Formal Verification of Secure Forwarding Protocols (Artifact for CSF'21)

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Contents

This is a generated file containing all of our models, from abstract to parametrized to protocol instances, that we formalized in Isabelle/HOL in a human-readable form. The theory dependencies given in the figure on the next page are useful. Nevertheless, the most convenient way of browsing the Isabelle theories is to use the Isabelle GUI. See the README for details.



Figure 1: Theory dependencies

Chapter 1

Verification Infrastructure

Here we define event systems, the term algebra, and the Dolev–Yao adversary

1.1 Event Systems

This theory contains definitions of event systems, trace, traces, reachability, simulation, and proves the soundness of simulation for proving trace inclusion. We also derive some related simulation rules.

theory *Event-Systems*
  imports *Main*
begin

record *('e, 's) ES* =
  init :: *'s ⇒ bool*
  trans :: *'s ⇒ 'e ⇒ 's ⇒ bool*   *((4-: --→ -) [50, 50, 50] 90)*

1.1.1 Reachable states and invariants

inductive
  reach :: *('e, 's) ES ⇒ 's ⇒ bool* **for** *E*
  where
    reach-init [*simp*, *intro*]: *init E s ⟹ reach E s*
  | *reach-trans* [*intro*]: ⟦ *E*: *s* −*e*→ *s'*; *reach E s* ⟧ ⟹ *reach E s'*

thm *reach.induct*

Abbreviation for stating that a predicate is an invariant of an event system.

definition *Inv* :: *('e, 's) ES ⇒ ('s ⇒ bool) ⇒ bool* **where**
  Inv E I ⟷ (∀ *s*. *reach E s* ⟶ *I s*)

lemmas *InvI* = *Inv-def* [*THEN iffD2*, *rule-format*]
lemmas *InvE* [*elim*] = *Inv-def* [*THEN iffD1*, *elim-format*, *rule-format*]

lemma *Invariant-rule* [*case-names Inv-init Inv-trans*]:
  assumes ⋀*s0*. *init E s0* ⟹ *I s0*
    and ⋀*s e s'*. ⟦*E*: *s* −*e*→ *s'*; *reach E s*; *I s*⟧ ⟹ *I s'*
  shows *Inv E I*
  ⟨*proof*⟩

Invariant rule that allows strengthening the proof with another invariant.

lemma *Invariant-rule-Inv* [*case-names Inv-other Inv-init Inv-trans*]:
  assumes *Inv E J*
    and ⋀*s0*. *init E s0* ⟹ *I s0*
    and ⋀*s e s'*. ⟦*E*: *s* −*e*→ *s'*; *reach E s*; *I s*; *J s*; *J s'*⟧ ⟹ *I s'*
  shows *Inv E I*
  ⟨*proof*⟩

1.1.2 Traces

type-synonym *'e trace* = *'e list*

inductive
  trace :: *('e, 's) ES ⇒ 's ⇒ 'e trace ⇒ 's ⇒ bool* *((4-: - −⟨-⟩→ -) [50, 50, 50] 90)*
  for *E s*
  where

trace-nil [*simp*,*intro*!]:
E: s $-\langle[]\rangle\rightarrow$ s
| *trace-snoc* [*intro*]:
$[\![$ E: s $-\langle\tau\rangle\rightarrow$ s'; E: s' $-e\rightarrow$ s'' $]\!]$ $\Longrightarrow$ E: s $-\langle\tau$ @ $[e]\rangle\rightarrow$ s''

thm *trace.induct*

inductive-cases *trace-nil-invert* [*elim*!]: E: s $-\langle[]\rangle\rightarrow$ t
inductive-cases *trace-snoc-invert* [*elim*]: E: s $-\langle\tau$ @ $[e]\rangle\rightarrow$ t

lemma *trace-init-independence* [*elim*]:
assumes E: s $-\langle\tau\rangle\rightarrow$ s' *trans* E = *trans* F
shows F: s $-\langle\tau\rangle\rightarrow$ s'
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *trace-single* [*simp*, *intro*!]: $[\![$ E: s $-e\rightarrow$ s' $]\!]$ $\Longrightarrow$ E: s $-\langle[e]\rangle\rightarrow$ s'
⟨*proof*⟩

Next, we prove an introduction rule for a "cons" trace and a case analysis rule distinguishing the empty trace and a "cons" trace.

lemma *trace-consI*:
assumes
E: s'' $-\langle\tau\rangle\rightarrow$ s' E: s $-e\rightarrow$ s''
shows
E: s $-\langle e$ # $\tau\rangle\rightarrow$ s'
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *trace-cases-cons*:
assumes
E: s $-\langle\tau\rangle\rightarrow$ s'
$[\![$ τ = []; s' = s $]\!]$ $\Longrightarrow$ P
$\bigwedge e\ \tau'\ s''$. $[\![$ τ = e # τ'; E: s $-e\rightarrow$ s''; E: s'' $-\langle\tau'\rangle\rightarrow$ s' $]\!]$ $\Longrightarrow$ P
shows P
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *trace-consD*: (E: s $-\langle e$ # $\tau\rangle\rightarrow$ s') $\Longrightarrow$ $\exists$ s''. (E: s $-e\rightarrow$ s'') $\wedge$ (E: s'' $-\langle\tau\rangle\rightarrow$ s')
⟨*proof*⟩

We show how a trace can be appended to another.

lemma *trace-append*: (E: s $-\langle\tau_1\rangle\rightarrow$ s') $\wedge$ (E: s' $-\langle\tau_2\rangle\rightarrow$ s'') $\Longrightarrow$ E: s $-\langle\tau_1$@$\tau_2\rangle\rightarrow$ s''
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *trace-append-invert*: (E: s $-\langle\tau_1$@$\tau_2\rangle\rightarrow$ s'') $\Longrightarrow$ $\exists s'$. (E: s $-\langle\tau_1\rangle\rightarrow$ s') $\wedge$ (E: s' $-\langle\tau_2\rangle\rightarrow$ s'')
⟨*proof*⟩

We prove an induction scheme for combining two traces, similar to *list-induct2*.

lemma *trace-induct2* [*consumes 3*, *case-names Nil Snoc*]:
$[\![$$E$: s $-\langle\tau\rangle\rightarrow$ s''; F: t $-\langle\sigma\rangle\rightarrow$ t''; *length* τ = *length* σ;
P [] s [] t;
$\bigwedge\tau\ s'\ e\ s''\ \sigma\ t'\ f\ t''$.
$[\![$$E$: s $-\langle\tau\rangle\rightarrow$ s'; E: $s'$$-e\rightarrow$ s''; F: t $-\langle\sigma\rangle\rightarrow$ t'; F: $t'$$-f\rightarrow$ t''; P τ s' σ $t'$$]\!]$

$\Longrightarrow P\ (\tau\ @\ [e])\ s''\ (\sigma\ @\ [f])\ t''\rrbracket$
$\Longrightarrow P\ \tau\ s''\ \sigma\ t''$
$\langle proof \rangle$

Relate traces to reachability and invariants

lemma *reach-trace-equiv*: $reach\ E\ s \longleftrightarrow (\exists\, s0\ \tau.\ init\ E\ s0 \wedge E\colon s0\ -\langle\tau\rangle\rightarrow\ s)$ (**is** $?A \longleftrightarrow ?B$)
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *reach-traceI*: $\llbracket init\ E\ s0;\ E\colon s0\ -\langle\tau\rangle\rightarrow\ s\rrbracket \Longrightarrow reach\ E\ s$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *reach-trace-extend*: $\llbracket E\colon s\ -\langle\tau\rangle\rightarrow\ s';\ reach\ E\ s\rrbracket \Longrightarrow reach\ E\ s'$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *Inv-trace*: $\llbracket Inv\ E\ I;\ init\ E\ s0;\ E\colon s0\ -\langle\tau\rangle\rightarrow\ s'\rrbracket \Longrightarrow I\ s'$
$\langle proof \rangle$

Trace semantics of event systems

We define the set of traces of an event system.

definition *traces* :: $('e,\ 's)\ ES \Rightarrow\ 'e\ trace\ set$ **where**
$traces\ E = \{\tau.\ \exists\, s\ s'.\ init\ E\ s \wedge E\colon s\ -\langle\tau\rangle\rightarrow\ s'\}$

lemma *tracesI* [*intro*]: $\llbracket\ init\ E\ s;\ E\colon s\ -\langle\tau\rangle\rightarrow\ s'\ \rrbracket \Longrightarrow \tau \in traces\ E$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *tracesE* [*elim*]: $\llbracket\ \tau \in traces\ E;\ \bigwedge s\ s'.\ \llbracket\ init\ E\ s;\ E\colon s\ -\langle\tau\rangle\rightarrow\ s'\ \rrbracket \Longrightarrow P\ \rrbracket \Longrightarrow P$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *traces-nil* [*simp*, *intro*!]: $init\ E\ s \Longrightarrow [] \in traces\ E$
$\langle proof \rangle$

We now define a trace property satisfaction relation: an event system satisfies a property φ, if its traces are contained in φ.

definition *trace-property* :: $('e,\ 's)\ ES \Rightarrow\ 'e\ trace\ set \Rightarrow bool$ (**infix** $\models_{ES}$ *90*) **where**
$E \models_{ES} \varphi \longleftrightarrow traces\ E \subseteq \varphi$

lemmas *trace-propertyI* = *trace-property-def* [*THEN iffD2*, *OF subsetI*, *rule-format*]
lemmas *trace-propertyE* [*elim*] = *trace-property-def* [*THEN iffD1*, *THEN subsetD*, *elim-format*]
lemmas *trace-propertyD* = *trace-property-def* [*THEN iffD1*, *THEN subsetD*, *rule-format*]

Rules for showing trace properties using a stronger trace-state invariant.

lemma *trace-invariant*:
assumes
$\tau \in traces\ E$
$\bigwedge s\ s'.\ \llbracket\ init\ E\ s;\ E\colon s\ -\langle\tau\rangle\rightarrow\ s'\ \rrbracket \Longrightarrow I\ \tau\ s'$
$\bigwedge s.\ I\ \tau\ s \Longrightarrow \tau \in \varphi$
shows $\tau \in \varphi$ $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *trace-property-rule*:
assumes

$\bigwedge s0.\ init\ E\ s0 \Longrightarrow I\ []\ s0$
$\bigwedge s\ s'\ \tau\ e\ s''.$
$[\![\ init\ E\ s;\ E\colon s\ -\langle\tau\rangle\rightarrow\ s';\ E\colon s'\ -e\rightarrow\ s'';\ I\ \tau\ s';\ reach\ E\ s'\ ]\!] \Longrightarrow I\ (\tau@[e])\ s''$
$\bigwedge \tau\ s.\ [\![\ I\ \tau\ s;\ reach\ E\ s\ ]\!] \Longrightarrow \tau \in \varphi$
shows $E \models_{ES} \varphi$
$\langle proof\rangle$

Similar to $[\![\bigwedge s0.\ init\ ?E\ s0 \Longrightarrow\ ?I\ []\ s0;\ \bigwedge s\ s'\ \tau\ e\ s''.\ [\![init\ ?E\ s;\ ?E\colon s\ -\langle\tau\rangle\rightarrow\ s';\ ?E\colon s'-e\rightarrow\ s'';\ ?I\ \tau\ s';\ reach\ ?E\ s']\!] \Longrightarrow\ ?I\ (\tau\ @\ [e])\ s'';\ \bigwedge \tau\ s.\ [\![?I\ \tau\ s;\ reach\ ?E\ s]\!] \Longrightarrow \tau \in\ ?\varphi]\!] \Longrightarrow\ ?E \models_{ES}\ ?\varphi$, but allows matching pure state invariants directly.

lemma *Inv-trace-property*:
assumes $Inv\ E\ I$ **and** $[] \in \varphi$
and $(\bigwedge s\ \tau\ s'\ e\ s''.$
$[\![init\ E\ s;\ E\colon s\ -\langle\tau\rangle\rightarrow\ s';\ E\colon s'\ -e\rightarrow\ s'';\ I\ s;\ I\ s';\ reach\ E\ s';\ \tau \in \varphi]\!] \Longrightarrow \tau@[e] \in \varphi)$
shows $E \models_{ES} \varphi$
$\langle proof\rangle$

1.1.3 Simulation

We first define the simulation preorder on pairs of states and derive a series of useful coinduction principles.

coinductive
$sim :: ('e,\ 's\ )\ ES \Rightarrow ('f,\ 't\ )\ ES \Rightarrow ('e \Rightarrow 'f) \Rightarrow 's \Rightarrow 't \Rightarrow bool$
for $E\ F\ \pi$
where
$[\![\ \bigwedge e\ s'.\ (E\colon s\ -e\rightarrow\ s') \Longrightarrow \exists\, t'.\ (F\colon t\ -\pi\ e\rightarrow\ t') \wedge sim\ E\ F\ \pi\ s'\ t'\ ]\!] \Longrightarrow sim\ E\ F\ \pi\ s\ t$

abbreviation
$simS :: ('e,\ 's\ )\ ES \Rightarrow ('f,\ 't\ )\ ES \Rightarrow 's \Rightarrow ('e \Rightarrow 'f) \Rightarrow 't \Rightarrow bool$
$((5\text{-},\text{-}\colon\ \text{-}\ \sqsubseteq_{\text{-}}\ \text{-})\ [50,\ 50,\ 50,\ 60,\ 50]\ 90)$
where
$simS\ E\ F\ s\ \pi\ t \equiv sim\ E\ F\ \pi\ s\ t$

lemmas *sim-coinduct-id* = *sim.coinduct*[**where** π=*id*, *consumes 1*, *case-names sim*]

We prove a simplified and slightly weaker coinduction rule for simulation and register it as the default rule for *sim*.

lemma *sim-coinduct-weak* [*consumes 1*, *case-names sim*, *coinduct pred*: *sim*]:
assumes
$R\ s\ t$
$\bigwedge s\ t\ a\ s'.\ [\![\ R\ s\ t;\ \ E\colon s-a\rightarrow\ s']\!] \Longrightarrow (\exists\, t'.\ (F\colon t-\pi\ a\rightarrow\ t') \wedge R\ s'\ t')$
shows
$E,F\colon s \sqsubseteq_\pi t$
$\langle proof\rangle$

lemma *sim-refl*: $E,E\colon s \sqsubseteq_i d\ s$
$\langle proof\rangle$

lemma *sim-trans*: $\llbracket$ *E*,*F*: $s \sqsubseteq_{\pi 1}$ *t*; *F*,*G*: $t \sqsubseteq_{\pi 2}$ *u* $\rrbracket \Longrightarrow$ *E*,*G*: $s \sqsubseteq_{(\pi 2 \circ \pi 1)}$ *u*
⟨*proof*⟩

Extend transition simulation to traces.

lemma *trace-sim*:
assumes *E*: $s -\langle\tau\rangle\rightarrow s'$ *E*,*F*: $s \sqsubseteq_\pi t$
shows $\exists t'.$ (*F*: $t -\langle map\ \pi\ \tau\rangle\rightarrow t'$) $\wedge$ (*E*,*F*: $s' \sqsubseteq_\pi t'$)
⟨*proof*⟩

Simulation for event systems

definition
sim-ES :: ('*e*, '*s*) *ES* $\Rightarrow$ ('*e* $\Rightarrow$ '*f*) $\Rightarrow$ ('*f*, '*t*) *ES* $\Rightarrow$ *bool* ((3- $\sqsubseteq_{-}$ -) [50, 60, 50] 95)
where
$E \sqsubseteq_\pi F \longleftrightarrow (\exists R.$
$(\forall s0.\ init\ E\ s0 \longrightarrow (\exists t0.\ init\ F\ t0 \wedge R\ s0\ t0)) \wedge$
$(\forall s\ t.\ R\ s\ t \longrightarrow E,F\colon s \sqsubseteq_\pi t))$

lemma *sim-ES-I*:
assumes
$\bigwedge s0.\ init\ E\ s0 \Longrightarrow (\exists t0.\ init\ F\ t0 \wedge R\ s0\ t0)$ **and**
$\bigwedge s\ t.\ R\ s\ t \Longrightarrow E,F\colon s \sqsubseteq_\pi t$
shows $E \sqsubseteq_\pi F$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *sim-ES-E*:
assumes
$E \sqsubseteq_\pi F$
$\bigwedge R.\ \llbracket \bigwedge s0.\ init\ E\ s0 \Longrightarrow (\exists t0.\ init\ F\ t0 \wedge R\ s0\ t0); \bigwedge s\ t.\ R\ s\ t \Longrightarrow E,F\colon s \sqsubseteq_\pi t \rrbracket \Longrightarrow P$
shows *P*
⟨*proof*⟩

Different rules to set up a simulation proof. Include reachability or weaker invariant(s) in precondition of "simulation square".

lemma *simulate-ES*:
assumes
init: $\bigwedge s0.\ init\ E\ s0 \Longrightarrow (\exists t0.\ init\ F\ t0 \wedge R\ s0\ t0)$ **and**
step: $\bigwedge s\ t\ a\ s'.\ \llbracket R\ s\ t;\ reach\ E\ s;\ reach\ F\ t;\ E\colon s-a\rightarrow s' \rrbracket$
$\Longrightarrow (\exists t'.\ (F\colon t-\pi\ a\rightarrow t') \wedge R\ s'\ t')$
shows $E \sqsubseteq_\pi F$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *simulate-ES-with-invariants*:
assumes
init: $\bigwedge s0.\ init\ E\ s0 \Longrightarrow (\exists t0.\ init\ F\ t0 \wedge R\ s0\ t0)$ **and**
step: $\bigwedge s\ t\ a\ s'.$
$\llbracket R\ s\ t;\ I\ s;\ J\ t;\ E\colon s-a\rightarrow s' \rrbracket \Longrightarrow (\exists t'.\ (F\colon t-\pi\ a\rightarrow t') \wedge R\ s'\ t')$ **and**
invE: $\bigwedge s.\ reach\ E\ s \longrightarrow I\ s$ **and**
invE: $\bigwedge t.\ reach\ F\ t \longrightarrow J\ t$
shows $E \sqsubseteq_\pi F$ ⟨*proof*⟩

lemmas *simulate-ES-with-invariant* = *simulate-ES-with-invariants*[**where** J=$\lambda s.$ *True*, *simplified*]

Variants with a functional simulation relation, aka refinement mapping.

lemma *simulate-ES-fun*:
  assumes
    init: $\bigwedge s0.\ init\ E\ s0 \Longrightarrow init\ F\ (h\ s0)$ **and**
    step: $\bigwedge s\ a\ s'.\ [\![\ E\colon s{-}a{\rightarrow}\ s';\ reach\ E\ s;\ reach\ F\ (h\ s)\ ]\!] \Longrightarrow F\colon h\ s{-}\pi\ a{\rightarrow}\ h\ s'$
  shows $E \sqsubseteq_{\pi} F$
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *simulate-ES-fun-with-invariants*:
  assumes
    init: $\bigwedge s0.\ init\ E\ s0 \Longrightarrow init\ F\ (h\ s0)$ **and**
    step: $\bigwedge s\ a\ s'.\ [\![\ E\colon s{-}a{\rightarrow}\ s';\ I\ s;\ J\ (h\ s)\ ]\!] \Longrightarrow F\colon h\ s{-}\pi\ a{\rightarrow}\ h\ s'$ **and**
    invE: $\bigwedge s.\ reach\ E\ s \longrightarrow I\ s$ **and**
    invF: $\bigwedge t.\ reach\ F\ t \longrightarrow J\ t$
  shows $E \sqsubseteq_{\pi} F$
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemmas *simulate-ES-fun-with-invariant* =
  simulate-ES-fun-with-invariants[**where** $J{=}\lambda t.\ True$, *simplified*]

Reflexivity and transitivity for ES simulation.

lemma *sim-ES-refl*: $E \sqsubseteq_{i} d\ E$
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *sim-ES-trans*:
  assumes $E \sqsubseteq_{\pi} 1\ F$ **and** $F \sqsubseteq_{\pi} 2\ G$ **shows** $E \sqsubseteq_{(} \pi 2 \circ \pi 1)\ G$
⟨*proof*⟩

Soundness for trace inclusion and property preservation

lemma *simulation-soundness*: $E \sqsubseteq_{\pi} F \Longrightarrow (map\ \pi)`traces\ E \subseteq traces\ F$
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemmas *simulation-rule* = *simulate-ES* [*THEN simulation-soundness*]
lemmas *simulation-rule-id* = *simulation-rule*[**where** $\pi{=}id$, *simplified*]

This allows us to show that properties are preserved under simulation.

corollary *property-preservation*:
  $[\![E \sqsubseteq_{\pi} F;\ F \models_{ES} P;\ \bigwedge\tau.\ map\ \pi\ \tau \in P \Longrightarrow \tau \in Q\ ]\!] \Longrightarrow E \models_{ES} Q$
  ⟨*proof*⟩

1.1.4 Simulation up to simulation preorder

lemma *sim-coinduct-upto-sim* [*consumes 1*, *case-names sim*]:
  assumes
    major: $R\ s\ t$ **and**
    S: $\bigwedge s\ t\ a\ s'.\ [\![\ R\ s\ t;\ E\colon s\ {-}a{\rightarrow}\ s']\!] \Longrightarrow$
        $\exists t'.\ (F\colon t\ {-}\pi\ a{\rightarrow}\ t') \wedge ((sim\ E\ E\ id)\ OO\ R\ OO\ (sim\ F\ F\ id))\ s'\ t'$
  shows
    $E{,}F\colon s \sqsubseteq_{\pi} t$
⟨*proof*⟩

end

1.2 Atomic messages

theory *Agents* **imports** *Main*
begin

The definitions below are moved here from the message theory, since the higher levels of protocol abstraction do not know about cryptographic messages.

1.2.1 Agents

type-synonym *as* = *nat*

type-synonym *aso* = *as option*

type-synonym *ases* = *as set*

locale *compromised* =
fixes
  bad :: *as set* — compromised ASes
begin

abbreviation
  good :: *as set*
where
  good ≡ −*bad*
end

1.2.2 Nonces and keys

We have an unspecified type of freshness identifiers. For executability, we may need to assume that this type is infinite.

typedecl *fid-t*

datatype *fresh-t* =
  mk-fresh fid-t nat (**infixr** $ *65*)

fun *fid* :: *fresh-t* ⇒ *fid-t* **where**
  fid (*f* $ *n*) = *f*

fun *num* :: *fresh-t* ⇒ *nat* **where**
  num (*f* $ *n*) = *n*

Nonces

type-synonym
  nonce = *fresh-t*

end

1.3 Symmetric and Asymetric Keys

theory *Keys* **imports** *Agents* **begin**

Divide keys into session and long-term keys. Define different kinds of long-term keys in second step.

datatype *key* = — long-term keys
  macK as — local MACing key
| *pubK as* — as's public key
| *priK as* — as's private key

The inverse of a symmetric key is itself; that of a public key is the private key and vice versa

fun $invKey :: key \Rightarrow key$ **where**
  $invKey\ (pubK\ A) = priK\ A$
| $invKey\ (priK\ A) = pubK\ A$
| $invKey\ K = K$

definition
  $symKeys :: key\ set$ **where**
  $symKeys \equiv \{K.\ invKey\ K = K\}$

lemma *invKey-K*: $K \in symKeys \Longrightarrow invKey\ K = K$
⟨*proof*⟩

Most lemmas we need come for free with the inductive type definition: injectiveness and distinctness.

lemma *invKey-invKey-id* [*simp*]: $invKey\ (invKey\ K) = K$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *invKey-eq* [*simp*]: $(invKey\ K = invKey\ K') = (K=K')$
⟨*proof*⟩

We get most lemmas below for free from the inductive definition of type *key*. Many of these are just proved as a reality check.

1.3.1 Asymmetric Keys

No private key equals any public key (essential to ensure that private keys are private!). A similar statement an axiom in Paulson's theory!

lemma *privateKey-neq-publicKey*: $priK\ A \neq pubK\ A'$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *publicKey-neq-privateKey*: $pubK\ A \neq priK\ A'$
⟨*proof*⟩

1.3.2 Basic properties of *pubK* and *priK*

lemma *publicKey-inject* [*iff*]: $(pubK\ A = pubK\ A') = (A = A')$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *not-symKeys-pubK* [*iff*]: $pubK\ A \notin symKeys$

⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *not-symKeys-priK* [*iff*]: $priK\ A \notin symKeys$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *symKey-neq-priK*: $K \in symKeys \Longrightarrow K \neq priK\ A$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *symKeys-neq-imp-neq*: $(K \in symKeys) \neq (K' \in symKeys) \Longrightarrow K \neq K'$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *symKeys-invKey-iff* [*iff*]: $(invKey\ K \in symKeys) = (K \in symKeys)$
⟨*proof*⟩

1.3.3 "Image" equations that hold for injective functions

lemma *invKey-image-eq* [*simp*]: $(invKey\ x \in invKey`A) = (x \in A)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *invKey-pubK-image-priK-image* [*simp*]: $invKey\ `\ pubK\ `\ AS = priK\ `\ AS$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *publicKey-notin-image-privateKey*: $pubK\ A \notin priK\ `\ AS$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *privateKey-notin-image-publicKey*: $priK\ x \notin pubK\ `\ AA$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *publicKey-image-eq* [*simp*]: $(pubK\ x \in pubK\ `\ AA) = (x \in AA)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *privateKey-image-eq* [*simp*]: $(priK\ A \in priK\ `\ AS) = (A \in AS)$
⟨*proof*⟩

1.3.4 Symmetric Keys

The following was stated as an axiom in Paulson's theory.

lemma *sym-shrK*: $macK\ X \in symKeys$ — All shared keys are symmetric
⟨*proof*⟩

Symmetric keys and inversion

lemma *symK-eq-invKey*: $[\![\ SK = invKey\ K;\ SK \in symKeys\ ]\!] \Longrightarrow K = SK$
⟨*proof*⟩

Image-related lemmas.

lemma *publicKey-notin-image-shrK*: $pubK\ x \notin macK\ `\ AA$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *privateKey-notin-image-shrK*: $priK\ x \notin macK\ `\ AA$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *shrK-notin-image-publicKey*: $macK\ x \notin pubK\ `\ AA$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *shrK-notin-image-privateKey*: $macK\ x \notin priK\ `\ AA$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *shrK-image-eq* [*simp*]: $(macK\ x \in macK\ `\ AA) = (x \in AA)$
$\langle proof \rangle$

end

1.4 Theory of ASes and Messages for Security Protocols

theory *Message* **imports** *Keys HOL−Library.Sublist*
begin

datatype *msgterm* =
  ε
  | *AS as* — Autonomous Systems, i.e. agents
  | *Num nat* — Ordinary integers, timestamps, ...
  | *Key key* — Crypto keys
  | *Nonce nonce* — Unguessable nonces
  | *L msgterm list* — Lists
  | *MPair msgterm msgterm* — Compound messages
  | *Hash msgterm* — Hashing
  | *Crypt key msgterm* — Encryption, public- or shared-key

Syntax sugar

syntax
  $\text{-}MTuple :: [\prime a,\ args] \Rightarrow \prime a * \prime b \quad ((2\langle\text{-},/\ \text{-}\rangle))$

syntax (*xsymbols*)
  $\text{-}MTuple :: [\prime a,\ args] \Rightarrow \prime a * \prime b \quad ((2\langle\text{-},/\ \text{-}\rangle))$

translations
  $\langle x,\ y,\ z\rangle \rightleftharpoons \langle x,\ \langle y,\ z\rangle\rangle$
  $\langle x,\ y\rangle \rightleftharpoons CONST\ MPair\ x\ y$

syntax
  $\text{-}MHF :: [\prime a,\ \prime b\ ,\ \prime c,\ \prime d,\ \prime e] \Rightarrow \prime a * \prime b * \prime c * \prime d * \prime e \quad ((5HF\triangleleft\text{-},/\ \text{-},/\ \text{-},/\ \text{-},/\ \text{-}\triangleright))$

abbreviation
  $Mac :: [msgterm,msgterm] \Rightarrow msgterm \quad ((4Mac[\text{-}]\ /\text{-})\ [0,\ 1000])$
where
  — Message Y paired with a MAC computed with the help of X
  $Mac[X]\ Y \equiv Hash\ \langle X, Y\rangle$

abbreviation *macKey* **where** $macKey\ a \equiv Key\ (macK\ a)$

definition
  $keysFor :: msgterm\ set \Rightarrow key\ set$
where
  — Keys useful to decrypt elements of a message set
  $keysFor\ H \equiv invKey\ \text{`}\ \{K.\ \exists X.\ Crypt\ K\ X \in H\}$

Inductive Definition of "All Parts" of a Message

inductive-set
  $parts :: msgterm\ set \Rightarrow msgterm\ set$
  for $H :: msgterm\ set$
  where
    $Inj\ [intro]: X \in H \Longrightarrow X \in parts\ H$
  | $Fst: \langle X,\text{-}\rangle \in parts\ H \Longrightarrow X \in parts\ H$
  | $Snd: \langle \text{-}, Y\rangle \in parts\ H \Longrightarrow Y \in parts\ H$

| *Lst*: $[\![L\ xs \in parts\ H;\ X \in set\ xs]\!] \Longrightarrow X \in parts\ H$

| *Body*: $Crypt\ K\ X \in parts\ H \Longrightarrow X \in parts\ H$

Monotonicity

lemma *parts-mono*: $G \subseteq H \Longrightarrow parts\ G \subseteq parts\ H$
⟨*proof*⟩

Equations hold because constructors are injective.

lemma *Other-image-eq* [*simp*]: $(AS\ x \in AS`A) = (x{:}A)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *Key-image-eq* [*simp*]: $(Key\ x \in Key`A) = (x{\in}A)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *AS-Key-image-eq* [*simp*]: $(AS\ x \notin Key`A)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *Num-Key-image-eq* [*simp*]: $(Num\ x \notin Key`A)$
⟨*proof*⟩

1.4.1 keysFor operator

lemma *keysFor-empty* [*simp*]: $keysFor\ \{\} = \{\}$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *keysFor-Un* [*simp*]: $keysFor\ (H \cup H') = keysFor\ H \cup keysFor\ H'$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *keysFor-UN* [*simp*]: $keysFor\ (\bigcup i{\in}A.\ H\ i) = (\bigcup i{\in}A.\ keysFor\ (H\ i))$
⟨*proof*⟩

Monotonicity

lemma *keysFor-mono*: $G \subseteq H \Longrightarrow keysFor\ G \subseteq keysFor\ H$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *keysFor-insert-AS* [*simp*]: $keysFor\ (insert\ (AS\ A)\ H) = keysFor\ H$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *keysFor-insert-Num* [*simp*]: $keysFor\ (insert\ (Num\ N)\ H) = keysFor\ H$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *keysFor-insert-Key* [*simp*]: $keysFor\ (insert\ (Key\ K)\ H) = keysFor\ H$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *keysFor-insert-Nonce* [*simp*]: $keysFor\ (insert\ (Nonce\ n)\ H) = keysFor\ H$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *keysFor-insert-L* [*simp*]: $keysFor\ (insert\ (L\ X)\ H) = keysFor\ H$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *keysFor-insert-Hash* [*simp*]: $keysFor\ (insert\ (Hash\ X)\ H) = keysFor\ H$

$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *keysFor-insert-MPair* [*simp*]: $keysFor\ (insert\ \langle X, Y\rangle\ H) = keysFor\ H$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *keysFor-insert-Crypt* [*simp*]:
$keysFor\ (insert\ (Crypt\ K\ X)\ H) = insert\ (invKey\ K)\ (keysFor\ H)$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *keysFor-image-Key* [*simp*]: $keysFor\ (Key`E) = \{\}$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *Crypt-imp-invKey-keysFor*: $Crypt\ K\ X \in H \Longrightarrow invKey\ K \in keysFor\ H$
$\langle proof \rangle$

1.4.2 Inductive relation "parts"

lemma *MPair-parts*:
$\llbracket$
$\langle X, Y\rangle \in parts\ H;$
$\llbracket\ X \in parts\ H;\ Y \in parts\ H\ \rrbracket \Longrightarrow P$
$\rrbracket \Longrightarrow P$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *L-parts*:
$\llbracket$
$L\ l \in parts\ H;$
$\llbracket\ set\ l \subseteq parts\ H\ \rrbracket \Longrightarrow P$
$\rrbracket \Longrightarrow P$
$\langle proof \rangle$

declare *MPair-parts* [*elim*!] *L-parts* [*elim*!] *parts.Body* [*dest*!]

NB These two rules are UNSAFE in the formal sense, as they discard the compound message. They work well on THIS FILE. *MPair-parts* is left as SAFE because it speeds up proofs. The Crypt rule is normally kept UNSAFE to avoid breaking up certificates.

lemma *parts-increasing*: $H \subseteq parts\ H$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemmas *parts-insertI* = *subset-insertI* [*THEN parts-mono*, *THEN subsetD*]

lemma *parts-empty* [*simp*]: $parts\{\} = \{\}$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *parts-emptyE* [*elim*!]: $X \in parts\{\} \Longrightarrow P$
$\langle proof \rangle$

WARNING: loops if H = Y, therefore must not be repeated!

lemma *parts-singleton*: $X \in parts\ H \Longrightarrow \exists\ Y \in H.\ X \in parts\ \{Y\}$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *parts-singleton-set*: $x \in parts\ \{s\ .\ P\ s\} \Longrightarrow \exists\ Y.\ P\ Y \wedge x \in parts\ \{Y\}$

⟨proof⟩

lemma *parts-singleton-set-rev*: $[\![x \in parts\ \{Y\};\ P\ Y]\!] \Longrightarrow x \in parts\ \{s\ .\ P\ s\}$
⟨proof⟩

lemma *parts-Hash*: $[\![\bigwedge t\ .\ t \in H \Longrightarrow \exists\, t'\ .\ t = Hash\ t']\!] \Longrightarrow parts\ H = H$
⟨proof⟩

Unions

lemma *parts-Un-subset1*: $parts\ G \cup parts\ H \subseteq parts(G \cup H)$
⟨proof⟩

lemma *parts-Un-subset2*: $parts(G \cup H) \subseteq parts\ G \cup parts\ H$
⟨proof⟩

lemma *parts-Un* [*simp*]: $parts(G \cup H) = parts\ G \cup parts\ H$
⟨proof⟩

lemma *parts-insert*: $parts\ (insert\ X\ H) = parts\ \{X\} \cup parts\ H$
⟨proof⟩

TWO inserts to avoid looping. This rewrite is better than nothing. Not suitable for Addsimps: its behaviour can be strange.

lemma *parts-insert2*:
$parts\ (insert\ X\ (insert\ Y\ H)) = parts\ \{X\} \cup parts\ \{Y\} \cup parts\ H$
⟨proof⟩

lemma *parts-two*: $[\![x \in parts\ \{e1,\ e2\};\ x \notin parts\ \{e1\}]\!] \Longrightarrow x \in parts\ \{e2\}$
⟨proof⟩

lemma *parts-UN-subset1*: $(\bigcup x{\in}A.\ parts(H\ x)) \subseteq parts(\bigcup x{\in}A.\ H\ x)$
⟨proof⟩

lemma *parts-UN-subset2*: $parts(\bigcup x{\in}A.\ H\ x) \subseteq (\bigcup x{\in}A.\ parts(H\ x))$
⟨proof⟩

lemma *parts-UN* [*simp*]: $parts(\bigcup x{\in}A.\ H\ x) = (\bigcup x{\in}A.\ parts(H\ x))$
⟨proof⟩

Added to simplify arguments to parts, analz and synth. NOTE: the UN versions are no longer used!

This allows *blast* to simplify occurrences of $parts\ (G \cup H)$ in the assumption.

lemmas *in-parts-UnE* = *parts-Un* [*THEN equalityD1*, *THEN subsetD*, *THEN UnE*]
declare *in-parts-UnE* [*elim*!]

lemma *parts-insert-subset*: $insert\ X\ (parts\ H) \subseteq parts(insert\ X\ H)$
⟨proof⟩

Idempotence

lemma *parts-partsD* [*dest*!]: $X \in parts\ (parts\ H) \Longrightarrow X \in parts\ H$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *parts-idem* [*simp*]: $parts\ (parts\ H) = parts\ H$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *parts-subset-iff* [*simp*]: $(parts\ G \subseteq parts\ H) = (G \subseteq parts\ H)$
⟨*proof*⟩

Transitivity

lemma *parts-trans*: $[\![\ X \in parts\ G;\ \ G \subseteq parts\ H\ ]\!] \Longrightarrow X \in parts\ H$
⟨*proof*⟩

Unions, revisited

You can take the union of parts h for all h in H

lemma *parts-split*: $parts\ H = \bigcup\ \{\ parts\ \{h\}\ |\ h\ .\ h \in H\}$
⟨*proof*⟩

Cut

lemma *parts-cut*:
$[\![\ Y \in parts\ (insert\ X\ G);\ \ X \in parts\ H\ ]\!] \Longrightarrow Y \in parts\ (G \cup H)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *parts-cut-eq* [*simp*]: $X \in parts\ H \Longrightarrow parts\ (insert\ X\ H) = parts\ H$
⟨*proof*⟩

Rewrite rules for pulling out atomic messages

lemmas *parts-insert-eq-I* = *equalityI* [*OF subsetI parts-insert-subset*]

lemma *parts-insert-AS* [*simp*]:
$parts\ (insert\ (AS\ agt)\ H) = insert\ (AS\ agt)\ (parts\ H)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *parts-insert-Epsilon* [*simp*]:
$parts\ (insert\ \varepsilon\ H) = insert\ \varepsilon\ (parts\ H)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *parts-insert-Num* [*simp*]:
$parts\ (insert\ (Num\ N)\ H) = insert\ (Num\ N)\ (parts\ H)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *parts-insert-Key* [*simp*]:
$parts\ (insert\ (Key\ K)\ H) = insert\ (Key\ K)\ (parts\ H)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *parts-insert-Nonce* [*simp*]:

$parts\ (insert\ (Nonce\ n)\ H) = insert\ (Nonce\ n)\ (parts\ H)$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *parts-insert-Hash* [*simp*]:
$parts\ (insert\ (Hash\ X)\ H) = insert\ (Hash\ X)\ (parts\ H)$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *parts-insert-Crypt* [*simp*]:
$parts\ (insert\ (Crypt\ K\ X)\ H) = insert\ (Crypt\ K\ X)\ (parts\ (insert\ X\ H))$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *parts-insert-MPair* [*simp*]:
$parts\ (insert\ \langle X,Y\rangle\ H) =$
$insert\ \langle X,Y\rangle\ (parts\ (insert\ X\ (insert\ Y\ H)))$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *parts-insert-L* [*simp*]:
$parts\ (insert\ (L\ xs)\ H) =$
$insert\ (L\ xs)\ (parts\ ((set\ xs) \cup\ H))$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *parts-image-Key* [*simp*]: $parts\ (Key`N) = Key`N$
$\langle proof \rangle$

In any message, there is an upper bound N on its greatest nonce.

lemma *parts-list-set* :
$parts\ (L`ls) = (L`ls) \cup (\bigcup l \in ls.\ parts\ (set\ l))$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *parts-insert-list-set* :
$parts\ ((L`ls) \cup H) = (L`ls) \cup (\bigcup l \in ls.\ parts\ ((set\ l))) \cup parts\ H$
$\langle proof \rangle$

suffix of parts

lemma *suffix-in-parts*:
$suffix\ (x\#xs)\ ys \Longrightarrow x \in parts\ \{L\ ys\}$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *parts-L-set*:
$[\![x \in parts\ \{L\ ys\};\ ys \in St]\!] \Longrightarrow x \in parts\ (L`St)$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *suffix-in-parts-set*:
$[\![suffix\ (x\#xs)\ ys;\ ys \in St]\!] \Longrightarrow x \in parts\ (L`St)$
$\langle proof \rangle$

1.4.3 Inductive relation "analz"

Inductive definition of "analz" – what can be broken down from a set of messages, including keys. A form of downward closure. Pairs can be taken apart; messages decrypted with known keys.

inductive-set
  $analz :: msgterm\ set \Rightarrow msgterm\ set$
  for $H :: msgterm\ set$
  where
    $Inj\ [intro,simp] : X \in H \Longrightarrow X \in analz\ H$
  $|\ Fst$: $\langle X,Y\rangle \in analz\ H \Longrightarrow X \in analz\ H$
  $|\ Snd$: $\langle X,Y\rangle \in analz\ H \Longrightarrow Y \in analz\ H$
  $|\ Lst$: $(L\ y) \in analz\ H \Longrightarrow x \in set\ (y) \Longrightarrow x \in analz\ H$
  $|\ Decrypt\ [dest]$: $[\![\ Crypt\ K\ X \in analz\ H;\ Key\ (invKey\ K) \in analz\ H\ ]\!] \Longrightarrow X \in analz\ H$

Monotonicity; Lemma 1 of Lowe's paper

lemma $analz\text{-}mono$: $G \subseteq H \Longrightarrow analz(G) \subseteq analz(H)$
$\langle proof\rangle$

lemmas $analz\text{-}monotonic = analz\text{-}mono\ [THEN\ [2]\ rev\text{-}subsetD]$

Making it safe speeds up proofs

lemma $MPair\text{-}analz\ [elim!]$:
  $[\![$
    $\langle X,Y\rangle \in analz\ H$;
    $[\![\ X \in analz\ H;\ Y \in analz\ H\ ]\!] \Longrightarrow P$
  $]\!] \Longrightarrow P$
$\langle proof\rangle$

lemma $L\text{-}analz\ [elim!]$:
  $[\![$
    $L\ l \in analz\ H$;
    $[\![\ set\ l \subseteq analz\ H\ ]\!] \Longrightarrow P$
  $]\!] \Longrightarrow P$
$\langle proof\rangle$

lemma $analz\text{-}increasing$: $H \subseteq analz(H)$
$\langle proof\rangle$

lemma $analz\text{-}subset\text{-}parts$: $analz\ H \subseteq parts\ H$
$\langle proof\rangle$

If there is no cryptography, then analz and parts is equivalent.

lemma $no\text{-}crypt\text{-}analz\text{-}is\text{-}parts$:
  $\neg\ (\exists\ K\ X\ .\ Crypt\ K\ X \in parts\ A) \Longrightarrow analz\ A = parts\ A$
$\langle proof\rangle$

lemmas $analz\text{-}into\text{-}parts = analz\text{-}subset\text{-}parts\ [THEN\ subsetD]$

lemmas $not\text{-}parts\text{-}not\text{-}analz = analz\text{-}subset\text{-}parts\ [THEN\ contra\text{-}subsetD]$

lemma $parts\text{-}analz\ [simp]$: $parts\ (analz\ H) = parts\ H$
$\langle proof\rangle$

lemma $analz\text{-}parts\ [simp]$: $analz\ (parts\ H) = parts\ H$
$\langle proof\rangle$

lemmas *analz-insertI* = *subset-insertI* [*THEN analz-mono*, *THEN* [*2*] *rev-subsetD*]

General equational properties

lemma *analz-empty* [*simp*]: *analz* {} = {}
⟨*proof*⟩

Converse fails: we can analz more from the union than from the separate parts, as a key in one might decrypt a message in the other

lemma *analz-Un*: $analz(G) \cup analz(H) \subseteq analz(G \cup H)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *analz-insert*: $insert\ X\ (analz\ H) \subseteq analz(insert\ X\ H)$
⟨*proof*⟩

Rewrite rules for pulling out atomic messages

lemmas *analz-insert-eq-I* = *equalityI* [*OF subsetI analz-insert*]

lemma *analz-insert-AS* [*simp*]:
  $analz\ (insert\ (AS\ agt)\ H) = insert\ (AS\ agt)\ (analz\ H)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *analz-insert-Num* [*simp*]:
  $analz\ (insert\ (Num\ N)\ H) = insert\ (Num\ N)\ (analz\ H)$
⟨*proof*⟩

Can only pull out Keys if they are not needed to decrypt the rest

lemma *analz-insert-Key* [*simp*]:
  $K \notin keysFor\ (analz\ H) \Longrightarrow$
    $analz\ (insert\ (Key\ K)\ H) = insert\ (Key\ K)\ (analz\ H)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *analz-insert-LEmpty* [*simp*]:
  $analz\ (insert\ (L\ [])\ H) = insert\ (L\ [])\ (analz\ H)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *analz-insert-L* [*simp*]:
  $analz\ (insert\ (L\ l)\ H) = insert\ (L\ l)\ (analz\ (set\ l \cup H))$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma $L[] \in analz\ \{L[L[]]\}$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *analz-insert-Hash* [*simp*]:
  $analz\ (insert\ (Hash\ X)\ H) = insert\ (Hash\ X)\ (analz\ H)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *analz-insert-MPair* [*simp*]:
  $analz\ (insert\ \langle X, Y\rangle\ H) =$
    $insert\ \langle X, Y\rangle\ (analz\ (insert\ X\ (insert\ Y\ H)))$

$\langle proof \rangle$

Can pull out enCrypted message if the Key is not known

lemma *analz-insert-Crypt*:
 $Key\ (invKey\ K) \notin analz\ H$
 $\Longrightarrow analz\ (insert\ (Crypt\ K\ X)\ H) = insert\ (Crypt\ K\ X)\ (analz\ H)$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *lemma1*:
 $Key\ (invKey\ K) \in analz\ H \Longrightarrow$
 $analz\ (insert\ (Crypt\ K\ X)\ H) \subseteq$
 $insert\ (Crypt\ K\ X)\ (analz\ (insert\ X\ H))$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *lemma2*:
 $Key\ (invKey\ K) \in analz\ H \Longrightarrow$
 $insert\ (Crypt\ K\ X)\ (analz\ (insert\ X\ H)) \subseteq$
 $analz\ (insert\ (Crypt\ K\ X)\ H)$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *analz-insert-Decrypt*:
 $Key\ (invKey\ K) \in analz\ H \Longrightarrow$
 $analz\ (insert\ (Crypt\ K\ X)\ H) =$
 $insert\ (Crypt\ K\ X)\ (analz\ (insert\ X\ H))$
$\langle proof \rangle$

Case analysis: either the message is secure, or it is not! Effective, but can cause subgoals to blow up! Use with *split-if*; apparently *split-tac* does not cope with patterns such as $analz\ (insert\ (Crypt\ K\ X)\ H)$

lemma *analz-Crypt-if* [*simp*]:
 $analz\ (insert\ (Crypt\ K\ X)\ H) =$
 $(if\ (Key\ (invKey\ K) \in analz\ H)$
 $then\ insert\ (Crypt\ K\ X)\ (analz\ (insert\ X\ H))$
 $else\ insert\ (Crypt\ K\ X)\ (analz\ H))$
$\langle proof \rangle$

This rule supposes "for the sake of argument" that we have the key.

lemma *analz-insert-Crypt-subset*:
 $analz\ (insert\ (Crypt\ K\ X)\ H) \subseteq$
 $insert\ (Crypt\ K\ X)\ (analz\ (insert\ X\ H))$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *analz-image-Key* [*simp*]: $analz\ (Key`N) = Key`N$
$\langle proof \rangle$

Idempotence and transitivity

lemma *analz-analzD* [*dest*!]: $X \in analz\ (analz\ H) \Longrightarrow X \in analz\ H$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *analz-idem* [*simp*]: $analz\ (analz\ H) = analz\ H$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *analz-subset-iff* [*simp*]: $(analz\ G \subseteq analz\ H) = (G \subseteq analz\ H)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *analz-trans*: $[\![\ X \in analz\ G;\ \ G \subseteq analz\ H\ ]\!] \Longrightarrow X \in analz\ H$
⟨*proof*⟩

Cut; Lemma 2 of Lowe

lemma *analz-cut*: $[\![\ Y \in analz\ (insert\ X\ H);\ \ X \in analz\ H\ ]\!] \Longrightarrow Y \in analz\ H$
⟨*proof*⟩

This rewrite rule helps in the simplification of messages that involve the forwarding of unknown components (X). Without it, removing occurrences of X can be very complicated.

lemma *analz-insert-eq*: $X \in analz\ H \Longrightarrow analz\ (insert\ X\ H) = analz\ H$
⟨*proof*⟩

A congruence rule for "analz"

lemma *analz-subset-cong*:
$[\![\ analz\ G \subseteq analz\ G';\ analz\ H \subseteq analz\ H'\ ]\!]$
$\Longrightarrow analz\ (G \cup H) \subseteq analz\ (G' \cup H')$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *analz-cong*:
$[\![\ analz\ G = analz\ G';\ analz\ H = analz\ H'\ ]\!]$
$\Longrightarrow analz\ (G \cup H) = analz\ (G' \cup H')$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *analz-insert-cong*:
$analz\ H = analz\ H' \Longrightarrow analz(insert\ X\ H) = analz(insert\ X\ H')$
⟨*proof*⟩

If there are no pairs, lists or encryptions then analz does nothing

lemma *analz-trivial*:
$[\![$
$\forall X\ Y.\ \langle X, Y\rangle \notin H;\ \forall xs.\ L\ xs \notin H;$
$\forall X\ K.\ Crypt\ K\ X \notin H$
$]\!] \Longrightarrow analz\ H = H$
⟨*proof*⟩

These two are obsolete (with a single Spy) but cost little to prove...

lemma *analz-UN-analz-lemma*:
$X \in analz\ (\bigcup i \in A.\ analz\ (H\ i)) \Longrightarrow X \in analz\ (\bigcup i \in A.\ H\ i)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *analz-UN-analz* [*simp*]: $analz\ (\bigcup i \in A.\ analz\ (H\ i)) = analz\ (\bigcup i \in A.\ H\ i)$
⟨*proof*⟩

Lemmas assuming absense of keys

If there are no keys in analz H, you can take the union of analz h for all h in H

lemma *analz-split*:

$\neg(\exists\ K\ .\ Key\ K \in analz\ H)$
$\Longrightarrow analz\ H = \bigcup\ \{\ analz\ \{h\}\ |\ h\ .\ h \in H\}$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *analz-Un-eq*:
assumes $\neg(\exists\ K\ .\ Key\ K \in analz\ H)$ **and** $\neg(\exists\ K\ .\ Key\ K \in analz\ G)$
shows $analz\ (H \cup G) = analz\ H \cup analz\ G$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *analz-Un-eq-Crypt*:
assumes $\neg(\exists\ K\ .\ Key\ K \in analz\ G)$ **and** $\neg(\exists\ K\ X\ .\ Crypt\ K\ X \in analz\ G)$
shows $analz\ (H \cup G) = analz\ H \cup analz\ G$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *analz-list-set* :
$\neg(\exists\ K\ .\ Key\ K \in analz\ (L`ls))$
$\Longrightarrow analz\ (L`ls) = \ (L`ls) \cup (\bigcup l \in ls.\ analz\ (set\ l))$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *analz-insert-list-set* :
$\neg(\exists\ K\ .\ Key\ K \in analz\ ((L`ls) \cup H))$
$\Longrightarrow analz\ ((L`ls) \cup H) = \ (L`ls) \cup (\bigcup l \in ls.\ analz\ ((set\ l))) \cup analz\ H$
$\langle proof \rangle$

1.4.4 Inductive relation "synth"

Inductive definition of "synth" – what can be built up from a set of messages. A form of upward closure. Pairs can be built, messages encrypted with known keys. AS names are public domain. Nums can be guessed, but Nonces cannot be.

inductive-set
$synth :: msgterm\ set \Rightarrow msgterm\ set$
for $H :: msgterm\ set$
where
$Inj\ \ [intro]:\ \ X \in H \Longrightarrow X \in synth\ H$
$|\ \varepsilon\ \ [simp,intro!]:\ \ \varepsilon \in synth\ H$
$|\ AS\ \ [simp,intro!]:\ \ AS\ agt \in synth\ H$
$|\ Num\ [simp,intro!]:\ \ Num\ n\ \in synth\ H$
$|\ Lst\ [intro]:\ \ \ \llbracket \bigwedge x\ .\ x \in set\ xs \Longrightarrow x \in synth\ H\ \rrbracket \Longrightarrow L\ xs \in synth\ H$
$|\ Hash\ \ [intro]:\ \ X \in synth\ H \Longrightarrow Hash\ X \in synth\ H$
$|\ MPair\ \ [intro]:\ \ \llbracket X \in synth\ H;\ \ Y \in synth\ H\ \rrbracket \Longrightarrow \langle X, Y\rangle \in synth\ H$
$|\ Crypt\ \ [intro]:\ \ \llbracket X \in synth\ H;\ \ Key\ K \in H\ \rrbracket \Longrightarrow Crypt\ K\ X \in synth\ H$

Monotonicity

lemma *synth-mono*: $G \subseteq H \Longrightarrow synth(G) \subseteq synth(H)$
$\langle proof \rangle$

NO *AS-synth*, as any AS name can be synthesized. The same holds for *Num*

inductive-cases *Key-synth* [*elim*!]: $Key\ K \in synth\ H$
inductive-cases *Nonce-synth* [*elim*!]: $Nonce\ n \in synth\ H$
inductive-cases *Hash-synth* [*elim*!]: $Hash\ X \in synth\ H$
inductive-cases *MPair-synth* [*elim*!]: $\langle X, Y\rangle \in synth\ H$

inductive-cases *L-synth* [*elim*!]: $L\ X \in synth\ H$
inductive-cases *Crypt-synth* [*elim*!]: $Crypt\ K\ X \in synth\ H$

lemma *synth-increasing*: $H \subseteq synth(H)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *synth-analz-self*: $x \in H \Longrightarrow x \in synth\ (analz\ H)$
⟨*proof*⟩

Unions

Converse fails: we can synth more from the union than from the separate parts, building a compound message using elements of each.

lemma *synth-Un*: $synth(G) \cup synth(H) \subseteq synth(G \cup H)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *synth-insert*: $insert\ X\ (synth\ H) \subseteq synth(insert\ X\ H)$
⟨*proof*⟩

Idempotence and transitivity

lemma *synth-synthD* [*dest*!]: $X\in synth\ (synth\ H) \Longrightarrow X \in synth\ H$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *synth-idem*: $synth\ (synth\ H) = synth\ H$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *synth-subset-iff* [*simp*]: $(synth\ G \subseteq synth\ H) = (G \subseteq synth\ H)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *synth-trans*: $[\![\ X\in synth\ G;\ \ G \subseteq synth\ H\ ]\!] \Longrightarrow X\in synth\ H$
⟨*proof*⟩

Cut; Lemma 2 of Lowe

lemma *synth-cut*: $[\![\ Y\in synth\ (insert\ X\ H);\ \ X\in synth\ H\ ]\!] \Longrightarrow Y\in synth\ H$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *Nonce-synth-eq* [*simp*]: $(Nonce\ N \in synth\ H) = (Nonce\ N \in H)$
try
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *Key-synth-eq* [*simp*]: $(Key\ K \in synth\ H) = (Key\ K \in H)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *Crypt-synth-eq* [*simp*]:
$Key\ K \notin H \Longrightarrow (Crypt\ K\ X \in synth\ H) = (Crypt\ K\ X \in H)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *keysFor-synth* [*simp*]:
$keysFor\ (synth\ H) = keysFor\ H \cup invKey`\{K.\ Key\ K \in H\}$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *L-cons-synth* [*simp*]:
$(set\ xs \subseteq H) \Longrightarrow (L\ xs \in synth\ H)$
⟨*proof*⟩

Combinations of parts, analz and synth

lemma *parts-synth* [*simp*]: $parts\ (synth\ H) = parts\ H \cup synth\ H$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *analz-analz-Un* [*simp*]: $analz\ (analz\ G \cup H) = analz\ (G \cup H)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *analz-synth-Un* [*simp*]: $analz\ (synth\ G \cup H) = analz\ (G \cup H) \cup synth\ G$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *analz-synth* [*simp*]: $analz\ (synth\ H) = analz\ H \cup synth\ H$
⟨*proof*⟩

chsp: added

lemma *analz-Un-analz* [*simp*]: $analz\ (G \cup analz\ H) = analz\ (G \cup H)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *analz-synth-Un2* [*simp*]: $analz\ (G \cup synth\ H) = analz\ (G \cup H) \cup synth\ H$
⟨*proof*⟩

For reasoning about the Fake rule in traces

lemma *parts-insert-subset-Un*: $X \in G \Longrightarrow parts(insert\ X\ H) \subseteq parts\ G \cup parts\ H$
⟨*proof*⟩

More specifically for Fake. Very occasionally we could do with a version of the form $parts\ \{X\} \subseteq synth\ (analz\ H) \cup parts\ H$

lemma *Fake-parts-insert*:
$X \in synth\ (analz\ H) \Longrightarrow$
$parts\ (insert\ X\ H) \subseteq synth\ (analz\ H) \cup parts\ H$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *Fake-parts-insert-in-Un*:
$[\![Z \in parts\ (insert\ X\ H);\ \ X \in synth\ (analz\ H)]\!]$
$\Longrightarrow Z \in\ synth\ (analz\ H) \cup parts\ H$
⟨*proof*⟩

H is sometimes Key ‘ $KK \cup spies\ evs$, so can't put $G = H$.

lemma *Fake-analz-insert*:
$X \in synth\ (analz\ G) \Longrightarrow$
$analz\ (insert\ X\ H) \subseteq synth\ (analz\ G) \cup analz\ (G \cup H)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *analz-conj-parts* [*simp*]:
$(X \in analz\ H\ \&\ X \in parts\ H) = (X \in analz\ H)$

$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *analz-disj-parts* [*simp*]:
$(X \in analz\ H \mid X \in parts\ H) = (X \in parts\ H)$
$\langle proof \rangle$

Without this equation, other rules for synth and analz would yield redundant cases

lemma *MPair-synth-analz* [*iff*]:
$(\langle X,Y\rangle \in synth\ (analz\ H)) =$
$(X \in synth\ (analz\ H)\ \&\ Y \in synth\ (analz\ H))$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *L-cons-synth-analz* [*iff*]:
$(L\ xs \in synth\ (analz\ H)) =$
$(set\ xs \subseteq synth\ (analz\ H))$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *L-cons-synth-parts* [*iff*]:
$(L\ xs \in synth\ (parts\ H)) =$
$(set\ xs \subseteq synth\ (parts\ H))$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *Crypt-synth-analz*:
$[\![\ Key\ K \in analz\ H;\ \ Key\ (invKey\ K) \in analz\ H\ ]\!]$
$\Longrightarrow (Crypt\ K\ X \in synth\ (analz\ H)) = (X \in synth\ (analz\ H))$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *Hash-synth-analz* [*simp*]:
$X \notin synth\ (analz\ H)$
$\Longrightarrow (Hash\langle X,Y\rangle \in synth\ (analz\ H)) = (Hash\langle X,Y\rangle \in analz\ H)$
$\langle proof \rangle$

1.4.5 HPair: a combination of Hash and MPair

We do NOT want Crypt... messages broken up in protocols!!

declare *parts.Body* [*rule del*]

Rewrites to push in Key and Crypt messages, so that other messages can be pulled out using the *analz-insert* rules

lemmas *pushKeys* =
insert-commute [*of Key K AS C* **for** *K C*]
insert-commute [*of Key K Nonce N* **for** *K N*]
insert-commute [*of Key K Num N* **for** *K N*]
insert-commute [*of Key K Hash X* **for** *K X*]
insert-commute [*of Key K MPair X Y* **for** *K X Y*]
insert-commute [*of Key K Crypt X K′* **for** *K K′ X*]

lemmas *pushCrypts* =
insert-commute [*of Crypt X K AS C* **for** *X K C*]
insert-commute [*of Crypt X K AS C* **for** *X K C*]
insert-commute [*of Crypt X K Nonce N* **for** *X K N*]
insert-commute [*of Crypt X K Num N* **for** *X K N*]

insert-commute [*of Crypt X K Hash X′* **for** *X K X′*]
insert-commute [*of Crypt X K MPair X′ Y* **for** *X K X′ Y*]

Cannot be added with [*simp*] – messages should not always be re-ordered.

lemmas *pushes* = *pushKeys pushCrypts*

By default only *o-apply* is built-in. But in the presence of eta-expansion this means that some terms displayed as $f \circ g$ will be rewritten, and others will not!

declare *o-def* [*simp*]

lemma *Crypt-notin-image-Key* [*simp*]: $Crypt\ K\ X \notin Key\ `\ A$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *Hash-notin-image-Key* [*simp*] :$Hash\ X \notin Key\ `\ A$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *synth-analz-mono*: $G \subseteq H \Longrightarrow synth\ (analz(G)) \subseteq synth\ (analz(H))$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *synth-parts-mono*: $G \subseteq H \Longrightarrow synth\ (parts\ G) \subseteq synth\ (parts\ H)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *Fake-analz-eq* [*simp*]:
$X \in synth(analz\ H) \Longrightarrow synth\ (analz\ (insert\ X\ H)) = synth\ (analz\ H)$
⟨*proof*⟩

Two generalizations of *analz-insert-eq*

lemma *gen-analz-insert-eq* [*rule-format*]:
$X \in analz\ H \Longrightarrow ALL\ G.\ H \subseteq G \dashrightarrow analz\ (insert\ X\ G) = analz\ G$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *synth-analz-insert-eq* [*rule-format*]:
$X \in synth\ (analz\ H)$
$\Longrightarrow ALL\ G.\ H \subseteq G \dashrightarrow (Key\ K \in analz\ (insert\ X\ G)) = (Key\ K \in analz\ G)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *Fake-parts-sing*:
$X \in synth\ (analz\ H) \Longrightarrow parts\{X\} \subseteq synth\ (analz\ H) \cup parts\ H$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemmas *Fake-parts-sing-imp-Un* = *Fake-parts-sing* [*THEN* [*2*] *rev-subsetD*]

For some reason, moving this up can make some proofs loop!

declare *invKey-K* [*simp*]

lemma *synth-analz-insert*:
assumes $analz\ H \subseteq synth\ (analz\ H')$
shows $analz\ (insert\ X\ H) \subseteq synth\ (analz\ (insert\ X\ H'))$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *synth-parts-insert*:
  assumes *parts* $H \subseteq$ *synth* (*parts* H')
  shows *parts* (*insert* X H) $\subseteq$ *synth* (*parts* (*insert* X H'))
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *parts-insert-subset-impl*:
  $[\![x \in$ *parts* (*insert* a G); $x \in$ *parts* $G \Longrightarrow x \in$ *synth* (*parts* H); $a \in$ *synth* (*parts* H)$]\!]$
    $\Longrightarrow x \in$ *synth* (*parts* H)
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *synth-parts-subset-elem*:
  $[\![A \subseteq$ *synth* (*parts* B); $x \in$ *parts* $A]\!] \Longrightarrow x \in$ *synth* (*parts* B)
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *synth-parts-subset*:
  $A \subseteq$ *synth* (*parts* B) $\Longrightarrow$ *parts* $A \subseteq$ *synth* (*parts* B)
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *parts-synth-parts*[*simp*]: *parts* (*synth* (*parts* H)) = *synth* (*parts* H)
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *synth-parts-trans*:
  assumes $A \subseteq$ *synth* (*parts* B) **and** $B \subseteq$ *synth* (*parts* C)
  shows $A \subseteq$ *synth* (*parts* C)
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *synth-parts-trans-elem*:
  assumes $x \in A$ **and** $A \subseteq$ *synth* (*parts* B) **and** $B \subseteq$ *synth* (*parts* C)
  shows $x \in$ *synth* (*parts* C)
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *synth-un-parts-split*:
  assumes $x \in$ *synth* (*parts* $A \cup$ *parts* B)
    and $\bigwedge x\ .\ x \in A \Longrightarrow x \in$ *synth* (*parts* C)
    and $\bigwedge x\ .\ x \in B \Longrightarrow x \in$ *synth* (*parts* C)
  shows $x \in$ *synth* (*parts* C)
⟨*proof*⟩
end

1.5 Tools

theory *Tools* **imports** *Main HOL−Library.Sublist*
begin

1.5.1 Prefixes, suffixes, and fragments

lemma *suffix-nonempty-extendable*:
$[\![$*suffix xs l*; $xs \neq l]\!] \Longrightarrow \exists\ x\ .\ $*suffix* $(x\#xs)\ l$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *set-suffix*:
$[\![x \in set\ l'; suffix\ l'\ l]\!] \Longrightarrow x \in set\ l$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *set-prefix*:
$[\![x \in set\ l'; prefix\ l'\ l]\!] \Longrightarrow x \in set\ l$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *set-suffix-elem*: $suffix\ (x\#xs)\ p \Longrightarrow x \in set\ p$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *set-prefix-elem*: $prefix\ (x\#xs)\ p \Longrightarrow x \in set\ p$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *Cons-suffix-set*: $x \in set\ y \Longrightarrow \exists\ xs\ .\ suffix\ (x\#xs)\ y$
⟨*proof*⟩

1.5.2 Fragments

definition *fragment* :: $'a\ list \Rightarrow\ 'a\ list\ set \Rightarrow bool$
where $fragment\ xs\ St \longleftrightarrow (\exists\, zs1\ zs2.\ zs1\ @\ xs\ @\ zs2 \in St)$

lemma *fragmentI*: $[\![\ zs1\ @\ xs\ @\ zs2 \in St\ ]\!] \Longrightarrow fragment\ xs\ St$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *fragmentE* [*elim*]: $[\![fragment\ xs\ St; \bigwedge zs1\ zs2.\ [\![\ zs1\ @\ xs\ @\ zs2 \in St\ ]\!] \Longrightarrow P\ ]\!] \Longrightarrow P$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *fragment-Nil* [*simp*]: $fragment\ []\ St \longleftrightarrow St \neq \{\}$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *fragment-subset*: $[\![St \subseteq St'; fragment\ l\ St]\!] \Longrightarrow fragment\ l\ St'$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *fragment-prefix*: $[\![prefix\ l'\ l; fragment\ l\ St]\!] \Longrightarrow fragment\ l'\ St$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *fragment-suffix*: $[\![suffix\ l'\ l; fragment\ l\ St]\!] \Longrightarrow fragment\ l'\ St$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *fragment-self* [*simp*, *intro*]: $[\![l \in St]\!] \Longrightarrow fragment\ l\ St$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *fragment-prefix-self* [*simp*, *intro*]:
$[\![l \in St;\ prefix\ l'\ l]\!] \Longrightarrow fragment\ l'\ St$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *fragment-suffix-self* [*simp*, *intro*]:
$[\![l \in St;\ suffix\ l'\ l]\!] \Longrightarrow fragment\ l'\ St$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *fragment-is-prefix-suffix*:
$fragment\ l\ St \Longrightarrow \exists\, pre\ suff\ .\ prefix\ l\ pre \wedge suffix\ pre\ suff \wedge suff \in St$
⟨*proof*⟩

1.5.3 Pair Fragments

definition *pfragment* :: $'a \Rightarrow ('b\ list) \Rightarrow ('a \times ('b\ list))\ set \Rightarrow bool$
where $pfragment\ a\ xs\ St \longleftrightarrow (\exists\, zs1\ zs2.\ (a,\ zs1\ @\ xs\ @\ zs2) \in St)$

lemma *pfragmentI*: $[\![\ (ainf,\ zs1\ @\ xs\ @\ zs2) \in St\ ]\!] \Longrightarrow pfragment\ ainf\ xs\ St$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *pfragmentE* [*elim*]: $[\![pfragment\ ainf\ xs\ St;\ \bigwedge zs1\ zs2.\ [\![\ (ainf,\ zs1\ @\ xs\ @\ zs2) \in St\ ]\!] \Longrightarrow P\ ]\!] \Longrightarrow P$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *pfragment-prefix*:
$pfragment\ ainf\ (xs\ @\ ys)\ St \Longrightarrow pfragment\ ainf\ xs\ St$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *pfragment-prefix'*:
$[\![pfragment\ ainf\ ys\ St;\ prefix\ xs\ ys]\!] \Longrightarrow pfragment\ ainf\ xs\ St$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *pfragment-suffix*: $[\![suffix\ l'\ l;\ pfragment\ ainf\ l\ St]\!] \Longrightarrow pfragment\ ainf\ l'\ St$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *pfragment-self* [*simp*, *intro*]: $[\![(ainf,\ l) \in St]\!] \Longrightarrow pfragment\ ainf\ l\ St$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *pfragment-suffix-self* [*simp*, *intro*]:
$[\![(ainf,\ l) \in St;\ suffix\ l'\ l]\!] \Longrightarrow pfragment\ ainf\ l'\ St$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *pfragment-self-eq*:
$[\![pfragment\ ainf\ l\ S;\ \bigwedge zs1\ zs2\ .\ (ainf,\ zs1@l@zs2) \in S \Longrightarrow (ainf,\ zs1@l'@zs2) \in S]\!] \Longrightarrow pfragment\ ainf\ l'\ S$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *pfragment-self-eq-nil*:
$[\![pfragment\ ainf\ l\ S;\ \bigwedge zs1\ zs2\ .\ (ainf,\ zs1@l@zs2) \in S \Longrightarrow (ainf,\ l'@zs2) \in S]\!] \Longrightarrow pfragment\ ainf\ l'\ S$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *pfragment-cons*: *pfragment ainfo* $(x \# fut)$ $S \Longrightarrow$ *pfragment ainfo fut S*
⟨*proof*⟩

1.5.4 Head and Tails

fun *head* **where** *head* $[] = None \mid head\ (x\#xs) = Some\ x$
fun *ifhead* **where** *ifhead* $[]\ n = n \mid ifhead\ (x\#xs)\ \text{-} = Some\ x$
fun *tail* **where** *tail* $[] = None \mid tail\ xs = Some\ (last\ xs)$

lemma *head-cons*: $xs \neq [] \Longrightarrow head\ xs = Some\ (hd\ xs)$ ⟨*proof*⟩
lemma *tail-cons*: $xs \neq [] \Longrightarrow tail\ xs = Some\ (last\ xs)$ ⟨*proof*⟩
lemma *tail-snoc*: $tail\ (xs\ @\ [x]) = Some\ x$ ⟨*proof*⟩
lemma $\forall\ y\ ys\ .\ l \neq ys\ @\ [y] \Longrightarrow l = []$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *tl-append2*: $tl\ (pref\ @\ [a,\ b]) = tl\ (pref\ @\ [a])@[b]$
⟨*proof*⟩

end

theory *TakeWhile* **imports** *Tools*
begin

1.6 takeW, holds and extract: Applying context-sensitive checks on list elements

This theory defines three functions, takeW, holds and extract. It is embedded in a locale that takes predicate P as an input that works on three arguments: pre, x, and z. x is an element of a list, while pre is the left neighbour on that list and z is the right neighbour. They are all of the same type 'a, except that pre and z are of 'a option type, since neighbours don't always exist at the beginning and the end of lists. The functions takeW and holds work on an 'a list (with an additional pre and z 'a option parameter). Both repeatedly apply P on elements xi in the list with their neighbours as context:

```
holds pre (x1#x2#...#xn#[]) z =
    P pre x1 x2 /\ P x1 x2 x3 /\ ... /\ P (xn-2) (xn-1) xn /\ P xn-1 xn z
takeW pre (x1#x2#...#xn#[]) z = the prefix of the list for which 'holds' holds.
```

extract is a function that returns the last element of the list, or z if the list is empty.

holds-takeW-extract is an interesting lemma that relates all three functions.

In our applications, we usually invoke takeW and holds with the parameters None l None, where l is a list of elements which we want to check for P (using their neighboring elements as context). takeW and holds thus mostly have the pre and z parameters for their recursive definition and induction schemes.

locale *TW* =
  fixes *P* :: (*'a option* ⇒ *'a* ⇒ *'a option* ⇒ *bool*)
begin

1.6.1 Definitions

holds returns true iff every element of a list, together with its context, satisfies P.

fun *holds* :: *'a option* ⇒ *'a list* ⇒ *'a option* ⇒ *bool*
where
  holds pre (*x* # *y* # *ys*) *nxt* ⟷ *P pre x* (*Some y*) ∧ *holds* (*Some x*) (*y* # *ys*) *nxt*
| *holds pre* [*x*] *nxt* ⟷ *P pre x nxt*
| *holds pre* [] *nxt* ⟷ *True*

holds returns the longest prefix of a list for every element, together with its context, satisfies P.

function *takeW* :: *'a option* ⇒ *'a list* ⇒ *'a option* ⇒ *'a list* **where**
  takeW - [] - = []
| *P pre x xo* ⟹ *takeW pre* [*x*] *xo* = [*x*]
| ¬ *P pre x xo* ⟹ *takeW pre* [*x*] *xo* = []
| *P pre x* (*Some y*) ⟹ *takeW pre* (*x* # *y* # *xs*) *xo* = *x* # *takeW* (*Some x*) (*y* # *xs*) *xo*
| ¬ *P pre x* (*Some y*) ⟹ *takeW pre* (*x* # *y* # *xs*) *xo* = []
⟨*proof*⟩
termination
  ⟨*proof*⟩

extract returns the last element of a list, or nxt if the list is empty.

fun *extract* :: *'a option* ⇒ *'a list* ⇒ *'a option* ⇒ *'a option*

where
  $extract\ pre\ (x\ \#\ y\ \#\ ys)\ nxt = (if\ P\ pre\ x\ (Some\ y)\ then\ extract\ (Some\ x)\ (y\ \#\ ys)\ nxt\ else\ Some\ x)$
| $extract\ pre\ [x]\ nxt = (if\ P\ pre\ x\ nxt\ then\ nxt\ else\ (Some\ x))$
| $extract\ pre\ []\ nxt = nxt$

1.6.2 Lemmas

Lemmas packing singleton and at least two element cases into a single equation.

lemma *takeW-singleton*:
  $takeW\ pre\ [x]\ xo = (if\ P\ pre\ x\ xo\ then\ [x]\ else\ [])$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *takeW-two-or-more*:
  $takeW\ pre\ (x\ \#\ y\ \#\ zs)\ xo = (if\ P\ pre\ x\ (Some\ y)\ then\ x\ \#\ takeW\ (Some\ x)\ (y\ \#\ zs)\ xo\ else\ [])$
⟨*proof*⟩

Some lemmas for splitting the tail of the list argument.

Splitting lemma formulated with if-then-else rather than case.

lemma *takeW-split-tail*:
  $takeW\ pre\ (x\ \#\ xs)\ nxt =$
    $(if\ xs = []$
     $then\ (if\ P\ pre\ x\ nxt\ then\ [x]\ else\ [])$
     $else\ (if\ P\ pre\ x\ (Some\ (hd\ xs))\ then\ x\ \#\ takeW\ (Some\ x)\ xs\ nxt\ else\ []))$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *extract-split-tail*:
  $extract\ pre\ (x\ \#\ xs)\ nxt =$
    $(case\ xs\ of$
       $[] \Rightarrow (if\ P\ pre\ x\ nxt\ then\ nxt\ else\ (Some\ x))$
     $|\ (y\ \#\ ys) \Rightarrow (if\ P\ pre\ x\ (Some\ y)\ then\ extract\ (Some\ x)\ (y\ \#\ ys)\ nxt\ else\ Some\ x))$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *holds-split-tail*:
  $holds\ pre\ (x\ \#\ xs)\ nxt \longleftrightarrow$
    $(case\ xs\ of$
       $[] \Rightarrow P\ pre\ x\ nxt$
     $|\ (y\ \#\ ys) \Rightarrow P\ pre\ x\ (Some\ y) \land holds\ (Some\ x)\ (y\ \#\ ys)\ nxt)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *holds-Cons-P*:
  $holds\ pre\ (x\ \#\ xs)\ nxt \Longrightarrow \exists\, y\ .\ P\ pre\ x\ y$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *holds-Cons-holds*:
  $holds\ pre\ (x\ \#\ xs)\ nxt \Longrightarrow holds\ (Some\ x)\ xs\ nxt$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemmas *tail-splitting-lemmas* =
  extract-split-tail holds-split-tail

Interaction between *holds*, *takeWhile*, and *extract*.

declare *if-split-asm* [*split*]

lemma *holds-takeW-extract*: *holds pre* (*takeW pre xs nxt*) (*extract pre xs nxt*)
⟨*proof*⟩

Interaction of *holds*, *takeWhile*, and *extract* with (@).

lemma *takeW-append*:
  takeW pre (*xs* @ *ys*) *nxt* =
    (*let y* = *case ys of* [] ⇒ *nxt* | *x* # - ⇒ *Some x in*
    (*let new-pre* = *case xs of* [] ⇒ *pre* | - ⇒ (*Some* (*last xs*)) *in*
      if holds pre xs y then xs @ *takeW new-pre ys nxt*
                else takeW pre xs y))
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *holds-append*:
  holds pre (*xs* @ *ys*) *nxt* =
    (*let y* = *case ys of* [] ⇒ *nxt* | *x* # - ⇒ *Some x in*
    (*let new-pre* = *case xs of* [] ⇒ *pre* | - ⇒ (*Some* (*last xs*)) *in*
      holds pre xs y ∧ *holds new-pre ys nxt*))
⟨*proof*⟩

corollary *holds-cutoff*:
  holds pre (*l1*@*l2*) *nxt* ⟹ ∃ *nxt'* . *holds pre l1 nxt'*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *extract-append*:
  extract pre (*xs* @ *ys*) *nxt* =
    (*let y* = *case ys of* [] ⇒ *nxt* | *x* # - ⇒ *Some x in*
    (*let new-pre* = *case xs of* [] ⇒ *pre* | - ⇒ (*Some* (*last xs*)) *in*
      if holds pre xs y then extract new-pre ys nxt else extract pre xs y))
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *takeW-prefix*:
  prefix (*takeW pre l nxt*) *l*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *takeW-set*: *t* ∈ *set* (*TW.takeW P pre l nxt*) ⟹ *t* ∈ *set l*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *holds-implies-takeW-is-identity*:
  holds pre l nxt ⟹ *takeW pre l nxt* = *l*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *holds-takeW-is-identity*[*simp*]:
  takeW pre l nxt = *l* ⟷ *holds pre l nxt*
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *takeW-takeW-extract*:
  takeW pre (*takeW pre l nxt*) (*extract pre l nxt*)
  = *takeW pre l nxt*
⟨*proof*⟩

Show the equivalence of two takeW with different pres

lemma *takeW-pre-eqI*:
$[\![\bigwedge x\ .\ l = [x] \Longrightarrow P\ pre\ x\ nxt \longleftrightarrow P\ pre'\ x\ nxt;$
$\bigwedge x1\ x2\ l'\ .\ l = x1\#x2\#l' \Longrightarrow P\ pre\ x1\ (Some\ x2) \longleftrightarrow P\ pre'\ x1\ (Some\ x2)]\!] \Longrightarrow$
$takeW\ pre\ l\ nxt = takeW\ pre'\ l\ nxt$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *takeW-replace-pre*:
$[\![P\ pre\ x1\ n;\ n = ifhead\ xs\ nxt]\!] \Longrightarrow prefix\ (TW.takeW\ P\ pre'\ (x1\#xs)\ nxt)\ (TW.takeW\ P\ pre\ (x1\#xs)\ nxt)$
$\langle proof \rangle$

Holds unfolding

This section contains various lemmas that show how one can deduce P pre' x' nxt' for some of pre' x' nxt' out of a list l, for which we know that holds pre l nxt is true.

lemma *holds-set-list*: $[\![holds\ pre\ l\ nxt;\ x \in set\ l]\!] \Longrightarrow \exists\ p\ y\ .\ P\ p\ x\ y$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *holds-unfold*: $holds\ pre\ l\ None \Longrightarrow$
$l = [] \vee$
$(\exists\ x\ .\ l = [x] \wedge P\ pre\ x\ None) \vee$
$(\exists\ x\ y\ ys\ .\ l = (x\#y\#ys) \wedge P\ pre\ x\ (Some\ y) \wedge holds\ (Some\ x)\ (y\#ys)\ None)$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *holds-unfold-prexnxt*:
$[\![suffix\ (x0\#x1\#x2\#xs)\ l;\ holds\ pre\ l\ nxt]\!]$
$\Longrightarrow P\ (Some\ x0)\ x1\ (Some\ x2)$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *holds-unfold-prexnxt'*:
$[\![holds\ pre\ l\ nxt;\ l = (zs@(x0\#x1\#x2\#xs))]\!]$
$\Longrightarrow P\ (Some\ x0)\ x1\ (Some\ x2)$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *holds-unfold-xz*:
$[\![suffix\ (x1\#x2\#xs)\ l;\ holds\ pre\ l\ nxt]\!] \Longrightarrow \exists\ pre'.\ P\ pre'\ x1\ (Some\ x2)$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *holds-unfold-prex*:
$[\![suffix\ (x1\#x2\#xs)\ l;\ holds\ pre\ l\ nxt]\!] \Longrightarrow \exists\ nxt'.\ P\ (Some\ x1)\ x2\ nxt'$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *holds-suffix*:
$[\![holds\ pre\ l\ nxt;\ suffix\ l'\ l]\!] \Longrightarrow \exists\ pre'.\ holds\ pre'\ l'\ nxt$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *holds-unfold-prelnil*:
$[\![holds\ pre\ l\ nxt;\ l = (zs@(x0\#x1\#[]))]\!]$
$\Longrightarrow P\ (Some\ x0)\ x1\ nxt$
$\langle proof \rangle$

end
end

Chapter 2

Abstract, and Concrete Parametrized Models

This is the core of our verification – the abstract and parametrized models that cover a wide range of protocols.

2.1 Network model

theory *Network-Model*
  imports
    infrastructure/Agents
    infrastructure/Tools
    infrastructure/TakeWhile
begin

as is already defined as a type synonym for nat.

type-synonym *ifs* = *nat*

The authenticated hop information consists of the interface identifiers UpIF, DownIF and an identifier of the AS to which the hop information belongs. Furthermore, this record is extensible and can include additional authenticated hop information (aahi).

record *ahi* =
  UpIF :: *ifs option*
  DownIF :: *ifs option*
  ASID :: *as*

type-synonym *'aahi ahis* = *'aahi ahi-scheme*

locale *network-model* = *compromised* +
  fixes
   auth-seg0 :: (*'ainfo* × *'aahi ahi-scheme list*) *set*
   and *tgtas* :: *as* ⇒ *ifs* ⇒ *as option*
   and *tgtif* :: *as* ⇒ *ifs* ⇒ *ifs option*
begin

2.1.1 Interface check

Check if the interfaces of two adjacent hop fields match. If both hops are compromised we also interpret the link as valid.

fun *if-valid* :: *'aahi ahis option* ⇒ *'aahi ahis* => *'aahi ahis option* ⇒ *bool* **where**
  if-valid None hf - — this is the case for the leaf AS
    = *True*
| *if-valid* (*Some hf1*) (*hf2*) -
    = ((∃ *downif* . *DownIF hf2* = *Some downif* ∧
        tgtas (*ASID hf2*) *downif* = *Some* (*ASID hf1*) ∧
        tgtif (*ASID hf2*) *downif* = *UpIF hf1*)
      ∨ *ASID hf1* ∈ *bad* ∧ *ASID hf2* ∈ *bad*)

makes sure that: the segment is terminated, i.e. the first AS's HF has Eo = None

fun *terminated* :: *'aahi ahis list* ⇒ *bool* **where**
  terminated (*hf*#*xs*) ⟷ *DownIF hf* = *None* ∨ *ASID hf* ∈ *bad*
| *terminated* [] = *True*

makes sure that: the segment is rooted, i.e. the last HF has UpIF = None

fun *rooted* :: *'aahi ahis list* ⇒ *bool* **where**
  rooted [*hf*] ⟷ *UpIF hf* = *None* ∨ *ASID hf* ∈ *bad*
| *rooted* (*hf*#*xs*) = *rooted xs*

| *rooted* [] = *True*

abbreviation *ifs-valid* **where**
ifs-valid pre l nxt ≡ *TW.holds if-valid pre l nxt*

abbreviation *ifs-valid-prefix* **where**
ifs-valid-prefix pre l nxt ≡ *TW.takeW if-valid pre l nxt*

abbreviation *ifs-valid-None* **where**
ifs-valid-None l ≡ *ifs-valid None l None*

abbreviation *ifs-valid-None-prefix* **where**
ifs-valid-None-prefix l ≡ *ifs-valid-prefix None l None*

lemma *strip-ifs-valid-prefix*:
pfragment ainfo l auth-seg0 ⟹ *pfragment ainfo* (*ifs-valid-prefix pre l nxt*) *auth-seg0*
⟨*proof*⟩

Given the AS and an interface identifier of a channel, obtain the AS and interface at the other end of the same channel.

abbreviation *rev-link* :: *as* ⇒ *ifs* ⇒ *as option* × *ifs option* **where**
rev-link a1 i1 ≡ (*tgtas a1 i1*, *tgtif a1 i1*)

end
end

2.2 Abstract Model

theory *Parametrized-Dataplane-0*
imports
Network-Model
infrastructure/Event-Systems
begin

A packet consists of an authenticated info field (e.g., the timestamp of the control plane level beacon creating the segment), as well as past and future paths. Furthermore, there is a history variable *history* that accurately records the actual path – this is only used for the purpose of expressing the desired security property ("Detectability", see below).

record $('aahi, 'ainfo)$ *pkt0* =
AInfo :: *'ainfo*
past :: *'aahi ahi-scheme list*
future :: *'aahi ahi-scheme list*
history :: *'aahi ahi-scheme list*

In this model, the state consists of channel state and local state, each containing sets of packets (which we occasionally also call messages).

record $('aahi, 'ainfo)$ *dp0-state* =
$chan :: (as \times ifs \times as \times ifs) \Rightarrow ('aahi, 'ainfo)\ pkt0\ set$
$loc :: as \Rightarrow ('aahi, 'ainfo)\ pkt0\ set$

We now define the events type; it will be explained below.

datatype $('aahi, 'ainfo)$ *evt0* =
evt-dispatch-int0 as $('aahi, 'ainfo)$ *pkt0*
| *evt-recv0 as ifs* $('aahi, 'ainfo)$ *pkt0*
| *evt-send0 as ifs* $('aahi, 'ainfo)$ *pkt0*
| *evt-deliver0 as* $('aahi, 'ainfo)$ *pkt0*
| *evt-dispatch-ext0 as ifs* $('aahi, 'ainfo)$ *pkt0*
| *evt-observe0* $('aahi, 'ainfo)$ *dp0-state*
| *evt-skip0*

context *network-model*
begin

We define shortcuts denoting that from a state s, a packet pkt is added to either a local state or a channel, yielding state s'. No other part of the state is modified.

definition $dp0\text{-}add\text{-}loc :: ('aahi, 'ainfo)\ dp0\text{-}state \Rightarrow ('aahi, 'ainfo)\ dp0\text{-}state \Rightarrow as \Rightarrow ('aahi, 'ainfo)\ pkt0 \Rightarrow bool$
where
$dp0\text{-}add\text{-}loc\ s\ s'\ asid\ pkt \equiv s' = s(\!|loc := (loc\ s)(asid := loc\ s\ asid \cup \{pkt\})|\!)$

This is a shortcut to denote adding a message to an inter-AS channel. Note that it requires the link to exist.

definition $dp0\text{-}add\text{-}chan :: ('aahi, 'ainfo)\ dp0\text{-}state \Rightarrow ('aahi, 'ainfo)\ dp0\text{-}state \Rightarrow as \Rightarrow ifs \Rightarrow ('aahi, 'ainfo)\ pkt0 \Rightarrow bool$ **where**
$dp0\text{-}add\text{-}chan\ s\ s'\ a1\ i1\ pkt \equiv$
$\exists\, a2\ i2\ .\ rev\text{-}link\ a1\ i1 = (Some\ a2, Some\ i2) \wedge$
$s' = s(\!|chan := (chan\ s)((a1, i1, a2, i2) := chan\ s\ (a1, i1, a2, i2) \cup \{pkt\})|\!)$

Predicate that returns true if a given packet is contained in a given channel.

definition *dp0-in-chan* :: $('aahi, 'ainfo)$ *dp0-state* $\Rightarrow$ *as* $\Rightarrow$ *ifs* $\Rightarrow$ $('aahi, 'ainfo)$ *pkt0* $\Rightarrow$ *bool* **where**

dp0-in-chan s a1 i1 pkt $\equiv$
$\exists\, a2\ i2\ .\ \textit{rev-link}\ a1\ i1 = (\textit{Some}\ a2, \textit{Some}\ i2) \wedge \textit{pkt} \in (\textit{chan}\ s)(a2, i2, a1, i1)$

lemmas *dp0-msgs* = *dp0-add-loc-def dp0-add-chan-def dp0-in-chan-def*

2.2.1 Events

A typical sequence of events is the following:

- An AS creates a new packet using *evt-dispatch-int0* event and puts the packet into its local state.
- The AS forwards the packet to the next AS with the *evt-send0* event, which puts the message into an inter-AS channel.
- The next AS takes the packet from the channel and puts it in the local state in *evt-recv0*.
- The last two steps are repeated as the packet gets forwarded from hop to hop through the network, until it reaches the final AS.
- The final AS delivers the packet internally to the intended destination with the event *evt-deliver0*.

definition
dp0-dispatch-int
where
dp0-dispatch-int s m ainfo asid pas fut hist s' $\equiv$
— guard: check that the future path is a fragment of an authorized segment. In reality, honest agents will always choose a path that is a prefix of an authorized segment, but for our models this difference is not significant.
$m = (\!|\ \textit{AInfo} = \textit{ainfo}, \textit{past} = \textit{pas}, \textit{future} = \textit{fut}, \textit{history} = \textit{hist}\ |\!) \wedge$
$\textit{hist} = [] \wedge$
pfragment ainfo fut auth-seg0 $\wedge$
— action: Update the state to include m
dp0-add-loc s s' asid m

definition
dp0-recv
where
dp0-recv s m asid ainfo hf1 downif pas fut hist s' $\equiv$
— guard: there are at least two hop fields left, which means we can advance the packet by one hop.
$m = (\!|\ \textit{AInfo} = \textit{ainfo}, \textit{past} = \textit{pas}, \textit{future} = \textit{hf1}\ \#\ \textit{fut}, \textit{history} = \textit{hist}\ |\!) \wedge$
dp0-in-chan s asid downif m $\wedge$

ASID hf1 = *asid* $\wedge$

— action: Update state to include message
dp0-add-loc s s' asid $(\!|$
$\textit{AInfo} = \textit{ainfo},$

$past = pas,$
$future = hf1 \# fut,$
$history = hist$
$\|)$

definition
dp0-send
where
$dp0\text{-}send\ s\ m\ asid\ ainfo\ hf1\ upif\ pas\ fut\ hist\ s' \equiv$
— guard: there are at least two hop fields left, which means we can advance the packet by one hop.
$m = (\| AInfo = ainfo, past = pas, future = hf1\#fut, history = hist \|) \wedge$
$m \in (loc\ s)\ asid \wedge$
$UpIF\ hf1 = Some\ upif \wedge$
$ASID\ hf1 = asid \wedge$

— action: Update state to include modified message
$dp0\text{-}add\text{-}chan\ s\ s'\ asid\ upif\ (\|$
$AInfo = ainfo,$
$past = hf1 \# pas,$
$future = fut,$
$history = hf1 \# hist$
$\|)$

This event represents the destination receiving the packet. Our properties are not expressed over what happens when an end hosts receives a packet (but rather what happens with a packet while it traverses the network). We only need this event to push the last hop field from the future path into the past path, as the detectability property is expressed over the past path.

definition
dp0-deliver
where
$dp0\text{-}deliver\ s\ m\ asid\ ainfo\ hf1\ pas\ fut\ hist\ s' \equiv$
$m = (\| AInfo = ainfo, past = pas, future = hf1\#fut, history = hist \|) \wedge$
$ASID\ hf1 = asid \wedge$
$m \in (loc\ s)\ asid \wedge$
$fut = [] \wedge$

— action: Update state to include modified message
$dp0\text{-}add\text{-}loc\ s\ s'\ asid$
$(\|$
$AInfo = ainfo,$
$past = hf1 \# pas,$
$future = [],$
$history = hf1 \# hist$
$\|)$

— Direct dispatch event. A node with asid sends a packet on its outgoing interface upif.
Note that the attacker is NOT part of the real past path. However, detectability is still achieved in practice, since hf (the hop field of the next AS) points with its downif towards the attacker node.
definition
dp0-dispatch-ext
where

$dp0\text{-}dispatch\text{-}ext\ s\ m\ asid\ ainfo\ upif\ pas\ fut\ hist\ s' \equiv$
$m = (\!|\ AInfo = ainfo,\ past = pas,\ future = fut,\ history = hist\ |\!) \wedge$
$hist = [] \wedge$

$pfragment\ ainfo\ fut\ auth\text{-}seg0\ \wedge$

— action: Update state to include attacker message
$dp0\text{-}add\text{-}chan\ s\ s'\ asid\ upif\ m$

2.2.2 Transition system

fun *dp0-trans* **where**
$dp0\text{-}trans\ s\ (evt\text{-}dispatch\text{-}int0\ asid\ m)\ s' \longleftrightarrow$
$(\exists\, ainfo\ pas\ fut\ hist.\ dp0\text{-}dispatch\text{-}int\ s\ m\ ainfo\ asid\ pas\ fut\ hist\ s')\ |$
$dp0\text{-}trans\ s\ (evt\text{-}recv0\ asid\ downif\ m)\ s' \longleftrightarrow$
$(\exists\, ainfo\ hf1\ pas\ fut\ hist.\ dp0\text{-}recv\ s\ m\ asid\ ainfo\ hf1\ downif\ pas\ fut\ hist\ s')\ |$
$dp0\text{-}trans\ s\ (evt\text{-}send0\ asid\ upif\ m)\ s' \longleftrightarrow$
$(\exists\, ainfo\ hf1\ pas\ fut\ hist.\ dp0\text{-}send\ s\ m\ asid\ ainfo\ hf1\ upif\ pas\ fut\ hist\ s')\ |$
$dp0\text{-}trans\ s\ (evt\text{-}deliver0\ asid\ m)\ s' \longleftrightarrow$
$(\exists\, ainfo\ hf1\ pas\ fut\ hist.\ dp0\text{-}deliver\ s\ m\ asid\ ainfo\ hf1\ pas\ fut\ hist\ s')\ |$
$dp0\text{-}trans\ s\ (evt\text{-}dispatch\text{-}ext0\ asid\ upif\ m)\ s' \longleftrightarrow$
$(\exists\, ainfo\ pas\ fut\ hist.\ dp0\text{-}dispatch\text{-}ext\ s\ m\ asid\ ainfo\ upif\ pas\ fut\ hist\ s')\ |$
$dp0\text{-}trans\ s\ (evt\text{-}observe0\ s'')\ s' \longleftrightarrow s = s' \wedge s = s''\ |$
$dp0\text{-}trans\ s\ evt\text{-}skip0\ s' \longleftrightarrow s = s'$

definition $dp0\text{-}init :: ('aahi,\ 'ainfo)\ dp0\text{-}state$ **where**
$dp0\text{-}init \equiv (\!|chan = (\lambda\text{-}.\ \{\}),\ loc = (\lambda\text{-}.\ \{\})|\!)$

definition $dp0 :: (('aahi,\ 'ainfo)\ evt0,\ ('aahi,\ 'ainfo)\ dp0\text{-}state)\ ES$ **where**
$dp0 \equiv (\!|$
$init = (=)\ dp0\text{-}init,$
$trans = dp0\text{-}trans$
$|\!)$

lemmas *dp0-trans-defs = dp0-dispatch-int-def dp0-recv-def dp0-send-def dp0-deliver-def dp0-dispatch-ext-def*
lemmas *dp0-defs = dp0-def dp0-init-def dp0-trans-defs*

soup is a predicate that is true for a packet m and a state s, if m is contained anywhere in the system (either in the local state or channels).

definition *soup* **where** $soup\ m\ s \equiv \exists\, x.\ m \in (loc\ s)\ x \vee (\exists\, x.\ m \in (chan\ s)\ x)$

declare *soup-def* [*simp*]
declare *if-split-asm* [*split*]

lemma *dp0-add-chan-msgs*:
assumes $dp0\text{-}add\text{-}chan\ s\ s'\ asid\ upif\ m$ **and** $soup\ n\ s'$ **and** $n \neq m$
shows $soup\ n\ s$
$\langle proof \rangle$

2.2.3 Path authorization property

Path authorization is defined as: For all messages in the system: the future path is a fragment of an authorized path. We strengthen this property by including the real past path (the recorded history that can not be faked by the attacker). The concatenation of these path remains invariant during forwarding, which simplifies our proof. Note that the history path is in reverse order.

definition *auth-path* :: $('aahi, 'ainfo)$ *pkt0* $\Rightarrow$ *bool* **where**
  auth-path m $\equiv$ *pfragment* (*AInfo m*) (*rev* (*history m*) @ *future m*) *auth-seg0*

definition *inv-auth* :: $('aahi, 'ainfo)$ *dp0-state* $\Rightarrow$ *bool* **where**
  inv-auth s $\equiv \forall$ *m* . *soup m s* $\longrightarrow$ *auth-path m*

lemma *inv-authI*:
  assumes $\bigwedge$*m* . *soup m s* $\Longrightarrow$ *pfragment* (*AInfo m*) (*rev* (*history m*) @ *future m*) *auth-seg0*
  shows *inv-auth s*
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *inv-authD*:
  assumes *inv-auth s soup m s*
  shows *pfragment* (*AInfo m*) (*rev* (*history m*) @ *future m*) *auth-seg0*
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *inv-auth-add-chan*[*elim*!]:
  assumes *dp0-add-chan s s' asid upif m* **and** *inv-auth s*
    and *pfragment* (*AInfo m*) (*rev* (*history m*) @ *future m*) *auth-seg0*
   shows *inv-auth s'*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *inv-auth-add-loc*[*elim*!]:
  assumes *dp0-add-loc s s' asid m* **and** *inv-auth s*
    and *pfragment* (*AInfo m*) (*rev* (*history m*) @ *future m*) *auth-seg0*
   shows *inv-auth s'*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *Inv-inv-auth*: *Inv dp0 inv-auth*
⟨*proof*⟩

abbreviation *TR-auth* **where** *TR-auth* $\equiv$
  $\{\tau \mid \tau \,.\, \forall\ s \,.$ *evt-observe0 s* $\in$ *set* $\tau \longrightarrow$ *inv-auth s*$\}$

lemma *tr0-satisfies-pathauthorization*: *dp0* $\models_{ES}$ *TR-auth*
  ⟨*proof*⟩

2.2.4 Detectability property

The attacker sending a packet to another AS is not part of the real path. However, the next hop's interface will point to the attacker AS (if the hop field is valid), thus the attacker remains identifiable.

Detectability, the first property: the past real path is a prefix of the past path

definition *inv-detect* :: ($'aahi$, $'ainfo$) *dp0-state* $\Rightarrow$ *bool* **where**
inv-detect s $\equiv \forall\, m$. *soup m s* $\longrightarrow$ *prefix* (*history m*) (*past m*)

lemma *inv-detectI*:
assumes $\bigwedge m\ x$. *soup m s* $\Longrightarrow$ *prefix* (*history m*) (*past m*)
shows *inv-detect s*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *inv-detectD*:
assumes *inv-detect s*
shows $\bigwedge m\ x\ .m \in$ (*loc s*) $x \Longrightarrow$ *prefix* (*history m*) (*past m*)
and $\bigwedge m\ x\ .m \in$ (*chan s*) $x \Longrightarrow$ *prefix* (*history m*) (*past m*)
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *inv-detect-add-chan*[*elim*!]:
assumes *dp0-add-chan s s′ asid upif m inv-detect s prefix* (*history m*) (*past m*)
shows *inv-detect s′*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *inv-detect-add-loc*[*elim*!]:
assumes *dp0-add-loc s s′ asid m inv-detect s prefix* (*history m*) (*past m*)
shows *inv-detect s′*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *Inv-inv-detect*: *Inv dp0 inv-detect*
⟨*proof*⟩

abbreviation *TR-detect* **where** *TR-detect* $\equiv \{\tau \mid \tau\ .\ \forall\ s$. *evt-observe0 s* $\in$ *set* $\tau \longrightarrow$ *inv-detect s*$\}$

lemma *tr0-satisfies-detectability*: *dp0* $\models_{ES}$ *TR-detect*
⟨*proof*⟩

end
end

2.3 Intermediate Model

theory *Parametrized-Dataplane-1*
  imports
    Parametrized-Dataplane-0
    infrastructure/Message
begin

This model is almost identical to the previous one. The only changes are (i) that the receive event performs an interface check and (ii) that we permit the attacker to send any packet with a future path whose interface-valid prefix is authorized, as opposed to requiring that the entire future path is authorized. This means that the attacker can combine hop fields of subsequent ASes as long as the combination is either authorized, or the interfaces of the two hop fields do not correspond to each other. In the latter case the packet will not be delivered to (or accepted by) the second AS. Because (i) requires the *evt-recv0* event to check the interface over which packets are received, in the mapping from this model to the abstract model we can thus cut off all invalid hop fields from the future path.

type-synonym $('aahi, 'ainfo)$ *dp1-state* $=$ $('aahi, 'ainfo)$ *dp0-state*
type-synonym $('aahi, 'ainfo)$ *pkt1* $=$ $('aahi, 'ainfo)$ *pkt0*
type-synonym $('aahi, 'ainfo)$ *evt1* $=$ $('aahi, 'ainfo)$ *evt0*

context *network-model*
begin

2.3.1 Events

definition
  dp1-dispatch-int
where
  dp1-dispatch-int s m ainfo asid pas fut hist s' $\equiv$
    — guard: check that the future path is a fragment of an authorized segment. In reality, honest agents will always choose a path that is a prefix of an authorized segment, but for our models this difference is not significant.
    $m = (\!|\ AInfo = ainfo,\ past = pas,\ future = fut,\ history = hist\ |\!) \wedge$
    $hist = [] \wedge$
    pfragment ainfo (*ifs-valid-prefix None fut None*) *auth-seg0* $\wedge$
    — action: Update the state to include m
    dp0-add-loc s s' asid m

We construct an artificial hop field that contains a specified asid and upif. The other fields are irrelevant, as we only use this artificial hop field as "previous" hop field in the *ifs-valid-prefix* function. This is used in the direct dispatch event: the interface-valid prefix must be authorized. Since the dispatching AS' own hop field is not part of the future path, but the AS directly after the it does check for the interface correctness, we need this artificial hop field.

abbreviation *prev-hf* **where**
  prev-hf asid upif $\equiv$
  $(Some\ (\!|UpIF = Some\ upif,\ DownIF = None,\ ASID = asid,\ \ldots = undefined|\!))$

definition
  dp1-dispatch-ext

where
dp1-dispatch-ext s m asid ainfo upif pas fut hist s′ ≡
m = ⦇ *AInfo* = *ainfo*, *past* = *pas*, *future* = *fut*, *history* = *hist* ⦈ ∧
hist = [] ∧
pfragment ainfo (*ifs-valid-prefix* (*prev-hf asid upif*) *fut None*) *auth-seg0* ∧

— action: Update state to include attacker message
dp0-add-chan s s′ asid upif m

definition
dp1-recv
where
dp1-recv s m asid ainfo hf1 downif pas fut hist s′ ≡
DownIF hf1 = *Some downif*
∧ *dp0-recv s m asid ainfo hf1 downif pas fut hist s′*

2.3.2 Transition system

fun *dp1-trans* **where**
dp1-trans s (*evt-dispatch-int0 asid m*) *s′* ⟷
(∃ *ainfo pas fut hist*. *dp1-dispatch-int s m ainfo asid pas fut hist s′*) |
dp1-trans s (*evt-dispatch-ext0 asid upif m*) *s′* ⟷
(∃ *ainfo pas fut hist* . *dp1-dispatch-ext s m asid ainfo upif pas fut hist s′*) |
dp1-trans s (*evt-recv0 asid downif m*) *s′* ⟷
(∃ *ainfo hf1 pas fut hist*. *dp1-recv s m asid ainfo hf1 downif pas fut hist s′*) |
dp1-trans s e s′ ⟷ *dp0-trans s e s′*

definition *dp1-init* :: (*′aahi*, *′ainfo*) *dp1-state* **where**
dp1-init ≡ ⦇*chan* = (λ-. {}), *loc* = (λ-. {})⦈

definition *dp1* :: ((*′aahi*, *′ainfo*) *evt1*, (*′aahi*, *′ainfo*) *dp1-state*) *ES* **where**
dp1 ≡ ⦇
init = (=) *dp1-init*,
trans = *dp1-trans*
⦈

lemmas *dp1-trans-defs* = *dp0-trans-defs dp1-dispatch-ext-def dp1-recv-def*
lemmas *dp1-defs* = *dp1-def dp1-dispatch-int-def dp1-init-def dp1-trans-defs*

fun *pkt1to0chan* :: *as* ⇒ *ifs* ⇒ (*′aahi*, *′ainfo*) *pkt1* ⇒ (*′aahi*, *′ainfo*) *pkt0* **where**
pkt1to0chan asid upif ⦇ *AInfo* = *ainfo*, *past* = *pas*, *future* = *fut*, *history* = *hist* ⦈ =
⦇ *pkt0.AInfo* = *ainfo*, *past* = *pas*, *future* = *ifs-valid-prefix* (*prev-hf asid upif*) *fut None*, *history* = *hist*⦈

fun *pkt1to0loc* :: (*′aahi*, *′ainfo*) *pkt1* ⇒ (*′aahi*, *′ainfo*) *pkt0* **where**
pkt1to0loc ⦇ *AInfo* = *ainfo*, *past* = *pas*, *future* = *fut*, *history* = *hist* ⦈ =
⦇ *pkt0.AInfo* = *ainfo*, *past* = *pas*, *future* = *ifs-valid-prefix None fut None*, *history* = *hist*⦈

definition *R10* :: (*′aahi*, *′ainfo*) *dp1-state* ⇒ (*′aahi*, *′ainfo*) *dp0-state* **where**
R10 s =
⦇*chan* = λ(*a1*, *i1*, *a2*, *i2*) . (*pkt1to0chan a1 i1*) ‘ ((*chan s*) (*a1*, *i1*, *a2*, *i2*)),
loc = λ*x* . *pkt1to0loc* ‘ ((*loc s*) *x*)⦈

fun π_1 :: ('*aahi*, '*ainfo*) *evt1* $\Rightarrow$ ('*aahi*, '*ainfo*) *evt0* **where**
π_1 (*evt-dispatch-int0 asid m*) = *evt-dispatch-int0 asid* (*pkt1to0loc m*)
| π_1 (*evt-recv0 asid downif m*) = *evt-recv0 asid downif* (*pkt1to0loc m*)
| π_1 (*evt-send0 asid upif m*) = *evt-send0 asid upif* (*pkt1to0loc m*)
| π_1 (*evt-deliver0 asid m*) = *evt-deliver0 asid* (*pkt1to0loc m*)
| π_1 (*evt-dispatch-ext0 asid upif m*) = *evt-dispatch-ext0 asid upif* (*pkt1to0chan asid upif m*)
| π_1 (*evt-observe0 s*) = *evt-observe0* (*R10 s*)
| π_1 *evt-skip0* = *evt-skip0*

declare *TW.takeW.elims*[*elim*]

lemma *dp1-refines-dp0*: *dp1* $\sqsubseteq_{\pi 1}$ *dp0*
⟨*proof*⟩

2.3.3 Auxilliary definitions

These definitions are not directly needed in the parametrized models, but they are useful for instances.

fun *ASO* :: *msgterm* $\Rightarrow$ *nat option* **where**
ASO (*AS ifs*) = *Some ifs* | *ASO* ε = *None*

Check if interface option is matched by a msgterm.

fun *ASIF* :: *ifs option* $\Rightarrow$ *msgterm* $\Rightarrow$ *bool* **where**
ASIF (*Some a*) (*AS a'*) = (*a*=*a'*)
| *ASIF None* ε = *True*
| *ASIF* - - = *False*

Turn a msgterm to an ifs option. Note that this maps both ε (the msgterm denoting the lack of an interface) and arbitrary other msgterms that are not of the form "AS t" to None. The result may thus be ambiguous. Use with care.

fun *term2if* :: *msgterm* $\Rightarrow$ *ifs option* **where**
term2if (*AS a*) = *Some a*
| *term2if* ε = *None*
| *term2if* - = *None*

fun *if2term* :: *ifs option* $\Rightarrow$ *msgterm* **where** *if2term* (*Some a*) = *AS a* | *if2term None* = ε

lemma *if2term-eq*[*elim*]: *if2term a* = *if2term b* $\Longrightarrow$ *a* = *b*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *term2if-if2termm*[*simp*]: *term2if* (*if2term a*) = *a* ⟨*proof*⟩

fun *hf2term* :: *ahi* $\Rightarrow$ *msgterm* **where**
hf2term (|*UpIF* = *upif*, *DownIF* = *downif*, *ASID* = *asid*|) = *L* [*if2term upif*, *if2term downif*, *Num asid*]

fun *term2hf* :: *msgterm* $\Rightarrow$ *ahi* **where**
term2hf (*L* [*upif*, *downif*, *Num asid*]) = (|*UpIF* = *term2if upif*, *DownIF* = *term2if downif*, *ASID* = *asid*|)

lemma *term2hf-hf2term*[*simp*]: *term2hf* (*hf2term hf*) = *hf* ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *ahi-eq*:
$[\![ASID\ ahi' = ASID\ (ahi{::}ahi);\ ASIF\ (DownIF\ ahi')\ downif;\ ASIF\ (UpIF\ ahi')\ upif;$
$ASIF\ (DownIF\ ahi)\ downif;\ ASIF\ (UpIF\ ahi)\ upif]\!] \Longrightarrow ahi = ahi'$
$\langle proof \rangle$

end
end

2.4 Concrete Parametrized Model

This is the refinement of the intermediate dataplane model. This model is parametric, and requires instantiation of the hop validation function, (and other parameters). We do so in the *Parametrized-Dataplane-3-directed* and *Parametrized-Dataplane-3-undirected* models. Nevertheless, this model contains the complete refinement proof, albeit the hard case, the refinement of the attacker event, is assumed to hold. The crux of the refinement proof is thus shown in these directed/undirected instance models. The definitions to be given by the instance are those of the locales *dataplane-2-defs* (which contains the basic definitions needed for the protocol, such as the verification of a hop field, called *hf-valid-generic*), and *dataplane-2-ik-defs* (containing the definition of components of the intruder knowledge). The proof obligations are those in the locale *dataplane-2*.

theory *Parametrized-Dataplane-2*
  imports
    Parametrized-Dataplane-1 Network-Model
begin

record ($'aahi$, $'uhi$) *HF* =
  AHI :: $'aahi$ *ahi-scheme*
  UHI :: $'uhi$
  HVF :: *msgterm*

record ($'aahi$, $'uhi$, $'ainfo$) *pkt2* =
  AInfo :: $'ainfo$
  UInfo :: *msgterm*
  past :: ($'aahi$, $'uhi$) *HF list*
  future :: ($'aahi$, $'uhi$) *HF list*
  history :: $'aahi$ *ahi-scheme list*

We use pkt2 instead of pkt, but otherwise the state remains unmodified in this model.

record ($'aahi$, $'uhi$, $'ainfo$) *dp2-state* =
  chan2 :: $(as \times ifs \times as \times ifs) \Rightarrow$ ($'aahi$, $'uhi$, $'ainfo$) *pkt2 set*
  loc2 :: $as \Rightarrow$ ($'aahi$, $'uhi$, $'ainfo$) *pkt2 set*

datatype ($'aahi$, $'uhi$, $'ainfo$) *evt2* =
    evt-dispatch-int2 as ($'aahi$, $'uhi$, $'ainfo$) *pkt2*
  | *evt-recv2 as ifs* ($'aahi$, $'uhi$, $'ainfo$) *pkt2*
  | *evt-send2 as ifs* ($'aahi$, $'uhi$, $'ainfo$) *pkt2*
  | *evt-deliver2 as* ($'aahi$, $'uhi$, $'ainfo$) *pkt2*
  | *evt-dispatch-ext2 as ifs* ($'aahi$, $'uhi$, $'ainfo$) *pkt2*
  | *evt-observe2* ($'aahi$, $'uhi$, $'ainfo$) *dp2-state*
  | *evt-skip2*

definition *soup2* **where** $soup2\ m\ s \equiv \exists x.\ m \in (loc2\ s)\ x \lor (\exists x.\ m \in (chan2\ s)\ x)$

declare *soup2-def* [*simp*]

2.4.1 Hop validation check, authorized segments, and path extraction.

First we define a locale that requires a number of functions. We will later extend this to a locale *dataplane-2*, which makes assumptions on how these functions operate. We separate the assumptions in order to make use of some auxiliary definitions defined in this locale.

locale *dataplane-2-defs* = *network-model* - *auth-seg0*
  for *auth-seg0* :: ($'ainfo \times 'aahi$ *ahi-scheme list*) *set* +
— *hf-valid-generic* is the check that every hop performs. Besides the hop's own field, the check may require access to its neighboring hop fields as well as on *ainfo*, *uinfo* and the entire sequence of hop fields. Note that this check should include checking the validity of the info fields. Depending on the directed vs. undirected setting, this check may only have access to specific fields.
  fixes *hf-valid-generic* :: $'ainfo \Rightarrow$ *msgterm*
    $\Rightarrow ('aahi, 'uhi)$ *HF list*
    $\Rightarrow ('aahi, 'uhi)$ *HF option*
    $\Rightarrow ('aahi, 'uhi)$ *HF*
    $\Rightarrow ('aahi, 'uhi)$ *HF option* $\Rightarrow$ *bool*
— *hfs-valid-prefix-generic* is the longest prefix of a given future path, such that *hf-valid-generic* passes for each hop field on the prefix.
  and *hfs-valid-prefix-generic* ::
    $'ainfo \Rightarrow$ *msgterm*
     $\Rightarrow ('aahi, 'uhi)$ *HF list*
     $\Rightarrow ('aahi, 'uhi)$ *HF option*
     $\Rightarrow ('aahi, 'uhi)$ *HF list*
     $\Rightarrow ('aahi, 'uhi)$ *HF option* $\Rightarrow ('aahi, 'uhi)$ *HF list*
— We need *checkInfo* only for the empty segment (ainfo, []) since according to the definition any such ainfo will be contained in the intruder knowledge. With checkInfo we can restrict this.
  and *checkInfo* :: $'ainfo \Rightarrow$ *bool*
— *extr* extracts from a given hop validation field (*HVF hf*) the entire authenticated future path that is embedded in the HVF.
  and *extr* :: *msgterm* $\Rightarrow 'aahi$ *ahi-scheme list*
— *extr-ainfo* extracts the authenticated info field (ainfo) from a given hop validation field.
  and *extr-ainfo* :: *msgterm* $\Rightarrow 'ainfo$
— *ik-auth-ainfo* extracts what msgterms the intruder can learn from analyzing a given authenticated info field. Note that currently we do not have a similar function for the unauthenticated info field *uinfo*. Protocols should thus only use that field with terms that the intruder can already synthesize (such as Numbers).
  and *ik-auth-ainfo* :: $'ainfo \Rightarrow$ *msgterm*
— *ik-hf* extracts what msgterms the intruder can learn from analyzing a given hop field; for instance, the hop validation field HVF hf and the segment identifier UHI hf.
  and *ik-hf* :: $('aahi, 'uhi)$ *HF* $\Rightarrow$ *msgterm set*

— We require that *hfs-valid-prefix-generic* behaves as expected, i.e., that it implements the check mentioned above.
assumes *prefix-hfs-valid-prefix-generic*:
  prefix (*hfs-valid-prefix-generic ainfo uinfo pas pre fut nxt*) *fut*
    and *cons-hfs-valid-prefix-generic*:
  $[\![$*hf-valid-generic ainfo uinfo hfs* (*head pas*) *hf1* (*head fut*); *hfs* = (*rev pas*)@*hf1* #*fut*$]\!]$
$\Longrightarrow$ *hfs-valid-prefix-generic ainfo uinfo pas* (*head pas*) (*hf1* # *fut*) *None* =
   hf1 # (*hfs-valid-prefix-generic ainfo uinfo* (*hf1*#*pas*) (*Some hf1*) *fut None*)
begin

Auxiliary definitions and lemmas

This function maps hop fields of the dp2 format to hop fields of dp0 format.

definition *AHIS* :: $('aahi, 'uhi)$ *HF list* $\Rightarrow 'aahi$ *ahi-scheme list* **where**
  AHIS hfs $\equiv$ *map AHI hfs*

declare *AHIS-def* [*simp*]

fun *extr-from-hd* :: ('*aahi*, '*uhi*) *HF list* ⇒ '*aahi ahi-scheme list* **where**
  extr-from-hd (*hf*#*xs*) = *extr* (*HVF hf*)
| *extr-from-hd* - = []

fun *extr-ainfoHd* **where**
  extr-ainfoHd (*hf*#*xs*) = *Some* (*extr-ainfo* (*HVF hf*))
| *extr-ainfoHd* - = *None*

lemma *prefix-AHIS*:
prefix x1 x2 ⟹ *prefix* (*AHIS x1*) (*AHIS x2*)
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *AHIS-set*: *hf* ∈ *set* (*AHIS l*) ⟹ ∃ *hfc* . *hfc* ∈ *set l* ∧ *hf* = *AHI hfc*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *AHIS-set-rev*: (|*AHI* = *ahi*, *UHI* = *uhi*, *HVF* = *x*|) ∈ *set hfs* ⟹ *ahi* ∈ *set* (*AHIS hfs*)
⟨*proof*⟩

fun *pkt2to1* :: ('*aahi*, '*uhi*, '*ainfo*) *pkt2* ⇒ ('*aahi*, '*ainfo*) *pkt1* **where**
pkt2to1 (| *AInfo* = *ainfo*, *UInfo* = *uinfo*, *past* = *pas*, *future* = *fut*, *history* = *hist* |) =
  (| *pkt0.AInfo* = *ainfo*,
    past = *AHIS pas*,
    future = *AHIS* (*hfs-valid-prefix-generic ainfo uinfo pas* (*head pas*) *fut None*),
    history = *hist*|)

abbreviation *AHIo* :: ('*aahi*, '*uhi*) *HF option* ⇒ '*aahi ahi-scheme option* **where**
AHIo ≡ *map-option AHI*

Authorized segments

Main definition of authorized up-segments. Makes sure that:

- the segment is rooted
- the segment is terminated
- the segment has matching interfaces
- the projection to AS owners is an authorized segment in the abstract model.

definition *auth-seg2* :: ('*ainfo* × ('*aahi*, '*uhi*) *HF list*) *set* **where**
auth-seg2 ≡ ({(*ainfo*, *l*) | *ainfo l uinfo* . *hfs-valid-prefix-generic ainfo uinfo* [] *None l None* = *l*
  ∧ *checkInfo ainfo*
  ∧ (*ainfo*, *AHIS l*) ∈ *auth-seg0*})

lemma *auth-seg20*:
(*x*, *y*) ∈ *auth-seg2* ⟹ (*x*, *AHIS y*) ∈ *auth-seg0* ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *pfragment-auth-seg20*:

pfragment ainfo l auth-seg2 $\Longrightarrow$ *pfragment ainfo* (*AHIS l*) *auth-seg0*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *pfragment-auth-seg20'*:
⟦*pfragment ainfo l auth-seg2*; l' = *AHIS l*⟧ $\Longrightarrow$ *pfragment ainfo* l' *auth-seg0*
⟨*proof*⟩

This is a shortcut to denote adding a message to a local channel.

definition
dp2-add-loc2 ::
('*aahi*, '*uhi*, '*ainfo*, '*more*) *dp2-state-scheme* ⇒
('*aahi*, '*uhi*, '*ainfo*, '*more*) *dp2-state-scheme* ⇒ *as* ⇒ ('*aahi*, '*uhi*, '*ainfo*) *pkt2* ⇒ *bool*
where
dp2-add-loc2 s s' asid pkt ≡ *s'* = *s*⦇*loc2* := (*loc2 s*)(*asid* := *loc2 s asid* ∪ {*pkt*})⦈

This is a shortcut to denote adding a message to an inter-AS channel. Note that it requires the link to exist.

definition
dp2-add-chan2 ::
('*aahi*, '*uhi*, '*ainfo*, '*more*) *dp2-state-scheme* ⇒ ('*aahi*, '*uhi*, '*ainfo*, '*more*) *dp2-state-scheme*
⇒ *as* ⇒ *ifs* ⇒ ('*aahi*, '*uhi*, '*ainfo*) *pkt2* ⇒ *bool*
where
dp2-add-chan2 s s' a1 i1 pkt ≡
∃ *a2 i2* . *rev-link a1 i1* = (*Some a2*, *Some i2*) ∧
s' = *s*⦇*chan2* := (*chan2 s*)((*a1*, *i1*, *a2*, *i2*) := *chan2 s* (*a1*, *i1*, *a2*, *i2*) ∪ {*pkt*})⦈

This is a shortcut to denote receiving a message from an inter-AS channel. Note that it requires the link to exist.

definition
dp2-in-chan2 :: ('*aahi*, '*uhi*, '*ainfo*, '*more*) *dp2-state-scheme* ⇒ *as* ⇒ *ifs* ⇒ ('*aahi*, '*uhi*, '*ainfo*) *pkt2* ⇒ *bool*
where
dp2-in-chan2 s a1 i1 pkt ≡
∃ *a2 i2* . *rev-link a1 i1* = (*Some a2*, *Some i2*) ∧
pkt ∈ (*chan2 s*)(*a2*, *i2*, *a1*, *i1*)

lemmas *dp2-msgs* = *dp2-add-loc2-def dp2-add-chan2-def dp2-in-chan2-def*

end

2.4.2 Intruder Knowledge definition

print-locale *dataplane-2-defs*
locale *dataplane-2-ik-defs* = *dataplane-2-defs* - - - - *hf-valid-generic* - -
for *hf-valid-generic* :: '*ainfo* ⇒ *msgterm*
⇒ ('*aahi*, '*uhi*) *HF list*
⇒ ('*aahi*, '*uhi*) *HF option*
⇒ ('*aahi*, '*uhi*) *HF*
⇒ ('*aahi*, '*uhi*) *HF option* ⇒ *bool* +
— *ik-add* is Additional Intruder Knowledge, such as hop authenticators in EPIC L1.
fixes *ik-add* :: *msgterm set*

— *ik-oracle* is another type of additional Intruder Knowledge. We use it to model the attacker's ability to brute-force individual hop validation fields and segment identifiers.
and *ik-oracle* :: *msgterm set*
— As *ik-oracle* gives the attacker direct access to hop validation fields that could be used to break the property, we have to either restrict the scope of the property, or restrict the attacker such that he cannot use the oracle-obtained hop validation fields in packets whose path origin matches the path origin of the oracle query. We choose the latter approach and fix a predicate *no-oracle* that tells us if the oracle has not been queried for a path origin (ainfo, uinfo combination). This is a prophecy variable.
and *no-oracle* :: $'ainfo \Rightarrow msgterm \Rightarrow bool$
begin

This set should contain all terms that can be learned from analyzing a hop field, in particular the content of the HVF and UHI fields.

definition *ik-auth-hfs* :: *msgterm set* **where**
$ik\text{-}auth\text{-}hfs = \{t \mid t\ hf\ hfs\ ainfo.\ t \in ik\text{-}hf\ hf \wedge hf \in set\ hfs \wedge (ainfo,\ hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2\}$

declare *ik-auth-hfs-def* [*simp*]

definition *ik* :: *msgterm set* **where**
$ik = ik\text{-}auth\text{-}hfs$
$\cup \{ik\text{-}auth\text{-}ainfo\ ainfo \mid ainfo\ hfs.\ (ainfo,\ hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2\}$
$\cup\ Key`(macK`bad)$
$\cup\ ik\text{-}add$
$\cup\ ik\text{-}oracle$

definition *ik-pkt* :: $('aahi,\ 'uhi,\ 'ainfo)\ pkt2 \Rightarrow msgterm\ set$ **where**
$ik\text{-}pkt\ m \equiv \{t \mid t\ hf.\ t \in ik\text{-}hf\ hf \wedge hf \in set\ (past\ m) \cup set\ (future\ m)\}$
$\cup \{ik\text{-}auth\text{-}ainfo\ ainfo \mid ainfo\ .\ ainfo = AInfo\ m\}$

Intruder knowledge. We make a simplifying assumption about the attacker's passive capabilities: In contrast to his ability to insert messages (which is restricted to the locality of ASes that are compromised, i.e. in the set 'bad', the attacker has global eavesdropping abilities. This simplifies modelling and does not make the proofs more difficult, while providing stronger guarantees. We will later prove that the Dolev-Yao closure of *ik-dyn* remains constant, i.e., the attacker does not learn anything new by observing messages on the network (see *Inv-inv-ik-dyn*).

definition *ik-dyn* :: $('aahi,\ 'uhi,\ 'ainfo,\ 'more)\ dp2\text{-}state\text{-}scheme \Rightarrow msgterm\ set$ **where**
$ik\text{-}dyn\ s \equiv ik \cup (\bigcup \{ik\text{-}pkt\ m \mid m\ x\ .\ m \in loc2\ s\ x\}) \cup (\bigcup \{ik\text{-}pkt\ m \mid m\ x\ .\ m \in chan2\ s\ x\})$

lemma *ik-dyn-mono*: $[\![x \in ik\text{-}dyn\ s;\ \bigwedge m\ .\ soup2\ m\ s \Longrightarrow soup2\ m\ s']\!] \Longrightarrow x \in ik\text{-}dyn\ s'$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *ik-info*[*elim*]:
$(ainfo,\ hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2 \Longrightarrow ik\text{-}auth\text{-}ainfo\ ainfo \in synth\ (analz\ ik)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *ik-ik-auth-hfs*: $t \in ik\text{-}auth\text{-}hfs \Longrightarrow t \in ik$ ⟨*proof*⟩

2.4.3 Events

This is an attacker event (but does not require the dispatching node to be compromised).

The attacker is allowed to send any message that he can derive from his intruder knowledge, except for messages whose path origin he has queried the oracle for.

definition
  dp2-dispatch-int
where
  dp2-dispatch-int s m ainfo uinfo asid pas fut hist s' ≡
    $m = (\!|\ AInfo = ainfo,\ UInfo = uinfo,\ past = pas,\ future = fut,\ history = hist\ |\!) \wedge$
    $hist = [] \wedge$
    $ik\text{-}auth\text{-}ainfo\ ainfo \in synth\ (analz\ (ik\text{-}dyn\ s)) \wedge$
    $(\forall hf \in set\ fut \cup set\ pas\ .\ ik\text{-}hf\ hf \subseteq synth\ (analz\ (ik\text{-}dyn\ s))) \wedge$
    $no\text{-}oracle\ ainfo\ uinfo \wedge$
    — action: Update the state to include m
    dp2-add-loc2 s s' asid m

definition
  dp2-recv
where
  dp2-recv s m asid ainfo uinfo hf1 downif pas fut hist s' ≡
    — guard: a packet with valid interfaces and valid validation fields is in the incoming channel.
    $m = (\!|\ AInfo = ainfo,\ UInfo = uinfo,\ past = pas,\ future = hf1\#fut,\ history = hist\ |\!) \wedge$
    $dp2\text{-}in\text{-}chan2\ s\ (ASID\ (AHI\ hf1))\ downif\ m \wedge$
    $DownIF\ (AHI\ hf1) = Some\ downif \wedge$
    $ASID\ (AHI\ hf1) = asid \wedge$
    $hf\text{-}valid\text{-}generic\ ainfo\ uinfo\ (rev(pas)@hf1\#fut)\ (head\ pas)\ hf1\ (head\ fut) \wedge$

    — action: Update local state to include message
    dp2-add-loc2 s s' asid m

definition
  dp2-send
where
  dp2-send s m asid ainfo uinfo hf1 upif pas fut hist s' ≡
    — guard: forward the packet on the external channel and advance the path by one hop.
    $m = (\!|\ AInfo = ainfo,\ UInfo = uinfo,\ past = pas,\ future = hf1\#fut,\ history = hist\ |\!) \wedge$
    $m \in (loc2\ s)\ asid \wedge$
    $UpIF\ (AHI\ hf1) = Some\ upif \wedge$
    $ASID\ (AHI\ hf1) = asid \wedge$
    $hf\text{-}valid\text{-}generic\ ainfo\ uinfo\ (rev(pas)@hf1\#fut)\ (head\ pas)\ hf1\ (head\ fut) \wedge$

    — action: Update state to include modified message
    dp2-add-chan2 s s' asid upif (|
        $AInfo = ainfo,$
        $UInfo = uinfo,$
        $past = hf1\ \#\ pas,$
        $future = fut,$
        $history = AHI\ hf1\ \#\ hist$
      |)

definition
  dp2-deliver
where
  dp2-deliver s m asid ainfo uinfo hf1 pas fut hist s' ≡

$m = (\!| \ AInfo = ainfo, \ UInfo = uinfo, \ past = pas, \ future = hf1\#fut, \ history = hist \ |\!) \wedge$
$m \in (loc2 \ s) \ asid \wedge$
$ASID \ (AHI \ hf1) = asid \wedge$
$fut = [] \wedge$
$hf\text{-}valid\text{-}generic \ ainfo \ uinfo \ (rev(pas)@hf1\#fut) \ (head \ pas) \ hf1 \ (head \ fut) \wedge$

— action: Update state to include modified message
$dp2\text{-}add\text{-}loc2 \ s \ s' \ asid$
$(\!|$
$AInfo = ainfo,$
$UInfo = uinfo,$
$past = hf1 \ \# \ pas,$
$future = [],$
$history = (AHI \ hf1) \ \# \ hist$
$|\!)$

This is an attacker event (but does not require the dispatching node to be compromised).

The attacker is allowed to send any message that he can derive from his intruder knowledge, except for messages whose path origin he has queried the oracle for.

definition
dp2-dispatch-ext
where
$dp2\text{-}dispatch\text{-}ext \ s \ m \ asid \ ainfo \ uinfo \ upif \ pas \ fut \ hist \ s' \equiv$
$m = (\!| \ AInfo = ainfo, \ UInfo = uinfo, \ past = pas, \ future = fut, \ history = hist \ |\!) \wedge$
$hist = [] \wedge$
$ik\text{-}auth\text{-}ainfo \ ainfo \in synth \ (analz \ (ik\text{-}dyn \ s)) \wedge$
$(\forall hf \in set \ fut \cup set \ pas \ . \ ik\text{-}hf \ hf \subseteq synth \ (analz \ (ik\text{-}dyn \ s))) \wedge$
$no\text{-}oracle \ ainfo \ uinfo \wedge$

— action
$dp2\text{-}add\text{-}chan2 \ s \ s' \ asid \ upif \ m$

2.4.4 Transition system

fun *dp2-trans* **where**
$dp2\text{-}trans \ s \ (evt\text{-}dispatch\text{-}int2 \ asid \ m) \ s' \longleftrightarrow$
$(\exists \ ainfo \ uinfo \ pas \ fut \ hist \ . \ dp2\text{-}dispatch\text{-}int \ s \ m \ ainfo \ uinfo \ asid \ pas \ fut \ hist \ s') \ |$
$dp2\text{-}trans \ s \ (evt\text{-}recv2 \ asid \ downif \ m) \ s' \longleftrightarrow$
$(\exists \ ainfo \ uinfo \ hf1 \ pas \ fut \ hist \ . \ dp2\text{-}recv \ s \ m \ asid \ ainfo \ uinfo \ hf1 \ downif \ pas \ fut \ hist \ s') \ |$
$dp2\text{-}trans \ s \ (evt\text{-}send2 \ asid \ upif \ m) \ s' \longleftrightarrow$
$(\exists \ ainfo \ uinfo \ hf1 \ pas \ fut \ hist. \ dp2\text{-}send \ s \ m \ asid \ ainfo \ uinfo \ hf1 \ upif \ pas \ fut \ hist \ s') \ |$
$dp2\text{-}trans \ s \ (evt\text{-}deliver2 \ asid \ m) \ s' \longleftrightarrow$
$(\exists \ ainfo \ uinfo \ hf1 \ pas \ fut \ hist. \ dp2\text{-}deliver \ s \ m \ asid \ ainfo \ uinfo \ hf1 \ pas \ fut \ hist \ s') \ |$
$dp2\text{-}trans \ s \ (evt\text{-}dispatch\text{-}ext2 \ asid \ upif \ m) \ s' \longleftrightarrow$
$(\exists \ ainfo \ uinfo \ pas \ fut \ hist \ . \ dp2\text{-}dispatch\text{-}ext \ s \ m \ asid \ ainfo \ uinfo \ upif \ pas \ fut \ hist \ s') \ |$
$dp2\text{-}trans \ s \ (evt\text{-}observe2 \ s'') \ s' \longleftrightarrow s = s' \wedge s = s'' \ |$
$dp2\text{-}trans \ s \ evt\text{-}skip2 \ s' \longleftrightarrow s = s'$

definition $dp2\text{-}init$ :: $('aahi, \ 'uhi, \ 'ainfo) \ dp2\text{-}state$ **where**
$dp2\text{-}init \equiv (\!| chan2 = (\lambda\text{-}. \ \{\}), \ loc2 = (\lambda\text{-}. \ \{\}) |\!)$

definition $dp2$ :: $(('aahi, \ 'uhi, \ 'ainfo) \ evt2, \ ('aahi, \ 'uhi, \ 'ainfo) \ dp2\text{-}state) \ ES$ **where**

dp2 ≡ (|
  init = (=) *dp2-init*,
  trans = *dp2-trans*
|)

lemmas *dp2-trans-defs* = *dp2-dispatch-int-def dp2-recv-def dp2-send-def dp2-deliver-def dp2-dispatch-ext-def*
lemmas *dp2-defs* = *dp2-def dp2-init-def dp2-trans-defs*

end

2.4.5 Assumptions of the parametrized model

We now list the assumptions of this parametrized model.

locale *dataplane-2* = *dataplane-2-ik-defs* - - - - - - - - - - *hf-valid-generic*
  for *hf-valid-generic* :: *'ainfo* ⇒ *msgterm*
    ⇒ (*'aahi*, *'uhi*) *HF list*
    ⇒ (*'aahi*, *'uhi*) *HF option*
    ⇒ (*'aahi*, *'uhi*) *HF*
    ⇒ (*'aahi*, *'uhi*) *HF option* ⇒ *bool* +
assumes *ik-seg-is-auth*:
  ⟦⋀*hf* . *hf* ∈ *set hfs* ⟹ *ik-hf hf* ⊆ *synth* (*analz ik*); *ik-auth-ainfo ainfo* ∈ *synth* (*analz ik*);
    nxt = *None*; *no-oracle ainfo uinfo*⟧
  ⟹ *pfragment ainfo*
          (*ifs-valid-prefix prev'*
            (*AHIS* (*hfs-valid-prefix-generic ainfo uinfo pas pre hfs nxt*))
           None)
              auth-seg0
begin

2.4.6 Mapping dp2 state to dp1 state

definition *R21* :: (*'aahi*, *'uhi*, *'ainfo*) *dp2-state* ⇒ (*'aahi*, *'ainfo*) *dp1-state* **where**
  R21 s = (|*chan* = λ*x* . *pkt2to1* ' ((*chan2 s*) *x*),
          loc = λ*x* . *pkt2to1* ' ((*loc2 s*) *x*)|)

lemma *auth-seg2-pfragment*:
  ⟦*pfragment ainfo* (*hf* # *fut*) *auth-seg2*; *AHIS* (*hf* # *fut*) = *x* # *xs*⟧
    ⟹ *pfragment ainfo* (*x* # *xs*) *auth-seg0*
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *dp2-in-chan2-to-0E*[*elim*]:
  ⟦*dp2-in-chan2 s1 a1 i1 pkt2*; *pkt2to1 pkt2* = *pkt0*; *s0* = *R21 s1*⟧ ⟹
    dp0-in-chan s0 a1 i1 pkt0
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *dp2-in-loc2-to-0E*[*elim*]:
  ⟦*pkt2* ∈ (*loc2 s1*) *asid*; *pkt2to1 pkt2* = *pkt0*; *P* = *pkt2to1* ' *loc2 s1 asid*⟧ ⟹
    pkt0 ∈ *P*
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *dp2-add-loc20E*:
 ⟦*dp2-add-loc2 s1 s1' asid p1*; *p0* = *pkt2to1 p1*; *s0* = *R21 s1*; *s0'* = *R21 s1'*⟧

$\Longrightarrow$ *dp0-add-loc s0 s0' asid p0*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *dp2-add-chan20E*:
$[\![$*dp2-add-chan2 s1 s1' a1 i1 p1*; *p0* = *pkt2to1 p1*; *s0* = *R21 s1*; *s0'* = *R21 s1'*$]\!]$
$\Longrightarrow$ *dp0-add-chan s0 s0' a1 i1 p0*
⟨*proof*⟩

2.4.7 Invariant: Derivable Intruder Knowledge is constant under *dp2-trans*

Derivable Intruder Knowledge stays constant throughout all reachable states

definition *inv-ik-dyn* :: (*'aahi*, *'uhi*, *'ainfo*) *dp2-state* ⇒ *bool* **where**
inv-ik-dyn s ≡ *ik-dyn s* ⊆ *synth* (*analz ik*)

lemma *inv-ik-dynI*:
assumes $\bigwedge$*t m x* . $[\![$*t* ∈ *ik-pkt m*; *m* ∈ *loc2 s x*$]\!]$ $\Longrightarrow$ *t* ∈ *synth* (*analz ik*)
and $\bigwedge$*t m x* . $[\![$*t* ∈ *ik-pkt m*; *m* ∈ *chan2 s x*$]\!]$ $\Longrightarrow$ *t* ∈ *synth* (*analz ik*)
shows *inv-ik-dyn s*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *inv-ik-dynD*:
assumes *inv-ik-dyn s*
shows $\bigwedge$*t m x* . $[\![$*m* ∈ *chan2 s x*; *t* ∈ *ik-pkt m*$]\!]$ $\Longrightarrow$ *t* ∈ *synth* (*analz ik*)
$\bigwedge$*t m x* . $[\![$*m* ∈ *loc2 s x*; *t* ∈ *ik-pkt m*$]\!]$ $\Longrightarrow$ *t* ∈ *synth* (*analz ik*)
⟨*proof*⟩

lemmas *inv-ik-dynE* = *inv-ik-dynD*[*elim-format*]

lemma *inv-ik-dyn-add-loc2*[*elim*!]:
$[\![$*dp2-add-loc2 s s' asid m*; *inv-ik-dyn s*; *ik-pkt m* ⊆ *synth* (*analz ik*)$]\!]$
$\Longrightarrow$ *inv-ik-dyn s'*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *inv-ik-dyn-add-chan2*[*elim*!]:
$[\![$*dp2-add-chan2 s s' a1 i1 m*; *inv-ik-dyn s*; *ik-pkt m* ⊆ *synth* (*analz ik*)$]\!]$
$\Longrightarrow$ *inv-ik-dyn s'*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *inv-ik-dyn-ik-dyn-ik*[*simp*]:
assumes *inv-ik-dyn s* **shows** *synth* (*analz* (*ik-dyn s*)) = *synth* (*analz ik*)
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *ik-hf-auth*: $[\![$*t* ∈ *ik-hf hf*; (*ainfo*, *AHIS hfs*) ∈ *auth-seg0*; *checkInfo ainfo*;
hfs-valid-prefix-generic ainfo uinfo [] *None hfs None* = *hfs*; *hf* ∈ *set hfs*$]\!]$
$\Longrightarrow$ *t* ∈ *synth* (*analz ik*)
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *Inv-inv-ik-dyn*: *reach dp2 s* $\Longrightarrow$ *inv-ik-dyn s*
⟨*proof*⟩

This lemma shows that our definition of *dp2-dispatch-int* also works for honest senders. All packets than an honest sender would send are authorized. According to the definition of the intruder knowledge, they are then also derivable from the intruder knowledge. Hence, an honest sender can send packets with authorized segments. However, the restriction on *no-oracle* remains.

lemma *dp2-dispatch-int-also-works-for-honest*:
$[\![$*pfragment ainfo fut auth-seg2*; *reach dp2 s*; *pas* $= []]\!] \Longrightarrow$
ik-auth-ainfo ainfo $\in$ *synth* (*analz* (*ik-dyn s*)) $\wedge$
($\forall$ *hf* $\in$ *set fut* $\cup$ *set pas* . *ik-hf hf* $\subseteq$ *synth* (*analz* (*ik-dyn s*)))
$\langle$*proof*$\rangle$

2.4.8 Refinement proof

fun π_2 :: (*'aahi*, *'uhi*, *'ainfo*) *evt2* $\Rightarrow$ (*'aahi*, *'ainfo*) *evt0* **where**
π_2 (*evt-dispatch-int2 asid m*) = *evt-dispatch-int0 asid* (*pkt2to1 m*)
| π_2 (*evt-recv2 asid downif m*) = *evt-recv0 asid downif* (*pkt2to1 m*)
| π_2 (*evt-send2 asid upif m*) = *evt-send0 asid upif* (*pkt2to1 m*)
| π_2 (*evt-deliver2 asid m*) = *evt-deliver0 asid* (*pkt2to1 m*)
| π_2 (*evt-dispatch-ext2 asid upif m*) = *evt-dispatch-ext0 asid upif* (*pkt2to1 m*)
| π_2 (*evt-observe2 s*) = *evt-observe0* (*R21 s*)
| π_2 *evt-skip2* = *evt-skip0*

lemma *dp2-refines-dp1*: *dp2* $\sqsubseteq_{\pi 2}$ *dp1*
$\langle$*proof*$\rangle$

2.4.9 Property preservation

The following property is weaker than *TR-auth* in that it does not include the future path. However, this is inconsequential, since we only included the future path in order for the original invariant to be inductive. The actual path authorization property only requires the history to be authorized. We remove the future path for clarity, as including it would require us to also restrict it using the interface- and cryptographic valid-prefix functions.

definition *auth-path2* :: (*'aahi*, *'uhi*, *'ainfo*) *pkt2* $\Rightarrow$ *bool* **where**
auth-path2 m $\equiv$ *pfragment* (*AInfo m*) (*rev* (*history m*)) *auth-seg0*

abbreviation *TR-auth2-hist* :: (*'aahi*, *'uhi*, *'ainfo*) *evt2 list set* **where** *TR-auth2-hist* $\equiv$
$\{\tau \mid \tau$. $\forall$ *s m* . *evt-observe2 s* $\in$ *set* τ $\wedge$ *soup2 m s* $\longrightarrow$ *auth-path2 m*$\}$

lemma *evt-observe2-0*:
evt-observe2 s $\in$ *set* $\tau \Longrightarrow$ *evt-observe0* (*R10* (*R21 s*)) $\in (\lambda x.\ \pi_1\ (\pi_2\ x))$ ‘ *set* τ
$\langle$*proof*$\rangle$

declare *soup2-def* [*simp del*]
declare *soup-def* [*simp del*]

lemma *loc2to0*: $[\![$*mc* $\in$ *loc2 sc x*; *sa* = *R10* (*R21 sc*); *ma* = *pkt1to0loc* (*pkt2to1 mc*)$]\!] \Longrightarrow$ *ma* $\in$ *loc sa x*
$\langle$*proof*$\rangle$

lemma *chan2to0*: $[\![$*mc* $\in$ *chan2 sc* (*a1*, *i1*, *a2*, *i2*); *sa* = *R10* (*R21 sc*); *ma* = *pkt1to0chan a1 i1* (*pkt2to1 mc*)$]\!]$
$\Longrightarrow$ *ma* $\in$ *chan sa* (*a1*, *i1*, *a2*, *i2*)
$\langle$*proof*$\rangle$

lemma *loc2to0-auth*:
$[\![mc \in loc2\ sc\ x;\ sa = R10\ (R21\ sc);\ ma = pkt1to0loc\ (pkt2to1\ mc);\ auth\text{-}path\ ma]\!] \Longrightarrow auth\text{-}path2\ mc$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *chan2to0-auth*:
$[\![mc \in chan2\ sc\ (a1,\ i1,\ a2,\ i2);\ sa = R10\ (R21\ sc);\ ma = pkt1to0chan\ a1\ i1\ (pkt2to1\ mc);\ auth\text{-}path\ ma]\!] \Longrightarrow auth\text{-}path2\ mc$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *tr2-satisfies-pathauthorization*: $dp2 \models_{ES} TR\text{-}auth2\text{-}hist$
⟨*proof*⟩

definition *inv-detect2* :: $('aahi,\ 'uhi,\ 'ainfo)\ dp2\text{-}state \Rightarrow bool$ **where**
$inv\text{-}detect2\ s \equiv \forall\, m\ .\ soup2\ m\ s \longrightarrow prefix\ (history\ m)\ (AHIS\ (past\ m))$

abbreviation *TR-detect2* **where** $TR\text{-}detect2 \equiv \{\tau \mid \tau\ .\ \forall\ s\ .\ evt\text{-}observe2\ s \in set\ \tau \longrightarrow inv\text{-}detect2\ s\}$

lemma *tr2-satisfies-detectability*: $dp2 \models_{ES} TR\text{-}detect2$
⟨*proof*⟩

end
end

2.5 Network Assumptions used for authorized segments.

theory *Network-Assumptions*
imports
Network-Model
begin

locale *network-assums-generic* = *network-model* - *auth-seg0* **for**
auth-seg0 :: ('*ainfo* × '*aahi ahi-scheme list*) *set* +
assumes
— All authorized segments have valid interfaces
ASM-if-valid: $(info,\ l) \in auth\text{-}seg0 \Longrightarrow ifs\text{-}valid\text{-}None\ l$ **and**
— All authorized segments are rooted, i.e., they start with None
ASM-empty [*simp*, *intro*!]: $(info,\ []) \in auth\text{-}seg0$ **and**
ASM-rooted: $(info,\ l) \in auth\text{-}seg0 \Longrightarrow rooted\ l$ **and**
ASM-terminated: $(info,\ l) \in auth\text{-}seg0 \Longrightarrow terminated\ l$

locale *network-assums-undirect* = *network-assums-generic* - - +
assumes
ASM-adversary: $[\![\bigwedge hf.\ hf \in set\ hfs \Longrightarrow ASID\ hf \in bad]\!] \Longrightarrow (info,\ hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg0$

locale *network-assums-direct* = *network-assums-generic* - - +
assumes
ASM-singleton: $[\![ASID\ hf \in bad]\!] \Longrightarrow (info,\ [hf]) \in auth\text{-}seg0$ **and**
ASM-extension: $[\![(info,\ hf2\#ys) \in auth\text{-}seg0;\ ASID\ hf2 \in bad;\ ASID\ hf1 \in bad]\!]$
$\Longrightarrow (info,\ hf1\#hf2\#ys) \in auth\text{-}seg0$ **and**
ASM-modify: $[\![(info,\ hf\#ys) \in auth\text{-}seg0;\ ASID\ hf = a;\ ASID\ hf' = a;\ UpIF\ hf' = UpIF\ hf;\ a \in bad]\!]$
$\Longrightarrow (info,\ hf'\#ys) \in auth\text{-}seg0$ **and**
ASM-cutoff: $[\![(info,\ zs@hf\#ys) \in auth\text{-}seg0;\ ASID\ hf = a;\ a \in bad]\!] \Longrightarrow (info,\ hf\#ys) \in auth\text{-}seg0$
begin

lemma *auth-seg0-non-empty* [*simp*, *intro*!]: $auth\text{-}seg0 \neq \{\}$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *auth-seg0-non-empty-frag* [*simp*, *intro*!]: $\exists\ info\ .\ pfragment\ info\ []\ auth\text{-}seg0$
⟨*proof*⟩

This lemma applies the extendability assumptions on *auth-seg0* to pfragments of *auth-seg0*.

lemma *extend-pfragment0*:
assumes *pfragment ainfo* (*hf2#xs*) *auth-seg0*
assumes $ASID\ hf1 \in bad$
assumes $ASID\ hf2 \in bad$
shows *pfragment ainfo* (*hf1#hf2#xs*) *auth-seg0*
⟨*proof*⟩

This lemma shows that the above assumptions imply that of the undirected setting

lemma $[\![\bigwedge hf.\ hf \in set\ hfs \Longrightarrow ASID\ hf \in bad]\!] \Longrightarrow (info,\ hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg0$
⟨*proof*⟩

end
end

2.6 Parametrized dataplane protocol for directed protocols

This is an instance of the *Parametrized-Dataplane-2* model, specifically for protocols that authorize paths in an undirected fashion. We specialize the *hf-valid-generic* check to a still parametrized, but more concrete *hf-valid* check. The rest of the parameters remain abstract until a later instantiation with a concrete protocols (see the instances directory).

While both the models for undirected and directed protocols import assumptions from the theory *Network-Assumptions*, they differ in strength: the assumptions made by undirected protocols are strictly weaker, since the entire forwarding path is authorized by each AS, and not only the future path from the perspective of each AS. In addition, the specific conditions that instances have to verify differs between the undirected and the directed setting (compare the locales *dataplane-3-undirected* and *dataplane-3-directed*).

This explains the need to split up the verification of the attacker event into two theories. Despite the differences that concrete protocols may exhibit, these two theories suffice to show the crux of the refinement proof. The instances merely have to show a set of static conditions

theory *Parametrized-Dataplane-3-directed*
  imports
    Parametrized-Dataplane-2 Network-Assumptions
begin

2.6.1 Hop validation check, authorized segments, and path extraction.

First we define a locale that requires a number of functions. We will later extend this to a locale *dataplane-3-directed*, which makes assumptions on how these functions operate. We separate the assumptions in order to make use of some auxiliary definitions defined in this locale.

locale *dataplane-3-directed-defs = network-assums-direct - - - auth-seg0*
  for *auth-seg0* :: $('ainfo \times 'aahi\ ahi\text{-}scheme\ list)\ set$ +
— *hf-valid* is the check that every hop performs on its own and neighboring hop fields as well as on ainfo and uinfo. Note that this includes checking the validity of the info fields. Right now, we have a restriction in the model that this check can not depend on the previous hop field (see *COND-hf-valid-no-prev*).
  fixes *hf-valid* :: $'ainfo \Rightarrow msgterm$
    $\Rightarrow ('aahi, 'uhi)\ HF\ option$
    $\Rightarrow ('aahi, 'uhi)\ HF$
    $\Rightarrow ('aahi, 'uhi)\ HF\ option \Rightarrow bool$
— We need checkInfo only for the empty segment (ainfo, []) since according to the definition any such ainfo will be contained in the intruder knowledge. With checkInfo we can restrict this.
  and *checkInfo* :: $'ainfo \Rightarrow bool$
— extr extracts from a given hop validation field (HVF hf) the entire authenticated future path that is embedded in the HVF.
  and *extr* :: $msgterm \Rightarrow 'aahi\ ahi\text{-}scheme\ list$
— *extr-ainfo* extracts the authenticated info field (ainfo) from a given hop validation field.
  and *extr-ainfo* :: $msgterm \Rightarrow 'ainfo$
— *ik-auth-ainfo* extracts what msgterms the intruder can learn from analyzing a given authenticated info field. Note that currently we do not have a similar function for the unauthenticated info field *uinfo*. Protocols should thus only use that field with terms that the intruder can already synthesize (such as Numbers).
  and *ik-auth-ainfo* :: $'ainfo \Rightarrow msgterm$

— *ik-hf* extracts what msgterms the intruder can learn from analyzing a given hop field; for instance, the hop validation field HVF hf and the segment identifier UHI hf.
and *ik-hf* :: ('*aahi*, '*uhi*) *HF* ⇒ *msgterm set*
begin

abbreviation *hf-valid-generic* :: '*ainfo* ⇒ *msgterm*
⇒ ('*aahi*, '*uhi*) *HF list*
⇒ ('*aahi*, '*uhi*) *HF option*
⇒ ('*aahi*, '*uhi*) *HF*
⇒ ('*aahi*, '*uhi*) *HF option* ⇒ *bool* **where**
hf-valid-generic ainfo uinfo pas pre hf nxt ≡ *hf-valid ainfo uinfo pre hf nxt*

definition *hfs-valid-prefix-generic* ::
'*ainfo* ⇒ *msgterm* ⇒ ('*aahi*, '*uhi*) *HF list* ⇒ ('*aahi*, '*uhi*) *HF option* ⇒ ('*aahi*, '*uhi*) *HF list* ⇒ ('*aahi*, '*uhi*) *HF option* ⇒ ('*aahi*, '*uhi*) *HF list***where**
hfs-valid-prefix-generic ainfo uinfo pas pre fut nxt ≡
TW.takeW (λ *pre hf nxt* . *hf-valid ainfo uinfo pre hf nxt*) *pre fut nxt*

declare *hfs-valid-prefix-generic-def* [*simp*]

lemma *prefix-hfs-valid-prefix-generic*:
prefix (*hfs-valid-prefix-generic ainfo uinfo pas pre fut nxt*) *fut*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *cons-hfs-valid-prefix-generic*: *hf-valid-generic ainfo uinfo pas* (*head pas*) *hf1* (*head fut*)
⟹ *hfs-valid-prefix-generic ainfo uinfo pas* (*head pas*) (*hf1* # *fut*) *None* =
hf1 # (*hfs-valid-prefix-generic ainfo uinfo* (*hf1*#*pas*) (*Some hf1*) *fut None*)
⟨*proof*⟩

sublocale *dataplane-2-defs - - - auth-seg0 hf-valid-generic hfs-valid-prefix-generic checkInfo extr extr-ainfo ik-auth-ainfo ik-hf*
⟨*proof*⟩

abbreviation *hfs-valid* **where**
hfs-valid ainfo uinfo pre l nxt ≡ *TW.holds* (*hf-valid ainfo uinfo*) *pre l nxt*

abbreviation *hfs-valid-prefix* **where**
hfs-valid-prefix ainfo uinfo pre l nxt ≡ *TW.takeW* (*hf-valid ainfo uinfo*) *pre l nxt*

abbreviation *hfs-valid-None* **where**
hfs-valid-None ainfo uinfo l ≡ *hfs-valid ainfo uinfo None l None*

abbreviation *hfs-valid-None-prefix* **where**
hfs-valid-None-prefix ainfo uinfo l ≡ *hfs-valid-prefix ainfo uinfo None l None*

end

print-locale *dataplane-3-directed-defs*
locale *dataplane-3-directed-ik-defs* = *dataplane-3-directed-defs - - - - hf-valid checkInfo extr extr-ainfo ik-auth-ainfo ik-hf* **for**
hf-valid :: '*ainfo* ⇒ *msgterm* ⇒ ('*aahi*, '*uhi*) *HF option* ⇒ ('*aahi*, '*uhi*) *HF* ⇒ ('*aahi*, '*uhi*) *HF option* ⇒ *bool*
and *checkInfo* :: '*ainfo* ⇒ *bool*

and *extr* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *'aahi ahi-scheme list*
and *extr-ainfo* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *'ainfo*
and *ik-auth-ainfo* :: *'ainfo* ⇒ *msgterm*
and *ik-hf* :: (*'aahi*, *'uhi*) *HF* ⇒ *msgterm set*
\+
— *ik-add* is Additional Intruder Knowledge, such as hop authenticators in EPIC L1.
fixes *ik-add* :: *msgterm set*
— *ik-oracle* is another type of additional Intruder Knowledge. We use it to model the attacker's ability to brute-force individual hop validation fields and segment identifiers.
and *ik-oracle* :: *msgterm set*
— As *ik-oracle* gives the attacker direct access to hop validation fields that could be used to break the property, we have to either restrict the scope of the property, or restrict the attacker such that he cannot use the oracle-obtained hop validation fields in packets whose path origin matches the path origin of the oracle query. We choose the latter approach and fix a predicate *no-oracle* that tells us if the oracle has not been queried for a path origin (ainfo, uinfo combination). This is a prophecy variable.
and *no-oracle* :: *'ainfo* ⇒ *msgterm* ⇒ *bool*
begin

lemma *auth-seg2-elem*: ⟦(*ainfo*, *hfs*) ∈ *auth-seg2*; *hf* ∈ *set hfs*⟧
⟹ ∃ *pre nxt uinfo* . *hf-valid ainfo uinfo pre hf nxt* ∧ *checkInfo ainfo* ∧ (*ainfo*, *AHIS hfs*) ∈ *auth-seg0*
⟨*proof*⟩

print-locale *dataplane-2-ik-defs*
sublocale *dataplane-2-ik-defs* - - - - *hfs-valid-prefix-generic checkInfo extr extr-ainfo ik-auth-ainfo ik-hf hf-valid-generic ik-add ik-oracle no-oracle*
⟨*proof*⟩
end

2.6.2 Assumptions of the parametrized model

We now list the assumptions of this parametrized model.

print-locale *dataplane-3-directed-ik-defs*
locale *dataplane-3-directed* = *dataplane-3-directed-ik-defs* - - - - *hf-valid checkInfo extr extr-ainfo ik-auth-ainfo ik-hf ik-add ik-oracle no-oracle*
for *hf-valid* :: *'ainfo* ⇒ *msgterm*
⇒ (*'aahi*, *'uhi*) *HF option*
⇒ (*'aahi*, *'uhi*) *HF*
⇒ (*'aahi*, *'uhi*) *HF option* ⇒ *bool*
and *checkInfo* :: *'ainfo* ⇒ *bool*
and *extr* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *'aahi ahi-scheme list*
and *extr-ainfo* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *'ainfo*
and *ik-auth-ainfo* :: *'ainfo* ⇒ *msgterm*
and *ik-hf* :: (*'aahi*, *'uhi*) *HF* ⇒ *msgterm set*
and *ik-add* :: *msgterm set*
and *ik-oracle* :: *msgterm set*
and *no-oracle* :: *'ainfo* ⇒ *msgterm* ⇒ *bool* +

— A valid validation field that is contained in ik corresponds to an authorized hop field. (The notable exceptions being oracle-obtained validation fields.) This relates the result of *ik-hf* to its argument. *ik-hf* has to produce a msgterm that is either unique for each given hop field x, or it is only produced by an 'equivalence class' of hop fields such that either all of the hop fields of the class are authorized, or none are. While the extr function (constrained by assumptions below) also binds the hop information to the validation field, it does so only for AHI and AInfo, but not for UHI.

assumes *COND-ik-hf*:
$[\![$*hf-valid ainfo uinfo pre hf nxt*; *ik-hf hf* $\subseteq$ *analz ik*; *ik-auth-ainfo ainfo* $\in$ *analz ik*;
no-oracle ainfo uinfo$]\!]$
$\Longrightarrow \exists$ *hfs* . *hf* $\in$ *set hfs* $\wedge$ (*ainfo*, *hfs*) $\in$ *auth-seg2*

— A valid validation field that can be synthesized from the initial intruder knowledge is already contained in the initial intruder knowledge if it belongs to an honest AS. This can be combined with the previous assumption.

and *COND-honest-hf-analz*:
$[\![$*ASID* (*AHI hf*) $\notin$ *bad*; *hf-valid ainfo uinfo pre hf nxt*; *ik-hf hf* $\subseteq$ *synth* (*analz ik*);
no-oracle ainfo uinfo$]\!]$
$\Longrightarrow$ *ik-hf hf* $\subseteq$ *analz ik*

— A valid info field that can be synthesized from the initial intruder knowledge is already contained in the initial intruder knowlege.

and *COND-ainfo-analz*:
$[\![$*hf-valid ainfo uinfo pre hf nxt*; *ik-auth-ainfo ainfo* $\in$ *synth* (*analz ik*)$]\!]$
$\Longrightarrow$ *ik-auth-ainfo ainfo* $\in$ *analz ik*

— Extracting the path from the validation field of the first hop field of some path l returns an extension of the AHI-level path of the valid prefix of l.

and *COND-path-prefix-extr*:
prefix (*AHIS* (*hfs-valid-prefix ainfo uinfo pre l nxt*))
(*extr-from-hd l*)

— Extracting the path from the validation field of the first hop field of a completely valid path l returns a prefix of the AHI-level path of l. Together with *prefix* (*AHIS* (*hfs-valid-prefix ?ainfo ?uinfo ?pre ?l ?nxt*)) (*extr-from-hd ?l*), this implies that extr of a completely valid path l is exactly the same AHI-level path as l (see lemma below).

and *COND-extr-prefix-path*:
$[\![$*hfs-valid ainfo uinfo pre l nxt*; *nxt* = *None*$]\!] \Longrightarrow$ *prefix* (*extr-from-hd l*) (*AHIS l*)

— The validation check does not depend on the prev hop field. For up-segments this is fine, but this is an assumption we may eventually get rid off when we verify down-segments.

and *COND-hf-valid-no-prev*:
hf-valid ainfo uinfo pre hf nxt $\longleftrightarrow$ *hf-valid ainfo uinfo pre′ hf nxt*

— A valid hop field is only valid for one specific uinfo.

and *COND-hf-valid-uinfo*:
$[\![$*hf-valid ainfo uinfo pre hf nxt*; *hf-valid ainfo′ uinfo′ pre′ hf nxt′*$]\!]$
$\Longrightarrow$ *uinfo′* = *uinfo*

begin

lemma *holds-path-eq-extr*:
$[\![$*hfs-valid ainfo uinfo pre l nxt*; *nxt* = *None*$]\!] \Longrightarrow$ *extr-from-hd l* = *AHIS l*
⟨*proof*⟩

2.6.3 Lemmas that are needed for the refinement proof

lemma *honest-hf-analz-subsetI*:
$[\![$*ASID* (*AHI hf*) $\notin$ *bad*; *hf-valid ainfo uinfo prev hf nxt*; *ik-hf hf* $\subseteq$ *synth* (*analz ik*);
no-oracle ainfo uinfo; *t* $\in$ *ik-hf hf*$]\!]$
$\Longrightarrow$ *t* $\in$ *analz ik*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *extr-from-hd-eq*: ($l \neq [] \wedge l' \neq [] \wedge$ *hd l* = *hd l′*) $\vee$ ($l = [] \wedge l' = []$) $\Longrightarrow$ *extr-from-hd l* = *extr-from-hd l′*

$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *path-prefix-extr-l*:
$[\![hd\ l = hd\ l'; l' \neq []]\!] \Longrightarrow prefix\ (AHIS\ (hfs\text{-}valid\text{-}prefix\ ainfo\ uinfo\ pre\ l\ nxt))$
$(extr\text{-}from\text{-}hd\ l')$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *path-prefix-extr-l'*:
$[\![hd\ l = hd\ l'; l' \neq []; hf = hd\ l']\!] \Longrightarrow prefix\ (AHIS\ (hfs\text{-}valid\text{-}prefix\ ainfo\ uinfo\ pre\ l\ nxt))$
$(extr\ (HVF\ hf))$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *pfrag-extr-auth*:
assumes $hf \in set\ p$ **and** $(ainfo, p) \in auth\text{-}seg2$
shows $pfragment\ ainfo\ (extr\ (HVF\ hf))\ auth\text{-}seg0$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *X-in-ik-is-auth*:
assumes $ik\text{-}hf\ hf1 \subseteq analz\ ik$ **and** $ik\text{-}auth\text{-}ainfo\ ainfo \in analz\ ik$ **and** $no\text{-}oracle\ ainfo\ uinfo$
shows $pfragment\ ainfo\ (AHIS\ (hfs\text{-}valid\text{-}prefix\ ainfo\ uinfo$
pre
$(hf1\ \#\ fut)$
$nxt))$
$auth\text{-}seg0$
$\langle proof \rangle$

Fragment is extendable

makes sure that: the segment is terminated, i.e. the leaf AS's HF has Eo = None

fun $terminated2 :: ('aahi, 'uhi)\ HF\ list \Rightarrow bool$ **where**
$terminated2\ (hf\#xs) \longleftrightarrow DownIF\ (AHI\ hf) = None \vee ASID\ (AHI\ hf) \in bad$
$|\ terminated2\ [] = True$

lemma *terminated20*: $terminated\ (AHIS\ m) \Longrightarrow terminated2\ m\ \langle proof \rangle$

lemma *cons-snoc*: $\exists\, y\ ys.\ x\ \#\ xs = ys\ @\ [y]$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *terminated2-suffix*:
$[\![terminated2\ l; l = zs\ @\ x\ \#\ xs; DownIF\ (AHI\ x) \neq None; ASID\ (AHI\ x) \notin bad]\!] \Longrightarrow \exists\, y\ ys.\ zs = ys\ @\ [y]$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *attacker-modify-cutoff*: $[\![(info, zs@hf\#ys) \in auth\text{-}seg0; ASID\ hf = a;$
$ASID\ hf' = a; UpIF\ hf' = UpIF\ hf; a \in bad; ys' = hf'\#ys]\!] \Longrightarrow (info, ys') \in auth\text{-}seg0$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *auth-seg2-ik-hf*[*elim*]: $[\![x \in ik\text{-}hf\ hf; hf \in set\ hfs; (ainfo, hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2\ ]\!] \Longrightarrow x \in analz\ ik$
$\langle proof \rangle$

This lemma proves that an attacker-derivable segment that starts with an attacker hop field, and has a next hop field which belongs to an honest AS, when restricted to its valid prefix, is authorized. Essentially this is the case because the hop field of the honest AS already contains an interface identifier DownIF that points to the attacker-controlled AS. Thus, there must have been some attacker-owned hop field on the original authorized path. Given the assumptions we make in the directed setting, the attacker can make take a suffix of an authorized path, such that his hop field is first on the path, and he can change his own hop field if his hop field is the first on the path, thus, that segment is also authorized.

lemma *fragment-with-Eo-Some-extendable*:
  assumes *ik-hf hf2* $\subseteq$ *synth* (*analz ik*)
  and *ik-auth-ainfo ainfo* $\in$ *synth* (*analz ik*)
  and *ASID* (*AHI hf1*) $\in$ *bad*
  and *ASID* (*AHI hf2*) $\notin$ *bad*
  and *hf-valid ainfo uinfo pre hf1* (*Some hf2*)
  and *no-oracle ainfo uinfo*
  shows
   pfragment ainfo
     (*ifs-valid-prefix pre'*
       (*AHIS* (*hfs-valid-prefix ainfo uinfo*
         pre
         (*hf1* # *hf2* # *fut*)
         None))
     None)
    auth-seg0
⟨*proof*⟩

A1 and A2 collude to make a wormhole

We lift *extend-pfragment0* to DP2.

lemma *extend-pfragment2*:
  assumes *pfragment ainfo*
(*ifs-valid-prefix* (*Some* (*AHI hf1*))
(*AHIS* (*hfs-valid-prefix ainfo uinfo*
        (*Some hf1*)
        (*hf2* # *fut*)
        nxt))
    None)
        auth-seg0
  assumes *hf-valid ainfo uinfo pre hf1* (*Some hf2*)
  assumes *ASID* (*AHI hf1*) $\in$ *bad*
  assumes *ASID* (*AHI hf2*) $\in$ *bad*
  shows *pfragment ainfo*
(*ifs-valid-prefix pre'*
(*AHIS* (*hfs-valid-prefix ainfo uinfo*
        pre
        (*hf1* # *hf2* # *fut*)
        nxt))
    None)
      auth-seg0
  ⟨*proof*⟩

This is the central lemma that we need to prove to show the refinement between this model and dp1. It states: If an attacker can synthesize a segment from his knowledge, and does not use a path origin that was used to query the oracle, then the valid prefix of the segment is authorized. Thus, the attacker cannot create any valid but unauthorized segments.

lemma *ik-seg-is-auth*:
  assumes $\bigwedge hf\ .\ hf \in set\ hfs \Longrightarrow ik\text{-}hf\ hf \subseteq synth\ (analz\ ik)$ **and**
        $ik\text{-}auth\text{-}ainfo\ ainfo \in synth\ (analz\ ik)$ **and** $nxt = None$ **and** *no-oracle ainfo uinfo*
  shows *pfragment ainfo*
        (*ifs-valid-prefix prev'*
          (*AHIS* (*hfs-valid-prefix ainfo uinfo pre hfs nxt*))
         None)
          auth-seg0
⟨*proof*⟩

sublocale *dataplane-2* - - - - *hfs-valid-prefix-generic* - - - - - - - - *hf-valid-generic*
  ⟨*proof*⟩

end
end

2.7 Parametrized dataplane protocol for undirected protocols

This is an instance of the *Parametrized-Dataplane-2* model, specifically for protocols that authorize paths in an undirected fashion. We specialize the *hf-valid-generic* check to a still parametrized, but more concrete *hf-valid* check. The rest of the parameters remain abstract until a later instantiation with a concrete protocols (see the instances directory).

While both the models for undirected and directed protocols import assumptions from the theory *Network-Assumptions*, they differ in strength: the assumptions made by undirected protocols are strictly weaker, since the entire forwarding path is authorized by each AS, and not only the future path from the perspective of each AS. In addition, the specific conditions that instances have to verify differs between the undirected and the directed setting (compare the locales *dataplane-3-undirected* and *dataplane-3-directed*).

This explains the need to split up the verification of the attacker event into two theories. Despite the differences that concrete protocols may exhibit, these two theories suffice to show the crux of the refinement proof. The instances merely have to show a set of static conditions

theory *Parametrized-Dataplane-3-undirected*
  imports
    Parametrized-Dataplane-2 Network-Assumptions
begin

2.7.1 Hop validation check, authorized segments, and path extraction.

First we define a locale that requires a number of functions. We will later extend this to a locale *dataplane-3-undirected*, which makes assumptions on how these functions operate. We separate the assumptions in order to make use of some auxiliary definitions defined in this locale.

locale *dataplane-3-undirected-defs* = *network-assums-undirect* - - - *auth-seg0*
  for *auth-seg0* :: ('*ainfo* × '*aahi ahi-scheme list*) *set* +
— *hf-valid* is the check that every hop performs on its own and neighboring hop fields as well as on ainfo and uinfo. Note that this includes checking the validity of the info fields. Right now, we have a restriction in the model that this check can not depend on the previous hop field (see *COND-hf-valid-no-prev*).
  fixes *hf-valid* :: '*ainfo* ⇒ *msgterm*
    ⇒ ('*aahi*, '*uhi*) *HF list*
    ⇒ ('*aahi*, '*uhi*) *HF*
    ⇒ *bool*
— We need checkInfo only for the empty segment (ainfo, []) since according to the definition any such ainfo will be contained in the intruder knowledge. With checkInfo we can restrict this.
  and *checkInfo* :: '*ainfo* ⇒ *bool*
— extr extracts from a given hop validation field (HVF hf) the entire authenticated future path that is embedded in the HVF.
  and *extr* :: *msgterm* ⇒ '*aahi ahi-scheme list*
— *extr-ainfo* extracts the authenticated info field (ainfo) from a given hop validation field.
  and *extr-ainfo* :: *msgterm* ⇒ '*ainfo*
— *ik-auth-ainfo* extracts what msgterms the intruder can learn from analyzing a given authenticated info field. Note that currently we do not have a similar function for the unauthenticated info field *uinfo*. Protocols should thus only use that field with terms that the intruder can already synthesize (such as Numbers).
  and *ik-auth-ainfo* :: '*ainfo* ⇒ *msgterm*

— *ik-hf* extracts what msgterms the intruder can learn from analyzing a given hop field; for instance, the hop validation field HVF hf and the segment identifier UHI hf.
and *ik-hf* :: ($'aahi$, $'uhi$) *HF* ⇒ *msgterm set*
begin

abbreviation *hf-valid-generic* :: *'ainfo* ⇒ *msgterm*
⇒ (*'aahi*, *'uhi*) *HF list*
⇒ (*'aahi*, *'uhi*) *HF option*
⇒ (*'aahi*, *'uhi*) *HF*
⇒ (*'aahi*, *'uhi*) *HF option* ⇒ *bool* **where**
hf-valid-generic ainfo uinfo hfs pre hf nxt ≡ *hf-valid ainfo uinfo hfs hf*

abbreviation *hfs-valid-prefix* **where**
hfs-valid-prefix ainfo uinfo pas fut ≡ (*takeWhile* (λ*hf* . *hf-valid ainfo uinfo* (*rev*(*pas*)@*fut*) *hf*) *fut*)

definition *hfs-valid-prefix-generic* ::
'ainfo ⇒ *msgterm* ⇒ (*'aahi*, *'uhi*) *HF list* ⇒ (*'aahi*, *'uhi*) *HF option* ⇒ (*'aahi*, *'uhi*) *HF list* ⇒
(*'aahi*, *'uhi*) *HF option* ⇒ (*'aahi*, *'uhi*) *HF list***where**
hfs-valid-prefix-generic ainfo uinfo pas pre fut nxt ≡
hfs-valid-prefix ainfo uinfo pas fut

declare *hfs-valid-prefix-generic-def* [*simp*]

lemma *prefix-hfs-valid-prefix-generic*:
prefix (*hfs-valid-prefix-generic ainfo uinfo pas pre fut nxt*) *fut*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *cons-hfs-valid-prefix-generic*:
⟦*hf-valid-generic ainfo uinfo hfs* (*head pas*) *hf1* (*head fut*); *hfs* = (*rev pas*)@*hf1* #*fut*⟧
⟹ *hfs-valid-prefix-generic ainfo uinfo pas* (*head pas*) (*hf1* # *fut*) *None* =
hf1 # (*hfs-valid-prefix-generic ainfo uinfo* (*hf1*#*pas*) (*Some hf1*) *fut None*)
⟨*proof*⟩

sublocale *dataplane-2-defs - - - auth-seg0 hf-valid-generic hfs-valid-prefix-generic checkInfo extr extr-ainfo ik-auth-ainfo ik-hf*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *auth-seg2-elem*: ⟦(*ainfo*, *hfs*) ∈ *auth-seg2*; *hf* ∈ *set hfs*⟧
⟹ ∃ *uinfo* . *hf-valid ainfo uinfo hfs hf* ∧ *checkInfo ainfo* ∧ (*ainfo*, *AHIS hfs*) ∈ *auth-seg0*
⟨*proof*⟩

end

print-locale *dataplane-3-undirected-defs*
locale *dataplane-3-undirected-ik-defs* = *dataplane-3-undirected-defs - - - - hf-valid checkInfo extr extr-ainfo ik-auth-ainfo ik-hf* **for**
hf-valid :: *'ainfo* ⇒ *msgterm* ⇒ (*'aahi*, *'uhi*) *HF list* ⇒ (*'aahi*, *'uhi*) *HF* ⇒ *bool*
and *checkInfo* :: *'ainfo* ⇒ *bool*
and *extr* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *'aahi ahi-scheme list*
and *extr-ainfo* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *'ainfo*
and *ik-auth-ainfo* :: *'ainfo* ⇒ *msgterm*
and *ik-hf* :: (*'aahi*, *'uhi*) *HF* ⇒ *msgterm set*

+
— *ik-add* is Additional Intruder Knowledge, such as hop authenticators in EPIC L1.
fixes *ik-add* :: *msgterm set*
— *ik-oracle* is another type of additional Intruder Knowledge. We use it to model the attacker's ability to brute-force individual hop validation fields and segment identifiers.
and *ik-oracle* :: *msgterm set*
— As *ik-oracle* gives the attacker direct access to hop validation fields that could be used to break the property, we have to either restrict the scope of the property, or restrict the attacker such that he cannot use the oracle-obtained hop validation fields in packets whose path origin matches the path origin of the oracle query. We choose the latter approach and fix a predicate *no-oracle* that tells us if the oracle has not been queried for a path origin (ainfo, uinfo combination). This is a prophecy variable.
and *no-oracle* :: $'ainfo \Rightarrow msgterm \Rightarrow bool$
begin

print-locale *dataplane-2-ik-defs*
sublocale *dataplane-2-ik-defs - - - - hfs-valid-prefix-generic checkInfo extr extr-ainfo ik-auth-ainfo ik-hf hf-valid-generic ik-add ik-oracle no-oracle*
⟨*proof*⟩
end
print-locale *dataplane-3-undirected-ik-defs*
locale *dataplane-3-undirected* = *dataplane-3-undirected-ik-defs - - - - hf-valid checkInfo extr extr-ainfo ik-auth-ainfo ik-hf ik-add ik-oracle no-oracle*
for *hf-valid* :: $'ainfo \Rightarrow msgterm \Rightarrow ('aahi, 'uhi)\ HF\ list \Rightarrow ('aahi, 'uhi)\ HF \Rightarrow bool$
and *checkInfo* :: $'ainfo \Rightarrow bool$
and *extr* :: $msgterm \Rightarrow 'aahi\ ahi\text{-}scheme\ list$
and *extr-ainfo* :: $msgterm \Rightarrow 'ainfo$
and *ik-auth-ainfo* :: $'ainfo \Rightarrow msgterm$
and *ik-hf* :: $('aahi, 'uhi)\ HF \Rightarrow msgterm\ set$
and *ik-add* :: *msgterm set*
and *ik-oracle* :: *msgterm set*
and *no-oracle* :: $'ainfo \Rightarrow msgterm \Rightarrow bool$ +

— A valid validation field that is contained in ik corresponds to an authorized hop field. (The notable exceptions being oracle-obtained validation fields.) This relates the result of *ik-hf* to its argument. *ik-hf* has to produce a msgterm that is either unique for each given hop field x, or it is only produced by an 'equivalence class' of hop fields such that either all of the hop fields of the class are authorized, or none are. While the extr function (constrained by assumptions below) also binds the hop information to the validation field, it does so only for AHI and AInfo, but not for UHI.
assumes *COND-ik-hf*:
$[\![hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ l\ hf;\ ik\text{-}hf\ hf \subseteq analz\ ik;\ ik\text{-}auth\text{-}ainfo\ ainfo \in analz\ ik;$
$no\text{-}oracle\ ainfo\ uinfo;\ hf \in set\ l]\!]$
$\Longrightarrow \exists hfs\ .\ hf \in set\ hfs \wedge (ainfo, hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2$
— A valid validation field that can be synthesized from the initial intruder knowledge is already contained in the initial intruder knowledge if it belongs to an honest AS. This can be combined with the previous assumption.
and *COND-honest-hf-analz*:
$[\![ASID\ (AHI\ hf) \notin bad;\ hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ l\ hf;\ ik\text{-}hf\ hf \subseteq synth\ (analz\ ik);$
$no\text{-}oracle\ ainfo\ uinfo;\ hf \in set\ l]\!]$
$\Longrightarrow ik\text{-}hf\ hf \subseteq analz\ ik$
— A valid info field that can be synthesized from the initial intruder knowledge is already contained in the initial intruder knowlege.
and *COND-ainfo-analz*:

$[\![$*hf-valid ainfo uinfo l hf*; *ik-auth-ainfo ainfo* $\in$ *synth* (*analz ik*)$]\!]$
$\Longrightarrow$ *ik-auth-ainfo ainfo* $\in$ *analz ik*
— Each valid hop field contains the entire path.
and *COND-extr*:
$[\![$*hf-valid ainfo uinfo l hf*$]\!]$ $\Longrightarrow$ *extr* (*HVF hf*) = *AHIS l*
— A valid hop field is only valid for one specific uinfo.
and *COND-hf-valid-uinfo*:
$[\![$*hf-valid ainfo uinfo l hf*; *hf-valid ainfo' uinfo' l' hf*$]\!]$
$\Longrightarrow$ *uinfo'* = *uinfo*
begin

This is the central lemma that we need to prove to show the refinement between this model and dp1. It states: If an attacker can synthesize a segment from his knowledge, and does not use a path origin that was used to query the oracle, then the valid prefix of the segment is authorized. Thus, the attacker cannot create any valid but unauthorized segments.

lemma *ik-seg-is-auth*:
assumes $\bigwedge$*hf* . *hf* $\in$ *set fut* $\Longrightarrow$ *ik-hf hf* $\subseteq$ *synth* (*analz ik*) **and**
ik-auth-ainfo ainfo $\in$ *synth* (*analz ik*) **and** *nxt* = *None* **and** *no-oracle ainfo uinfo*
shows *pfragment ainfo*
(*AHIS* (*hfs-valid-prefix ainfo uinfo pas fut*))
auth-seg0
⟨*proof*⟩

sublocale *dataplane-2* - - - - *hfs-valid-prefix-generic* - - - - - - - - *hf-valid-generic*
⟨*proof*⟩

end
end

Chapter 3

Instances

Here we instantiate our concrete parametrized models with a number of protocols from the literature and variants of them that we derive ourselves.

3.1 SCION

theory *SCION*
  imports
    ../Parametrized-Dataplane-3-directed
    ../infrastructure/Keys
begin

locale *scion-defs* = *network-assums-direct* - - - *auth-seg0*
  for *auth-seg0* :: (*msgterm* × *ahi list*) *set*
begin

3.1.1 Hop validation check and extract functions

type-synonym *SCION-HF* = (*unit*, *unit*) *HF*

The predicate *hf-valid* is given to the concrete parametrized model as a parameter. It ensures the authenticity of the hop authenticator in the hop field. The predicate takes an authenticated info field (in this model always a numeric value, hence the matching on Num ts), the hop field to be validated and in some cases the next hop field.

We distinguish if there is a next hop field (this yields the two cases below). If there is not, then the hvf simply consists of a MAC over the authenticated info field and the local routing information of the hop, using the key of the hop to which the hop field belongs. If on the other hand, there is a subsequent hop field, then the hvf of that hop field is also included in the MAC computation.

fun *hf-valid* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *msgterm*
    ⇒ *SCION-HF option*
    ⇒ *SCION-HF*
    ⇒ *SCION-HF option* ⇒ *bool* **where**
  hf-valid (*Num ts*) *uinfo* - (|*AHI* = *ahi*, *UHI* = -, *HVF* = *x*|) (*Some* (|*AHI* = *ahi2*, *UHI* = -, *HVF* = *x2*|)) ⟷
    (∃ *upif downif upif2 downif2*.
        x = *Mac*[*macKey* (*ASID ahi*)] (*L* [*Num ts*, *upif*, *downif*, *upif2*, *downif2*, *x2*]) ∧
        ASIF (*DownIF ahi*) *downif* ∧ *ASIF* (*UpIF ahi*) *upif* ∧
        ASIF (*DownIF ahi2*) *downif2* ∧ *ASIF* (*UpIF ahi2*) *upif2* ∧ *uinfo* = ε)
| *hf-valid* (*Num ts*) *uinfo* - (|*AHI* = *ahi*, *UHI* = -, *HVF* = *x*|) *None* ⟷
    (∃ *upif downif*. *x* = *Mac*[*macKey* (*ASID ahi*)] (*L* [*Num ts*, *upif*, *downif*]) ∧
        ASIF (*DownIF ahi*) *downif* ∧ *ASIF* (*UpIF ahi*) *upif* ∧ *uinfo* = ε)
| *hf-valid* - - - - - = *False*

We can extract the entire path from the hvf field, which includes the local forwarding of the current hop, the local forwarding information of the next hop (if existant) and, recursively, all upstream hvf fields and their hop information.

fun *extr* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *ahi list* **where**
  extr (*Mac*[*macKey asid*] (*L* [*ts*, *upif*, *downif*, *upif2*, *downif2*, *x2*]))
  = (|*UpIF* = *ASO upif*, *DownIF* = *ASO downif*, *ASID* = *asid*|) # *extr x2*
| *extr* (*Mac*[*macKey asid*] (*L* [*ts*, *upif*, *downif*]))
  = [(|*UpIF* = *ASO upif*, *DownIF* = *ASO downif*, *ASID* = *asid*|)]
| *extr* - = []

Extract the authenticated info field from a hop validation field.

fun *extr-ainfo* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *msgterm* **where**
  extr-ainfo (*Mac*[*macKey asid*] (*L* (*Num ts* # *xs*))) = *Num ts*
| *extr-ainfo* - = ε

abbreviation *ik-auth-ainfo* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *msgterm* **where**
  ik-auth-ainfo ≡ *id*

An authenticated info field is always a number (corresponding to a timestamp).

abbreviation *checkInfo* **where**
  checkInfo ainfo ≡ (∃ *ts*. *ainfo* = *Num ts*)

When observing a hop field, an attacker learns the HVF. UHI is empty and the AHI only contains public information that are not terms.

fun *ik-hf* :: *SCION-HF* ⇒ *msgterm set* **where**
  ik-hf hf = {*HVF hf*}

abbreviation *no-oracle* **where** *no-oracle* ≡ (λ - -. *True*)

We now define useful properties of the above definition.

lemma *hf-valid-invert*:
  hf-valid tsn uinfo prev hf mo ⟷
   ((∃ *ahi ahi2 ts upif downif asid x upif2 downif2 x2*.
     hf = (|*AHI* = *ahi*, *UHI* = (), *HVF* = *x*|) ∧
     ASID ahi = *asid* ∧ *ASIF* (*DownIF ahi*) *downif* ∧ *ASIF* (*UpIF ahi*) *upif* ∧
     mo = *Some* (|*AHI* = *ahi2*, *UHI* = (), *HVF* = *x2*|) ∧
     ASIF (*DownIF ahi2*) *downif2* ∧ *ASIF* (*UpIF ahi2*) *upif2* ∧
     x = *Mac*[*macKey asid*] (*L* [*tsn*, *upif*, *downif*, *upif2*, *downif2*, *x2*]) ∧
     tsn = *Num ts* ∧
     uinfo = ε)
  ∨ (∃ *ahi ts upif downif asid x*.
     hf = (|*AHI* = *ahi*, *UHI* = (), *HVF* = *x*|) ∧
     ASID ahi = *asid* ∧ *ASIF* (*DownIF ahi*) *downif* ∧ *ASIF* (*UpIF ahi*) *upif* ∧
     mo = *None* ∧
     x = *Mac*[*macKey asid*] (*L* [*tsn*, *upif*, *downif*]) ∧
     tsn = *Num ts* ∧
     uinfo = ε)
)
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *hf-valid-checkInfo*[*dest*]: *hf-valid ainfo uinfo prev hf z* ⟹ *checkInfo ainfo*
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *info-hvf*:
  assumes *hf-valid ainfo uinfo prev m z hf-valid ainfo′ uinfo′ prev′ m′ z′ HVF m* = *HVF m′*
  shows *ainfo′* = *ainfo m′* = *m*
  ⟨*proof*⟩

3.1.2 Definitions and properties of the added intruder knowledge

Here we define a *ik-add* and *ik-oracle* as being empty, as these features are not used in this instance model.

sublocale *dataplane-3-directed-defs - - - auth-seg0 hf-valid checkInfo extr extr-ainfo ik-auth-ainfo ik-hf*
⟨*proof*⟩

declare *TW.holds-set-list*[*dest*]
declare *TW.holds-takeW-is-identity*[*simp*]
declare *parts-singleton*[*dest*]

abbreviation *ik-add* :: *msgterm set* **where** *ik-add* ≡ {}

abbreviation *ik-oracle* :: *msgterm set* **where** *ik-oracle* ≡ {}

3.1.3 Properties of the intruder knowledge, including *ik-add* and *ik-oracle*

We now instantiate the parametrized model's definition of the intruder knowledge, using the definitions of *ik-add* and *ik-oracle* from above. We then prove the properties that we need to instantiate the *dataplane-3-directed* locale.

sublocale
dataplane-3-directed-ik-defs - - - auth-seg0 hf-valid checkInfo extr extr-ainfo ik-auth-ainfo ik-hf ik-add ik-oracle no-oracle
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *ik-auth-hfs-form*: $t \in$ *parts ik-auth-hfs* $\Longrightarrow \exists\ t'\ .\ t = Hash\ t'$
⟨*proof*⟩

declare *ik-auth-hfs-def*[*simp del*]

lemma *parts-ik-auth-hfs*[*simp*]: *parts ik-auth-hfs* = *ik-auth-hfs*
⟨*proof*⟩

This lemma allows us not only to expand the definition of *ik-auth-hfs*, but also to obtain useful properties, such as a term being a Hash, and it being part of a valid hop field.

lemma *ik-auth-hfs-simp*:
$t \in$ *ik-auth-hfs* $\longleftrightarrow (\exists t'\ .\ t = Hash\ t') \wedge (\exists hf\ .\ t = HVF\ hf$
$\wedge (\exists hfs.\ hf \in set\ hfs \wedge (\exists ainfo\ .\ (ainfo, hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2$
$\wedge (\exists\ prev\ nxt\ uinfo.\ hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ prev\ hf\ nxt))))$ (**is** *?lhs* ⟷ *?rhs*)
⟨*proof*⟩

Properties of Intruder Knowledge

lemma *auth-ainfo*[*dest*]: $[\![(ainfo, hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2]\!] \Longrightarrow \exists\ ts\ .\ ainfo = Num\ ts$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *Num-ik*[*intro*]: $Num\ ts \in ik$
⟨*proof*⟩

There are no ciphertexts (or signatures) in *parts ik*. Thus, *analz ik* and *parts ik* are identical.

lemma *analz-parts-ik*[*simp*]: *analz ik* = *parts ik*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *parts-ik*[*simp*]: *parts ik* = *ik*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *key-ik-bad*: $Key\ (macK\ asid) \in ik \Longrightarrow asid \in bad$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *MAC-synth-helper*:
assumes $hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ prev\ m\ z$ $HVF\ m = Mac[Key\ (macK\ asid)]\ j$ $HVF\ m \in ik$
shows $\exists hfs.\ m \in set\ hfs \wedge (ainfo,\ hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2$
⟨*proof*⟩

This definition helps with the limiting the number of cases generated. We don't require it, but it is convenient. Given a hop validation field and an asid, return if the hvf has the expected format.

definition $mac\text{-}format :: msgterm \Rightarrow as \Rightarrow bool$ **where**
$mac\text{-}format\ m\ asid \equiv \exists\ j\ .\ m = Mac[macKey\ asid]\ j$

If a valid hop field is derivable by the attacker, but does not belong to the attacker, then the hop field is already contained in the set of authorized segments.

lemma *MAC-synth*:
assumes $hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ prev\ m\ z$ $HVF\ m \in synth\ ik$ $mac\text{-}format\ (HVF\ m)\ asid$
$asid \notin bad$ $checkInfo\ ainfo$
shows $\exists hfs\ .\ m \in set\ hfs \wedge (ainfo,\ hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2$
⟨*proof*⟩

3.1.4 Direct proof goals for interpretation of *dataplane-3-directed*

lemma *COND-honest-hf-analz*:
assumes $ASID\ (AHI\ hf) \notin bad$ $hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ prev\ hf\ nxt$ $ik\text{-}hf\ hf \subseteq synth\ (analz\ ik)$
$no\text{-}oracle\ ainfo\ uinfo$
shows $ik\text{-}hf\ hf \subseteq analz\ ik$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-ainfo-analz*:
assumes $hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ prev\ hf\ nxt$ **and** $ik\text{-}auth\text{-}ainfo\ ainfo \in synth\ (analz\ ik)$
shows $ik\text{-}auth\text{-}ainfo\ ainfo \in analz\ ik$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-ik-hf*:
assumes $hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ prev\ hf\ z$ **and** $HVF\ hf \in ik$ **and** $no\text{-}oracle\ ainfo\ uinfo$
shows $\exists hfs.\ hf \in set\ hfs \wedge (ainfo,\ hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-extr-prefix-path*:
$[\![hfs\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ pre\ l\ nxt;\ nxt = None]\!] \Longrightarrow prefix\ (extr\text{-}from\text{-}hd\ l)\ (AHIS\ l)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-path-prefix-extr*:
$prefix\ (AHIS\ (hfs\text{-}valid\text{-}prefix\ ainfo\ uinfo\ pre\ l\ nxt))$
$(extr\text{-}from\text{-}hd\ l)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-hf-valid-no-prev*:
$hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ prev\ hf\ z \longleftrightarrow hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ prev'\ hf\ z$

$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *COND-hf-valid-uinfo*:
$[\![hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ pre\ hf\ nxt;\ hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo'\ uinfo'\ pre'\ hf\ nxt']\!] \Longrightarrow uinfo' = uinfo$
$\langle proof \rangle$

3.1.5 Instantiation of *dataplane-3-directed* locale

sublocale
dataplane-3-directed - - - auth-seg0 hf-valid checkInfo extr extr-ainfo ik-auth-ainfo ik-hf ik-add ik-oracle no-oracle
$\langle proof \rangle$

end
end

3.2 SCION

This is a slightly variant version of SCION, in which the successor's hop information is not embedded in the MAC of a hop field. This difference shows up in the definition of *hf-valid*.

theory *SCION-variant*
  imports
    ../Parametrized-Dataplane-3-directed
    ../infrastructure/Keys
begin

locale *scion-defs* = *network-assums-direct* - - - *auth-seg0*
  for *auth-seg0* :: (*msgterm* × *ahi list*) *set*
begin

3.2.1 Hop validation check and extract functions

type-synonym *SCION-HF* = (*unit*, *unit*) *HF*

The predicate *hf-valid* is given to the concrete parametrized model as a parameter. It ensures the authenticity of the hop authenticator in the hop field. The predicate takes an authenticated info field (in this model always a numeric value, hence the matching on Num ts), the hop field to be validated and in some cases the next hop field.

We distinguish if there is a next hop field (this yields the two cases below). If there is not, then the hvf simply consists of a MAC over the authenticated info field and the local routing information of the hop, using the key of the hop to which the hop field belongs. If on the other hand, there is a subsequent hop field, then the hvf of that hop field is also included in the MAC computation.

fun *hf-valid* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *msgterm*
    ⇒ *SCION-HF option*
    ⇒ *SCION-HF*
    ⇒ *SCION-HF option* ⇒ *bool* **where**
  hf-valid (*Num ts*) *uinfo* - (|*AHI* = *ahi*, *UHI* = -, *HVF* = *x*|) (*Some* (|*AHI* = *ahi2*, *UHI* = -, *HVF* = *x2*|)) ⟷
    (∃ *upif downif*. *x* = *Mac*[*macKey* (*ASID ahi*)] (*L* [*Num ts*, *upif*, *downif*, *x2*]) ∧
        ASIF (*DownIF ahi*) *downif* ∧ *ASIF* (*UpIF ahi*) *upif* ∧ *uinfo* = ε)
  | *hf-valid* (*Num ts*) *uinfo* - (|*AHI* = *ahi*, *UHI* = -, *HVF* = *x*|) *None* ⟷
    (∃ *upif downif*. *x* = *Mac*[*macKey* (*ASID ahi*)] (*L* [*Num ts*, *upif*, *downif*]) ∧
        ASIF (*DownIF ahi*) *downif* ∧ *ASIF* (*UpIF ahi*) *upif* ∧ *uinfo* = ε)
  | *hf-valid* - - - - - = *False*

We can extract the entire path from the hvf field, which includes the local forwarding information as well as, recursively, all upstream hvf fields and their hop information.

fun *extr* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *ahi list* **where**
  extr (*Mac*[*macKey asid*] (*L* [*ts*, *upif*, *downif*, *x2*]))
  = (|*UpIF* = *ASO upif*, *DownIF* = *ASO downif*, *ASID* = *asid*|) # *extr x2*
  | *extr* (*Mac*[*macKey asid*] (*L* [*ts*, *upif*, *downif*]))
  = [(|*UpIF* = *ASO upif*, *DownIF* = *ASO downif*, *ASID* = *asid*|)]
  | *extr* - = []

Extract the authenticated info field from a hop validation field.

fun *extr-ainfo* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *msgterm* **where**
  $extr\text{-}ainfo\ (Mac[macKey\ asid]\ (L\ (Num\ ts\ \#\ xs))) = Num\ ts$
| $extr\text{-}ainfo\ \text{-} = \varepsilon$

abbreviation *ik-auth-ainfo* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *msgterm* **where**
  $ik\text{-}auth\text{-}ainfo \equiv id$

An authenticated info field is always a number (corresponding to a timestamp).

abbreviation *checkInfo* **where**
  $checkInfo\ ainfo \equiv (\exists\, ts.\ ainfo = Num\ ts)$

When observing a hop field, an attacker learns the HVF. UHI is empty and the AHI only contains public information that are not terms.

fun *ik-hf* :: *SCION-HF* ⇒ *msgterm set* **where**
  $ik\text{-}hf\ hf = \{HVF\ hf\}$

abbreviation *no-oracle* **where** $no\text{-}oracle \equiv (\lambda\ \text{-}\ \text{-}.\ True)$

We now define useful properties of the above definition.

lemma *hf-valid-invert*:
  $hf\text{-}valid\ tsn\ uinfo\ prev\ hf\ mo \longleftrightarrow$
  $((\exists\, ahi\ ahi2\ ts\ upif\ downif\ asid\ x\ x2.$
    $hf = (\!|AHI = ahi,\ UHI = (),\ HVF = x|\!) \land$
    $ASID\ ahi = asid \land ASIF\ (DownIF\ ahi)\ downif \land ASIF\ (UpIF\ ahi)\ upif \land$
    $mo = Some\ (\!|AHI = ahi2,\ UHI = (),\ HVF = x2|\!) \land$
    $x = Mac[macKey\ asid]\ (L\ [tsn,\ upif,\ downif,\ x2]) \land$
    $tsn = Num\ ts \land$
    $uinfo = \varepsilon)$
  $\lor (\exists\, ahi\ ts\ upif\ downif\ asid\ x.$
    $hf = (\!|AHI = ahi,\ UHI = (),\ HVF = x|\!) \land$
    $ASID\ ahi = asid \land ASIF\ (DownIF\ ahi)\ downif \land ASIF\ (UpIF\ ahi)\ upif \land$
    $mo = None \land$
    $x = Mac[macKey\ asid]\ (L\ [tsn,\ upif,\ downif]) \land$
    $tsn = Num\ ts \land$
    $uinfo = \varepsilon)$
  $)$
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *hf-valid-checkInfo*[*dest*]: $hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ prev\ hf\ z \Longrightarrow checkInfo\ ainfo$
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *info-hvf*:
  assumes $hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ prev\ m\ z\ hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo'\ uinfo'\ prev'\ m'\ z'\ HVF\ m = HVF\ m'$
  shows $ainfo' = ainfo\ m' = m$
  ⟨*proof*⟩

3.2.2 Definitions and properties of the added intruder knowledge

Here we define a *ik-add* and *ik-oracle* as being empty, as these features are not used in this instance model.

sublocale *dataplane-3-directed-defs - - - auth-seg0 hf-valid checkInfo extr extr-ainfo ik-auth-ainfo ik-hf*

⟨*proof*⟩

declare *TW.holds-set-list*[*dest*]
declare *TW.holds-takeW-is-identity*[*simp*]
declare *parts-singleton*[*dest*]

abbreviation *ik-add* :: *msgterm set* **where** *ik-add* ≡ {}

abbreviation *ik-oracle* :: *msgterm set* **where** *ik-oracle* ≡ {}

3.2.3 Properties of the intruder knowledge, including *ik-add* and *ik-oracle*

We now instantiate the parametrized model's definition of the intruder knowledge, using the definitions of *ik-add* and *ik-oracle* from above. We then prove the properties that we need to instantiate the *dataplane-3-directed* locale.

sublocale
dataplane-3-directed-ik-defs - - - auth-seg0 hf-valid checkInfo extr extr-ainfo ik-auth-ainfo ik-hf ik-add ik-oracle no-oracle
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *ik-auth-hfs-form*: $t \in parts\ ik\text{-}auth\text{-}hfs \Longrightarrow \exists\ t'\ .\ t = Hash\ t'$
⟨*proof*⟩

declare *ik-auth-hfs-def*[*simp del*]

lemma *parts-ik-auth-hfs*[*simp*]: $parts\ ik\text{-}auth\text{-}hfs = ik\text{-}auth\text{-}hfs$
⟨*proof*⟩

This lemma allows us not only to expand the definition of *ik-auth-hfs*, but also to obtain useful properties, such as a term being a Hash, and it being part of a valid hop field.

lemma *ik-auth-hfs-simp*:
$t \in ik\text{-}auth\text{-}hfs \longleftrightarrow (\exists t'\ .\ t = Hash\ t') \wedge (\exists hf\ .\ t = HVF\ hf$
$\wedge (\exists hfs.\ hf \in set\ hfs \wedge (\exists ainfo\ .\ (ainfo,\ hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2$
$\wedge (\exists\ prev\ nxt\ uinfo.\ hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ prev\ hf\ nxt))))$ (**is** *?lhs* ⟷ *?rhs*)
⟨*proof*⟩

Properties of Intruder Knowledge

lemma *auth-ainfo*[*dest*]: $[\![(ainfo,\ hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2]\!] \Longrightarrow \exists\ ts\ .\ ainfo = Num\ ts$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *Num-ik*[*intro*]: $Num\ ts \in ik$
⟨*proof*⟩

There are no ciphertexts (or signatures) in *parts ik*. Thus, *analz ik* and *parts ik* are identical.

lemma *analz-parts-ik*[*simp*]: $analz\ ik = parts\ ik$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *parts-ik*[*simp*]: $parts\ ik = ik$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *key-ik-bad*: $Key\ (macK\ asid) \in ik \Longrightarrow asid \in bad$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *MAC-synth-helper*:
assumes $hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ prev\ m\ z$ $HVF\ m = Mac[Key\ (macK\ asid)]\ j$ $HVF\ m \in ik$
shows $\exists hfs.\ m \in set\ hfs \wedge (ainfo,\ hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2$
⟨*proof*⟩

This definition helps with the limiting the number of cases generated. We don't require it, but it is convenient. Given a hop validation field and an asid, return if the hvf has the expected format.

definition *mac-format* :: $msgterm \Rightarrow as \Rightarrow bool$ **where**
$mac\text{-}format\ m\ asid \equiv \exists\ j\ .\ m = Mac[macKey\ asid]\ j$

If a valid hop field is derivable by the attacker, but does not belong to the attacker, then the hop field is already contained in the set of authorized segments.

lemma *MAC-synth*:
assumes $hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ prev\ m\ z$ $HVF\ m \in synth\ ik$ $mac\text{-}format\ (HVF\ m)\ asid$
$asid \notin bad$ $checkInfo\ ainfo$
shows $\exists hfs\ .\ m \in set\ hfs \wedge (ainfo,\ hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2$
⟨*proof*⟩

3.2.4 Direct proof goals for interpretation of *dataplane-3-directed*

lemma *COND-honest-hf-analz*:
assumes $ASID\ (AHI\ hf) \notin bad$ $hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ prev\ hf\ nxt$ $ik\text{-}hf\ hf \subseteq synth\ (analz\ ik)$
$no\text{-}oracle\ ainfo\ uinfo$
shows $ik\text{-}hf\ hf \subseteq analz\ ik$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-ainfo-analz*:
assumes $hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ prev\ hf\ nxt$ **and** $ik\text{-}auth\text{-}ainfo\ ainfo \in synth\ (analz\ ik)$
shows $ik\text{-}auth\text{-}ainfo\ ainfo \in analz\ ik$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-ik-hf*:
assumes $hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ prev\ hf\ z$ **and** $HVF\ hf \in ik$ **and** $no\text{-}oracle\ ainfo\ uinfo$
shows $\exists hfs.\ hf \in set\ hfs \wedge (ainfo,\ hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-extr-prefix-path*:
$[\![hfs\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ pre\ l\ nxt;\ nxt = None]\!] \Longrightarrow prefix\ (extr\text{-}from\text{-}hd\ l)\ (AHIS\ l)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-path-prefix-extr*:
$prefix\ (AHIS\ (hfs\text{-}valid\text{-}prefix\ ainfo\ uinfo\ pre\ l\ nxt))$
$(extr\text{-}from\text{-}hd\ l)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-hf-valid-no-prev*:
$hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ prev\ hf\ z \longleftrightarrow hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ prev'\ hf\ z$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-hf-valid-uinfo*:
$[\![$*hf-valid ainfo uinfo pre hf nxt*; *hf-valid ainfo' uinfo' pre' hf nxt'*$]\!] \Longrightarrow$ *uinfo' = uinfo*
⟨*proof*⟩

3.2.5 Instantiation of *dataplane-3-directed* locale

sublocale
dataplane-3-directed - - - auth-seg0 hf-valid checkInfo extr extr-ainfo ik-auth-ainfo ik-hf ik-add ik-oracle no-oracle
⟨*proof*⟩

end
end

3.3 EPIC Level 1 in the Basic Attacker Model

theory *EPIC-L1-BA*
 imports
  ../Parametrized-Dataplane-3-directed
  ../infrastructure/Keys
begin

locale *epic-l1-defs* = *network-assums-direct* - - - *auth-seg0*
 for *auth-seg0* :: (*msgterm* × *ahi list*) *set*
begin

3.3.1 Hop validation check and extract functions

The predicate *hf-valid* is given to the concrete parametrized model as a parameter. It ensures the authenticity of the hop authenticator in the hop field. The predicate takes an authenticated info field (in this model always a numeric value, hence the matching on Num ts), an unauthenticated info field uinfo, the hop field to be validated and in some cases the next hop field.

We distinguish if there is a next hop field (this yields the two cases below). If there is not, then the hop authenticator σ simply consists of a MAC over the authenticated info field and the local routing information of the hop, using the key of the hop to which the hop field belongs. If on the other hand, there is a subsequent hop field, then the uhi field of that hop field is also included in the MAC computation.

The hop authenticator σ is used to compute both the hop validation field and the uhi field. The first is computed as a MAC over the path origin (pair of absolute timestamp ts and the relative timestamp given in uinfo), using the hop authenticator as a key to the MAC. The hop authenticator is not secret, and any end host can use it to create a valid hvf. The uhi field, according to the protocol description, is σ shortened to a few bytes. We model this as applying the hash on σ.

The predicate *hf-valid* checks if the hop authenticator, hvf and uhi field are computed correctly.

fun *hf-valid* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *msgterm*
  ⇒ (*unit*, *msgterm*) *HF option*
  ⇒ (*unit*, *msgterm*) *HF*
  ⇒ (*unit*, *msgterm*) *HF option* ⇒ *bool* **where**
 hf-valid (*Num ts*) *uinfo* - ⦇*AHI* = *ahi*, *UHI* = *uhi*, *HVF* = *x*⦈ (*Some* ⦇*AHI* = *ahi2*, *UHI* = *uhi2*, *HVF* = *x2*⦈) ⟷
  (∃ σ *upif downif*. σ = *Mac*[*macKey* (*ASID ahi*)] (*L* [*Num ts*, *upif*, *downif*, *uhi2*]) ∧
    ASIF (*DownIF ahi*) *downif* ∧ *ASIF* (*UpIF ahi*) *upif* ∧ *uhi* = *Hash* σ ∧ *x* = *Mac*[σ] ⟨*Num ts*, *uinfo*⟩)
| *hf-valid* (*Num ts*) *uinfo* - ⦇*AHI* = *ahi*, *UHI* = *uhi*, *HVF* = *x*⦈ *None* ⟷
  (∃ σ *upif downif*. σ = *Mac*[*macKey* (*ASID ahi*)] (*L* [*Num ts*, *upif*, *downif*]) ∧
    ASIF (*DownIF ahi*) *downif* ∧ *ASIF* (*UpIF ahi*) *upif* ∧ *uhi* = *Hash* σ ∧ *x* = *Mac*[σ] ⟨*Num ts*, *uinfo*⟩)
| *hf-valid* - - - - - = *False*

We can extract the entire path from the uhi field, since it includes the hop authenticator, which includes the local forwarding information as well as, recursively, all upstream hop authenticators and their hop information. However, the parametrized model defines the extract function to operate on the hop validation field, not the uhi field. We therefore define a separate function that extracts the path from a hvf. We can do so, as both hvf and uhi contain the hop authenticator. Internally, that function uses *extrUhi*.

fun *extrUhi* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *ahi list* **where**
extrUhi (*Hash* (*Mac*[*macKey asid*] (*L* [*ts*, *upif*, *downif*, *uhi2*])))
= (| *UpIF* = *ASO upif*, *DownIF* = *ASO downif*, *ASID* = *asid* |) # *extrUhi uhi2*
| *extrUhi* (*Hash* (*Mac*[*macKey asid*] (*L* [*ts*, *upif*, *downif*])))
= [(| *UpIF* = *ASO upif*, *DownIF* = *ASO downif*, *ASID* = *asid* |)]
| *extrUhi* - = []

This function extracts from a hop validation field (HVF hf) the entire path.

fun *extr* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *ahi list* **where**
extr (*Mac*[σ] -) = *extrUhi* (*Hash* σ)
| *extr* - = []

Extract the authenticated info field from a hop validation field.

fun *extr-ainfo* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *msgterm* **where**
extr-ainfo (*Mac*[*Mac*[*macKey asid*] (*L* (*Num ts* # *xs*))] -) = *Num ts*
| *extr-ainfo* - = ε

abbreviation *ik-auth-ainfo* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *msgterm* **where**
ik-auth-ainfo ≡ *id*

An authenticated info field is always a number (corresponding to a timestamp).

abbreviation *checkInfo* **where**
checkInfo ainfo ≡ (∃ *ts*. *ainfo* = *Num ts*)

When observing a hop field, an attacker learns the HVF and the UHI. The AHI only contains public information that are not terms.

fun *ik-hf* :: (*unit*, *msgterm*) *HF* ⇒ *msgterm set* **where**
ik-hf hf = {*HVF hf*, *UHI hf*}

abbreviation *no-oracle* **where** *no-oracle* ≡ (λ - -. *True*)

We now define useful properties of the above definition.

lemma *hf-valid-invert*:
hf-valid tsn uinfo prev hf mo ⟷
((∃ *ahi ahi2* σ *ts upif downif asid x upif2 downif2 asid2 uhi uhi2 x2*.
hf = (| *AHI* = *ahi*, *UHI* = *uhi*, *HVF* = *x* |) ∧
ASID ahi = *asid* ∧ *ASIF* (*DownIF ahi*) *downif* ∧ *ASIF* (*UpIF ahi*) *upif* ∧
mo = *Some* (| *AHI* = *ahi2*, *UHI* = *uhi2*, *HVF* = *x2* |) ∧
ASID ahi2 = *asid2* ∧ *ASIF* (*DownIF ahi2*) *downif2* ∧ *ASIF* (*UpIF ahi2*) *upif2* ∧
σ = *Mac*[*macKey asid*] (*L* [*tsn*, *upif*, *downif*, *uhi2*]) ∧
tsn = *Num ts* ∧
uhi = *Hash* σ ∧
x = *Mac*[σ] ⟨*tsn*, *uinfo*⟩)
∨ (∃ *ahi* σ *ts upif downif asid uhi x*.
hf = (| *AHI* = *ahi*, *UHI* = *uhi*, *HVF* = *x* |) ∧
ASID ahi = *asid* ∧ *ASIF* (*DownIF ahi*) *downif* ∧ *ASIF* (*UpIF ahi*) *upif* ∧
mo = *None* ∧
σ = *Mac*[*macKey asid*] (*L* [*tsn*, *upif*, *downif*]) ∧

$tsn = Num\ ts \wedge$
$uhi = Hash\ \sigma \wedge$
$x = Mac[\sigma]\ \langle tsn,\ uinfo\rangle)$
)
$\langle proof\rangle$

lemma *hf-valid-checkInfo*[*dest*]: $hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ prev\ hf\ z \Longrightarrow checkInfo\ ainfo$
$\langle proof\rangle$

lemma *info-hvf*:
assumes $hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ prev\ m\ z\ HVF\ m = Mac[\sigma]\ \langle ainfo',\ uinfo'\rangle \vee hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo'\ uinfo'\ prev'\ m\ z'$
shows $uinfo = uinfo'\ ainfo' = ainfo$
$\langle proof\rangle$

3.3.2 Definitions and properties of the added intruder knowledge

Here we define a sets which are added to the intruder knowledge: *ik-add*, which contains hop authenticators.

sublocale *dataplane-3-directed-defs - - - auth-seg0 hf-valid checkInfo extr extr-ainfo ik-auth-ainfo ik-hf*
$\langle proof\rangle$

declare *TW.holds-set-list*[*dest*]
declare *TW.holds-takeW-is-identity*[*simp*]
declare *parts-singleton*[*dest*]

This additional Intruder Knowledge allows us to model the attacker's access not only to the hop validation fields and segment identifiers of authorized segments (which are already given in *ik-auth-hfs*), but to the underlying hop authenticators that are used to create them.

definition *ik-add* :: *msgterm set* **where**
$ik\text{-}add \equiv \{\ \sigma \mid ainfo\ uinfo\ l\ hf\ \sigma.$
$(ainfo,\ l) \in auth\text{-}seg2 \wedge hf \in set\ l \wedge HVF\ hf = Mac[\sigma]\ \langle ainfo,\ uinfo\rangle\ \}$

lemma *ik-addI*:
$[\![(ainfo,\ l) \in auth\text{-}seg2;\ hf \in set\ l;\ HVF\ hf = Mac[\sigma]\ \langle ainfo,\ uinfo\rangle]\!] \Longrightarrow \sigma \in ik\text{-}add$
$\langle proof\rangle$

lemma *ik-add-form*: $t \in ik\text{-}add \Longrightarrow \exists\ asid\ l\ .\ t = Mac[macKey\ asid]\ l$
$\langle proof\rangle$

lemma *parts-ik-add*[*simp*]: $parts\ ik\text{-}add = ik\text{-}add$
$\langle proof\rangle$

abbreviation *ik-oracle* :: *msgterm set* **where** $ik\text{-}oracle \equiv \{\}$

3.3.3 Properties of the intruder knowledge, including *ik-add* and *ik-oracle*

We now instantiate the parametrized model's definition of the intruder knowledge, using the definitions of *ik-add* and *ik-oracle* from above. We then prove the properties that we need to instantiate the *dataplane-3-directed* locale.

sublocale

dataplane-3-directed-ik-defs - - - auth-seg0 hf-valid checkInfo extr extr-ainfo ik-auth-ainfo
ik-hf ik-add ik-oracle no-oracle
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *ik-auth-hfs-form*: $t \in parts\ ik\text{-}auth\text{-}hfs \Longrightarrow \exists\ t'\ .\ t = Hash\ t'$
⟨*proof*⟩

declare *ik-auth-hfs-def*[*simp del*]

lemma *parts-ik-auth-hfs*[*simp*]: *parts ik-auth-hfs* = *ik-auth-hfs*
⟨*proof*⟩

This lemma allows us not only to expand the definition of *ik-auth-hfs*, but also to obtain useful properties, such as a term being a Hash, and it being part of a valid hop field.

lemma *ik-auth-hfs-simp*:
$t \in ik\text{-}auth\text{-}hfs \longleftrightarrow (\exists t'\ .\ t = Hash\ t') \wedge (\exists hf\ .\ (t = HVF\ hf \vee t = UHI\ hf)$
$\wedge (\exists hfs.\ hf \in set\ hfs \wedge (\exists ainfo\ .\ (ainfo,\ hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2$
$\wedge (\exists\ prev\ nxt\ uinfo.\ hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ prev\ hf\ nxt))))$ (**is** *?lhs* ⟷ *?rhs*)
⟨*proof*⟩

Properties of Intruder Knowledge

lemma *auth-ainfo*[*dest*]: $[\![(ainfo,\ hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2]\!] \Longrightarrow \exists\ ts\ .\ ainfo = Num\ ts$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *Num-ik*[*intro*]: $Num\ ts \in ik$
⟨*proof*⟩

There are no ciphertexts (or signatures) in *parts ik*. Thus, *analz ik* and *parts ik* are identical.

lemma *analz-parts-ik*[*simp*]: *analz ik* = *parts ik*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *parts-ik*[*simp*]: *parts ik* = *ik*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *key-ik-bad*: $Key\ (macK\ asid) \in ik \Longrightarrow asid \in bad$
⟨*proof*⟩

Updating hop fields with different uinfo

Those hop validation fields contained in *auth-seg2* or that can be generated from the hop authenticators in *ik-add* have the property that they are agnostic about the uinfo field. If a hop validation field is contained in *auth-seg2* (resp. derivable from *ik-add*), then a field with a different uinfo is also contained (resp. derivable). To show this, we first define a function that updates uinfo in a hop validation field.

fun *uinfo-upd-hf* :: *msgterm* ⇒ (*unit*, *msgterm*) *HF* ⇒ (*unit*, *msgterm*) *HF* **where**
uinfo-upd-hf new-uinfo hf =
$(case\ HVF\ hf\ of\ Mac[\sigma]\ \langle ainfo,\ uinfo\rangle \Rightarrow hf(\!|HVF := Mac[\sigma]\ \langle ainfo,\ new\text{-}uinfo\rangle|\!)\ |\ \text{-} \Rightarrow hf)$

fun *uinfo-upd* :: *msgterm* ⇒ (*unit*, *msgterm*) *HF list* ⇒ (*unit*, *msgterm*) *HF list* **where**
uinfo-upd new-uinfo hfs = *map* (*uinfo-upd-hf new-uinfo*) *hfs*

lemma *uinfo-upd-valid*:
  $hfs\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ pre\ l\ nxt \Longrightarrow hfs\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ new\text{-}uinfo\ pre\ (uinfo\text{-}upd\ new\text{-}uinfo\ l)\ nxt$
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *uinfo-upd-hf-AHI*: $AHI\ (uinfo\text{-}upd\text{-}hf\ new\text{-}uinfo\ hf) = AHI\ hf$
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *uinfo-upd-hf-AHIS*[*simp*]: $AHIS\ (map\ (uinfo\text{-}upd\text{-}hf\ new\text{-}uinfo)\ l) = AHIS\ l$
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *uinfo-upd-auth-seg2*:
  assumes $hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ prev\ m\ z\ \sigma = Mac[Key\ (macK\ asid)]\ j$
    $HVF\ m = Mac[\sigma]\ \langle ainfo,\ uinfo'\rangle\ \sigma \in ik\text{-}add$
  shows $\exists\, hfs.\ m \in set\ hfs \wedge (ainfo,\ hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *MAC-synth-helper*:
$[\![hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ prev\ m\ z;$
  $HVF\ m = Mac[\sigma]\ \langle ainfo,\ uinfo\rangle;\ \sigma = Mac[Key\ (macK\ asid)]\ j;\ \sigma \in ik \vee HVF\ m \in ik]\!]$
    $\Longrightarrow \exists\, hfs.\ m \in set\ hfs \wedge (ainfo,\ hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2$
  ⟨*proof*⟩

This definition helps with the limiting the number of cases generated. We don't require it, but it is convenient. Given a hop validation field and an asid, return if the hvf has the expected format.

definition $mac\text{-}format :: msgterm \Rightarrow as \Rightarrow bool$ **where**
  $mac\text{-}format\ m\ asid \equiv \exists\ j\ ts\ uinfo\ .\ m = Mac[Mac[macKey\ asid]\ j]\ \langle Num\ ts,\ uinfo\rangle$

If a valid hop field is derivable by the attacker, but does not belong to the attacker, then the hop field is already contained in the set of authorized segments.

lemma *MAC-synth*:
  assumes $hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ prev\ m\ z\ HVF\ m \in synth\ ik\ mac\text{-}format\ (HVF\ m)\ asid$
    $asid \notin bad\ checkInfo\ ainfo$
  shows $\exists\, hfs\ .\ m \in set\ hfs \wedge (ainfo,\ hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2$
  ⟨*proof*⟩

3.3.4 Direct proof goals for interpretation of *dataplane-3-directed*

lemma *COND-honest-hf-analz*:
  assumes $ASID\ (AHI\ hf) \notin bad\ hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ prev\ hf\ nxt\ ik\text{-}hf\ hf \subseteq synth\ (analz\ ik)$
    $no\text{-}oracle\ ainfo\ uinfo$
    shows $ik\text{-}hf\ hf \subseteq analz\ ik$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-ainfo-analz*:
  assumes $hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ prev\ hf\ nxt$ **and** $ik\text{-}auth\text{-}ainfo\ ainfo \in synth\ (analz\ ik)$
  shows $ik\text{-}auth\text{-}ainfo\ ainfo \in analz\ ik$
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-ik-hf*:
  assumes $hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ prev\ hf\ z$ **and** $HVF\ hf \in ik$ **and** $no\text{-}oracle\ ainfo\ uinfo$

shows $\exists$ *hfs. hf* $\in$ *set hfs* $\wedge$ (*ainfo*, *hfs*) $\in$ *auth-seg2*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-extr-prefix-path*:
⟦*hfs-valid ainfo uinfo pre l nxt*; *nxt* = *None*⟧ $\Longrightarrow$ *prefix* (*extr-from-hd l*) (*AHIS l*)
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-path-prefix-extr*:
prefix (*AHIS* (*hfs-valid-prefix ainfo uinfo pre l nxt*))
(*extr-from-hd l*)
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-hf-valid-no-prev*:
hf-valid ainfo uinfo prev hf z $\longleftrightarrow$ *hf-valid ainfo uinfo prev' hf z*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-hf-valid-uinfo*:
⟦*hf-valid ainfo uinfo pre hf nxt*; *hf-valid ainfo' uinfo' pre' hf nxt'*⟧ $\Longrightarrow$ *uinfo'* = *uinfo*
⟨*proof*⟩

3.3.5 Instantiation of *dataplane-3-directed* locale

sublocale
dataplane-3-directed - - - auth-seg0 hf-valid checkInfo extr extr-ainfo ik-auth-ainfo ik-hf ik-add
ik-oracle no-oracle
⟨*proof*⟩

end
end

3.4 EPIC Level 1 in the Strong Attacker Model

theory *EPIC-L1-SA*
imports
../Parametrized-Dataplane-3-directed
../infrastructure/Keys
begin

locale *epic-l1-defs* = *network-assums-direct* - - - *auth-seg0*
for *auth-seg0* :: (*msgterm* × *ahi list*) *set* +
fixes *no-oracle* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *msgterm* ⇒ *bool*
begin

3.4.1 Hop validation check and extract functions

The predicate *hf-valid* is given to the concrete parametrized model as a parameter. It ensures the authenticity of the hop authenticator in the hop field. The predicate takes an authenticated info field (in this model always a numeric value, hence the matching on Num ts), an unauthenticated info field uinfo, the hop field to be validated and in some cases the next hop field.

We distinguish if there is a next hop field (this yields the two cases below). If there is not, then the hop authenticator σ simply consists of a MAC over the authenticated info field and the local routing information of the hop, using the key of the hop to which the hop field belongs. If on the other hand, there is a subsequent hop field, then the uhi field of that hop field is also included in the MAC computation.

The hop authenticator σ is used to compute both the hop validation field and the uhi field. The first is computed as a MAC over the path origin (pair of absolute timestamp ts and the relative timestamp given in uinfo), using the hop authenticator as a key to the MAC. The hop authenticator is not secret, and any end host can use it to create a valid hvf. The uhi field, according to the protocol description, is σ shortened to a few bytes. We model this as applying the hash on σ.

The predicate *hf-valid* checks if the hop authenticator, hvf and uhi field are computed correctly.

fun *hf-valid* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *msgterm*
⇒ (*unit*, *msgterm*) *HF option*
⇒ (*unit*, *msgterm*) *HF*
⇒ (*unit*, *msgterm*) *HF option* ⇒ *bool* **where**
hf-valid (*Num ts*) *uinfo* - (|*AHI* = *ahi*, *UHI* = *uhi*, *HVF* = *x*|) (*Some* (|*AHI* = *ahi2*, *UHI* = *uhi2*, *HVF* = *x2*|)) ⟷
(∃ σ *upif downif*. σ = *Mac*[*macKey* (*ASID ahi*)] (*L* [*Num ts*, *upif*, *downif*, *uhi2*]) ∧
ASIF (*DownIF ahi*) *downif* ∧ *ASIF* (*UpIF ahi*) *upif* ∧ *uhi* = *Hash* σ ∧ *x* = *Mac*[σ] ⟨*Num ts*, *uinfo*⟩)
| *hf-valid* (*Num ts*) *uinfo* - (|*AHI* = *ahi*, *UHI* = *uhi*, *HVF* = *x*|) *None* ⟷
(∃ σ *upif downif*. σ = *Mac*[*macKey* (*ASID ahi*)] (*L* [*Num ts*, *upif*, *downif*]) ∧
ASIF (*DownIF ahi*) *downif* ∧ *ASIF* (*UpIF ahi*) *upif* ∧ *uhi* = *Hash* σ ∧ *x* = *Mac*[σ] ⟨*Num ts*, *uinfo*⟩)
| *hf-valid* - - - - - = *False*

We can extract the entire path from the uhi field, since it includes the hop authenticator, which includes the local forwarding information as well as, recursively, all upstream hop authenticators and their hop information. However, the parametrized model defines the extract function to operate on the hop validation field, not the uhi field. We therefore define a separate function that extracts the path from a hvf. We can do so, as both hvf and uhi contain the hop authenticator. Internally, that function uses *extrUhi*.

fun *extrUhi* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *ahi list* **where**
extrUhi (*Hash* (*Mac*[*macKey asid*] (*L* [*ts*, *upif*, *downif*, *uhi2*])))
= (| *UpIF* = *ASO upif*, *DownIF* = *ASO downif*, *ASID* = *asid*|) # *extrUhi uhi2*
| *extrUhi* (*Hash* (*Mac*[*macKey asid*] (*L* [*ts*, *upif*, *downif*])))
= [(| *UpIF* = *ASO upif*, *DownIF* = *ASO downif*, *ASID* = *asid*|)]
| *extrUhi* - = []

This function extracts from a hop validation field (HVF hf) the entire path.

fun *extr* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *ahi list* **where**
extr (*Mac*[σ] -) = *extrUhi* (*Hash* σ)
| *extr* - = []

Extract the authenticated info field from a hop validation field.

fun *extr-ainfo* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *msgterm* **where**
extr-ainfo (*Mac*[-] ⟨*Num ts*, -⟩) = *Num ts*
| *extr-ainfo* - = ε

abbreviation *ik-auth-ainfo* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *msgterm* **where**
ik-auth-ainfo ≡ *id*

An authenticated info field is always a number (corresponding to a timestamp).

abbreviation *checkInfo* **where**
checkInfo ainfo ≡ (∃ *ts*. *ainfo* = *Num ts*)

When observing a hop field, an attacker learns the HVF and the UHI. The AHI only contains public information that are not terms.

fun *ik-hf* :: (*unit*, *msgterm*) *HF* ⇒ *msgterm set* **where**
ik-hf hf = {*HVF hf*, *UHI hf*}

We now define useful properties of the above definition.

lemma *hf-valid-invert*:
hf-valid tsn uinfo prev hf mo ⟷
((∃ *ahi ahi2* σ *ts upif downif asid x upif2 downif2 asid2 uhi uhi2 x2*.
hf = (|*AHI* = *ahi*, *UHI* = *uhi*, *HVF* = *x*|) ∧
ASID ahi = *asid* ∧ *ASIF* (*DownIF ahi*) *downif* ∧ *ASIF* (*UpIF ahi*) *upif* ∧
mo = *Some* (|*AHI* = *ahi2*, *UHI* = *uhi2*, *HVF* = *x2*|) ∧
ASID ahi2 = *asid2* ∧ *ASIF* (*DownIF ahi2*) *downif2* ∧ *ASIF* (*UpIF ahi2*) *upif2* ∧
σ = *Mac*[*macKey asid*] (*L* [*tsn*, *upif*, *downif*, *uhi2*]) ∧
tsn = *Num ts* ∧
uhi = *Hash* σ ∧
x = *Mac*[σ] ⟨*tsn*, *uinfo*⟩)
∨ (∃ *ahi* σ *ts upif downif asid uhi x*.
hf = (|*AHI* = *ahi*, *UHI* = *uhi*, *HVF* = *x*|) ∧
ASID ahi = *asid* ∧ *ASIF* (*DownIF ahi*) *downif* ∧ *ASIF* (*UpIF ahi*) *upif* ∧
mo = *None* ∧
σ = *Mac*[*macKey asid*] (*L* [*tsn*, *upif*, *downif*]) ∧

$tsn = Num\ ts \wedge$
$uhi = Hash\ \sigma \wedge$
$x = Mac[\sigma]\ \langle tsn,\ uinfo\rangle)$
)
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *hf-valid-checkInfo*[*dest*]: $hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ prev\ hf\ z \Longrightarrow checkInfo\ ainfo$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *info-hvf*:
assumes $hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ prev\ m\ z\ HVF\ m = Mac[\sigma]\ \langle ainfo',\ uinfo'\rangle \vee hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo'\ uinfo'\ prev'\ m\ z'$
shows $uinfo = uinfo'\ ainfo' = ainfo$
$\langle proof \rangle$

sublocale *dataplane-3-directed-defs - - - auth-seg0 hf-valid checkInfo extr extr-ainfo ik-auth-ainfo ik-hf*
$\langle proof \rangle$

3.4.2 Definitions and properties of the added intruder knowledge

Here we define two sets which are added to the intruder knowledge: *ik-add*, which contains hop authenticators. And *ik-oracle*, which contains the oracle's output to the strong attacker.

abbreviation *is-oracle* **where** $is\text{-}oracle\ ainfo\ t \equiv \neg\ no\text{-}oracle\ ainfo\ t$

declare *TW.holds-set-list*[*dest*]
declare *TW.holds-takeW-is-identity*[*simp*]
declare *parts-singleton*[*dest*]

This additional Intruder Knowledge allows us to model the attacker's access not only to the hop validation fields and segment identifiers of authorized segments (which are already given in *ik-auth-hfs*), but to the underlying hop authenticators that are used to create them.

definition *ik-add* :: *msgterm set* **where**
$ik\text{-}add \equiv \{\ \sigma\ |\ ainfo\ uinfo\ l\ hf\ \sigma.$
$(ainfo::msgterm,\ l::((unit,\ msgterm)\ HF\ list)) \in$
$(local.auth\text{-}seg2::((msgterm \times (unit,\ msgterm)\ HF\ list)\ set))$
$\wedge\ hf \in set\ l \wedge HVF\ hf = Mac[\sigma]\ \langle ainfo,\ uinfo\rangle\ \}$

lemma *ik-addI*:
$[\![(ainfo,\ l) \in local.auth\text{-}seg2;\ hf \in set\ l;\ HVF\ hf = Mac[\sigma]\ \langle ainfo,\ uinfo\rangle]\!] \Longrightarrow \sigma \in ik\text{-}add$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *ik-add-form*: $t \in local.ik\text{-}add \Longrightarrow \exists\ asid\ l\ .\ t = Mac[macKey\ asid]\ l$

$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *parts-ik-add*[*simp*]: $parts\ ik\text{-}add = ik\text{-}add$
$\langle proof \rangle$

This is the oracle output provided to the adversary. Only those hop validation fields and segment identifiers whose path origin (combination of ainfo uinfo) is not contained in *no-oracle* appears here.

definition *ik-oracle* :: *msgterm set* **where**
ik-oracle = $\{t \mid t$ *ainfo hf l uinfo* . *hf* $\in$ *set l* $\wedge$ *hfs-valid-None ainfo uinfo l* $\wedge$
is-oracle ainfo uinfo $\wedge$ (*ainfo*, *l*) $\notin$ *auth-seg2* $\wedge$ (t = *HVF hf* $\vee$ t = *UHI hf*) $\}$

lemma *ik-oracle-parts-form*:
$t \in$ *ik-oracle* $\Longrightarrow$
($\exists$ *asid l ainfo uinfo* . t = *Mac*[*Mac*[*macKey asid*] *l*] $\langle$*ainfo*, *uinfo*$\rangle$) $\vee$
($\exists$ *asid l* . t = *Hash* (*Mac*[*macKey asid*] *l*))
$\langle$*proof*$\rangle$

lemma *parts-ik-oracle*[*simp*]: *parts ik-oracle* = *ik-oracle*
$\langle$*proof*$\rangle$

lemma *ik-oracle-simp*: $t \in$ *ik-oracle* $\longleftrightarrow$
($\exists$ *ainfo hf l uinfo*. *hf* $\in$ *set l* $\wedge$ *hfs-valid-None ainfo uinfo l* $\wedge$ *is-oracle ainfo uinfo*
$\wedge$ (*ainfo*, *l*) $\notin$ *auth-seg2* $\wedge$ (t = *HVF hf* $\vee$ t = *UHI hf*))
$\langle$*proof*$\rangle$

3.4.3 Properties of the intruder knowledge, including *ik-add* and *ik-oracle*

We now instantiate the parametrized model's definition of the intruder knowledge, using the definitions of *ik-add* and *ik-oracle* from above. We then prove the properties that we need to instantiate the *dataplane-3-directed* locale.

sublocale
dataplane-3-directed-ik-defs - - - auth-seg0 hf-valid checkInfo extr extr-ainfo ik-auth-ainfo
ik-hf ik-add ik-oracle no-oracle
$\langle$*proof*$\rangle$

lemma *ik-auth-hfs-form*: $t \in$ *parts ik-auth-hfs* $\Longrightarrow \exists\ t'$. t = *Hash* t'
$\langle$*proof*$\rangle$

declare *ik-auth-hfs-def* [*simp del*]

lemma *parts-ik-auth-hfs*[*simp*]: *parts ik-auth-hfs* = *ik-auth-hfs*
$\langle$*proof*$\rangle$

This lemma allows us not only to expand the definition of *ik-auth-hfs*, but also to obtain useful properties, such as a term being a Hash, and it being part of a valid hop field.

lemma *ik-auth-hfs-simp*:
$t \in$ *ik-auth-hfs* $\longleftrightarrow$ ($\exists t'$. t = *Hash* t') $\wedge$ ($\exists$ *hf* . (t = *HVF hf* $\vee$ t = *UHI hf*)
$\wedge$ ($\exists$ *hfs*. *hf* $\in$ *set hfs* $\wedge$ ($\exists$ *ainfo* . (*ainfo*, *hfs*) $\in$ *auth-seg2*
$\wedge$ ($\exists$ *prev nxt uinfo*. *hf-valid ainfo uinfo prev hf nxt*)))) (**is** *?lhs* $\longleftrightarrow$ *?rhs*)
$\langle$*proof*$\rangle$

Properties of Intruder Knowledge

lemma *auth-ainfo*[*dest*]: $[\![$(*ainfo*, *hfs*) $\in$ *auth-seg2*$]\!] \Longrightarrow \exists$ *ts* . *ainfo* = *Num ts*
$\langle$*proof*$\rangle$

lemma *Num-ik*[*intro*]: *Num ts* $\in$ *ik*
$\langle$*proof*$\rangle$

There are no ciphertexts (or signatures) in *parts ik*. Thus, *analz ik* and *parts ik* are identical.

lemma *analz-parts-ik*[*simp*]: *analz ik* = *parts ik*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *parts-ik*[*simp*]: *parts ik* = *ik*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *key-ik-bad*: *Key* (*macK asid*) ∈ *ik* ⟹ *asid* ∈ *bad*
⟨*proof*⟩

Updating hop fields with different uinfo

Those hop validation fields contained in *auth-seg2* or that can be generated from the hop authenticators in *ik-add* have the property that they are agnostic about the uinfo field. If a hop validation field is contained in *auth-seg2* (resp. derivable from *ik-add*), then a field with a different uinfo is also contained (resp. derivable). To show this, we first define a function that updates uinfo in a hop validation field.

fun *uinfo-upd-hf* :: *msgterm* ⇒ (*unit*, *msgterm*) *HF* ⇒ (*unit*, *msgterm*) *HF* **where**
uinfo-upd-hf new-uinfo hf =
(*case HVF hf of Mac*[σ] ⟨*ainfo*, *uinfo*⟩ ⇒ *hf*⦇*HVF* := *Mac*[σ] ⟨*ainfo*, *new-uinfo*⟩⦈ | - ⇒ *hf*)

fun *uinfo-upd* :: *msgterm* ⇒ (*unit*, *msgterm*) *HF list* ⇒ (*unit*, *msgterm*) *HF list* **where**
uinfo-upd new-uinfo hfs = *map* (*uinfo-upd-hf new-uinfo*) *hfs*

lemma *uinfo-upd-valid*:
hfs-valid ainfo uinfo pre l nxt ⟹ *hfs-valid ainfo new-uinfo pre* (*uinfo-upd new-uinfo l*) *nxt*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *uinfo-upd-hf-AHI*: *AHI* (*uinfo-upd-hf new-uinfo hf*) = *AHI hf*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *uinfo-upd-hf-AHIS*[*simp*]: *AHIS* (*map* (*uinfo-upd-hf new-uinfo*) *l*) = *AHIS l*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *uinfo-upd-auth-seg2*:
assumes *hf-valid ainfo uinfo prev m z* σ = *Mac*[*Key* (*macK asid*)] *j*
HVF m = *Mac*[σ] ⟨*ainfo*, *uinfo'*⟩ σ ∈ *ik-add*
shows ∃*hfs*. *m* ∈ *set hfs* ∧ (*ainfo*, *hfs*) ∈ *auth-seg2*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *MAC-synth-oracle*:
assumes *hf-valid ainfo uinfo prev m z HVF m* ∈ *ik-oracle*
shows *is-oracle ainfo uinfo*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *ik-oracle-is-oracle*:
⟦*Mac*[σ] ⟨*ainfo*, *uinfo*⟩ ∈ *ik-oracle*⟧ ⟹ *is-oracle ainfo uinfo*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *MAC-synth-helper*:
⟦*hf-valid ainfo uinfo prev m z*; *no-oracle ainfo uinfo*;

$HVF\ m = Mac[\sigma]\ \langle ainfo,\ uinfo\rangle;\ \sigma = Mac[Key\ (macK\ asid)]\ j;\ \sigma \in ik \vee HVF\ m \in ik]\!]$
$\Longrightarrow \exists\, hfs.\ m \in set\ hfs \wedge (ainfo,\ hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2$
⟨*proof*⟩

This definition helps with the limiting the number of cases generated. We don't require it, but it is convenient. Given a hop validation field and an asid, return if the hvf has the expected format.

definition *mac-format* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *as* ⇒ *bool* **where**
$mac\text{-}format\ m\ asid \equiv \exists\ j\ ts\ uinfo\ .\ m = Mac[Mac[macKey\ asid]\ j]\ \langle Num\ ts,\ uinfo\rangle$

If a valid hop field is derivable by the attacker, but does not belong to the attacker, and is over a path origin that does not belong to an oracle query, then the hop field is already contained in the set of authorized segments.

lemma *MAC-synth*:
assumes *hf-valid ainfo uinfo prev m z* $HVF\ m \in synth\ ik$ *mac-format* (*HVF m*) *asid*
$asid \notin bad$ *checkInfo ainfo no-oracle ainfo uinfo*
shows $\exists\, hfs\ .\ m \in set\ hfs \wedge (ainfo,\ hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2$
⟨*proof*⟩

3.4.4 Direct proof goals for interpretation of *dataplane-3-directed*

lemma *COND-honest-hf-analz*:
assumes $ASID\ (AHI\ hf) \notin bad$ *hf-valid ainfo uinfo prev hf nxt* $ik\text{-}hf\ hf \subseteq synth\ (analz\ ik)$
no-oracle ainfo uinfo
shows $ik\text{-}hf\ hf \subseteq analz\ ik$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-ainfo-analz*:
assumes *hf-valid ainfo uinfo prev hf nxt* **and** $ik\text{-}auth\text{-}ainfo\ ainfo \in synth\ (analz\ ik)$
shows $ik\text{-}auth\text{-}ainfo\ ainfo \in analz\ ik$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-ik-hf*:
assumes *hf-valid ainfo uinfo prev hf z* **and** $HVF\ hf \in ik$ **and** *no-oracle ainfo uinfo*
shows $\exists\, hfs.\ hf \in set\ hfs \wedge (ainfo,\ hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-extr-prefix-path*:
$[\![hfs\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ pre\ l\ nxt;\ nxt = None]\!] \Longrightarrow prefix\ (extr\text{-}from\text{-}hd\ l)\ (AHIS\ l)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-path-prefix-extr*:
$prefix\ (AHIS\ (hfs\text{-}valid\text{-}prefix\ ainfo\ uinfo\ pre\ l\ nxt))$
$(extr\text{-}from\text{-}hd\ l)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-hf-valid-no-prev*:
$hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ prev\ hf\ z \longleftrightarrow hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ prev'\ hf\ z$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-hf-valid-uinfo*:
$[\![hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ pre\ hf\ nxt;\ hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo'\ uinfo'\ pre'\ hf\ nxt']\!] \Longrightarrow uinfo' = uinfo$

⟨*proof*⟩

3.4.5 Instantiation of *dataplane-3-directed* locale

sublocale
dataplane-3-directed - - - auth-seg0 hf-valid checkInfo extr extr-ainfo ik-auth-ainfo ik-hf ik-add ik-oracle no-oracle
⟨*proof*⟩

end
end

3.5 EPIC Level 1 Example instantiation of locale

In this theory we instantiate the locale *dataplane0* and thus show that its assumptions are satisfiable. In particular, this involves the assumptions concerning the network. We also instantiate the locale *epic-l1-defs*.

theory *EPIC-L1-SA-Example*
  imports
    EPIC-L1-SA
begin

The network topology that we define is the same as in Fig. 2 of the paper.

abbreviation *nA* :: *as* **where** *nA* ≡ *3*
abbreviation *nB* :: *as* **where** *nB* ≡ *4*
abbreviation *nC* :: *as* **where** *nC* ≡ *5*
abbreviation *nD* :: *as* **where** *nD* ≡ *6*
abbreviation *nE* :: *as* **where** *nE* ≡ *7*
abbreviation *nF* :: *as* **where** *nF* ≡ *8*
abbreviation *nG* :: *as* **where** *nG* ≡ *9*

abbreviation *bad* :: *as set* **where** *bad* ≡ {*nF*}

We assume a complete graph, in which interfaces contain the name of the adjacent AS

fun *tgtas* :: *as* ⇒ *ifs* ⇒ *as option* **where**
  tgtas a i = *Some i*
fun *tgtif* :: *as* ⇒ *ifs* ⇒ *ifs option* **where**
  tgtif a i = *Some a*

3.5.1 Left segment

abbreviation *hiAl* :: *ahi* **where** *hiAl* ≡ (|*UpIF* = *None*, *DownIF* = *Some nB*, *ASID* = *nA*|)
abbreviation *hiBl* :: *ahi* **where** *hiBl* ≡ (|*UpIF* = *Some nA*, *DownIF* = *Some nD*, *ASID* = *nB*|)
abbreviation *hiDl* :: *ahi* **where** *hiDl* ≡ (|*UpIF* = *Some nB*, *DownIF* = *Some nE*, *ASID* = *nD*|)
abbreviation *hiEl* :: *ahi* **where** *hiEl* ≡ (|*UpIF* = *Some nD*, *DownIF* = *Some nF*, *ASID* = *nE*|)
abbreviation *hiFl* :: *ahi* **where** *hiFl* ≡ (|*UpIF* = *Some nE*, *DownIF* = *None*, *ASID* = *nF*|)

3.5.2 Right segment

abbreviation *hiAr* :: *ahi* **where** *hiAr* ≡ (|*UpIF* = *None*, *DownIF* = *Some nB*, *ASID* = *nA*|)
abbreviation *hiBr* :: *ahi* **where** *hiBr* ≡ (|*UpIF* = *Some nA*, *DownIF* = *Some nD*, *ASID* = *nB*|)
abbreviation *hiDr* :: *ahi* **where** *hiDr* ≡ (|*UpIF* = *Some nB*, *DownIF* = *Some nE*, *ASID* = *nD*|)
abbreviation *hiEr* :: *ahi* **where** *hiEr* ≡ (|*UpIF* = *Some nD*, *DownIF* = *Some nG*, *ASID* = *nE*|)
abbreviation *hiGr* :: *ahi* **where** *hiGr* ≡ (|*UpIF* = *Some nE*, *DownIF* = *None*, *ASID* = *nG*|)

abbreviation *hfF-attr-E* :: *ahi set* **where** *hfF-attr-E* ≡ {*hi* . *ASID hi* = *nF* ∧ *UpIF hi* = *Some nE*}
abbreviation *hfF-attr* :: *ahi set* **where** *hfF-attr* ≡ {*hi* . *ASID hi* = *nF*}

abbreviation *leftpath* :: *ahi list* **where**
  leftpath ≡ [*hiFl*, *hiEl*, *hiDl*, *hiBl*, *hiAl*]
abbreviation *rightpath* :: *ahi list* **where**
  rightpath ≡ [*hiGr*, *hiEr*, *hiDr*, *hiBr*, *hiAr*]
abbreviation *rightsegment* **where** *rightsegment* ≡ (*Num 0*, *rightpath*)

abbreviation *leftpath-wormholed* :: *ahi list set* **where**
leftpath-wormholed ≡
{ $xs@[hf, hiEl, hiDl, hiBl, hiAl]$ | $hf\ xs$. $hf \in hfF\text{-}attr\text{-}E \wedge set\ xs \subseteq hfF\text{-}attr$}

definition *leftsegment-wormholed* :: (*msgterm* × *ahi list*) *set* **where**
leftsegment-wormholed = { (*Num 0*, *leftpath*) | *leftpath* . *leftpath* ∈ *leftpath-wormholed*}

definition *attr-segment* :: (*msgterm* × *ahi list*) *set* **where**
attr-segment = { (*ainfo*, *path*) | *ainfo path* . *set path* ⊆ *hfF-attr*}

definition *auth-seg0* :: (*msgterm* × *ahi list*) *set* **where**
auth-seg0 = *leftsegment-wormholed* ∪ {*rightsegment*} ∪ *attr-segment*

lemma *tgtasif-inv*:
⟦*tgtas u i* = *Some v*; *tgtif u i* = *Some j*⟧ ⟹ *tgtas v j* = *Some u*
⟦*tgtas u i* = *Some v*; *tgtif u i* = *Some j*⟧ ⟹ *tgtif v j* = *Some i*
⟨*proof*⟩

locale *no-assumptions-left*
begin

sublocale *d0*: *network-model bad auth-seg0 tgtas tgtif*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *attr-ifs-valid*: ⟦*ASID y* = *nF*; *set ys* ⊆ *hfF-attr*⟧ ⟹ *d0.ifs-valid* (*Some y*) *ys nxt*

⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *attr-ifs-valid'*: ⟦*set ys* ⊆ *hfF-attr*; *pre* = *None*⟧ ⟹ *d0.ifs-valid pre ys nxt*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *leftpath-ifs-valid*: ⟦*pre* = *None*; *ASID hf* = *nF*; *UpIF hf* = *Some nE*; *set xs* ⊆ *hfF-attr*⟧
⟹ *d0.ifs-valid pre* (*xs* @ [*hf*, *hiEl*, *hiDl*, *hiBl*, *hiAl*]) *nxt*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *ASM-if-valid*: ⟦(*info*, *l*) ∈ *auth-seg0*; *pre* = *None*⟧ ⟹ *d0.ifs-valid pre l nxt*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *rooted-app*[*simp*]: *d0.rooted* (*xs*@*y*#*ys*) ⟷ *d0.rooted* (*y*#*ys*)
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *ASM-rooted*: (*info*, *l*) ∈ *auth-seg0* ⟹ *d0.rooted l*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *ASM-terminated*: (*info*, *l*) ∈ *auth-seg0* ⟹ *d0.terminated l*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *ASM-empty*: (*info*, []) ∈ *auth-seg0*

$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *ASM-singleton*: $[\![ASID\ hf \in bad]\!] \Longrightarrow (info,\ [hf]) \in auth\text{-}seg0$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *ASM-extension*:
$[\![(info,\ hf2\#ys) \in auth\text{-}seg0;\ ASID\ hf2 \in bad;\ ASID\ hf1 \in bad]\!]$
$\Longrightarrow (info,\ hf1\#hf2\#ys) \in auth\text{-}seg0$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *ASM-modify*: $[\![(info,\ hf\#ys) \in auth\text{-}seg0;\ ASID\ hf = a;$
$ASID\ hf' = a;\ UpIF\ hf' = UpIF\ hf;\ a \in bad]\!] \Longrightarrow (info,\ hf'\#ys) \in auth\text{-}seg0$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *rightpath-no-nF*: $[\![ASID\ hf = nF;\ zs\ @\ hf\ \#\ ys = rightpath]\!] \Longrightarrow False$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *ASM-cutoff-leftpath*:
$[\![ASID\ hf = nF;$
$\forall hfa.\ UpIF\ hfa = Some\ nE \longrightarrow ASID\ hfa = nF \longrightarrow (\forall xs.\ hf\ \#\ ys = xs\ @\ [hfa,\ hiEl,\ hiDr,\ hiBr,$
$hiAr] \longrightarrow$
$\neg\ set\ xs \subseteq hfF\text{-}attr);\ x \in set\ ys;\ info = Num\ 0;$
$zs\ @\ hf\ \#\ ys = xs\ @\ [hfa,\ hiEl,\ hiDr,\ hiBr,\ hiAr];\ ASID\ hfa = nF;\ UpIF\ hfa = Some\ nE;$
$set\ xs \subseteq hfF\text{-}attr]\!]$
$\Longrightarrow ASID\ x = nF$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *ASM-cutoff*: $[\![(info,\ zs@hf\#ys) \in auth\text{-}seg0;\ ASID\ hf \in bad]\!] \Longrightarrow (info,\ hf\#ys) \in auth\text{-}seg0$
$\langle proof \rangle$

definition *no-oracle* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *msgterm* ⇒ *bool* **where**
no-oracle ainfo uinfo = *True*

sublocale *e1*: *epic-l1-defs bad tgtas tgtif auth-seg0 no-oracle*
$\langle proof \rangle$

sublocale *e1-int*: *epic-l1-defs bad tgtas tgtif auth-seg0 no-oracle*
$\langle proof \rangle$

3.5.3 Executability

Honest sender's packet forwarding

abbreviation *ainfo* **where** $ainfo \equiv Num\ 0$
abbreviation *uinfo* **where** $uinfo \equiv Num\ 1$
abbreviation σA **where** $\sigma A \equiv Mac[macKey\ nA]\ (L\ [ainfo,\ \varepsilon,\ AS\ nB])$
abbreviation σB **where** $\sigma B \equiv Mac[macKey\ nB]\ (L\ [ainfo,\ AS\ nA,\ AS\ nD,\ Hash\ \sigma A])$
abbreviation σD **where** $\sigma D \equiv Mac[macKey\ nD]\ (L\ [ainfo,\ AS\ nB,\ AS\ nE,\ Hash\ \sigma B])$
abbreviation σE **where** $\sigma E \equiv Mac[macKey\ nE]\ (L\ [ainfo,\ AS\ nD,\ AS\ nF,\ Hash\ \sigma D])$
abbreviation σF **where** $\sigma F \equiv Mac[macKey\ nF]\ (L\ [ainfo,\ AS\ nE,\ \varepsilon,\ Hash\ \sigma E])$

definition *hfAl* **where** $hfAl \equiv (\!|AHI = hiAl,\ UHI = Hash\ \sigma A,\ HVF = Mac[\sigma A]\ \langle ainfo,\ uinfo\rangle|\!)$
definition *hfBl* **where** $hfBl \equiv (\!|AHI = hiBl,\ UHI = Hash\ \sigma B,\ HVF = Mac[\sigma B]\ \langle ainfo,\ uinfo\rangle|\!)$

definition *hfDl* **where** $hfDl \equiv (\!| AHI = hiDl,\ UHI = Hash\ \sigma D,\ HVF = Mac[\sigma D]\ \langle ainfo,\ uinfo\rangle |\!)$
definition *hfEl* **where** $hfEl \equiv (\!| AHI = hiEl,\ UHI = Hash\ \sigma E,\ HVF = Mac[\sigma E]\ \langle ainfo,\ uinfo\rangle |\!)$
definition *hfFl* **where** $hfFl \equiv (\!| AHI = hiFl,\ UHI = Hash\ \sigma F,\ HVF = Mac[\sigma F]\ \langle ainfo,\ uinfo\rangle |\!)$

lemmas *hfl-defs = hfAl-def hfBl-def hfDl-def hfEl-def hfFl-def*

lemma *e1.hf-valid ainfo uinfo None hfAl None*
⟨*proof*⟩
lemma *e1.hf-valid ainfo uinfo None hfBl* (*Some hfAl*)
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *e1.hf-valid ainfo uinfo None hfFl* (*Some hfEl*)
⟨*proof*⟩

abbreviation *forwardingpath* **where**
$forwardingpath \equiv [hfFl,\ hfEl,\ hfDl,\ hfBl,\ hfAl]$

definition *pkt0* **where** $pkt0 \equiv (\!|$
$AInfo = ainfo,$
$UInfo = uinfo,$
$past = [],$
$future = forwardingpath,$
$history = []$
$|\!)$
definition *pkt1* **where** $pkt1 \equiv (\!|$
$AInfo = ainfo,$
$UInfo = uinfo,$
$past = [hfFl],$
$future = [hfEl,\ hfDl,\ hfBl,\ hfAl],$
$history = [hiFl]$
$|\!)$
definition *pkt2* **where** $pkt2 \equiv (\!|$
$AInfo = ainfo,$
$UInfo = uinfo,$
$past = [hfEl,\ hfFl],$
$future = [hfDl,\ hfBl,\ hfAl],$
$history = [hiEl,\ hiFl]$
$|\!)$
definition *pkt3* **where** $pkt3 \equiv (\!|$
$AInfo = ainfo,$
$UInfo = uinfo,$
$past = [hfDl,\ hfEl,\ hfFl],$
$future = [hfBl,\ hfAl],$
$history = [hiDl,\ hiEl,\ hiFl]$
$|\!)$
definition *pkt4* **where** $pkt4 \equiv (\!|$
$AInfo = ainfo,$
$UInfo = uinfo,$
$past = [hfBl,\ hfDl,\ hfEl,\ hfFl],$
$future = [hfAl],$
$history = [hiBl,\ hiDl,\ hiEl,\ hiFl]$
$|\!)$
definition *pkt5* **where** $pkt5 \equiv (\!|$

$AInfo = ainfo,$
$UInfo = uinfo,$
$past = [hfAl, hfBl, hfDl, hfEl, hfFl],$
$future = [],$
$history = [hiAl, hiBl, hiDl, hiEl, hiFl]$
$\|)$

definition *s0* **where** $s0 \equiv e1.dp2\text{-}init$
definition *s1* **where** $s1 \equiv s0(|loc2 := (loc2\ s0)(nF := \{pkt0\})|)$
definition *s2* **where**
$s2 \equiv s1(|chan2 := (chan2\ s1)((nF, nE, nE, nF) := chan2\ s1\ (nF, nE, nE, nF) \cup \{pkt1\})|)$
definition *s3* **where** $s3 \equiv s2(|loc2 := (loc2\ s2)(nE := \{pkt1\})|)$
definition *s4* **where**
$s4 \equiv s3(|chan2 := (chan2\ s3)((nE, nD, nD, nE) := chan2\ s3\ (nE, nD, nD, nE) \cup \{pkt2\})|)$
definition *s5* **where** $s5 \equiv s4(|loc2 := (loc2\ s4)(nD := \{pkt2\})|)$
definition *s6* **where**
$s6 \equiv s5(|chan2 := (chan2\ s5)((nD, nB, nB, nD) := chan2\ s5\ (nD, nB, nB, nD) \cup \{pkt3\})|)$
definition *s7* **where** $s7 \equiv s6(|loc2 := (loc2\ s6)(nB := \{pkt3\})|)$
definition *s8* **where**
$s8 \equiv s7(|chan2 := (chan2\ s7)((nB, nA, nA, nB) := chan2\ s7\ (nB, nA, nA, nB) \cup \{pkt4\})|)$
definition *s9* **where** $s9 \equiv s8(|loc2 := (loc2\ s8)(nA := \{pkt4\})|)$
definition *s10* **where** $s10 \equiv s9(|loc2 := (loc2\ s9)(nA := \{pkt4, pkt5\})|)$

lemmas *forwading-states* =
s0-def s1-def s2-def s3-def s4-def s5-def s6-def s7-def s8-def s9-def s10-def

lemma *forwardingpath-valid*: *e1.hfs-valid-None ainfo uinfo forwardingpath*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *forwardingpath-auth*: *pfragment ainfo forwardingpath e1.auth-seg2*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *reach-s0*: *reach e1.dp2 s0* ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *s0-s1*: *e1.dp2*: *s0* −*evt-dispatch-int2 nF pkt0*→ *s1*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *s1-s2*: *e1.dp2*: *s1* −*evt-send2 nF nE pkt0*→ *s2*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *s2-s3*: *e1.dp2*: *s2* −*evt-recv2 nE nF pkt1*→ *s3*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *s3-s4*: *e1.dp2*: *s3* −*evt-send2 nE nD pkt1*→ *s4*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *s4-s5*: *e1.dp2*: *s4* −*evt-recv2 nD nE pkt2*→ *s5*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *s5-s6*: *e1.dp2*: *s5* −*evt-send2 nD nB pkt2*→ *s6*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *s6-s7*: *e1.dp2*: *s6* −*evt-recv2 nB nD pkt3*→ *s7*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *s7-s8*: *e1.dp2*: *s7* −*evt-send2 nB nA pkt3*→ *s8*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *s8-s9*: *e1.dp2*: *s8* −*evt-recv2 nA nB pkt4*→ *s9*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *s9-s10*: *e1.dp2*: *s9* −*evt-deliver2 nA pkt4*→ *s10*
⟨*proof*⟩

The state in which the packet is received is reachable

lemma *executability*: *reach e1.dp2 s10*
⟨*proof*⟩

Attacker event executability

We also show that the attacker event can be executed.

definition *pkt-attr* **where** *pkt-attr* ≡ ⦇
AInfo = *ainfo*,
UInfo = *uinfo*,
past = [],
future = [*hfEl*],
history = []
⦈

definition *s-attr* **where**
s-attr ≡ *s0*⦇*chan2* := (*chan2 s0*)((*nF*, *nE*, *nE*, *nF*) := *chan2 s0* (*nF*, *nE*, *nE*, *nF*) ∪ {*pkt-attr*})⦈

lemma *ik-auth-hfs-in-ik*: *t* ∈ *e1.ik-auth-hfs* ⟹ *t* ∈ *synth* (*analz* (*e1.ik-dyn s*))
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *hvf-e-auth*: *HVF hfEl* ∈ *e1.ik-auth-hfs*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *uhi-e-auth*: *UHI hfEl* ∈ *e1.ik-auth-hfs*
⟨*proof*⟩

The attacker can also execute her event.

lemma *attr-executability*: *reach e1.dp2 s-attr*
⟨*proof*⟩

end
end

3.6 EPIC Level 2 in the Strong Attacker Model

theory *EPIC-L2-SA*
imports
../Parametrized-Dataplane-3-directed
../infrastructure/Keys
begin

locale *epic-l2-defs* = *network-assums-direct* - - - *auth-seg0*
for *auth-seg0* :: (*msgterm* × *ahi list*) *set* +
fixes *no-oracle* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *msgterm* ⇒ *bool*
begin

3.6.1 Hop validation check and extract functions

We model the host key, i.e., the DRKey shared between an AS and an end host as a pair of AS identifier and source identifier. Note that this "key" is not necessarily secret. Because the source identifier is not directly embedded, we extract it from the uinfo field. The uinfo (i.e., the token) is derived from the source address. We thus assume that there is some function that extracts the source identifier from the uinfo field.

definition *source-extract* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *msgterm* **where** *source-extract* = *undefined*

definition *K-i* :: *as* ⇒ *msgterm* ⇒ *msgterm* **where**
K-i asid uinfo = ⟨*AS asid*, *source-extract uinfo*⟩

The predicate *hf-valid* is given to the concrete parametrized model as a parameter. It ensures the authenticity of the hop authenticator in the hop field. The predicate takes an authenticated info field (in this model always a numeric value, hence the matching on Num ts), an unauthenticated info field uinfo, the hop field to be validated and in some cases the next hop field.

We distinguish if there is a next hop field (this yields the two cases below). If there is not, then the hop authenticator σ simply consists of a MAC over the authenticated info field and the local routing information of the hop, using the key of the hop to which the hop field belongs. If on the other hand, there is a subsequent hop field, then the uhi field of that hop field is also included in the MAC computation.

The hop authenticator σ is used to compute both the hop validation field and the uhi field. The first is computed as a MAC over the path origin (pair of absolute timestamp ts and the relative timestamp given in uinfo), using the hop authenticator as a key to the MAC. The hop authenticator is not secret, and any end host can use it to create a valid hvf. The uhi field, according to the protocol description, is σ shortened to a few bytes. We model this as applying the hash on σ.

The predicate *hf-valid* checks if the hop authenticator, hvf and uhi field are computed correctly.

fun *hf-valid* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *msgterm*
⇒ (*unit*, *msgterm*) *HF option*
⇒ (*unit*, *msgterm*) *HF*
⇒ (*unit*, *msgterm*) *HF option* ⇒ *bool* **where**
hf-valid (*Num ts*) *uinfo* - (|*AHI* = *ahi*, *UHI* = *uhi*, *HVF* = *x*|) (*Some* (|*AHI* = *ahi2*, *UHI* = *uhi2*, *HVF* = *x2*|)) ⟷

$(\exists\, \sigma\ upif\ downif.\ \sigma = Mac[macKey\ (ASID\ ahi)]\ (L\ [Num\ ts,\ upif,\ downif,\ uhi2]) \wedge$
$ASIF\ (DownIF\ ahi)\ downif \wedge ASIF\ (UpIF\ ahi)\ upif \wedge uhi = Hash\ \sigma \wedge$
$x = Mac[K\text{-}i\ (ASID\ ahi)\ uinfo]\ \langle Num\ ts,\ uinfo,\ \sigma\rangle)$
$|\ hf\text{-}valid\ (Num\ ts)\ uinfo\ \text{-}\ (\!|AHI = ahi,\ UHI = uhi,\ HVF = x|\!)\ None \longleftrightarrow$
$(\exists\, \sigma\ upif\ downif.\ \sigma = Mac[macKey\ (ASID\ ahi)]\ (L\ [Num\ ts,\ upif,\ downif]) \wedge$
$ASIF\ (DownIF\ ahi)\ downif \wedge ASIF\ (UpIF\ ahi)\ upif \wedge uhi = Hash\ \sigma \wedge$
$x = Mac[K\text{-}i\ (ASID\ ahi)\ uinfo]\ \langle Num\ ts,\ uinfo,\ \sigma\rangle)$
$|\ hf\text{-}valid\ \text{-}\ \text{-}\ \text{-}\ \text{-}\ \text{-} = False$

We can extract the entire path from the uhi field, since it includes the hop authenticator, which includes the local forwarding information as well as, recursively, all upstream hop authenticators and their hop information. However, the parametrized model defines the extract function to operate on the hop validation field, not the uhi field. We therefore define a separate function that extracts the path from a hvf. We can do so, as both hvf and uhi contain the hop authenticator. Internally, that function uses *extrUhi*.

fun $extrUhi :: msgterm \Rightarrow ahi\ list$ **where**
$extrUhi\ (Hash\ (Mac[macKey\ asid]\ (L\ [ts,\ upif,\ downif,\ uhi2])))$
$= (\!|UpIF = ASO\ upif,\ DownIF = ASO\ downif,\ ASID = asid|\!)\ \#\ extrUhi\ uhi2$
$|\ extrUhi\ (Hash\ (Mac[macKey\ asid]\ (L\ [ts,\ upif,\ downif])))$
$= [(\!|UpIF = ASO\ upif,\ DownIF = ASO\ downif,\ ASID = asid|\!)]$
$|\ extrUhi\ \text{-} = []$

This function extracts from a hop validation field (HVF hf) the entire path.

fun $extr :: msgterm \Rightarrow ahi\ list$ **where**
$extr\ (Mac[\text{-}]\ \langle\text{-},\ \text{-},\ \sigma\rangle) = extrUhi\ (Hash\ \sigma)$
$|\ extr\ \text{-} = []$

Extract the authenticated info field from a hop validation field.

fun $extr\text{-}ainfo :: msgterm \Rightarrow msgterm$ **where**
$extr\text{-}ainfo\ (Mac[\text{-}]\ \langle Num\ ts,\ \text{-},\ \text{-}\rangle) = Num\ ts$
$|\ extr\text{-}ainfo\ \text{-} = \varepsilon$

abbreviation $ik\text{-}auth\text{-}ainfo :: msgterm \Rightarrow msgterm$ **where**
$ik\text{-}auth\text{-}ainfo \equiv id$

An authenticated info field is always a number (corresponding to a timestamp).

abbreviation *checkInfo* **where**
$checkInfo\ ainfo \equiv (\exists\, ts.\ ainfo = Num\ ts)$

When observing a hop field, an attacker learns the HVF and the UHI. The AHI only contains public information that are not terms.

fun $ik\text{-}hf :: (unit,\ msgterm)\ HF \Rightarrow msgterm\ set$ **where**
$ik\text{-}hf\ hf = \{HVF\ hf,\ UHI\ hf\}$

We now define useful properties of the above definition.

lemma *hf-valid-invert*:
$hf\text{-}valid\ tsn\ uinfo\ prev\ hf\ mo \longleftrightarrow$
$((\exists\, ahi\ ahi2\ \sigma\ ts\ upif\ downif\ asid\ x\ upif2\ downif2\ asid2\ uhi\ uhi2\ x2.$
$hf = (\!|AHI = ahi,\ UHI = uhi,\ HVF = x|\!) \wedge$
$ASID\ ahi = asid \wedge ASIF\ (DownIF\ ahi)\ downif \wedge ASIF\ (UpIF\ ahi)\ upif \wedge$

$mo = Some\ (|AHI = ahi2,\ UHI = uhi2,\ HVF = x2|) \wedge$
$ASID\ ahi2 = asid2 \wedge ASIF\ (DownIF\ ahi2)\ downif2 \wedge ASIF\ (UpIF\ ahi2)\ upif2 \wedge$
$\sigma = Mac[macKey\ asid]\ (L\ [tsn,\ upif,\ downif,\ uhi2]) \wedge$
$tsn = Num\ ts \wedge$
$uhi = Hash\ \sigma \wedge$
$x = Mac[K\text{-}i\ (ASID\ ahi)\ uinfo]\ \langle tsn,\ uinfo,\ \sigma\rangle)$
$\vee\ (\exists\, ahi\ \sigma\ ts\ upif\ downif\ asid\ uhi\ x.$
$hf = (|AHI = ahi,\ UHI = uhi,\ HVF = x|) \wedge$
$ASID\ ahi = asid \wedge ASIF\ (DownIF\ ahi)\ downif \wedge ASIF\ (UpIF\ ahi)\ upif \wedge$
$mo = None \wedge$
$\sigma = Mac[macKey\ asid]\ (L\ [tsn,\ upif,\ downif]) \wedge$
$tsn = Num\ ts \wedge$
$uhi = Hash\ \sigma \wedge$
$x = Mac[K\text{-}i\ (ASID\ ahi)\ uinfo]\ \langle tsn,\ uinfo,\ \sigma\rangle)$
$)$
$\langle proof\rangle$

lemma *hf-valid-checkInfo*[*dest*]: *hf-valid ainfo uinfo prev hf z* $\Longrightarrow$ *checkInfo ainfo*
$\langle proof\rangle$

lemma *info-hvf*:
assumes *hf-valid ainfo uinfo prev m z HVF m* $= Mac[k\text{-}i]\ \langle ainfo',\ uinfo',\ \sigma\rangle \vee$ *hf-valid ainfo' uinfo' prev' m z'*
shows $uinfo = uinfo'$ $ainfo' = ainfo$
$\langle proof\rangle$

sublocale *dataplane-3-directed-defs - - - auth-seg0 hf-valid checkInfo extr extr-ainfo ik-auth-ainfo ik-hf*
$\langle proof\rangle$

3.6.2 Definitions and properties of the added intruder knowledge

Here we define two sets which are added to the intruder knowledge: *ik-add*, which contains hop authenticators. And *ik-oracle*, which contains the oracle's output to the strong attacker.

abbreviation *is-oracle* **where** *is-oracle ainfo t* $\equiv \neg$ *no-oracle ainfo t*

declare *TW.holds-set-list*[*dest*]
declare *TW.holds-takeW-is-identity*[*simp*]
declare *parts-singleton*[*dest*]

This additional Intruder Knowledge allows us to model the attacker's access not only to the hop validation fields and segment identifiers of authorized segments (which are already given in *ik-auth-hfs*), but to the underlying hop authenticators that are used to create them.

definition *ik-add* :: *msgterm set* **where**
$ik\text{-}add \equiv \{\ \sigma \mid ainfo\ uinfo\ l\ hf\ \sigma\ k\text{-}i.$
$(ainfo,\ l) \in auth\text{-}seg2$
$\wedge\ hf \in set\ l \wedge HVF\ hf = Mac[k\text{-}i]\ \langle ainfo,\ uinfo,\ \sigma\rangle\ \}$

lemma *ik-addI*:
$[\![(ainfo,\ l) \in auth\text{-}seg2;\ hf \in set\ l;\ HVF\ hf = Mac[k\text{-}i]\ \langle ainfo,\ uinfo,\ \sigma\rangle]\!] \Longrightarrow \sigma \in ik\text{-}add$
$\langle proof\rangle$

lemma *ik-add-form*: $t \in ik\text{-}add \Longrightarrow \exists\ asid\ l\ .\ t = Mac[macKey\ asid]\ l$

$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *parts-ik-add*[*simp*]: *parts ik-add* = *ik-add*
$\langle proof \rangle$

This is the oracle output provided to the adversary. Only those hop validation fields and segment identifiers whose path origin (combination of ainfo uinfo) is not contained in *no-oracle* appears here.

definition *ik-oracle* :: *msgterm set* **where**
$ik\text{-}oracle = \{t \mid t\ ainfo\ hf\ l\ uinfo\ .\ hf \in set\ l \wedge hfs\text{-}valid\text{-}None\ ainfo\ uinfo\ l \wedge$
$is\text{-}oracle\ ainfo\ uinfo \wedge (ainfo,\ l) \notin auth\text{-}seg2 \wedge (t = HVF\ hf \vee t = UHI\ hf)\ \}$

lemma *ik-oracle-parts-form*:
$t \in ik\text{-}oracle \Longrightarrow$
$(\exists\ asid\ l\ ainfo\ uinfo\ k\text{-}i\ .\ t = Mac[k\text{-}i]\ \langle ainfo,\ uinfo,\ Mac[macKey\ asid]\ l\rangle) \vee$
$(\exists\ asid\ l\ .\ t = Hash\ (Mac[macKey\ asid]\ l))$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *parts-ik-oracle*[*simp*]: *parts ik-oracle* = *ik-oracle*
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *ik-oracle-simp*: $t \in ik\text{-}oracle \longleftrightarrow$
$(\exists\, ainfo\ hf\ l\ uinfo.\ hf \in set\ l \wedge hfs\text{-}valid\text{-}None\ ainfo\ uinfo\ l \wedge is\text{-}oracle\ ainfo\ uinfo$
$\wedge (ainfo,\ l) \notin auth\text{-}seg2 \wedge (t = HVF\ hf \vee t = UHI\ hf))$
$\langle proof \rangle$

3.6.3 Properties of the intruder knowledge, including *ik-add* and *ik-oracle*

We now instantiate the parametrized model's definition of the intruder knowledge, using the definitions of *ik-add* and *ik-oracle* from above. We then prove the properties that we need to instantiate the *dataplane-3-directed* locale.

sublocale
dataplane-3-directed-ik-defs - - - auth-seg0 hf-valid checkInfo extr extr-ainfo ik-auth-ainfo ik-hf ik-add ik-oracle no-oracle
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *ik-auth-hfs-form*: $t \in parts\ ik\text{-}auth\text{-}hfs \Longrightarrow \exists\ t'\ .\ t = Hash\ t'$
$\langle proof \rangle$

declare *ik-auth-hfs-def*[*simp del*]

lemma *parts-ik-auth-hfs*[*simp*]: *parts ik-auth-hfs* = *ik-auth-hfs*
$\langle proof \rangle$

This lemma allows us not only to expand the definition of *ik-auth-hfs*, but also to obtain useful properties, such as a term being a Hash, and it being part of a valid hop field.

lemma *ik-auth-hfs-simp*:
$t \in ik\text{-}auth\text{-}hfs \longleftrightarrow (\exists\, t'\ .\ t = Hash\ t') \wedge (\exists\, hf\ .\ (t = HVF\ hf \vee t = UHI\ hf)$
$\wedge (\exists\, hfs.\ hf \in set\ hfs \wedge (\exists\, ainfo\ .\ (ainfo,\ hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2$
$\wedge (\exists\ prev\ nxt\ uinfo.\ hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ prev\ hf\ nxt))))$ (**is** *?lhs* $\longleftrightarrow$ *?rhs*)
$\langle proof \rangle$

Properties of Intruder Knowledge

lemma *auth-ainfo*[*dest*]: $[\![(ainfo, hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2]\!] \Longrightarrow \exists\ ts\ .\ ainfo = Num\ ts$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *Num-ik*[*intro*]: $Num\ ts \in ik$
⟨*proof*⟩

There are no ciphertexts (or signatures) in *parts ik*. Thus, *analz ik* and *parts ik* are identical.

lemma *analz-parts-ik*[*simp*]: $analz\ ik = parts\ ik$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *parts-ik*[*simp*]: $parts\ ik = ik$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *key-ik-bad*: $Key\ (macK\ asid) \in ik \Longrightarrow asid \in bad$
⟨*proof*⟩

Updating hop fields with different uinfo

fun *K-i-upd* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *msgterm* ⇒ *msgterm* **where**
K-i-upd ⟨*AS asid*, -⟩ *uinfo′* = ⟨*AS asid*, *source-extract uinfo′*⟩
| *K-i-upd* - - = ε

Those hop validation fields contained in *auth-seg2* or that can be generated from the hop authenticators in *ik-add* have the property that they are agnostic about the uinfo field. If a hop validation field is contained in *auth-seg2* (resp. derivable from *ik-add*), then a field with a different uinfo is also contained (resp. derivable). To show this, we first define a function that updates uinfo in a hop validation field.

fun *uinfo-upd-hf* :: *msgterm* ⇒ (*unit*, *msgterm*) *HF* ⇒ (*unit*, *msgterm*) *HF* **where**
uinfo-upd-hf new-uinfo hf =
(*case HVF hf of Mac*[*k-i*] ⟨*ainfo*, *uinfo*, σ⟩
⇒ *hf*⦇*HVF* := *Mac*[*K-i-upd k-i new-uinfo*] ⟨*ainfo*, *new-uinfo*, σ⟩⦈ | - ⇒ *hf*)

fun *uinfo-upd* :: *msgterm* ⇒ (*unit*, *msgterm*) *HF list* ⇒ (*unit*, *msgterm*) *HF list* **where**
uinfo-upd new-uinfo hfs = *map* (*uinfo-upd-hf new-uinfo*) *hfs*

lemma *uinfo-upd-valid*:
hfs-valid ainfo uinfo pre l nxt ⟹ *hfs-valid ainfo new-uinfo pre* (*uinfo-upd new-uinfo l*) *nxt*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *uinfo-upd-hf-AHI*: *AHI* (*uinfo-upd-hf new-uinfo hf*) = *AHI hf*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *uinfo-upd-hf-AHIS*[*simp*]: *AHIS* (*map* (*uinfo-upd-hf new-uinfo*) *l*) = *AHIS l*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *uinfo-upd-auth-seg2*:
assumes *hf-valid ainfo uinfo prev m z* σ = *Mac*[*Key* (*macK asid*)] *j*
HVF m = *Mac*[*k-i*] ⟨*ainfo*, *uinfo′*, σ⟩ σ ∈ *ik-add*
shows ∃ *hfs*. *m* ∈ *set hfs* ∧ (*ainfo*, *hfs*) ∈ *auth-seg2*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *MAC-synth-oracle*:
assumes *hf-valid ainfo uinfo prev m z HVF m* $\in$ *ik-oracle*
shows *is-oracle ainfo uinfo*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *ik-oracle-is-oracle*:
⟦*Mac*[*k-i*] ⟨*ainfo*, *uinfo*, σ⟩ $\in$ *ik-oracle*⟧ $\Longrightarrow$ *is-oracle ainfo uinfo*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *MAC-synth-helper*:
⟦*hf-valid ainfo uinfo prev m z*; *no-oracle ainfo uinfo*;
HVF m = *Mac*[*k-i*] ⟨*ainfo*, *uinfo*, σ⟩; σ = *Mac*[*Key* (*macK asid*)] *j*; $\sigma \in$ *ik* $\vee$ *HVF m* $\in$ *ik*⟧
$\Longrightarrow \exists$ *hfs*. *m* $\in$ *set hfs* $\wedge$ (*ainfo*, *hfs*) $\in$ *auth-seg2*
⟨*proof*⟩

This definition helps with the limiting the number of cases generated. We don't require it, but it is convenient. Given a hop validation field and an asid, return if the hvf has the expected format.

definition *mac-format* :: *msgterm* $\Rightarrow$ *as* $\Rightarrow$ *bool* **where**
mac-format m asid $\equiv \exists$ *j ts uinfo k-i* . *m* = *Mac*[*k-i*] ⟨*Num ts*, *uinfo*, *Mac*[*macKey asid*] *j*⟩

If a valid hop field is derivable by the attacker, but does not belong to the attacker, and is over a path origin that does not belong to an oracle query, then the hop field is already contained in the set of authorized segments.

lemma *MAC-synth*:
assumes *hf-valid ainfo uinfo prev m z HVF m* $\in$ *synth ik mac-format* (*HVF m*) *asid*
asid $\notin$ *bad checkInfo ainfo no-oracle ainfo uinfo*
shows $\exists$ *hfs* . *m* $\in$ *set hfs* $\wedge$ (*ainfo*, *hfs*) $\in$ *auth-seg2*
⟨*proof*⟩

3.6.4 Direct proof goals for interpretation of *dataplane-3-directed*

lemma *COND-honest-hf-analz*:
assumes *ASID* (*AHI hf*) $\notin$ *bad hf-valid ainfo uinfo prev hf nxt ik-hf hf* $\subseteq$ *synth* (*analz ik*)
no-oracle ainfo uinfo
shows *ik-hf hf* $\subseteq$ *analz ik*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-ainfo-analz*:
assumes *hf-valid ainfo uinfo prev hf nxt* **and** *ik-auth-ainfo ainfo* $\in$ *synth* (*analz ik*)
shows *ik-auth-ainfo ainfo* $\in$ *analz ik*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-ik-hf*:
assumes *hf-valid ainfo uinfo prev hf z* **and** *HVF hf* $\in$ *ik* **and** *no-oracle ainfo uinfo*
shows $\exists$ *hfs*. *hf* $\in$ *set hfs* $\wedge$ (*ainfo*, *hfs*) $\in$ *auth-seg2*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-extr-prefix-path*:
⟦*hfs-valid ainfo uinfo pre l nxt*; *nxt* = *None*⟧ $\Longrightarrow$ *prefix* (*extr-from-hd l*) (*AHIS l*)
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-path-prefix-extr*:
  prefix (*AHIS* (*hfs-valid-prefix ainfo uinfo pre l nxt*))
    (*extr-from-hd l*)
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-hf-valid-no-prev*:
  hf-valid ainfo uinfo prev hf z ⟷ *hf-valid ainfo uinfo prev′ hf z*
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-hf-valid-uinfo*:
  ⟦*hf-valid ainfo uinfo pre hf nxt*; *hf-valid ainfo′ uinfo′ pre′ hf nxt′*⟧ ⟹ *uinfo′* = *uinfo*
  ⟨*proof*⟩

3.6.5 Instantiation of *dataplane-3-directed* locale

sublocale
  dataplane-3-directed - - - *auth-seg0 hf-valid checkInfo extr extr-ainfo ik-auth-ainfo ik-hf ik-add*
    ik-oracle no-oracle
  ⟨*proof*⟩

end
end

3.7 ICING

We abstract and simplify from the protocol ICING in several ways. First, we only consider Proofs of Consent (PoC), not Proofs of Provenance (PoP). Our framework does not support proving the path validation properties that PoPs provide, and it also currently does not support XOR, and dynamically changing hop fields. Thus, instead of embedding $A_i \oplus PoP_{0,1}$, we embed A_i directly. We also remove the payload from the Hash that is included in each packet.

We offer three versions of this protocol:

- *ICING*, which contains our best effort at modeling the protocol as accurately as possible.
- *ICING-variant*, in which we strip down the protocol to what is required to obtain the security guarantees and remove unnecessary fields.
- *ICING-variant2*, in which we furthermore simplify the protocol. The key of the MAC in this protocol is only the key of the AS, as opposed to a key derived specifically for this hop field. In order to prove that this scheme is secure, we have to assume that ASes only occur once on an authorized path, since otherwise the MAC for two different hop fields (by the same AS) would be the same, and the AS could not distinguish the hop fields based on the MAC.

theory *ICING*
  imports
    ../Parametrized-Dataplane-3-undirected
begin

locale *icing-defs* = *network-assums-undirect* - - - *auth-seg0*
  for *auth-seg0* :: (*msgterm* × *nat ahi-scheme list*) *set*
begin

3.7.1 Hop validation check and extract functions

type-synonym *ICING-HF* = (*nat*, *unit*) *HF*

The term *sntag* is a key that is derived from the key of an AS and a specific hop field. We use it in the computation of *hf-valid*. The "tag" field is a opaque numeric value which is used to encode further routing information of a node.

fun *sntag* :: *nat ahi-scheme* ⇒ *msgterm* **where**
  sntag (| *UpIF* = *upif*, *DownIF* = *downif*, *ASID* = *asid*, ... = *tag* |)
    = ⟨*macKey asid*, *if2term upif*, *if2term downif*, *Num tag*⟩

lemma *sntag-eq*: *sntag ahi2* = *sntag ahi1* ⟹ *ahi2* = *ahi1*
  ⟨*proof*⟩

fun *hf2term* :: *nat ahi-scheme* ⇒ *msgterm* **where**
  hf2term (| *UpIF* = *upif*, *DownIF* = *downif*, *ASID* = *asid*, ... = *tag* |)
  = *L* [*if2term upif*, *if2term downif*, *Num asid*, *Num tag*]

fun *term2hf* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *nat ahi-scheme* **where**

term2hf (*L* [*upif*, *downif*, *Num asid*, *Num tag*])
= (| *UpIF* = *term2if upif*, *DownIF* = *term2if downif*, *ASID* = *asid*, ... = *tag* |)

lemma *term2hf-hf2term*[*simp*]: *term2hf* (*hf2term hf*) = *hf* ⟨*proof*⟩

We make some useful definitions that will be used to define the predicate *hf-valid*. Having them as separate definitions is useful to prevent unfolding in proofs that don't require it.

definition *fullpath* :: *ICING-HF list* ⇒ *msgterm* **where**
fullpath hfs = *L* (*map* (*hf2term o AHI*) *hfs*)

definition *maccontents* **where**
maccontents ahi hfs PoC-i-expire
= ⟨*Mac*[*sntag ahi*] ⟨*fullpath hfs*, *Num PoC-i-expire*⟩, ⟨*Num 0*, *Hash* (*fullpath hfs*)⟩⟩

The predicate *hf-valid* is given to the concrete parametrized model as a parameter. It ensures the authenticity of the hop authenticator in the hop field. The predicate takes an expiration timestamp (in this model always a numeric value, hence the matching on *Num PoC-i-expire*), the entire segment and the hop field to be validated.

fun *hf-valid* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *msgterm*
⇒ *ICING-HF list*
⇒ *ICING-HF*
⇒ *bool* **where**
hf-valid (*Num PoC-i-expire*) *uinfo hfs* (|*AHI* = *ahi*, *UHI* = *uhi*, *HVF* = *A-i*|) ⟷
uhi = () ∧ *uinfo* = ε ∧ *A-i* = *Hash* (*maccontents ahi hfs PoC-i-expire*)
| *hf-valid* - - - - = *False*

We can extract the entire path (past and future) from the hvf field.

fun *extr* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *nat ahi-scheme list* **where**
extr (*Mac*[*Mac*[-] ⟨*L fullpathhfs*, *Num PoC-i-expire*⟩] -)
= *map term2hf fullpathhfs*
| *extr* - = []

Extract the authenticated info field from a hop validation field.

fun *extr-ainfo* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *msgterm* **where**
extr-ainfo (*Mac*[-] (*L* (*Num ts* # *xs*))) = *Num ts*
| *extr-ainfo* - = ε

abbreviation *ik-auth-ainfo* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *msgterm* **where**
ik-auth-ainfo ≡ *id*

An authenticated info field is always a number (corresponding to a timestamp).

abbreviation *checkInfo* **where**
checkInfo ainfo ≡ (∃ *ts*. *ainfo* = *Num ts*)

When observing a hop field, an attacker learns the HVF. UHI is empty and the AHI only contains public information that are not terms.

fun *ik-hf* :: *ICING-HF* ⇒ *msgterm set* **where**
ik-hf hf = {*HVF hf*}

abbreviation *no-oracle* **where** *no-oracle* ≡ (λ - -. *True*)

We now define useful properties of the above definition.

lemma *hf-valid-invert*:
  $\textit{hf-valid tsn uinfo hfs hf} \longleftrightarrow$
$(\exists$ *PoC-i-expire ahi A-i* . $\textit{tsn} = \textit{Num PoC-i-expire} \wedge \textit{ahi} = \textit{AHI hf} \wedge$
$\textit{UHI hf} = () \wedge \textit{uinfo} = \varepsilon \wedge$
$\textit{HVF hf} = \textit{A-i} \wedge$
$\textit{A-i} = \textit{Hash}\ (\textit{maccontents ahi hfs PoC-i-expire}))$
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *hf-valid-checkInfo*[*dest*]: $\textit{hf-valid ainfo uinfo hfs hf} \Longrightarrow \textit{checkInfo ainfo}$
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *info-hvf*:
  assumes $\textit{hf-valid ainfo uinfo hfs m hf-valid ainfo}'\ \textit{uinfo}'\ \textit{hfs}'\ m'$
    $\textit{HVF}\ m = \textit{HVF}\ m'\ m \in \textit{set hfs}\ m' \in \textit{set hfs}'$
  shows $\textit{ainfo}' = \textit{ainfo}\ m' = m$
  ⟨*proof*⟩

3.7.2 Definitions and properties of the added intruder knowledge

Here we define a *ik-add* and *ik-oracle* as being empty, as these features are not used in this instance model.

sublocale *dataplane-3-undirected-defs - - - auth-seg0 hf-valid checkInfo extr extr-ainfo ik-auth-ainfo ik-hf*
  ⟨*proof*⟩

declare *parts-singleton*[*dest*]

definition *ik-add* :: *msgterm set* **where**
  $\textit{ik-add} \equiv \{\ \textit{PoC} \mid \textit{ainfo l hf PoC pkthash}.$
    $(\textit{ainfo}, l) \in \textit{auth-seg2}$
    $\wedge\ \textit{hf} \in \textit{set}\ l \wedge \textit{HVF hf} = \textit{Mac}[\textit{PoC}]\ \textit{pkthash}\ \}$

lemma *ik-addI*:
  $[\![(\textit{ainfo}, l) \in \textit{local.auth-seg2};\ \textit{hf} \in \textit{set}\ l;\ \textit{HVF hf} = \textit{Mac}[\textit{PoC}]\ \textit{pkthash}]\!] \Longrightarrow \textit{PoC} \in \textit{ik-add}$
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *ik-add-form*:
  $t \in \textit{ik-add} \Longrightarrow \exists\ \textit{asid upif downif tag}\ l\ .\ t = \textit{Mac}[\langle \textit{macKey asid}, \textit{if2term upif}, \textit{if2term downif}, \textit{Num tag}\rangle]\ l$
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *parts-ik-add*[*simp*]: $\textit{parts ik-add} = \textit{ik-add}$
  ⟨*proof*⟩

abbreviation *ik-oracle* :: *msgterm set* **where** $\textit{ik-oracle} \equiv \{\}$

3.7.3 Properties of the intruder knowledge, including *ik-add* and *ik-oracle*

We now instantiate the parametrized model's definition of the intruder knowledge, using the definitions of *ik-add* and *ik-oracle* from above. We then prove the properties that we need to instantiate the *dataplane-3-undirected* locale.

sublocale
dataplane-3-undirected-ik-defs - - - auth-seg0 hf-valid checkInfo extr extr-ainfo ik-auth-ainfo ik-hf ik-add ik-oracle no-oracle
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *ik-auth-hfs-form*: $t \in parts\ ik\text{-}auth\text{-}hfs \Longrightarrow \exists\ t'\ .\ t = Hash\ t'$
⟨*proof*⟩

declare *ik-auth-hfs-def*[*simp del*]

lemma *parts-ik-auth-hfs*[*simp*]: $parts\ ik\text{-}auth\text{-}hfs = ik\text{-}auth\text{-}hfs$
⟨*proof*⟩

This lemma allows us not only to expand the definition of *ik-auth-hfs*, but also to obtain useful properties, such as a term being a Hash, and it being part of a valid hop field.

lemma *ik-auth-hfs-simp*:
$t \in ik\text{-}auth\text{-}hfs \longleftrightarrow (\exists t'\ .\ t = Hash\ t') \wedge (\exists hf\ .\ t = HVF\ hf$
$\wedge (\exists hfs.\ hf \in set\ hfs \wedge (\exists ainfo\ .\ (ainfo,\ hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2$
$\wedge (\exists uinfo.\ hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ hfs\ hf))))$ (**is** *?lhs* ⟷ *?rhs*)
⟨*proof*⟩

Properties of Intruder Knowledge

lemma *auth-ainfo*[*dest*]: $[\![(ainfo,\ hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2]\!] \Longrightarrow \exists\ ts\ .\ ainfo = Num\ ts$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *Num-ik*[*intro*]: $Num\ ts \in ik$
⟨*proof*⟩

There are no ciphertexts (or signatures) in *parts ik*. Thus, *analz ik* and *parts ik* are identical.

lemma *analz-parts-ik*[*simp*]: $analz\ ik = parts\ ik$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *parts-ik*[*simp*]: $parts\ ik = ik$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *sntag-synth-bad*: $sntag\ ahi \in synth\ ik \Longrightarrow ASID\ ahi \in bad$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *HF-eq*:
$[\![AHI\ hf' = AHI\ hf;\ UHI\ hf' = UHI\ hf;\ HVF\ hf' = HVF\ hf]\!] \Longrightarrow hf' = (hf::('x,\ 'y)HF)$
⟨*proof*⟩

3.7.4 Direct proof goals for interpretation of *dataplane-3-undirected*

lemma *ik-add-auth*: $[\![Mac[sntag\ (AHI\ hf)]\ \langle fullpath\ hfs,\ Num\ PoC\text{-}i\text{-}expire\rangle \in ik\text{-}add;$
$ASID\ (AHI\ hf) \notin bad;\ hf \in set\ hfs;\ uinfo = \varepsilon;$
$HVF\ hf = Mac[Mac[sntag\ (AHI\ hf)]\ \langle fullpath\ hfs,\ Num\ PoC\text{-}i\text{-}expire\rangle]\ \langle Num\ 0,\ Hash\ (fullpath\ hfs)\rangle]\!]$
$\Longrightarrow \exists hfs'\ .\ hf \in set\ hfs' \wedge (Num\ PoC\text{-}i\text{-}expire,\ hfs') \in auth\text{-}seg2$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-honest-hf-analz*:
  assumes *ASID* (*AHI hf*) $\notin$ *bad hf-valid ainfo uinfo hfs hf ik-hf hf* $\subseteq$ *synth* (*analz ik*)
    no-oracle ainfo uinfo hf $\in$ *set hfs*
    shows *ik-hf hf* $\subseteq$ *analz ik*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-ainfo-analz*:
  assumes *hf-valid ainfo uinfo hfs hf* **and** *ik-auth-ainfo ainfo* $\in$ *synth* (*analz ik*)
  shows *ik-auth-ainfo ainfo* $\in$ *analz ik*
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-ik-hf*:
  assumes *hf-valid ainfo uinfo hfs hf* **and** *HVF hf* $\in$ *ik* **and** *no-oracle ainfo uinfo* **and** *hf* $\in$ *set hfs*
  shows $\exists$ *hfs*. *hf* $\in$ *set hfs* $\wedge$ (*ainfo*, *hfs*) $\in$ *auth-seg2*
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-extr*:
  $[\![$*hf-valid ainfo uinfo l hf*$]\!] \Longrightarrow$ *extr* (*HVF hf*) = *AHIS l*
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-hf-valid-uinfo*:
  $[\![$*hf-valid ainfo uinfo l hf*; *hf-valid ainfo' uinfo' l' hf*$]\!]$
  $\Longrightarrow$ *uinfo'* = *uinfo*
  ⟨*proof*⟩

3.7.5 Instantiation of *dataplane-3-undirected* locale

sublocale
  dataplane-3-undirected - - - auth-seg0 hf-valid checkInfo extr extr-ainfo ik-auth-ainfo ik-hf
    ik-add ik-oracle no-oracle
  ⟨*proof*⟩

end
end

3.8 ICING variant

We abstract and simplify from the protocol ICING in several ways. First, we only consider Proofs of Consent (PoC), not Proofs of Provenance (PoP). Our framework does not support proving the path validation properties that PoPs provide, and it also currently does not support XOR, and dynamically changing hop fields. Thus, instead of embedding $A_i \oplus PoP_{0,1}$, we embed A_i directly. We also remove the payload from the Hash that is included in each packet.

We offer three versions of this protocol:

- *ICING*, which contains our best effort at modeling the protocol as accurately as possible.
- *ICING-variant*, in which we strip down the protocol to what is required to obtain the security guarantees and remove unnecessary fields.
- *ICING-variant2*, in which we furthermore simplify the protocol. The key of the MAC in this protocol is only the key of the AS, as opposed to a key derived specifically for this hop field. In order to prove that this scheme is secure, we have to assume that ASes only occur once on an authorized path, since otherwise the MAC for two different hop fields (by the same AS) would be the same, and the AS could not distinguish the hop fields based on the MAC.

theory *ICING-variant*
  imports
    ../Parametrized-Dataplane-3-undirected
begin

locale *icing-defs* = *network-assums-undirect* - - - *auth-seg0*
  for *auth-seg0* :: (*msgterm* × *ahi list*) *set*
begin

3.8.1 Hop validation check and extract functions

type-synonym *ICING-HF* = (*unit*, *unit*) *HF*

The term *sntag* is a key that is derived from the key of an AS and a specific hop field. We use it in the computation of *hf-valid*.

fun *sntag* :: *ahi* ⇒ *msgterm* **where**
  sntag (|*UpIF* = *upif*, *DownIF* = *downif*, *ASID* = *asid*|) = ⟨*macKey asid*,⟨*if2term upif*,*if2term downif*⟩⟩

lemma *sntag-eq*: *sntag ahi2* = *sntag ahi1* ⟹ *ahi2* = *ahi1*
  ⟨*proof*⟩

The predicate *hf-valid* is given to the concrete parametrized model as a parameter. It ensures the authenticity of the hop authenticator in the hop field. The predicate takes an expiration timestamp (in this model always a numeric value, hence the matching on *Num PoC-i-expire*), the entire segment and the hop field to be validated.

fun *hf-valid* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *msgterm*
    ⇒ *ICING-HF list*

$\Rightarrow$ *ICING-HF*
$\Rightarrow$ *bool* **where**
hf-valid (*Num PoC-i-expire*) *uinfo hfs* $(\!| AHI = ahi,\ UHI = uhi,\ HVF = x |\!) \longleftrightarrow uhi = () \wedge$
$x = Mac[sntag\ ahi]\ (L\ ((Num\ PoC\text{-}i\text{-}expire)\#(map\ (hf2term\ o\ AHI)\ hfs))) \wedge uinfo = \varepsilon$
| *hf-valid* - - - - = *False*

We can extract the entire path (past and future) from the hvf field.

fun *extr* :: *msgterm* $\Rightarrow$ *ahi list* **where**
extr (*Mac*[-] (*L hfs*))
= *map term2hf* (*tl hfs*)
| *extr* - = []

Extract the authenticated info field from a hop validation field.

fun *extr-ainfo* :: *msgterm* $\Rightarrow$ *msgterm* **where**
extr-ainfo (*Mac*[-] (*L* (*Num ts* # *xs*))) = *Num ts*
| *extr-ainfo* - = ε

abbreviation *ik-auth-ainfo* :: *msgterm* $\Rightarrow$ *msgterm* **where**
ik-auth-ainfo $\equiv$ *id*

An authenticated info field is always a number (corresponding to a timestamp).

abbreviation *checkInfo* **where**
checkInfo ainfo $\equiv (\exists\, ts.\ ainfo = Num\ ts)$

When observing a hop field, an attacker learns the HVF. UHI is empty and the AHI only contains public information that are not terms.

fun *ik-hf* :: *ICING-HF* $\Rightarrow$ *msgterm set* **where**
ik-hf hf = $\{HVF\ hf\}$

abbreviation *no-oracle* **where** *no-oracle* $\equiv (\lambda$ - -. *True*)

We now define useful properties of the above definition.

lemma *hf-valid-invert*:
hf-valid tsn uinfo hfs hf $\longleftrightarrow$
$(\exists\ ts\ ahi.\ tsn = Num\ ts \wedge ahi = AHI\ hf \wedge$
$UHI\ hf = () \wedge$
$HVF\ hf = Mac[sntag\ ahi]\ (L\ ((Num\ ts)\#(map\ (hf2term\ o\ AHI)\ hfs))) \wedge uinfo = \varepsilon)$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *hf-valid-checkInfo*[*dest*]: *hf-valid ainfo uinfo hfs hf* $\Longrightarrow$ *checkInfo ainfo*
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *info-hvf*:
assumes *hf-valid ainfo uinfo hfs m hf-valid ainfo' uinfo' hfs' m'*
$HVF\ m = HVF\ m'\ m \in set\ hfs\ m' \in set\ hfs'$
shows $ainfo' = ainfo\ m' = m$
$\langle proof \rangle$

3.8.2 Definitions and properties of the added intruder knowledge

Here we define a *ik-add* and *ik-oracle* as being empty, as these features are not used in this instance model.

sublocale *dataplane-3-undirected-defs - - - auth-seg0 hf-valid checkInfo extr extr-ainfo ik-auth-ainfo ik-hf*
⟨*proof*⟩

declare *parts-singleton*[*dest*]

abbreviation *ik-add* :: *msgterm set* **where** *ik-add* ≡ {}

abbreviation *ik-oracle* :: *msgterm set* **where** *ik-oracle* ≡ {}

3.8.3 Properties of the intruder knowledge, including *ik-add* and *ik-oracle*

We now instantiate the parametrized model's definition of the intruder knowledge, using the definitions of *ik-add* and *ik-oracle* from above. We then prove the properties that we need to instantiate the *dataplane-3-undirected* locale.

sublocale
dataplane-3-undirected-ik-defs - - - auth-seg0 hf-valid checkInfo extr extr-ainfo ik-auth-ainfo ik-hf ik-add ik-oracle no-oracle
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *ik-auth-hfs-form*: $t \in parts\ ik\text{-}auth\text{-}hfs \Longrightarrow \exists\ t'.\ t = Hash\ t'$
⟨*proof*⟩

declare *ik-auth-hfs-def*[*simp del*]

lemma *parts-ik-auth-hfs*[*simp*]: $parts\ ik\text{-}auth\text{-}hfs = ik\text{-}auth\text{-}hfs$
⟨*proof*⟩

This lemma allows us not only to expand the definition of *ik-auth-hfs*, but also to obtain useful properties, such as a term being a Hash, and it being part of a valid hop field.

lemma *ik-auth-hfs-simp*:
$t \in ik\text{-}auth\text{-}hfs \longleftrightarrow (\exists t'.\ t = Hash\ t') \wedge (\exists hf.\ t = HVF\ hf$
$\wedge (\exists hfs.\ hf \in set\ hfs \wedge (\exists ainfo.\ (ainfo, hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2$
$\wedge (\exists uinfo.\ hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ hfs\ hf))))$ (**is** *?lhs* ⟷ *?rhs*)
⟨*proof*⟩

Properties of Intruder Knowledge

lemma *auth-ainfo*[*dest*]: $[\![(ainfo, hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2]\!] \Longrightarrow \exists\ ts.\ ainfo = Num\ ts$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *Num-ik*[*intro*]: $Num\ ts \in ik$
⟨*proof*⟩

There are no ciphertexts (or signatures) in *parts ik*. Thus, *analz ik* and *parts ik* are identical.

lemma *analz-parts-ik*[*simp*]: $analz\ ik = parts\ ik$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *parts-ik*[*simp*]: $parts\ ik = ik$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *sntag-synth-bad*: $sntag\ ahi \in synth\ ik \Longrightarrow ASID\ ahi \in bad$
⟨*proof*⟩

3.8.4 Direct proof goals for interpretation of *dataplane-3-undirected*

lemma *COND-honest-hf-analz*:
assumes $ASID\ (AHI\ hf) \notin bad$ *hf-valid ainfo uinfo hfs hf* $ik\text{-}hf\ hf \subseteq synth\ (analz\ ik)$
no-oracle ainfo uinfo $hf \in set\ hfs$
shows $ik\text{-}hf\ hf \subseteq analz\ ik$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-ainfo-analz*:
assumes *hf-valid ainfo uinfo hfs hf* **and** $ik\text{-}auth\text{-}ainfo\ ainfo \in synth\ (analz\ ik)$
shows $ik\text{-}auth\text{-}ainfo\ ainfo \in analz\ ik$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-ik-hf*:
assumes *hf-valid ainfo uinfo hfs hf* **and** $HVF\ hf \in ik$ **and** *no-oracle ainfo uinfo* **and** $hf \in set\ hfs$
shows $\exists hfs.\ hf \in set\ hfs \wedge (ainfo,\ hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-extr*:
$[\![hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ l\ hf]\!] \Longrightarrow extr\ (HVF\ hf) = AHIS\ l$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-hf-valid-uinfo*:
$[\![hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ l\ hf;\ hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo'\ uinfo'\ l'\ hf]\!]$
$\Longrightarrow uinfo' = uinfo$
⟨*proof*⟩

3.8.5 Instantiation of *dataplane-3-undirected* locale

sublocale
dataplane-3-undirected - - - auth-seg0 hf-valid checkInfo extr extr-ainfo ik-auth-ainfo ik-hf
ik-add ik-oracle no-oracle
⟨*proof*⟩

end
end

3.9 ICING variant

We abstract and simplify from the protocol ICING in several ways. First, we only consider Proofs of Consent (PoC), not Proofs of Provenance (PoP). Our framework does not support proving the path validation properties that PoPs provide, and it also currently does not support XOR, and dynamically changing hop fields. Thus, instead of embedding $A_i \oplus PoP_{0,1}$, we embed A_i directly. We also remove the payload from the Hash that is included in each packet.

We offer three versions of this protocol:

- *ICING*, which contains our best effort at modeling the protocol as accurately as possible.
- *ICING-variant*, in which we strip down the protocol to what is required to obtain the security guarantees and remove unnecessary fields.
- *ICING-variant2*, in which we furthermore simplify the protocol. The key of the MAC in this protocol is only the key of the AS, as opposed to a key derived specifically for this hop field. In order to prove that this scheme is secure, we have to assume that ASes only occur once on an authorized path, since otherwise the MAC for two different hop fields (by the same AS) would be the same, and the AS could not distinguish the hop fields based on the MAC.

theory *ICING-variant2*
  imports
    ../Parametrized-Dataplane-3-undirected
begin

locale *icing-defs = network-assums-undirect - - - auth-seg0*
  for *auth-seg0* :: (*msgterm* × *ahi list*) *set*
+ **assumes** *auth-seg0-no-dups*:
  $[\![(ainfo, hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg0;\ hf \in set\ hfs;\ hf' \in set\ hfs;\ ASID\ hf' = ASID\ hf]\!] \Longrightarrow hf' = hf$
begin

3.9.1 Hop validation check and extract functions

type-synonym *ICING-HF* = (*unit*, *unit*) *HF*

The term *sntag* simply is the AS key. We use it in the computation of *hf-valid*.

fun *sntag* :: *ahi* ⇒ *msgterm* **where**
  sntag (|*UpIF* = *upif*, *DownIF* = *downif*, *ASID* = *asid*|) = *macKey asid*

The predicate *hf-valid* is given to the concrete parametrized model as a parameter. It ensures the authenticity of the hop authenticator in the hop field. The predicate takes an expiration timestamp (in this model always a numeric value, hence the matching on *Num PoC-i-expire*), the entire segment and the hop field to be validated.

fun *hf-valid* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *msgterm*
    ⇒ *ICING-HF list*
    ⇒ *ICING-HF*
    ⇒ *bool* **where**
  hf-valid (*Num PoC-i-expire*) *uinfo hfs* (|*AHI* = *ahi*, *UHI* = *uhi*, *HVF* = *x*|) ⟷ *uhi* = () ∧

x = *Mac*[*sntag ahi*] (*L* ((*Num PoC-i-expire*)#(*map* (*hf2term o AHI*) *hfs*))) ∧ *uinfo* = ε
| *hf-valid* - - - - = *False*

We can extract the entire path (past and future) from the hvf field.

fun *extr* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *ahi list* **where**
extr (*Mac*[-] (*L hfs*))
= *map term2hf* (*tl hfs*)
| *extr* - = []

Extract the authenticated info field from a hop validation field.

fun *extr-ainfo* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *msgterm* **where**
extr-ainfo (*Mac*[-] (*L* (*Num ts* # *xs*))) = *Num ts*
| *extr-ainfo* - = ε

abbreviation *ik-auth-ainfo* :: *msgterm* ⇒ *msgterm* **where**
ik-auth-ainfo ≡ *id*

An authenticated info field is always a number (corresponding to a timestamp).

abbreviation *checkInfo* **where**
checkInfo ainfo ≡ (∃ *ts*. *ainfo* = *Num ts*)

When observing a hop field, an attacker learns the HVF. UHI is empty and the AHI only contains public information that are not terms.

fun *ik-hf* :: *ICING-HF* ⇒ *msgterm set* **where**
ik-hf hf = {*HVF hf*}

abbreviation *no-oracle* **where** *no-oracle* ≡ (λ - -. *True*)

We now define useful properties of the above definition.

lemma *hf-valid-invert*:
hf-valid tsn uinfo hfs hf ⟷
(∃ *ts ahi*. *tsn* = *Num ts* ∧ *ahi* = *AHI hf* ∧
UHI hf = () ∧
HVF hf = *Mac*[*sntag ahi*] (*L* ((*Num ts*)#(*map* (*hf2term o AHI*) *hfs*))) ∧ *uinfo* = ε)
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *hf-valid-checkInfo*[*dest*]: *hf-valid ainfo uinfo hfs hf* ⟹ *checkInfo ainfo*
⟨*proof*⟩

3.9.2 Definitions and properties of the added intruder knowledge

Here we define a *ik-add* and *ik-oracle* as being empty, as these features are not used in this instance model.

sublocale *dataplane-3-undirected-defs* - - - *auth-seg0 hf-valid checkInfo extr extr-ainfo ik-auth-ainfo ik-hf*
⟨*proof*⟩

declare *parts-singleton*[*dest*]

abbreviation *ik-add* :: *msgterm set* **where** *ik-add* ≡ {}

abbreviation *ik-oracle* :: *msgterm set* **where** *ik-oracle* ≡ {}

3.9.3 Properties of the intruder knowledge, including *ik-add* and *ik-oracle*

We now instantiate the parametrized model's definition of the intruder knowledge, using the definitions of *ik-add* and *ik-oracle* from above. We then prove the properties that we need to instantiate the *dataplane-3-undirected* locale.

sublocale
dataplane-3-undirected-ik-defs - - - auth-seg0 hf-valid checkInfo extr extr-ainfo ik-auth-ainfo ik-hf ik-add ik-oracle no-oracle
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *ik-auth-hfs-form*: $t \in parts\ ik\text{-}auth\text{-}hfs \Longrightarrow \exists\ t'\ .\ t = Hash\ t'$
⟨*proof*⟩

declare *ik-auth-hfs-def*[*simp del*]

lemma *parts-ik-auth-hfs*[*simp*]: $parts\ ik\text{-}auth\text{-}hfs = ik\text{-}auth\text{-}hfs$
⟨*proof*⟩

This lemma allows us not only to expand the definition of *ik-auth-hfs*, but also to obtain useful properties, such as a term being a Hash, and it being part of a valid hop field.

lemma *ik-auth-hfs-simp*:
$t \in ik\text{-}auth\text{-}hfs \longleftrightarrow (\exists\, t'\ .\ t = Hash\ t') \wedge (\exists\, hf\ .\ t = HVF\ hf$
$\wedge (\exists\, hfs.\ hf \in set\ hfs \wedge (\exists\, ainfo\ .\ (ainfo, hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2$
$\wedge (\exists\, uinfo.\ hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ hfs\ hf)))) $ (**is** $?lhs \longleftrightarrow ?rhs$)
⟨*proof*⟩

Properties of Intruder Knowledge

lemma *auth-ainfo*[*dest*]: $[\![(ainfo, hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2]\!] \Longrightarrow \exists\ ts\ .\ ainfo = Num\ ts$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *Num-ik*[*intro*]: $Num\ ts \in ik$
⟨*proof*⟩

There are no ciphertexts (or signatures) in *parts ik*. Thus, *analz ik* and *parts ik* are identical.

lemma *analz-parts-ik*[*simp*]: $analz\ ik = parts\ ik$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *parts-ik*[*simp*]: $parts\ ik = ik$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *sntag-synth-bad*: $sntag\ ahi \in synth\ ik \Longrightarrow ASID\ ahi \in bad$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *back-subst-set-member*: $[\![hf' \in set\ hfs;\ hf' = hf]\!] \Longrightarrow hf \in set\ hfs$ ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *sntag-asid*: $sntag\ hf = sntag\ hf' \Longrightarrow ASID\ hf' = ASID\ hf$ ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *map-hf2term-eq*: $map\ (\lambda x.\ hf2term\ (AHI\ x))\ hfs = map\ (\lambda x.\ hf2term\ (AHI\ x))\ hfs'$
$\Longrightarrow AHIS\ hfs' = AHIS\ hfs$ ⟨*proof*⟩

3.9.4 Direct proof goals for interpretation of *dataplane-3-undirected*

lemma *COND-honest-hf-analz*:
  assumes $ASID\ (AHI\ hf) \notin bad$ *hf-valid ainfo uinfo hfs hf* $ik\text{-}hf\ hf \subseteq synth\ (analz\ ik)$
    no-oracle ainfo uinfo $hf \in set\ hfs$
    shows $ik\text{-}hf\ hf \subseteq analz\ ik$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-ainfo-analz*:
  assumes *hf-valid ainfo uinfo hfs hf* **and** $ik\text{-}auth\text{-}ainfo\ ainfo \in synth\ (analz\ ik)$
  shows $ik\text{-}auth\text{-}ainfo\ ainfo \in analz\ ik$
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-ik-hf*:
  assumes *hf-valid ainfo uinfo hfs hf* **and** $HVF\ hf \in ik$ **and** *no-oracle ainfo uinfo* **and** $hf \in set\ hfs$
  shows $\exists hfs.\ hf \in set\ hfs \wedge (ainfo,\ hfs) \in auth\text{-}seg2$
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-extr*:
  $[\![hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ l\ hf]\!] \Longrightarrow extr\ (HVF\ hf) = AHIS\ l$
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *COND-hf-valid-uinfo*:
  $[\![hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo\ uinfo\ l\ hf;\ hf\text{-}valid\ ainfo'\ uinfo'\ l'\ hf]\!]$
  $\Longrightarrow uinfo' = uinfo$
  ⟨*proof*⟩

3.9.5 Instantiation of *dataplane-3-undirected* locale

sublocale
  dataplane-3-undirected - - - auth-seg0 hf-valid checkInfo extr extr-ainfo ik-auth-ainfo ik-hf
    ik-add ik-oracle no-oracle
  ⟨*proof*⟩

end
end

3.10 All Protocols

We import all protocols.

theory *All-Protocols*
  imports
    instances/SCION
    instances/SCION-variant
    instances/EPIC-L1-BA
    instances/EPIC-L1-SA
    instances/EPIC-L1-SA-Example
    instances/EPIC-L2-SA
    instances/ICING
    instances/ICING-variant
    instances/ICING-variant2
begin

end