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A STUDY OF FALSEHOOD

By HARRIS L. LATHAM, Presbyterian Training School, Chicago, Ill.

Him thus intent Ithuriel with his spear
Touched lightly; for no falsehood can endure
Touch of celestial temper.—*Milton*.

We have various modes of presenting our discoveries; we may use poetry, narrative, scientific essay, philosophic essay, the pictorial arts and the drama. By each of these instrumentalities men have given us information on falsehood. No one of these means can be safely discarded, yet the scientist and the philosopher will be the judges in the court of final appeal.

In the work of serious analysis falsehood and truth are concepts that very readily suggest a logical treatment of the problem. Consequently in the works of the logicians will be found elaborate discussions of fallacies; Aristotle set the problems. Well-known writers on falsehood and truth include such names as Sedgwick, W. W. Johnson, J. W. Powell, C. M. Wieland, J. Watson, F. C. S. Schiller, John Fiske, J. Cook, Saint George Mivart and all of the writers of standard texts in logic.

The broader reaches of philosophy inevitably lead into the problem of falsehood. A capital instance of this is the doctrine of Maya or illusion so welcome to the philosophic mind of the East Indian. All of the phenomenal world is false; reality can be known only in nescience, on the sense plane; a universal knowledge which grasps the illusory nature of all that is not soul discovers reality in the identity of the soul with the Brahman.

In art the problem of falsehood is well recognized. Paulhan for example has discussed "*Le Mensonge de l'Art*" through three hundred and seventy-seven pages.

In a larger way falsehood as a constituent trait of human character and personality is treated in Paulhan's "*Le Mensonge du Caractère*;" his principal topics are false indifference and simulation.

The most revolutionary treatise at hand is by Max Nordau; he has written on the Conventional Deceptions of our Civilization. The German original appeared in 1883; translations into

a number of the European languages have been made. On its appearance friends and foes quickly arose to share in a violent discussion. The author found himself surrounded on every side by deception and hypocrisy. We all play a part in a profoundly immoral comedy due to an almost unmitigated egoism, precipitated by the struggle for existence.

In more recent decades the psychological approach¹ to the study of falsehood has been preferred. Some of the topics already treated may be enumerated: the lie, children's lies, the lie of pathological cases, our general attitude toward truth, popular delusions, conjuring deceptions, falsity in report, make believe, illusions, the social uses of deception, the relation of imagination and falsehood.²

¹ The subject of falsehood is indeed a matter of prime interest in view of the following: "Perhaps the most interesting contemporary group of thinkers in the psychic field is now challenging consciousness itself, which has so long been the oracle of philosophy, as never saying what it means, but always dealing with symbols that need laborious interpretations, the canons of which they are now attempting to evolve." G. Stanley Hall, "Educational Problems," Vol. I, p. 348.

² The exact titles of some of the numerous articles and books dealing with these topics are herewith transcribed: Félix-Thomas, "Le Mensonge," *Revue Pédagogique*, Vol. 50, pp. 509-19. Drommard, "Les Mensonge de la Vie Interieure." St. John, "A Genetic Study of Veracity," *Pedagogical Seminary*, Vol. XV, pp. 246-70. G. Stanley Hall, "Children's Lies," in his "Educational Problems," ch. VI (and *Ped. Sem.*, Vol. I, pp. 211-18). Lipmann, "Einige interessante Kinderluegen," *Zeitschrift fuer paedagogische Psychologie, Pathologie und Hygiene*, Vol. 8, pp. 85-88. In the same journal, Vol. 7, pp. 195-201, see also Schafer, "Kommen Luegen bei Kindern vor dem vierten Jahren vor?" Guillermet, "Un cas de mensonge infantile," *Archives de Psychologie*, Vol. 2, p. 377. Demoor et Daniel, "Les enfants anormaux à Bruxelles," *Année Psychologique*, Vol. 7, pp. 286-313. "Rapport oral sur les mensonges d'enfants," *Bulletin de la Société Libre pour l'Etude Psychologique de l'Enfant*, 1902, pp. 130-137. Oppenheim, "Why Children Lie," *Popular Science Monthly*, Vol. 44, pp. 382-87. Barnes, "Why Children Lie," *Current Literature*, Vol. 34, pp. 213-14. Richard, "Le mensonge chez la femme hystérique." Delbrueck, "Die pathologische Luege und die psychisch abnormen Schwindler." Piper, "Die pathologische Luege," *Zeitschrift fuer paedagogische Psychologie, Pathologie und Hygiene*, Vol. 8, pp. 1-15. Jonckhiere, "Le Mensonge chez les Arriérés," *Archives de Psychologie*, Vol. 2, pp. 263-66. Eisenhofer, vide "Wahrheitsgefühl" und "Wahrheitsliebe" in Rein's *Enzyklopaedische Handbuch der Paedagogie*, Vol. 7, pp. 538-44. Chas. Mackay, "Memories of Popular Delusions." Jastrow, "Fact and Fable in Psychology." Triplett, "The Psychology of Conjuring Deceptions," *American Journal of Psychology*, Vol. II, pp. 439-510. The Aussage literature, as Stern's "Erinnerung, Aussage und Luege in der Ersten Kindheit" (abstract in *American Journal of Psychology*, Vol. XXI, pp. 270-82); Lobsien, "Aussage und Wirklichkeit bei Schulkindern," *Beiträge zur Psychologie der Aussage*, Vol. I, Heft 2, pp. 26-89. "Original Make-Believe Games," *Pedagogical Seminary*, Vol. VI, p. 317 ff.

As an example of a monographic treatment from the psychological point of view we may refer to Duprat's "*Le Mensonge, Étude de Psycho-Sociologie Pathologique et Normal*" (1909). The ground covered includes the description and classification of deception, deception in abnormal persons (criminals included) deception in children, deception in social life, deception in primitive and cultured societies, the psychophysiology of deception, the moral aspects of deception, deception and education.

This study was made on material gained by a questionnaire sent to school teachers to ascertain the facts as to voluntary and involuntary modifications of truth by school children. It is sane, balanced, illuminative and suggestive of further studies of a similar character.

The present writer proposes a study of falsehood from a viewpoint different from all those alluded to above. A vocabulary as nearly exhaustive as possible was collected.³ This list of words contains the terminology, current in the English-speaking world of to-day, used to describe or denote every false relation, fact, act, idea, etc., with which we have to deal. The entries number nearly twenty-five hundred.

For facility of treatment it seems best to allow the material to fall into two groups: terms that denote general concepts; terms that represent special concepts. This distinction is not absolute, but nevertheless is sufficiently correct for our present purpose. The specialized types of action are denoted by such terms as thievery, cheating at games, treason, magic, lying, stratagem and the like; the present paper will not treat of these further.

The general terms are concerned with states of mind, consequences of acts, attributes of persons, acts and so on. These words are almost wholly indicative of an intellectual state in which falsity plays a part. They serve to describe the reaction of the individual mind to experiences in which falsity is a vital factor.

One indeed soon discovers while making this study that the facts are nearly all social facts. By far the larger part of the actions described are not performed by the agent on

³ Suggestions on the use of vocabularies may be drawn from the following: Westermarck, "The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas," Vol. I, ch. VI. Bréal, "Semantic." Articles in the Pedagogical Seminary: M. C. and H. Gale, "Vocabularies of Three Children," Vol. IX, pp. 4, 22-35. Chambers, "How Words Get Meaning," Vol. IX, pp. 30-50; Trettien, "Psychology of the Language Interest of Children," Vol. XI, pp. 113-77 (with bibliog.); Doran, "A Study of Vocabularies," Vol. XIV, pp. 401-38; Mateer, "The Vocabulary of a Four-Year-Old Child," Vol. XV, pp. 63-74.

himself but upon another person or group of persons. And yet there is a range of mental states in which precision and definiteness to a degree are wanting, where classification of the facts has remained in general terms rather than advanced to specific ones.

To facilitate discussion the following rubrics have been selected: the act (neuter, subjective, objective); attributes of the act; the concept; attributes of the concept; the person (agent, patient); the attribute of the person. Other classifications of the data might have served the purpose as well, but the suggestion of this one came naturally out of the material and represents very largely the human interests involved in the experiences described.

It is convenient to distinguish acts which are directed essentially toward an effect to be produced in another living being from those that have a subjective goal in the person of the actor himself; both of these classes may be oftentimes demarcated from a third which embraces acts that are equivocal, acts in which the person or thing that experiences the consequences of the acts is not determined. Our ordinary grammatical distinctions of transitive and intransitive are not adequate guides at this point because these distinctions are formal and do not permit the elasticity desired. For the purpose of this discussion all actions that have no specific indication of their goal whether self or other living being may be termed neuter. This class will be vigorously reduced to the minimum for the sake of economy; for it facilitates apprehension of experience to regard it from the viewpoint of its most concrete aspects rather than from its more generalized and therefore more elusive relations. Our first task then is a study of states, processes, relations expressed by terms denoting action, but not indicating specifically any person or thing as appreciably affected by the act. We postpone a discussion of the verbal falsehood as constituting a special sort of falsity.

An obsolete use of the verb *to false* as a transitive verb has the meaning to falsify, to make untrue, to introduce falsehood into something. It also means to maintain to be false. *To falsify* means to make false or incorrect, to alter fraudulently, to introduce false matter into or to give an incorrect version (of a document, etc.), to alter or pervert from the correct rule, to declare or prove false; as v. i. to make a false representation; to deal in falsehood '(Obs). As a metaphor taken from a mechanical process we use *distort* as a synonym.

There is a small group of words formed with the prefix *mis-* that must be considered here. *Misapplication* (*to mis-*

apply) is forming wrong associations for a given truth, doctrine, or principle, attempting to place the wrong particular under a given principle or rule; this is an intellectual error in the use of a general fact or truth. Another case is a *mistake* in the selection of an object or matter; here one *mischooses* the thing selected, doubtless out of a wrong estimate of values. Not unlike this is the error of placing a given object in the wrong class or category, that is, *misclassification*.

Mathematical error is fairly considered as colorless for the most part as the notions just alluded to. One may *miscipher*, *miscalculate* or *miscompute*. The *miscomputation* may be affirmed without designating the direction of the consequences of the error in mathematical processes. The unique significance of the term is that it points out the fact of error in some mathematical operation and by a metaphor gives some estimate of forces in operation within the range of the observer's attention.

If the person under consideration suffers error in the matter of his volitional activities he may be said to have *misintended* when his act of will turns out to be ill-advised. The act is called a *misintention*. A *misstep* is an error in procedure; it may refer to an accident while out walking or to an erroneous decision. To *simulate* (*simulation*), (*mis-seeming*, Obs) connotes false assumption, feigning, pretending, suggesting falsely; or to convert into something by simulation (Obs); or to put forward deceptively (Obs. Rare); as v. i. to pretend or to feign.

Here belongs a section of the terms that denote logical error. The greater part of the general vocabulary of falsehood may be used in describing illogical procedure, but a specific list of terms has been developed. To *chicane*, to *cavil*, to *false*, to *gerrymander*, to *paralogize* (*paralogism*), to *misinfer*, (*misinference*), to *misjudge*, (*misjudgment*), to *quibble* (a *quibble*) all indicate the type of error now before us. The mildest of these terms is the *misinference*: with one or more premises given a wrong inference is drawn. Logically antecedent to the *misinference* is the *misjudgment*, which of course necessitates error in all processes founded upon it. To *paralogize* is to argue falsely; it is a highly technical term and is almost a pedantic name of a very simple fact. The *paralogism* is a piece of illogical reasoning, an erroneous argument, a fallacy; all of these terms are strong in that they brand the argument described in its true character.

Illegitimate logic is as often defensive as it is offensive. To *cavil* is to raise captious objections or to find fault without

reason; to chicanery is to quibble over a matter and a quibble is an equivocation of the point at issue, an evasion of the real point in the argument.

A very peculiar characterization of falsity in argument grew up from the conduct of Governor Elbridge Gerry of Connecticut, in regard to the redistribution of electoral districts for the purpose of favoring his political party. To gerrymander has since come to signify to garble and misconstrue, as the premises of an argument, so as to arrive at a forced conclusion.

A critic may witness some false act or discover a false situation; to error in such a case is to decide a thing to be erroneous (chiefly in law).

We may summarize the mental acts thus far enumerated as follows: to make untrue, to introduce falsehood into a true somewhat (document, procedure, etc.); to attempt to govern a given act or piece of procedure by unsuitable law or principle; to err in the selection of a part from a whole; to err by wrongly classifying a thing; to commit mathematical errors; to misjudge the course of events; to make a wrong decision; to mistake the proper steps in a procedure whether in bodily action or abstract projects; to attempt to duplicate qualities found in other persons; to commit a logical fallacy, to misconstrue purposely points at issue in an argument for the purpose of evasion, or to force a biased conclusion; to pronounce erroneous after examining an object.

These are fair instances of judgments in which the least possible implication appears as to an estimate of the actor or the least possible evidence of the outcome of the act upon any one within its reach. These highly refined judgments show man changing the true into the false, intermingling the true and the false, thinking false thoughts, adopting false procedure, making false decisions, recognizing false entities as true.

These descriptions differ from those yet to be presented under our heading "concept" only in this particular—these are unequivocally discriminated as actions of a person.

We now advance to a group of discriminations in which the trend of the act is directed toward a particular subject (person). The outcome of the act is reflexive, internal, subjective. Whatever consequences of the act may reach out into social groups they exist positively without presenting a clue so far as the analysis of the situation is concerned. Falsehood, error and all the allied factors then may be experienced by a single person without the active cooperation

of other persons. Moreover these experiences may consist of overt acts as well as of passive states.

One's ideas, policies, theories, plans, opinions and the like may be projected into wrong directions; may embrace more or less of untruth. In such cases the person *aberrs, errs, mis-thinks, goes astray, wanders into error*. It is a case of *aberrance* (*aberrancy*, Obs), or *straying into a vagary*, a case of *aberration* or *deviation* from a direct, prescribed course of action whether intellectual or moral. Aberration even in a normal person may readily suggest a pathological tendency. One errs by adopting a false principle; he *blunders* in wrongly applying a principle.

The more emphatic instrumentality of the self in the committing of mistakes is seen when one *deceives or fools himself* (*self-deceit* or *self-deception*) or perchance *allows himself to be misled*. The result of all this is a *delusion* in the sense of being misled (Obs). One may be led to *believe what is false*. Two slang expressions have the same import: *to get bit* and *to get the sack*, signifying a state of deception in which one has been a contributing factor.

One often starts out well in a course of thinking and ultimately *overshoots the mark*, thus *falling into error, getting into the mists, being drawn into error* or *lying under an error*. A milder situation may arise perhaps when we merely *misappreciate* the conditions of things. This *misappreciation* depends on a *misapprehension* of the facts as presented. One *misapprehends* when he does not rightly observe, when he gains erroneous information by failure in the simplest act of recognition of a fact. If the error is more serious he may *miscomprehend* or *misunderstand* the whole situation. If narrowly intellectual it is a case of *misconception*; one may *misconceive* that which is to be realized in some future action or event. (*Misconceit*, n. and v. more rarely.) A *misinterpretation* of factors in a situation will result in a *misconjecture* as to the outcome of the acts, or series of events. Very often statements heard or facts presented may be in themselves true and correct but out of ignorance or for some other reason they are *misconstrued* and their proper import *misinterpreted*. This *misconstruction* is also described as due to *misdistinguishing* or *misknowing* the facts; more commonly we *mistake* them, through insufficient observation. We may misconstrue that from which the meaning is gathered by inference; we *misinterpret* that which is intended to express a given meaning.

If the problem relates to matter confessedly darkly understood one may despite all be constrained to attempt to *decipher*

it. In this case he is apt to *misguess* the facts or to *mis-imagine* the elements left for conjecture. In this connection we often resort to mathematical attitudes of mind; wherever failure attends our efforts we may be guilty of *miscalculation*. If we *miscalculate* we also *misreckon* or *reckon without our host* by overlooking some determining element in the circumstance.

Typical and well recognized psychological processes are involved in these erroneous adventures of the mind. *Mis-recollection* (to *misrecollect*) is due largely to a mislearning and in turn constitutes a part of *misremembering* or *mis-imagining* in the case of an attempt at an imaginary construction. If we misjudge matters presented to us we are said to misdeem them (Obs.).

If we ever misstate the facts it is, alas, because sometimes we *mismean* the proposition that we utter. If we are unduly credulous it is because we *misbelieve* (*misbelief*). If we hold to false opinions we are guilty of *pseudodoxy*.

Hallucination is a pathological experience in which whether a sense stimulus be present or not the patient falsely supposes he perceives objects. In the *illusion* the normal person likewise commits error in perception, but it is due to a complication of natural processes, with no disease factor present. Our interest is in the fact that both of these psychical states are well known to involve unequivocal error; this error is positively subjective in its origin, the external factors are so allocated as to furnish the appropriate stimulus.

We conclude then that a person may precipitate himself into intellectual error by allowing himself to be deceived, to err, by actually embracing error, by carrying a correct principle or policy too far, by using insufficient insight in the apprehension of facts, by remembering poorly, by intentionally perverting the facts, by wrongly perceiving objective things, or by being over credulous as to matters reported.

Our next division deals with these more narrowly intellectual processes as they reach out beyond the actor to a part of his social environment. We have considered actions that are largely colorless as to their outcome, actions that positively react on the actor; now we examine the processes that expressly modify conditions in a living being other than the actor. It is not to be assumed that any of these acts are necessarily consciously apprehended as to the element of falsity; the awareness of the presence of falsity must be affirmed only on the warrant of positive information to that effect. That is, an act may be false and work out its effect on society without being recognized as false by the perpe-

trator of the deed. This matter of cognizing the false factor may be determined only by the full context of the situation; this situation may be or may not be summed up in the term that describes the act in its aspect of falsity.

Even in case the falsity of the act is known to the actor the degree of this apprehension is a constantly varying factor and cannot be considered for the most part in a discussion like the present. Our concern is strictly with the fact that one person performs an act that modifies typically the state of mind of another person or group of persons, animal or group or animals, in such a manner as to introduce into this state of mind some element of error or falsity. The factor thus introduced is specifically intellectual and is therefore general in character.

Mystification is an act in which one plays upon the credulity of his victim, *throws dust in his eyes*, and so prevents him from exercising his ordinary intelligence. A state of *bewilderment* arises when one is *bamblustercated*, *hoodwinked*, *inveigled* (Obs), *mystified* and he is in a state in which he can easily be *humbugged*; he is in a *haze*; he is *mixed*; he is *blind*.

A more complex means of deception is that of *charming* a person. Here the actor *fascinates*, *bewitches*, *enchants* his victim so that he cannot exercise his normal intelligence. His capacity for usual precaution is disabled. *To feed* implies something of helplessness on the part of the victim, as he is easily deluded into the acceptance of fictitious facts. In order to describe more vividly this type of deception another metaphor is allowable, that is, to *fox*, meaning to compass and end by some crafty means. *To get it over* one is to seduce him, to fascinate him and so accomplish some nefarious design.

Deceit, to *deceive* (to *feint*, Obs), *deception* all are terms designating an action in which one conceals the truth from another in order to mislead him, causing him to believe what is false. *To hallucinate* formerly had the same meaning. A *heave* is a mere attempt at deception.

The situation is more serious when the actor *deludes* (*eludes*, Obs., *foxes*, Obs.) his victim, leading him by pretense to hold a false opinion; this act of *delusion* consists in *befooling* a person in his expectations. It is the same as to *dupe* or to *fool* or to *make a fool* of a person. It involves *pretension* (to *pretend*), that is, alleging falsely with the intent to deceive.

A very moderate form of deception consists of *simulation*: *falsely suggesting*, *putting forward deceptively* (Obs.) with the intent to deceive. A positive action takes place when one *misinforms* the one duped on some point of fact; if this is an extended process it becomes *misinstruction* (to *misinstruct*)

and both necessarily involve *misrepresentation* (to *misrepresent*) or *false representation* of facts.

A more aggressive though perhaps less effective deception results from an attempt to *bluff* a person. The plan here is to *blindfold*, to *hoodwink* a victim so as to deter him from an act by a false show of opposition with a view to the achievement of some hidden purpose. Usually the actor expects some definite personal gain; he may *run a bluff* with a pretense of assurance covering real uncertainty or weakness on his part. A metaphor drawn from the kitchen is to *sweeten*, approximately denoting the same as to *stuff*. A slang expression appears in to make one *believe that the moon is made of green cheese*.

The significant difference between these other acts and *guilery* is that the latter marks out the deception as arising in the wicked nature of the actor, due to a wily regard for his own interests. To *guile* is to beguile or to deceive. Success in capturing game has yielded a term descriptive of this same act: to *gull* is to capture a person by means of a trick, to make a gull or dupe of one. A *gull* is a trick or piece of deception; *gullage* and *gullery* are alternatives of the same import.

When special pains are taken to use soft phrases or sophism the deceiver *hones* his victim. If the arts of the *juggler* are at command one can *sleight* the duped one, using craft and cunning in a piece of subtle dealing, thus producing an *illusion* in the observer's mind. A *wile* is an act of deception in which cunning artifice is employed. By so doing the deceiver *sucks* the deceived, *takes him in* and perhaps at once proceeds to greater crimes.

In an attitude of defense one may *baffle* his pursuers whether he is in physical flight or is meeting logical attacks; if a known fact when expressed is likely to harm one he may resort to *reservation* on being questioned and so deceive; he may mislead an opponent by giving him a *false scent*. A reservation is a deceptive answer or excuse (Obs. as to excuse). A similar *evasion* is to *shuffle*, making use of false pretenses or unfair *shifts*, to *conceal* the facts, to *fence*, to perpetrate a *come-off*, or to give one the *go-by*.

In brief then to deceive another is so to affect his mind as to prevent normal action of the powers of understanding, to induce an overestimate of specific values or factors, to lead into misunderstanding by means of a cunning trick, to suppress truth, to disappoint expectations, to suggest false ideas, to arouse self-regarding feelings in the victim and so render clear comprehension impossible.

We have found that false acts have been marked and named in unmistakable terms applicable to them alone. But not satisfied with this English speaking peoples have attempted to describe the falsity of conduct by designating the qualities exhibited in these acts. Substantive and adjectival expression largely cognate in etymology with the words naming actions are used to express these qualities.

While the essential significance of the judgments next to be studied may not be oftentimes appreciably different from the denotation of the action names, it will be worth while to observe what aspects of these false actions have so impressed the mind as to secure special recognition.

The development of attributive notions has permitted the marking of a false quality appearing in a slight degree in an act characterized mainly perhaps by some other quality. Action names are usually not indicative of the degree of qualities comprising an act; whereas by means of the substantive and the adjective an act obviously true in its main aspects may be described in its secondary attributes and so its falsity be accurately labelled.

Actions may be described as merely consisting of *wandering* from truth; in this case motives are not under observation and the drift of the process is impliedly poorly understood by the actor. He is preoccupied perhaps with other matters. If so the act exhibits *aberration*, an unaccountable deviation from uniform law or procedure. The act is *errorous*, the thought, opinion, conclusion is *erroneous*, *errorful* in so far as it is recognized by the critic as falling short of the standard employed.

Wide of the truth is another phrase expressing the same judgment, the definite consciousness of a point of divergence from the norm of the comparison; it is somewhat more emphatic than the term *untruthfulness*, though the latter is a far more scathing epithet. *Inaccuracy* suggests divergence from a known standard in some procedure, but it will describe mental acts as well.

From another point of view acts are seen to exhibit *false-ness*. (Falsity, falsimony.) This connotes the antithesis to truthfulness without implying a genetic relation to it. *Aberration* is an attribute of an act; the term may also mean the process of leaving the truth for the untruth. As an attribute of an act it indicates definitely a prior relation in it to a previous fact. Falseness does not express though it does imply such a relation; it is therefore narrower in meaning and marks a more dogmatic judgment. *Falship* and *falsome* are rarer terms of the same import.

Falsity in acts with peculiar subjective reference appears as *delusion*, *delusoriness*, *delusiveness*. The deed may be described as *hallucinatory* or *illusional*, according to the specific content of the mind.

The positive effort to pervert truth is observable in actions; if so the act may be *falsidical*, suggesting what is not true, or *falsific* when the actor is making false that which he knows to be true. A similar implication underlies all the derivatives of to *deceive*, though these words may be used in describing acts of unconscious deception. A *deceptive* act is usually found to be due to a definite aim on the part of the deceiver to mislead the person with whom he deals. How largely human nature has revealed this type of falsity may be seen from the accumulation of the following list of derivatives: *deceitful*, *deceitous* (Obs.), *deceitfulness*, *deceptional*, *deceptious*, *deceptive*, *deceptiveness*, *deceptivity*, *deceptory*. These words are all used in describing the acts of man. They point out precisely the same qualities.

The deceptive quality of an act may be closely associated with some specific attribute of the actor. If the act shows *guile* (*guileful*, *guilefulness*), that is, *insidious cunning*, the guilt of the doer is plainly marked in the character of the deed. In a similar manner if the deed shows *sleightness* or a *sleight* it is said to be *sleightful* and the actor is marked as a cunning person, one skilled in artfulness.

The highly psychological features of an act are plainly alluded to in the power that one mind has over another when an act exhibits a *charmingness* or a *charm* (*charmful*). If the observer is unwilling to attribute positively this quality he may characterize the act as having a *charmlike* aspect. In like manner the whole tenor of a deed may be imitative of some other deed or show the actor assuming the characters of another person; in this case it is *simulative* or *simulatory*.

Summarizing our results as to the qualities of false actions we have found that they exhibit an undefined error as to the facts related to the actor; that falsity may reside in the positive faulty action of one's intellectual processes; there may be a mere wandering from the truth; the consequences of the act may be purposely conceived; success of the false acts may depend on the ignorance of the victim; some acts involve great power of mind of the actor over the mind of the victim; the feeling and hopes of the victim may be fundamentally affected by deception.

Some acts show merely a tendency to some sort of falsity; others show the quality clearly enough but no other aspect of the situation is indicated; again the abundance of the

quality is often made known as when an adjective ending in -ful is used to describe it; the attribute may be a mere likeness to a recognized falsity of some sort; lastly the positive quality of falsity is suggested by negative terms such as untruthful.

We have now examined the methods by which we describe actions primarily intellectual that are marked by falsehood. It is to be borne in mind that we have included the more general acts, acts that may occur in any social situation or be due to any one of the countless subjective conditions which may arise in the human mind. Our interest at once suggests an immediate study of more specific types of acts but it will be more profitable to penetrate further into this same field before descending to particularities. There remains a discussion of certain concepts not otherwise provided for and the classification of persons who commit the acts already described or who share in the consequences.

Treating persons first it seems most convenient to divide them into three groups: (a) agents—those who actively perform false deeds; (b) patients—persons who receive or manifest the consequences of the false actions; (c) in whom there is no transfer of consequence from actor to patient certainly indicated. Here again other groupings of the facts are possible; but the constant interest where falsity is involved is in the dramatic situation—the doer, the deed and the consequences.

The designation of the doer is closely parallel to the description of the deed. Those who actively perform false deeds are first of all the *deceivant*, the *deceiver*, the *deceptionist*, the *deceptor*, the *falsary*, the *false* (Obs.), the *falsificator*, the *falsifier*, the *deceptr*, the *illusor*, the *mystifier*, the *mystificator*. With the exception of the last four words these terms are interchangeable in use; the mystificator and the mystifier however designate actors who effect a more pronounced confusion in the mind of the victim than does the mere deceiver. The *bluffer* and the *charmer* make more complete preparation for the deception of their victims; the *duper* makes a dupe of them. The *guiler* acts from his own corrupt nature in deceiving another. The *tricker* or *trickster* has a ready device for misleading his victim. He differs in no considerable respect from the *hoodwink* (Obs.).

The *errorist* is a teacher of false doctrines (Obs. Rare). If the knowledge imparted to another is incorrect the giver of the information is a *misinformant* or *misinformer*, generally thought to be innocent of moral offense. A *deluder* who practices illusions is an *illusionist* or *deceptionist*; if he

claims qualities or relations on false grounds he is *pretender* or *shuffler*. If he assumes the character of some one else he is a *simulator*. When pretending to be a wit he is a *flasher* or *fop* (*fopper*, Obs.); if despicably insignificant he is a *fopling*. A deluder who is frequently engaged in leading others astray is a *delusionist*.

It is to be noted that only one of the terms in this category has the feminine ending. It is too much to argue that the falsifier is only rarely a woman; it is undoubtedly true that despite the known facts woman's errors have not been grievous enough to develop a distinctive vocabulary of an appreciable size. This holds good as to the entire list of terms in the Vocabulary of Falsehood. The reason why more feminine nouns have not been brought into use is doubtless that men have taken the more active part in social affairs and so have determined the vocabulary of social relations. That we have adequate resources for discrimination in respect to sex is fully evidenced by the multiplicity of terms in use say in respect to thievery, roguery, commercial dishonesty. As a matter of fact sex lines have not entered appreciably into our judgments of falsity in human conduct.

The attributes of the agent are largely the same as those of the act. A priori we would argue that the character of the act is of course due to the character of the person. Having discussed these attributes above we present a list of terms used in describing the agent with but brief comment.

Charm, any alluring quality.

Charmful, abounding in charms.

Charmingness, power to charm.

Deceitful, full of deceit.

Deceitfulness, the quality of being deceitful.

Deceivable, having the quality or habit of deceiving, deceitful.

Deceivableness, the capacity of deceiving, deceitfulness, deceit, deceptiveness.

Deceivant, a deceiver, deceitful.

Deceptive, of the nature of or characterized by deception; that tends to deceive, mislead.

Deceptive, apt to deceive, having the character of deceiving, deceptivity.

Deceptory, apt to deceive.

Duplicity, deceitfulness.

Elusory, tending to elude, characterized by eluding.

Falsehood, (*falset*, Obs.), falseness, deceitfulness.

Falship (Obs.), untruthfulness, deceit.

Falsimony, falsity, falseness.

Falsome, deceitful, untrue.

Falsity, the quality or condition of being false, untruthfulness.

Figmentitious, addicted to framing figments.

Fopical, befitting a fop.

Foppery, silly affectation of elegance.

Foppish, resembling or befitting a fop.

Foppishness, character befitting a fop.

Guile, insidious cunning, deceit.

Guileful, deceitful.

Illusive, that tends to illude or deceive by unreal appearance.

Sleighty, possessed or making use of sleight or craft, crafty, subtle.

Trickish, given to or characterized by tricks or trickery.

Trickiness, trickishness, given to fraud or trickery.

Untruthfulness, the quality of falsity.

Wily, given to the use of cunning, wily devices.

The patient is one who suffers when a false deed transpires.

One person acts, another is the recipient of the consequence.

From the material at hand we conclude that some form of the verb is usually employed as a denominative, for the list of substantives expressly signifying the patient is small. The *hallucinator* is afflicted with hallucinations. The *delusionist* is one given up to delusions. It is not to be doubted for an instant that he may originate his delusions but he may also be led into them by another agency. A *dupe* is one who allows himself to be deceived; he is also a *fool*. A *gull* is a credulous person, easily imposed upon; if his social rank is not high he may be called a *sucker*. If the dupe is employed on a considerable undertaking he is a *tool*.

The attribute or qualities of the patient are more completely represented by special terms. They are as follows:

Deceivability, capacity of being deceived (Rare).

Deceivable, capable of being or liable to be, deceived, fallible (Rare).

Deceivableness, liability of being deceived.

Deceptibility, aptness to be deceived.

Deceptible, apt to be deceived.

Delusable, capable of being deluded, deludable.

Dupery, the condition of one who is duped.

Gullage, deception, the state of being gulled.

Hallucination, the mental condition of being deceived or mistaken, or of entertaining unfounded notions; the apparent perception by an abnormal person of an external object when no such object is present.

Hallucinatory, characterized by, pertaining to, or of the nature of, hallucination.

Illusion, the fact or condition of being deceived or deluded by appearances, when in a normal state; a mental state involving the attribution of reality to what is unreal; a false conception or idea; a deception or delusion, fancy.

Illusionable, liable to illusion.

Mystification, the condition or fact of being mystified.

Sweet, gullible, easily deceived.

We have been constrained to adopt the class "concept" in our system of rubrics for this discussion for the reason that in addition to the descriptions of acts and persons our language shows that we can note falsity in its various forms without indicating to what the quality belongs. The notion is so general that it is applicable to persons, acts, literature, situations of many sorts and so forth. In the previous discussion we have positive data showing that acts and persons are fully discriminated in respect to falsity in its many aspects. But this did not exhaust the facts at hand.

A *deception* is anything that deceives the mind with a false impression, a delusion. An *err* (Obs.) is an *error*, a *fault*, a *heresy*. An error may be a *delusion* or *trick* (Obs.) or a *mistake*. A *fallacy*, commonly reserved for logical terminology, also denotes deception, guile, trickery or a deception, a trick or deceitfulness, a delusion, an error and the condition of being in error. *Falsehood* signifies not merely an untrue statement but also an error or mistake, a piece of deception or falsification. *Falsity* is a more abstract concept than falsehood; it denotes error without implication of the conditions under which the error exists.

A *fiction* is a supposition known to be at variance with the facts, but conventionally accepted. A *figment* is a product of fictitious invention. A *fool's paradise* is a situation conceived to be fortunate when such is not the case. A *half-truth* is a proposition conveying a half or a part only of the truth. "A half truth is often a falsehood." An *illusion* is something that deceives or deludes by producing a false impression. Experience with illusions has resulted in a definite theory of the world which holds that the material world as a whole is an illusion.

Misintelligence is wrong, false, or erroneous news or information or misunderstanding of correct statements (Obs.). *Misinterpretation* is misconstruing the significance of language signs; it is due to a false impression.

A *quirk* is a trick, a piece of subtlety, a shift or evasion. A *reservation* is something kept back, a secret. A *untruism* is something obviously untrue. A *misconcept* is an erroneous concept.

An additional list of attributes will now be presented. *False* has several broad meanings of which one is important at this point. It signifies erroneous, wrong as applied to opinions, propositions, representations.

That which is productive of hallucinations is *hallucinative*. That is *illusive* which tends to illude or deceive by unreal appearances; is productive of illusion or false impression. *Misapprehensible* is applicable when the fact concerned may be misunderstood by human intelligence; if the fact can be misconceived as to the relation of its constituents it is *misconstruable*, or *misintelligible*. If the meaning may be mistaken, the fact, opinion or proposition is *misinterpretable*. If the sign or symbols, the various devices for giving information naturally fail in their effect they are *misrepresentative* and give rise as a matter of course to mistakes.

A *quirky* thing is full of quirks, shifts or tricks. If *truthless* it lacks truth or reality, it is untrue, contrary to fact or falls short of some standard of correctness. In this sense untruth and *untruthness* may have the same import. *Mock* denotes a quality imitative of a genuine attribute. *Mere-tricious* is applied where an object seeks high evaluation without real justifications. If *fictitious* the article or thing has only the form of reality; it is an *artificial* thing, a *bogus* entity.

In the field of logic a few broad concepts have been reserved for treatment in this connection. A *false judgment* is an opinion, thought or idea that does not agree with the facts. *Antilogic* is a false and spurious logic, a piece of vicious reasoning. When applied to duties and similar subjects it becomes *casuistry*. A *fallacy* is a piece of deceptive or misleading argument, a *sophism* or course of sophistical reasoning. The sophistical nature, the unsoundness of an argument is typically pointed out by this concept. The *pathetic fallacy* occurs when the falsification of the object results from the intrusion of the self, constituting the typical sentimental crime. If only a *fallacious* proposition is under consideration it may be called a falsehood. A *paralogism* is broadly speaking any logical fallacy; more narrowly a fallacy of which the speaker is unconscious. A *man of straw* is an artificial logical fallacy set up so that the speaker may exhibit his positive argument while overthrowing the error of the fallacy.

That is *fallacious* (*fallace*, *paralogic*, *paralogical*) which contains a fallacy and so exhibits fallaciousness, fallacity or a paralogism. At the same time falsehood or falsity, *want of conformity* to truth is apparent.

We have completed a survey of the judgments recorded

in our language on the matter of intellectual falsehood. A few observations covering the whole body of facts are in order. One is early impelled to enquire as to the frequency of metaphorical expressions in this list of terms. They are surprisingly few. Ruling out primitive metaphors which have led to a very large number of new meanings that since time immemorial have been recognized as the literal significations of words, we may venture on a tentative list of metaphorical expressions taken from the data given above. The use of judgments employed in mathematical processes to describe errors of non-mathematical thinking is the first instance to be noted: miscalculate, miscompute and the like. The transfer of meaning is certainly easy and natural and is a distinct addition to the vocabulary of falsehood. A discussion of the origin of gerrymander has already pointed out its figurative use in the present connection.

All judgments resorting to variation from a pathway in which one is supposed to walk are distinctly dependent on a metaphor: misstep, err, wander and the like. Archery furnishes one term in to overshoot the mark. Misconception is taken from a race-wide experience and aptly preserves the Socratic doctrine of maieutics. Misconstruction is reminiscent of the builder. Mystification is based on one's experience in making his way through some sort of mystery. Hood-wink points to an artificial blinding of the eyes.

The well known arts of the magician and juggler furnish us with the charm and the enchantment. Hallucination and illusion are employed in a metaphorical sense as well as in the original psychological sense. The known possibilities of deceiving a person as to the actual composition of the foods of which he partakes furnishes an apt term in to feed. The habits of the fox enable us to describe neatly the cunning deceiver. Hunting has given us the gull. A cruder figure is that by which a deceiver is said to suck his victim. Purely physical movements of the body have suggested reservation, shuffle, elusory.

Wide of the truth is based on common spatial judgments. Sweet is derived from a remote analogy with the ease with which one takes in a sweet food product.

We have completed a survey of the judgments recorded in our language on the matter of intellectual falsehood. The facts show that like a poison injected into the circulation falsity has permeated to the minutest of our rational processes. While discrimination could conceivably be carried into much greater detail it is clear that with the tools available our descriptive powers may record every type of intellectual

falsehood that human perspicacity may discern. The facts presented in their unvarnished state are in themselves worthy of study. Human intelligence has discovered its own weakness, has marked the pitfalls. It has branded the more serious offenders against intellectual truth and accuracy with epithets that cannot be shaken off. It has taken note of men and women who for any reason are the cause of their own errors. It distinguishes the intentional from the unintentional error. The actor is adequately labelled and the one who experiences the consequences of his skill in deception is fully described.

The falsity of careless or even of ordinary thought processes commands the larger part of the list presented; but unmistakable judgments are also in evidence showing that strictly logical argument is also vitiated by various means until in fact it may become mere sophistry.

Let us also affirm with M. Duprat: "L'étude qui précède a montré que le mensonge est un fait aisé à constater dans toutes les civilisations, dans toutes les classes de la société, à tous les âges et quel que soit le sexe. Malgré la diversité de ses formes, il peut être défini en général: un moyen de suggérer l'erreur, ce que l'on sait ou croit être l'erreur. . . . La lutte contre le mensonge est une partie de la lutte pour la moralité."⁴ None of us can be satisfied with the discovery of the universality of falsehood as a mere scientific fact. At once we are hurried on to the problem of limits that each individual should place upon the encroachments of falsity in his own attitudes and acts.

⁴ Duprat, "Le Mensonge," etc., pp. 181, 184.