

Lebedev, S.V. (2022). Demo-totalitarianism: the Baltic version. *Actual Issues of Modern Science. European Scientific e-Journal*, 6 (21), 24-37. Ostrava: Tuculart Edition.  
Лебедев, С.В. (2022). Демототалитаризм: прибалтийский вариант. *Actual Issues of Modern Science. European Scientific e-Journal*, 6 (21), 24-37. Ostrava: Tuculart Edition. (на англ.)

DOI: 10.47451/pol2022-06-01

The paper will be published in Crossref, ICI Copernicus, Academic Resource Index ResearchBib, J-Gate, ISI International Scientific Indexing, Zenodo, OpenAIRE, BASE, LORY, LUASA, ADL, eLibrary, and WebArchive databases.



**Sergey V. Lebedev**, Professor, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Head of Department, Department of Philosophy, Higher School of Folk Arts, St. Petersburg, Russia. ORCID: 0000-0002-7994-2660.

### **Demo-totalitarianism: the Baltic version**

*Abstract:* The purpose of the study is to define demo-totalitarianism as a social and political phenomenon in the independent Baltic countries at the present stage of development of the European community. The political history of many countries, including the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), is distinguished by its originality, sharply distinguishing these countries from countries with a democratic regime. Quite democratic procedures coexist in the Baltic States, but at the same time, discrimination of so-called “non-titular” population is carried out. These regimes can be characterized as demo-tatotal. To achieve the goal set in the study and solve problems, historical-genetic, historical-comparative, actualization and chronological methods were used. In the course of the study, numerous archival and journalistic materials were used, which are freely available and do not violate the legal framework of the Baltic states. The author concludes that the change of the demototalitarian regime will not occur as a result of a people’s revolution, since the bulk of the “titular” Balts defend the status quo in order to at least see their significance in something. Due to geopolitics, the West will not notice human rights violations in the Baltics. Because of this, Baltic demo-totalitarianism will continue to exist in the foreseeable future. The author takes full responsibility for the complexity and political ambiguity of the research topic, therefore he defines it as purely scientific.

*Keywords:* political regime, democracy, totalitarianism, demo-totalitarianism, discrimination.



**Сергей Викторович Лебедев**, профессор, доктор философских наук, заведующий кафедрой, кафедры философии, Высшая школа народных искусств, Санкт-Петербург, Россия.  
ORCID: 0000-0002-7994-2660.

### **Демототалитаризм: прибалтийский вариант**

*Аннотация:* Целью исследования является определение демототалитаризма как социально-политического явления в независимых странах Прибалтики на современном этапе развития европейского сообщества. Политическая история многих стран, в том числе и стран Прибалтики (Эстония, Латвия, Литва) отличается своеобразием, резко отличающих эти страны от стран с демократическим режимом. В Прибалтике сосуществуют вполне демократические процедуры, но одновременно осуществляется дискриминация т.н. «нетитульного» населения. Данные режимы можно охарактеризовать как демотатоталитарные. Для достижения поставленной в исследовании цели и решения задач были использованы историко-генетический, историко-сравнительный, актуализационный и хронологический методы. В ходе исследования были использованы многочисленные архивные и публицистические материалы, находящиеся в свободном доступе и

не нарушающие законодательную базу прибалтийских государств. Автор делает заключение, что смена демототалитарного режима не произойдет в результате народной революции, поскольку основная масса «титовых» прибалтов защищать статус-кво, дабы хотя бы в чем-то увидеть свою значимость. В силу геополитики Запад не будет замечать нарушения прав человека в Прибалтике. В силу этого прибалтийский демототалитаризм будет существовать и в обозримом будущем. Автор со всей ответственностью относится к сложности и политической неоднозначности темы исследования, поэтому определяет его как сугубо научное.

*Ключевые слова:* политический режим, демократия, тоталитаризм, демототалитаризм, дискриминация.



## Introduction

The political history of many countries, including the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), is distinguished by its originality, sharply distinguishing these countries from countries with a democratic regime. Quite democratic procedures coexist in the Baltic States, but at the same time, discrimination of so-called “non-titular” population is carried out. These regimes can be characterised as demo-tatotal.

One of the most common concepts in political science is the word “regime”. The way the political system functions, the methods of managing society, the degree of political freedom and openness of the country is understood under the political regime. Regime (*régime* in French) means “order”. Regime is a set of norms and rules that are not recommended to be violated. It is no coincidence that there are such concepts as the regime of the day, the mode of operation of the enterprise, the mode of secrecy, bed rest, sports mode, etc. Political scientists distinguish (depending on their preferences) many variants of the regime. However, basically in science, there are such types of political regimes: democratic, totalitarian, and authoritarian. At the same time, the democratic regime is initially assessed as “good”, “correct”, in direct contrast to the other two.

A democratic regime, or simply democracy, is a political regime in which the people are recognized as the only source of power, power is exercised by the will and in the interests of the people (*Bychik, 2019*). The main thing in democracy is the turnover of power and the guarantee of the rights of the minority. It should note that due to the popularity of the word “democracy”, many political regimes have themselves democratic. In fact, democracy in no country is complete, there is where to expand democratic values.

The totalitarian regime (from the Latin *total* – universal) is characterized precisely by the universality, the inclusiveness of its power. The entire life of citizens – from birth to death – is completely controlled by the state. The main feature of totalitarianism is not the cruelty of power and not the presence of a leader, but the dominance of the official ideology. At the same time, the totalitarian regime is popular until a certain time, a significant part of society supports the regime or, at least, does not see an alternative to it. That is why the totalitarian regimes were able to withstand super-tension and achieve outstanding success. However, when the ideology is weakened, the regime can collapse somehow unexpectedly for everyone. However, totalitarianism does not appear because of the evil will of some scoundrels. The forerunner of every totalitarian regime is a weak, inefficient democracy that is incapable of solving the

problems facing society. Totalitarianism conducts a kind of total mobilisation of all the resources of society to achieve certain goals.

Authoritarian regime (from the Latin *auctoritas* – power, influence) is the regime of personal power of the dictator. Today, most of the countries of the world have an authoritarian regime. A classic example of authoritarianism is when, in some exotic country, a general of the local army makes a coup and becomes a dictator. Civilian authoritarianism is also possible, when a political leader who turns into a dictator wins elections more or less legally.

However, this triad ignores many hybrid mode options. As the experience of many decades shows, outwardly completely democratic regimes periodically arise in the world, combining many elements of totalitarian regimes. In other words, society is divided into “pure”, for whom there are rights and freedoms, and “impure”, who are in an unequal position. At the same time, the principle of this inequality has been elevated to a legal law. The society is dominated by a certain totalitarian ideology, which justifies a strict division into those who are attached to the elements of democracy, and those who must obey the “pure”. Demo-totarism can be called the political structure of the United States before the abolition of racial segregation in the 1960s, demototarism could be called the apartheid regime in South Africa before the black majority came to power in 1994, and the structure of Israel, which rigidly distinguishes the rights of Jews and others, has clear features of demototalitarianism. Finally, the most recent example of demo-totalitarianism comes from the Baltic states of the last three decades. The official ideology of the United States and South Africa, before the abolition of racial inequality, was based on the idea of the superiority of the white race. The official ideology of Israel comes from the ideas of Zionism. In the Baltic States, more precisely, in Estonia and Latvia, the ideology is generally very simple: where your grandfather lived until 1940. The politics of these countries, as well as Lithuania, where there is no legal recognition of inequality, although in practice discrimination against minorities covers all aspects of life, is also influenced by the legacy of the Soviet era.

The study's purpose was to define demototalitarianism as a social and political phenomenon in the independent Baltic countries at the present stage of development of the European community.

Based on the study's purpose, the following tasks were identified:

- define and justify the existing political Baltic regimes;
- trace and analyse the genesis of the formation of demototalitarianism in the Baltic states;
- characterise the Baltic demo-totalitarianism through the social activity of significant members of the Baltic societies.

To achieve the set purpose and solve the tasks of the study, historical-genetic, historical-comparative, actualisation and chronological methods were used.

In the course of the study, numerous archival and journalistic materials, which are freely available and do not violate the legal framework of the Baltic states, were used.

The author takes full responsibility for the complexity and political ambiguity of the study topic, therefore he defines it as purely scientific.

### **The results of the study**

In the West, all Baltic countries are considered democratic. And, of course, the aborigines agree with this. However, in general, it is very difficult to consider a political system in which

“non-citizens” are present as democracy. Also, democracy cannot be considered independent when foreigners are appointed to the most important state posts at the request of foreign embassies.

However, in the Baltic States, everything is fine with democratic procedures in the form of elections, a free press that can draw caricatures of any presidents. In short, there is no authoritarian dictatorship in the Baltic States now, as opposed to the times of the “first independence”. However, a regime dominated by a rigid ideology and ruled for decades by the same political grouping, where there is no independence in either domestic or foreign policy, cannot be attributed to democracy. Strangely enough, in the Baltic Republics there are much more elements of totalitarianism in political life.

In the modern Baltic States, ideology prevails not in the form of a clear doctrine, but tacitly recognised by the majority of the population, including many “migrants”, the idea of “small but proud nations” that flourished before 1940 and were subjected to Soviet occupation. Accordingly, all real or imaginary problems of the past and present are explained only by this occupation. That is why “migrants” should be officially classified as the second class of residents, Russia should pay and repent. Thus, the political regime in the Baltic Republics can be called demo-totalitarian.

The whole Baltic ideology is based on the belief that all three republics represent the only form of existence of the three indigenous Baltic ethnic groups. All politics during the period of both independencies is built in an effort to create a mono-national state of “titular” nations. But this is what makes the entire development of the Baltic republics so, let’s say, specific. The construction of a mono-national state in a multiethnic society is always a simplification and primitivization of all levels of culture, economy, politics and the humanitarian sphere that existed before it. Attempts to build a mono-national state leads to the fact that all logic and common sense disappear in the policy pursued by the ruling elite. For a long time, not only Russian, but also a few local experts believed that “sound pragmatism” would prevail in the Baltic States’ interactions with Russia, because politicians would not “chop off the heads of all the chickens laying golden eggs”. In other words, normal political leaders, regardless of what they think about their neighbors and their own residents of non-titular nationality, will be guided by common sense and develop normal economic relations both inside and outside their countries. But nothing like that happened. However, what is a normal economy when the main goal of the Baltic politicians is to oust all non-titular peoples from their own area and bring their relative numbers to a comfortable level. There have been numerous cases in history when a mono-national state was built by exterminating or expelling all “non-titular” peoples. In the Baltic States, Baltic politicians are still inspired by the memories of the expulsion of the Ostsee Germans – the former owners of the region, the extermination of local Jews and similar pleasant historical events. Is it by chance that the Baltic States treat SS veterans so reverently. The whole policy in the Baltic Republics boils down to the desire to partly expel, partly assimilate, and for the most part turn all “non-titular” people into second-class people. That is why unbearable conditions are created for local Russians. The desire to eradicate the Russian language from everyday life is especially indicative. Even if all fiction is an insignificant phenomenon in the “titular” language, and there is no technical literature at all, a nationalist will never recognise the

right to the existence of another language, especially if it is a world language with which it is objectively impossible to compete.

So, the existing Baltic regimes are a demo-totalitarian ethnocracy.

An indicator of the uniqueness of the regime can be found when taking into account the recruitment of the ruling elite. There were no underground revolutionaries or even ordinary dissidents among the Baltic figures during the period of secession from the *USSR*. The pillars of the separatist movements were the first secretaries of the local republican branches of the *CPSU*, party and Komsomol functionaries of all levels, *KGB* officers, the local intelligentsia, caressed by the Soviet government and created by it. In the early 90s, the share of immigrants from the *CPSU* and Komsomol in the political elite of the newly independent Baltic states was 58% in Lithuania, 75% in Latvia and 73% in Estonia (*Smirnov, 2020*).

Here are some biographical information about the pillars of Baltic demo-totalitarianism. In Latvia, the separatist movement was led by Anatoly Valerianovich Gorbunov, the former secretary of the Central Committee of the *CPL* on ideology, and before a long-term Komsomol functionary. In 1988, Gorbunov was appointed Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the *Latvian SSR*, immediately supported the Popular Front of Latvia and until 1993 was Chairman of the Supreme Council, and then the Seimas of Latvia. The process of Estonia's secession from the *USSR* was headed by Arnold Rüütel, a member of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the *KPE*, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR since 1983, who later became President of the Republic of Estonia.

In addition to the “founding fathers” of independent states, the second echelon of rulers went through a completely similar path. The example of the President of Lithuania in 2009-2019, Dali Grybauskaitė, is indicative. She made a successful Soviet career due to the fact that her father participated in the Soviet army in the Great Patriotic War and in the postwar years worked in the fire paramilitary protection of the *NKVD*, and participated in the fight against the “forest brothers”. Komsomol member from the age of 14, a student of the Faculty of Economics of the Leningrad State University. Zhdanova went to Leningrad, (and during her studies, according to some information, which the Lithuanian side completely denies, she was engaged in currency prostitution) Grybauskaitė has been teaching the political economy of socialism at the Vilnius Higher Party School of the Central Committee of the *CPSU* since 1983. In 1988, she defended her PhD thesis at the Academy of Social Sciences under the Central Committee of the *CPSU*, where only the most promising party cadres promoted by the Union leadership received additional education. The topic of her dissertation was *The Relationship of Public and Personal Property in the Functioning a Personal Subsidiary Farm*. The reasons for Grybauskaitė's success in the presence of serious compromising material were explained by cooperation with the Soviet State Security Committee (*KGB*) under the nickname “Magnolia”.

However, the “grandfather” of Lithuania, the leader of the Sąjūdis (movement in support of perestroika) Vytautas Landsbergis was generally a hereditary *KGB* agent. Since 1927, his father Vytautas Landsbergis-Žemkalnis was an agent of the *NKVD*, and then the *KGB* of the *USSR*. He was part of the so-called *Provisional Government of Lithuania*, created in 1941 by agents of the Third Reich, holding the position of “minister” of public utilities. After the defeat of Germany, this “minister” fled to Australia. However, since Landsbergis-Zhyamkalnis betrayed his

accomplices to the Soviet special services, he received an amnesty from Lubyanka and permission to return to Soviet Lithuania.

His son began working for the “authorities” in 1955, while a student at the conservatory. Later, Landsbergis became a professor at the Vilnius Conservatory, teaching a course on Marxist-Leninist aesthetics. The Vytautas Landsbergis’s ominous star rose during the period of Gorbachev’s “perestroika” in September 1988, when, at a meeting (without minutes), members of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania agreed with the proposal of Eduardas Eismuntas, the KGB chairman of the Lithuanian SSR, to recommend a professor-musicologist as the leader of the Sąjūdis (*Shved, 2019*).

The fact that almost all the “founding fathers” of the independent Baltic republics were associated with the KGB is evidenced by the data on Lithuania. According to the KGB archives in Lithuania, in 1940-1991, about 118 thousand people, who lived or served in Lithuania at that time, collaborated with the MGB-KGB. Until April 11, 1990, 36,237 intelligence files were destroyed. 8,539 cases of KGB agents were taken from Lithuania to the USSR (*The Lithuanian politician proposed to publish a list of persons who collaborated with the KGB, 2017*). However, in modern Lithuania, they are afraid to publish information about those who served the “office”. It is no coincidence that there are constant “erasures” and sometimes complete destruction of cases that can ruin the reputation of quite a few Lithuanian politicians, cultural figures and businessmen.

There are similar data for Latvia. Back in August 1991, after the dissolution of the LSSR KGB, all the documentation of the committee was in the hands of the Latvian authorities - lists of employees and informants, a card file, etc. And this data was immediately hidden. As a result, only 27 years later, at the end of 2018, the KGB file cabinet was still open to the public (*LPSR VDK dokumentu arhīvs*). Among the thousands of people who, for various reasons, ended up in this card index, the names of well-known opposition politicians, including Russian-speaking ones, were also found (*Karamzin, 2018*). At the same time, the Seimas deputies have repeatedly argued that people close to power could remove the names of the most famous figures from the KGB card index in advance. It is clear that after 27 years this information was no longer of interest to voters.

The last KGB head in the *Estonian SSR*, Rein Sillar, after three decades of silence, spoke about what happened in the last years of the KGB in Estonia: “I worked in the KGB for 20 years and I did not see any struggle for freedom anywhere!”. According to Sillar, “We had thousands and thousands of agents. Imagine if everyone knew what their fathers and mothers once did ...” (*Minnik, 2021*).

In Soviet times, a very important lift for a career was kinship with the Baltic communist leaders. But as soon as the winds of change began to blow, these relatives of the Baltic Reds immediately began to act against the life work of their ancestors. Thus, a huge role in the restoration of Soviet power in Estonia in 1940 was played by Johannes Lauristin, who died in 1941. His daughter Marya Lauristin made a good Soviet career by defending her dissertation at Moscow State University. In 1988, she became one of the leaders of the Estonian Popular Front, and after independence, she took over as Minister of Social Affairs in the early 1990s. Here, the daughter of a communist pursued a completely cannibalistic social policy that caused mass demonstrations in slow-moving Estonia. Marya Lauristin’s half-brother, Jaak Allik, the son of an outstanding revolutionary, one of the founders of Soviet Estonia in 1940, was the Minister



of Culture of Estonia. Andres, the grandson of Jaan Anvelt, an outstanding Estonian revolutionary, the organiser of the Estonian Labor Commune of 1918, was the Minister of the Interior of Estonia, organising the persecution of dissidents. Egils Levits, the 10th president of Latvia, was the great-grandson of the revolutionaries of 1905 and the son of a prominent pro-Soviet figure, Jonah Levits, who became a state commissar (minister) of the government of Soviet Latvia in the summer of 1940. Of course, Egils began to pursue a policy directly opposite to what his ancestors fought for.

Similar processes were typical for cultural figures. Thus, among the classics of Lithuanian literature of the Soviet period of history, the personality of the great writer Antanas Venclova (1906-1971) stands out. In August 1940, he signed the *Declaration on the Entry of Lithuania into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, was the People's Commissar of Education of the *Lithuanian SSR* in 1940, wrote the anthem of this republic. However, his son named Thomas, also a man of letters, became a dissident. Although his dissidence is quite doubtful, family ties in a small republic are a significant thing, but Thomas went into exile. Later he returned to "Free Lithuania" and became an official writer, betraying all the ideals of his father. However, Thomas is the winner of many prestigious awards and honorary titles.

The first president of Estonia, Lennart-Georg Meri, could well consider himself a victim of the Soviet regime, having been deported to Siberia at the age of 12. However, he made a name for himself in literature, becoming a writer and screenwriter, quite favored by the authorities. But as soon as the "perestroika" began, Meri immediately turned into an ardent nationalist. At the same time, in his Russophobic rage, he spoke complete nonsense, such as: "Soviet rule in Estonia was nothing like the British rule in India in the good old days, sung by Kipling. The Russians presented themselves as a "nation of masters", they behaved like the SS, and not like ordinary Wehrmacht soldiers" (*The unwise policy of Tallinn...*, 1993). That is really someone who, but the Russians have never suffered from the "people-master" complex. It is just that everyone judges others according to their own depravity.

However, in the conditions when the recent Soviet partocrats proclaimed the doctrine of "continuity", that is, the continuity of the existence of the Baltic states after 1940, it was urgently necessary to nominate the offspring of the leaders of the "first independence" to the national leaders. For this reason, in 1993, Guntis Ulmanis, the former director of the Riga House of Life, became the President of Latvia. He had no merit, except for the fact that Guntis was the great-nephew of Kārlis Augusts Vilhelms Ulmanis, the dictator of the "first Latvia". However, Ulmanis Jr. did not distinguish himself in anything special in the presidential post.

However, the years go by. And now the representatives of the "elite" from among the Soviet partocrats, who became "democratic" politicians, began to pass on their position by inheritance. The grandson of the sinister Sajūdis leader Vytautas Landsbergis became the Lithuanian foreign minister. It is quite possible that, according to family tradition, he is also a Russian intelligence officer. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Finance, and later the Prime Minister of Estonia, Siim Kallas, was pleased to see that his daughter Kaja Kallas became the leader of the Reform Party by inheritance and then automatically became the Prime Minister of Estonia. Edgar Savisaar, who played a big role during the Estonian Singing Revolution, who held a number of ministerial posts, the mayor of Tallinn and a former prime minister, can also be happy for his son Erkki, who became the Minister of the Environment in 2021.

Meanwhile, the Baltic regimes, while proclaiming themselves democratic, completely adopted some features of the Soviet totalitarianism they so cursed. In particular, in Lithuania there is a personality cult of Vytautas Landsbergis. This is reflected, in particular, in whole epics about the life and struggle of the leader Sąjūdis, the “father of the nation” and a KGB agent. Thus, the wife of the “father of the nation” Grazyna Rucyte-Landsbergienė, together with the director Agnė Marcinkevičiūtė, created the trilogy *Vytautas Landsbergis: Thoughts and Creativity*. But this seemed to her not enough, and she prepared another series of films called *A Fracture at the Baltic* (in the center of the story is the same main character). In 2003, the son of Landsbergis made a tape with the eloquent title *The Whole Truth About My Father*. Russian director Alexander Sokurov made the former chairman of the Seimas of Lithuania the main character of his film *A Simple Elegy*. Documentary film *Mr. Landsbergis. Destroy the Evil Empire*, dedicated to the former Chairman of the Seimas of Lithuania, received the main prize of the IDFA 2021 film festival in Amsterdam. It is noteworthy that this project was funded by the State Lithuanian Film Center ([Ilyashevich, 2021](#)). The running time of the film is no less than 246 minutes! Some Sąjūdis activists are indignant that Landsbergis alone gets all the glory, and demand to glorify themselves as well.

As a rule, the Baltic figures, in response to sarcastic remarks about the nepotism of their politicians, snap that in many countries there are dynasties of politicians. You can remember the Kennedy clan or the Bushes in the United States. And, on this basis, they conclude that the Baltic republics are not at all post-Soviet countries, but originally European countries, which for some reason were occupied for almost their entire history. But after all, it is in the post-Soviet countries that one can see everything that is characteristic of the modern Baltic regimes – the absolute predominance among the ruling elite of people from the CPSU and the Komsomol, KGB officers, the formation of a closed caste society with low social mobility, limited communication between the elite and the people, the inheritance of one’s social status, the oppression of ethnic minorities. So no matter how the Baltic politicians proclaim their belonging to the “West” and do not refer to “continuity”, all the same, the three Baltic republics are precisely post-Soviet formations. Another thing is that many features of the “post-Soviet” in the Baltics are not so bright. In any case, they do not yet pass on the presidential throne by inheritance, and do not rename the city in honor of their leaders. In general, everything is modest in the Baltic.

According to a modern prominent specialist in the history and economy of the Baltic states, Doctor of Economics, N.M. Mezhevich, the economic reality of the Baltics is “the liberal Anglo-Saxon model, with post-Soviet corruption, deindustrialization in the Eastern European style, North Korean ideologisation and North European self-identification” ([Mezhevich, 2016](#)).

The demographic problems of the territories newly annexed to the USSR in 1940 greatly complicated the economic and social development of the Baltic states. Under these conditions, Soviet political and economic leaders were forced to organize in Estonia and especially in Latvia a large-scale use of labor from all over the USSR. Lithuania, which had quite normal demographic development during the Soviet era, was able to make do with its own labor force, and therefore avoided large-scale migration. However, a particularly large influx of migrants arrived in Latvia. So, according to the 1989 census, for 1961-89. in Latvia, the net increase due to migration was 371,900 people. They were predominantly ethnic Russians and largely almost entirely Russian-speaking.



After the so-called *Restoration of Independence* in 1991, the entire population of the Baltic states is divided (and at the official level!) into two rigid categories – “titular”, that is, as it were, indigenous nationalities, and “migrants”, they are also “Russian-speaking”. According to official history, the titular ones are the original and permanent residents of the Baltic countries, and the Russians are only “migrants” who have come in large numbers. To begin with, it should be pointed out that there is simply no clear definition of indigenous peoples in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Thus, autochthonism (originality) of a particular population often becomes a matter not of the work of scientists, but the fruit of the work of politicians, lobbyists and interested parties.

Immediately after the declaration of independence, the authorities of the new Baltic countries introduced the concept of “non-citizens” (in fact, restricting the rights of all migrants). These racial laws effectively placed “non-citizens” in a position reminiscent of the legal status of “non-Aryans” in the Third Reich.

On February 6, 1992, the Estonian Supreme Council issued a Decree restoring the 1938 Estonian Citizenship Law. In accordance with the Decree, only persons who had citizenship on June 16, 1940 and their direct descendants were automatically considered citizens. As a result, only about 120,000 out of almost 470,000 Russians were able to become automatically Estonian citizens. Persons who resettled in Estonia after its entry into the USSR in 1940 could only acquire citizenship through the naturalization process. The official Estonian name for “non-citizens” is “persons of undetermined citizenship” (Est. *määratlemata kodakondsusega isik*).

The Law on Citizenship of Latvia was adopted on July 22, 1994, according to which the totality of original citizens consists of persons, who were citizens of Latvia before June 17, 1940, as well as their descendants who have passed registration. As a result of the application of this Law, only about 280,000 out of almost 900,000 Russians received citizenship.

“Non-citizens” are discriminated against at all levels. For example, in Latvia there are 70 differences in the rights of citizens and non-citizens: restrictions on holding positions in various sectors (state, private and public sectors) – 19, 8, and 11 differences, respectively; restrictions on the right to property – 9 differences; restrictions on private entrepreneurship - 6 differences; social rights – 3 differences; other rights – 14 differences. And after Latvia joined the *EU*, a number of classes (13 in total), still inaccessible to non-citizens of Latvia, became available to *EU* citizens. In particular, this concerns the right to stand as a candidate and vote in local elections, which is allowed for *EU* citizens with six months of residence in Latvia. However, it is still forbidden to non-citizens, most of whom are local natives, and most of the rest have lived in the country for more than 30 years. All this apartheid, of course, is not seen point-blank by “human rights activists” and “European democracies”.

Even in prisons apartheid is carried out on a national basis. The Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Estonia has introduced mandatory marking of prisoners in republican prisons. The Latin letter “C” on the prison uniform denotes those who speak Estonian as their native language, the letter “B” – those who, at the very least, can express themselves, and the letter “A” – those who know only a few words. Prisoners who do not speak Estonian at all were left unmarked (*Nikiforov, 2012*).

At the same time, although the official propaganda of Estonia and Latvia states that Russians are discriminated against only on the grounds that they arrived in the republics after

1940, this is all nonsense. Thus, in 2013, the Saeima of Latvia adopted a law according to which the right to dual citizenship of Latvia is provided only for ethnic Latvians. In other words, the descendants of Latvian emigrants from the Russian Empire, who left long before 1918, who never lived in “free Latvia” during the “first independence”, who do not speak Latvian at all, can count on obtaining Latvian citizenship without any problems. And this is in contrast to the Russians, who were born and worked all their lives in Latvia, and who remain “non-citizens”. Quite rarely, some Russians from the Baltics still get citizenship solely because of their celebrity. So, the citizenship of Latvia was received by the ballet dancer Mikhail Baryshnikov, a native of Riga, but who came from a military family. In other words, the classic son of the “occupiers”. At the same time, Baryshnikov left Riga during his school years, so he did not have any “experience” of living in Latvia. However, since Baryshnikov became world famous, the Latvian Seimas in 2017 unanimously voted to grant him Latvian citizenship.

Meanwhile, Western democracies, as they say, do not see discrimination against Russians and the existence of the institution of “non-citizens”. The international organization *Freedom House*, headquartered, of course, in Washington, regularly reporting which countries in the world are “free”, which are “semi-free”, and which are completely “not free”, constantly classifies the Baltic republics as free countries. Russia, on the other hand, always refers to “not free” countries according to the *House of Freedom* methods.

In Lithuania, there is no such apartheid at the official level, although in the domestic sphere it blooms and smells. However, it is very difficult to call Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians “titular” nations. Title has always assumed independence, and the Baltic peoples for most of their existence were only in complete subordination. The truly titular peoples in the Baltics are the Russians, as well as the disappeared Baltic Germans and, to some extent, the Poles of Lithuania.

So, the distinction between natives and migrants remains very clear, and the authorities of the Baltic republics are doing everything to make this distinction more noticeable. Aborigines like to emphasize their “Europeanness”, referring to the architecture of their cities (although they did not build them), to the Protestant and Catholic religions (although most of them are not religious). The tradesman complex in the nobility contributes to frankly boorish antics. For example, Latvian banker Girts Rungainis stated that Russian “is not the language of culture” (*In Latvia, a banker called Russian “the language of savages”, 2018*). The Latvian supposedly writer Didzis Sedlenieks announced that Russians are “beings of the lowest intellectual level” (*Latvian science fiction writer..., 2018*).

In Lithuania, one of the Sąjūdis leaders, Romualdas Ozolas, announced that Russians are nationally debility, and called Russian dances by gorilla dances. The chairman of the capital faction of the Conservative People’s Party (*EKRE*) of Estonia, Mart Kallas, called the Russian-speaking inhabitants of the country human garbage. He stated this on his Facebook page. In 2017, a member of the *Latvian Seimas*, Edvīns Šnore, on the pages of the newspaper *Neatkarīga Rīta Avīze*, compared Russians with “lice” who still do not want to leave Latvia: “If you let a Russian louse into a fur coat once, you can’t take it back. Indeed, we see that visitors, as well as local Russian-speakers, who in Soviet times denigrated, scolded and slandered Latvia, still do not leave Latvia back” (*Guryanov, 2017*).

Everything is being done to take root Russophobia in the “titular” Balts from childhood. In Latvia, the novel of the writer Gunars Anatolijs Janovskis, who fled from Latvia together with the Nazis in 1944, was introduced into the curriculum of school literature teaching. In this “work” that schoolchildren are studying, there are such lines, however, as if they belonged to an Estonian: “If you meet a Russian, then talk to him as if you were standing in a window on the second floor, and he was knee-deep in mud and shit because the difference between Russian and Estonian is so great. Be polite and icy kind, sometimes even smile. Do not hit him in the face, but look down on him and you will see how afraid he is of you. The dog is so afraid when he hears the slightest harshness in the owner’s voice, and the Russian with his narrow soul is still nothing but a slave beaten with whips by the Tatars” (*“Russian is a slave beaten with whips”... 2019*). However, we should leave the assessment of such derogatory words about any people to specialists to comment on these revelations of a representative of the people, who himself was beaten with German whips for seven centuries.

In 2022, during a period of sharp aggravation of the international situation caused by the Ukrainian crisis, Baltic politicians began to speak out against the Russians especially viciously. For example, Veiko Spolitis, a member of the Latvian Seimas, called Russian diplomats in Geneva by “primates”. In a comment to the tweet, the ex-president of Estonia Ilves immediately leaned in and corrected his colleague: “Veiko, you write about “primates”, but Homo sapiens are also primates, Russians are unworthy of this. I would prefer the word “monkeys” (*Isfakhan, 2022*). Both Baltic politicians showed not only their Russophobia, but also their general level of development. Recall that monkeys, in fact, are primates, lemurs, tarsiers, bats are also primates, a person also belongs to the order of primates. It turns out that if the Balts are not primates, then who are they according to their logics?

However, the Baltic cultural figures sometimes outperform politicians in their speeches. The famous Latvian theater director Alvis Hermanis stated in 2022 that:

“1. It is still difficult for the West [the Balts also consider themselves part of the West for some reason] to realise that the Russians are a completely different civilization. This is an optical illusion. They only look European on the outside. Their behavior has little in common with Western civilization. I emphasise, they are not second-class people, they are simply arranged differently.

2. In the case of Russia, it is impossible to talk about the subject of society. On that earth there was never a society in the sense that we understand it. One that is capable of self-organization. There has always been for centuries only a crowd or biomass, which obeyed one person. And hoping for the opposite is a waste of time.

3. It is a mistake to assume that the Russian people are not responsible for the imperial aggressive behavior. Quite the opposite – with the liberation from all sorts of Stalins and Brezhnevs, nothing changes and everything starts from the beginning. Because the idea of imperialism comes directly from the people themselves.

4. We must also honestly admit that Russian oppositionists are still only in very rare cases Russians by nationality. As we can see even now, these are mostly Jews, or Georgians, Tatars and others. Yes, there are Russians among them, but not many.

5. The Russian psychological cocktail (in most cases) consists of two main elements – an inferiority complex and megalomania. Or the eternal victim syndrome plus the mystical consciousness of exclusivity. Diverse work for psychotherapists.

6. The responsibility of Russian culture is a very debatable issue. Because most of Russian culture really inspired the people that Russians are endowed with a special spirituality that is somehow not inherent in other peoples, and therefore it is higher than others. Also, the famous phrase “great Russian culture”, which many people continue to use, including oppositionists, also points to imperial complexes. I have never heard, for example, the expression among Italians – “great Italian culture”. I had a lot of contact with Russian artists, and manifestations of cultural chauvinism and arrogance, unfortunately, are present even among the most sane” (*Granderator, 2022*).

One should not think that all this Russophobia is only a phenomenon of today. During the years of “perestroika”, the Estonian “professor” Tiit Made, angrily wrote to the Russians: “Who is a true Russian? Russians lived for centuries under the Mongol or Tatar yoke, and therefore Russians are still ethnically a mixed nation... Tatars and Mongols invaded Russian villages in their time, exterminated and captured the male population, raped Russian women. Therefore, today the Russian people are so mixed with those people who once raped Russian women. Hence this aggressiveness, the need to show strength and passing off other people’s successes as their own” (*Made, 1989*). The same Tiit Made back in the mid-1990s urged ultranationalists not to rush to part with the “occupiers”, they say, who will serve the Estonians? However, all this is just a manifestation of the Freudian complexes of small nations that had neither a great past, nor a wonderful present, and no future.

“Migrants” love to tease the Balts, given their lethargy, unsubstantiated claims to a special culture and a complete lack of a sense of humor. As an example of the Baltic (specifically, Estonian) “humor” we can give the following example. In 2007, the Ministry of Education of this country approved humorous collections for teaching children 12-13 years old. Here are some jokes taken from these tutorials: “Which animals are the most common in Estonia? Answer: Russians. Or here is another joke: “Why do Russians wear straw hats? Answer: they always put straw on the manure. The manuals mentioned above are full of such “humor” (*Ivanova, 2007*). However, the Estonians themselves did not think of this. They collected all this in collections of American racist jokes about blacks (after all, blacks in the American South a century ago really wore straw hats, unlike all the inhabitants of Estonia, where the climate is slightly different).

And the general director of the Estonian Language Inspectorate, Ilmar Tomusk, published a children’s book about a 14-year-old boy named Johaness, who does not understand why it is necessary to learn Russian... However, one day, a teenager watches how drunk Russians who do not understand either Estonian or English are beaten kicking a little boy and trying to take his phone away from him. Since Johannes was a big and strong guy, he punches drunk Russians in the teeth, comes home and tells his parents that now he understands why it is necessary to learn Russian – in order to explain to drunk Russians what they will get in the teeth for now (*Kolebakina, 2011*).

In these “jokes”, one can see not only Russophobia, but also the hidden desire of the farm laborers to feel like big gentlemen. This is still a syndrome of peoples who at once moved from

a plow state to an industrial state under the influence and leadership of strangers. Thus, we can assume that hence the hatred of their civilisers comes from.

However, while Russian children in Latvia are forcibly driven into the Latvian educational environment, Latvian parents themselves are horrified by the quality of textbooks and school programs in Latvia in the “state language”. There is a plot from a Latvian textbook: a discussion of the size of the boy penis. However, there are also such masterpieces as the problem from the Latvian mathematics textbook: “9 apples grew on an oak tree” (*Dzadan, 2020*). The desire to reduce education to Russophobia led to the complete decline of full-fledged education in general.

Separate sober-minded intellectuals from among the aborigines who are trying to point out that a rigid division of the country’s population into two categories will lead to a crisis and, ultimately, to the death of these states, are subjected to real persecution. It was only in 2009 that the respected lawyer Chancellor of Justice of Estonia Indrek Teder proposed to change the national approach in state ideology to a civilian one, then the media immediately launched a hysterical campaign against him, accusing him of almost an attempt on the very existence of the Estonian nation. Of course, the Chancellor of Justice immediately corrected himself. In July 2012, he stated that the Russian language of education was contrary to the Estonian Constitution. However, if it goes on like this, the nation is doomed without him.

As the modern author P.M. Koryavtsev notes, “it is quite obvious that the hostility (often turning into hatred) towards Russia and the “Russian-speakers”, characteristic of a significant part of the titular nation’s representatives in the Baltic republics, is not caused by any guilty actions of the object of hostility (since it manifested itself long ago) to any repressive measures, which in almost all cases were retaliatory on the Russian side), but is completely irrational in nature and is a specific feature of their worldview. Further, it is necessary to take into account that the “Russian-speaking” population of the Baltic states is in fact no less “indigenous” than representatives of the titular nations or the same Baltic Germans, and therefore the Baltic rhetoric about the “occupiers” that has become familiar is frankly speculative in nature. In general, the anti-Russian policy of the Baltic states is caused by reasons of a completely non-constructive nature, and apparently one should not count on its sanity and the prospects for a reasonable correction, given Russia’s arbitrarily loyal attitude towards them. These circumstances should be taken into account at all levels of interethnic communication – from interstate to personal” (*Koryavtsev, 2005*).

In general, the anti-Russian policy of the Baltic states is caused by reasons of a completely non-constructive nature. So, apparently one should not count on its sanity and the prospects for a reasonable correction, given Russia’s arbitrarily loyal attitude towards them. These circumstances should be taken into account at all levels of interethnic communication - from interstate to personal.

The Latvian and Russian publicist Alexander Gilman writes about the possibility of Russian resistance to the policy of discrimination: “The most important value for any Latvian is the statehood of Latvia. Therefore, a reciprocal step suggests itself: to demonstrate that for us, the Russians of Latvia, this statehood has no value” (*Gilman, 2020*). If half of the population of the country does not see any value in the existing statehood, then this statehood will not last long.



## Conclusion

Demo-totalitarianism is not noticed in the Baltics only because it is beneficial to countries that ambitiously call themselves the “free world”. In the conditions of the liquidation of almost all industry and a considerable part of agricultural production, the Baltic countries can offer the powerful of this world only one thing - their policy of following in the mainstream of the owner. And this policy can only be a Russophobic policy. Such countries, which are trying to trade their “unfortunate historical fate” for the lack of some kind of their own images of the future, simply once again prove the meaninglessness of their existence from a historical point of view. However, it is not necessary to expect that the change of the demo-totalitarian regime will occur as a result of a people’s revolution, since the bulk of the “titular” Balts defend the status quo in order to at least see their significance in something. Due to geopolitics, the West will not continue to notice human rights violations in the Baltics. Because of this, Baltic demo-totalitarianism will exist in the foreseeable future. But still, sooner or later, the regimes will be changed as a new generation of Russians rises in the Baltics, who have no feeling of humiliation towards the titular Balts, who constantly say that they were “occupied in 1940, and from which parents suffered. Young Balts, who have no access to almost all social elevators, except for the opportunity to emigrate, are also able to fight for a change in the existing regime. All this makes Baltic demo-totalitarianism doomed to collapse.



## References:

- Buychik, A. (2019). *History of Society and Democracy: Before New Epoch. Book 6. Unbelievable Ancient Russia: Slavic Democracy*. Kindle Edition.
- Dzadan, Oksana (2020, March 11). “Anger and stupidity are the main motive”: Latvians are shocked by the Latvian school. Sputnik Latvia. Retrieved December 25, 2020, from <https://lv.sputniknews.ru/Latvia/20200311/13351981/Zloba-i-tupost---osnovnoy-motiv-latyshy-v-shoke-ot-latyshskoy-shkoly.html> (in Russian)
- Gilman, Alexander (2020, May 12). The opponent is known in conversation: how to convince a Latvian to switch to the side of the Russians. Baltnews. Retrieved March 15, 2022, from [https://lv.baltnews.com/school\\_Russian/20200512/1023891426/Opponent-poznaetsya-v-besede-kak-ubedit-latyssha-pereyti-na-storonu-russkikh.html](https://lv.baltnews.com/school_Russian/20200512/1023891426/Opponent-poznaetsya-v-besede-kak-ubedit-latyssha-pereyti-na-storonu-russkikh.html) (in Russian)
- Granderator (2022, May 22). Alvis Hermanis: Russia is a fascist state. Ursa Manor. Retrieved May 25, 2022, from <http://ursa-tm.ru/forum/index.php?/topic/420975-rabotodatel-chulpan-hamatovoy-rossiya-%E2%80%94-fashistskoe-gosudarstvo/&tab=comments> (in Russian)
- Guryanov, Sergey (2017, May 19). Latvian deputy called Russians by “lice”. Business Newspaper Vzgljad. Retrieved March 20, 2022, from <https://vz.ru/news/2017/5/19/871011.html> (in Russian)
- Ilyashevich, A (2021, November 30). “The fighter against the Evil Empire”: Ordinary Lithuanians pay for the PR of Landsbergis’ grandfather in the West. Retrieved March 15, 2022, from <https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20211130-borets-s-imperiej-zla-prostye-litovtsy-oplachivayut-piar-dedule-landsbergisa-na-zapade/>



- In Latvia, a banker called Russian “the language of savages” (2018, February 17). RIA News <https://ria.ru/20180217/1514824808.html> (in Russian)
- Isfakhan (2022, January 12). Why are Russians unworthy to be called even primates? – Opinion of Baltic politicians. Ursa Manor. Retrieved February 21, 2022, from <http://ursa-tm.ru/forum/index.php?/topic/408495-pochemu-russkie-nedostoiny-nazyvatsya-dazhe-primatami-mnenie-pribaltiyskih-politikov/> (in Russian)
- Ivanova, Maria (2007, October 19). Estonians insulted Russians. Business Newspaper “Vzglyad”. Retrieved April 5, 2022, from <https://vz.ru/society/2007/10/19/118791.html> (in Russian)
- Karamzin, I. (2018, December 26). Large bags: KGB archive declassified in Latvia. Izvestia. Retrieved March 12, 2022, from <https://iz.ru/827744/igor-karmazin/krupnymi-meshkami-vlatvii-rassekretili-arkhiv-kgb> (in Russian)
- Kolebakina, Elena (2011, June 1). Russians in Estonia are made into ordinary working cattle. Komsomolskaya Pravda. Retrieved April 10, 2022, from <http://www.km.ru/bsssr/2011/06/01/polozhenie-russkoyazychnogo-naseleniya-v-respublikakh-byvshego-sssr/iz-russkikh-v-e> (in Russian)
- Koryavtsev, P.M. (2005). *The Baltic Gambit*. St. Petersburg.
- Latvian science fiction writer: “Russians are a genetic deviation” (2018, July 10). NewsBalt. Retrieved March 19, 2022, from <http://newsbalt.ru/news/2018/07/10/latyshskiy-fantast-russkie-geneticheskoe-otklonenie/> (in Russian)
- LPSR VDK dokumentu arhīvs (Archive of documents of the KGB of the USSR). Retrieved March 10, 2022, from <https://kgb.arhivi.lv> (in Latvian)
- Made, T. (1989). Stor rysk nationalism. *Svenska Dagbladet*. (in Swedish)
- Mezhevich, N.M. (2016). *The Baltic States 2.0. A quarter of a century “second republics”*. Moscow: Russian Book.
- Nikiforov, Ilya (2012, June 29). Ethnic Russians in Estonia go to jail more often than others. Retrieved February 10, 2022, from <https://newdaynews.ru/moskow/393128.html> (in Russian)
- Smirnov, V.A. (2020). The political elites of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia in 1990-2019: The main results of the transformation. *Modern Europe*, 5, 111-120. (in Russian)
- Shved, Vladislav (2019, January 23). How a KGB agent became the “Grey Cardinal” of Lithuania: the true biography of Landsbergis. Retrieved March 15, 2022, from <https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/kultura-i-istoriya/23012019-kak-agent-kgb-stal-serym-kardinalom-litvy-podlinnaya-biografiya-landsbergisa/> (in Russian)
- Minnik, Taavi (2021, December 17). The last head of the Estonian KGB: We had thousands and thousands of agents. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from <https://rus.delfi.ee/statja/95425643/posledniy-glava-estonskogo-kgb-u-nas-byli-tysyachi-i-tysyachi-agentov-predstavte-esli-by-vse-uznali-chem-kogda-to-zanimalis-ih-otcy-i-materi> (in Russian)
- “Russian is a slave beaten with whips”: Schoolchildren in Latvia were surprised by a literature assignment (2019, November 21). Postimees. Retrieved March 10, 2022, from <https://rus.postimees.ee/6831773/russkiy-izbityy-knutami-rab-shkolnikov-v-latvii-udivilo-zadanie-po-literature> (in Russian)

The Lithuanian politician proposed to publish a list of persons who collaborated with the KGB (2017, July 27). Retrived March 22, 2022, from <https://topwar.ru/121425-litovskiy-politik-predlozhil-opublikovat-spisok-lic-sotrudnichavshih-s-kgb.html> (in Russian)

The unwise policy of Tallinn can turn Estonia into the provinces of Estonia and Livonia (1993, December 22). Izvestia. Retrieved February 19, 2022, from <http://www.yeltsincenter.ru/digest/release/den-za-dnem-22-dekabrya-1993-goda> (in Russian)