

VI

BUDDHIST NOTES

VEDANTA AND BUDDHISM

By LOUIS DE LA VALLEE POUSSIN

THERE is much to support the opinion of Rāmānuja, Dr. Thibaut, and many others, that Śaṅkara's doctrine of "illusion" is a biased rendering of the old Vedānta, Bādarāyaṇik as well as Aupanishadic. If that be granted, it is by no means self-evident that Buddhism has been without influence on Śaṅkara's speculation; and the last writer on the subject, Vasudev Anant Sukhtankar, a very able pupil of Professor Jacobi, does not conceal his opinion, or his surmise, that Śaṅkara is indebted to Nāgārjuna.¹ That may be true, but I would object that we really know little or nothing about the history of Vedānta, and that conclusions based on philosophical parallels are by no means definitive. Autonomous developments—autonomous if not absolutely independent—are admissible. Nāgārjuna (or his predecessors, the anonymous authors of the oldest Mahāyānasūtras), by the very fact that he proclaims "voidness" to be the real nature of things, was prepared to distinguish the relative truth (*samvṛtisatya*) and the absolute one (*pāramārthika*); and his nihilism coupled with "idealism" might lead to the Vijñānavāda: "existence of pure non-intelligent (?) intellect." On the other hand the Aupanishadas, from their main thesis (*tat tvam asi*, etc.),² could derive the distinction of the

¹ *The Teachings of Vedānta according to Rāmānuja* (Inaugural Dissertation, Bonn, August 12, 1908; Wien, Druck von Adolf Holzhausen, 1908).

² I think that no unprejudiced reader will admit Rāmānuja's interpretation of the old pantheist or monist sayings of the Upanishads. Against Vasudev Anant Sukhtankar (p. 13), I adhere to the opinion of Dr. Thibaut: "The fundamental doctrines of Śaṅkara's system are manifestly in greater harmony with the essential teaching of the

two *brahmans*, of the two *vidyās*. Both developments are natural enough; the conception of the universal void (o) and the intuition of the infinite (∞) are convergent, in the end; but parallel and convergent as they are, these developments do not lose their primitive tinge. The *qualis ab incepto* is true of every evolution, political (as M. de Kérallain has proved¹) or doctrinal: the *samvrtisatya*, "erroneous truth," of Nāgārjuna is really "untruth"; the *vaiyavahārika satya*, "practical truth," of Śaṅkara is truth, provisory indeed, but truth *quand même*. *Māyā* is. Śaṅkara's "magic play" is caused by a magician, and this magician is a Lord. Nāgārjuna's *samvrti*, the Buddhist counterpart of the Vedāntic *māyā*, is like the son of a barren woman: it is not, it cannot be. But the two systems bear *un air de famille*, which has been taken into account more than once and from both sides.

This problem is of paramount importance in the history of Indian thought. It would not be imprudent to say that as long as we have not ascertained the chronological relations between primitive Buddhism and the Aupaniśhadic-Sāṅkhya theories, between the system of Nāgārjuna and that of Śaṅkara, between Dignāga and "orthodox Nyāya",² we cannot boast of even having traced the cardinal lines of the spiritual and intellectual history of India.

It is not my present object to discuss the claims of

Upanishads than those of other Vedantic systems" (S.B.E., xlv, p. cxxiv). The "essential teaching" of the Upanishads is not their spiritual undogmatic or polydogmatic enthusiasm (the chief part from the point of view of the history of religion), but their ontological surmises.

¹ M. de K. is the French translator of Sumner Maine, Sir Frederick Pollock, and Sir Alfred Lyall. One will find in the *Études sur les mœurs religieuses et sociales de l'Extrême Orient* (Paris, Fontemoing, 1908) a splendid translation of the *Asiatic Studies* of Sir Alfred, with many notes, illustrations, and appendices of no small interest.

² It is a pity that M. Th. de Stcherbatskoï is writing in Russian.

Śaṅkara or Rāmānuja to Aupanishadic orthodoxy, or to unravel the problem of the relations of Buddhism to Śaṅkara's monism, to specify the possible or probable loans on both sides. I only intend to give a few references, some of which are already well known.

I

The common opinion of the Dvaitavādins or "dualists" (Sāṃkhyas, Viśiṣṭādvaitavādins) is that the Māyā-doctrine is not Vaidic, i.e. Aupanishadic: *māyāvādam avaidikam*, says Śiva; *na . . . tad Vedāntamatam*, argues Vijñāna-bhikṣu. This doctrine is "Buddhism in disguise", a doctrine of "crypto-Bauddhas" (as says Dr. Thibaut)—

*māyāvādam asac chāstram pracchannaṃ bauddham
eva ca.*

The theologians who maintain the "Neo-illusionism" (*ādhunika māyāvāda*) and style themselves Vedāntin (*Vedāntibruva*) are, in fact, Buddhists; more precisely, they belong to that branch of the Buddhist school which is named Vijñānavādins, "who maintain the sole existence of thought" (*bauddhaprabhedāḥ, Vijñānavādyekadeśitayā*). They assimilate the "data" of experience, merit, and demerit, etc., to the "data" of a dream, and, using the (Buddhist) phrase *sāṃvṛtika* (erroneous) as the exact connotation of the "particular", they admit that the world, the whole of the "knowable" (*prapañca*) is produced by Ignorance. Therefore they ought to be styled *Nāstikas* (miscreants, or Buddhists). Thus Vijñāna-bhikṣu.¹

Yamunācārya, too, the *guru* of the *guru* of Rāmānuja,

¹ See *Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya*, edited and translated by Professor Richard Garbe, index *sub voc.* bauddha, pracchannabauddha, vijñānavāda. With I, 22 (p. 16, 6-7), compare the readings of *Padmapurāṇa* (xliii) apud Aufrecht, *Cat. Oconiensis*, p. 14: "māyāvādam asac chāstram pracchannaṃ bauddham ucyate, mayaiḥ kathitaṃ devi kalau brāhmaṇarūpiṇā . . . parātma-jīvaḥ aikyaṃ mamātra pratipadyate, brahmaṇo 'sya param rūpaṃ nirguṇaṃ vakṣyate mayā, sarvasya jagato 'py atra mohanāya kalau yuge."

clearly refers to Dharmakīrti in his *Siddhitrayam*,¹ when he compares a thesis of the “avowed Buddhists” (*prakatāḥ saṅgatāḥ*), with the formula of the “Buddhists in disguise”.

The first say—

“Although the pure intelligence is free from differences; it is understood, by people whose view is troubled, as multiple : object of knowledge, subject of knowledge, knowledge.”²

The second say—

“The pure reality is not the cause of the development [of names and forms, of the intellectual contingencies], because it ceases not to be [what it is, pure] : therefore it is Illusion who is the mother of this distinction, knower, knowable.”

It is only just to say that Rāmānuja could hardly avoid the reproach of dualism, and may be styled “Sāṃkhya in disguise”.

II

Whilst Brahmin nihilists (*māyāvādins*) are charged with the crime of Buddhism, Buddhist monists (*viññānavādins*) have to apologize for their “Brahmic” speculations.³

As has been said in this Journal (1908, p. 889), Buddhists are aware of the close relation between Vedāntism and some of their systems. The Viññānavāda, at least in some of its ontological principles, is very like

¹ Chowkhamba S.S. (No. 36), p. 19. For this reference I am indebted to Vasudev Anant Sukhtankar, p. 19, who also refers to Rāmānuja, *Śrībhāṣya*, ii, 2. 27.

² This line occurs in *Sarvadārśanasamgraha*, p. 16 (Bibl. Indica, 1858), and elsewhere ; it is extracted from the *Pramāṇavinīśaya* of Dharmakīrti (see *Museon*, 1902, and *Bouddhisme d'après les sources brahmaniques*, p. 34 ; add reference to Śuklavidaśanā). It runs as follows : *avibhāgo 'pi buddhyātmā viparyāsitadarśanaih, grāhyagrāhakaśaṃvittibhedavān iva lakṣyate (or kalpyate)*. Vasudev Anant Sukhtankar understands *buddhyātmā* : the Buddhist attributes the false distinction . . . to *buddhi*, as the Pseudo-Buddhist attributes the same distinction to *māyā*. I prefer my translation.

³ Śākyamuni has condemned Viññānavāda-Vedānta, *Majjhima*, i, p. 329 : *viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ anantaṃ sabbatopabhaṃ*.

Vedāntism in disguise, or, to be more exact, it is likely to be understood in a Vedāntic sense: as Mahāmāti said to Buddha in so many words. We cannot forget that Vijñānavādins are divided into several schools, which are not without analogy with the schools of Vedānta. Some of them believe that the prime spirit or thought remains pure, untouched by the development of contingencies [*prapañca*, i.e. *manas*, *manovijñāna* (= *nāma*, *nāma-rūpa*): does not this resemble *vivartavāda*? Others will admit that the development is real: does not this resemble *viśiṣṭādvaita*?

I will not miss this opportunity of avowing that I have been perhaps unfair in my review of my friend Suzuki's book, *Outlines of Mahāyāna* (see *Journal*, 1908, p. 885). The claim of the Buddhists to be *sūnyatāvādins*, "doctors of the voidness," not *brahmvādins*, cannot be set aside: philosophers must be credited with the opinions they profess to cherish. And I have strong objections, as an historian, to the Buddhist modernism of the Japanese scholars, of P. L. Narasu, etc. But there may be some slight portion of truth in Modernisms (they may develop old, unconscious ideas: much that is believed to be modern is old),¹ and, as a matter of fact, *sūnyatā* turns out to

¹ I have just read a good book, written from the "intellectualist" point of view, but very "matter of fact", *Pragmatisme, Modernisme, Protestantisme* (Paris, Bloud, 1909; by A. Leclère, Dr. es-Lettres, Prof. agrégé à l'Université de Berne). The author says, p. 217, note—"Il vaudrait la peine, après avoir rapproché le modernisme catholique du Protestantisme libéral moderne ou modernisme protestant, d'étudier le modernisme israélite et le modernisme mahométan. On sait qu'il s'est récemment formé à Paris une association israélite en vue de mettre le Judaïsme, en le simplifiant, à la hauteur de la pensée contemporaine; ce mouvement a déjà une littérature; il s'est constitué par un minimisme assez analogue à ceux que nous avons signalés. D'autre part, le Babisme, si tangent chez ses meilleurs représentants avec la pure religion naturelle, et si bienveillant à l'égard de toutes les religions positives, qu'il prétend dépasser, modernise avec ardeur le vieil Islam. Autant de dissolutions des formes positives de la religion. L'écart est moins grand qu'on ne le pense généralement entre celles de ces dissolutions où on a l'illusion d'approfondir l'esprit de la doctrine qu'on

be very like *brahma*, and *nirvāṇa*, “translated” as it is by *bodhi* or **buddhabhūya*, has the same religious import as *brahmabhūya*.

III

One cannot read the Gaudapādakārikās without being struck by the Buddhist character of the leading ideas and of the wording itself. The author seems to have used Buddhist works or sayings, and to have adjusted them to his Vedāntic design ; nay more, he finds pleasure in *double entendre*. As Gaudapāda is the spiritual grandfather of Śaṅkara, this fact is not insignificant.¹

The fourth chapter bears a distinctly Buddhist tinge. It has been happily summarized by Professor A. A. Macdonell : “ It is entitled *Alātasānti*, or ‘ Extinction of the firebrand (circle) ’, so called from an ingenuous comparison made to explain how plurality and genesis seem to exist in the world. If a stick which is glowing at one end is waved about, fiery lines or circles are produced without anything being added to or issuing from the single burning point. The fiery line or circle exists only in the consciousness (*viñāna*). So, too, the many phenomena of the world are merely the vibrations of the consciousness, which is one.”² One could add that, really, knowledge (*jñāna*) or *brahman* is free from the threefold determination ; knower, knowable, and knowledge. If we are not to rest on syllables—*appamattakaṃ kho pan ’etaṃ yad idaṃ byañjanaṃ ! mā āyasmanto appamattakehi vivādaṃ āpajjittha*³—

transforme [as it is apparently the case with Nāgārjuna, with Śaṅkara], et celles où l’on a conscience d’évoluer tout à fait en dehors de la tradition.” (Neo-Buddhists ought to be aware that they are pouring new wines, and, alas ! sophisticated alcohols, into old bottles.) A historical study of Neo-Buddhism would be very interesting, as an episode of the intellectual conquest of the East by the West and vice versa.

¹ The following notes are by no means exhaustive.

² *Sanskrit Literature*, p. 242.

³ *Majjhima*, ii, p. 240. “Syllables are of little importance : do not, O monks, dispute on mere trifles.”

this transcendent knowledge is like the absolute blank of the Vijñānavādins.

The simile of the firebrand circle occurs in *Maitry-upaniṣad*, iv, 24: "He beholds Brahman flashing like the circle of a whirling torch, in colour like the sun . . .";¹ but it can also be traced in Buddhist books as one of the numerous symbols of unreality,² namely, in the *Laṅkāvatāra*³—

tadyathā Mahāmate acakram alātacakram bālais cakrabhāvena parikalpyate na paṇḍitair; evam eva Mahāmate kudrṣṭitīrthyāśayapatitā ekatvānyatvobhaya-tvānubhayatvaṃ parikalpayiṣyanti sarvabhāvotpattau :

"The firebrand circle is not a circle, and is wrongly supposed by the ignorant, not by the wise, to be a circle. In the same way, heretics will suppose that beings originate from themselves, from others, from both, without both."⁴

¹ Cowell's translation. *Alātacakram iva sphurantam ādityavarṇam . . . brahma . . . apaśyat.* (Comm.: *tasya brahmana ātmābhedatva-khyāpanāya pumlingair viśeṣanair viśinasti.*) *Id est*, the unreal qualifications of *brahman*, "flashing like a firebrand circle," are in the masculine "to show the identity between the neuter *brahman* and the masculine soul", says Rāmatīrtha (and also to spare the undenotability and the unconcern of the Absolute). As a matter of fact, Brahman does not flash into unreal solar protuberances, but it appears, it appears to itself, to be flashing. Cf. vi, 17: *Brahma . . . eko 'nantah.*

² *Mahāvīyutpatti*, § 139, 21.

³ Buddhist Text Society, p. 95.

⁴ The simile of the firebrand is also of use in the Sautrāntika school, to explain the *quomodo* of the "compound perceptions". See Wassilieff, *Buddhismus*, p. 284 (312): "The forms of the object penetrate one after the other into the understanding: the illusion of simultaneity is caused by the swiftness of this proceeding. Just so an arrow passes through the eight leaves of a flower, as it were, at the same time, and firebrand appears as a circle."

From another point of view it is evident that any compound perception (i.e. every perception) is "born from imagination", or subjective: "The notion of a cloth or a straw mat is gradually produced: therefore this notion has for real object the parts of the cloth or straw mat, and as such, as cloth or mat notion, it results from imagination. As in the case of a firebrand. The notion of a firebrand circle has for real object a firebrand which obtains successively different places owing to a rapid

Nevertheless, the title of the fourth chapter of the *Kārikās* cannot be said so far to be Buddhist (the phrase *alātasānti* has not been traced in Buddhist books); but the main idea that there is no birth, production, *jāti*, *utpāda*, that causation is impossible since the cause cannot be identical with, nor different from, the effect, since neither being, nor nonbeing, nor being + nonbeing, can originate, is thoroughly Madhyamaka. Gaudapāda maintains *ajāti* (once *anutpatti*), and denies *uccheda*, with the same emphasis as Bhagavat in the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā prajñāpāramitā* or in the *Laṅkāvatāra*; and he supports his thesis by Nāgārjuna's or Buddhapālita's favourite arguments:—

II, 32. *na nirodho na cotpattir na baddho na ca sādhaḥ
na mumukṣur na vai mukta ity eṣā paramārthatā*

“There is no destruction, no birth, no bound, no endeavouring [for release], no desiring release, no released: such is the real truth.”¹

Or again—

IV, 59. *yathā māyāmayād bījāj jāyate tanmayo 'ṅkuraḥ
nāsanu nityo na cocchedī tadvad dharmeṣu yojanā*

“From a magical seed is born a magical sprout: this sprout is neither permanent nor perishing. Such are things, and for the same reason.”

It is the *śūnyebhya eva śūnyā dharmāḥ prabhavanti dharmebhyaḥ*, “from void things, void things are born,” each

motion. Just so. Argument: cloth is not real, because the grasping of it depends on the grasping of its parts, as is the case with the fire-brand circle—*yasmāt krameṇa paṭabuddhiḥ kaṭabuddhir vā tasmād avayaveṣu eva paṭāvayaveṣu kaṭāvayaveṣu vā tadbuddhiḥ paṭabuddhiḥ paṭabuddhir vā vikalpavaśād bhavati. alātacakravat. yathālāte śighra-saṃcārāt tatra tatrotpadyamāne 'lātacakraḥ bhavati, tadvat. sādhanam cātra: na dravyasat paṭo 'vayavagrahāṇasāpekṣagrahaṇatvād, alātacakravat (Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, MS. Soc. As., fol. 267a).*

¹ Quoted more than once by Vijñānabhikṣu; see Garbe's indexes. Madhyamaka, xvi, 5: *na badhyante na mucyante.*

according to its causes, for "illusion is manifold, being produced by manifold causes".¹

As concerns the wording, let us compare—

1. Gauḍapāda, ii, 38²—

*tattvam ādhyātmikam dr̥ṣṭvā tattvam dr̥ṣṭvā tu bāhyataḥ
tattvibhūto tadārāmas tattvād apracyuto bhavet.*

COMM. bāhyam pṛthivyādi tattvam ādhyātmikam ca dehādilakṣaṇam rajjusarpādivat svapnamāyādivad asat; ātmā ca sabāhyāntaro hy ajo . . . nirguṇo niṣkalo niṣkriyas tat satyam sa ātmā . . . evam tattvam dr̥ṣṭvā . . .

Bhagavat (quoted *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 348)³—
*ṣṭnyam ādhyātmikam paśya paśya śūnyam bahirgatam
na vidyate so'pi kaś cid yo bhāvayati śūnyatām.*

2. Gauḍapāda, iv, 1—

*jñānenākāśakalpena dharmān' yo gaganopamān
jñeyābhinnena sambuddhas taṃ vande dvīpadāṃ varam*

COMM. ayam eśvaro yo Nārāyaṇākhyas taṃ vande . . . dvīpadāṃ varam dvīpadopalakṣitānām puruṣāṇām varam pradhānam puruṣottamam ity abhiprāyaḥ . . . jñānajñeya, jñātṛbhedarahitam paramārthatattvadarśanam . . .

It is probable that this śloka is a Buddhist one: the excellent biped is Śākyamuni.

3. Gauḍapāda, iv, 7—

prakṛter anyathābhāvo na kathaṃ cid bhaviṣyati.

Nāgārjuna, *Madhyamaka*, xv, 8 (*Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 271)—

prakṛter anyathābhāvo na hi jātūpapadyate.

4. Gauḍapāda, iv, 17, 18—

*aprasiddhaḥ kathaṃ hetuḥ phalam utpādayiṣyati ?
yadi hetoḥ phalāt siddhiḥ phalasiddhiś ca hetutaḥ
katarat pūrvanīspannam yasya siddhir apeksayā ?*

¹ *Sāpi nānāvidhā māyā nānāpratyayasambhavā*, Bodhicaryāvatāra, ix, 12.

² Ānandāśrama edition.

³ *Bibliotheca Buddhica*.

Nāgārjuna, *Madhyamaka*, x, 8 (Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 207)—

yadīndhanam apeksyāgnir apeksyāgnim yadīndhanam katarat pūrvanīspannaṃ yad apeksyāgnir indhanam?

5. Gauḍapāda, iv, 19—

evam hi sarvathā buddhair ajātiḥ paridīpitā.

COMM. *evam* hetuphalayoḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvānupapatter ajātiḥ sarvasyānutpattiḥ paridīpitā prakāṣitānyonyāpeksādoṣaṃ bruvadbhir vādibhir buddhaiḥ paṇḍitair ity arthaḥ.

Laṅkāvatāra (p. 78)¹—

anutpannāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ.

Satyadvayāvatārasūtra (quoted Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 375)—

evam eva devaputra . . . saṃsāro' py paramārthato 'tyantānutpādatā yāvan nirvāṇam api paraṃārthato 'tyantānutpādatā.

6. Gauḍapāda, iv, 22—

svato vā parato vāpi na kiṃ cid vastu jāyate sad asat sadasad vāpi na kiṃ cid vastu jāyate.

Nāgārjuna, *Madhyamaka*, i, 1 (Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 12; cf. i, 6-7, p. 82)—

na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpy ahetutāḥ utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kva cana ke cana.

7. Gauḍapāda, iv, 93—

ādisāntā hy anutpannāḥ prakṛtyaiva sunirvṛtāḥ sarve dharmāḥ samābhinnā ajaṃ sāmyaṃ viśāradam.

COMM. *ādisāntā* nityam eva *śāntā* . . . *ajāś* ca prakṛtyaiva suṣṭhūparatasvabhāvāḥ . . . *sarve dharmāḥ samāś* cābhinnāś ca . . . *ajaṃ sāmyaṃ viśāradaṃ viśuddham ātmatattvaṃ yasmāt tasmāc chāntir mokṣo vā nāsti kartavya ity arthaḥ.*

Mādhyamikas, too, maintain that *nirvāṇa* or *śānti* or *mokṣa* is not to be acquired, as says Bodhisattva Sarvaṇīvaraṇaviṣkambhin in

¹ Buddhist Text Society.

Ratnameghasūtra (quoted Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 225)—
ādicāntā hy anutpannāḥ prakṛtyaiva ca nirvṛtāḥ
dharmās te vivṛtā nātha dharmacakrapravartane.

8. Gauḍapāda, iv, 98—

alabdhāvaranāḥ sarve dharmāḥ prakṛtinirmalāḥ
ādau buddhās tathā muktā budhyanta iti nāyakāḥ.

COMM. alabdhām aprāptam āvaranam avidyādinibandhanam yeṣāṃ te dharmā alabdhāvaranā bandhanarahitā ity ārthaḥ. prakṛtinirmalāḥ svabhāvasuddhā ādau buddhās tathā muktā yasmān nityasuddhabuddhā muktasvabhāvāḥ. yady evaṃ katham tarhi budhyanta ity ucyate. nāyakāḥ svāmināḥ samarthā boddhūm bodhaśaktimatsvabhāvā ity ārthaḥ. yathā nityaprakāśasvarūpo 'pi savitā prakāśata ity ucyate yathā vā nityanivṛttagatayo 'pi nityam eva śailās tiṣṭhantīty ucyate tadvat.

Bodhicaryāvatāra, ix, 104—

sattvāḥ prakṛtyā parinirvṛtāḥ.

Pañjikā ad ix, 108—

sarvadharmāḥ . . . anutpannāniruddhasvabhāvatvāc
ca prakṛtiparinirvṛtā ādisāntā ity ucyante.

Bodhicaryāvatāra, ix, 151—

nirvṛtānirvṛtānām ca viśeṣo nāsti vastutah.

COMM. nirvṛtā ye sarvadharmāvaranāprahāṇād vinirmuktasarvabandhanāḥ. anirvṛtā ye rāgādikleṣapāśāyattacittasamṭatayaḥ saṃsāracāra-kāntargatāḥ. teṣāṃ ubhayeṣāṃ api viśeṣo bhedo nāsti na sambhavati . . . vastutah paramārthataḥ sarvadharmānām niḥsvabhāvatayā prakṛtiparinirvṛtatvāt. nirvṛtāḥ svabhāvasūnyatvād utpādanirodharahitāḥ. paramārthena paramārthasatyataḥ prakṛtinirvāṇatayā 'disāntatvāt.

Laṅkāvatāra (p. 80)—

prakṛtiprabhāsvavaraviśuddhyādiviśuddha . . . tathāga-
tagarbha.

Aṣṭasāhasrikā prajñāpāramitā (p. 47)—

ādiśuddhatvād ādipariśuddhatvāt sattvasya.

9. Gauḍapāda, iv, 99—

kramate na hi buddhasya jñānaṃ dharmeṣu tāyinaḥ
sarve dharmās tathā jñānaṃ naitad buddhena bhāṣitam

COMM. yasmān na hi kramate buddhasya paramārthadarśino jñānaṃ viśayāntareṣu dharmeṣu dharmasamṭham savitarīva prabhā. tāyinaḥ,

tāyo 'syāstīti tāyī, saṃtāyavato¹ nirantarasyākāśakalpasyety arthaḥ, pūjāvato vā prajñāvato vā. sarve dharmā ātmāno 'pi tathā jñānavad evākāśakalpatvān na kramante kvacid apy arthāntara ity arthaḥ. yad ādāv upanyastam jñānenākāśakalpenetyādi² tad idam ākāśakalpasya tāyino buddhasya tadananyatvād ākāśakalpaṃ jñānam na kramate kvacid apy arthāntare. tathā dharmā iti. 'ākāśam ivācalam avikriyaṃ niravayavaṃ nityam advitīyam asaṅgam adṛśyam agrāhyam aṇāyādyatītaṃ brahmātmatattvaṃ "na hi draṣṭur drṣṭer viparīlopo vidyata" iti śruteḥ, jñānajñeyajñātrbhedarahitaṃ paramārthatattvaṃ advayaṃ etaṃ na buddhena bhāṣitaṃ. yady api bāhyārthanirākaraṇaṃ jñānamātrakalpanā cādvayavastusāmīpyam uktam, idaṃ tu paramārthatattvaṃ advaitam vedānteṣv eva vijñeyam ity arthaḥ.

"The knowledge of an Awakened (*Buddha*), *id est* of a seer of reality, does not bear on things, *id est* on any extraneous object; it resides on things itself, as does light in the sun. Awakened = *Tāyin*. The Awakened one is, indeed, homogeneous (*tāyin*), *id est* endowed with homogeneity, possessed of continuity, without interval or difference, space-like. *Tāyin* can also be understood in the meaning of Adorable or Sage. Such are all the things, *id est* all the souls; just as the knowledge [of a Buddha], they are space-like, and do not bear on anything outside themselves. What has been said at the beginning of this treatise (Gauḍapāda, iv, 1), 'by a space-like knowledge,' that space-like knowledge of a space-like homogeneous Awakened who is nothing else than this knowledge³ does not bear on anything outside. Such are [also] things [whatever they are]. This [knowledge] space-like, immovable, unmodifiable, without parts, fast, sole, free, not to be seen, not to be grasped, beyond hunger and the like, essence of Brahma-ātmā, according to the Scripture 'there is not discontinuity of seeing to the seer' (Brhat. iv, 3. 23), free from the opposition knowledge-knowable-knower, reality, non-duality, has not been taught by (Śākyamuni) Buddha. When denying the existence of the external world and supposing the sole existence of knowledge, he came very near the essential non-duality: but this non-dual reality can only be learned in the Upanishads."

As a matter of fact, this knowledge, without "knowable-knower-knowledge", is the knowledge of a Buddha, according to the Mahāyāna. And a Buddhist may say *naitad buddhena bhāṣitaṃ*, "This doctrine has not been taught by Buddha," for Buddha does not teach anything.

¹ Editor has *tāpi(yi)naḥ tāpo(yo) saṃtānavato*; MSS. *tāpī, tāyī, tāpo, tāyo, saṃtāpavato*—see M.W.²; *tāy* = to spread, to proceed in a continuous stream or line, Dhātup., xiv, 18. See Mahāvīyutpatti, I, 15; 96, 6; Nāmasaṃgīti, = *trātar*; Burn., *Intr.*, p. 227; Kern, *ad Lotus*, i, 73, ii, 47 (mighty, able, clever), iv, 40 (strenuous; Pān. i, 3. 38, *kramate, tāyante*), ix, 4 (mighty saint); Speyer, *ad Divyāvadāna*, Wien Z. xvi, p. 349.

² See above, p. 137, No. 2.

³ *tadananyatvāt* (?).