

## ARTICLE

## White Collar Crime In Museums

STEVEN PETER COX 

**Abstract** White Collar Crime (WCC) can be defined as crimes committed by employees against their employers. Little empirical research has been conducted into WCC in the museum sector. The majority of a museums collection is held in back-of-house storage facilities with only a relatively small number of objects actually on public display. The true extent of WCC is unknown and it is a difficult area because of its complexity and invisibility. The article gives an overview of white-collar crime, outlines the characteristics and techniques of this type of crime and seeks to identify the problems of controlling white-collar crime with particular reference to the UK museum sector.

## INTRODUCTION

John Nevin, an assistant at the Victoria and Albert Museum pleaded guilty to 25 charges of theft of objets d'art and asked for another 1935 charges of theft to be taken into consideration; thefts which he had committed over a period of 23 years between 1930 and 1953 (Sandino 2009). The records of this theft had been embargoed until 2008 because, at the time, the Official Secrets Act covered the thefts. The assistant had removed the collection records of the items that he had taken to minimize the chance of discovery. This is an example of white-collar crime (WCC) where an employee had access to valuable and unique items that he stole and removed official records to cover his tracks. The true extent of WCC is unknown and the estimated costs of WCC vary enormously. This can be credited to the lack of official statistics and empirical studies into WCC (Cliff and Desilets 2014).

In the museum world “the three principles of the First Law of Collections Management may be formulated as follows: If it exists, people

will collect it. If people collect it, they will exhibit it. If people exhibit it, someone will try to steal it” (Chure 2000, 18).

The true extent of WCC is unknown and the estimated costs of WCC vary enormously. This can be credited to the lack of official statistics and empirical studies into WCC, difficulty to agree which acts comprise WCC and difficulty in capturing the data (Cliff and Desilets 2014).

The US National White Collar Crime Centre recognised that the extent of WCC remains largely unknown and is extremely difficult to quantify the true cost of such a pervasive problem (Hull et al. 2010). They attribute this to a number of factors, including a lack of official statistical information and empirical studies devoted to WCC as well as the nature of WCC. In a recent global study it is estimated that losses due to employee theft totals around \$3.7trillion (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 2016). All the countries surveyed believed exposure to fraud increased with 82% of responding companies in 2016 reporting a fraud incident, up from 61% in 2012. In 2012 29% of

Steven Peter Cox (redcps1@aol.com) is the head of security at the Museum of London, London, United Kingdom.

respondents reported an increase in theft of physical assets up from 22% in 2015. The most common perpetrators of fraud, cyber and security incidents over a 12-month period were current and former employees including senior or middle managers and more junior employees (Kroll 2017).

Croall (1994) identified that, although there is undoubted prevalence of WCC, there is little research into the subject in the UK. Much of the published research has been USA based. Very little research has been conducted in the museum sector in the USA or in the UK (Griffiths and Krol 2009; Jones 2009; Mansfield 2009).

**What Is White Collar Crime?**

Edwin Sutherland introduced the concept of white-collar crime (WCC) in his presidential address to the American Sociological Society on December 27, 1939. He identified that WCC consisted of the violation of trust by a person in business or in the professions. He emphasized that WCC is a real crime that needed to be included in the scope of criminology (Sutherland 1940). His address sparked into life an important area of study in criminology that has expanded over the past seventy years. Sutherland’s approach and definition have been debated, challenged, expanded and criticized since then. Tappan (1947) considered that a more legalistic approach should be used where a person is not labeled a criminal unless they have been convicted through formal criminal proceedings. Hollinger and Llash (1983, 1 as cited in Beck and Peacock 2009, 67) defined employee theft as “the unauthorised taking, control or transfer of money and/or property of the formal work organisation perpetrated by an employee during the course of occupational activity which is related to his or her

employment.” An operational definition of WCC was agreed at the National White Collar Crime Centre Conference as the

Illegal or unethical acts that violate fiduciary responsibility or public trust, committed by an individual or organisation, usually during the course of legitimate occupational activity, by persons of high or respectable social status for personal or organizational gain (Helmkamp et al. 1996, 351).

Clinard et al. (1994) believed that all crimes committed during the course of occupations should be defined as “Occupational crimes,” whereas Shapiro (1990, 358) posited that it should be based on an abuse of occupational trust and stated “Offending clothed in very different wardrobes, lie, steal, falsify, fabricate, exaggerate, omit, deceive, dissemble, shirk, embezzle, misappropriate, self-deal, and engage in corruption or incompetence by misusing their positions of trust.” Croall (2001, 17) defined WCC as “an abuse of a legitimate occupational role which is regulated by law.” Salinger (2013, xxvii) defined WCC as

Any behaviour that occurs in a corporate and/or individual occupational context; is committed for personal and/or corporate gain and/or violate the trust associated with the individual and/or corporations position and/or status; and is a violation of any criminal law, civil law, administrative law, rule, ruling, norm or regulation condemning the behaviour.

Clinard et al. (1994, 173) divided WCC into two key areas: “Occupational crime” that is “offences committed by individuals for themselves in the course of their occupations” and “Corporate crime,” defined as “offences committed by corporate officials on behalf of the corporations.” The use of Clinnard, Quinney

and Wildeman's separation helps to place those crimes committed within an organisation under the area of occupational crime, however, their definition is open to criticism because it demands that an offence is actually committed. For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation approached WCC in terms of the offence (Barnett 2000) similar to that proposed by Clinard et al. (1994). Shapiro (1980, 1), however, was very specific that "White-collar crime is not a legal category incorporating specific offences. Rather, it is a social construct." Robin (1974, 262) defined occupational crime "to include all violations that occur during the course of occupational activity and are related to employment." Braithwaite (1985) pointed out that occupational crime is a much less consistent category arguing that there are differences between an employee committing WCC against an employer compared to a professional individual like a medical consultant or solicitor cheating a client. Mounce and Mounce (2013, 99) developed this further by defining WCC and occupational crime as "the use of ones occupation for personal enrichment through deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing organisation's resources and assets." Hollinger and Davis (2006, 223) highlighted that "employee theft and staff dishonesty is not an easily understood phenomenon. It is hard to measure, difficult to theoretically explain, and almost impossible to prevent." Brightman (2009, 3) had a broader definition that included "virtually any non-violent act committed for financial gain, regardless of one's social status. Fraud, forgery, embezzlement, counterfeiting, and misuse of public office are only a few examples of such offences."

It can be seen from the above that researchers and criminologists have struggled to agree

on one definition of WCC that satisfies all aspects of this type of crime. Friedrichs (2007) concluded that it was not possible for WCC to have one meaning or definition. There appears to be, however, general agreement that there is a difference between occupational crime and corporate crime. This article focuses on crimes committed by employees in the museum sector during the course of their employment. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, the following definition of WCC will be used "the use of one's occupation for personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing organisation's resources or assets." (Mounce and Mounce 2013, 99).

#### **WHITE COLLAR CRIME—INSIDER THEFT**

There is no single source for law enforcement data available. The FBI's Criminal Justice Services Division operationalizes WCC to mean offences of fraud, forgery, counterfeiting, embezzlement, and 58 National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) offences although not all of them apply to WCC (Barnett 2000). The FBI's definition excludes non-criminal illegal activity, incidents not reported to the police, and incidents that do not fit the relevant NIBRS category (Cliff and Desilets 2014).

In the UK the 2013 Commercial Victimization Survey (Home Office 2014) shows the number of incidents of crime per 1000 premises. Libraries, archives, museums, and other cultural activities showed a total of 4167 incidents per 1000 premises in 2013. However, data was suppressed when estimates were based on less than 50 premises indicating a measure of underreporting by survey respondents. The 2014 Commercial Victimization Survey (Home Office 2015) focused on wholesale and retail premises and shows the average number of thefts by employees per 1000 premises as 6; down by 1%

compared to the 2012 Commercial Victimisation Survey.

Retail crime figures in the UK for the period 2012–2013 suggests that employee theft and fraud cost the retail industry £1681 million (Centre for Retail Research 2016a). The National Survey of Retail Crime and Security identified that losses from employees was 20% for smaller retailers, 29% for multiples and 36% from large multiples. Staff theft cost retailers £426 million in 2000 (Centre for Retail Research 2016b). These data would suggest that employee theft and fraud is a significant problem in the UK.

WCC is often not handled by the police; it is more often handled internally by the organisation, and therefore is not reflected in national statistics (Hollinger and Davis 2006). This would indicate that WCC is larger than national statistics show. Most employee crimes are not, in fact, found or reported (Mugellini 2013). A comparative survey study found that 18% of the sample in England and Wales had taken or stolen something from their workplace (Karstedt and Farrall 2006). Statistically it is very difficult to identify with any accuracy the prevalence of WCC within the UK due to the lack of data.

A significant concern is that where a case of WCC occurs the organisation often considers the crime had resulted from poor management practice, the lack of resources or the lack of appropriate policies and procedures rather than treating it as a criminal act (Gottschalk 2012). Employee theft is often referred to as perks and fiddles (Mars 1983; Croall 2001). Whilst in many work places this may be considered normal and, in some cases, it includes taking work items, misuse of work equipment, fiddling travel expenses and claiming time. Few employees who do engage in theft from the workplace consider themselves thieves, in fact “they may feel a

certain legitimacy attached to their stealing” (Challinger 1995, 3).

Little research has been conducted in the UK public sector that includes museums. Public sector organisations had typically argued, however, that “standards of probity were high and suggest that fraud is less prevalent in the public sector than in the private sector” (Croall 2001, 27). Croall’s comments about the public sector did not include museums.

### White Collar Crime in the Museum Sector

The professionalism of museum staff, the high level of confidence in museum staff by management and a passion for the museum field are all values that are considered highly by the museum profession and WCC directly impacts these values, not only in the maintenance of a museum’s assets, but also the trust in public museums to protect cultural assets. In many respects this is a moral position that is held to a higher standard than would be the case in the commercial sector.

Little research has been conducted into WCC within the museum sector. A number of high profile cases have been highlighted over the years in the media and a few examples illustrate that museums are not immune from WCC. A curator at the Copenhagen art museum was charged with stealing 100 exhibits from the museum with a value of around £90,000 in the period 1999–2002. He was sentenced to prison in 2005 (BBC News 2005). Henk van Leewen stole 194 items from the Australian Museum in Sydney. He was employed as a pest controller by the museum and was subsequently sentenced to 7 years in prison (Daily Telegraph 2007). The Danish Royal Library lost a large number of books over a period of years. An employee of the library had been employed from 1967 to his retirement in

2000. During that time he stole 1665 books (Jorgensen 2007). Daniel Lorello worked at the New York State Library archives and stole 1600 historical documents and artifacts some of which he sold over the Internet for personal profit (Museum Security Network 2008). In another case an assistant at the Victoria and Albert Museum, John Nevin, pleaded guilty to 25 charges of theft of objets d'art. At the court hearing he asked for 1935 other charges to be taken into consideration over a period of some 23 years (The Guardian 2013). In 2003, Alexander Polman, a curator at the Army Museum in Delft, in the Netherlands, had stolen hundreds of books and thousands of prints from the museum to sell them to an art dealer. Being a curator allowed him access to the museum's cataloguing system as well as authority to alter the system that enabled him to cover his tracks. He was jailed for 18 months (Richardson 2009). The Ronald Reagan Presidential Library was found unable to account for more than 80,000 artifacts out of its collection of around 100,000 items (Alonso-Zaldivar and Saillant 2007). In a study of publicized thefts from US libraries, archives and museums it was found that one-third of thefts were shown to be insider perpetrators where an offender had a position of trust and detailed knowledge of the premises where materials were stored (Samuelson et al. 2012).

The Collections Trust in the UK together with the Arts Council have developed a comprehensive and integrated approach to museum security which provides support to museums on all aspects of security. The approach seeks to balance security with the need for access to collections, detailed records of collections and maintaining a visible security profile (Collection Trust 2013).

The UK National Security Adviser at the Arts Council is responsible for advising on the

security and safety of collections in national museums. The International Council of Museums (ICOM) is an international organisation that is committed to ensuring the conservation and protection of museum artifacts. It works on an international basis to fight the illicit trade of cultural goods, the protection of heritage and risk management in museums. It also publishes basic guides on museum security under the auspices of the ICOM Committee for Museum Security. ICOM recommend that museums develop an internal theft prevention program that includes accountability of property and access control (Case1993). A comprehensive list for an internal theft prevention programme is outlined by ICOM and the International Security Committee (1995). That list emphasizes staff record checks, inventory checks, access controls and identity checks together with authorisation protocols.

Performance indicators set by the UK's Department of Culture, Media and Sports include visitor numbers, income and visitor satisfaction but make no mention of items stolen or missing as a key indicator for the security of a museum (ICOM and the International Security Committee 1995).

According to Jones (2009) museum, library or archive staffs are often wholly or partially responsible for thefts from museums and library collections. Museum staffs have the access and the means to engage in WCC but little effort from within the museum profession has been made to research WCC in museums (Griffiths and Krol 2009).

## **WHITE COLLAR CRIME—CHARACTERISTICS AND TECHNIQUES**

There are three main characteristics that distinguish occupational WCC from other crimes. First, the offender has legitimate access

to the target as a result of their occupational position. Secondly, the offender is separated from the victim; the offender never or only rarely comes into contact with the victim. Thirdly, WCC has the superficial appearance of legitimacy. Often the offenders' actions are not perceived as illegal (Benson 2009).

Felson and Clarke (1998) argue that opportunity is a fundamental cause of crime and they outlined ten principles of crime opportunity. These included that some products offer more tempting crime opportunities; crime can be prevented by reducing opportunities, and crime opportunities depend on everyday movements of activity. Coleman (1987) looked at the structure of opportunity; that in cases where there is no opportunity there would not be any crime. Mars (1983, 2) divided all jobs into four categories, "hawks, donkeys, wolves and vultures." Using Mars' definition in the museum world those museum employees with access to the collections would fall under the heading of Hawks, "individuals. . .tend to bend the rules to suit themselves. . .the innovative professional" (Mars 1983, 2) and "successful academics" (Mars 1983, 29). However, should the same museum professional collude or conspire they would move into the Wolves category: "Groups then come to possess considerable control over the resources of their individual members. . .-claims on their time as well as their loyalties. . .there is no place here for the independent individualist" (Mars 1983, 32). Hollinger and Davis (2006) concluded that the most favoured theories regarding employee theft fell into three categories. Firstly, rational choice theories, secondly job satisfaction or workplace equity theories and, thirdly, organizational theories that focused on workplace dishonesty.

Rational choice theories are based on those occasions where employees take advantage of

opportunities in the workplace for theft that have a low risk of detection whilst providing for potential benefit (Hollinger and Clark 1983 as cited in Beck and Peacock 2009). Job satisfaction or workplace equity theories focus on employees who are likely to steal because of the way they are treated by their employers. Organizational theories, in respect of rational choice theories, focus on the culture of the organisation. The organizational culture influences honesty within the workforce (Cherrington and Cherrington 1982) and the control of deviance within an organisation can be influenced by the formal structures of the organisation together with the sub-cultures of the employees (Parilla et al. 1988). Employee theft takes many forms, which are many in number and often of complex design (Greenberg and Barling 1996). However, Apel and Paternoster (2009) believed that WCC researchers had jumped to erroneous conclusions regarding the criminogenic effect of an organisation cultural or ethical climate on WCC.

#### THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLING WHITE COLLAR CRIME IN MUSEUMS

There are inherent limitations in the controls that can be put in place to reduce the risk of WCC. Security departments are often only alerted to the most high profile thefts within an organisation. An employee's decision to steal is fundamentally influenced by the belief that they will either be caught or not caught. In order for deterrence to work the employee must believe that there is a high probability of being caught and, if caught, there will be consequences that are severe and costly. This deterrence only works if the organisation's employees believe that there is a high probability of being caught (Hollinger and Davis 2006). Parilla et al. (1988) argued that there are three deterrent

strategies that organisations can adopt to minimize WCC. A firm policy regarding theft by employees, good security management to make it clear to employees that internal theft will result in apprehension and punishment, and some form of pre-employment screening. There is also unwillingness by employees to report WCC carried out by other employees that makes apprehending them more difficult (Parilla et al. 1988).

Prevention and control are two main approaches to reduce WCC. Prevention includes sound background checks in the recruitment process, and pre-employment screening. Control would include surveillance techniques, keeping accurate records and regular inspections of employee bags (Greenberg and Barling 1996). Reducing the opportunities of crime can help to prevent crime. Situational crime prevention includes controlling access to specific areas, screening entrances and exits, surveillance and clear rules and procedures (Felson and Clarke 1998). Internal theft can be reduced by reducing employee dissatisfaction, involving staff in devising approaches to staff dishonesty, setting rules and procedures (such as Codes of Conduct) and reducing the opportunities for WCC within the workplace (Chalinger 1995). Crime prevention strategies can be categorized into external measures such as security lighting, CCTV, and key control and internal measures that include background checks, employee identification, computer security and the minimization of cash holdings (Bressler 2009).

The public generally accepts the use of CCTV to control crime in public areas (Brown 1995). This is not an issue in museums as the public expects internal and external CCTV monitoring in public buildings housing irreplaceable objects. CCTV plays an important part in a museum's security portfolio to protect

its collections from theft or damage and also acts as a deterrent to a potential offender (Poole 2013).

Beck (2006) recommended that staff monitoring and surveillance, including staff searches and the use of CCTV, could be used to reduce WCC in the retail environment. Staff awareness programs and the development of a culture of intolerance of dishonesty and encouraging staff to play an active role in the policing of their own work environment would help to reduce WCC.

In museums and libraries one of the fundamental questions regarding theft is "How do we, as collections managers, mitigate this threat, yet provide the public and the scientific community the necessary access to specimens for research and education?" (Chure 2000, 20). The requirement of museums to support the exchange of information about collections and support research and inquiry from the public or other public institutions puts additional pressure on the security of collections (Griffiths and Krol 2009). The security of collections, however, is often put at risk by under-investment in prevention and preventative policing compared to other forms of crime (Braithwaite 2010).

In a study of theft Samuelson et al. (2012) concluded that as security measures were increased insider theft also increased; museums and special collections showing increases in insider theft because of the restricted access to artifacts which makes it more difficult for outsiders to gain access in the first place. An important issue regarding the control of WCC within museums is that whilst museums spend considerable amounts of money on acquisitions, preservation and display of collections the actual protection of their assets is often woefully underfunded (Keller 1995).

Museums give access to their collections by lending and borrowing museum objects for the

benefit of other museums and their visitors. Museums often stage temporary exhibitions where their objects are supplemented by borrowed objects for a limited period of time. Museums should have an access policy that allows for the lending and borrowing of objects (Collection Trust 2016; Malaro 1995).

Museums often provide access to their storage areas to researchers and interested members of the public as “open access storage” (Keene et al. 2008). This provides access to a museum’s collections held in storage under specific access policy principles.

There are some similarities between museums and retail organisations. Both museums and retail organisations manage their organisation’s assets; the only difference being the product profile of those assets as, for example, stocks of washing liquid or stocks of roman coins. These are all assets that need some form of “stock control” and security oversight. Large retailers have front-of-house operations where goods for sale are displayed. Museums’ front-of-house consists of public display areas, where objects are displayed, and retail activities such as the museum shop and refreshment areas. The back-of-house functions consist, for both retail and museums, of storage of goods and the control of these storage areas is important. “Maintaining a sound location tracking practice is essential for the success of a collection inventory which is vital to security as well as to collection management” (Lord and Lord 2009, 100). Robust collection documentation is essential to ensure all objects are accounted for in the collection management system (Rivard and Miller 1995).

Inventory control systems in the retail sector are very sophisticated and can highlight stock losses quickly and efficiently (Beck and Peacock 2009). Robust inventory control systems in museums however are lacking which

makes it difficult to audit objects on a regular basis (Jones 2009). Internal theft of objects could remain undiscovered for many years. A nationally recognised museum management standard (SPECTRUM) provides guidance on collections management for UK museums. This guidance includes inventory control procedures which advocate the accounting for and location of all objects belonging to the museum as well as an audit procedure that defines a museum audit as “the examination of objects or object information, in order to verify their location, authenticity, accuracy and relationships” (Collection Trust 2009, 143). Radio frequency identification (RFID) technology is one of the fastest growing technologies that has been applied to supply chain management, logistics and manufacturing and has been slowly adopted by some museums to enhance the visitor experience rather than manage collections (Ngai et al. 2008). The retail industry is increasingly using RFID for improving inventory management (Koh et al. 2006). Beck and Peacock (2009) also recognised that the use of RFID technology in the retail world as a means to combat stock loss was an emerging technology with plans to tag all products so that they can be tracked remotely through the supply chain. RFID tags can be used at entry and exit locations within a museum where objects carrying an identity tag can be automatically detected and logged as they pass through onto the collections management system, however, the use of this technology in museums has been restricted due to the high set-up costs. The Collections Trust publishes, as part of its collections management standard, a comprehensive audit procedure to ensure that museums conduct an examination of object information in order to verify their location, accuracy and authenticity. A robust audit procedure allows a museum to ensure that object related documentation is up to date, verification



of the physical presence of the objects and appropriate action is taken where objects are missing, incorrectly documented or not documented at all. Such audits would also highlight the robustness of the inventory control or collections management system (Collection Trust 2011).

The responsibility for security in museums is unique to each museum. ICOM uses a number of terms to capture all those in museums who may have responsibility for security. These include institutional managers, collection managers and protection managers (Case 1993). ICOM and the International Security Committee (1995) uses the term cultural institution manager as a catch-all for the individual who has responsibility for the care of cultural collections. The amount of money spent on security in museums can be as low as 14% of the total museum budget and priority is related to perceived risk with resources devoted to the most valuable objects (Lord et al. 1995).

Most museums split the responsibility for security between front-of-house and back-of-house. The responsibility for back-of-house security in many museums is under the collections departments rather than the security department. Whether professional curators have, in fact, the necessary expertise in the security of their museums needs to be explored further. Deterrence only works if employees believe they will be caught (Hollinger and Davis 2006) but often in museums curators are responsible for back-of-house security, which does not seem ideal, as curators would have the knowledge to circumnavigate any deterrence installed by the organisation. Deterrence, or situational crime prevention techniques, could well have been installed under the management of the curators themselves.

In many museums the front-of-house security is often managed by a senior manager or, in

some cases, a curator or conservator whereas, as mentioned above, back-of-house security is often in the hands of curators and conservators—the very people who know the value of objects and, most importantly, have access to the collections management systems. Financial gain is a potential motivational gain and being responsible for security could present the opportunity to commit WCC (Coleman 1995).

The levels of money spent on security between front-of-house and back-of-house is often significantly different. The average spend divided between front-of-house and back-of-house is around 60% and 40% respectively showing that, on average, museums spend twice as much on front-of-house security compared to back-of-house.

This represents a significant difference in security expenditure between front-of-house and back-of-house facilities—between a small minority of objects and the substantial majority of objects held in store. It could be argued that there is a greater risk of crime in the front-of-house areas of a museum where the objects are on public display and that most security resources are therefore allocated to protecting the most valuable objects (Lord et al. 1995).

Front-of-house security expenditure would include the physical security of specific objects on public display such as CCTV, high security display cases, alarmed displays and motion detectors. The amount of money spent on the security of back-of-house storage areas is significantly less than that for front-of-house. Keller (1995) identified that the protection of museum assets is often underfunded. Benson explored internal crimes where he identified three important characteristics of WCC (Benson 2009). These were legitimate access, spatially separated and the appearance of legitimacy. Museum employees have legitimate access to many areas of a museum and would have knowledge of the

security systems, control keys, codes and the collections management system. This authorised access by staff during their daily work activities would be normal and not seen as out of place or suspicious.

A museum employee is unlikely to steal from front-of-house because he or she has knowledge of the situational crime prevention techniques adopted by the museum. However, a theft from back-of-house is far more likely as such a theft could remain undetected for a very long time. Felson and Clarke (1998) emphasised that opportunity is a fundamental cause of crime. The perpetrator would most likely be a staff member who has legitimate access and, being a museum employee, would have the appearance of legitimacy as outlined by Benson (2009). Museum employees with access rights to the museums collections would be “Hawks” under the definition of Mars (Mars 1983, 2) where employees can bend the rules as the innovative professional or academic (Mars 1983, 29). Rational choice theories posit that employees take advantage of opportunities that have a low risk of detection (Hollinger and Clark 1983 as cited in Beck and Peacock 2009). This emphasizes the argument put forward by Gottschalk (2012) where WCC is often considered to be the result of poor management practices or the lack of policies and procedures rather than being treated as a criminal act. WCC is often not perceived as a crime by employees because there could be perceived legitimacy to their theft (Challinger 1995). Hollinger and Davis (2006) posited that WCC was often not handled by the police; organisations often preferred to handle such cases internally and away from the public eye.

Museums generally have formal access procedures that have restrictions and/or minimum standards and processes. Benson (2009) outlined that an offender had to have legitimate

access as a result of their occupation. Many members of staff in a museum would, of course, have legitimate access to both front-of-house and back-of-house locations.

When museum access procedures are overruled it invariable means that a museum object or objects are physically removed from the museum’s collections and relocated elsewhere. This can mean that the statuses of the objects are not updated in the collections management system because, for expedient reasons, a senior member of the management team overrules the formal access procedures. This results in the object being loaned to another museum or loaned to some other organisation and, most importantly, the museum has no formal record that this has happened. Records management is therefore compromised and presents the opportunity to the potential offender (Felson and Clarke 1998). The potential for this is that the object could be stolen, not in location, missing or on loan—the museum does not know.

## CONCLUSION

It is clear that WCC can and does occur in museums worldwide even though preventative measures are in place. A number of key security initiatives can help minimize the risk of WCC by ensuring the security recommendations outlined by the various museum professional bodies are fully implemented. This article argues that museums should introduce RFID technology on artifacts so that movement of artifacts can be tracked and the collections management system updated. This is an emerging technology for museums and should be embraced as soon as possible. A comprehensive audit procedure is required to ensure that museums conduct regular examinations of object information to verify their location, accuracy and authenticity. A review of how security is treated within the

museum organisation would be helpful to ensure that robust systems are in place in both front-of-house and back-of-house locations. The budget for back-of-house locations should be urgently reviewed to ensure artifacts stored in back-of-house locations are adequately and robustly protected from a security perspective, not just a collection care perspective. Security organisational arrangements should be reviewed to ensure back-of-house security is the responsibility of professional security staff rather than museum curators.

The museum profession prides itself on its professionalism and passion for the museum field but museum professionals must recognise the professionalism of museum security staff and recognise that museum security should be managed by security professionals rather than museum curators who have “security” added to their management role as an additional responsibility (usually to save on budget headcount) rather than employing a security professional to lead security in a museum. **END**

## REFERENCES

- Apel, R. and R. Paternoster. 2009. “Understanding ‘Criminogenic’ Corporate Culture: What White-Collar Crime researchers Can Learn from Studies of the Adolescent Employment-Crime Relationship.” In *The Criminology of White-Collar Crime*, edited by S. Simpson and D. Weisburd, 15–33. New York: Springer.
- Alonso-Zaldivar, R. and Saillant, C. 2007. “Reagan Library Items Lost or Pilfered.” *Los Angeles Times*, November 08. Accessed March 29, 2017. Retrieved from <http://articles.latimes.com/2007/nov/08/nation/na-reagan8>
- Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. 2016. *Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse 2016: Global Fraud Study*. Accessed March 30, 2017. Retrieved from <http://www.nw3c.org/research>
- Barnett, C. 2000. *The Measurement of White-Collar Crime Using Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Data*. USA: Federal Bureau of Investigations.
- BBC News. 2005. *Museum Worker ‘Took 100 Exhibits*. BBC News. Accessed March 30, 2016. Retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/4163656.stm>.
- Beck, A.. 2006. *Staff Dishonesty in the Retail Sector: Understanding the Opportunities: A White Paper for ECR Europe*. Leicester: ECR Europe.
- Beck, A. and C. Peacock. 2009. *New Loss Prevention: Redefining Shrinkage Management*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Benson, M. 2009. “White-Collar Crime.” In *21st Century Criminology: A Reference Handbook*, edited by J. M. Miller, 549–56. London: SAGE Publications Ltd..
- Braithwaite, J. 1985. “White-Collar Crime.” *Annual Review of Sociology* 11(1): 1–15.
- . 2010. “The Impact of Crime on Business: A Model for Prevention, Detection and Remedy.” *Journal of Management and Marketing Research* 3: 1–13.
- Bressler, M.. 2009. “The Impact of Crime on Business: A Model for Prevention, Detection and remedy.” *Journal of Management and Marketing Research* 3: 1–13.
- Brightman, Hank. J. 2009. *Today’s White-Collar Crime: Legal, Investigative, and Theoretical Perspectives*. Oxen: Routledge.
- Brown, B. 1995. *CCTV in Town Centres: Three Case studies*. Police Research Group Crime Detection and Prevention Series Paper 68. London: Police Research Group.
- Case, M. 1993. “Protection, Security, and Conservation of Collections.” In *Museum Security and Protection: A Handbook for Culture Heritage Institutions*, edited by D. Liston, 91–120. Oxen: Routledge.
- Centre for Retail Research. 2016a. “Retail Crime in the UK.” Retailresearch. Org. Accessed May 14, 2016. Retrieved from <http://www.retailresearch.org/ukretailcrime.php>.
- Centre for Retail Research. 2016b. “The National Survey of Retail Crime and Security.” Retailresearch. Org. Accessed May 14, 2016.

- Retrieved from [http://www.retailresearch.org/downloads/PDF/uk\\_retail\\_crime\\_stats.pdf](http://www.retailresearch.org/downloads/PDF/uk_retail_crime_stats.pdf).
- Challinger, D. 1995. "Feeling Good at Work—An Antidote to Workplace Crime." *Criminology Australia* 6(4): 27–30.
- Cherrington, D. and J. O. Cherrington. 1982. "The Climate of honesty in Retail Stores." In *Employee Theft: Research, Theory, and Applications*, edited by W. Terris, 3–16. Illinois: London Press House.
- Chure, D. 2000. "New Threats to Old Bones: The Theft of Fossil Vertebrates from Museum Collections." *Cultural Resource Management* 23 (5): 18–22.
- Cliff, G. and C. Desilets. 2014. "White-Collar Crime: What It Is and Where It's Going." *Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy* 28 (2): 481–523.
- Clinard, M., R. Quinney, and J. Wildeman. 1994. *Criminal Behaviour Systems: A Typology*, 3rd edn. Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Co.
- Collection Trust. 2009. *Spectrum: The UK Museum Documentation Standard*. Cambridge: Collection Trust.
- Collection Trust. 2011. *Spectrum: The UK Museum Collection Management Standard: Audit Procedure Spectrum 4.0*. London: Collection Trust.
- Collection Trust. 2013. "*The Museum security Toolkit*." Collection Trust. Accessed June 11, 2016. Retrieved from <http://www.collectiontrust.org.uk/collections-link/risk-management/security/item/1744-the-museum-security-toolkit>.
- Collection Trust. 2016. "*Accreditation Section: Users and their experience*." Collection Trust. Accessed June 11, 2016. Retrieved from [http://www.collectiontrust.org.uk/collections-link/accreditation/index.php?option=com\\_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=13401&Itemid=2109](http://www.collectiontrust.org.uk/collections-link/accreditation/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=13401&Itemid=2109).
- Coleman, J. 1987. "Towards an Integrated Theory of White-Collar Crime." *The American Journal of Sociology* 93(2): 406–39.
- . 1995. "Motivation and Opportunity: Understanding the Causes of White-Collar Crime." In *White-Collar Crime: Classic and Contemporary Views*, 3rd edn, edited by G. Geis, R. Meier and L. Salinger, 360–81. New York: The Free Press.
- Croall, H. 1994. *White-Collar Crime*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- . 2001. *Understanding White-Collar Crime*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Daily Telegraph. 2007. "*Jail for Stuffed Dolphin Theft*." Daily Telegraph. Accessed March 30, 2016. Retrieved from <http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/nsw/jail-for-stuffed-dolphin-theft/story-e6freuzi-1111113378802>.
- Felson, M. and R. Clarke. 1998. *Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical Theory for Crime Prevention. Police Research Series Paper 98*. London: Home Office.
- Friedrichs, D. 2007. *Trusted Criminals White-Collar Crime in Contemporary Society*. Belmont, CA: Thomas Wadsworth.
- Gottschalk, P. 2012. "Rotten Apples versus Rotten Barrels in White-Collar Crime: A Qualitative Analysis of White-Collar Offenders in Norway." *International Journal of Criminal Justice Sciences* 7 (2): 575–90.
- Greenberg, L. and J. Barling. 1996. "Employee Theft." In *Trends in Organizational Behaviour*, Vol. 3, edited by C. Cooper and D. Rousseau, 49–64. New York: Wiley.
- Griffiths, R. and A. Krol. 2009. "Insider Theft: Reviews and Recommendations from the Archive and Library Professional Literature." *Library and Archival Security* 22(1): 5–18.
- Helmkamp, J., Ball, R., and Townsend, K. 1996. "*Definition Dilemma: Can and Should There Be a Universal Definition of White-Collar Crime?*" Paper presented at the academic workshop National White-Collar Crime Centre, West Virginia University, June 20–22, 1996. Retrieved from <https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/publications/Abstract.aspx?id=166244>.
- Hollinger, R. and J. Davis. 2006. "Employee Theft and Staff Dishonesty." In *The Handbook of Security*, edited by M. Gill, 203–28. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Home Office. 2014. *Crime against Businesses: Detailed Findings from the 2013 Commercial Victimisation Survey*. London: Home Office.

- Home Office. 2015. *Crime against Businesses: Findings from the 2014 Commercial Victimisation Survey*. London: Home Office.
- Hull, R., Desilets, C., and Kane, J. 2010. *The 2010 National Public Survey on White Collar Crime*. National White Collar Crime Centre. Accessed March 29, 2017. Retrieved from <http://www.acfe.com/rtn2016.aspx>
- ICOM and the International Security Committee. 1995. "Protection, Security and Conservation of Collections." In *Collections Management*, edited by A. Fahy, 251–73, London: Routledge.
- Jones, L.. 2009. "The 'Sleazy' Underbelly of Museum Collecting: Archiving Theft in Museums." *Library and Archival Security* 22(1): 19–32.
- Jorgensen, J. 2007. "The Anatomy of a Crime Discovery after 25 Years. A Notable Case of Book Theft and its Detection." *LIBER Quarterly* 17(1): 32–47.
- Karstedt, S. and S. Farrall. 2006. "The Moral Economy of Everyday Crime." *British Journal of Criminology* 46(6): 1011–36.
- Keene, S., A. Stevenson, and F. Monti. 2008. *Collections for People: Museum's Stored Collections as a Public Resource*. London: UCL Institute of Archaeology.
- Keller, S. 1995. "The Quandaries of Museum Security." *The Journal of Museum Education* 20(1): 10–1.
- Koh, C., H. Kim, and E. Kim. 2006. "The Impact of RFID in Retail Industry: Issues and Critical Success Factors." *Journal of Shopping Centre Research* 13(1): 101–7.
- Kroll. 2017. *Global Fraud and Risk Report: Building Resilience in a Volatile World: Annual Edition 2016/17*. Accessed March 29, 2017. Retrieved from <http://www.kroll.com/en-us/intelligence-center/events/2017-global-fraud-risk-report-launch>
- Lord, G. and B. Lord. 2009. *The Manual of Museum Management*, 2nd edn. Plymouth: AltaMira Press.
- Lord, B., G. Lord, and J. Nicks. 1995. "A Framework for Management." In *Collections Management*, edited by A. Fahy, 66–77. London: Routledge.
- Malaro, M. 1995. "Collection Management Policies." In *Collections Management*, edited by A. Fahy, 11–28. London: Routledge.
- Mansfield, D. 2009. "Reducing Book Theft at University Libraries." *Library and Information Research* 33(103): 10–5.
- Mars, G. 1983. *Cheats at Work: An Anthropology of Workplace Crime*. London: Unwin.
- Mounce, M., and P. Mounce. 2013. "An Investigation of Special Collections Library Theft." *Library & Archival Security* 25(2): 99.
- Mugellini, G. 2013. *Measuring and Analyzing Crime against the Private Sector: International Experiences and the Mexican Practice*. Mexico: National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEDI).
- Museum Security Network. 2008. "Insider Theft: Ex-Archivist Stole State Documents." Museum Security Network. Accessed April 6, 2016. Retrieved from <http://www.museum-security.org/2008/10/insider-theft-ex-archivist-stole-state-documents/>.
- Ngai, E., K. Moon, F. Riggins, and C. Yi. 2008. "RFID Research: An Academic Literature Review (1995–2005) and Future Research Directions." *International Journal of Production Economics* 112(2): 510–20.
- Parilla, P., R. Hollinger, and J. Clark. 1988. "Organizational Control of Deviant Behavior: The Case of Employee Theft." *Social Science Quarterly* 60(2): 261–80.
- Poole, N. 2013. "Security in Museums and Galleries: CCTV Systems" Collections Trust. Accessed May 20, 2016. Retrieved from <http://www.collectionstrust.org.uk/digital-strategy/item/1847-security-in-museums-and-galleries-cctv-systems>.
- Richardson, T. 2009. "What Drives People to Steal Precious Books." FT.com. Accessed March 30, 2016. Retrieved from <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d41a83d6-09dc-11de-add8-0000779fd2ac.htmlaxzz48e7PHZXD>.
- Rivard, P. and S. Miller. 1995. "Cataloguing Collections: Erratic Starts and Eventual Success: A Case Study." In *Collections Management*, edited by A. Fahy, 211–32. London: Routledge.

- Robin, G. 1974. "White-Collar Crime and Employee Theft." *Crime and Delinquency* 20: 251–62.
- Salinger, L. 2013. "Introduction." In *Encyclopedia of White-Collar Crime & Corporate Crime*, edited by L. Salinger, xxvii–vii. London: SAGE Publications Ltd..
- Samuelson, T., L. Sare, and C. Coker. 2012. "Unusual Suspects: The Case of Insider Theft in Research Libraries and Special Collections." *College & Research Libraries* 73(6): 556–68.
- Sandino, L. 2009. "News from the Past: Oral History at the V&A." V&A Online Journal issue 2 Autumn 2009. Accessed May 14, 2016. Retrieved from <http://www.vam.ac.uk/content/journals/research-journal/issue-02/news-from-the-past-oral-history-at-the-v-and-a/>.
- Shapiro, S. 1980. *Thinking about White-Collar Crime: Matters of Conceptualization and Research*. USA: National Institute of Justice.
- . 1990. "Collaring the Crime, Not the Criminal: Reconsidering the Concept of White-Collar Crime." *American Sociological Review* 55(3): 345–65.
- Sutherland, E. 1940. "White-Collar Criminality." *American Sociological Review* 5(1): 1–12.
- Tappan, P. 1947. "Who is the Criminal?" *American Sociological Review* 12(1): 96–102.
- The Guardian. 2013. "From the Archive, 5 June 1954: Stolen Art Haul Recovered from Home of V&A Worker." The Guardian.com. Accessed March 30, 2016. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2013/jun/05/victoria-and-albert-museum-assistant-thefts>.