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57. Anthropology at the Universities.

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wire, which they obtain by melting and drawing British and Portuguese coins. Father Torrend, of the Jesuit Mission at Chupanga on the Zambesi, told me that these goldsmiths are nominally Christians, that their craft, together with their professed belief, has been handed down from father to son since the early days of the Portuguese conquests, when both craft and creed were taught to their ancestors by Christian missionaries who were natives of the Portuguese Indian possessions at Goa.

RALPH A. DURAND.

### Anthropology : Academic.

Duckworth and Others.

**Anthropology at the Universities.** By *W. L. H. Duckworth, M.D., D.Sc.; Alfred C. Haddon, D.Sc., F.R.S.; W. H. R. Rivers, M.D., and Professor W. Ridgeway, D.Litt., F.B.A.*

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In the April number of *MAN* (1906, 38) appears an article entitled "Anthropology at the Universities," in which the writer describes the recent regulations issued in regard to that study at the Universities of Oxford and London. In the concluding paragraph the following words occur: "It will not be thought rash, perhaps, to predict that the excellent example set by Oxford and London will soon be followed by other universities . . ."

In May 1904, the Senate of the University of Cambridge established a Board of Anthropological Studies, with the powers of a Degree Committee, like those of other special boards. In August 1904, Mr. Henry Balfour, in his Presidential Address to Section H. of the British Association, then in session at Cambridge, said: "It appears more than probable that Cambridge will be much involved in the future advancement of anthropological studies in Great Britain, if we may judge from the evident signs of a growing interest in the science, not the least of which is the recent establishment of a Board of Anthropological Studies, an important development, upon which we may well congratulate the University."

Your correspondent's article makes no mention whatsoever of events upon which we could establish a claim to priority, were that desirable, but we write to ask you to make this corrective statement in an early number of *MAN*, and thus to enable us to avoid the alternative of publishing the matter elsewhere.

W. L. H. DUCKWORTH.

ALFRED C. HADDON.

W. H. R. RIVERS.

WILLIAM RIDGEWAY (Chairman of the Board of Anthropological Studies).

(Ex-officio members of the Anthropological Board.)

[The Editor wishes to express regret that the susceptibilities of the distinguished signatories of the manifesto printed above should have been in any way hurt by an article appearing in *MAN*, and to state expressly that no slight whatever upon the University of Cambridge was intended in the words to which exception has been taken. Both the gentleman whose signature appears at the foot of the article in question and the Editor were well aware that a Research Degree in Anthropology had already been established at Cambridge, and took it for granted that it was a matter of common knowledge to anthropologists.]

Of course, the advance marked by the schemes now put forward by the Universities of Oxford and London lies in the fact that both have drawn up carefully ordained curricula, a difficult task involving the classification and sub-classification of the various elements which go to make up the wide and somewhat amorphous sciences of Anthropology and Archæology. It is unnecessary to say that the intricate work of definition is of the highest value to science at large, and the fact that the classifications formulated in the above-mentioned curricula bear the official seal of two great centres of

research and education, invests them with unusual importance, and renders them factors which future promulgators of similar schemes can hardly afford to neglect.

The words, therefore, which have evoked the protest from Cambridge merely expressed the hope that "other universities" would assist in the endeavour to crystallise two somewhat fluid sciences, and were not intended to deprive Cambridge of the honour of priority in granting a degree in Anthropology.]

## REVIEWS.

### Ethics.

Westermarck.

*The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas.* By Edward Westermarck, Ph.D. Vol. I. London: Macmillan & Co., 1906. Pp. xxi + 716. 23 × 15 cm. Price 14s.

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Dr. Westermarck has conceived, and, with the publication of his second volume, will have carried out, a piece of research no less surpassingly valuable than difficult. On the one hand, the history of primitive ethics is almost a *terra incognita* wherein the most surprising discoveries are likely to attend the hardy adventurer. On the other hand, the equipment of such a pioneer is no easy matter to procure, since he must be a competent anthropologist and philosopher to boot. It is greatly to be hoped that this magnificent effort will attract an army of explorers into the same field. It is no dishonour to Dr. Westermarck to suppose that much remains to do. It seems, therefore, of chief importance to consider what is to be learnt from this great work as regards method. Uncertainty of method has hitherto been the bane of the subject.

It seems to me that Dr. Westermarck takes his all-important first step in precisely the right direction. Ethics may be understood in a sense so wide as to render it incapable of determinate treatment, namely, as the science of good, and hence of practice as a whole. Nothing short of history as a whole could presume to grapple with such a theme. But the ethics that Dr. Westermarck has in his eye is concerned with a particular kind of good, to wit, moral good. To pronounce an act or a character virtuous or the reverse involves a specific mode of valuation on our part. If only one could get this determinate type of valuation clear before the mind, so as to be able to fix its salient characters and thus learn to recognise it when met, it ought to be possible to write its history. But to isolate it in thought is no easy matter, and Dr. Westermarck wisely devotes half his first volume to this preliminary task.

As I understand him, he holds that a distinctively moral valuation occurs when one feels—feels first, as it were, and then by feeling comes to think—"in the name of society" "this conduct or this character is praiseworthy or blameworthy." This is very much on a par with Clifford's famous definition of conscience as "self-judgment in the name" "of the tribe." What I have tried to express by "in the name of society" is, however, primarily no more than a tone in the feeling that prompts the moral valuation. It consists in a certain flavour of "generality, disinterestedness, and apparent impartiality." Moral approval and disapproval are always "public emotions." The differentia, then, being this flavour of publicity, what of the genus? Dr. Westermarck finds approval and disapproval as such to be "reservative" emotions. We react on the cause of pleasure or pain to retain the one and to suppress the other. Now this may be sound enough as a biological explanation, yet it need not follow that the retributiveness ascribed to the emotion manifests itself in any recognisable way within consciousness. Dr. Westermarck, however, appears to think that it does so manifest itself. Approval and disapproval are never wholly "undirected." When we experience them we are more or less aware that we are "going for" something.

Now does this description of a moral valuation make it determinate enough to be the subject of a special historical study? I confess to thinking that even now its nature