independence and integrity of China, and declared that they continued faithful to the principle of the "open door." They stated that they were wholly opposed to the obtaining by any foreign governments of rights or special privileges touching the independence and integrity of China, and which might deny either to the people of the country or to the nationals of others the full enjoyment of the ordinary advantages of commerce and industry participated in by the people of other countries.

The new agreement differed from the former one of November 30th, 1908; first, in the recognition of the special rights and interests in China of Japan, and, secondly, in the expression of the determination of the two contracting Governments to prevent any other Power acquiring such rights or privileges as would infringe or endanger the independence and integrity of China. This was the first occasion upon which the United States had so clearly expressed themselves in this regard. The Japanese Government, on the other hand, repudiated all idea of attempting anything against the sovereignty of China and the principle of "the open door." There thus disappeared all the difficulties and misunderstandings which had hitherto troubled the two Governments, and of which their opponents had made use to raise suspicion and mistrust between them, since, in the alliance by which

they were thenceforth united, anything of this nature was rendered impossible. Further, their mutual intercourse with China, which was also included in this alliance, wholly prevented any intention or idea which could in any way whatever conflict with the sovereignty, the independence, or the integrity of their ally.

Of the other interesting questions connected with the war now in progress, it seems certain, although nothing official has been published, that the United States and Japan intend to examine and regulate all the numberless problems—military, naval, financial, and economic—connected with their alliance. Something has been made known in regard to the arrangements for the amount of tonnage which Japan is to place at the disposal of the United States, and for the proportion of steel with which the United States shall furnish Japan for the building of new ships, as also for the manufacture of arms and munitions. Certain solutions have also been discovered in regard to the war against the submarine, as to the inter-allied communications, and in regard to the carrying out of the economic programme as adopted at the Paris Conference in June, 1916.

So far as concerns the determination of the Japanese Government to pursue to the end the war for liberation and justice, in agreement and accord with the United States and the Allies in Europe, the speeches made by Viscount Ishii and by Marshal Teraoutshi, as by Count Motono in the last session of the Tokyo Parliament, permit of no doubt whatever of the perseverance and firmness with which it will be carried out. "Both for Japan and for the United States," said Count Motono in his speech of June 26th last, "I am rejoiced at the entrance of our great neighbour America into the quarrel. It is an event unprecedented in the history of the world. We cannot foresee the end of this war, which has already endured for three years. But do not imagine, gentlemen, that the end of the war will put an end to all difficulties. On the contrary, I would say to you that it is after the war that the most serious difficulties will become apparent. It is then that we shall have need of all our strength and energies for the establishment of a durable peace throughout the world, and for the defence of our rights and interests." The Viscount Ishii, speaking to audiences at San Francisco and at New York, said: "Our message to-day is that our intentions are yours, your road is ours, your aim that which we are pursuing. The United States and Japan will march together, work and fight like comrades side by side until the end is reached and the victory is won. We have just stated that America and Japan are joined together in defence of our rights and liberties. The first duty of Japan and of the United States is to guard the Pacific, to assure the free and continuous communication between America and Asia, and to make law and humanity respected on this ocean whence the German cancer was removed in the very first year of the war. And when victory is ours, we will help one another to build up that new world, noble, powerful, and good, on the ruins of the old!"

If Japan and the United States considered the safeguarding of the Pacific and the creation of a free road between America and Asia

as one of the chief of the tasks they mutually undertook, they have by no means overlooked the care of the land-route which stretches from Asia to Europe, and along which, during critical periods, the United States as well as Japan have forwarded material of war of all kinds. Here lies one of the problems which more than ever—it may be now or it may be after the war—will demand the attention of the Allies. The breath of a free and purified Pacific must be revivifying and health-giving for the lungs of all who may enjoy it.

VII.

When the Allied Conference met in Paris, under the leadership of the French Government, on November 29th, 1917, it was the first occasion upon which the United States had there been represented. The head of the delegates was Colonel House, sent specially by President Wilson and possessing his full confidence. Among the seventeen different countries occupying seats at this Conference, were those which only a few months previously had answered America's appeal and followed her initiative; the Republic of Cuba, Brazil, the two Powers of Eastern Asia—China and Siam, who had become attached to the cause of the Allies by the influence of America. In regard to Japan, whose representatives had from the very first taken part in the meetings in Paris, in London, and in Rome, she had just emphasized, in the mission of Viscount Ishii to Washington, her sympathy and gratitude at the entry of the Federal Republic into the Grand Alliance.

The composition of the American delegation, containing as it did representatives of the army, navy, finance, commerce, and industry, and the part played by these representatives in the work of the various sections of the Conference, marked the precision of method, the boldness of design, and the care of execution of a co-operation for which, from the very first year, the raising of an army of two million men, their transport to Europe, their equipment, supply and maintenance, all the measures had been foreseen, while at the same time there was no check or stint in the amount of help which the United States was continuing to give so generously to every one of the Allied nations.

But what even more than all these vast preparations afforded comfort and relief to the Allies and to the world was the impulse given to the war, the aim stated by the United States and their President, the resolution come to on April 6th, 1917, to carry on hostilities to the end, to victory—or, as the Mayor of Chicago said to M. Viviani, to give their last man and their last dollar. The great American democracy, whose foreign policy for a century had been contained within the limits of the doctrine laid down by Monroe, and which, since the presidential message of 1823, had, as a matter of principle, held itself systematically aloof from the affairs of the Old World, had now, faced by the spectacle of the present war, formed opinions based on reason and conscience, had realized that this same doctrine of independence and liberty actually demanded its entry into the field,

its absolute and whole-hearted participation in the Crusade of the Allies. "I propose," said President Wilson in his message of January 22nd, 1917, "that the different nations should agree to adopt the Monroe Doctrine as the doctrine of the world at large, that no one nation should seek to impose its policy upon another, that, on the contrary, each people should be free to decide upon its own policy, to select for itself the line of progress it thinks it best to adopt, that in so doing it should not suffer hindrance, molestation, or threat from anyone, and that the small nation may be seen marching forward shoulder to shoulder with the great and the powerful nation." And he added, in his inaugural address of March 4th: "We have realized that the great things which have to be accomplished must be carried out in agreement with the whole world, on a larger stage, in co-operation with all the forces of mankind. We are no longer merely provincial. The tragic events which we have lived through during the last two years and a half have made of us citizens of the world. But we are none the less Americans; we are, if possible, more American than ever before, but we shall remain always faithful to the principles in which we have been brought up. These principles are not those of any one province, or even of any one continent; they are those which we have always proclaimed as the sentiments of the whole world."

Thus from the doctrine of isolation and of non-interference, which had hitherto been accepted as the Monroe Doctrine, President Wilson drew up the formula which, henceforth, was to unite the world in an alliance more vast than history had ever known. The French Government has caused his admirable words to be displayed on all our walls. They announce and proclaim the coming of the "League of Nations," which will yet issue from the dark places and bloody mist of this war, and become, as we firmly hope and believe, the Reality of To-morrow.