0.00/0.00	% File    : /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
0.00/0.00	% app-encoded or not : original
0.00/0.00	% Variant    : purification_int
0.00/0.00	% Ordering    : kbo
0.00/0.00	% Command    : 
0.00/0.00	#!/bin/sh
0.00/0.00	
0.00/0.00	./zipperposition.native ${1:+"$1"} \
0.00/0.00	  -i tptp \
0.00/0.00	  -o tptp \
0.00/0.00	  --timeout "$STAREXEC_WALLCLOCK_LIMIT" \
0.00/0.00	  --mem-limit "$STAREXEC_MAX_MEM" \
0.00/0.00	  --no-avatar \
0.00/0.00	  --ho \
0.00/0.00	  --force-ho \
0.00/0.00	  --no-ho-elim-pred-var \
0.00/0.00	  --ho-general-ext-pos \
0.00/0.00	  --no-ho-unif \
0.00/0.00	  --no-induction \
0.00/0.00	  --no-unif-pattern \
0.00/0.00	  --ord $2  \
0.00/0.00	  --simultaneous-sup false \
0.00/0.00	  --ho-purify int \
0.00/0.00	  --ho-no-ext-pos \
0.00/0.00	  --ho-no-ext-neg \
0.00/0.00	  --ho-prim-enum none \
0.00/0.00	  --no-max-vars \
0.00/0.00	  --dont-select-ho-var-lits \
0.00/0.00	  --no-fool
0.00/0.20	% Computer   : n177.star.cs.uiowa.edu
0.00/0.20	% Model      : x86_64 x86_64
0.00/0.20	% CPU        : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2609 0 @ 2.40GHz
0.00/0.20	% Memory     : 32218.625MB
0.00/0.20	% OS         : Linux 3.10.0-693.2.2.el7.x86_64
0.00/0.20	% CPULimit   : 300
0.00/0.20	% DateTime   : Fri Feb  2 14:31:54 CST 2018
11.14/11.40	% done 6517 iterations in 11.197s
11.14/11.40	% SZS status Theorem for '/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p'
11.14/11.40	% SZS output start Refutation
11.14/11.41	tff(conj_0, axiom,
11.14/11.41	  (member(event,
11.14/11.41	          says(server,a,crypt(k1,mPair(na,mPair(agent1(b),mPair(key(k),x))))),
11.14/11.41	          set(event,evs)))).
11.14/11.41	tff('0', plain,
11.14/11.41	    member(event, 
11.14/11.41	      says(server, a, 
11.14/11.41	        crypt(k1, mPair(na, mPair(agent1(b), mPair(key(k), x))))), 
11.14/11.41	      set(event, evs)),
11.14/11.41	    inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [conj_0])).
11.14/11.41	tff(fact_91_Says__Server__message__form, axiom,
11.14/11.41	  (![Evsa:list(event),Xa:msg,Ka:nat,Ba:agent,N:msg,K_a:nat,Aa:agent]:
11.14/11.41	     (member(event,
11.14/11.41	             says(server,Aa,
11.14/11.41	                  crypt(K_a,mPair(N,mPair(agent1(Ba),mPair(key(Ka),Xa))))),
11.14/11.41	             set(event,Evsa)) =>
11.14/11.41	      (member(list(event),Evsa,nS_Sha254967238shared) =>
11.14/11.41	       ((K_a = aa(agent,nat,shrK,Aa)) & 
11.14/11.41	        (Xa = crypt(aa(agent,nat,shrK,Ba),mPair(key(Ka),agent1(Aa)))) & 
11.14/11.41	        (~member(nat,Ka,image(agent,nat,shrK,top_top(fun(agent,bool)))))))))).
11.14/11.41	tff('1', plain,
11.14/11.41	    ![X300 : list(event), X301 : agent, X302 : nat, X303 : msg, 
11.14/11.41	      X304 : agent, X305 : nat, X306 : msg]:
11.14/11.41	      (~ member(list(event), X300, nS_Sha254967238shared)
11.23/11.42	       | ~ member(event, 
11.23/11.42	             says(server, X301, 
11.23/11.42	               crypt(X302, 
11.23/11.42	                 mPair(X303, mPair(agent1(X304), mPair(key(X305), X306))))), 
11.23/11.42	             set(event, X300))
11.23/11.42	       | X306
11.23/11.42	          = crypt(aa(agent, nat, shrK, X304), mPair(key(X305), agent1(X301)))),
11.23/11.42	    inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [fact_91_Says__Server__message__form])).
11.23/11.42	tff('2', plain,
11.23/11.42	    (~ $true
11.23/11.42	     | x = crypt(aa(agent, nat, shrK, b), mPair(key(k), agent1(a)))
11.23/11.42	     | ~ member(list(event), evs, nS_Sha254967238shared)),
11.23/11.42	    inference('sup-', [status(thm)], ['0', '1'])).
11.23/11.42	tff(conj_4, axiom, (member(list(event),evs,nS_Sha254967238shared))).
11.23/11.42	tff('3', plain, member(list(event), evs, nS_Sha254967238shared),
11.23/11.42	    inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [conj_4])).
11.23/11.42	tff('4', plain,
11.23/11.42	    (~ $true
11.23/11.42	     | x = crypt(aa(agent, nat, shrK, b), mPair(key(k), agent1(a)))
11.23/11.42	     | ~ $true),
11.23/11.42	    inference('demod', [status(thm)], ['2', '3'])).
11.23/11.42	tff('5', plain, x = crypt(aa(agent, nat, shrK, b), mPair(key(k), agent1(a))),
11.23/11.42	    inference('simplify', [status(thm)], ['4'])).
11.23/11.42	tff(fact_7_secrecy__lemma, axiom,
11.23/11.42	  (![Evsa:list(event),Ka:nat,Ba:agent,NAa:msg,Aa:agent]:
11.23/11.42	     (member(event,
11.23/11.42	             says(server,Aa,
11.23/11.42	                  crypt(aa(agent,nat,shrK,Aa),
11.23/11.42	                        mPair(NAa,
11.23/11.42	                              mPair(agent1(Ba),
11.23/11.42	                                    mPair(key(Ka),
11.23/11.42	                                          crypt(aa(agent,nat,shrK,Ba),
11.23/11.42	                                                mPair(key(Ka),agent1(Aa)))))))),
11.23/11.42	             set(event,Evsa)) =>
11.23/11.42	      ((~member(agent,Aa,bad)) =>
11.23/11.42	       ((~member(agent,Ba,bad)) =>
11.23/11.42	        (member(list(event),Evsa,nS_Sha254967238shared) =>
11.23/11.42	         ((![NB2:msg]:
11.23/11.42	             (~
11.23/11.42	               member(event,notes(spy,mPair(NAa,mPair(NB2,key(Ka)))),
11.23/11.42	                      set(event,Evsa)))) =>
11.23/11.42	          (~member(msg,key(Ka),analz(knows(spy,Evsa))))))))))).
11.23/11.42	tff('6', plain,
11.23/11.42	    ![X21 : list(event), X22 : nat, X23 : msg, X24 : agent, X25 : agent]:
11.23/11.42	      (~ member(list(event), X21, nS_Sha254967238shared)
11.23/11.42	       | ~ member(msg, key(X22), analz(knows(spy, X21)))
11.23/11.42	       | member(event, 
11.23/11.42	           notes(spy, mPair(X23, mPair(sk_NB2(X23, X22, X21), key(X22)))), 
11.23/11.42	           set(event, X21))
11.23/11.42	       | member(agent, X24, bad)
11.23/11.42	       | ~ member(event, 
11.23/11.42	             says(server, X25, 
11.23/11.42	               crypt(aa(agent, nat, shrK, X25), 
11.23/11.42	                 mPair(X23, 
11.23/11.42	                   mPair(agent1(X24), 
11.23/11.42	                     mPair(key(X22), 
11.23/11.42	                       crypt(aa(agent, nat, shrK, X24), 
11.23/11.42	                         mPair(key(X22), agent1(X25)))))))), set(event, X21))
11.23/11.42	       | member(agent, X25, bad)),
11.23/11.42	    inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [fact_7_secrecy__lemma])).
11.23/11.42	tff('7', plain,
11.23/11.42	    ![X0 : list(event), X1 : msg]:
11.23/11.42	      (~ member(event, 
11.23/11.42	           says(server, a, 
11.23/11.42	             crypt(aa(agent, nat, shrK, a), 
11.23/11.42	               mPair(X1, mPair(agent1(b), mPair(key(k), x))))), 
11.23/11.42	           set(event, X0))
11.23/11.42	       | member(agent, a, bad)
11.23/11.42	       | member(agent, b, bad)
11.23/11.42	       | member(event, 
11.23/11.42	           notes(spy, mPair(X1, mPair(sk_NB2(X1, k, X0), key(k)))), 
11.23/11.42	           set(event, X0))
11.23/11.42	       | ~ member(msg, key(k), analz(knows(spy, X0)))
11.23/11.42	       | ~ member(list(event), X0, nS_Sha254967238shared)),
11.23/11.42	    inference('sup-', [status(thm)], ['5', '6'])).
11.23/11.42	tff('8', plain,
11.23/11.42	    ![X300 : list(event), X301 : agent, X302 : nat, X303 : msg, 
11.23/11.42	      X304 : agent, X305 : nat, X306 : msg]:
11.23/11.42	      (~ member(list(event), X300, nS_Sha254967238shared)
11.23/11.42	       | ~ member(event, 
11.23/11.42	             says(server, X301, 
11.23/11.42	               crypt(X302, 
11.23/11.42	                 mPair(X303, mPair(agent1(X304), mPair(key(X305), X306))))), 
11.23/11.42	             set(event, X300))
11.23/11.42	       | X302 = aa(agent, nat, shrK, X301)),
11.23/11.42	    inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [fact_91_Says__Server__message__form])).
11.23/11.42	tff('9', plain,
11.23/11.42	    (~ $true
11.23/11.42	     | k1 = aa(agent, nat, shrK, a)
11.23/11.42	     | ~ member(list(event), evs, nS_Sha254967238shared)),
11.23/11.42	    inference('sup-', [status(thm)], ['0', '8'])).
11.23/11.42	tff('10', plain, (~ $true | k1 = aa(agent, nat, shrK, a) | ~ $true),
11.23/11.42	    inference('demod', [status(thm)], ['9', '3'])).
11.23/11.42	tff('11', plain, k1 = aa(agent, nat, shrK, a),
11.23/11.42	    inference('simplify', [status(thm)], ['10'])).
11.23/11.42	tff('12', plain,
11.23/11.42	    ![X0 : list(event), X1 : msg]:
11.23/11.42	      (~ member(event, 
11.23/11.42	           says(server, a, 
11.23/11.42	             crypt(k1, mPair(X1, mPair(agent1(b), mPair(key(k), x))))), 
11.23/11.42	           set(event, X0))
11.23/11.42	       | member(agent, a, bad)
11.23/11.42	       | member(agent, b, bad)
11.23/11.42	       | member(event, 
11.23/11.42	           notes(spy, mPair(X1, mPair(sk_NB2(X1, k, X0), key(k)))), 
11.23/11.42	           set(event, X0))
11.23/11.42	       | ~ member(msg, key(k), analz(knows(spy, X0)))
11.23/11.42	       | ~ member(list(event), X0, nS_Sha254967238shared)),
11.23/11.42	    inference('demod', [status(thm)], ['7', '11'])).
11.23/11.42	tff(conj_2, axiom, (~member(agent,a,bad))).
11.23/11.42	tff('13', plain, ~ member(agent, a, bad),
11.23/11.42	    inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [conj_2])).
11.23/11.42	tff('14', plain,
11.23/11.42	    ![X0 : list(event), X1 : msg]:
11.23/11.42	      (~ member(list(event), X0, nS_Sha254967238shared)
11.23/11.42	       | ~ member(msg, key(k), analz(knows(spy, X0)))
11.23/11.42	       | member(event, 
11.23/11.42	           notes(spy, mPair(X1, mPair(sk_NB2(X1, k, X0), key(k)))), 
11.23/11.42	           set(event, X0))
11.23/11.42	       | member(agent, b, bad)
11.23/11.42	       | ~ member(event, 
11.23/11.42	             says(server, a, 
11.23/11.42	               crypt(k1, mPair(X1, mPair(agent1(b), mPair(key(k), x))))), 
11.23/11.42	             set(event, X0))),
11.23/11.42	    inference('clc', [status(thm)], ['12', '13'])).
11.23/11.42	tff(conj_3, axiom, (~member(agent,b,bad))).
11.23/11.42	tff('15', plain, ~ member(agent, b, bad),
11.23/11.42	    inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [conj_3])).
11.23/11.42	tff('16', plain,
11.23/11.42	    ![X0 : list(event), X1 : msg]:
11.23/11.42	      (~ member(event, 
11.23/11.42	           says(server, a, 
11.23/11.42	             crypt(k1, mPair(X1, mPair(agent1(b), mPair(key(k), x))))), 
11.23/11.42	           set(event, X0))
11.23/11.42	       | member(event, 
11.23/11.42	           notes(spy, mPair(X1, mPair(sk_NB2(X1, k, X0), key(k)))), 
11.23/11.42	           set(event, X0))
11.23/11.42	       | ~ member(msg, key(k), analz(knows(spy, X0)))
11.23/11.42	       | ~ member(list(event), X0, nS_Sha254967238shared)),
11.23/11.42	    inference('clc', [status(thm)], ['14', '15'])).
11.23/11.42	tff('17', plain,
11.23/11.42	    (~ $true
11.23/11.42	     | ~ member(list(event), evs, nS_Sha254967238shared)
11.23/11.42	     | ~ member(msg, key(k), analz(knows(spy, evs)))
11.23/11.42	     | member(event, 
11.23/11.42	         notes(spy, mPair(na, mPair(sk_NB2(na, k, evs), key(k)))), 
11.23/11.42	         set(event, evs))),
11.23/11.42	    inference('sup-', [status(thm)], ['0', '16'])).
11.23/11.42	tff(conj_5, conjecture, (~member(msg,key(k),analz(knows(spy,evs))))).
11.23/11.42	tff(zf_stmt_0, negated_conjecture,
11.23/11.42	  (member(msg,key(k),analz(knows(spy,evs))))).
11.23/11.42	tff('18', plain, member(msg, key(k), analz(knows(spy, evs))),
11.23/11.42	    inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [zf_stmt_0])).
11.23/11.42	tff('19', plain,
11.23/11.42	    (~ $true
11.23/11.42	     | ~ $true
11.23/11.42	     | ~ $true
11.23/11.42	     | member(event, 
11.23/11.42	         notes(spy, mPair(na, mPair(sk_NB2(na, k, evs), key(k)))), 
11.23/11.42	         set(event, evs))),
11.23/11.42	    inference('demod', [status(thm)], ['17', '3', '18'])).
11.23/11.42	tff('20', plain,
11.23/11.42	    member(event, notes(spy, mPair(na, mPair(sk_NB2(na, k, evs), key(k)))), 
11.23/11.42	      set(event, evs)),
11.23/11.42	    inference('simplify', [status(thm)], ['19'])).
11.23/11.42	tff(conj_1, axiom,
11.23/11.42	  (![NB:msg]:
11.23/11.42	     (~member(event,notes(spy,mPair(na,mPair(NB,key(k)))),set(event,evs))))).
11.23/11.42	tff('21', plain,
11.23/11.42	    ![X340 : msg]:
11.23/11.42	      ~ member(event, notes(spy, mPair(na, mPair(X340, key(k)))), 
11.23/11.42	          set(event, evs)),
11.23/11.42	    inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [conj_1])).
11.23/11.42	tff('22', plain, ~ $true, inference('sup-', [status(thm)], ['20', '21'])).
11.23/11.42	tff('23', plain, $false, inference('simplify', [status(thm)], ['22'])).
11.23/11.42	
11.23/11.42	% SZS output end Refutation
11.23/11.42	EOF
