Conference paper Open Access

Aspiration-based Perturbed Learning Automata

Chasparis, Georgios

This paper introduces a novel payoff-based learning scheme for distributed optimization in repeatedly-played strategic-form games. Standard reinforcement-based learning exhibits several limitations with respect to their asymptotic stability. For example, in two-player coordination games, payoff-dominant (or efficient) Nash equilibria may not be stochastically stable. In this work, we present an extension of perturbed learning automata, namely aspiration-based perturbed learning automata (APLA) that overcomes these limitations. We provide a stochastic stability analysis in multi-player coordination games. In the case of two-player coordination games, we show that the payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium is the unique stochastically stable state.

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