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Patrick's *Sextus Empiricus Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism*. A Degree Thesis accompanied by a Translation of the First Book of the 'Pyrrhonic Sketches,' by Mary Mills Patrick. 8vo. pp. viii, 163 Cambridge, Deighton. 1899. 5s.

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of Aristarchus (B.C. 210). Our author is decidedly of opinion against Waeschke and Flach that Aristarchus did not write a commentary on Hesiod. His argument against the evidence which is supposed to establish the opposite view (*v. pp.* 118 ff.) is strong and convincing. The commentary of Didymus recorded the opinions of Alexandrine critics, particularly those of Aristarchus, but the length of his remarks caused the scholiasts to prefer to make their extracts from the more concise Aristonicus.

Chapter III deals with the quotations by ancient writers, so far as they afford evidence of genuine variants. These are discussed with discrimination and good sense, but it may be well here to mention a few points of difference. In l. 64 Origen's *διδασκόμεναι* seems entitled to more consideration than our author is inclined to bestow upon it. The vulgate *διδασκῆσαι* is an atrocity, not in the least degree redeemed by Voss's apparent success in introducing *διδασκήσαιμι* into Hym. Dem. 144. Again I find it necessary to protest against the idea, broached and defended in a long note pp. 172 f., that *ἔδωρήσαντ'* could stand before *πῆμα* in l. 82 by apocope. This is a much more serious matter than *ἔπος 'φυγεν*, the harmless oddity we meet in a well-known edition of Homer. It opens a ready way for the introduction of the most admirable and inextricable confusion into our conception of epic metre. By taking a few more liberties of this kind, *e.g.* turning *ὄνεαρ* into *ὄνεαρ* with another eminent authority, we should soon be enabled to scan the greater part of Herodotus and Thucydides. In l. 199 the defence of *ἴτην* against *ἴτον* is not convincing, nor is *ὄς κ' ἔμμορε* from Stobaeus in l. 347 a variant of any value. In l. 352 the *ἴσα ἄτησι* of A is really worth very little as evidence for *ἴσ' ἄατησι* pace Meineke and Nauck; for the writing *ἐκ πλήρους* must once have been universal. Still *ἴσ' ἄατησι* even without MS. support is a true restoration, though a surprisingly bold step for our

author, who rarely goes one jot beyond the tradition. He is essentially conservative and would doubtless have refused to believe that in l. 235 :—

τίκτουσιν δὲ γυναῖκες ἐοικότα τέκνα γονεῦσι,

setting aside the dispute between *γονεῦσι* and *τοκεῦσι* (D) the real remedy is transposition :—

τίκτουσιν δὲ γονεῦσι ἐοικότα τέκνα γυναῖκες.

To return to the author's conclusions, the *testimonia veterum*, he observes, are either all for, or all against, the vulgate, never against one another; consequently they, the *veteres*, must all have used copies of the same edition, which was different from our vulgate. Of this other recension, as our author calls it, we have 52 readings more or less important, in fact nearly all better than those of the vulgate. Again 17 lines of the vulgate were not in this edition, which however had nine lines which the vulgate does not give. Next comes the question, what was the origin of these two recensions. The vulgate was in the hands of many in the first centuries of our era. In the fourth it alone existed. Proclus and Choeroboscus had it: the Alexandrines, *i.e.* Aristarchus with his contemporaries and predecessors, had it not. Neither had Seleucus or Didymus. Finally, whoever was the author, it must be pronounced a bad piece of work. The other, the earlier and better, recension was probably executed by Aristarchus, who would have for a foundation to work upon the supposed edition of Pisistratus.

The above will serve to indicate the scope of this treatise. It is, as the preface says, *opus imperfectum magis quam inchoatum*. Its merits are very striking, but can hardly be exhibited here without copious quotation: enough however has been said to prove that the work is one that no conscientious editor of Hesiod's *Ἔργα καὶ Ἡμέραι* can well afford to neglect.

T. L. AGAR.

PATRICK'S *SEXTUS EMPIRICUS*.

Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism. A Degree Thesis accompanied by a Translation of the First Book of the 'Pyrrhonic Sketches,' by MARY MILLS PATRICK. 8vo. pp. viii, 163 Cambridge, Deighton. 1899. 5s.

THIS little book deserves a hearty welcome as an introduction to the study of Sextus Empiricus. For the historian of philosophy the stores of information which Sextus accumulated respecting the tenets of his dogmatic foes have far more value than his

exposition of the doubting school to which he belonged. But in these matters fortune has a voice. While the writings of the Presocratics have made shipwreck, Sextus, like Seneca and Plotinus, has come down to us almost entire; we must perforce use such materials as we have. Nor is the later Scepticism lacking in interest of its own. Each of the five chapters, of which the work before us consists, suggests some fascinating problem for research. The historical relations of Sextus occupy us first. What was the scene of his activity as a teacher? Has he a claim to the title Empiricus which in *Hyp.* i. 237, 241 he seems to renounce? What was the succession in the Pyrrhonian school, and can it be fixed chronologically? Next the position and aim of Pyrrhonism is discussed. Then come the sceptical tropes in their threefold arrangement, followed by the so-called tropes of Aenesidemus against causality. A further question is raised by an obscure statement attributed to Aenesidemus or his followers (οἱ περὶ τὸν Αἰνισίδημον), viz. that the sceptical movement was a path to the system of Heraclitus. Sextus declares this statement to be absurd. Our author is perhaps seen at her best in the discussion of this question. She first gives a summary of the views previously advanced by Zeller, Pappenheim, Hirzel, Natorp, Brochard and others: views which mainly fall into one or other of two classes. Zeller and Pappenheim agree that Aenesidemus never really changed his sceptical views: hence they have to account for the statement in question, either as a blunder of Sextus, or as an assertion made by followers of Aenesidemus contemporary with Sextus, and not by Aenesidemus himself, then long since dead. The other alternative is to assume some change of view, or at any rate change of expression, in Aenesidemus, sufficient to justify the citation of dogmatic utterances by him in the remarkable form Αἰνισίδημος καθ' Ἡράκλειτον. The writer criticises all these explanations and then goes on to offer her own: viz., that although Aenesidemus was a sceptic and left the Academy when it was abandoning scepticism for eclecticism, and although he remained a sceptic to the end, yet in the two centuries which elapsed between him and Sextus there was a gradual narrowing of the limits of scepticism, so that what Sextus considers his apparent dogmatism might be accounted for by the eclectic spirit of the time and the psychological effect upon himself of formulating sceptical beliefs. 'He remained a Sceptic

as he had always been, but must have grown dogmatic in his attitude towards the sceptical formulae, and was thus able to adopt some of the teachings of Heraclitus, unconscious of their inconsistency' (p. 80). This suggestion deserves to be considered side by side with that of Brochard 'whose solution of the difficulty is on the whole the most logical' (p. 76)—a change of opinion on the part of Aenesidemus. To suppose, with Hirzel and Natorp, that the Heraclitean dogma 'contradictory qualities belong (ὑπάρχει) to the same thing' was understood by Aenesidemus only in the phenomenal sense, so that ὑπάρχει = φαίνεται, is a great strain on our credulity. In the last chapter Pyrrhonism is critically examined. The final judgment may be summed up as follows: 'I think we may safely say that Pyrrhonism was the most consistent system of scepticism ever offered to the world, and yet it proves most decidedly that complete scepticism is psychologically impossible.' This estimate is considerably higher than that which many have passed upon what Mr. A. W. Benn felicitously terms 'the philosophy of the dinner-bell.' And as Dr. Reid has pointed out in his introduction to the *Academics*, two assumptions greatly limit the scope of the ancient, as compared with the modern, discussion upon the bases of human knowledge: one is, that all knowledge comes from experience, and the other, that none of the disputants questions the existence of a real world of things lying behind the phenomena of which we are conscious. It is difficult to avoid confusion in any exposition of the world of phenomena as conceived by the Sceptic. Our author has, we believe, correctly apprehended Sextus, but the various expedients she adopts in translating φαντασία, φαινόμενα, and the like terms, render her statements perplexing to follow. Thus on p. 26 she says: 'Phenomena are the only things which the Sceptic does not deny, and he guides his life by them. They are, however, subjective.' So far, so good: but she continues, 'Sextus distinctly affirms that sensations are the phenomena and that they lie in susceptibility and voluntary [—a misprint for 'involuntary'—] feeling, and that they constitute the appearances of objects,' with references to *Hyp.* i. 22 and *Diog.* ix. 11, 105. But on the same page is cited from *Hyp.* i. 19 [it should be 22]: 'we call the criterion of the Sceptical School the phenomenon, meaning by this name the *idea* of it' (the italics are ours). It is clear that, if practicable, some attempt

should be made to preserve the connexion between *φαινόμενον* and *φαντασία* here (the original is *κριτήριον τοίνυν φαιέν εἶναι τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς τὸ φαινόμενον, δυνάμει τῆν φαντασίαν αὐτοῦ οὔτω καλοῦντες*). One objection to 'idea' is its ambiguity: again Sextus opposes *φαινόμενα* to *νοούμενα*, objects of sense to objects of thought (§§ 31–33), where our translator rather lamely uses 'the intellectual' in opposition to 'phenomena.' Nor is 'idea' particularly appropriate for *φαντασία* in the first, fourth and fifth tropes (§§ 58, 59, 61, 113, 114, 117, 121, 123). In our opinion there are other terms—appearance, presentation, impression—which, whatever the objections to them, would upon occasion have been preferable to 'idea' as renderings of *φαντασία* in an account of perception.

Of the translation as a whole it may be said that it deserves, quite as much as the original, to be commended for 'beauty and facility of style' (p. 11). It is lively reading and fairly accurate. A few slips have escaped a perhaps hasty revision (to judge by misprints, e.g. *σύγγενος* for *συγγενής*, p. 44, *Menedotus*, p. 3, 'Thracian' for 'Thasian,' p. 123). The book of Sextus *Πρὸς φυσικούς* should not be described as 'against physics,' nor does *συνάγεσθαι*, § 36, mean 'to take place.' In § 32, *οὐράνια* = the heavenly bodies, and in the same context *κατασκευάζειν*, the technical term for 'establish a positive conclusion, maintain, prove' as opposed to *disprove*, has its force strangely exaggerated. The original *πρὸς τὸν κατασκευάζοντα ὅτι ἔστι πρόνοια ἐκ τῆς τάξεως τῶν οὐρανίων* is rendered 'to the one who from the order of the heavens builds a tower of reasoning to prove that a providence exists.' Again, § 223, 'when (Socrates) performs mental gymnastics,' *ὅταν γυμνάζεταιται*, is an odd way of alluding to the Platonic dialogues of search. On the other hand the translator now and then strikes out a line of her own with advantage: e.g. § 238, it is a

decided improvement, if the text is sound, to make *ὁ μεθοδικός*, and not *τὰ φύσει ἀλλότρια*, the subject of *ἀναγκάζει*. We append a note on one or two other points. The formula 'Nothing more' (§ 14; cf. 190, 226) is ambiguous and must mislead the English reader. Some extension of it is absolutely demanded by English idiom: not more (this than that), not more so (than the opposite), no more A than not-A. Such an equivalent should at least be appended in a footnote. Similarly Cicero *Acad.* ii. 43, *non eorum qui clament nihilo magis vera illa esse quam falsa*. In § 69 *φησὶ γοῦν αὐτὸν... ἐπιβάλλειν τῷ πέμπτῳ διὰ πλείονων ἀναποδείκτων* is rendered [Chrysippus] 'said that the dog follows the fifth of the several non-apodictic syllogisms.' A note referring to *Hyp.* ii. 156 *sqq.* would have been of some service. By the *ἀναπόδεκτα* or *λόγοι ἀναπόδεκτοι*, the Stoics meant much the same as 'immediate inferences,' arguments syllogistic in form which are too obvious to need proof. The example of the fifth kind given ii. 158 has for the major premiss a disjunctive proposition of two members only: 'it is either day or night.' In § 69 it is humorously applied to the case of the dog: 'for when he comes to a meeting of three roads, after seeking the scent in the two roads through which his prey has not passed, he presses forward quickly in the third without scenting it. For the dog reasons in this way; the animal passed through this, or this, or this: it was neither through this nor this, therefore it was through this.' As in the disjunctive proposition which serves as the dog's major premiss there are three clauses, *διὰ πλείονων* is introduced to distinguish it from the normal disjunctive of two clauses (either A or B). The omission of the article before *διὰ πλείονων* is unnecessarily harsh and *τῶν* might easily have dropped out after *-τῷ*.

R. D. HICKS.

WILCKEN'S GRIECHISCHE OSTRAKA.

Griechische Ostraka aus Aegypten und Nubien; ein Beitrag zur antiken Wirtschaftsgeschichte, von Dr. ULRICH WILCKEN (Leipzig and Berlin: Giesecke and Devrient, 1899). Pp. xvi. + 860 + 497. 42s.

STUDENTS of the Berlin papyrus-publication have been accustomed to see, in the notes to the texts published by Prof. Ulrich Wilcken of Breslau, references to a work entitled *Griechische Ostraka*, which has now