V.—DISCUSSIONS.

PROF. WATSON ON PERSONAL IDEALISM: A REPLY.

IN a criticism which he has done me the honour to bestow, in a chapter of *The Philosophical Basis of Religion*, upon my article on *Personal Idealism*, Prof. Watson has misunderstood and misrepresented me in a way which I should have thought quite impossible. I think I shall best succeed in correcting these misrepresentations, and at the same time do something to meet his objections, not by writing an article or attempting a continuous argument but by citing and commenting on a few passages of his book.

1. "Let us put ourselves for a moment at the point of view of the Personal Idealist. All that I or any other being directly apprehends consists, as we must suppose, of ideas in my mind—ideas which, as unique and peculiar, cannot be present in any other mind, not even the mind of God, in the sense in which they are present to me. Now, if we are to take this doctrine strictly, as we have a right to do with any philosophical theory, is it not evident that by no possible process can any of us ever break through the charmed circle of his own separate individuality?" (p. 108).

Now in the first place, I have not said that all that I "directly apprehend" consists in "ideas in my own mind". Nor can I find in my article any statement which can reasonably be thus interpreted. But Prof. Watson will probably want to know whether I am prepared or not to accept the doctrine imputed to me. I should reply that there is a fatal ambiguity in the word "idea," in the word "directly," and in the word "apprehend". I may best perhaps exhibit the first ambiguity by recalling Mr. Bradley's familiar distinction between idea as a psychical event "in my head" and idea as "meaning". By this I do not mean that I adopt without qualification Mr. Bradley's theory of predication. It is enough that an "idea" in my mind may be looked upon either as a "psychical event," or to indicate something for which it stands in Reality. Now I certainly do contend that my idea considered as a psychical event exists in my mind and nowhere else: I do not conceive it thinkable or possible that God should experience, for instance, the identical pleasures and pains which I experience. Prof. Watson has himself pronounced it "perfectly true" that "the existence of the hunger in me may be known by others while

no one but myself can experience the feeling" (p. 119).¹ But supposing we turn from the "idea" considered as an event in my mind to an "idea" as it enters into knowledge, I have never suggested that an idea is *simply* an event in my mind. I recognise that in every judgment (which may be treated for the present purpose as an *idea*²) there is an objective reference. But this objective reference does not by itself carry me beyond my own experience. That objective reference exists no less in a judgment such as "I had a toothache," or even "I have a toothache," than in the judgment "Trees are green". Even here what I mean relates to a reality which is something other than the judgment itself considered as a momentary state of my consciousness: for I necessarily think of myself as something distinguishable from this or that momentary sensation. As the judgment is made immediately and is not an inference, it might perhaps be called a "direct apprehension," though "direct apprehension" does not seem to me a suitable word to apply to any judgment—even a "judgment of perception". But the question remains whether I can pronounce equally "immediate" judgments upon anything but my own mental states, past or present. Now for the moment we may put aside the question how far I may be said to make immediate judgments about things existing outside or independently of my own consciousness. There is a real difference, though I think not so great a difference as Prof. Watson supposes, between my Idealism and his as to the relation between the individual mind and the "external world" of things in space. But his argument for the moment is, I take it, that, upon the view that reality ultimately consists in the experiences of individual minds, I could not by any possibility get beyond *my own* individual mind, and attain a knowledge of other minds. That we actually do make judgments

¹ Perhaps it will be fairer to Prof. Watson and more satisfactory to the reader to quote the whole passage (Prof. Watson is here arguing against "the new Realism"). "Now, there can be no difficulty in dealing with such an instance as this. My feeling of hunger, it is said, is distinct from the actual condition of hunger; in other words, the feeling is a mode of my individual consciousness, the hunger is not. One reason given for this contention is, that the existence of the hunger in me may be known by others while no one but myself can experience the feeling. And of course this is perfectly true" (p. 120). It may be, of course, that Prof. Watson is here thinking only of other "finite" persons, and not of God or the Absolute. If so, of course my *argumentum ad hominem* falls to the ground. I can only say that to me it is as much a matter "of course" that God does not experience my hunger (however much He may know it) as it is to Prof. Watson that his neighbour does not experience Prof. Watson's hunger. By that I do not mean of course that the relation between God and any individual human soul is the same as the relation between two human souls. I shall return to this point hereafter.

² Prof. Watson may object to such a use of terms; but it is only on this assumption that I should admit in any sense whatever that the mind directly apprehends only its own ideas.

about the contents of other people's consciousness is common ground between us: but Prof. Watson will want to know whether I admit that we "directly apprehend" such contents. I have some difficulty in understanding what he means by "direct apprehension" in such a connexion. That the ordinary mind at the level of "common-sense" thought does not draw a distinction between the directness of the judgment "I have a toothache" and the judgment "he has a toothache," I do not of course deny. But does Prof. Watson himself contend that there really is no difference? Prof. Watson admits it to be true that "no one but myself can experience the feeling of hunger". Can he then contend that another person has as direct an apprehension of my hunger as he has of his own? Can he deny that it is by inference that he knows that I am hungry? If it is not by inference, how is it that we are liable to mistakes as to whether others are hungry, whereas we don't make such mistakes about our own hunger? I could wish that Prof. Watson had given an instance of what he means by a "direct apprehension" of another man's state of consciousness. But, whatever instance he gives, he would still, as it seems to me, have to admit that in *some cases* we have no direct apprehension of another's mental states, and yet do by inference attain to a knowledge of his states. What Prof. Watson can do in one case, the "personal idealist"—if I am to be taken as a representative of that position—can do in all.

2. Prof. Watson, after the passage quoted above, goes on, "What, then, can be meant by other objects or individuals, or by God? My knowledge of them must consist in the ideas which arise in me" (p. 108). Why so? The argument might hold, if I had admitted I cannot get an *indirect* apprehension or, as I should prefer to say, "judgment" or "knowledge" of those states: but I have not done so. And I am not bound to do so any more than he is. To say that my knowledge of God or other minds "consists in the idea¹ which arises" in me is true enough (could Prof. Watson himself deny it?), if by knowledge is meant the actual psychical state of the knowing mind: but it does not follow that the object that I know is simply the state of my own mind. Prof. Watson admits that the experience of hunger is in my mind only. Does it follow that, according to him either another's hunger is a state of my mind, or I cannot know another's hunger? No reason that he can give for inferring the existence of hunger in another is unavailable for me. Even if there be other things about other minds which are objects of "direct apprehension" (I don't in the least know to what kind of fact about other minds

¹ I here allow myself to adopt the phraseology which Prof. Watson attributes to me, but I have never used this language about "ideas". Prof. Watson appears to assume that because I have more respect for Berkeley than some other Idealists, I am bound to endorse all Berkeley's sensationalistic errors.

Prof. Watson would appeal), that would not alter the situation. What Prof. Watson can do in one case, the personal Idealist can do in others.

3 Prof. Watson continues: "Nor can it even be said that these ideas in some way correspond to objects lying beyond my mind, for Personal Idealism does not admit the existence of any objects other than ideas" (*ib.*). I have never anywhere said, implied, or thought that there exist no objects but ideas. On the contrary, my whole line of argument assumes a direct consciousness of the 'self' which is not (for me at least) a mere succession of ideas. But even if we substitute, "objects other than the self," the accusation is unfounded.

There is here again a fatal ambiguity in the word "object". I fully recognise the difference between an "object of thought" and an "idea" in the sense of a sensation; and if by "ideas" Prof. Watson means "sensations," I have never asserted that all our knowledge is of "ideas". I accept the distinction between a knowledge of objects and a mere consciousness of sensation as fully, and in much the same sense, as Kant or Green. But we are not now concerned with the question of *things*. To show that the Personal Idealist can get beyond his own mind, it is enough to show that he can know ideas in other people's minds. Now does the denial of the existence of any object but "ideas" prevent my knowing that another man has ideas, and what they are? The legitimacy of the inference I will discuss in a moment. But its impossibility is assuredly not proved by the argument now employed. The personal Idealist does not assert that all objects are ideas in *his own* mind. Why may not I have a knowledge of other people's ideas, which knowledge is also undeniably (from another point of view) an idea in my own mind? I quite recognise the difficulties of the "correspondence theory" of Truth. But the difficulties are as great, so long at least as we are dealing with the knowledge of mental states, from Prof. Watson's point of view as from mine. These difficulties it would take us too long to discuss now. At least "at a certain level of thought" I don't see that Prof. Watson could deny that, when he thinks of another's "hunger," the object of his thought is an 'idea' in another's mind to which another idea in his own mind, *i.e.* his knowledge of it, "corresponds". The difference between a mere sensation and a piece of knowledge is here irrelevant: both are ideas in the sense that they are psychical states. If, then, "the Personal Idealist does not admit the existence of any objects other than ideas" means "ideas in his own mind," the imputation is untrue; if it includes "ideas in other people's minds," it is true on the understanding that in "idea" is included every kind of psychical experience, and that to "ideas" we add "selves, spirits, or persons".

4. "If each individual is confined to his own ideas, by what

strange process is he led to imagine that there are other individuals besides himself? Is it not obvious that such a notion would never dawn upon him at all?" (ib.). As I have just explained, I have never said that "each individual is confined to his own ideas," if by that is meant that his judgments have no objective reference, or that he cannot know another's ideas, or that he cannot know himself as the permanent subject of his changing states. But I do certainly contend that it is by inference or analogy that the individual reaches the knowledge of other selves. I do not mean that psychologically the infant starts with a fully developed consciousness of the distinction between "self" and "not-self," or between "self and others". The distinction between 'self' and 'not-self,' between subject and object, gradually emerges in the development of consciousness, and so does the distinction between self and others. The inference is no doubt unconscious inference in the sense that the individual does not and often could not analyse the process. But it is unnecessary for our present purpose to go into these questions of Psychology. The real question is whether the reflecting individual can at the present moment justify his belief in the existence of other persons except by a process of inference from the facts of his own consciousness.

Prof. Watson calls such a process "strange". Why "strange"? If within my own experience I discover objects resembling my own organism, behaving in a similar way, responding to such and such stimuli in a similar way to my own organism, is it not a perfectly reasonable inference that there exists another consciousness similar to my own, which is *for itself* (with differences of detail which very often I do not and cannot fully know) what I am to myself? If I find another object of knowledge, shrinking, wriggling, crying out just as that object of knowledge which I call my organism does when I am in pain, why may not I infer that it is because there is another consciousness in pain similar (more or less) to my own? No difference of opinion as to the sense in which either organism exists independently of anybody's knowledge or anybody's sensation can affect the validity of this inference. In reply to this charge that Personal Idealism leads to Solipsism, I need do no more than refer to the chapter of Mr. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* entitled "Solipsism". Mr. Bradley's analysis of the reasons for believing in other selves besides my own seems to be one that cannot be improved upon, and the reasons seem to me unanswerable. Mr. Bradley's system as a whole is not mine, but my Idealism is the same as his in so far as it admits—what seems to me the logical consequence of all Idealism—that "Reality is experience". There is not, so far as I have noticed, a single argument used in that chapter which I am precluded from using by anything that I have ever written. Nor do I see how Prof. Watson could himself use any other line of argument. Does he contend that the knowledge of other selves is

a priori? Then will he tell us what he knows about them *a priori*? Does he, apart from experience, know how many such selves there are, how far they resemble himself and how far they differ? If that is so, why does he not save the Government from the elaborate and expensive machinery of the census? If not, his knowledge of other selves seems to be very much in the same case as Kant's knowledge of things-in-themselves, and the usual argument against that theory can be used against Prof. Watson. If he does not know *what* they are, how can he tell even *that* they are?

5. The whole argument on page 109 proceeds upon the assumption that the Personal Idealist admits that an individual has "no knowledge of the ideas of any other individual". This I have already repudiated. On the following page (p. 110) I come to a still more definite misrepresentation. "God, however, as it is admitted, is the originator of the human and all other minds, though He is only the cause of those experiences which are not willed by other causes." I have never said this: the "only" is a gratuitous addition of Prof. Watson. The passage which Prof. Watson probably had in mind runs as follows: "By any one who admits the idea of volition into his own conception of God at all it will hardly be questioned that, if God wills He must will all, or at least (let us say for the present) everything that is not willed by some lesser will". Prof. Watson absolutely ignores the words "all, or at least". I was anxious to avoid in my short contribution to *Personal Idealism* entering upon the Free-will controversy at all, and therefore put aside the question of the relation of the divine Will to acts caused by a human will. I have since more fully explained myself in *The Theory of Good and Evil*, but even in *Personal Idealism* I carefully guarded myself against saying that acts willed by a human will are not also willed by God; and, since I explained that I did not postulate Free-will in the indeterminist sense but only "in the sense of the Determinist who believes in self-determination," i.e., in the sense of Green or Dr. Caird, it ought to have been clear to any reader who knew the meaning of the terms used that I did not at all events exclude the possibility of *all* the experiences of each and every individual being willed by God. For the Determinist who believes in "self-determinism," and who regards the self as created, it is obvious that all the 'free' acts of the self must be in some "eminent" sense referred to God, since they proceed from the nature of the self which is caused to be what it is by God. I do not think I need here copy out the pages of *The Theory of Good or Evil*, in which I have there definitely rejected the Libertarian or Indeterminist position; but even in *Personal Idealism* I wrote explicitly: "We have found it necessary, moreover, to regard Him as causative—as causin; those experiences of the other souls of which their own wills are not the cause, and (since no human will is ever the *whole* cause of anything) as co-operating in some sense with whatever causality is exercised by

human wills" (p. 380). Prof. Watson may regard this explanation as unsatisfactory, as it was admittedly inadequate, but it is inexcusable that he should ignore it, and insert an "only" where I used none.

6. "Is it really necessary to point out that, as all experiences of individuals, whether willed or not, belong solely (according to subjective idealism) to the individuals themselves, those experiences cannot without contradiction be ascribed to God by thinkers whose fundamental principle it is that nothing exists except what is experienced by individuals?" (p. 111).

There is an ambiguity here in "ascribed to God". I have denied that God "has" the same identical experiences as ourselves, just as Prof. Watson apparently, in the passage quoted above, admits that my hunger is in my own mind only. But I do not deny that God knows those experiences, and can therefore cause them. Why is there any "contradiction" in maintaining that God can cause hunger in another without feeling hunger Himself, just as I can cause hunger in another without being hungry myself? Of course I am aware that arguments may be used against such a view: but where is the contradiction? Again, there is an ambiguity about the statement that "all experiences of individuals . . . belong solely . . . to the individuals themselves". If "belong" to the individuals means "are their experiences" I admit (with Prof. Watson) that my hunger is not my neighbour's; but I do not deny that I can *know* another's hunger, and that when I and my neighbour are both hungry our hunger is in a sense the same hunger. My hunger is like another's, and I accept the doctrine, which I presume Prof. Watson would hardly deny, that likeness = identity + difference. There is an element in the two hungers which is the same, but this identical element is, taken by itself, a mere abstraction and not reality. The universal hunger only has real existence in the two consciousnesses. When from personal and very subjective feelings we turn to what are commonly called events or objects in the external world, the identity becomes greater, and the differences may often be such as may for practical purposes be ignored. I say that I and my neighbour look at the "same" house. When I come to analyse what the house means, I cannot deny that our concept of the house means that it produces (*inter alia*) red sensations in both of us and in all other men who are not colour-blind; but these two sets of feelings are not the same, unless I make abstraction of the fact that they are experienced by two different minds. I do not deny that my concepts or my judgments are often absolutely identical with those of my neighbour, but then concepts are abstractions when taken apart from their psychical context in individual minds. I have been taught by Mr. Bradley and others not to make the reality of the world consist in abstractions. Prof. Watson professes to be an Idealist. If so, he cannot claim reality for the object independently

of its relation to the subject. And I for one cannot help pressing the question "What subject?" I say "God and all men and higher animals and all other minds capable of seeing and knowing the house". If Prof. Watson chooses to regard all these minds as really one, that is an important difference between us; but I fail to see that I have any more difficulty than he has in accounting for my knowledge of other minds, and so of escaping Solipsism. His—as I cannot but think it ambiguous and hesitating—attitude on the question to what extent and in what sense objects in space exist independently of any mind's experience leaves us in exactly the same position as regards other consciousnesses, which neither of us regards as mere states of the mind which knows them.

7. "What, then," Prof. Watson continues (p. 111), "can possibly be meant by speaking of God as willing the 'world'? The 'world,' as we are told, is admittedly the 'object of God's thought,' i.e. it consists of His individual states of consciousness or experiences. To will these, however, is merely to will certain experiences of His own, and such experiences must be entirely distinct from the 'world' itself, i.e. from the experiences of other beings." Here I am really at a loss to understand what strange opinion it is that is attributed to me. Prof. Watson appears (1) to accuse me of making the world = merely the experience of God, and then (2) to assume that by the world I mean only the experience of other beings to the exclusion of God's experience. Now it is obvious that if I thought the world was simply the experiences of God, I should not admit that those experiences of God must be entirely distinct from the 'world' itself: for I should be identifying the two things. How Prof. Watson can suppose that I could possibly have held both the above positions, I am at a loss to imagine. Certainly he makes not the smallest attempt by quotation, or even by plausible inference, to convict me of having maintained so gross a contradiction.

As a matter of fact, each of these two inconsistent interpretations of the word "world" is a partial and one-sided interpretation of my meaning. I do hold (1) that the world is the experience of God: when I hold that God wills these experiences of His own, I am in exactly the same position as any orthodox Hegelian who uses the expression "God creates the objects of His own thought," except that I do not think that God's consciousness consists merely in the system of abstractions which make up "thought" as that term is commonly used by ordinary people. I hold that it includes feeling or an element analogous to feeling in us. Some Hegelians explain that this was fully admitted by Hegel, only that what ordinary people call feeling, he called "immediacy" or "immediate thought". With such Hegelians I have so far no quarrel. But I hold (2) that this world of Nature exists also in the consciousness of other minds, i.e. in the sense that those minds know partially what God knows perfectly and have experiences which have a certain

resemblance to those which we are bound to infer in God. These experiences of others I hold to be known to God, and also that He wills these experiences to be experienced by them. The only point at which I differ from at least some Hegelians is that (1) I emphasise this volitional aspect of Consciousness which they are more or less disposed to explain away into thinking (from a passage on p. 127, where he speaks of God as "creative reason," I infer that Prof. Watson does not adopt this attitude). (2) I do not hold that the experiences of other minds are at one and the same time also parts of the divine Consciousness, though they are known to the divine Consciousness.

8. "The self-contradictory character of this doctrine lies on the very surface of it. To begin with, it assumes that God, like other forms of being, is a separate individual, limited to His own experiences, and *incapable of exercising any influence upon other self-involved individuals*" (p. 110).

At this point Prof. Watson's misrepresentation of me reaches a climax. By what process of inference Prof. Watson has succeeded in persuading himself that the words italicised represent my opinion, I am at a loss to imagine. Not only have I not said one word to justify them, but I have said over and over again precisely the contrary. I have expressly (*Personal Idealism*, p. 380) spoken of God as "causing those experiences of the other souls of which their own wills are not the cause". I may here put aside the fact, which I have already pointed out, that I have expressly spoken of God as also in a sense the cause of those experiences which *are* due to their own wills. It is enough for my present purpose to insist that, in saying that God causes even the non-voluntary experiences, I have obviously admitted that He does "exercise an influence upon other individuals"—individuals whom I have never spoken of as "self-involved," whatever that may mean.

Here are a few other statements of mine: "The dependence upon God of the bodily organism carries with it the dependence upon Him also of the spirits to which such bodies are organic" (p. 381). I have spoken of the "contrast between an eternal or unoriginated mind and minds which are originated and *dependent*" (p. 381). I go on to say that as attempts to express the relation of God to other spirits "I have no objection to the fashionable phrases, 'partial communication to us of the divine thought,' 'partial reproductions of the divine consciousness,' 'limited modes of the universal self-consciousness,' 'emanations from the divine Mind,' and so on, provided that they are not used to evade the admission that the fact of such reproductions occurring must be regarded as no less due to the divine will than the first appearance and the gradual development of the bodily organism by which these reproductions are conditioned" (p. 382). How in the teeth of these declarations Prof. Watson can bring himself to accuse me of holding that God, having brought the spirits into existence, 'no

longer influences them,' or of believing in "a being who originates minds which are completely independent of their originator" (p. 112), or that individual minds are "hermetically-sealed" or the like, I am at a loss to conceive. I should have thought that my language in *Personal Idealism* was plain enough to leave no doubt in the mind of any candid reader that I regard every successive moment's existence and every successive experience of every spirit other than God as caused by God not less directly and completely than the first moment of such existence—that in old-fashioned theological language the act of conservation is essentially the same as that of creation.

But perhaps, as Prof. Watson finds a difficulty in recognising identity of doctrine when it is not expressed in the particular set of comfortable Mesopotamia-like phrases to which he is wedded, I had better express my confession of faith in his own words.

"While Constructive Idealism thus affirms the objective reality of God, it refuses to admit that He can be conceived as a separate and independent Being standing apart from the world and only acting externally upon it; on the contrary, it affirms that He is actually present in the world, and above all in the self-conscious life of man, while yet the infinite fulness of His being is not comprehended by us" (p. 432).

Or again:—

"Constructive Idealism maintains that not the most infinitesimal atom of matter or the faintest trace of feeling, not to speak of the fair creations of imaginative genius or the solid constructions of reflective thought, could possibly exist, were they not involved in the Infinite and supported by its continual presence and spiritual energy" (p. 437).

But for the use of the ambiguous and misleading word "Infinite" there is nothing in these passages to which I could not heartily and *ex animo* subscribe, and which does not represent what I have over and over again endeavoured to express in my own no doubt crude and unscientific way. The points of difference between us lie chiefly in these points:—

(1) I hold that, if it is once admitted that the object has no existence apart from *some* subject, we must be bold enough to accept the inference that the object is, in ultimate analysis, merely the experience of some subject or subjects, though we must make it plain that we do not mean by "experience" merely the mere sensations of the Sensationalist. My Idealism, in short, is the Idealism of such genuinely Idealistic writers as Lotze, Mr. Bradley, Prof. Ward, Prof. A. E. Taylor, Prof. McTaggart—not the "soft Idealism" of the school to which Prof. Watson belongs—a school which after refuting the Materialist by idealistic arguments meets the assaults of the Realist by unsaying all that he has said about the necessary reference to Consciousness involved in all the objects of our knowledge (except Spirits), and so leaving on the mind of an

outsider desirous of penetrating to its esoteric meaning much the same impression as the Athanasian Creed produces upon the mind of the average layman. For my own part I do not quite see the difference between saying that "Reality is experience" and saying (with Prof. Watson, p. 446) that "the physical world has no independent being, but is merely a phase in the life of mind"—at least not if Mind is to be held to imply (as for Prof. Watson it apparently does imply) consciousness.

(2) I do not regard the consciousness of each human individual as identical with the consciousness of God, or part of it, holding that the idea of a consciousness which forms part of another consciousness is essentially unintelligible and self-contradictory. To be caused by another consciousness, to be influenced by it, to love it and be loved by it, to hold communion with it—all these are not the same thing as to *be* another consciousness. Doubtless God and all the other consciousnesses constitute a Unity—if you like an Absolute. But I can see no reason to believe that this Unity is the particular kind of Unity which belongs to a self-conscious Being. Believing with Prof. Watson that God is a self-conscious Being, I refuse therefore to identify Him with the Whole, the Universe, or the Absolute. Consequently also He is not, in the natural and obvious sense of the word, "infinite," though I could easily find senses in which that word might intelligibly be applied to Him.

This was the gist of my contention. And this point is so little discussed by Prof. Watson that, even after reading his book, I cannot tell whether he does or does not identify himself with the position I attacked. If he is to be really consistent with his declaration that "no one but myself can experience the feeling" of hunger (p. 119), I should infer that he does not share it. If so, the supposed difference between us disappears. Only I fail to see how, if Prof. Watson were logically to think out what is implied in this position, he could avoid finding himself in much the same position as the object of his criticism, with all its difficulties real or imaginary, and being compelled to give up the doctrine that God "must be conceived as in some sense comprehending within Himself all that is" (p. 273).

(3) I may just allude to a third point of difference. I do not accept the doctrine that God is "out of time". In what Prof. Watson says about God having "successive ideas and experiences," "distinguishes Himself from all other consciousnesses" and the like (p. 110), he has most unfairly taken no account of the paragraph in which I expressly qualified any statement which might bear such an interpretation by suspending judgment upon the question of God's relation to time.

I do not intend to enter upon any further argument with Prof. Watson at the present moment. If I did so, I could do little but repeat the arguments which, as expressed in *Personal Idealism*,

Prof. Watson found so unconvincing or unintelligible, or by reproducing the fuller account of my views upon some points which is now to be found in *The Theory of Good or Evil*, in my contribution to *Contentio Veritatis* (which is referred to in a note in *Personal Idealism*), in an article upon "The Alleged Immanence of God" (*Contemporary Review*, June, 1907), and elsewhere. I am quite aware that all that I have written does not amount to a fully developed and articulated metaphysical system. I could only fully meet Prof. Watson's arguments by developing such a system. But I think I have said enough to show that his representation of my opinions amounts to a mere caricature. The only way in which I can account for his attributing such absurdities and contradictions to me is by supposing that he is really in earnest with the position to which some of his language seems to point, i.e., that he gets his notions of what goes on in other people's minds entirely *a priori*. At all events, I feel that any further reply to a criticism based upon such misconceptions would be useless. I am not likely to underrate the value of the debt which all British Philosophy, and especially Oxford Philosophy, owes to the School to which Prof. Watson would be the first to admit that he belongs. but I am not disposed to think that Philosophy has simply stood still since the day when Prof. Watson was a student at Glasgow. And I hold also that the truth which that School teaches may often be expressed in language less ambiguous and more intelligible than the phrases which constitute its well-known shibboleth. I have read much—I may say most—of Prof. Watson's book with sympathy, agreement, and respect. If he had taken the trouble to understand me, he would probably have found that the difference between us is less than he supposes: for it is obvious to me that Prof. Watson's Idealism, unlike that of many who employ almost exactly the same phrases, is the Idealism of a genuine Theist. He is free therefore, or comparatively free, from many of the tendencies against which "Personal Idealism" is a protest. I do not doubt the perfect good faith of Prof. Watson's criticism. At the same time I cannot but remark that a little more pains would at least have avoided attributing to me opinions which I have in express words disclaimed, whatever may be said about the legitimacy of the inferences drawn by him from what I actually have maintained. The injury which such misrepresentations do to the criticised is something which no subsequent correction can undo. Misrepresentations of this kind stick. Prof. Watson's book will be read by people who do not read the back numbers of *MIND*, and they will believe that I have said and think what he attributes to me. If my opinions were so inconceivably absurd and so full of "obvious contradictions" as Prof. Watson supposes, they would hardly have been worthy of the criticism which he has bestowed upon them in a serious philosophical treatise.

The harm that is done by such distortions of a writer's position may be illustrated by the fact that my friend Prof. Mackenzie, in spite of his having, as I have reason gratefully to remember, read through my largest work in a very sympathetic spirit, pronounces in his review of Prof. Watson's book in *MIND* (October, 1908) that it is "thoroughly fair in its references to divergent positions". I trust that, after reading this paper, he may find reason for altering his opinion on this point, though the alteration will leave the merits of the greater part of the book just what they were before.

H. RASHDALL.