

II.—KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM AND EMPIRICAL REALISM.

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THE terms Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism are incomplete. They have no meaning unless the objects be designated of which transcendental ideality and empirical reality are predicated. The term Empirical Realism might suggest that it predicates reality only of empirical objects. The term Transcendental Idealism would then, by analogous interpretation, imply that ideality is to be predicated only of transcendental objects. This is, in each case, a wrong disjunction of the component terms. The predication intended by Kant is not of ideality or of reality to transcendental or to empirical objects ; but it is of transcendental ideality and of empirical reality, and the question is, to what objects these attributes are applied. They are intended by Kant to be applied to the same objects, spoken of in general as the objects of the senses, or more particularly, as the objects of intuition and of experience. Both the Transcendental Idealism and the Empirical Realism are meant by Kant to be in respect to Time and Space and to the Sensible Objects appearing in them, or in general, in respect to Intuitions and Phenomena. It would, however, be well not to use these terms simply, but to add to them the reference to the objects intended ; for they may be applied to still other objects. Kant himself, conceiving of a world of things-in-themselves, whose existence he admitted, maintained a doctrine of Transcendental Realism in respect to Things-in-themselves ; while at the same time he rejected a doctrine of Transcendental Realism in respect to Time and Space and the Sensible Objects or Phenomena in them.

Before examining the possible systems that may be framed by combination of these things, we must firmly grasp the meanings in which Kant used the four characterising terms. They are made to fall into two groups, in which each term

in the one is contrasted with a term in the other—transcendental with empirical, and idealism with realism. As by “empirical” is meant reference to what may be experienced, so by “transcendental” is meant reference to what cannot be experienced because of its being, or being taken to be, beyond experience, or outside the realm of experience, the idea of which, however, is supposed to underlie our experience. And as by “realism” is meant a doctrine of reality, so by “idealism” is meant a doctrine of unreality: the “ideal” is made to mean what is only thought of, not having anything to correspond to the thought, what is therefore falsely thought of, and is nothing; by “ideality” is meant nothingness. By “the transcendental ideality of phenomena,” Kant tells us, he means merely that “outside our representations,” i.e. transcendently taken, “they are nothing”.¹ In fact, for “Transcendental Idealism” Kant might equally well have employed the phrase “Unempirical Unrealism”.

As these terms admit of being used interchangeably, and as they are applicable both to intuitions and phenomena and to things-in-themselves, it is possible to form of them eight combinations, descriptive of eight doctrines, although some of these may overlap and coincide. Four of them are doctrines held by Kant, and four are doctrines rejected by Kant. The four held by Kant are the following:—

(1) *Transcendental Idealism of Intuitions and Phenomena*.—That intuitions and phenomena are nothing beyond experience.

(2) *Empirical Idealism of Things-in-themselves*.—That things-in-themselves are nothing in experience (i.e. that they are not experienced).

(3) *Transcendental Realism of Things-in-themselves*.—That things-in-themselves are real beyond experience.

(4) *Empirical Realism of Intuitions and Phenomena*.—That intuitions and phenomena are real in experience.

The four rejected by Kant are the following:—

(5) *Transcendental Realism of Intuitions and Phenomena*.—That intuitions and phenomena are real beyond experience.

(6) *Empirical Realism of Things-in-themselves*.—That things-in-themselves are real in experience.

(7) *Transcendental Idealism of Things-in-themselves*.—That things-in-themselves are nothing beyond experience.

¹ III., 356, cf. 63, 68, 347.—The references are to volumes and pages of Hartenstein's chronological edition, in eight volumes, Leipzig, 1867-68. Vol. iii. contains the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, vol. iv., 1-131, the *Prolegomena*.

(8) *Empirical Idealism of Intuitions and Phenomena*.—That intuitions and phenomena are nothing in experience (i.e. have not objective reality).¹

The fifth is rejected because it is contrary to the first, the sixth because it is contrary to the second, and so on. The second and third virtually overlap, since the reality of things-in-themselves beyond experience and their unreality in experience are mutually supplementary. Likewise the fifth and sixth may coincide, since the reality of phenomena beyond experience permits them to be things-in-themselves, while the reality of things-in-themselves in experience makes them into phenomena. The doctrines held and the doctrines rejected, then, each reduce to three. Kant himself used names for only three out of these six doctrines, and abbreviated. He spoke of the first merely as Transcendental Idealism, of the fourth as Empirical Realism, and of the eighth as Empirical Idealism, or simply Idealism.

The question before us is: Did Kant prove the doctrines he held, and did he disprove the doctrines he rejected? In the case of the fourth doctrine the question will be found to require investigation into the meaning of the doctrine itself.

At the very outset it may without hesitation be said that the doctrine of the Transcendental Ideality of Time and Space as intuitions and of Sensible Objects as phenomena in them, is not successfully established. Here at once an objection is to be set aside which was urged by some of the early critics. This is that even though Kant proved the subjective character of our time and space (their empirical reality), he does not prove that there cannot be an objective time and space resembling them—that there cannot be a transcendently real time and space. The objection misses the mark because Kant attempts to prove, not merely the subjective character of our time and space, but their formativeness. Were time and space shown to be subjective merely as *modes* of the existence of our sense-objects and representations, there

¹ It may be noticed that the combination "empirical idealism," in each division, makes a break in the symmetry of the arrangement. In fact, it is somewhat forced, since there is no empirical nothingness and what is experienced is real, so that a new meaning is involved for the term "ideality". The combination is included because it was actually employed by Kant, even though, as we shall see, it was, in the last form, wrongly applied by him, the doctrine it denotes being ascribed to philosophers who did not entertain it. Kant sometimes called it (the eighth) "Material Idealism," which is a better term if it is confined to the denial of matter taken as any extended object outside us; for in the sense of matter as consisting of extended things-in-themselves, it would be a denial of what Kant himself denied.

would be no reason apparent why things existing by themselves might not have modes of existence *like* the modes of existence of the sense-objects which are only in us. There would be no justice in maintaining that the time and space of my sense-objects, which are supposed to resemble the time and space of your sense-objects, cannot resemble the time and space of things-in-themselves. In fact I cannot sensibly perceive your sense-objects, nor you mine, and yet all we mean when we say that your sense-objects are probably in a time and space like mine is that if I could sensibly perceive yours, or you mine, or if some one being could sensibly perceive both yours and mine, I, or you, or he would find them to be in like times and spaces. And so we do not know but that some being who could sensibly or otherwise perceive things-in-themselves, would find them to be in—or to have in and between themselves—a time and space like ours. But Kant does not stop at this position. He does not say that our time and space are modes existing in our sense-objects only after and because these exist. He recognises, to be sure, that he *finds* his own time and space only in his sensible objects after he has them.¹ Yet he maintains that his time and space are distinctive forms (or moulds) existing in him prior to his having any sense-objects, hence independent of his sense-objects, and that the existence of his sense-objects, as successive and extended things, is consequent to, and dependent upon, the existence of his forms, time and space. From this doctrine it would result that things-in-themselves could not be in any time and space, but could at best only have some time and space in them, just as my time and space are in me as a subject-in-myself, so that they would be merely other subjects-in-themselves (or monads). For it would be absurd to suppose that a thing existing by itself, as an entity self-contained, could exist in something like something existing in a subject-in-itself as a form of its representations or modifications. This reasoning, however, does not apply to things conceived of merely as "transcendental objects" relatively to us; for such objects might exist in a time and space, themselves forms in another being, say God, as maintained in the Berkeleyan system. A time and space like our formative times and spaces could, of course, be objective to all of us, existing apart from all men, but only by residing in another percipient Being. And transcendental objects need not be things-in-themselves, strictly so called, although Kant does not appear to have recognised this distinction;

for transcendental objects to us may be attributes or determinations, whether modal or formal, of, or residing in, things-in-themselves. Thus if Kant succeeded in proving his complete doctrine about the nature of our times and spaces, he would have proved their transcendental ideality, if not relatively merely to us, yet relatively to all percipient beings, that is, absolutely. He would have proved the nothingness of time and space outside percipient beings or things-in-themselves—the non-reality of any absolute time and space—the falsity of the opinion that time and space are independent, or self-dependent, existences. It is incumbent upon us, therefore, to show that he did not succeed in proving his complete doctrine.

In the "Metaphysical Exposition" Kant gives four arguments purporting to prove his doctrine. These fall short of proving his complete doctrine; for the last two aim only at proving that time and space are intuitions, and the first two only at proving that they are *a priori*—which two are also very defective. At proving the formativeness of time and space, or their prescriptiveness concerning the nature of the objects appearing in them, no argument is directed except the "Transcendental Exposition" in the *Asthetik*, which corresponds to the "Transcendental Deduction" in the *Analytik*. These together form the epistemological argument, to the effect that the hypothesis of their formativeness is necessary for the possibility of our sciences of applied mathematics and physics, on the ground that in no other way than by the existence in us of the forms and principles prescriptive of the nature of our objects could we have certain knowledge of them, such as we claim to have; whereby also is involved the conclusion that the objects dealt with must also be in us, for only in this case could their forms and principles or laws be in us. There are many defects in this argument. To enter into a criticism of it in detail is beside the purpose of this paper, which is expositive. But a destruction of it will be attempted by pointing out an inconsistency in the doctrine which this doctrine prepares; for Kant's Transcendental Idealism is nothing without supplementation by his Empirical Realism.

The inconsistency here alluded to is not in two out of the three branches of Kant's metaphysical system. The doctrine of Transcendental Idealism in respect to Time and Space and the Sensible Objects in them is a perfectly self-consistent and conceivable doctrine. We can perfectly well think that there is no time or space apart from the intuitive faculty in percipient beings—that time and space are neither

things nor attributes of things existing apart from such a faculty—that there is no *Gegenbild* of time and space (iii., 608), and consequently none of phenomenal objects, existing “in the same manner” (iii., 570), or “in the same quality” (iii., 607, 608), outside, by themselves.¹ Also, in spite of all Berkeleyans, we can perfectly well think of the existence of things beside percipient beings and their representations; wherefore we may perfectly well entertain a system of Transcendental Realism concerning them. For entirely consistent with itself and with the preceding is the conception that there may be a world of things existing by themselves, not in time and not in space, either themselves or their “determinations” or “manners of existing,” about which therefore we are not able to know or even to conceive what they may be in detail, whether we happen or not to be able to know or to believe that they exist. We can, furthermore, think of them as interacting and as acting upon our subjects - in - themselves; for ourselves, by abstracting our faculties and their contents, may be regarded as similar things-in-themselves. The concept of causality applied to these is not the concept of causality which Kant applied to our sensible objects and defined as the positing of something preceding as condition of something following, since this is applicable only to events taking place in time. That kind of causality he called the sensible, phenomenal, or empirical. The kind which is applicable to things-in-themselves he called the intelligible, noumenal, or transcendental.² So it is conceivable that the objects-in-themselves may cause in me (a subject-in-itself) my sensations, which I distribute into a spatial and temporal and orderly world of phenomena; and similarly they may cause in you your sensations, which your subject-in-itself distributes into an extended and temporal and orderly world of phenomena, and so on in every individual person, every one of whom would have his own subjective world of phenomena, and the only objective world, common as object to all individual persons, would be the one world of things-in-themselves. To imagine what may be the conditions or states in that world corresponding to the extended and succeeding states in our phenomenal worlds is impossible, for the very reason of their total differentiation from our representations; but simply to think

¹ Rather that our time and space and the objects appearing in them are not *Gegenbilder*, or mirrored images, of a real time and space and of real things existing in them.

² III., 349, 374, 377, 378.

that other corresponding states may exist is at least possible. But this thought does not constitute Kant's Empirical Realism; for there is nothing empirical about such realities. They are not objects in our experience, and so, in a way, as Kant says, they are not objects for us,¹—and he even says they are nothing for us,² though by this statement he does not mean that they are absolutely nothing. On the contrary, if existing, they are the absolute realities, the term "reality" here being used not in an empirical but in a transcendental sense. In other words, this is the doctrine of Transcendental Realism in respect to Things-in-themselves.³

These two transcendental doctrines, then, are perfectly consistent, each with itself and each with the other. The one means that transcendently taken, that is, outside of ourselves, sensible objects do not exist, and there are no objects resembling them. The other means that in that outer region, though there may be objects corresponding to our sensible objects, they do not resemble them in any particular whatsoever, so that their nature must be wholly unknowable to us. The two fit together perfectly. But it cannot be said that Kant's empirical doctrine—his doctrine of Empirical Realism in respect to Time and Space and the Sensible Objects in them—is self-consistent, or altogether consistent with those others. It is a fact which has been mostly overlooked, that Kant gives two distinct accounts of this Empirical Realism. These deserve to be carefully distinguished.

Empirical Realism deals with the empirically and phenomenally real, or the reality in experience or in phenomenon. Of such reality Kant gives, and frequently repeats, all unconsciously, two totally distinct definitions. The one is that the phenomenally real is the matter of our sense-perceptions, or simply our sensations themselves; the other, that the phenomenally real is that which *corresponds* to the matter of our sense-perceptions, or simply *to* our sensations.⁴ The

¹ III., 399.

² III., 350, 571; iv., 84.

³ A doctrine of this sort, but confined to the consideration of space, and also not positively but problematically stated, had been advanced twenty-seven years before Kant wrote the *Kritik*, by Condillac in his *Traité des Sensations*, part iv., ch. v. Condillac, as well as Kant, drew from Leibnitz.

⁴ The second is the more common, as in iii., 144, 158 n., 180, etc. The first is given along with the second in the following: "Alle äussere Wahrnehmung also *dewiset* unmittelbar etwas Wirkliches im Raume, oder *ist* vielmehr das Wirkliche selbst," iii., 602, and the last is repeated on the same page. Now in *Wahrnehmung* is both intuition and sensa-

importance of the distinction, the moment attention is called to it, is obvious. Our sensations, and consequently, too, the matter of our sense-perceptions, exist only in our sensibility, and have no existence when we do not perceive them.¹ But that which corresponds to them is distinct from them, and does not necessarily cease to exist when we do not sensibly perceive it through the medium of the sensations it excites in us. In accordance with these differing definitions Kant represents Empirical Realism in two different ways, of the distinction between which he likewise does not appear to have been clearly conscious.

In general, sensible objects, whether taken for representations in me or for objects corresponding to such representations, are regarded by Kant as (phenomenally) real which I, awake, and in possession of all my faculties, in a normal state, experience. The justification for calling these real is that we find that other men have similar experiences and there is possibility of intercourse on the supposition that we are experiencing the same objects, so that these objects are "objective," i.e. are objects for all men in common. There is little room here for divergence of doctrine, unless it be in regard to the use of the term "same" applied to the sensible objects of different persons, for which it may be contended we ought in strictness to substitute the word "like". The divergence is first and most plainly noticeable in dealing with things of which we do not happen to have, or possibly cannot have, actual sense-perception, such as the walls of this room when my eyes are shut, or the centre of the earth, or the historical person Cæsar, or the things in the world before the appearance of man, which we yet think of as real objects and distinguish from imaginary objects, such as chimeras, or from objects in our dreams. The difference, first being noticeable in dealing with the unexperienced real objects, becomes apparent later also in dealing with the real objects which we actually experience and while we experience them. The doubleness, then, of Kant's Empirical Realism

tion, iv., 57, and the latter is the empirical, iv., 32, so that empirical reality could only be the latter and not the whole *Wahrnehmung*. Thus he says *sensatio* is *realitas phenomenon*, iii., 146, and again: "In aller Erfahrung muss etwas empfunden werden, und das ist das Reale der sinnlichen Anschauung," iv., 370.—He even gets the same difference into the matter of *Erscheinung* and of *Wahrnehmung*, defining it both as *being* sensation itself, iii., 72, 159, 195, etc., and as *corresponding* to sensation, iii., 56, 483, or as being an object of sensation, iv., 370.

¹ Cf., "Das Reale äusserer Erscheinungen ist also wirklich nur in der *Wahrnehmung* und kann auf keine andere Weise wirklich sein," iii., 602.

is most apparent in his treatment of unexperienced real phenomenal objects. Now, one of his two treatments of such objects may be expounded as follows; for so the case seems to have presented itself to him.

Objects such as the walls of this room, which I now actually see or feel, exist only as phenomenal objects in my sense-perception; for they vanish the moment I shut my eyes or walk away. Ceasing to exist when I do not sensibly perceive them, they have no existence apart from my sense-perception of them—they are objects only in my sensibility. If, then, there is any object existing unaffected by my action, or by the action of other percipient beings, it is only the unknown, never sensibly perceived "transcendental cause" of the phenomenal wall I did sensibly perceive, the "transcendental object" or, may be, the thing-in-itself, which latter, however, according to the above-described Transcendental Idealism and Transcendental Realism, does not exist in space and time, and is not a sensible object for me even when I am beholding the phenomenal wall. While my eyes are shut, I may *imagine* the walls to be where they were when I saw them, and also *think* of them as being there; but they are not really there, since the thing-in-itself is nowhere, and the phenomenal object has vanished, and my imaginary wall is not real (for, while somebody else was watching it, the wall may have tumbled down, although I still continue to imagine and to think of it as standing). Yet while I have no reason to think (to believe) that the object, which others may be experiencing, and which I might experience if I chose, has changed, I continue to speak of the object as if I were still experiencing it, that is, I treat my imaginary wall as a real phenomenal wall because I judge it to be a sufficiently accurate representation of the real wall which I should, I think, the while be experiencing, had I kept my eyes open. Thus this imagining is clearly distinguished from the mere imagining of fantastic shapes and events, or from dream-pictures, which I have no reason for believing to be correct representations of any objects which I or others could experience. Such are objects produced in the minds of some men, with no reason for supposing them to be directly caused by any corresponding transcendental object,—they are merely subjective. As for past events, or distant or minute objects, I may similarly think my imaginary objects (which I have formed from hearsay or from history, or by arguing from effect to cause) to be correct representations of objects which I should have experienced had I been there and then, or which I could experience had I more powerful

or finer sense-organs, or in general, as Kant expresses it, which I could reach "in a possible extension of [my] experience" (iii., 348). Such objects likewise are not phenomenally real (or actual) objects (or objects for me), since I have no actual experience of them, and, too, they may be objects that have not been experienced by anybody. They are, however, treated as phenomenally real objects because of this possible connexion between them and my present experience,—because they are believed to be experienceable objects that have been, or would have been, or would be, experienced under proper conditions.¹ But if there is any real object apart from the mere series of my possible experience, or of the possible experience of other percipient beings—any real objects that exist independently of such experiences or their possibility,—this, too, can only be the transcendental object (either a thing-in-itself, or an attribute of a thing-in-itself). Kant, however, conceived of such transcendental objects only as things-in-themselves; and therefore he could speak of such an object even of a past phenomenal existence only in the present tense of general time as the nearest approach to expressing no time (as when we say the sum of two and two is four); for according to his transcendental doctrines not only the things-in-themselves but their "determinations" or "manners of existing" do not exist in time and cannot be past any more than present. The peculiarity of all this way of viewing the reality of unexperienced phenomenal things is that such things are regarded as real only so far as we consider that we could experience, or could have experienced, them, although they are admitted not to be real (or actual) when, while, or if not experienced. "The objects of the senses," says Kant, "exist only in experience" (iv., 89); and applying to these objects the term "phenomena," he similarly says that "phenomena cannot, as such, exist outside us, but they exist only in our sensibility" (iii., 583). When not existing in anybody's actual experience, they must be thought of merely as potentially real, though Kant never used this expression. And as for the objects of the senses that exist in my experience, evidently *these* cannot exist in anybody else's experience. The real sense-objects of different individuals are distinct. Distinct also are their spaces, their times, their consciousnesses, their experiences, their phenomenal worlds. The only common objects, really the same for two or more

¹ Cf. what is practically the definition of "wirklich" in the second Postulate iii., 193, which is frequently repeated.

persons, are the transcendental objects, taken by Kant for things-in-themselves, out of any person's experience, but cause of the many (supposedly similar) representations in many persons' experiences. This last is not clearly expounded by Kant. But the general conception of the phenomenally or empirically real, as here explained, is to be found, with somewhat of elaborateness, though not wholly free from admixture of the other conception, in the sixth section of the part of the *Dialektik* dealing with the Antinomies; and it is employed by Kant throughout his solution, or dissolution, of the first two Antinomies.¹ It has been described here first because it is the only way in which Kant's Transcendental Idealism and his treatment of time and space as forms of sensibility, consequently as peculiar to each individual, properly allowed him to treat them.

This doctrine, let us notice, is perfectly consistent with the two transcendental doctrines already described. In fact, it is little else than a *résumé* of them, except for the drawing of the distinction between real sense-perception and imagination or dreaming. According to it the empirically real is only either the by us experienced or the by us experienceable. Outside the possible range of our experience our sensible objects do not exist—they are transcendently ideal. Outside the possible range of our experience the only objects that exist, exist in ways totally distinct from the ways in which our sensible objects exist. As such real transcendental objects do not resemble our real empirical objects, and cannot be sensibly perceived, they cannot be said to have empirical reality. They have only transcendental reality.

Beside this consistent Empirical Realism Kant has another Empirical Realism that is not so consistent, either with itself or with the other two doctrines. He has another way of treating the unexperienced real phenomenal objects—those objects which because unexperienced are not phenomenal to me, and possibly are not and never have been or never shall be phenomenal to anybody, and which yet are real because they are experienceable. This other treatment he brings about through a lack of definition and a slurring over of distinctions that ought to be recognised, which we find both in his treatment of time and space in the *Aesthetik* and in his treatment of experience in the *Analytik*. Kant gener-

¹ Cf. "Eine rohe Unterscheidung der *Sinnenwelt* von der *Verstandeswelt*, davon die erstere nach Verschiedenheit der Sinnlichkeit in mancherlei Weltbeschauern auch sehr verschieden sein kann, indessen die zweite, die ihr zum Grunde liegt, immer dieselbe bleibt," iv., 299 (*Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*).

ally speaks of time and space simply, or at most of "our" time and space, without confining himself to *his* time and space—that is, in the first person, to *my* time and space. Now, as the unity of the forms of the sensibility is a cardinal feature in Kant's doctrine of time and space, by the slurring of the distinction between individuals—of the fact that *my* sense-objects are not *your* sense-objects, *my* forms of my intuition of those objects not *your* forms, and conversely, however much they may resemble each other,—Kant comes to speak simply of *one* time and of *one* space, as though there were one time and one space the same for all men (instead of there being as many distinct though similar times and spaces as there are distinct persons). Likewise the unity of experience is a cardinal feature in his doctrine of experience, so that by leaving off the restriction to individuals he comes to speak of *one* experience,—and even, we may add, he goes so far as to speak of *one* consciousness. And as a consequence from all these, he ends by speaking of *one* phenomenal world and of *one* nature.¹ In this view an unexperienced phenomenal object, such as the wall of my room when my eyes are shut and nobody else is sensibly perceiving it, is simply taken for an object of this one experience, existing in this one phenomenal world, subject to the laws of this one nature, extended in this one space, enduring or passing in this one time—in short being a representation in this one consciousness. And past things, of course, are not, but were, real phenomenal objects in the one experience, one world, one space, one time, one consciousness, even though no individual human being or terrestrial animal ever sensibly perceived them or so much as thought of them. In this conception our real phenomenal objects are even more clearly than in the preceding distinguished from our merely imaginary objects

¹ "Es ist nur *eine* Erfahrung, in welcher alle Wahrnehmungen als im durchgängigen und gesetzmässigen Zusammenhange vorgestellt werden; eben so, wie nur *ein* Raum und Zeit ist, in welcher alle Formen der Erscheinung und alles Verhältniss des Seins oder Nichtseins stattfinden," iii., 574. "Es ist nur *eine* Zeit," 173. He speaks of "die einige allbefassende Erfahrung," 399; and of the Analogies as exhibiting "alle reale Verknüpfung in einer Erfahrung überhaupt," 196, cf. iv., 58, 68, and 359 (*Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*). "Alle Erscheinungen liegen in *einer* Natur und müssen darin liegen," iii., 191, cf. 876. "Nimmt man die reine Anschauung des Raumes, so wie dieser . . . nur ein Raum ist; so sind dadurch alle Substanzen . . . verbunden und machen ein Ganzes aus, so dass alle Wesen, als Dinge im Raume, zusammen nur eine Welt ausmachen," viii., 545-546 (*Ueber die Fortschritte der Metaphysik*), cf. iii., 208. For the one consciousness see iv., 49, 53, 66.—Kant does, however, sometimes distinguish between the distinct times of different persons, as in iii., 594-595.

and from our dreams; for these latter exist only in the individual, are only "subjective," but the former exist also in the single experience, world, time, space, consciousness, outside every individual man, are "objective" in both the senses of being alike for all men and of being objects distinct from the individual subject's representations of them. Unexperienced real phenomenal objects are no longer merely experienceable objects; they are actually experienced in the one consciousness, they are real objects in the one experience. And now two or more men may be literally said to sensibly perceive the same thing; for though their representations of it are distinct, yet the object can be the same, being a single outside thing in the one phenomenal world. Thus the same object of many men's many representations is no longer merely the transcendental object or thing-in-itself, but it is a phenomenal object, and yet outside us in an outside space and time, and corresponding to (and resembling) the many representations in the many men.¹ Still, in Kant's opinion, such outside objects are not transcendental, but are empirically real, because they are objects in an experience, although we should have to regard them as transcendental so far as they are supposed to be outside of human experience.

The holding of this realism is facilitated, if not induced, by the ambiguous use of two terms. The first of these is the term "outside me" employed in connexion with the terms "outer" and "extended," and, by contrast, with "inner" and "inside me". In the terms "outer" and "outside me," used interchangeably, Kant admits two distinct meanings. On the one hand he refers to anything extended in space (having parts outside parts), and on the other to anything existing as a transcendental object, independent of me, whether in space or not. This doubleness of meaning he pronounced "unavoidable," yet sought to avoid it by calling the former "empirical outsideness" and the latter "transcendental outsideness".² Now the objects empirically outside me he views as still inside me, because extended things that are objects for me are in my space, which is in me (cf. iii., 599). Thus a distinction arises also in the terms "inner" and "inside me"; for, in contrast with the preceding, Kant applies these terms to empirical objects that

¹ Cf. "Das Dasein der Gegenstände im Raum ausser uns" and "ausser mir" in the *Widerlegung des Idealismus* in the 2nd ed. of the *Kritik*. Also: "In so fern ist also der empirische Realismus ausser Zweifel, d. i. es correspondirt unsern äusseren Anschauungen etwas Wirkliches im Raume," iii., 602 (1st ed.).

² III., 600-601; cf. 603-604; iv., 84-85.

are not extended in space but are only successive in time, such as my thoughts and feelings or emotions, and then also allows them, in a wider sense, to cover objects extended in space, since these are also successive in time. There is here a doubleness in the use of terms within the field of experience itself, which Kant in no wise tries to avoid, but rather turns to his account. For now many of our empirical objects can be described both as outside us and as inside us. This use of language could easily be avoided by refraining from speaking of *extended* objects as objects "outside me," which expression is highly improper, because, so applied, it has no meaning whatever, since the "me" here spoken of is not an object extended in space (for by "me" Kant cannot be referring to my body), and things outside one another in space are not outside anything not in space (except transcendently, which is a manner not now under consideration). But by using this expression as synonymous with "extended" Kant does not make merely a confusion in the use of words. He makes also a confusion in thought, concerning the actual relationship of extended objects to the percipient subject. For he evidently has in mind the fact that objects extended in the one space the same for all men would be outside the spaces that are peculiar to individual persons, and therefore would be really outside me, as well transcendently as empirically. Yet their transcendental outsideness he is able to ignore because of their empirical outsideness (their being extended in some space) and because of their empirical insideness (their being successive in time). And so by placing objects extended simply "in space," indefinitely, also in me, he gets all the advantages of treating merely of objects "in me,"—objects wholly within my power, of which I can have consciousness, and about which I can know everything there is to know, since nothing can be there but what I am conscious of as being there. Thus in the first edition of the *Kritik*, when trying to find a paralogism in the position of the so-called Empirical Idealists, there described as merely doubting the existence of outside things because of inability to prove it demonstratively, he maintained that no proof is needed because we have direct consciousness of the existence of outside things. Really the paralogism is in Kant's own position. He is trying to make out that the Empirical Idealists were surreptitiously transforming their proper doubt (or admission of want of certainty) about the existence of things outside us transcendently into an improper doubt about the existence of things outside us empirically (i.e. about the existence of merely extended objects or representations)—

which nobody has ever done. But he himself the while, in claiming that we have direct consciousness of empirically outside things in the sense merely of extended things (representations in us individually), is really also claiming that we have direct consciousness of extended things outside us universally, things only corresponding to the extended representations in us individually. But such things really are transcendently outside us, although they are supposed to resemble our representations and are not taken to be things-in-themselves out of space altogether; for he is maintaining that they are in a space and in a consciousness—without, however, making it plain in what space or in whose consciousness they are. Then when he came to republish the *Kritik* he seems to have had an inkling of the unsatisfactoriness of this reply, for he omitted it and substituted elsewhere an argument—the so-called Refutation of Idealism. Thus he now attempts to give a proof of what he before thought to need no proof. His argument is that my consciousness in general of things inside me (including extended representations), or of myself, is an indication of the existence of extended things outside me, on the ground that my consciousness of the former, because of its positing something permanent in sense perception¹ which cannot be in me (although he finds it in space and puts space in me), would not be possible without the existence of the latter. And he now omits to notice even so much as the distinction he had noticed in the first edition, and speaks quite indefinitely of the “objects in space outside me”. He does not see, or does not want it to be seen, that either, if he is trying to prove the need of the existence merely of extended objects, the argument is useless, since of these we do have direct consciousness; or, if he is trying to prove the existence of objects in a space outside me distinct from the space in me, objects of which I do not have direct consciousness, he might just as well have made this a proof of the existence of objects outside me indefinitely, that is, of objects admitted to be transcendental, since also here nothing is introduced into the argument to show that the outer objects must be in space. Where Kant attempted to prove this was in the First Analogy; and there what he aimed at proving was that there must be a “substance in phenomenon,” a substratum of all change which itself remains unchanged,—which substance indeed he took to be extended in space, the only argument for this being the general epistemo-

¹ This rests on the Proof of the First Analogy.

logical argument, which is the characteristic of Kant's "critical" philosophy, but which can be satisfied only by placing space as well as time in me, and therefore cannot properly be applied to a space outside me, except by confusing this with the space inside me.¹ In the Refutation, however, the reference to a "space outside me" is plain, with its necessary implication of a space outside my space, since my space is in me. And here towards the end of the *Analytik* in the second edition this second account of Empirical Realism is employed throughout. This is an improvement upon the treatment in the first edition in the *Dialektik*, where the first account of Empirical Realism was the only one avowedly employed (*i.e.* in the argument or first assertion), though he ran off into the second whenever he could escape into it (in the conclusion or restatement).²

¹ The argument in the Refutation was directed at proving merely this: "Also ist die Wahrnehmung dieses Beharrlichen [in der Wahrnehmung] nur durch ein *Ding* ausser mir und nicht durch die bloße *Vorstellung* eines Dinges ausser mir möglich"; and the argument in the First *Analogy* only sought to prove that in the *Gegenstände der Wahrnehmung* (and consequently in the *Dinge ausser mir*) there must be something permanent, their substance. In both cases it is only by means of the confusion of taking *Ding ausser mir* as equivalent to *Ding im Raume*, or extended thing, and of placing it both in me and out of me, that the ultimate conclusion desired is reached. In earlier issues of *MIND*, Kant has been accused by Mr. Balfour of having in his Refutation confused "being in space" with "being outside the mind and other than one of a series of conscious states," vol. iii., no. 12 (1878), p. 498; and by the late Prof. Sidgwick, replying to a defence by Prof. Caird, of having confused "externality in space" and "externality to consciousness," vol. iv., no. 15 (1879), p. 410. But really in this passage Kant made no allusion at all (as he had done in the omitted passage in the first edition) to externality to consciousness (of the things-in-themselves), and his confusion was between two kinds of externality in consciousness—between externality in the sense of extension in space in me and externality in the sense of existence in a space outside me, and outside every one else, and yet, according to his doctrine, somehow in some one consciousness, and still empirical even to me, instead of transcendental (like that of things in themselves). Outer objects in this space, we shall presently see, are treated as intermediate between the extended objects (in this sense "outside me") which are wholly in me (my extended modifications or representations), and the objects (not extended) which are wholly outside me (the things-in-themselves). Without recognition of the *threefold* use of such terms as "object," "outer," and many others (*two* of the meanings being taken as empirical, although only one is wholly so), it is impossible to understand Kant, and to make one's way through the maze of his verbiage.

² The greater emphasis laid upon the second kind of Empirical Realism in the second edition was no doubt due to desire to avoid the criticism of "Idealism" (the eighth in our list) which had been brought against him after the publication of the first edition, as may be seen by consulting the intervening *Prolegomena*.

The other ambiguously used term which helps is the word "phenomenon". This may mean both the appearance of a thing and the thing which appears. Thus my representation, only in me, of a wall outside me, is an appearance or phenomenon of the wall outside me; but also the wall outside me may itself be called a phenomenon because it appears to me through the medium of its representation or appearance in me. Then because the wall outside me is a phenomenon in this one sense of the term, it is easy to take it as a phenomenon in the other sense, that is, as an appearance or representation of still another thing outside, which is the thing-in-itself. To be sure, this other thing could be treated in the same way, and so on without end. But in such sequences there is a tendency to be satisfied with three terms, which furnish a beginning, middle and end. Such is the use Kant makes of the word.¹ The thing-in-itself and the representation he held resolutely apart. But between them he put a something which he called a phenomenon (and also even a representation), to which he gave the nature of both—that of the thing-in-itself by making it a distinct outside object, and that of the representation proper by treating it as the representation of something else and by putting it also in us. The intermediary character of the objects which Kant calls real phenomena, according to this one of his two ways of conceiving of empirically real things, calls for especial attention. Our individual worlds are wholly subjective, the world of things-in-themselves is wholly objective, but this world of outside phenomena is both subjective and objective.² Again, the objects in our individual worlds have both the primary and the secondary qualities; things-in-themselves, according to the Transcendental Idealism, have neither the primary nor the secondary qualities; but these outside phenomena in the one phenomenal world have the primary but not the secondary qualities.³ And because of this intermediary nature of phenomena Kant was able,

¹ The three are mentioned together in iv., 37: (1) "Vorstellungen welche ihr [der Körper] Einfluss auf unsere Sinnlichkeit uns verschafft"; (2) "Dinge, . . . denen wir die Benennung eines Körpers geben, welches Wort also bloß die Erscheinung . . . bedeutet"; (3) "jener unbekannte aber nichts desto weniger wirkliche Gegenstand".

² Cf. iii., 74, where rain-drops are allowed, physically understood, to be things-in-themselves, i.e. objective things, compared with the rainbow (or with colours); but compared with the things-in-themselves proper, they are said to be only modifications in us, i.e. subjective. (See also 64.)

³ Cf. the preceding, and see also iii., 63 n.; iv., 38; viii., 529 (*Ueber die Fortschritte der Metaphysik*).

whenever it pleased him, to treat them merely as representations (as in the first account above given of Empirical Realism),¹ and then again to class them with the things-in-themselves as substances (or as containing substances), but with the distinction that they are "phenomenal substances" (the last subjects of existence in space, forever enduring in time), while things-in-themselves are "noumenal substances" (the last subjects of being in general).² Indeed he avows that he treats phenomena as having two sides, the one as the object-in-itself is considered, the other as its appearance in the subject is sought after;³ and, more generally, he proclaims his teaching to be that an *object* is to be taken in two meanings, as phenomenon or as thing-in-itself.⁴ And thus treating phenomena as aspects of things-in-themselves, he puts phenomena in the place of things-in-themselves, and so is able, in physics, to get along without concerning himself about the latter.⁵

There is still another bit of equivocation that runs parallel with the ambiguity in the Empirical Realism, and abets it. This can hardly escape the attention of any one who follows the fortunes of the Analogies throughout the rest of Kant's work after he has in the second book of the *Analytik* satisfactorily to himself set them up as proved principles or laws of the understanding. In the *Analytik* itself was introduced the distinction between constitutive and regulative principles. Still, before coming to the practical philosophy, which deals with regulative principles only, we are given to understand that that distinction applied only in reference to intuition and that as regards experience (and consequently as regards the phenomenally real) they are, all of them, constitutive (iii., 448). Yet so quickly as in the very next part of the work, the *Dialektik*, the constitutive principles are frequently treated as nothing better than regulative principles, though

¹ E.g. "Erscheinungen, d.i. bloße Vorstellungen," iii., 346-347; and frequently so.

² IV., 394; less fully, iii., 215 n. For the epithets see iii., 234, cf. 170.

³ III., 70; cf. 374.—Similarly in the case of the subject, he allows one and the same subject to be treated both as phenomenon and as thing-in-itself, iii., 375; iv., 92; v., 102, 120; vii., 453; viii., 530-531.

⁴ III., 23; cf. 78.—Accordingly it was indifferent to him whether he said we are in our "outer sense" affected by outside phenomena, through motion, cf. iv., 366, or by things-in-themselves, iii., 592; iv., 63, 66, 299; vi., 35, without motion, iii., 609. Generally, however, he said merely we are affected by objects, iii., 33, 55, cf. 82, etc.

⁵ "In allen Aufgaben, die im Felde der Erfahrung vorkommen mögen, behandeln wir jene Erscheinungen [die äusseren] als Gegenstände an sich selbst, ohne uns um den ersten Grund . . . zu bekümmern," iii., 612; and similarly 64, 234; viii., 538.

they are still also retained as constitutive. The second Analogy is the most important. This we find even converted into a "regulative principle of the reason," to the effect that in the search after natural causes for any given phenomenon we can never stop at any first natural cause, but, however far back we go, must always regard the cause we reach as still an effect demanding search for a further cause (387). Yet, as originally enunciated in the *Analytik*, and as again repeated on the very next page after what has just been quoted, the second Analogy was a principle stating as a truth that every phenomenon *has* a preceding phenomenon for its cause. From this constitutive principle—for it certainly is expressed constitutively—it follows analytically and apodictically that the series of preceding causes must be without a beginning, must be infinite,—and "uneingeschränkt" (388) and "nirgend geendigt" (389) Kant calls it, though he avoids the term "unendlich" except in connexion with the principle taken regulatively (as on 423). Now this constitutive principle, as thus established and held (taken to be true), fits in only with the second kind of Empirical Realism as above described, because it asserts that *every* phenomenon, hence also *my first* phenomenon, has a preceding phenomenon for its cause; but my first phenomenon cannot have a preceding phenomenon in me for its cause, and its cause can only be a phenomenon outside me. Nor can its cause be supposed to be a phenomenon entirely in somebody else; for that would be absurd in itself, and would break the alleged continuity in the series of actual causes. It would also involve the position that there never was a first man or first animal, but that the succession of living creatures has been from eternity; which Kant repudiated (359-360). Then the only phenomenon causing my first phenomenon, or causing the first phenomenon in the first living and percipient being, must be a phenomenon simply as a phenomenon, in the One world,—or in the One consciousness. And the only place for the unlimited series of phenomena in the never-begun chain of events is the One phenomenal world in general, or the One consciousness. But if the first-described account of Empirical Realism be adhered to, then only can the regulative principle be held; for this alone fits that theory, asserting as it does that so far as we go in the search after preceding causes so far we must regard the phenomenal reality as going, but not asserting that the phenomenal reality goes any farther—nor even that it goes so far.