The Failed Attempt to Move the Emperor to Yamaguchi and the Fall of the Ōuchi

This article seeks to explain the sudden fall of the Ōuchi in 1551. It argues that the Ōuchi, the lords of the West, were established as a powerful force in sixteenth-century Japan, and that their home city of Yamaguchi reflected their wider influence and prosperity. In 1551, however, this came to a sudden end with the suicide of Ōuchi Yoshitaka and the swift fall of the family. This development, which has never been properly explained, stems from an ambitious but ultimately unsuccessful attempt to move the emperor to Yamaguchi, and thereby transform the city into Japan’s new capital. Opposition from rival warriors, courtiers, and some members of the Ōuchi organization led to the overthrow and death of Yoshitaka, along with the slaughter of all the courtiers who had traveled to Yamaguchi. The resultant turmoil coupled with the death of most of the key participants caused this epochal event to have been largely forgotten.

three major deputies of the Ouchi organization. Instead, the turmoil arose because Yoshitaka, at the peak of his powers, was involved in an attempt to move the emperor from Kyoto to Yamaguchi. 15 While preoccupied with these preparations, a cabal of Ouchi deputies rebelled against Yoshitaka, killing him, his seven-year-old son, and a coterie of courtiers who already resided in Yamaguchi, in the autumn of 1551. 16 This article will explore Yoshitaka's attempt to move the emperor to Yamaguchi, explain how and why it has been forgotten, and suggest that it has profound consequences for the study of Japanese history.

Ouchi Yoshitaka and the Kyoto Court
A warlord, trader and courtier, Ouchi Yoshitaka was one of the preeminent figures of his day. He dominated trade with Korea and China and controlled northern Kyushu and western Japan. His wealth and power fostered links with influential warriors. Yoshitaka was the brother-in-law of Hosokawa Mochitaka (?-1553), a scion of the deputy shogun (kanrei 管領) family, and of Ashikaga Yoshitsuna (1509-73), one claimant for the position of shogun. 17 His ties to the court were deeper and more intimate than those of comparable daimyo. Yoshitaka had taken a wife from the Madenok oji family of administrative nobles before divorcing her. His subsequent primary consort was a daughter of Otsuki Takaharu, scion of a powerful family who was responsible for drafting most important court documents. 18 An influential courtier, Yoshitaka had attained the second rank in 1548, even though he never traveled to or resided in Kyoto. Because of this, he possessed the status and connections to communicate directly with Emperor Go-Nara and he used these to discuss the movement of nobles and shrine attendants to the west. 19 The nature of the exchange suggests that Yoshitaka and Go-Nara easily transmitted messages without any need for intermediaries, a level of communication possible only for courtiers of the highest rank.
hiki for the repair of the palace in 1542, paid for sacred dances (mikagura 御神楽) in 1548, and granted the court 200 kanmon yearly to finance all major ceremonies. 21 These payments, which were beyond the means of competing daimyo who provided lesser amounts, continued through 1550 when Yoshitaka increased the sum to 300 kanmon. 22 Ouchi largess allowed emperor-centered rites to continue in Kyoto, but turmoil in the central provinces in 1550 delayed the transmission of these funds by over half a year.
Yoshitaka's increasing intimacy with the court developed against a chaotic backdrop in the capital itself. The prosperous city of Yamaguchi, with its impressive temples and shrines, contrasted starkly with an increasingly dilapidated Kyoto, which had suffered exodus and ruin. The Ashikaga palace, where the shogun resided, had been rebuilt in 1477 to be burned again in 1480, and archaeological evidence reveals that its immediate vicinity came to be sparsely settled thereafter. 23 Likewise, temples in Kyoto such as Daigoji's Sanb oin or T oji, arguably the most significant temple in Kyoto, had been destroyed, either during the Onin War or in its aftermath by mobs clamoring for debt relief in 1486. 24 By the late 1540s, Kyoto had become a decayed place where 'great stretches … remained abandoned'. 25 Francis Xavier, visiting early in 1551, commented on how Kyoto was 'a great part in ruins and waste'. 26 The political landscape in Kyoto was dominated by the Miyoshi, a warrior family from northern Shikoku that had originally gained prominence in several districts in Awa province, and from there became a retainer of the Hosokawa. Miyoshi Korenaga (?-1520), who raised his family fortunes, had a reputation for being 'strong in battle', but the 'source of great evil'. 27 His great-grandson Nagayoshi (1522-64), proved a worthy heir to Korenaga. In 1548, he had attacked his overlord Hosokawa Harumoto (1514-63) and subsequently forced the shogun Ashikaga Yoshiharu (1511-50) to abandon Kyoto that year. 28 Many courtiers, including the regent Konoe Taneie (1502-66) and Koga Harumichi (1519-75) fled with Ashikaga Yoshiharu to Sakamoto, in Omi province to the east of Kyoto. 29 Nagayoshi's relationship with the court can only be described as antagonistic. He seized imperial lands and constricted the flow of revenue to the court, making it difficult for rites to be performed in Kyoto. Reliant on force to achieve his political objectives, he gave primacy to military expediency over other considerations and made no effort to obtain imperial sanction or support. Archaeological evidence reveals that he used an ancient tomb as a castle. These tombs had often been plundered, but their incorporation into a castle's structure appears to have been new. 30  Nakarai, R om oki, Eish o 17 (1520). 5.11, 123-24. 28 For the most recent study of this important daimyo, see Imatani et al.,Miyoshi Nagayoshi. 29 Yugawa, 'Ashikaga Yoshiharu sh ogun ki', 72. Yoshiharu died in 1550 and was succeeded by his son, Yoshiteru, who remained in rustic Sakamoto along with Taneie and Harumichi, and was killed by the Miyoshi in 1565. 30 End o, 'Kofun no j okaku riy o ni kan suru ichi k osatsu'. on 1551.3.8, 31 and he was so reviled in some quarters that assassins struck five days later, stabbing him twice at a banquet, but he escaped with minor injuries. 32 The tumultuous political environment in the capital led Emperor Go-Nara to seek security in the form of Yoshitaka, who was drawn still closer to the court.
In 1551.3.27 the emperor appointed Ouchi Yoshitaka as protector of Yamashiro by granting him the title of the Acting Governor of the province. 33 This appointment appears in the Omagaki (大間書), official records of promotions that were written on discarded calendars for the emperor's personal use. 34 Yoshitaka's appointment has largely gone unnoticed because Omagaki are little studied, as few survive, and when this source was published in the Zoku gunsho ruij u, Yoshitaka's name was miscopied as Yoshizumi. 35 Yoshitaka's appointment in absentia as the Acting Governor of Yamashiro meant that the court relied on him as its protector. Historical precedent existed for comparable positions, since Yoshitaka's father Yoshioki had governed Kyoto and Yamashiro with Hosokawa Takakuni (1484-1531) from 1508 until 1518. Symbolizing this cooperation, Yoshioki had the rank of Left City Commissioner (saky o daibu 左京大夫) and Takakuni had that of Right City Commissioner (uky o daibu 右京大夫). These city commissioners were nominally in charge of population registration, security, tax collection and legal appeals in the capital, and this title remained a symbol of governing authority in Kyoto. 36 The office of Acting Governor of Yamashiro exceeded these two commissioner positions, for Yamashiro was the home province where Kyoto was located. 37 For someone as illustrious as Yoshitaka to assume the office of Acting Governor of Yamashiro might seem anomalous, as the post of Governor of Yamashiro commonly constituted a sinecure, and not a remarkable or meaningful one at that. Nevertheless, the appointment as Acting Governor of Yamashiro meant that the administrative function of the office was paramount, rather than its prestige. 38 Go-Nara effectively appointed Yoshitaka as the key official charged with protecting and administering Kyoto. This appointment provided the catalyst for Yoshitaka's most ambitious move, the attempt to transfer the emperor from Kyoto to Yamaguchi. 31 Tokitsugu ky oki, vol. 3, 1551 (Tenbun 20).3.8, 135. 32 Nagae, Miyoshi Nagayoshi, 116-20. See also Tokitsugu ky oki, vol. 3, 1551 (Tenbun 20).3.14-16, 137-38, and Genjo dais oj oki ge, 1551 (Tenbun 20).3.14, 54. 33 His title was that of Acting Governor of Yamashiro (Yamashiro gon no kami 山城権守). See Omagaki, 720. 34 This source dates from 1551, but Omagaki survive for a few other years as well. 35 That this appointment was for Yoshitaka can easily be verified, for the document refers to his surname, Tatara, rank (second) and office of the dazai daini, or governor of Kyushu. When deciphering calligraphy, the name Yoshizumi (義澄) can easily be mistaken for Yoshitaka (義隆), but Yoshizumi, an Ashikaga shogun, died in 1508, and had only attained the third court rank.

Reconstructing Ouchi Yoshitaka's Attempt to Move the Emperor to Yamaguchi
Despite his influence, Yoshitaka could not bring stability to Central Japan. The capital remained unstable as Miyoshi and Hosokawa soldiers fought there during the seventh month of 1551. 39 Because of this, Yoshitaka, in his role of Acting Governor of Yamashiro, and by extension protector of the court, decided to ensure the safety of the emperor and palace officials by embarking on an attempt to move the emperor to Yamaguchi.
The evidence for this move lies first in three distinct chronicles that each recount circumstances of Yoshitaka's gambit. The one written within living memory of the events of 1551 is known as the Ch ugoku chiranki, and was written some time after 1568, the last year mentioned in the work. 40 Focusing on the politics of western Japan, the anonymous author explained that in 1551: Ashikaga kiseiki, 207-8. This account also recounts the Miyoshi assassination and the fact that the Otomo aided Sue Harukata in his rebellion, both of which can otherwise be verified. This record supports the Ch ugoku chiranki account and suggests that Yoshitaka had long planned for Go-Nara to come to Yamaguchi. 43 The third account, Muromachi dono nikki, was written by Naramura Naganori some time between 1597 and 1602 for Maeda Gen'i (1539-1602), a monk from Owari who advised Oda Nobunaga's son Nobutada, and then became a Kyoto administrator for Toyotomi Hideyoshi. Although scholar Ise Sadatake (1717-84) described this record as reliable (jikki 実記), it was in fact characterized by exaggerated descriptions of Yamaguchi. 44 This is clear in its account of events of 1551. The Muromachi dono nikki states that Yoshitaka 'tried to move the capital to this place [of Yamaguchi]' (t osho ni miyako o utsuran tote 当所に都をうつらんとて) but then claims that he laid down roads in Yamaguchi in a grid pattern, which did not occur. 45 Although we can discount some of its more exaggerated statements, the text is nonetheless important in that it provides further confirmation of the planned move.
Taken together, these accounts suggest that Yoshitaka's attempt to move the emperor, and establish Yamaguchi as the site of the imperial palace, was widely known and these texts are varied enough that they do not appear to have been simply copied from one source. Other more vague accounts allude to Yamaguchi's importance. The Tatara metsub o shidai, written in 1615, recounts how 'a number of nobles, including members of the monastic nobility … and even the imperial guards, traveled to Yamaguchi' and notes that 'their presence made Yamaguchi resemble Kyoto' (Ky oto kuge onmonzeki, kaku aru sh u 46 hokumen no katawara made mo Yamaguchi e ongek o arite izure no gi [mo]Ky oto no y o ni nasare m oshite s or o 京都公家御門跡、覚ある衆、北面の傍 まても山口へ御下向有て、いつれの儀「も」京都の様に成申て候), but the statement is ambiguous as to whether Yamaguchi can be conceived as a capital in its own right. 47 A final chronicle, Yoshitaka-ki, otherwise known as the Tatara j osuiki, vividly describes courtiers traveling to Yamaguchi and provides evidence that even imperial guards (hokumen 北面) sojourned there as well. 48 Most of the courtiers mentioned in the Ch ugoku chiranki, the Ashikaga kiseiki, the Muromachi dono nikki, and the Yoshitaka-ki can be documented as traveling to Yamaguchi in the 1540s. Nij o Tadafusa, a retired Regent, had been in Yamaguchi since 1547. The ritual specialists Sanj o Kin'yori and Jimy oin Motonori traveled to Yamaguchi on 1549.11.10, and Tadafusa's son Yoshitoyo (1536-1551) came to Yamaguchi on 1550.7.21. 49 The prominent courtiers who congregated in Yamaguchi were specialists in or integrally involved with the sechie, the most important rite of the year. 50 Sanj o Kin'yori, a retired Grand Minister, was knowledgeable about rites of state, 43 See the analysis of the Ashikaga kiseiki, in Kokushi daijiten, vol. 1, 160. 44 Naramura, Muromachi dono nikki, 31 for Yoshitaka's attempt to move the emperor, and 304, 307 for analysis of the text and recognition that 'not all of the account is truthful'. For more on Maeda Gen'i, see Matsunaga,Taionki,109. 45 Naramura, Muromachi dono nikki, 31. 46 The text has been revised, with the character for 'group' (sh u 衆) replacing that of 'persons' (hito 人).

47
Tatara metsub o shidai, in Yamaguchi kenshi shiry ohen ch usei 1: 743-48, 743-44 . For the attribution, and a survey of references to Yamaguchi as 'The Western Capital' in the Tokugawa, Meiji and more recent eras, see Maki, 'Yamaguchi wa "Nishi no Miyako" to yobarata ka', 51. 48 Tatara j osuiki, in Yamaguchi shishi shiry ohen Ouchi bunka: 98-115, 101. This account is highly reliable, as many of its assertions can be independently verified. 49 Tomita, 'Sengokuki no kugesh u', 257 for Nij o Tadafusa and Yoshitoyo, 259-60 for Kin'yori and 278-79 for Motonori. Another noble, Minase Chikayo, of the third rank (hisangi) can also be documented as being in Yamaguchi. See Tomita,288 and Kugy o bunin,vol. 3,429. 50 For insight into the intricacies of the court, and the sechie rites, I am indebted to Yoshikawa Shinji. and his residence had also served as the palace. 51 He had good connections to prominent warriors, as one of his daughters was the primary wife of the famous Eastern daimyo Takeda Shingen. Kin'yori wrote a treatise on sechie rites in 1537, which, along with a few scattered diary pages, represents one of his few surviving works. 52 In this record, Kin'yori revealed that he worked with Jimy oin Motonori, a counselor (ch unagon) who wrote drafts of documents and participated in New Year's ceremonies in 1535 and 1539. 53 If these chronicles provide evidence of the planned move, further confirmation is also available in a striking rupture in the sources. The year 1551 proves to be one of the least knowable years regarding the politics of Kyoto. 54 The almost complete absence of chronicles and documents dating from the last nine months of 1551 suggests an unusual and traumatic disruption of the administrative and ritual functions of the court. There are often gaps in court sources, but it is very rare for nearly all records from all strata to be missing. This lacuna stems from the fact that most of the individuals involved in this endeavor, and their documents, were engulfed in the violence triggered by Yoshitaka's attempt to move the emperor. In this way, an unprecedented gap in surviving sources points to a cataclysmic rending of the intellectual and social fabric of the court.
Chronicles composed by high-ranking courtiers, be they Fujiwara regents or members of the second (seika 清華) tier of the nobility, such as members of the Saionji or Koga families, constitute the most useful political sources for reconstructing contemporary political or ritual affairs. And yet no journals or chronicles survive from members of these higher ranks from 1551. This may seem unremarkable, but their forebears had been able to preserve their records during the decade-long Onin War and the ensuing decades of turmoil.
A notable lacuna also exists among the mid-level administrative nobility, often identified as either meike (名家) or urinke (羽林家) families. The meike included the Hino and Kaj uji families. In the sixteenth century, the Kaj uji were most involved with court administration, but tellingly no documents from 1551 remain in their archives although a few prayers do survive from 1552-53. 55 Another important urinke family, the Yamashina, remained in the environs of Kyoto. Yamashina Tokitsugu's diary (Tokitsugu ky oki) constitutes the best source for this age, for Tokitsugu (1507-79) was integrally involved with palace finances, since he raised funds for enthronement ceremonies and procured clothes for emperors. It is also telling that astronomical knowledge, in the form of almanacs (guch u reki 具注 暦), and the shichiy o reki (七曜暦), the most sophisticated calendar, was lost. 57 The last surviving guch u reki dates from 1551. 58 During New Year sechie rites, members of the Ministry of Divination (onmy o no tsukasa 陰陽寮), attached to the nakatsukasash o (中務 省) bureau, promulgated the new shichiy o reki for the year. 59 The knowledge required for the shichiy o reki proved so specialized that it could not be easily replicated. The calendar was integrally linked to the court's most core functions. 60 These specialists were in Yamaguchi because Yoshitaka intended to revitalize the sechie, and they died there, along with their expertise, in 1551. 61 In this way and in addition to the widespread loss of court records, important knowledge concerning the creation of calendars was extinguished as well.
Further evidence of the attempted move can be found in a range of other sources. It is clear for example that a number of key actors in the performance of court rites congregated in Yamaguchi in 1551. T ogi Kaneyasu, a musician specializing in court music (gagaku 雅楽) perished at Taineiji, and his grave is located near that of Yoshitaka and the other nobles. 62 The Suin o (出納) were important administrators and financial specialists but, because of their status, could not have an audience in the palace. Unlike their social superiors, who could mount the steps of the palace, they became known as jige (地下), which constituted a shorthand for those 'below', or 'on the ground'. Their presence was essential for rituals to be financed and performed, since the Suin o managed daily palace affairs. It is telling, therefore, that Suin o Hiroaki can be verified as traveling to Yamaguchi. 63 This suggests that an attempt to move the palace to Yamaguchi was afoot. Nevertheless, little else is knowable because Hiroaki perished in 1551 and his documents were lost. 64 Little-studied documents pertaining to officials of the sixth-rank or below are also enlightening because these local officers (jige) were responsible for maintaining the palace and ensuring that it functioned as a residential and ritual site. An appeal written 57 Guch u reki were calendars that provided basic astronomical (and astrological) data for every day of the year, with space provided for notations. These calendars served as framework for most courtier diaries. after the death of Kushida Munetsugu (?-1551) provides compelling evidence of a planned imperial move. Munetsugu, a local official (jin kanjin 陣官人), was responsible for constructing a small building, the jin no za (陣座), that was used in the New Year sechie rites. In addition to these duties, those appointed to Munetsugu's position made headgear and lit hibachi braziers for the throne, and thus constituted unlikely candidates for extensive travel away from the palace. 65 Nij o Tadafusa, a retired Regent (taik o 太閤), summoned Munetsugu to Yamaguchi because he required his knowledge of how to build the jin no za structure for the sechie. 66 The Kushida documents claim that Munetsugu traveled to Yamaguchi because Ouchi Yoshitaka desired to revitalize the sechie, which necessitated the presence of Emperor Go-Nara in Yamaguchi at the dawn of the New Year in 1552.
Taken together, these sources suggest that in light of the instability in the home provinces, Ouchi Yoshitaka attempted to bring the emperor to Yamaguchi with the goal of having the New Year rites performed there. The plans alluded to in the chronicles were acted upon, and by the end of the eighth month of 1551, save for the emperor and palace ladies, nearly all the necessary officials were in Yamaguchi preparing for the sechie. 67 Unfortunately for Yoshitaka, however, his ambitious scheme triggered a violent backlash that resulted in his death and the ultimate collapse of the Ouchi organization.

The Backlash: The M ori and Otomo Plot
While Yoshitaka was engrossed with these preparations to move the emperor to Yamaguchi, three deputies in the Ouchi organization, who bridled at the arrogance of these 'worthless' courtiers, rose against Yoshitaka, and launched a coup. 68 Yoshitaka fled with his son, and a band of loyal followers. Nij o Tadafusa offered to negotiate Yoshitaka's forced retirement, but instead he was cut down. Yoshitaka was forced to commit suicide and the other nobles were hunted down and killed, or committed suicide themselves. The Sue could not countenance their survival because they represented a potent political threat that had to be exterminated. In the ensuing orgy of violence, Yamaguchi was gutted, its treasures plundered, and even the cranes in Yoshitaka's gardens were butchered. 69  Before the coup, Yoshitaka was well aware of Sue Harukata's discontent and cursed him during the eleventh month of 1550. 70 Yoshitaka relied on M ori Motonari, an allied warrior who had fought heroically against the Amako in the 1540s, for support 'in case trouble should arise'. 71 Yoshitaka signed numerous oaths with Motonari for over a decade before these events, revealing the significance of the M ori chieftain in the Ouchi organization. 72 In the first month of 1551, Ouchi Yoshitaka secretly dispatched a document to Motonari, alluding to the fact that he was expecting trouble 'within the family' and asking that Motonari appear without delay in case of turmoil. 73 Yoshitaka was aware that his plan to move the capital was not popular with most of his followers, but he felt that he had enough support to quell any dissent.
That most of the Ouchi would side with the Sue and overthrow Yoshitaka suggests that the coup was as much over policyprobably concerning the expenses that these rituals entailed, and the privileges accorded to the nobilitythan personality. Sue Harukata appears to have had reformist leanings, and to have wished to facilitate trade, since shortly after he destroyed Yoshitaka, he issued several regulations to Itsukushima shrine prohibiting tolls (dabetsury o 駄別料), or the levying of protection fees (keigo mai 警固米) on merchant ships (kaisen 廻船). 74 Yoshitaka miscalculated the depth of dissatisfaction within his organization and mistakenly decided to trust M ori Motonari, who decided to side with Sue Harukata. Late in the eighth month of 1551, just days before his rebellion, Sue Harukata wrote a letter to Motonari, explaining that he and two important deputies, Sugi Shigenori and Nait o Okimori, had agreed to depose Yoshitaka in favor of Yoshitaka's infant son. 75  (1530-87) and nephew of Yoshitaka, as their lord. 76 Shortly after writing this missive, Harukata launched his rebellion, which unfolded according to his plan. After forcing Yoshitaka to commit suicide, however, the Sue and Nait o rebels executed Yoshitaka's son, who had been taken prisoner. Thereupon Otomo Haruhide became the final Ouchi lord, and changed his name to Ouchi Yoshinaga.
Although not privy to plans to kill Yoshitaka's son, Motonari's active involvement in the coup can be gathered from a [1551].9.19 document from Otomo S orin, who praised Motonari for his help in overthrowing Yoshitaka. 77 Sugi Shigenori and M ori Motonari rebelled against Yoshitaka's policies, but they opposed the murder of Yoshitaka and his son. Sue Harukata later had Sugi Shigenori killed. M ori Motonari, however, bided his time and three years later turned on the plotters, defeating Sue Harukata and ensuring his demise in 1555, and that of Yoshinaga, the last Ouchi lord, in 1557. 78 Thereupon the M ori gained tenuous control over most Ouchi territory in western Honshu.
The Otomo prospered mightily after the Ouchi collapse, for they took over the Ouchi domains in Kyushu. Otomo S orin's city of Funai replaced Yamaguchi as a center of trade in western Japan. After his son Yoshinaga's death in 1557, S orin preferred a weakened Yamaguchi under M ori control, because that vacuum allowed for trade to be concentrated at Funai, which flourished in the latter half of the sixteenth century. Indeed, Otomo S orin favored the M ori over an Otomo relative named Ouchi Teruhiro (?-1569), who tried to reestablish Ouchi rule in 1569. 79 S orin wrote to the Jesuits and explained that Ouchi resurgence would lead to Yamaguchi again becoming the center of trade, which he deplored. 80

Kyoto Connections to the Coup
At least one Kyoto noble, Kuj o Tanemichi (1507-94), appears to have been involved in this plot as well. A record in the Otomo archives states that the plotters against Yoshitaka 'received permission from Kyoto' (Ky oto ni j oi o ukete). 81 As the evidence found in the Omagaki reveals that Emperor Go-Nara favored Yoshitaka as a protector, the 'permission' refers to a courtier who was distant from Go-Nara's trusted officials in Kyoto, but who at the same time possessed strong ties to Ouchi Yoshitaka's rivals. As no evidence exists of involvement by Ashikaga Yoshiteru or his allies such as Konoe Taneie in Sakamoto, this person was mostly likely the retired Regent Kuj o Tanemichi. Tanemichi  Teruhiro was defeated by the M ori in 1569, and much of Yamaguchi was laid waste at this time. 80 Kishida, M ori Motonari to chiiki shakai, 33 for analysis of a 1567 (Eiroku 10).9.15 Otomo S orin letter written to the Jesuits. and visited the Itsukushima shrine in Aki. 82 Babe Takahiro has shown that Tanemichi established a close relationship with the Miyoshi in the twelfth month of 1548. Tanemichi can also be documented as visiting Harima as well as Izumo, where the Amako, archrivals of Ouchi Yoshitaka, lived. 83 He did not return to Kyoto until 1552.4.5, but when he did, he dramatically improved his position, and was reinstated as regent after 20 years. Kugy o bunin described his reinstatement as 'most remarkable'. 84 Matsunaga Teitoku, a confidant of Kuj o Tanemichi, recounted how Tanemichi reminisced that poverty and turmoil in Kyoto during the Tenbun era (1532-55) had made it difficult to remain there. He also wrote how Tanemichi had traveled to Sakai, a Miyoshi stronghold, and Kyushu in the west, which suggests that he served as the conduit for Miyoshi and Otomo communication. 85 According to Teitoku, Tanemichi also emphasized the sanctity of Kyoto and explained how the identity of his house, the Kuj o, was linked to a place in Kyoto. This constitutes an oblique critique of the attempted move of 1551. 86 Tanemichi appears to have opposed the transfer of the emperor from the capital of nearly 750 years. He found a willing ally in Miyoshi Nagayoshi, who only tenuously controlled central Japan, and would have been directly threatened by the emperor's move, since it would have undermined his authority and opened him to a potential Ouchi attack. Miyoshi Nagayoshi dedicated a linked-verse sequence (renga 連歌) to the Taga shrine in Yamaguchi three weeks after Yoshitaka's death. In one of his poems, he referred to the remains of the fallen autumn leaves (aki no ha no chiru ato shinobu shigure kana 秋の葉のちる跡しのぶ時雨かな), while in the other, he wrote about longing for the capitalpresumably Kyotoleft behind (ideshi miyako zo itodo koishiki いでし都ぞ いとど恋しき). 87 The timing of Nagayoshi's dedication of a memorial linked-verse sequence for Yoshitaka reveals that he knew about Yoshitaka's death before others at the court. Ladies of the palace mentioned the arrival of sumo wrestlers on 1551.9.14, two weeks after Yoshitaka's demise, but remained unaware of his passing. 88 Yoshida Kanemigi, a shrine specialist who lived in Yamaguchi for several years in the 1540s and revitalized shrine rites in western Japan, did not learn of Yoshitaka's death until 1551.9.21, some three weeks after the coup, but by this time Nagayoshi had completed his linked verse. 89 Thus, Nagayoshi was aware of Yoshitaka's demise far sooner than other members of the Kyoto court, suggesting involvement in the affair. Nevertheless, beyond these poems, and the alacrity with which Nagayoshi wrote them, no further evidence of his involvement in the coup remains.

Aftermath and Cover-up: Erasing the Memories of 1551
Few who participated in the coup long survived the events of 1551. All of the Ouchi plotters who rose against Yoshitaka died within a half-dozen years of 1551: Sugi Shigenori was killed in 1551, Nait o Okimori perished in 1554, and Sue Harukata died after suffering a crushing defeat at Itsukushima in 1555 by M ori Motonari. Emperor Go-Nara remained in Kyoto, but he descended into abject poverty, as Ouchi financial support ceased. One remarkable document, of contested veracity, suggests that he demanded that M ori Motonari kill Sue Harukata and Nait o Okimori's son Takayo in the first month of 1554 because they had killed their lord Yoshitaka. 90 His continued sympathies with Yoshitaka are evident in other surviving documents. One, from 1557.7.13, shortly before his death, requests that Ry ufukuji be rebuilt in accordance with the wishes of the late Yoshitaka (Yoshitaka k o). 91 Although he survived the turmoil of 1551, Miyoshi Nagayoshi never consolidated control over the area of central Japan before his death in 1564. Tellingly, he did not provide funds for the funeral of Go-Nara, who remained unburied for over 70 days in 1557. 92 Nagayoshi's heirs resorted to increasingly desperate measures to maintain their authority, murdering the shogun Ashikaga Yoshiteru in 1565 and burning T odaiji in 1566. The Miyoshi were supplanted when Oda Nobunaga entered the capital in 1568. Nobunaga proved equally willing to rely on untrammeled military force and constituted a worthy heir to the Miyoshi, although he too would be assassinated in the end.
Otomo S orin lived long enough to see his city of Funai prosper due largely to links with Portuguese traders and was appointed as the heir to the Ouchi holdings in Kyushu. 93 S orin's wealth and power proved fleeting, however, as Shimizu Yoshihiro smashed his forces at Mimigawa in 1578. In 1586, this same Yoshihiro reduced S orin's city of Funai to cinders. Otomo S orin died the following year. 94 M ori Motonari and his heirs consolidated their control over western Honshu, and Yamaguchi itself. Motonari had the funds to pay for enthronement rites in 1558, after a delay of a year, but could not afford to do so as lavishly as the Ouchi, and such rites were only desultorily performed. 95 The M ori quelled an Ouchi rebellion in 1569, which further decimated Yamaguchi, but were never able to control Kyushu or effectively 90 Yamaguchi kenshi shiry ohen ch usei 3, J oeiji monjo doc. 80, 1554 (Tenbun 23). See Oita ken shiry o, vol. 26, 358 for a 1559 (Eiroku 2).11.9 document appointing S orin as the heir to the Ouchi domains and 358-59 for the 1559 (Eiroku 2).6.26 appointment as the shugo of Chikuzen. S orin was also appointed as shugo of Buzen, Chikago and Hizen. Toyama,Otomo S orin,44. 94 For the best survey of the archaeological artifacts recounting the period of Funai's prosperity, see Tamanaga and Sakamoto, Otomo S orin no sengoku toshi: Funai.

95
Tsunemoto gyoki, box 553, Chokuzai anmon, no 16, 1558 (Eiroku 1).8.15 Onsokui fu an (御即位付案). This document reveals that M ori Motonari belatedly bankrolled the celebratory enthronement (sokui) ceremonies of Emperor Ogimachi. Viewed at Kyoto University on 12 March 2012. engage in trade with the continent, although a few artifacts of their attempt survive, such as a 1584 'tally flag' that was shared between Ming and M ori merchants. 96 While the Otomo admitted their role in the coup, the M ori, who governed Yamaguchi after the Ouchi downfall, had an active interest in covering up what had happened in 1551. Motonari and his heirs portrayed the M ori as remaining loyal to Ouchi Yoshitaka and, unsurprisingly, obscured traces of their rebellion. 97 Chronicles written during the latter half of the sixteenth century by people in the M ori domains fail to mention Motonari's duplicity, or Yoshitaka's attempt to bring the emperor to Yamaguchi. 98 M ori Terumoto (1553-1625 commissioned Takahashi Kotonobu, the head of Taga shrine in Yamaguchi, to write the Ouchi sama o-ie konponki. This account, completed in 1615, says nothing about Yoshitaka's attempt to have sechie rites performed in Yamaguchi, which would have entailed making this city the sole capital of Japan. 99 Ouchi Yoshitaka's poignant 1551 appeal to Motonari also no longer appears in the M ori house records. Instead, this original document ended up in the possession of a Sh oren'in monk, most likely because they entrusted it to him when commissioning prayers for the pacification of Yoshitaka's spirit.
The M ori tried to maintain an image of upholders of Ouchi rule, but at the same time, they sold or transferred several important structures from Yamaguchi to Hiroshima, or northern Kyushu, so as to erase the wealth and power evident there. They continued praying at Manganji in H ofu throughout the Tokugawa period, fearful of vengeful spirits. 100 Motonari's role in the turmoil of 1551 did not sit well with him and his descendants.
Ultimately, as the centuries passed, histories were selectively edited so as to obscure even further what had happened in 1551. The most direct evidence of obfuscation of these events appears in the writings of Narushima Chikuzan (1803-54), a Confucian scholar who was employed by the Tokugawa bakufu and compiled the Latter Mirror [Nochi kagami], a chronicle of the Ashikaga regime. 101 Narushima relied on both the Ashikaga kiseiki and the Ch ugoku chiranki to reconstruct the events of 1551. Although he recounted the coup against Yoshitaka in 1551, he nevertheless omitted references from both of these sources regarding Yoshitaka's attempt to move the emperor to Yamaguchi. 102 The Continuing Importance of Court Rites This article has attempted to explain why the Ouchi fell and fell so quickly. It has suggested that the answer lies in Ouchi Yoshitaka's ambitious attempt to move the emperor from Kyoto to Yamaguchi. Yoshitaka adopted a breathtakingly bold plan to 96 See the 1584 Nichimin b oeki senki (日明貿易船旗), from the Takasu house collection, located in the Yamaguchi Prefectural Archives. 97 Hagi han batsu etsu roku, vol 4. 'B och o jisha sh omon', for the Daineiji yuisho, 7, which describes how he conquered the rebel Sue Harukata, and avenged Yoshitaka. See also 'Zoku Onin k oki', maki 6, 108-9. 98 The 1580 'Fusa-aki oboegaki', or reminiscences by the head of Itsukushima shrine, has been characterized as being reliable and ignores the attempt to move the emperor, but it was written when the M ori were overlords of Aki and Itsukushima. For the reliability of this source, see Dazaifu shishi ch usei shiry ohen, 834. 99 Yamaguchi shishi shiry ohen Ouchi bunka, 'Shiry o kaidai', 2. 100 H ofu is located on the coast of the Inland Sea, slightly over ten miles to the southeast of Yamaguchi. 101 This work was compiled between the years 1837 and 1853. 102 See Nochi kagami,vol. 4, buttress the court by moving it to Yamaguchi, and making his home city the political, economic and cultural center of Japan. This upset many of his retainers, who would have to pay for such a prohibitively expensive endeavor. While Yoshitaka was engrossed in these preparations, most of his organization rose against him. Only such a widespread rebellion from within was sufficient to destroy the powerful Ouchi and to ruin their city of Yamaguchi.
At the same time, the events of 1551 have implications for how we understand Japan's Warring States period (sengoku jidai) more broadly. Most narratives of this period are predicated on the notion that the political institutions of the center collapsed. The few studies that do exist regarding the center in this time emphasize the political marginalization of the court before 1568, when Oda Nobunaga (1534-82) entered Kyoto. 103 But this tends to ignore the continued ritual and political functions of the state. Contrary to commonly accepted narratives, court rituals remained an important part of politics and continued to be performed during the waning days of the Onin War (1467-77) and through to 1551. These rites have been overlooked, however, because most scholars have assumed that they were not politically significant, and could only occur in Kyoto, which had been gutted in the conflagrations of Onin. In fact, both of these assumptions are flawed. Rites remained significant and they could and were performed in other centers, most notably Yamaguchi, where expansive rites to uphold peace and prosperity in the realm were performed from 1476 until 1551.
The continuing importance of court rites is further confirmed by the events of 1551. That Yoshitaka intended to move the emperor provides proof of their continued relevance, as does the fierce resistance that his attempt engendered. The slaughter of the courtiers in 1551 has merited little attention in works devoted to the Ouchi, or studies of the court, while the attempt to move Go-Nara has been all but unknown until now. 104 Their massacre suggests that the very existence of courtiers in a position of command proved threatening enough that all had to be killed along with Yoshitaka and his son. These men were not just the unlucky bystanders in a coup; rather, they attracted such unfavorable attention because of their importance as arbiters of politics. Courtiers were not mere dilettantes. Instead they were specialists of ritual affairs, whose active participation was perceived as a prerequisite for governance. The collapse of the Yamaguchi polity, the concurrent destruction of court knowledge and loss of so many courtiers contributed to the later notion that the court was supine, its rituals abandoned, its courtiers powerless, and the emperor irrelevant throughout an era of unbridled warfare. In fact, the court's influence remained significant for far longer than has been generally assumed. The continued role of the center calls into question the 'Warring States' label which fails to account for the persistence importance of political institutions.
The year 1551 represents a crucial turning point in Japanese history. Yoshitaka's attempt to move Go-Nara stands at the endpoint of a millennium in which the court functioned as the dominant mode of political authority in Japan. It also marks the 103 According to Butler, it was not until Nobunaga entered the capital that, once again, 'Japan's imperial court occupied a central place in the country'; Butler, Emperor and Aristocracy in Japan, 296. While admitting that the 'court remained active', he argues that 'it was moving in no clear direction' and 'pursuing a path that promised little hope of great change'. See ibid., 100. 104 To date only Shimomura Isao has argued that the courtiers moved to Yamaguchi because of some political objective. See his 'Yoshitaka no ry ogoku keiei' 80-81, 103-4 and Yamaguchi kenshi ts ushihen ch usei, 547. Butler ably recounts Yoshitaka's role in funding court ceremonies, but does not mention the presence of so many courtiers in Yamaguchi;Butler,Emperor and Aristocracy in Japan,[84][85]129. emergence of a new model that emphasized military might over political legitimacy. Over the course of the early sixteenth century, warriors such as the Miyoshi and the Sue increasingly rejected the ritual order in favor of a territorial lordship expressly based on command authority as a reflection of military might. Given these priorities, they felt little need to divert resources to fund state or local ceremonies. Instead, all available resources were committed to the costly endeavor of arming troops, constructing castles, and fighting battles. For all his emphasis on military affairs, Sue Harukata proved to be surprisingly inept in battle and was defeated and killed at Itsukushima. He effectively swept away the Ouchi order, but could not maintain his authority, or for that matter, survive the very violence that he had unleashed. Indeed, none of this new generation of warriors who were characterized by their exclusive focus on military affairs proved to be particularly successful in establishing enduring structures; the country would endure a punctuated period of violence before an order was once again restored. Although much was lost when Yoshitaka fell, and much more was forgotten, Yoshitaka's pattern of rule, with its reliance on the court, and rites, provided a template for the later reconstitution of political authority in Japan.