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power. Finally, Taiwan, despite warmed relations, is rarely far from China’s strategic thinking, with the conclusion that “the price Taiwan must pay to maintain autonomy from China is increasing” (p. 221).

The case of Vietnam is especially complex and not only due to the legacy of historical mistrust between Beijing and Hanoi. In addition, unlike Japan and the Philippines, Vietnam has been much more wary of any sort of great power alignment given its bitter experiences over the last century. Instead, Hanoi has opted for a thorny policy of balancing various power interests in the region while maintaining its stance against growing Chinese encroachment in the South China Sea. Russia is described not as an ally of China but rather a strategic partner, with the caveat that despite still considerable Russian power, the country’s relations with China are becoming less equal.

The final sections of the book analyse China’s growing international concerns and strategic interests. Some risks are established, including nuclear proliferation and energy security, but more recent additions to this list are human security, cyber warfare and terrorism, as befitting a great power in modern era. Although the book does suggest that conflict either on the international or the regional level is not inevitable, the author does conclude that China’s rise at present is having a potentially negative impact on overall global security. This point may be argued, but the book contributes much well-reasoned thinking to the growing debate over the role of China as a strategic actor and into what sort of great power it is evolving. As such, this book makes a significant and impressive contribution to Chinese security and foreign policy studies.

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The Dragon Extends Its Reach: Chinese Military Power Goes Global
LARRY M. WORTZEL
xv + 240 pp. $29.95.

A former military attaché in Beijing and one of the United States’ most experienced observers of China’s defence establishment, Larry Wortzel assesses the improvements defence modernization programmes are making in the war-fighting capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), as the services and branches are collectively named, and the implications for the United States. He sees two core drivers for these programmes. First, Beijing views the United States as China’s most capable potential adversary thereby requiring the PLA to counter, but not match, the recognized superior capabilities of US armed forces in essentially all warfare domains. Second is Beijing’s drive for the military capacity to protect the expanding national interests that have accompanied China’s burgeoning dependence on imports and greater engagement with the world. Extending the PLA’s reach is a consequence of both drivers.

Employing a comprehensive exploration of Chinese and secondary sources, Wortzel’s assessments concentrate on the PLA’s progress in acquiring the tools of contemporary warfare where military operations go beyond the land, sea and air domains. Individual chapters on C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems), space war and space control, and information war accompany those evaluating the ground, air,
naval and strategic missile forces capabilities. In a particularly unique contribution, Wortzel includes a chapter on information operations run by the PLA General Political Department.

Emphasis is correctly placed on the integration of advanced technology systems into the revisions of doctrine, operational concepts and training undertaken by all three services and the 2nd Artillery Force commanding China’s strategic and conventionally-armed missiles. Wortzel is careful to lay out PLA deficiencies in these realms, primarily that it does not have an extensive body of personnel capable of operating in an advanced technology environment. He stresses that China’s military leaders recognize this limitation and are intent on developing a deeper pool of personnel by 2020 capable of planning and conducting joint military operations, maintaining advanced technology weapon systems and platforms, and managing information systems and cyber technologies.

The PLA’s current global reach is assessed as limited to its space, cyber, missile and nuclear forces. The conventional forces are not yet able to conduct sustained combat operations for any extended period much beyond China’s periphery, including the Yellow, East and South China Seas. The PLA Navy’s dependence on ground-based air cover limits its ability to conduct sustained combat operations much beyond these peripheral waters. The commissioning of the Liaoning aircraft carrier and the construction of larger amphibious warfare and underway replenishment ships suggest the intent to develop future naval expeditionary forces unrestrained by air power limitations. The single area where the PLA is evaluated as reaching world-class level is in the cyber domain. Here it has been able to engage in cyber operations on a global scale. Again, this capability does not penetrate deeply into the ranks of the PLA, but Wortzel judges it is adapting its concepts to the capabilities it has and plans to develop.

The concluding chapter focuses on the implications of the PLA’s improving capabilities for the United States. Although not anticipating a Sino-American war, Taiwan and North Korea are identified as potential flash points together with maritime territorial disputes where the United States could become involved because of its security treaties with Japan and the Philippines. In essence, Wortzel argues that that the military edge the United States holds over China’s forces is no longer as robust as it was 20 years ago – a conclusion also held by Admiral Locklear commanding US Pacific Command. China’s nuclear deterrent is becoming more credible and when the latest SSBNs receive their missiles will become even more so. The conventional-armed missiles of the 2nd Artillery Force can now strike critical US and allies’ bases in the region. Aided by China’s advancing C4ISR, US Navy units will soon be subject to attack by anti-ship ballistic missiles adding to the threat presented by the PLA Navy’s large and growing force of conventional and nuclear-powered attack submarines. US space systems will become ever more subject to degradation by Chinese anti-satellite capabilities. In short, it will become increasingly hazardous for US forces to operate on China’s periphery opposing the strategy known by China as “counter intervention” and the US as “anti-access/area denial.”

Where this reviewer does have a reservation is Wortzel’s failure to assess the extensive and nuanced discussion of deterrence found in The Science of Military Strategy published by the PLA Academy of Military Science that he cites several times. After a lengthy discussion of the multiple elements necessary for effective deterrence strategies that go beyond strategic nuclear deterrence the authors conclude the “more powerful the war-fighting capability, the more effective the deterrence.” Wortzel’s focus on war-fighting suggests he underestimates the deterrent component of China’s strategy and defence modernization programmes.
With this limitation in mind, Wortzel’s book is a definite contribution to our understanding of the PLA’s current and emerging capabilities. As such, he provides both those newly interested in China’s defence establishment and experienced PLA-watchers a book well worth reading and retaining.

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The Rise of China and Chinese International Relations Scholarship
WANG HUNG-JEN
vii + 194 pp. £49.95; $80.00

This study on Chinese debates regarding international relations is quite timely, as the changing role and status of the PRC in world politics is currently one of the most heatedly debated topics in the broader political science literature. The book examines Chinese scholars’ views and interpretations of the country’s rise to global power status, and thus adds an inside-out perspective that is reflective of the deeper historical and cultural foundations of Chinese politics. The starting point of analysis is the 1990s, when China’s status changed from being a passive observer to becoming, in Chinese terminology, one pole of the new multipolar world system.

The possible impact of China’s rise on the international system and its power contributions alongside those of the major actors involved therein have been subjects of discussion for the past three decades. Scholars of international relations have come up with two rather incompatible scenarios: neorealist theoreticians predict an inevitable clash of claims and a struggle for hegemony between the United States and China, while scholars relying on liberal and ideational interpretations of world politics instead argue that growing global interdependencies might facilitate international cooperation, and thus make possible the peaceful integration of a rising China into the international system. While international observers of China often apply analytical frames derived mainly from the context of European history, Chinese scholars meanwhile are now attempting to devise their own frames of analysis. The development of the field of International Relations (IR) studies in China has been examined and documented in several monographs and academic articles by other authors ever since the 1990s; Wang Hung-Jen provides a rather brief overview of some of these works before coming to the main part and contribution of his own research: the analysis of four selected case studies on China’s relations with the US, Japan, Southeast Asia and Taiwan (caveat: the latter is not part of China’s external relations and thus has to be analysed in light of the one-China principle).

Influenced by the main assumptions and frames of role theory (and by the writings of the Taiwanese scholar Shih Chih-yu), Wang Hung-Jen presents a new history of China’s external relations. As he correctly outlines in his case studies, Chinese IR research is no longer limited to one single narrative but is characterized by the coexistence therein of multiple theory schools and competing interpretations. China’s rise is causing dynamic changes to take place in China’s role within the international system, which is consequently prompting shifts in China’s bilateral relationships. Again, these new constellations have required modifications to be made to Chinese scholars’ research on the country’s rise.