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The Administration of the English and French Armies in the Crimea

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THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ENGLISH AND FRENCH ARMIES IN THE CRIMEA.

By CAPTAIN R. D. BARBOR, Army Service Corps.

TABLE OF IMPORTANT EVENTS.

Sept. 23rd, 1853.	Count Walewski, French Ambassador, asked for <i>immediate action</i> on the part of England against Russia.
Oct. 23rd, 1853.	Sultan of Turkey declared war against Russia.
Nov. 30th, 1853.	Turkish Fleet destroyed by Russia in Sinope Harbour. Public opinion in England <i>went mad</i> .
Jan. 31st, 1854.	Parliament asked to increase Army and Navy.
Feb. 20th, 1854.	British troops leave for seat of war.
Feb. 21st, 1854.	Mr. Filder appointed Commissary-General. England and France broke off diplomatic relations with Russia.
March 13th, „	One thousand men under General Canrobert embark at Marseilles.
March 15th, „	Formation of French Expeditionary Force decided on.
March 28th, „	England declared war.
March 29th, „	Marshal St. Arnaud, French Commander-in-Chief, embarked.
March 30th, „	French occupy Gallipoli.
April 5th, „	English detachments arrive at seat of war.
April 10th, „	Lord Raglan left England, and Mr. Filder sailed for Constantinople.
June 15th, „	The <i>Times</i> orders the destruction of Sebastopol.
June 22nd, „	Office of Secretary of State for War separated from Secretary of State for Colonies.
June 27th, „	Cabinet, after a few hours' sitting, and in deference to public opinion, ordered invasion of Crimea.

July 16th, 1854	Orders for invasion of Crimea arrived.
July 18th, „	Reconnaissance of Crimean coast ordered.
August 8th, „	Raglan wrote to Home Government with reference to question of winter quarters.
August 10th, „	Great fire at Varna.
August 24th, „	Embarkation begun.
Sept. 6th, „	British forces ready to move from Varna.
Sept. 9th, „	Arrival off Crimea.
Sept. 13th, „	English landed at Old Fort. Mr. Filder wrote home for hay.
Sept. 18th, „	Debarkation concluded.
Sept. 19th, „	Advances commenced.
Nov. 8th, „	<i>Commissary-General directed to make provision for a winter in the Crimea.</i>
Nov. 13th, „	The great storm.
Nov. 28th, „	French supply of warm clothing arrived.
Dec. 8th, „	Mr. Filder sent his <i>eighth</i> appeal for hay.
Dec. 22nd, „	Commissariat removed from Treasury and placed under the War Department.
Jan. 24th, 1855.	Land Transport Corps raised by Royal Warrant.
March 20th, „	Railway constructed as far as Col de Balaclava.
March „	Land Transport Corps at work in Crimea.
April 5th, „	Commissariat transferred all transport to Land Transport Corps.
May „	Troops left Crimea.

THE name of the Crimea calls to the mind of every Briton a story of splendid bravery, and of terrible suffering, of tactical triumphs, and of administrative disasters. Of the reasons for these disasters from an administrative point of view, very little has been written. Most people know vaguely that "someone had blundered," and beyond that, nothing. It is possible, therefore, that a consideration of the causes of our administrative shortcomings in 1854 and 1855, may be of something more than academic interest. If the British Army goes forth to war again, as in 1854, against a European Power with a European ally, it seems improbable that similar mistakes should be repeated, but on the other hand, in the history of the strife of nations, the obvious military teachings of one generation have been frequently forgotten by the next. It is our duty, therefore, to consider the causes of the administrative disasters in the Crimea, not in a spirit of barren criticism, but with a view to learning from the mistakes of others, the pitfalls which we ourselves may have to avoid.

To the average military student there are certain great landmarks in the evolution of European warfare, points at which, owing to the magnitude of the operations, the science of war is studied closely, with a view to deducing from past

happenings, practical lessons for our future guidance. In accordance with this practice, the soldier student makes a "bond" from Frederick the Great to Napoleon I., from Napoleon to the Crimea, and so on. In order, however, to form a judgment on any campaign, it is essential not only to know all the conditions, strategical, tactical and administrative, under which it was conducted, but also to trace their evolution from one great war to another. Strategic principles remain the same, the tactical formations of the victors in one war are generally adopted at the commencement of the next, but we find that the administrative services are often entirely changed between one war and another, from causes which have little relation to war efficiency. This was especially true between 1815 and 1854, and in order to appreciate the position of the administrative services of the Allies during the Crimean War, it is desirable to survey rapidly the vicissitudes of these services from Waterloo to 1854.

In England and France, after the downfall of Napoleon Bonaparte, a great and natural peace reaction set in. The nations were war weary, and serious social problems awaited solution all through Europe. Every effort was made to direct the wealth and energy of the nations towards the victories of peace; swords were turned into ploughshares, and military expenditure was reduced to a minimum. In accordance with this endeavour the administrative services, notably supply and transport, were marked out as a field for retrenchment.

THE FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES.

In France, after the peace of 1815, the entire Imperial organization of the "*Train des Equipages*" was done away with, except two companies, which were formed into one squadron in December, 1822. In 1819, however, a colonial train was formed for service in the French foreign possessions. In 1825, an attempt was made by the Minister for War to disband the solitary squadron, with the intention of employing civilian contractors to do the work; public opinion, however, insisted on the retention of the squadron.

In 1823, France declared war against the Spanish Revolutionary party. It was then found that to supply the French Army of 100,000 men, an increase of 13,662 men and 14,649 horses would be required in the supply and transport personnel. Eight companies of the train were ordered to be formed for ammunition wagons, and 22 brigades of pack mules, each comprising 150 mules. However, these arrangements never got beyond a paper stage; the pack brigades were changed by a decree of June 11th, into "dismounted" companies, which never crossed the Pyrennees. An Intendant General was appointed two days before the departure of the Army. This somewhat tardy appointment, which has the

air of an afterthought, only served the purpose of providing a scapegoat for the "War Stores Scandal" Commission, which assembled after the war, and spent two years in taking evidence and giving judgment. The Government at last turned in despair to a big contractor, a "William Whiteley" of his epoch, in order to obtain supplies and transport for the Army. Briefly, the result of this course was, that in addition to unsatisfactory working and long delays, the big contractor received 43 million francs for supplies which should have cost 22 millions! The moral of which is, that as long as war is a possibility, undue retrenchment may be false economy.

In November, 1830, the Army was reorganized. The "*Train des Equipages*" was raised to eight active, and eight reserve companies, with one dépôt company, the total strength being 3,325 officers and men, and 5,260 horses, which strength was increased the following year by 1,050 men. In 1833 six companies of the train were disbanded. In 1841 the "*Train des Equipages*" was placed on a peace footing of four squadrons of four companies each, and a dépôt "cadre" company. Four companies of artificers were also formed for the service of construction and repair dépôts. In case of war mobile repair parks were to be established in the rear of the Army.

At this epoch a great confusion of ideas reigned as regards the proper organization of the administrative services, and it remained for Marshal St. Arnaud, then War Minister, to reorganize in 1852 the transport of the Army. The Marshal addressed to the Prince President of the Republic a special memorandum on the reorganization of the train. He pointed out that the teachings of the great Napoleon had been forgotten, and that the real problem was to keep during peace sufficient resources for war, in other words, the retention of cadres capable of expansion. In accordance with this principle, he organized the "*Train des Equipages*" in five squadrons, each containing three service and one dépôt company, capable of an expansion up to 35 service companies, of which 26 would be available for an Army of 300,000 men operating in Europe, the remaining nine companies being allotted to Algeria. In 1853 the Intendance was given the command as well as the control of all the transport of the Army. On the threat of war a 6th squadron and a Guards squadron were immediately formed. All the companies of the train were doubled, and 16 auxiliary companies were formed, recruited from the infantry soldiers in the Crimea, or from the Turks and Tartars.

Such was the organization of the French supply and transport services for the war against Russia in 1854. The French Commander-in-Chief had an organized service for the administration of supplies and transport, immediately under

his own orders, and formed on lines which he had personally laid down, with a senior officer personally responsible to him for these departments. As regards medical services, an organized corps of ambulance drivers, with ambulance wagons, was in existence. Clothing, equipment and pay, were provided by departments of the Intendance, and the provision of these, as well as of ammunition, was the responsibility of the War Minister, who was always a General Officer on the Active List. We have, therefore, in France, on the eve of war, a single Department of State, called the War Office, responsible for the co-ordination and performance of all the administrative duties necessary to the conduct of operations in the field.

THE BRITISH ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES.

In the British Army a different state of things existed. With us the supply and transport administration, as organized by the Duke of Wellington, did not suffer from continuous changes as in France. It simply disappeared. In 1833 the Royal Wagon Train, which had performed all the transport work in the Peninsula, was disbanded, and from that date up to the commencement of the campaign of 1854, no military unit for the services of supplies, baggage, or ambulance work was in existence. A Commissariat Department still existed, but as a purely civil department, directly under the orders of the Treasury, and not answerable to the military authorities. In 1854 this Department contained 114 officers, none of whom served in England, but were distributed all over our Colonies and foreign possessions, except India. Their duties, as laid down in the Army List of 1854, are enlightening. These duties were "blended" with those of the Army, Navy, Ordnance, and many other branches of the public service, and in addition to the usual responsibility for supplies to the troops, and for land and water transport, they had charge of the Military Chest, from which they issued pay, not only to the Regimental Paymasters, but also to the Naval and Ordnance Departments, to Stipendiary Magistrates in the West Indies, to naval and military pensioners, and even to the Ecclesiastical Establishments in Canada, Nova Scotia, and Jamaica; they also issued clothing, provisions and stores, to the convict prisons in Australia, and made all contracts for Ordnance Stores, and for building materials. Such being the duties of the only department concerned with supply and transport, it seems quite clear that no organization existed for the supply and transport of an expeditionary force from England.

As regards the medical service, every regiment had its own surgeon and assistant-surgeon; ambulance wagons, however, were non-existent, likewise medical orderlies and drivers

of ambulances. In short, the medical organization did not appear to contemplate anything beyond the provision of "first aid." Every unit had its own Paymaster, who received cash from the Commissariat, and every cavalry regiment had its own veterinary officer. A Board of 15 general officers, presided over by a Field-Marshal, looked after the clothing of the Army, which was issued free, except boots, for which the soldiers in the Crimea had to pay 8s. a pair, until a general order of January 6th made boots a free issue. Necessaries were obtained privately from London tradesmen by each regiment according to the fancy of the commanding officer. The Board of Ordnance was responsible for equipment and ammunition.

As regards the higher administration of the Army, a few words are necessary. The Cabinet Minister responsible was the Secretary of State for the Colonies *and* War. Three public Departments were concerned with the control of the Army:—

1. The Staff at Headquarters (Horse Guards) consisting of the Commander-in-Chief, his Military Secretary, the Adjutant-General, with three assistants, and a Quartermaster-General, with only two. The command, discipline, and posting of cavalry and infantry only were under this Department, which was in turn responsible not to the Government, but solely to Her Majesty the Queen.

2. The War Office, which contained: (a) The Board of Ordnance, under whose orders were the artillery and engineers of the Army, and who were responsible for the provision of all warlike stores for both the Navy and Army; (b) the Clothing Board of General Officers; (c) the Commissioners, Royal Military College; (d) the Commissioners, Royal Military Asylum. The War Office, unlike the staff at Headquarters, was responsible to the Cabinet.

3. The Treasury, under whose orders the Commissariat Department worked.

There were two Inspectors, an Inspector-General of Cavalry under the Horse Guards, and an Inspector of Regimental Colours under the War Office. There was also a Chaplain-General, who had a chair at the War Office.

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.

Such was the administrative situation of the Armies of France and Great Britain when the war clouds commenced to gather in the East. The causes which led to this war are a matter of diplomatic rather than of military interest, but the attitude of the British Government towards the question of war is a matter of moment, inasmuch as it had its effect on the military preparations. It must be remembered that every British Government of that epoch was strongly opposed to war in the abstract, and Lord Palmerston, a great statesman,

expressed a doubt in 1853 as to whether "we were destined ever to be at war again." This was the expression of a very general conviction, which is supported by the fact that the portfolios of the Colonies and of War were held by one Minister.

Two external causes, however, pushed the Cabinet of 1853 towards war, the Emperor of the French, and British public opinion. The former might have been ignored, but it became impossible to resist the violence of the latter. This nation of ours, ever unwilling to prepare for, but ever ready to engage in war, was incited to a white heat of rage because the Russian fleet had destroyed the Turkish fleet in Sinope Harbour on November 30th, 1853. This perfectly legitimate act of war was considered unsporting and barbaric, and the "many-headed multitude" went mad. The daily papers, like the heathen, "ragged furiously," and even the great Poet Laureate attacked the Government in general, and John Bright in particular, for preaching peace. As a result the hand of the Government was forced. On January 30th, Parliament increased the establishments of the Navy and Army, and on March 28th Great Britain declared war against Russia, France having done so nine days previously. On April 10th a Treaty of Alliance was signed between France and Great Britain, and on that date the British Commander-in-Chief, Lord Raglan (better known then as Lord Fitzroy Somerset, of Waterloo fame) left for Paris en route for Constantinople.

THE SEA TRANSPORT TO GALLIPOLI.

As soon as the expedition was decided upon, the first care of both the French and British Governments was to arrange for the embarkation of a large force, destined in the first instance for Gallipoli, as a place of assembly. At that time the Royal Navy was responsible for making all arrangements for sea transport, but had only three vessels permanently allocated for the work. It therefore became necessary to draw upon the resources of the mercantile marine, and, thanks to our great resources in merchant ships, the embarkation of the Army was not a matter of insuperable difficulty.

With the French Army things were different. There the Navy found the transport, and handed it over immediately to the Intendance. The French merchant service was quite unable to cope with the work of embarking the French troops for the East, and the Government had recourse to the English and American merchant services, and even ships of war were used as transports. In spite of the greatest activity, the suddenness with which the expedition was decided upon prevented satisfactory organization. On March 13th, General Canrobert and one thousand men were hurriedly sent off in a convoy

consisting of one man-of-war, one small steamship, and one sailing vessel! Marshal St. Arnaud, the French Commander-in-Chief, left France on March 29th, arriving at Gallipoli on April 15th. His first act was to order a review. Unfortunately there was almost nothing to review. The mistake had been made of paying for the sailing ship transports *by the day*. As a result, the wily captains prolonged the voyage as much as possible, and had to be searched for in secluded bays, by the warships accompanying the expedition. The men were embarked on the steamships, the supplies, equipment and horses on sailing ships. As late as May 30th, '54, St. Arnaud wrote:—"I have not the right to compromise or endanger the honour of the flag by sending into action an army neither constituted nor organized, having neither its artillery, its cavalry, its train, its ambulances nor its supplies. Everything arrives piece-meal, guns without their carriages and horses, horses without their gun carriages. We can only push forward at Varna the *heads* of columns." Again, on July 9th, he wrote:—"In order to undertake a great operation of war, one should have great resources—we have *none*. For six months the Admiralty have been asked for sloops and flat-bottomed boats, which are indispensable for a disembarkation. The invariable reply of the Admiralty is that the matter is 'under consideration.'" We have, therefore, the spectacle of two Allied Armies, the one well organized, but unable to arrive at the decisive point for want of sea transport, the other, brought to the decisive point, but not yet organized.

It has been shown previously that Great Britain lacked an organization for transport, supplies, and medical services. It was on the same day as Lord Raglan, that the gentleman embarked to whom was entrusted the herculean task of organizing the supplies and transport of the Expeditionary Force for the East. Mr. Filder was a retired Commissariat officer of advanced years, who had served in the Peninsula and been present at nine engagements. On February 21st, 1854, he was appointed Commissary-General of the Army in the East, and on April 10th he sailed for Constantinople. His departure was preceded by that of one Commissariat officer of junior rank, who had been sent to take over the barracks at Scutari, to arrange for the reception of troops, and to secure supplies and local transport, but only at Scutari. In his work of construction Mr. Filder had very little but Peninsula precedent to guide him. No regulations existed except a paragraph in the Queen's Regulations fixing the amount of *bât* animals allowed as regimental transport. From the Government he received only two injunctions, "to cut things fine, and get provisions locally." To assist him in this invidious occupation, he had only 40 Commissariat officials gathered from the ends of the earth, while the services of a great number of East Indian Commissaries, then on leave in

England, were not made use of. His duties as Commissary-General were to provide the necessary supplies and transport for an Army operating in Turkey in Europe, whose strength was at first fixed at 10,000, but was subsequently increased to 25,000. As soon as Mr. Filder knew that it was decided to move beyond Constantinople, he endeavoured to hire transport, but could not succeed in doing so. He then urged Lord Raglan to obtain from Roumelia and Bulgaria, through the influence of Omar Pasha, the Turkish Commander-in-Chief, 3,000 arabas.¹ Only 1,500, however, could be got up to June, and 5,300 pack animals were further obtained by contract. Mr. Filder's estimate of the transport requirements for a campaign in Bulgaria was 14,000 animals, including line of communication animals. Long before this number was arrived at, the Crimea was decided upon as the objective of the allies.

A word must be said as to the organization of the medical services. In March, 1854, the Deputy-Secretary of War received a letter from Lord Raglan's military secretary, asking him for volunteers from the Pension List for a Hospital Ambulance Corps for the East, although the Director-General of Medical Services had begged for anything but pensioners. On March 30th, the War Office therefore asked from the ranks of the pensioners for 100 privates and ten sergeants as ambulance drivers, and ten sergeants, with 250 privates, as hospital orderlies. The age limit was 50, which was not, however, rigidly observed, as one man claimed, and obtained, his discharge from Bulgaria on the plea that he was 74! On arriving in Bulgaria, it was found, that owing to the smallness of the Bulgarian horses, double the number estimated would be required for ambulance work. This meant doubling the number of drivers, and this deficiency was quickly made good by taking away the men enlisted as hospital orderlies, who were enlisted without any knowledge whatever of horses or transport work. The results were not satisfactory for either branch of the Ambulance Corps, and, as in the transport services, we see inadequate numbers, and an untrained personnel, resulting in the delay and hampering of military operations.

It must be remembered that it is to this inability of the French and English to act immediately that we owe the many changes of strategic plans, and indirectly the final determination to operate in the Crimea. The original intention of the Allies appears to have been, after having landed round Gallipoli, to move north against the Russian Field Army to support the Turks in Bulgaria. On May 19th the Turks were attacked at Silistria by the Russians, but for want of transport the Allies could not move up to support. At first the scheme of going

¹An araba is a country cart drawn by two bullocks and taking a load of 700 lbs.

by sea to Varna was decided on, but on June 4th, at which time the English Light Division was already at Varna, the French Commander-in-Chief proposed a new plan to which Lord Raglan would not consent, and on June 10th, Marshal St. Arnaud agreed to the original plan, preparatory to marching north, with Varna as a joint base. Meanwhile, during the inaction of the French and English, the Turks were covering themselves with glory, and once again the course of military operations was decided by the public and the Press in England.

On June 15th a leading article appeared in the *Times*, in which it was pointed out that the true solution of the strategic problem was an invasion of the Crimea, and the reduction of the great fortress of Sevastopol. Seven days after, a still stronger article urged, or rather ordered, the Government to adopt this plan, a sort of "referendum" on the advisability of this strategy having been taken meanwhile in the country. The great British public was "out for blood," and again the hand of the Government was forced. On June 27th, after a sitting of a few hours, the Cabinet ordered the invasion of the Crimea. It was about this time that the portfolios of the Secretary of State for the Colonies and for War were separated, and the Duke of Newcastle became Secretary of State for War. Unfortunately his former staff remained at the Colonial Ministry. On June 29th, the Duke of Newcastle sent orders to Lord Raglan for the expedition to the Crimea. It should be pointed out that those orders were somewhat conditional. It was mentioned that Constantinople must be first of all safeguarded, and that "insuperable obstacles," such as the "want of ample preparation by either Army," or the "presence of a superior Russian force in the Crimea," might be allowed to hinder the expedition. Still later on an expedition in conjunction with Schamyl, the Circassian Chieftain, to surround a Russian Army at Tiflis, was mentioned. Reference is made to these plans only because it is possible that this element of strategic uncertainty may have had its effect on Lord Raglan's administrative arrangements, although neither Lord Raglan nor Mr. Filder ever made such a claim. However, on July 16th, the orders to invade the Crimea arrived, and on July 18th, a reconnaissance of the Crimean coast was made with a view to the discovery of a suitable landing place. The valley of the Katcha was chosen. From this date the preparations for the Crimean expedition commenced.

CRIMEAN EXPEDITION.

In the midst of these preparations for the expedition, a disaster overtook the Allies. On August 10th a great fire broke out at Varna, and all the magazines of the Allies were destroyed. This disaster, however, cannot be said to have affected the subsequent situation in the Crimea itself, as it will be seen

later that inability to obtain supplies was not one of the causes of our troubles, and Colonel Gordon in his evidence before the Commission stated that the Army left Varna fully equipped.

On August 24th, the embarkation of the Allied forces commenced at Varna, and on the evening of September 6th the transports were ready to move. Three hundred transports, 55 sailing and steam vessels of war and 34 ships of the line conveyed the Allied Armies. On September 9th the convoys arrived at their destinations. Lord Raglan then decided that the Allies should land on the beach opposite Old Fort, in Kalamita Bay, six miles north of the Bulganac stream. By September 14th the disembarkation of the British Army of the

Crimea was commenced, and was completed without any opposition by September 18th. The French Army had completed their disembarkation the previous day. For the disembarkation, the French had caused flat-bottomed lighters to be constructed which would take guns with their gun carriages, and allow these to be run straight on the beach. The construction of these lighters took ten days. A British naval officer and some military officers had been sent to Constantinople to obtain something similar, but finally a sort of platform resting on two boats was adopted for landing guns. The remainder of the expedition was landed in boats.

The forces of the Allies landed in the Crimea were as follows:—

*French*¹: 31,000, of whom 24,000 were infantry, with 3,000 horses, 133 guns (68 of which were field guns), and a bridging train. Only 100 cavalry soldiers were with the French Army.

English: 26,000, of whom 22,000 were infantry, 1,000 cavalry, and 60 guns.

In readiness for embarkation at Varna the British had in addition a brigade of heavy cavalry, a siege train and 6,000 pack horses. These latter were never embarked from Varna, but were sent down by Lord Raglan's orders to Constantinople, where they formed a reserve dépôt of animals. No doubt remembering their instructions to "cut things fine," the Commissariat kept these animals on half rations. The reason for this action was stated by Mr. Filder to the Commission to have been that "these animals were not worth their keep." As a reserve of animals they consequently proved but a broken reed. According to Kinglake, large supplies of field ammunition and food for the troops were also embarked, with hay and barley for the horses. However, some of the horse transports had not on board enough forage for the voyage! According to French accounts, 45 days' rations in biscuit, salt meat, and forage were embarked, and each soldier on disembarkation was to receive four days' rations, while an extra six days' were made ready for subsequent issue. The French had also brought seven field ovens and the necessary materials for the construction of 20 more. They also embarked an ambulance for each division, and for the Headquarter Staff, 40 wagons and 350 mules being allocated for this service. In addition, 13,000 gabions, 34,000 fascines, 180,000 sandbags, 23,000 pioneer's tools and 50,000 lbs. of powder were embarked for the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers of the Allies. The British Army had neither ambulance wagons nor field ovens, and were destined shortly to suffer in consequence; no divisional supplies of medicine were taken, and a few divisions had medical panniers. In addition, other essentials of an Army in the field were left behind by them, for want of sea transport. At Varna two ships had been allotted to Mr. Filder for the conveyance of land transport, the available total capacity of these ships being 120 vehicles, with animals and equipment. However, only 70 (Kinglake states 60) carts, and 70 mules were brought for transport purposes, a number that appears absurdly inadequate.

At this time regimental transport was divided into (a) private, and (b) public bāt animals, the former foraged by the Government, but the property of the officers of the regiment,

¹ These figures are taken from French sources and do not agree with Kinglake's figures.

the latter issued by the Commissariat to the regiment for conveyance of public equipment. The majority of the regiments left these animals behind in Bulgaria, and it is difficult to understand how some battalions succeeded in bringing their *bât* animals (the 41st brought 12) while others landed without any. The allowance of public *bât* animals for a cavalry regiment was 14, but the 11th Hussars and 13th Dragoons only had three each on landing in the Crimea. For want of transport the English Army was also obliged to leave its tents behind, including hospital marquees and equipment. These tents were disembarked on the 14th as it was raining heavily, and were re-embarked four days later by the sailors. The French Army carried the "*tente abri*."

It was clearly of great importance to obtain any form of transport locally, and also supplies. The "requisitioning detachment," as at present constituted, was undreamt of in 1854. According to Kinglake, requisitioning was one of the chief duties of the light cavalry. However, in a very short time about 350 vehicles with teams and drivers were collected, 80 of which, laden with flour for the Russian troops, had been captured by the Commander-in-Chief's Aide-de-Camp, Captain Nolan. Thanks to these wagons the Commissary-General stated that he had enough transport for the food supply of the Army. What exactly did this mean? At the outbreak of the war in the East, the Commissariat Department was not obliged to find anything for the soldier except bread and meat, but its officials were, however, directed to "use their best efforts" to obtain groceries. The daily ration was 1 lb. of salt or fresh meat (raised on October 23rd, 1854, to 1½ lbs.) and 1 lb. biscuit or 1½ lbs. bread (raised on October 15th to 1½ lbs. biscuit, and reduced again, November 7th, for want of supply). These rations were not quite a free issue, but had to be paid for as part of the soldier's messing, out of his pay of one shilling a day. In 1850 the stoppage was fixed at 3½d. per diem. During the campaign in Bulgaria a quantity of groceries was placed by the Treasury at the disposal of the Commissariat, and the prices to be paid by the soldiers were fixed (vide Appendix A). On June 28th, 1854, a General Order added 1 oz. of coffee and 1¾ ozs. of sugar to the daily ration. The extra penny charged for this caused much dissatisfaction, as it was more than the price of the ration issued! On July 19th, 2 ozs. of rice per diem were added free, and also a ration of rum. The British soldier's rations therefore cost him 4½d. a day. The French soldier's ration consisted of 12 ozs. beef or 10 ozs. of pork daily, 2¼ ozs. of rice, and 27 ozs. of bread or 20 ozs. of biscuit. A compressed vegetable ration was also held in reserve, for issue when fresh vegetables could not be obtained. Vegetables for the British Army had to be found by the troops as best they could. However, on December 10th, the War Office ordered a free issue of vegetables, and regular issues were commenced

by the Commissariat in January, 1855. Lime juice was regarded as a medical comfort up to February, 1855, when it became part of the daily ration. In stating that the available transport was adequate, we now see on what the Commissary-General based his calculations.

Fuel was not considered. Mr. Filder strenuously opposed the issue of fuel to the troops—even when they had to dig into the frozen ground for tree stumps—because it had not been a commissariat service in the Peninsula, and should only be issued to the troops in barracks! This attitude of the Commissary-General is the more difficult to understand as a dépôt of fuel had been established by him at Scutari. It was not until December 16th that an Army Order was issued, on the recommendation of a "Board of Officers," fixing a scale of fuel rations to be issued to all ranks. It seems that, according to this Board, the higher the rank, the greater the need for fuel, for while the soldier got one and a half rations daily (at 3 lbs. of wood the ration), junior officers got eight rations, field officers 16, and General Officers 40! No lights were issued to troops at first, but the resourceful British soldier endeavoured to fashion candles from the fat of the pork ration.

Such, then, were the administrative conditions under which the Allied Armies landed in the Crimea, invading an Empire against unknown forces with means of transport only sufficient for a raid.

ADVANCE ON SEVASTOPOL.

On September 19th the Allies (the British Army on the left) commenced their southward march against Sevastopol, a distance of 25 miles away. The order of march of the baggage and supplies was different with the French and British Armies. St. Arnaud, who had been with Bugeaud at Isly, marched his baggage, transport and artillery together, between the two brigades of each division. The British baggage and supplies, with the captured cattle, marched in the rear of the 3rd Division, with the 1st Division acting as a flank guard, as shown:—

		■	Cavalry.
Light Division	□	□	2nd Division.
4th Division	□	□	3rd Division.
1st Division	□	◼	Supplies, Cattle, Baggage.

The fleet sailed parallel to the advance, since it was intended to use it as a floating base of supplies, the British Army only carrying with it ammunition for two battles, and supplies for three days. Of these supplies, the soldier carried one day in his

haversack. The French soldier, however, carried six days' rations.

So great was the anxiety to get on to Sevastopol, that an order was issued in the British Army, allowing the troops, if

so desired, to leave behind their knapsacks and valises, which contained a change of clothing. These were left on board ship, and the vessels were sent off to the opposite coast to convey reinforcements and supplies. When the knapsacks reached the

troops, *six weeks later*, many of them had been pillaged, and dreadful suffering ensued. The folly of issuing an optional order, or, indeed, of issuing such an order at all, needs no comment. The French soldier kept his knapsack and his "*tente abri*." The British soldier, however, marched without tents or waterproof sheets, and with no spare clothing, save a spare shirt for each man, and a pair of boots and socks wrapped in his blanket. Camp kettles, which were carried by the men, and entrenching tools were likewise found to be an inconvenience to the British soldier on the march, and were thrown away in large numbers during the advance. The ratio in the 4th Division of the numbers of camp kettles landed to those in possession of the troops at the end of 12 days is shown in Appendix "B." During the advance camp fires were forbidden for tactical reasons, but later on the effect of the needless loss of these camp kettles, which were not replaced till December, was serious. Without camp kettles the soldier attempted to cook his rations in his own mess tin, and much sickness was caused by eating half-cooked food. The 1st Division borrowed boilers from the Turks.

With the tactical victory of this advance we are not here concerned. Every schoolboy knows the story of the Alma, but the effect of this battle was to reduce the fighting strength of the Allies, and it became the more necessary that the administration of the Army should perform its proper function of sending the soldier into action in as perfect fighting condition as possible.

THE ALLIES BEFORE SEVASTOPOL.

From September 24th the administrative situation underwent a complete change. On the 21st the battle of the Alma was fought and won, and an immediate attack on Sevastopol from the north appeared to be the logical sequence of the defeat of the Russian Field Army. The original intention of the Allies had been so to attack from the north; hence a landing at Old Fort. Some uneasiness, however, existed as to the strength of the defences of Sevastopol on the north. Added to this, the fleet was still the base of supply, and for protracted operations, a safe anchorage became necessary. This did not exist on the west coast. Consequently, on September 24th, with a view to attacking Sevastopol from the south, the Allies determined to risk a hazardous flank march in order to base their Armies on the harbours of Balaclava, and Kamiesch Bay on the south of the Crimea. Not without strong protest from the French, Lord Raglan appropriated Balaclava as his base, leaving to his Ally the harbour of Kamiesch Bay. As subsequent events proved, the advantage of position lay with the French. The British right rested on the sea at Balaclava, the left on the heights of Inkerman. The base, Balaclava harbour, was practically in advance of the Army and liable to be cut off

by a vigorous attack from Prince Mentschikoff's Field Army. Consequently a large force was necessary for the separate protection of the base. The French base, on the other hand, was directly covered by the position of the French troops, and lay well out of reach of any hostile raids. At the same time, owing to the distance between the two bases, the French and British Armies could not keep touch. Immediate steps were taken by the Allies to disembark siege artillery and supplies of food and ammunition at their respective bases.

TRANSPORT AND SUPPLY.

The administrative situation now changes from the supply of an Army on the march to the supply of a stationary force. From this point all that seems to be required is the landing at the base of sufficient supplies of ammunition, clothing, equipment and food to maintain the Army, and the provision of transport to convey these necessities to that part of the Army which was some six or seven miles distant from the base. For that portion of the troops which was in Balaclava itself transport difficulties cannot have arisen. Yet it is from this moment that the story commences with which we are all familiar, a story of sufferings from exposure, overwork, and want, of uncomplaining fortitude and bravery, under inconceivable conditions of hunger and cold. The nation and the Army were destined to learn the truth of Colonel Gordon's statement to the Commission that "the War Office regulations were not adapted for a state of war." It has been the custom to place all the blame for our administrative inferno in the Crimea on the "system," and the Treasury. It should be remembered, however, that the leading soldiers of that period do not appear to have been dissatisfied with the system, and some measure of responsibility must therefore rest with the Army itself. That the system of higher control was bad, no one disputes, but then, two questions arise: (1) Were there any other causes which adversely affected the administrative situation in the Crimea? and (2) Were any of these avoidable? From an examination of certain statements made in evidence before the Commission, one is entitled to form the opinion, that apart from the Treasury or the "system," a great many causes are to be found for our troubles, and that some of these were avoidable. The final conclusions arrived at after the war were, that owing to Treasury neglect enough forage was not sent out; owing to want of forage the number of transport animals could not be increased, and owing to want of transport, the troops went without supplies and clothing. Let us examine these conclusions:—

There is not the smallest doubt that the primary necessity for the satisfactory supply of the Army was a road connecting the base of operations with the troops. This must have been apparent from the first. The question then arises, was the

improvement of the existing road an impossibility? On September 21st, General Burgoyne, the Chief Engineer, reported that the road from Balaklava to the positions of the troops was good. It does not seem to have been foreseen that the road could not remain good for long, and the question of repairing it was not considered until two months later, when the condition of the road prevented wheeled transport being used. It was impossible then to get civilian labour locally, and the troops could not be spared to do the work, but if steps had been taken in September to get labour from Constantinople to improve the road, the transport capacity of the Commissariat would not have been reduced by two-thirds, by a change from draught to pack. We have seen previously what was Mr. Filder's conception of the transport requirements of the Army. His point of view was narrow and departmental, and when it became necessary to employ the few available animals as pack instead of draught, the situation for the Army was serious.

The apparent solution was to increase the number of animals at once. It will be remembered that there was a reserve remount dépôt at Constantinople, where the animals were living (or dying) on half rations. However, it was impossible to draw on this source of supply for another reason. There was not sufficient forage available at Balaklava. A great disaster had overtaken the British Army on November 14th, when the "great storm," as it was called, destroyed 21 British ships in and outside Balaklava harbour. The French lost only three. Twenty days' hay was lost, ten million rounds of ammunition and one ship containing warm clothing for the troops.

One may well ask how it was that by November 14th there was not already landed a large reserve of hay. The blame for this, as already stated, has been placed entirely on the Treasury. It should be noted, however, that *before* November 14th hay was going short, and after that date it ceased altogether, while only 2½ lbs. of barley per horse was being issued. Since the issue of hay ceased *entirely* as a result of the storm it looks as if there was no hay in the dépôt at Balaklava. On September 13th Mr. Filder wrote to the Treasury asking for hay, and from that date up to December 8th eight further appeals were sent. On September 22nd, however, Mr. Filder wrote saying that hay and forage abounded in the Crimea, adding, that they could not be made available "to any extent" owing to the Cossack cavalry. This letter apparently left a false impression. There were, however, other resources in forage quite near at hand, and an examination of the contracts made by the Commissariat (vide Appendix C), and of those rejected by the Commissariat (vide Appendix D), makes it evident that enormous quantities of forage were available a few days' sail distant, in Constantinople and the surrounding country. Why were some of these resources not made available? It was not a question of want of

sea transport, for the Commissariat had at their disposal two steam vessels of 700 tons each, six others for cattle, and 16 sailing horse transports. Later on (December 12th) all the horse transports of the Army were placed at their disposal, and the Quartermaster-General of the Army stated that ample transport was always at the disposal of the Commissary-General. One cause of delay in the arrival of local forage is supplied by Mr. Filder's own evidence. A hydraulic hay press had been sent out from England to Constantinople to press the hay for Balaclava. This press was fitted up 15 miles away from the hay! When time was all-important, and local transport none too plentiful, this was a serious want of foresight. On one occasion a cargo of chopped hay was lent by the French Intendance, and at the end of November three cargoes were offered.

But even assuming that the number of transport animals could not be immediately increased there was a means of bringing up supplies, which might have been adopted. When the want of transport animals first began to make itself felt, Lord Cardigan was asked to allow the cavalry horses to bring up their own forage from Balaclava. This he declined to allow, and later on, when the situation became more serious, and the same request was repeated, he again refused. In war a course of action rarely presents itself which is not open to some objections, and a General is often obliged to choose of two evils the lesser. That a cavalry horse should be reduced to the level of a mule was no doubt objectionable, but the alternative proved to be reduction to the level of a corpse. On December 22nd the horses of the Light Cavalry Brigade, were in such a state of weakness that they had to be *led* back to Balaclava, and in a six mile march, 17 died. We have it in evidence on the authority of the Quartermaster-General of the Army that many starving horses ate their blankets, and gnawed off the manes and tails of their fellows! Surely the Commander-in-Chief of the Army should have issued *orders* for the cavalry horses to be sent down to draw their own forage.

Another remedy for the deficiency of transport would have been the early establishment of an advanced supply depôt. This was actually attempted by Mr. Filder. Early in October a depôt was made close to Lord Raglan's Headquarters, and by October 26th, ten days' biscuit, five days' salt meat, and a quantity of rum, coffee and sugar were collected there. However, the 150 animals and carts required for conveying further supplies were then taken away for the work of bringing up much-needed ammunition, and the supplies in the advanced depôt were not kept up. If strenuous efforts had been made, while yet the road was good and the weather dry, to push up supplies to an advanced depôt, the privations of the troops would have been greatly diminished.

By the middle of October the regiments in the Crimea were in possession of about 50 per cent. of their regulation number

of bât animals. Remembering that the Army was at rest, every single regimental animal should have been utilized. It must be realized that the failure to do this reacted on the troops, and the reserve animals, when they arrived, only served to fill the places of the casualties due to want of forage, instead of increasing the available transport. These reserve animals in turn arrived in such bad condition, thanks to their half-ration régime at Constantinople, that they lost no time in dying. In January there were only 333 instead of 1,240 bât animals with the regiments (vide Appendix E.) However, in spite of the mortality, Mr. Filder stated on December 12th that he only required 450 more animals. On December 18th, Lord Raglan sent a requisition to the Commissary-General for 476 pack animals with saddles for the use of the Small-Arm Ammunition Corps, and when 247 fine Spanish mules arrived on January 15th, Lord Raglan, influenced by the appalling mortality amongst the commissariat animals, due to neglect and overwork, refused to hand these latest arrivals to the Commissariat, but placed a combatant officer in charge, and reserved these animals for the work of carrying up huts for the troops. These animals were subsequently handed over to the Land Transport Corps upon its formation.

The result of this shortage of transport told severely on the troops. Not only were they deprived of regular rations, but, already overworked, they were obliged to march in from the camp on the heights to Balaclava, and to bring back their own rations, and even portions of the huts, which were provided to take the place of the tents, when the cold weather set in. As many as 200 men were required to bring up the constituent parts of a hut for 25 men. On leaving England, every regiment had taken with it the full number of tents according to establishment, and not according to strength, and all drafts subsequently sent to the Crimea took their own tents. A field officer was allowed two tents, other officers one, while one tent was allotted to every 12 mounted, or 15 dismounted soldiers, four extra tents per regiment being added for guards.

It must be remembered that the actual want of supplies was not the only cause that sapped the effective strength of the Army. The *nature* of the rations issued was a further, and preventible, source of loss of efficiency. In this respect the most serious fault was the want of fresh bread and fresh meat. As regards bread, the Special Commission reported that "the only bread issued to the troops till the month of April was biscuit!" This biscuit was quite good, but unluckily a large proportion of the troops were suffering from sore gums, as a consequence of scurvy, and could not eat biscuit. As already pointed out the French troops had brought ovens with them, and the fact that the French were always supplied with fresh bread was particularly galling to the British forces. On one occasion the whole of the 4th Division received a present of

fresh bread from the French, and on numerous occasions men purchased bread from the same source. A few ovens were set up by private enterprise in Balaklava. The average cost of the bread produced was 2s. 6d. a pound, so that the commodity was hardly within the means of the private soldier. The first attempt to procure fresh bread for the troops as a whole was due to the initiative of Colonel Tulloch, one of the officers sent out to enquire into the supply situation in the Crimea. Many obstacles appear to have been put in the way of his scheme, and when Colonel Tulloch eventually offered to superintend personally the construction of ovens, two sappers to be "occasionally employed" were placed at his disposal! The Commissary-General did obtain some fresh bread at Constantinople, but this supply all went bad on the journey to Balaklava. A "floating bakery" was also sent out from England at a later stage, but it is quite clear that the necessity for a regular supply of fresh bread was not recognized in the first instance.

The lack of fresh meat was still more serious, and less excusable. The supply of cattle and sheep available from the Turkish provinces was enormous, but the Commissary-General seriously stated that although he had plenty of transport available he did not care to risk the mortality of cattle on the voyage! The alternative was the mortality of men, but apparently this was not realized. (The total amount of the actual contracts made by the Commissary-General is shown in Appendix C). The tremendous congestion in Balaklava harbour, to which allusion will be made later, did not affect the landing of cattle, as it was admittedly possible to have landed animals on the open beach close at hand. Up to the end of October fresh meat obtained from captures and purchases in the Crimea was abundant, but from that date until the end of March the supply was deficient. The average quantity of fresh meat issued in December was $6\frac{1}{4}$ lbs. per man per month; and as the greater part of this went to the sick, it is clear that the fighting troops got practically none. As was to be expected, the troops after a time refused to consume their meat rations, and hundreds of pounds were thrown out daily by regiments. Pork was also issued, and this ration was more popular, except, for some reason, with the Scottish regiments.

There was, however, a means to hand of neutralizing the injurious effects of too much salt meat, by an issue of lime juice or of fresh vegetables. In spite of medical representations, lime juice was not made a part of the daily ration till February, and although from December 10th 2,000 gallons lay in the commissariat stores at Balaklava none was issued until March, when Lord Raglan—to quote the words of Kinglake—"happily interposed"! There was no question of want of transport here, as lime juice, which was wanted, could obviously have been sent up to the troops in lieu of a proportion of the salt meat, which was *not* wanted. Rice was also available for issue. An

order of Lord Raglan in Bulgaria had fixed a daily issue of 2 ozs. per man up to November 15th. On November 15th this order was not renewed, and for that reason alone the issue ceased! From October 24th Lord Raglan took steps to get vegetables, and the commandant at Varna was ordered to send fresh vegetables by every ship that sailed. There was also a stock of preserved potatoes in the commissariat stores at Balaclava, which, according to Mr. Filder, the troops refused to accept. It appears, however, that this refusal occurred at a time when fresh meat was being issued, and the offer of an issue was not renewed when fresh meat was deficient. Also, the price charged for these potatoes was very heavy. As previously stated vegetables were not fixed as a portion of the soldiers' rations until December 10th, 1852. Another issue to which exception may be taken was that of green coffee. As the troops had not enough fuel, it was quite impossible to roast coffee, and tea was never issued.

To what extent the Commissary-General may be held responsible for the sufferings of the troops must be determined by each one for himself from the foregoing recital of the causes of supply and transport deficiencies. It is but fair to add, however, that the want of a properly-trained personnel was, in a large measure, responsible for much of the trouble, and many Regular officers who served in the Crimea have not hesitated to state that no deficiencies would have occurred had it been possible to replace the off-scourings of the Levant, who did duty as transport drivers, by a corps of disciplined men. Mr. Filder himself asked for such a corps to be enlisted, but not till March, 1855, when it required no great intuition to recognize their necessity. The absolute necessity for disciplined and highly-trained transport personnel as an integral part of the Army is, of course, fully realized, but it cannot be fairly said that the absence of such a corps was the sole cause of administrative failure in the Crimea.

CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT.

So far only the failures of the supply and transport services have been touched upon, and the record is a long one. Unhappily there remains more to be told. A word is now necessary as regards the clothing and equipment, for which the Quartermaster-General with the Army was responsible. The Commissariat Department was responsible for the purchase of all stores, and for their custody, but as in the case of lime juice, not for the issue. In the French Army there was a special storekeeper's department for the custody and issue of clothing and equipment.

As previously stated the Army left Varna completely equipped, but losses due to men being allowed to throw away their equipment on the march quickly occurred. On November

22nd, Major Wetherall was sent to purchase 22,000 blankets at Constantinople. On November 25th the Quartermaster-General sent officers to seven different places to make local purchases of clothing, and a requisition for camp stores was sent to England. This requisition caused much annoyance at the War Office, because it had not been transmitted through the proper channels as laid down during the Peninsular War. From the Quartermaster-General in the field, the requisition should have gone to the Military Secretary, thence to the Commander of the Forces, thence to the War Minister, who would give directions to the departments concerned. This "proper channel" is interesting, as the Quartermaster-General at the Horse Guards is left out of the chain altogether. About the end of December two letters were received, one from the Horse Guards, the other from the War Office, sanctioning a free issue of clothing for officers. The scales of issue, however, in the two letters, were quite different! By the beginning of December there were large supplies of warm clothing available for issue. Amongst these were 12,000 great coats, of which 9,000 remained in store up to the end of January. One of the reasons officially given for the non-issue of these coats was that the Regulations only authorized an issue every three years, so the troops were not therefore entitled to an issue! One may be permitted to wonder for what purpose the officer who gave this reason imagined the coats had been sent out. No doubt the War Office might have directed an issue, but this hardly appears to have been necessary.

One of the greatest wants of the troops was the lack of a waterproof sheet. The artillery, whose equipment came from Woolwich, were the only fortunate possessors of this luxury. A substitute, however, existed on the spot, in the shape of paillasses. Twenty-one thousand of these were sent from England, but, as there was no straw to fill them, they were not issued. The Commissariat objected to supplying straw for paillasses, as it was only the custom to issue it for horses. These paillasses, even empty, would have been of some use. There were also 24,000 rugs in store at Balaklava, of which only 800 were issued. It is alleged by an officer of the Quartermaster-General's Staff, that he "occasionally mentioned" the existence of these rugs to the quartermasters of units, but they declined to have them. It is difficult to accept this statement without some modification, and every quartermaster who was examined by the Commission contradicted it. In any case, the proper person to have informed would have been the commanding officer, not the quartermaster. It should be pointed out that units were not made aware of what was available for issue. Commanding officers were informed that they need not send in requisitions for what they wanted, because whenever supplies were available for issue, approved proportions would be sent by the Quartermaster General's Department to each unit. As the staff could not know the special wants of each unit, this system was unsound.

The horses had their share of suffering from lack of equipment. Nosebags and picketing gear were specially lacking, and the want of some shelter from the cold was also the cause of many casualties. Commanding cavalry officers pressed for some form of shelters, but their well-meant suggestions were not always received with favour. When the officer commanding the Scots Greys represented the advisability of erecting some sort of cover as a protection for his horses, Lord Lucan threatened to put him under arrest for presuming (*sic*) to make such a suggestion!

About the middle of January plenty succeeded dearth, as far as clothing was concerned. From private as well as public sources came all sorts of garments, sheepskin coats, fur caps, buffalo robes (in *lieu* of waterproof sheets), waterproof coats, leggings, long boots, trousers, and short coatees.

CONDITIONS IN BALACLAVA HARBOUR.

It must now be clear, from what has been written, that the want and suffering in the Crimea were not solely due to lack of transport. Another cause of unsatisfactory administration is to be found in the congestion and difficulties of off-loading at the base. As a base, Balacava was not entirely satisfactory, but it must be remembered that Lord Raglan deliberately chose it, leaving Kamiesch Bay to the French. The harbour was small, about 300 feet wide, but there was anchorage for half a mile with depth of water for the largest ships. Unloading facilities were not abundant, and it appears that the Commissariat had to depend upon men-of-wars' boats for landing supplies not actually alongside. It was, therefore, doubly necessary to have a smoothly working system. None, however, appears to have existed. It was not uncommon for ship-loads of stores to be taken away because no military authority would take them over, and on one occasion a boat-load of medical stores, sent from Scutari to Balacava, was brought back from Balacava because no one knew anything about the consignment. On another occasion 25 barrels of boots were carried back and forward three times between Balacava and Constantinople, because no military authority would receive them. The best idea of the slowness of the work of landing stores is obtained from the fact that the average time taken between the landing of one cargo and the next from the same boat was 16 days, the average sea distance being 300 miles. Another cause of slow working at the base was the removal of fatigue parties. For six days during December nothing could be taken ashore because the fatigue parties were absent from work, while the officer commanding the —th Regiment refused to send fatigue parties to Balacava.

There seems, in fact, to have been a complete want of harmonious working between the various branches of the Army

and Navy, upon whose co-operation the welfare of the Army so largely depended. As a matter of fact, the relations between the Army and Navy were for some time distinctly strained. Since the Navy was entirely responsible for the berthing of vessels in the harbour, its effect on the situation is apparent. The closest friendly relations were, therefore, necessary, in order that the naval and military authorities should keep in touch with one another. That this was not so during the period of office of one "Principal Agent of Transports," is apparent from the Assistant-Quartermaster-General's evidence before the Commission. "This officer," it is stated, "found it incompatible with the dignity of his position, to report daily to the Quartermaster-General the contents of ships arriving and their dates. As a compromise, he allowed a subordinate to do so, but declined to sign the statement. He lives at the outer end of the harbour, and has no office ashore. It was different with his predecessor." One can easily imagine the delays that must have taken place under the conditions set forth in the A.Q.M.G.'s evidence. It must be noted here, that the French Commander-in-Chief did not deal with any naval officer, but dealt direct with the merchant captains of the transports, who had possibly more experience in the berthing of their own particular class of ship, and in discharging and receiving cargo than any naval officer could have had. With the French there was no necessity ever to refer matters to an Admiral who might be away on the high seas anywhere.

POSITION OF THE COMMISSARY-GENERAL.

The relations between the Commissary-General and Lord Raglan and his staff are also worthy of some remark, as there is no doubt they had an injurious effect on the administrative situation of the English in the Crimea. While fully realizing that the system, under which the Commissariat was independent of the Commander-in-Chief, was to blame, there is no doubt that even under that system harmonious working would have been quite possible. The evidence of the A.Q.M.G. is again of interest: "The Commissary-General," he stated, "seems to have desired his officers to issue rations according to his own views, instead of according to the General Orders of the Army." On this point the correspondence that passed between the A.Q.M.G. and Mr. Filder is illuminating. When lights were sanctioned for troops in tents, Mr. Filder wrote to the Assistant-Quartermaster-General, enquiring "what sort of lights should be issued in tents," to which that officer replied: "I have to inform you that the description of lights to be issued to troops in tents, huts, or even holes in the ground, is the same as would be issued in barracks." This was hardly the "soft answer that turneth away wrath!" On another occasion the Assistant-Quartermaster-General wrote saying that nine or ten letters had not

been answered, and that "the Commander-in-Chief does not like to write officially again, etc." The Commissary-General replied that "it was not the custom to acknowledge or answer letters of that description!" On October 23rd, the Assistant-Quartermaster-General wrote to the Commissary-General, requesting him to land some charcoal. When on the 30th Mr. Filder was asked officially how much fuel he had in store, he replied: "The Commissariat has no charcoal or fuel of any kind, nor has any invoice, advice, or information been furnished to the Commissary-General of any fuel or charcoal being shipped for the Army." It seems as if the Commissary-General resented any inquiry into the working of his Department. It must be remembered that the Quartermaster-General had no power to call for a state of supplies or transport from the Commissary-General, and it was not till January 8th, that Lord Raglan demanded a report on the state of the transport which had become so terrible.

States showing the actual amount of supplies were not rendered until the end of the same month. From the evidence given before the Supply Commission, one is led to wonder whether these "states," when rendered, were of much value. The Commissariat Department was unable to furnish the Commission with accurate quantities of stores on hand at any time, as no account was kept of the amounts of supplies in cargoes before landing, while issues direct from cargoes were frequently made. No accounts at all were kept of the amounts of fresh vegetables demanded or issued. It was the practice for regiments to demand in advance three days' supplies at a time, for which a receipt was given at the back of the "demand," before the supplies were issued. It was the custom to enter these "demands" as actual issues. Furthermore, supplies were sometimes issued at a "nominal" weight, which was 25 per cent. short of the actual weight. It seems probable, therefore, that "states" would have been misleading. The principle, however, was fatal. Not only was the important consideration of the supply and transport of his Army not under the control, but it was not even within the knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief, upon whom lay the responsibility for failure or success. Whenever supply questions did arise, it was the custom at the beginning of the campaign to refer them to either the Adjutant-General, or the Quartermaster-General's branch of the staff; no one was quite sure which was correct. Eventually Lord Raglan decided that supply questions were matters for the Adjutant-General's branch, since they were matters affecting discipline.

The general conclusion that is forced upon us is that the inherent defects of the system were increased by a great deal of what would be comprehensively called to-day "bad staff work."

From March, 1855, a general improvement was made in the situation of our Army in the Crimea. On December 22nd,

1854, the Commissary Department had been removed from the Treasury and placed under the War-Office. The Land Transport Corps, a combatant corps for the transport duties of the Army, which was raised by Royal Warrant of January 24th, 1855, began to work in the Crimea under Colonel McMurdo. Before the end of the war it comprised 17,000 drivers (of whom 10,000 were soldiers) and 28,000 animals. A railway was also built from the port to the Col de Balaclava, and hay was sent out in enormous quantities from England. To dearth succeeded plenty, and the starving Army had—to quote the florid sentences of Kinglake—"pyramids of grain and flour sacks, hillocks of charcoal, acres and acres of draught and pack horses, mules and dromedaries, and mounds of vegetables."

THE FRENCH ORGANIZATION.

A few words are desirable as regards the situation of the French. Whether it was that they were more fortunate, or that, as Kinglake somewhat jealously suggests, they concealed their deficiencies more artfully, there is no doubt that they presented a better front, and their effective strength was always proportionately superior to that of the British Army. As already stated, they started with several advantages, an organized system of control by the Commander-in-Chief over the administration of supply and transport, a trained regular personnel for intendants work, an organized medical service with ambulance wagons, and a better base. Having seen the results in the British Army due to the lack of all the foregoing advantages it is clear that the more comfortable position of the French troops was due to design rather than to accident. It must not be supposed that they had no difficulties to contend with or that everything with them was perfect. On September 10th the Auxiliary Companies of the Train had 11,402 animals, with only 2,115 instead of 5,021 conductors. At the end of the month only 1,500 conductors remained, and it was impossible to use daily more than 375 arabas, 280 Maltese carts, and 400 pack animals. However, one of the first steps taken by the French was the construction of a good road from their base to the ground occupied by the troops, a distance of some four miles. The French Intendance had the same difficulties to contend with in obtaining meat and forage, and at no time during the winter had they more than ten days' reserve supplies in their magazines. They quite gave up any idea of bringing up fuel wood from the base, and on a few occasions no forage was issued for the horses. The severity of the weather told equally on their transport animals (except the horses and mules sent from Northern Africa), but the existence of a regular cadre for the auxiliary transport companies enabled the best use to be made of the animals available. A steady influx of drafts from France replaced the casualties and kept up the fighting strength

of the French Army. In a word, the administration of the French Army, thanks to the existence of sounder principles, was far superior to that of their Allies.

CONCLUSION.

Such is the story of the Administration of the British and French in the Crimea. It will be seen that our failures proceeded from certain definite causes. In the first place, the then existing administration was never intended for European war, since there was a deeply-rooted belief that Great Britain could never be drawn into a European conflict. Lord Raglan was therefore faced by the difficulty of adapting to the requirements of war an organization framed only for peace. It must be left to the reader to decide whether his solution of the problem was the best possible in the circumstances. Secondly, there was the failure to realize the relation between strategy and administration. The value of any military administration can only be accurately gauged by asking the question: "How far has the strategy of the Commander-in-Chief been helped or hindered by the Administration of the Army?" All strategy, however, finds its consummation on the battlefield, for finality lies at the point of the bayonet. To get the troops to the battlefield as soon as possible, and as strong as possible in numbers and *moral* is a problem whose solution depends mainly on the administrative services of the Army.

In 1854 the fact that administration was a *military* question was not realized. Food and clothing had to be found and carried for the soldier simply because human beings require food and warmth to sustain life. How *best* the soldier should be fed and clothed to get from him the maximum fighting and marching power, *this* was not fully considered. Napoleon knew it well, Wellington possibly better, but 38 years of peace had allowed the lessons of a former generation to sink into oblivion. In matters administrative we have marched far since 1855. We are possibly sometimes inclined to amazement at the stupidity of that period, forgetting how much easier it is to be wise *after* the event. The lesson for us to retain from the story of 1854-5, long after its incidents are forgotten, is that what we sow in peace, we reap in war. You cannot improvise victory in 1913 and after, for the seeds of success are sown in peace, or not at all.

APPENDIX "A."

Supplies placed at disposal of Commissariat in Bulgaria by the Treasury.

Porter 64,800 gallons at 3d. per quart; pale ale 2,700 gallons at 4d. per quart; preserved potatoes 50,000 lbs. at 5d. per lb.; chocolate 10,000 lbs. at 4d. per lb.; coffee 80,000 lbs. at 5½d. per lb.; tea 8,000 lbs. at 1s. per lb.; sugar 100,000 lbs. at 2d. per lb.; rice 200,000 lbs. at 3d. per lb.; Scotch barley 10,000 lbs. at 1½d. per lb.

APPENDIX "B."

Statement showing number of Camp-Kettles and Bill Hooks in possession of the Fourth Division on landing in the Crimea, and after the march to Balaclava.

Fourth Division.	In possession Sept. 18th at Lake Touzla.		In possession Sept. 30th at Camp before Sebastopol.	
	Camp kettles.	Bill hooks.	Camp kettles.	Bill hooks.
20th Regiment	216	200	23	16
21st " 	150	250	18	7
68th " 	184	170	8	4
63rd " 	216	200	33	22
1st Battalion Rifle Brigade ..	195	180	—	—

APPENDIX "C."

Accepted Tenders.

FORAGE.—Hay 36,500 tons, 2,239,635 okes.; preserved hay 24 tons, 3 cwts.; straw 400 tons, 176,000 okes, 17,000 cantars; chopped straw 350 tons, 448,500 quintals; barley 514,452 kilos; bran 200,000 lbs., 16,000 okes; oats 2,500 kilos.

FUEL.—Coal 1,273 tons, 4 cwts.; steam coal 430 tons; charcoal 500,000 lbs., 70,000 kilos, 10,000 quintals, 996,500 okes, 10,000 cantars; wood 3,000 tons, 20,000 cwts.

CATTLE.—Oxen 35,250; sheep 42,000.

APPENDIX "D."

Tenders Rejected.

FUEL.—Patent Welch fuel (Warlich's patent) 137 tons.

CATTLE.—One thousand to 1,500 head of cattle; 300 live oxen; 4,000 to 6,000 oxen; 1,000 oxen; 5,000 sheep; 500 head of cattle; 6,000 head of cattle; 6,500 head of sheep; 60,000 live sheep.

FORAGE.—380,000 to 400,000 okes of hay.

NOTE.—Oke=2½ lbs. Cantar=124 lbs. Quintal=112 lbs.

APPENDIX "E."

General return of Transport employed for the service of the British Army in the Crimea, January 16th, 1855.

Distribution.	Horses and Mules.	Camels.	Carts.	Arabas.
Light Division	60	—	13	—
First Division (portion in front) ...	32	6	4	—
Highland Brigade, Balaclava ...	6	3	3	—
Second Division	70	—	26	—
Third Division	51	—	27	—
Fourth Division	45	3	18	—
Siege Train	18	—	4	—
Head-quarters	7	—	3	—
Naval Brigade	6	—	—	—
Light Cavalry	4	—	3	—
Heavy Cavalry	10	—	10	—
Hospital purposes	4	—	2	—
C. and I. Troop Horse Artillery ...	3	—	—	1
Sick Cavalry Dépôt	2	—	1	—
Invalid Dépôt (Kanani)	—	—	11	—
General Dépôt (Balaclava)	15	—	—	—
Total with Army	333	12	125	1
In Reserve at Constantinople	1071	—	—	—
Grand Total	1404	12	125	1

APPENDIX "F."

List of articles required in the Quartermaster-General's Department, Army of the East.

Six portable chairs, six portable stools, six portable tables, similar to those brought out by the Commissariat; a portable box with pigeon-holes, for keeping papers; two powerful naval telescopes with slings, to be carried by a man on horseback; five quires of transfer-paper; 500 pentagraph pins; three prismatic compasses; six ivory rectangular protractors, ruled across, and with a slit in each for a ribbon; four large portfolios, two of 24 in. by 18 in., and two of 30 in. by 24 in.; four despatch bags for mounted orderlies, with similar locks and keys.

(signed) RICHARD AIREY.

November 28th, 1854. Quartermaster-General, Army in the East.