Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin
Published December 22, 2017 | Version v1
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Taxons are not Homeostatic Property Clusters Either [Los taxones tampoco son racimos homeostáticos de propiedades]

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  • 1. Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Brasil

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The notion of homeostatic property cluster is adequate to characterize types and the natural kinds that these types delimit; but assuming that way of considering natural types and classes does not lead to challenging taxonomic individualism: the thesis according to which taxa are individual entities and not natural kinds. The arguments that serve to show that the taxa are not natural kinds, in a more rigid or more classic sense of the term, are also valid, mutatis mutandis, when the idea of types as homeostatic property clusters is accepted. In this regard, Boyd’s proposal does not bring major newness for Philosophy of Biology. Besides that, this proposal can involve a confusion between essence and idiosyncrasy that would be better to preserve.

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