RECENT PUBLICATIONS ON MYSTICISM¹

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Pending further development of experimental methods we are obliged to rely, for the chief data of mysticism, upon literary records of one sort or another. Psychology profits directly, however, from records of introspective impressions and valuations. For example, the search for witnesses to a supposed mystical revelation common to all religions brings to light deep contrasts within mysticism itself, and not merely between it and the non-mystical. The Quest Series (1, 9, 15) places side by side the mystical union (Jewish, Christian, and Muslim), which asserts itself as fulness of experience, and the early Buddhist Jhāna-consciousness or emptying of the mind, which contains no reference to a merging into something else (15, pp. 114 f.). The Zen sect of Buddhists, too (10), whose teachings modern Japan "has acknowledged as an ideal doctrine for her rising generation" (p. xii), connects no supernaturalism whatever with its yoga-like practises. Moreover, these two types, the full and the void, appear to take opposite attitudes towards magic and theurgy. Jhāna-consciousness claims to be a vestibule to psychic phenomena that range all the way from clairvoyance to levitation (pp. 126 f.). This is early Buddhism. But early Sufism decried reliance upon miracles (9, pp. 130 f.), and Christian mysticism as a whole has belittled hallucinations, and has had scant dealing with what the German language calls *Mystizismus* (3, 5, 13, 19). These two opposing tendencies Royce (16) discovers in John Fox, who experienced both "openings" (discernment of spirits, etc.) and the Light (a calming, unifying influence).

Another profound difference between types comes to light in an attempt to evaluate mysticism for modern life (3). Alongside of nature mysticism and contemplative mysticism, both of which tend to make individuality illusory, there has been a personal mysticism which focalizes the individual in an effort to produce social consciousness. Mysticism has been blamed for its individualism, yet praised because its inmost principle is love. May not the praise and the blame refer, after all, to different things that

¹ The Freudian interpretation of mysticism, the progress of psychic research, investigations of the social consciousness, and of immediacy and the time process, are here omitted on the ground that they should naturally appear in other notices.

bear a common name? From the data now before us it is clear that the assertion, to which James gave the weight of his name, that there is a common mystical experience in the different religions and outside of them, must be reëxamined. There are violent differences of type in what is called mystical. How much these types have in common we do not yet know, or whether indeed there is any reason at all for a common name. In view of this situation, detailed description of experiences even from an ecclesiastical point of view, either Catholic (13) or Protestant (3, 5), has value, much more so (in spite of uncritical psychology) such a large-minded apology as Underhill has given (19). Her attempt (20) to prove that Christianity was fully mystical from the start, as against the common opinion that mysticism entered Christianity through Neo-Platonism, may be found to contribute to the proof of types rather than of uniformity.

On almost all hands there is asserted the continuity of mystical experiences with the common life. This, if I mistake not, is a new drift. Ames (2), essaying a functional analysis, finds that mysticism arises from the same impulses as science, but seeks to satisfy them by a short-cut method. Taylor (18) looks upon mysticism as "one path among others, all leading to the same goal, the realization of the whole personality in such a way that it shall be real through and through." Peabody (11) holds that Quaker eminence in social reform is directly connected with Quaker mystical practises. Jones (7), advancing beyond his former assent to mystical theory, sees in the experience not a "way" of either knowledge or life but rather a more effective use of ordinary resources. Buckham (3) and Underhill (20) maintain that even the "way" of the great mystics can be used in common, everyday life. It is significant that Underhill's attempt to teach the ordinary layman causes her psychological notions to gain in simplicity and clarity. Pollock (12) holds that the central position of mysticism is compatible with any philosophy, materialism included. Dixon (4) connects literary inspirations, in respect to both content and form (rhythm, imagination), with the problem of reality. Finally (6), ritualistic Anglicans are finding fellowship with Quakers in the common use of prayer without words.

From the opinion that mysticism is a set of fantastic doctrines psychology first advanced to the view that it is a set of pathological phenomena. Today we are distinctly beyond this position. Even extreme mystics, as Delacroix has shown, attain a more stable will,

a more firmly organized personality by means of their mystical practises. A remarkable example at the present moment is the steadiness of the Bahaists in both preaching and practising universal brotherhood in the face of direst persecutions (22). Here prophetism reappears in all its pristine vigor, and here appears the power of religion that is not yet mechanized.

The continuity of such extreme cases with everyday conduct lies in the fact that personal and social experience as a whole seems to secure organization and control of itself by reference to something that is not in experience at all—that is, in the scientifically orthodox sense of "experience." Bergson (8) solves this paradox by revising the notion of experience, but Bertrand Russell insists upon sharpening it in the orthodox sense (17; cf. 14). After denying the traditional metaphysics of mysticism (intuition, unity, the unreality of time), he declares that "good and bad" are nothing but "reflections of our own emotions on other things, not part of the substance of things as they are in themselves" (p. 799). For psychology, one may conclude, the problem of mysticism—at least the chief problem—is, What is realization? In particular, what part therein has desire or the selectiveness of attention?

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THE TASK AND THE METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY IN THEOLOGY

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German theologians have of late frequently discussed, and at times with apprehensive interest, the significance of psychology for their discipline. Many of these theologians are university professors whose students hear also the lectures of the German masters of psychology and philosophy. It would seem, therefore, highly desirable in a journal devoted to psychology to set forth as fully as possible the point of view of this group of men, in so far as it concerns the relation of psychology to their science. This would be well worth while even though nothing more should be gained than a definite understanding of their points of agreement and of disagreement with the professional psychologist.

Wobbermin's book (3), to which the larger part of this review is devoted, embodies by far the most formal effort made so far to set forth a psychological method for the use of theologians. His book might well serve as an introduction to what in German theology deserves the attention of the psychologist, since he discusses most of the important works related to his subject, particularly those of Schleiermacher, Herrmann, Kaftan, Troeltsch, Fries, Frank and Biedermann.

In book I (pp. 1-244) the place of theology in the system of