The Function and Scope of Social Philosophy. H. A. OVERSTREET.
J. of Philos., Psychol., &c., 1914, **11**, pp. 533-43.

Professor Overstreet pleads for a recognized and organized social philosophy. Philosophy has been too much occupied with criticizing the results and presuppositions of the mathematical, physical, and biological sciences. But the disorganized state of the social sciences shows that they have need of a philosophical criticism of their categories if they are ever to get organized as a truly coherent body of scientific knowledge. Professor Overstreet has no difficulty in giving striking illustrations of the need of a social philosophy from the present state of the social sciences, especially economics and politics.

Defining social philosophy, then, as "the critique of social categories," he holds that an inventory of the "master concepts" of the social sciences is its first task. These "master concepts" he finds to be (1) work, (2) sex-life, (3) æsthetic enjoyment, (4) knowledge-seeking, (5) government, (6) heeding the good (*i. e.*, ethics and religion.) It follows that the philosophy of work or industry will be the fundamental section of social philosophy upon which, Professor Overstreet thinks, all others section must rest. Then successively must be developed philosophies of sex-life, of æsthetics, of science and education, of ethics and religion, in order to complete social philosophy.

While this article is suggestive and sensibly written, it leaves an impression of looseness and vagueness in the mind of the trained worker in the social sciences. What, for instance, is the relation between this social philosophy, as Professor Overstreet conceives it, and sociology? To be sure, he starts out with the modest program of making "social philosophy" merely a criticism of the categories of the social sciences, but he ends with the demand that a completed social philosophy include philosophies of everything from industry to religion. If these several philosophies are to be built upon the facts of history and experience, as well as upon the criticism of concepts, wherein will they differ from sections of a scientific sociology in the broad sense of that term? Again, in the same spirit Professor Overstreet fails to recognize that social psychology and social biology must be sections of sociology. A carefully worked-out logic of the social sciences would surely have enabled him to speak less vaguely regarding social philosophy. Finally, in asserting that a philosophy of work must be fundamental to all other sections of social philosophy, does not Professor Overstreet

fall into the same error as the "economic determinists"? Social philosophies we have in plenty at the present time; what we need is a scientific criticism and synthesis of the elements of worth in each of them.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

Socialism and Syndicalism. P. SNOWDEN. Baltimore: Warwick & York, 1914. Pp. 262.

This is the type of book on a social movement which makes the psychologist despair. No attempt is made at *psychological* interpretation or criticism of the socialist and syndicalist movements. Instead, we are met at the beginning with the dogmatic statement that "Socialism, based upon the impregnable rock of history, economy, and morality, can alone explain the causes of existing industrial and social evils, and alone submits a coherent, intelligent, scientific, and practical scheme of change" (p. 15). How a political and economic program, such as Socialism, can *explain* anything is difficult to see, unless indeed it be assumed that such a program has back of it and implicit in it an adequate scientific social philosophy. This, of course, is just what Mr. Snowden does rather vaguely assume for Socialism. Hence the futility, it would seem, of the labors of the social psychologists.

Not that Mr. Snowden is an extreme socialist. On the contrary he is of the moderate type. He criticizes Marx's theories in a mild way, but his criticisms are of the conventional sort and show no knowledge of modern psychology. In the same way his treatment of Syndicalism leaves much to be desired. He repeats the ordinary economic explanations of the syndicalist movement, and makes no attempt at a psychological analysis of it.

The book can be commended only as a sample of the literature of the social sciences when they are still in the stage in which there is little or no appreciation of the bearing of modern psychology upon social theory.

C. A. ELLWOOD

Democracy and Race Friction. J. M. MECKLIN. New York: Macmillan, 1914. Pp. x + 270.

The status of the negro, past, present, and future, is the main problem under discussion. Discarding the vague humanitarianism of idealistic philosophy, of the political equalitarians, and of the recent psychology which asserts that all peoples are roughly uni-