

theory. There is much to be said for such an attempt, but to describe emotions as 'disorders,' or to characterize them as pathological creates more difficulties than it solves.

Passing to the psychological nature of emotion, the author distinguishes between the mechanism and the consciousness of the emotion. This inevitably leads him to the James-Lange theory which he strenuously defends. Here again it is a pity that the author is apparently unacquainted with recent work on the subject, notably Shand's. A consistent psychology of instinct and emotion can doubtless be developed along the general lines followed, but it must include what is sound in the work of James, McDougall, Shand, Freud, and Rivers. Of such a psychology we are here presented with little more than fragmentary outlines. In spite of this the chapter on emotion has considerable interest and value.

As an introduction to psychology the book as a whole, in spite of the points criticised, must be pronounced excellent.

JAMES DREVER.

*Psyche's Lamp: A Revaluation of Psychological Principles as Foundation of all Thought.* BY ROBERT BRIFFAULT. George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1921. Pp. 240.

This is not so original a book as its author seems to suppose, nor are its conclusions likely to call forth such a chorus of indignation as he anticipates. In a postscript—thoughtfully provided as "first aid to critics"—Mr. Briffault announces that the conclusions to which his arguments have led "are a challenge to the most fundamental of all notions, to the foundation of all past and current thought and evaluations of life's values, the notion of individuality, the *sum* that was once regarded as the one solid rock of certainty amid a universe of uncertainties," and he adds in the next sentence "Berkeley dissolved the 'external world' of the thinker; I call in question the existence of the thinker himself" (p. 238). Has Mr. Briffault forgotten Hume, not to mention William James and the latest exponents of Behaviourism?

It is true that Mr. Briffault's method of attack is quite different from Hume's and owes not a little to modern psychology and biology of which he has an extensive knowledge. He differs also from Hume in having a pronounced ethical purpose which gives added charm to a naturally flowing style. Mr. Briffault is convinced that "the concept of individuality has plunged the world into despair from which it could be saved were we but persuaded of the continuity and impersonal unity of all the forces that represent the substance of being" (p. 240). He thus sets out to expose the "illusion of individuality" which reached its climax in the *cogito* of Descartes. Because our cognitive consciousness does not reach beyond the cycle of what we call 'our individual life,' we suppose that in thought we find the foundation of the *sum*. But, as Hume pointed out, there is much that we do not remember even in that which we call distinctively "ours"; hence, lapse of memory does not suffice to establish discontinuity of the individual. There is, then, no warrant for the conclusion that the discontinuity of cognitive experience constitutes the line of demarcation between the individual and the "continuity of life". This argument is reinforced by the consideration that much of our mental attitude is the result of the unconscious workings of mind that is continuous in the race; from which, again, it follows that cognition is not the essence of mind and, therefore, cannot be the principle of its differentiation. This seems to me both true and important, and Mr. Briffault is only mistaken in supposing that it is revolutionary and, further, that it is capable of supplying the key to all problems.

The book is interestingly written and is easy reading. It is obvious that the author considers the ethical applications of his theory to be of great significance, and questions of evaluation constantly recur. Space permits us to touch on two problems only. Chap. VII. is devoted to the discussion of "freedom" about which some interesting things are said. Mr. Briffault points out first that the problem largely arises from a failure to recognise that the causality of mental process is nothing but "the control which an idea exercises over thought and action" (p. 170), and it is just this relation of control that constitutes freedom. Secondly, he argues that all necessity is logical, and results only from the lameness of our intellect which forces us to demonstrate the obvious. Thus the scientific determinism that would construct the universe given the data is but the elaboration of a tautology. Hence no consequence of any importance follows. Mr. Briffault concludes that our dynamics is inapplicable to the universe. So, too, is our psychology and the conception of purpose; with the rejection of the latter our ethical values cease to have meaning in reference to the whole of things. Yet, in his summing up, Mr. Briffault falls into inconsistencies and speaks of the universe as *punishing* sins against the laws of Life, and he even concludes with the exhortation to *trust* the universe that we do not need to cognise.

So, after all, value returns and we judge the universe of which we are but a fragment.

L. S. S.

*Dual Evolution.* Being outlines in a theory which is thought to reconcile Idealism and Realism from the viewpoint of Humanism. By J. O'CALLAGHAN. London: G. Bell & Sons, Ltd., 1921. Pp. viii, 259. Price 12s. net.

Mr. O'Callaghan claims to keep a tight hold of actuality, and will not allow himself to be led astray into the excesses of either an absolute monism or an intellectualist mechanism. As part of his vision of the actual world he has three irreducibles; a world of matter outside of and indifferent to selves; selves behind and owning those activities we call consciousness; and consciousness, the system of activities by which the self passes from potentiality to actuality. Matter is essentially sensation, and possesses extensity and duration, which are real where abstract space and time are unreal. Sensation which is matter and sensation which is in consciousness seem to be two different things, though they are both essentially movements.

There is much of which we are not clear, though the fault is perhaps not Mr. O'Callaghan's. After his modest sub-title, he makes amends by being sufficiently assertive throughout his book. The book has attractive and repellent aspects. There is no index. There is an annoying use of adjectives as nouns (irreducibles, perceptibles, apprehendibles, distinguishables, recognisables and expressibles, etc.); an exuberant flow of language too often where terseness would prove welcome; a hearty disdain for the mechanical philosophers: but it is all in the interests of concreteness, vividness, actuality (his chief friends are "particularities," his main enemy an "epiphenomenon"); and he has learned so many excellent things from such excellent masters (among whom may be noted Croce and Bergson) that it is a pity from a philosophical point of view that he let his imagination run riot instead of bowing to the rigour of a decent logic. Among other marvels, he speaks of the origin of life (108-109), and this is an essential part of his theory; of the relation of the parent "selves" (as distinct from their "bodies") to the offspring "selves" (120-122); of the significance of the differentiation of male and female (224); and, in