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HIGH-STAKES ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE EXPANSION OF A SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT INDUSTRY IN CHILE

A public-private sector comparison

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Introduction

In recent decades, the global spread of test-based accountability reforms has intensified commercialisation processes in education, involving the expansion of a testing, measurement and school improvement industry. As Ball (2012) points out, 'Education is big business' (p. 161), and performance technologies have contributed to expand such a business at local, national and supranational scales. Especially in those countries with high-stakes accountability systems in place, private companies, consultancies and research organisations benefit from substantive contracts with governments for the design, administration and analysis of performance data. At the same time, private companies are also very active in selling school improvement services, test simulations, lesson plans and educational platforms to those local governments, school boards and schools that aim to increase their academic performance.

This investigation analyses the emergence of a school improvement industry in Chile, a country well known internationally for being highly marketised and commodified and for its high-stake testing policies (Bellei & Vanni, 2015; Falabella, 2020a; Parcerisa & Falabella, 2017). In this country, not only does school provision follow market rules, but in the last 15 years, the hardening and diversification of accountability measures has contributed to expand a market of commercial services for schools. Resorting to commercial 'school improvement' services, which in Chile are known as services of Educational Technical Assistance (ATE, for its acronym in Spanish), is one of the main ways both public and private schools address accountability pressures.

Commercialisation, however, is not emerging in Chile as an unregulated educational market that, as reported in other countries, evolves beyond government scrutiny (OECD, 2014). In Chile, the state favours and steers the participation

of ATE services in the educational system determinately through both regulatory and financial instruments. Specifically, with the approval of the Preferential School Subsidy Law in 2008, both public and private subsidised schools receive substantive additional public resources to contract services from ATE services, as long as they accept being subject to stricter performative accountability rules. The strong public subsidisation of ATE services – about US \$40 million a year – has converted school improvement services into a vibrant economic sector employing numerous educational experts in Chile (Superintendencia de la Educación, 2019).

Despite the rapid growth of the ATE industry in Chile and the substantive amount of public resources invested in it, the phenomenon of education commercialisation is still under-researched. The objective of this chapter is twofold. It first explores the conditions that have contributed to the expansion of the school improvement industry in Chile; and second, on the basis of survey and interview data, it analyses how school principals and teachers use and engage with the services offered by the ATE. Our main line of inquiry is to understand whether public and private sector schools engage differently with school improvement services, and if so, why.

Our chapter is informed by theoretical literature on the schools' logic of action in education quasi-markets. This literature shows that schools, according to their position in education markets, react differently to competitive pressure and to other incentives from the environment (Maroy & Van Zanten, 2009; Moschetti, 2018; Zancajo, 2017). We expect that school ownership, as a variable that clearly structures market positioning in a country like Chile, will condition patterns of ATE services consumption and engagement.

The chapter is organised as follows. First, we present the main characteristics of the Chilean education system and discuss how this system generates the necessary conditions for the emergence of a strong and publicly incentivised, commercial education industry. Second, we present the main results of our study with a particular focus on the relationship between school type (e.g. public or private schools) and their involvement with the school improvement industry. We argue that while the use of ATE services is widespread across private and public schools in Chile, it is clear that private schools have more autonomy in choosing the most relevant ATE services for the individual needs of their school, and thus have greater satisfaction with the ATE industry. Finally, we reflect upon the limitations of ATE services to respond effectively to school contextual needs and more generally on the implications of the Chilean policy with commercial services for public education.

School improvement policies and the expansion of the commercial education industry in Chile

The Chilean school system can be characterised as a quasi-market with a highly liberalised school choice system, high-stakes testing and a highly decentralised governance architecture (Bellei, 2015; Corvalán, Carrasco & García-Huidobro,

2016; Verger, Fontdevila & Zancajo, 2016). The market reforms adopted in the 1980s by the government of the military dictatorship made the state play a subsidiary role in education, which generated high levels of educational inequalities and school segmentation. To address this situation, the educational policies of the 1990s, once democracy was restored, focused on providing additional resources and educational improvement support to schools located in disadvantaged areas (Osse, Bellei & Valenzuela, 2015). Initially, this technical support was carried out directly by the Ministry of Education. During the early 2000s, new compensatory school improvement programmes were created, and for the first time, external institutions (universities and private foundations) were contracted by the state to carry out school consultancy. This school improvement support was framed under a logic of data-driven accountability. Its main goal consisted in guiding schools in how to improve their school results on the national standardised test, the so-called System for Measuring the Quality of Education¹ (SIMCE) (Falabella, 2020b).

In 2008, performance-based accountability became more central with the passing of Preferential School Subsidy Law. This law provides school administrators with additional resources to hire learning support assistance and psychosocial professionals, purchase teaching materials and contract ATE services. These extra institutional resources are conditional on the fulfilment of schools' performance and improvement goals. In the event of failure to achieve these goals, the law allows the state to remove the leadership team from the school or even close the school (Weinstein & Villalobos, 2016).

The purpose of ATE services' technical consultancy is to provide support to educational teams for sustained school improvement over time and to promote school autonomy. In the words of Garay-Aguilar and Bórquez (2014), the professional practice of technical consultancies 'aims to provide teachers and managers support for the development of their technical knowledge and problem-solving strategies, understanding that this is a dynamic, holistic and sustained process over time' (p. 50). ATE can offer a broad range of services that go from conflict management tools to teachers' training on data use or testing preparation services.

According to the Preferential Subsidy Law, the school administrator, whether a local government official (for public schools) or the school owner (for private subsidised schools), defines the type of intervention that is required based on a diagnosis of each school.² The policy seeks to give greater autonomy to local school management and decentralise the improvement processes according to the school's particular needs and context specificities. However, in practice, this policy materialises differently in each school sector. In the public sector, ATE services are contracted by municipalities and not directly by the school, while in the private sector, as most school proprietors own only one school, the decision of contracting an ATE is made at the school level. In both public and subsidised private schools, schools pay ATE services through the preferential subsidy and must access them through an ATE platform managed by the Ministry of Education

and a public call for tender.³ Using these services is voluntary with the exception of low-performing schools, for which it is mandatory to contract an ATE.

Since the creation of the Preferential Subsidy, commercial education services have grown exponentially (Osses, Bellei & Valenzuela, 2015; Superintendencia de la Educación, 2019). ATE services are carried out by individual people, companies or foundations, and to a lesser extent, by universities. Currently, there is a significant concentration of the consultancy providers, as around half the service contracts are barely with six providers, and most of these services are contracted for assessing schools in the area of curriculum management (*Asesorías para el Desarrollo*, 2014).

In an attempt to regulate the quality and rapid growth of the ATE services' market, the Ministry of Education created a National Directory of all the existing registered technical consultancies in the country. This directory includes information about each consultancy provider along with a 'customer satisfaction' average grade, which results from the evaluations that schools do about each provider. Additionally, since 2018, the ATE services that are funded via the state budget cannot make a profit from their services, although effective supervision and enforcement of this rule is highly difficult.

Although technical consultancy for schools has expanded exponentially in the last decade in Chile, research on this phenomenon is still emerging. According to the evaluations available in the ATE's National Directory, most schools report satisfaction with the services delivered and would recommend the contracted provider (Osses, Bellei & Valenzuela, 2015). However, several scholars raise a number of concerns with this system, including whether school administrators have the ability to self-diagnose schools' needs and choose a quality ATE service; the lack of good-quality offerings available throughout the nation, with the exception of the largest cities; and schools' distrust towards ATE for the high cost of the service and for the potential for ATE providers to make a profit with state budget funds (Aguilar-Garay & Sánchez-Moreno, 2017; *Asesorías para el Desarrollo*, 2014; CIAE, 2008; Medrano & Contreras, 2013).

Aguilar-Garay and Sánchez-Moreno (2017) and Ríos and Villalobos (2016) point out that technical consultancies tend to provide a standardised, non-context-sensitive service, mainly focused on improving academic results in the subjects assessed by SIMCE. Osses, Bellei and Valenzuela (2015) argue that while there is evidence about the positive effects of technical advice, these effects decrease over time once the intervention ends. Therefore, one of the main concerns with this system of external consultancy is its sustainability in the long term.

Methods

Methodologically, this investigation follows a sequential mixed-methods design approach (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2006), in which the collection of quantitative data (via a survey administered to teachers and principals) and qualitative data (via interviews also with teachers and principals) was carried out in two phases

(see Ferrer-Esteban, 2020). The survey was administered in 77 schools⁴ (200 school leaders and 1,146 teachers responded), and in addition, we interviewed 24 principals and 28 teachers of 16 surveyed schools.

This research has been developed in the context of a broader study that focuses on the enactment and effects of school autonomy with accountability reforms in different country settings.⁵ One of the modules of both the survey and the interview instruments of the study look at how schools interact with school improvement consultancy services (see Levatino, 2019). For data analysis, in the quantitative phase, contingency tables and scatter plots were used, whereas in the qualitative phase, we conducted qualitative content analysis of the interview transcripts (Mayring, 2004). The qualitative analysis combined the use of emerging and pre-established codes concerning the identification of the type of services contracted, the actor in charge of contracting the commercial education services, the perceptions about the ATE services and the reasons that explain the level of satisfaction with the commercial education services.

Findings

In this section, we present data on schools' patterns of consumption and satisfaction with commercial education services and inquire whether school ownership (i.e. whether schools are public, private subsidised or totally private)⁶ is related to different levels of engagement and satisfaction with ATE services. We also explore why teachers and principals – who are generally critical of the test-based accountability environment in which ATE services emerge – are generally satisfied with the school improvement services that ATE services provide.

The influence of school ownership on ATE services consumption and uses

Survey data show that there is not a common pattern of external services consumption among Chilean schools – 51.5% of the school principals claim that they never or rarely use (once a year) external services; 21.2% use them at least a few times a year; and 27.3% of principals declare that they use these services more intensively and frequently (at least once a month, or two or three times a month).

The patterns of consumption and specifically which types of ATE services are more frequently consumed are to some extent affected by the school type of ownership. As Table 7.1 shows, the intensity in the use of *lesson plans* from commercial providers is slightly higher in private schools than in public schools. These differences are more significant in relation to both *test-preparation services* and *consultancy/training services for instructional improvement*. Overall, despite the slightly higher rates of using test-preparation resources and external services for instructional improvement more frequently in private schools, our findings confirm that consultancy services have also penetrated Chilean public schools.

TABLE 7.1 School Ownership and ATE Services Consumption and Uses

<i>Type of CEIS</i>	<i>School owner</i>	<i>Never (%)</i>	<i>Once a year (%)</i>	<i>More than once a year, but less than monthly (%)</i>	<i>Once a month (%)</i>	<i>Two or three times a month (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
Lesson plans	Public	36.5	17.6	18.8	10.6	16.5	100
	Private subsidised	36.5	13.5	23.1	6.7	20.2	100
	Private	44.4	0	22.2	0	33.3	100
	Total	36.9	14.6	21.2	8.1	19.2	100
Test preparation resources	Public	27.4	17.9	35.7	8.3	10.7	100
	Private subsidised	23.1	12.5	38.5	12.5	13.5	100
	Private	33.3	11.1	22.2	22.2	11.1	100
	Total	24.4	14.7	36.5	11.2	12.2	100
Consultancy/ training services	Public	41.2	36.5	15.3	1.2	5.9	100
	Private subsidised	21.2	27.9	45.2	2.9	2.9	100
	Private	22.2	33.3	33.3	11.1	0	100
	Total	29.8	31.8	31.8	2.5	4	100

Source: Elaborated by authors based on data from REFORMED Project.

Given that underperforming schools are obliged by law to consume ATE services, and that most underperforming schools in Chile can be found in the public sector, it is not surprising that the level of ATE services consumption is relatively high in the public sector. On its part, the high level of consumption of ATE services in private schools could be attributed to the competitive *ethos* that tends to predominate in these schools. While private schools tend to have a more advantaged student composition and better results in SIMCE, they also tend to perceive higher levels of both performative and market pressure (Zancajo, 2017). Our survey data on *perceived pressure* by sector shows that the ‘perception of pressure from test-based accountability’ is 0.19 points higher in private schools than in public schools, and that the ‘pressure to maintain enrolment’ is 0.42 points higher in private than in public schools. These higher levels of pressure may explain why private schools are more likely to use ATE services, in the belief these will assist them to boost their performance and promote their reputation in the local education market. Our interviews confirm this trend. Numerous teachers in the private subsidised school sector explained how their school use ATE data services rather instrumentally to boost their SIMCE results. Míriam, a primary teacher in an urban private subsidised school, explained it this way:

(INTERVIEWER): And, how do you prepare your students for the SIMCE tests?

(MIRIAM): Here we don’t have a ‘SIMCE workshop’. Once a month we have a test simulation, [...], once a month a [test] simulation and this year it was quite positive because an ATE was hired and children can do it online in the computers’ room and, since they love computing, then, they did it online, and we were doing very well, but that is, [...] we don’t have a preparation.

(INTERVIEWER): Are test simulations applied during the whole year, once a month?

(MIRIAM): Sure, once a month, [we implemented it] in April, May, June, then August, September, October, that’s what was done, once a month they are applied to see how [students] are doing, what we have to do, what [skills] we have to improve.

As private schools use ATE services more frequently, it would be expected that private school teachers conceive ATE services as a source of valid knowledge for school improvement more frequently than their public school colleagues. In private schools, 36.6% respondents consider external consultancy as a very valuable activity that provides useful information and guidance in how to improve the quality of teaching in their school, whereas in the public sector this percentage is slightly lower (29.9%).⁷ Thus, teachers who work in the public sector consider ATE services a less valuable contribution to their work than their colleagues in the private sector. In the following section, we will touch on and examine some of the reasons for this difference.

Satisfaction with ATE services in public and private schools

Survey data shows that overall principals tend to value commercial education services well (73.3%) or very well (7.9%), while only about 20% make a bad (15.7%) or very bad (3.1%) assessment of these services. Nevertheless, as happens with ATE services' use, principals' satisfaction with ATE services varies according to whether schools are public or private. Public schools tend to be more critical in assessing external consultancy services than private schools (critical assessments of these services are around 18 points above in public schools than in private subsidised schools). The opposite is also true, and about 90% of the principals of private subsidised schools make a good or very good evaluation of commercial education services, while positive assessments are only found in 71.1% of public schools (Table 7.2).

The trend towards public schools assessing more negatively ATE services might be due to the sum of two main factors. First is due to the lower decision-making power of schools and principals in the public sector when hiring consultancy services. In the case of public schools, the local school manager (i.e. the municipality) tends to contract the same standardised services for all schools under its jurisdiction, and usually without involving the schools in this decision. In practical terms, this implies that the school manager contracts services in a decontextualised manner and schools feel that the contracted services do not fit their specific needs. For example, Fabián, a principal of a public school with a high percentage of vulnerable students and low-medium performance, negatively assesses consulting services for this very reason:

(INTERVIEWER): Ok. And how do you assess these services?

(FABIÁN): Eh... damn! (...) it's quite scarce because these training courses were not consulted with teachers, so when they are not consulted it makes little sense for participation.

(INTERVIEWER): Did you hire them [the ATE] in the context of the leadership team?

(FABIÁN): That is... the school owner hired them.

(INTERVIEWER): Ok... how many schools does the owner have?

TABLE 7.2 School Ownership and Satisfaction with Commercial Education Services

	<i>CEIS value for money</i>				<i>Total (%)</i>
	<i>Good</i>	<i>Bad (%)</i>	<i>Bad (%)</i>	<i>Good (%)</i>	
Public	4.8	24.1	66.3	4.8	100
Private subsidised	2	8.1	79.8	10.1	100
Private	0	22.2	66.7	11.1	100
Total	3.1	15.7	73.3	7.9	100

Source: Elaborated by authors based on data from REFORMED Project.

(FABIÁN): 15 at the municipal level. So, when you do these trainings at the municipality level, the 15 schools participate.

Similarly, Manuel, the principal of an urban public school with an even higher percentage of vulnerable students and rated as having an ‘insufficient’ performance level, indicates that the municipality does not always take into account their opinions when hiring the commercial education services:

(INTERVIEWER): But, does the school manager choose the ATEs services considering your opinion?

(MANUEL): It does not always take into account our opinions. For example, in my case, I would be very interested if we could hire an [ATE] in which advisors come to support our teachers in the classrooms

The second reason why public schools tend to assess ATE services more negatively than private schools is related to the fact that these schools have a staff more critical of test-based accountability and its associated technologies. Our survey data shows that both principals and teachers in public schools are more critical of test-based accountability than their peers in private schools. In the case of teachers, 71.8% of respondents in the public sector consider the test-based accountability system to be unfair. In contrast, 56.7% of the respondents in the publicly subsidised private sector and 44.4% in the fully private sector consider test-based accountability to be unfair.

The qualitative data reveals some of the rationales behind these critical opinions towards test-based accountability. Particularly when asked about the fairness of the accountability system in Chile, a very common response among public school teachers is that standardised tests discriminate against public schools since these schools enrol a higher percentage of socially vulnerable and a more ‘difficult to teach’ population. This is, for instance, the case of Gabriela, a teacher from a public low-performing public school, who argues that standardised tests like SIMCE are ‘discriminatory’ because they do not take into account many contextual features that influence students’ results. She considers that it is unfair to be judged on the basis of SIMCE, because it is a very narrow measure of students’ learning and omits several conditions that affect students’ performance. Furthermore, the fact that ATE consumption is obligatory for low-performing schools – that are mostly public schools – contributes to teachers and principals in these schools making stronger associations between ATEs and external pressures and impositions. Gabriela declares that her first experience with an ATE ‘was very stressful’ and ‘meaningless’ because:

there was a lot of recording, there was a lot of documents to fill out... no, no, no, not that, it didn’t make sense to me because there was never feedback of everything they [the ATE’s members] saw, observed or took note of. So, for me, it didn’t make any sense.

In a nutshell, the fact that public schools on the one hand have less room for manoeuvre when deciding what type of ATE services to hire and, on the other perceive ATEs as an external imposition of an accountability system with which they are very critical contributes to these schools being less satisfied with the external services provided by ATE services than private schools.

Teachers, principals and commercial services in Chile: a love and hate story

So far, we have seen that the level of use and especially satisfaction with ATE services is higher among both principals and teachers in the private sector. However, in aggregated terms, the level of use and satisfaction is high in both the public and the private sector. This might seem paradoxical if we consider that teachers and principals are predominantly critical with both the fairness and reliability they attribute to the test-based accountability system, and that there is a clear association between the presence of ATEs in the system and the accountability pressure that they perceive. Nonetheless, our interviews capture that there are numerous principals and teachers – especially in the private sector, but also in the public one – that adopt a pragmatic approach and are inclined to see the potential contribution of consultancy services to their work in a context of continuous market and administrative pressures. This is, for instance, the case of Daniela, the pedagogic coordinator of an urban public school with medium performance, who, when asked about a learning platform that the school owner acquired from an ATE, states that:

(D): [we have hired] one platform, yes, because all schools must apply three tests every year: the SIMCE, the PSU, and tests for subjects. As I say, I have not looked at it [the platform] yet, because this was a week ago. But I will still take it as an input to be able to detect how the teaching process is going, for the same reason that I told you, that sometimes it is not because the teacher does not want or not... but there is ignorance in... how to structure a test that points to the three levels, for example. (...) So, I suppose that these tests sent to us, through the platform, are well structured. Then, it will also be a way of objectively seeing what is happening in the classroom from my point of view, from my role.

Performance technologies, provided by ATEs, tend to be understood and valued as objective and reliable information of what is occurring in classrooms. In a context of accountability pressure, testing students' progression is a key service for principals and school managers who do not always trust in teachers' capacity to produce accurate knowledge of students' learning progress.

We also got similar responses from teachers. For instance, Andrés, who works in a private subsidised school with a medium performance category, complains that SIMCE generates emotional stress among students and blames teachers for

school results. However, when asked about whether the data provided by the test preparation services contracted by the owner are useful, he stated:

Yes, because it is a fact that will let me know how [the test] went. Ok? Because, in the end, we will have the result as: 4th, that is, it will not be 4A, 4B, it is like an average. Two, because it also lets me know if I have some [students] that are advanced, how to exploit it. If there are students who are still insufficient, I will see the possibility of advancing them to the elementary level. Well, and see if students that were elementary have advanced or...

Similarly, Vanny, a teacher from another private subsidised school with medium-low performance, explains how the consultancy services contracted by the school, including test-preparation services and data analysis technologies, are used to design effective teaching strategies. Specifically, she considers that the standardised test and the data analysis services contracted provide detailed data that allows teachers to make a more fine-grained diagnosis about the main students' weaknesses as well as to design proper teaching strategies to improve students' learning outcomes. This example shows how, in some cases, teachers value ATE services positively because they perceive them as supportive resources to cope and respond strategically to performative pressures.

(INTERVIEWER): Can you describe [...] how did you use [these standardised tests]?

(VANNY): They [...] gave us the results and told us in which [learning standards] were more descended the pupils. So, we reinforced those [learning standards] and worked on them. That's what helped us with that [...].

(INTERVIEWER): And, what do you think about that particular ATE and its services? What is your evaluation [of the ATE]?

(VANNY): [...] I found it positive because in the middle of the road, I could make decisions to improve [students' learning outcomes].

In short, our study shows how the implementation of high-stakes accountability systems creates the necessary conditions for the expansion of a school improvement industry in both public and private schools. Beyond their perceptions and beliefs about the fairness of standardised tests and accountability, most principals and teachers are positive about ATE services because they see them as a source of useful data and as a resource to obtain short-term improvements to better cope with external performance pressures.

Conclusions

This chapter joins an emerging area of research on the role and impact of commercial education services in the reorganisation of education systems (see contributors to this volume; Amaral, Steiner-Khamsi & Thompson, 2019; Verger,

Lubienski & Steiner-Khamsi, 2016). The Chilean case has many similarities with other international trends, but also important particularities. First, in Chile the school improvement industry is not a globalising market, but rather a strongly localised industry serviced predominantly by domestic providers. Second, the education industry is not expanding in Chile due to insufficient regulation on external educational services provision, but rather through the active public promotion, financing and regulation of this services' sector by the state. To a great extent, the Chilean state is an active market maker in education. With the consecutive educational reforms undertaken in the last decades, it has generated the conditions, first, for an expanding market of school provision and, more recently, for a vibrant market of publicly subsidised school improvement services.

Our empirical findings show that the consumption of commercial services for school improvement is widespread in Chile, but does not respond to a homogenous pattern among schools. First, the school ownership influences the school's use of commercial education services. Specifically, private schools tend to make a more intense use of this kind of services, and teachers in private schools conceive ATE services as a more valuable instructional source than teachers in public schools. We attribute these differences to the more competitive *ethos* of private schools, but also to the fact that private schools face – or at least perceive – higher levels of competitive pressure than public schools. To these schools, ATE services are a way to address the competitive pressures they face in the marketplace. In other words, ATE services are perceived as key resources to cope with performance and market pressures. They are used strategically to boost students' learning outcomes and at the same time, increase the school's reputation in the local education market.

Second, school principals in both public and private schools tend to have a positive opinion of ATE services, but critical opinions with ATE services are more frequent in the public sector. Even though public and private subsidised schools follow the same channels of access to ATE services, in practice, public schools have limited autonomy to decide what type of services might actually be more beneficial to improve their pedagogical practices. The latter is due to the fact that, as it appears from our interviews, public school principals tend to have less decision-making power to contract consultancy services than principals working in the private sector. As a result, public schools tend to see ATE services as an external agent whose services do not necessarily respond to their most pressuring needs and immediate educational realities. This finding challenges the intended objective of public subsidies for ATE services as a device to enhance school autonomy. In practice, the ATE catalogue of services is highly standardised, and particularly in the public sector, school administrators tend to choose a limited and homogenous package of services for all the schools they are responsible for.

Finally, our results reflect on school actors' mixed feelings towards accountability measures. It's a hate and love story. On the one hand, critical discourses on the intensification of accountability policies and datafication in education

emerge. Yet, on the other hand, in an atmosphere of test anxiety and sense of scant time, school members value and feel grateful towards ATE services, as they help them to positively respond to accountability pressure. School managers are especially supportive of performance technologies, since they see them as truthful sources of evidence about students' learning progress and needs – which is something that tends to be detrimental of teachers' judgement on students' learning. As Holloway and Brass (2018, p. 18) point out, the introduction of accountability and data-intensive policy instruments in education has favoured the emergence of 'a performativity discourse', which has become the taken for granted framework through which teachers' subjectivity and practice is governed.

To conclude, the governmental support to commercial education services analysed in this chapter reifies and to a great extent deepens the subsidiary role of the Chilean state in education. Commercial services are contracted by the state to technically support and hold underperforming schools, which are usually public schools attending the most vulnerable population, accountable. Paradoxically, public schools are those that use commercial services less intensively in their daily practices and that are less satisfied with these services. The cross-sectoral differences observed in this study might prelude the generation of new systemic inequalities between public and private schools in an already highly segmented educational system.

Notes

- 1 The SIMCE test was created in the context of the market reform of the 1980s to inform school choice. At first, the test covered just two subjects and was administered once a year to students in fourth or eighth grade. However, the number of tests applied progressively increased. Today SIMCE is applied to four different grades in both primary and secondary education and covers four subjects (Literacy, Mathematics, Social Sciences and Natural Sciences).
- 2 In Chile, we can distinguish three main types of schools: (a) municipal (public) schools are publicly owned and managed at the municipal level, but with state funding; (b) private subsidised schools are privately owned and also receive state funding; and (c) totally private (non-subsidised) schools are owned, financed and managed privately. In basic education, most students are enrolled in private subsidised (52.47%) and public schools (38.23%), while only 9.3% of the student population is enrolled in private (non-subsidised) schools (MINEDUC, 2019).
- 3 This does not apply to totally private schools, which enjoy more autonomy in how and whether they approach ATEs, but in return private schools need to cover ATE services from their own budget.
- 4 The survey was administered to school leaders and teachers who taught in primary and/or lower-secondary levels.
- 5 We refer to European Research Council-funded REFORMED project (www.reformedproject.eu) GA-680172.
- 6 When in the findings section we refer to 'private schools', we include both subsidised private schools and totally private schools in the same category.
- 7 The observed mean in the private sector (3.04) is 0.3 points higher than in the public sector (2.74). Complementarily, the ANOVA test confirms significant differences between groups, although the association is very low.

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