

A General Theory of Eigenzeit Relations:

Difference, Overlap, Glitch and Emergence

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Abstract

This paper develops a general theory of Eigenzeit relations. Its point of departure is the observation that people, institutions, and systems share the same reality and yet often appear to live in different “worlds.” The present work argues that such differences should not primarily be understood as differences of identity, culture, personality, or diagnosis, but as differences of world-binding itself.

Building on the concepts of Gap, Seinsverschiebung (shift of being), Eigenzeit, negative topology, and raster formation, it is proposed that every Eigenzeit emerges as a local stabilisation of an open difference that can never be fully closed. Every form of world-binding produces a raster through which certain differences become visible while others remain invisible. Different Eigenzeiten therefore structure the same reality in different ways.

To describe the relations between different raster forms, the paper introduces the concepts of overlap, glitch, and morphogenetic pressure. These concepts serve to explain how different forms of world-binding enter into relation with one another, enable shared world-formation, or encounter conflict at the limits of their mutual resolvability.

Within this framework, neurodivergence, autism, artistic cognition, poverty, institutional conflicts, and artificial intelligence are examined as different contact zones between partially compatible and

incompatible Eigenzeiten. Particular attention is given to the phenomenon of masking, which is understood not primarily as the concealment of traits, but as the management of different rasters within the same situation of action.

The paper argues that emergence and violence can arise from the same underlying structure. Emergence appears where different rasters are able to maintain their difference productively. Violence emerges where one raster form mistakes its own resolution for reality itself and increasingly renders other forms of world-binding invisible.

The paper thus shifts the question from identity to relation, from diagnosis to world-binding, and from diversity as a moral value to diversity as a structural condition of open world-formation.

Earlier texts on Eigenzeit on which this paper builds can be found within the author's research programme and, in part, in the reference list.

Keywords: Eigenzeit relations, world-binding, negative topology, gap theory, operatoric ontology, emergence, incommensurability, raster formation, neurodivergence, autism, double empathy, monotropism, masking, world-formation, epistemic diversity, cognitive diversity, complexity theory, enactivism, predictive processing, structural violence, institutional conflict, artificial intelligence, creativity, social cognition, embodiment, morphogenesis, open systems, relational ontology, participatory sense-making, epistemic injustice, world-making

1. Introduction

People live in the same world and yet experience different realities. They work in the same company, attend the same school, read the same news, face the same political events, or encounter the same person—and nevertheless arrive at completely different assessments of what is happening, what matters, what is true, what constitutes violence, or what ought to be done.

The concept of subjectivity falls short here because it links the problem to the individual person rather than to the structure of the world itself.

Most contemporary theories treat this phenomenon as a consequence of different identities, cultures, diagnoses, personalities, or interests. Misunderstandings appear as deficits of communication. Conflicts appear as consequences of insufficient insight. Social tensions appear as problems of mutual understanding. Despite their differences, these approaches often share the same basic assumption: the participants refer to the same world but interpret it differently.

This paper proposes a different perspective.

The central assumption is that many conflicts, forms of creativity, misunderstandings, and social tensions do not arise primarily from different interpretations of the same world, but from different forms of world-binding itself.

The participants do not simply see the same world differently.

They bind the same world differently.

What is meant here is a level beneath psychology, cognition, or language. It refers to those conditions under which the world becomes bindable at all and within which existence takes concrete form. Interpretation remains discussable and changeable. World-binding, by contrast, is often irreversible. It does not emerge without consequences, but under conditions of real form-formation and real exclusions. It is deeply connected to existence itself. What is real depends fundamentally on the question of what exists. And what exists determines the conditions of what can become real.

This shift leads to a different question. The decisive question is not why people fail to understand one another, but how different forms of world-binding enter into relation with one another. How do resonance, cooperation, and shared world-formation emerge? Why do misunderstandings, exhaustion, conflict, or violence arise under other conditions? Why can the same differences produce creativity in one context and exclusion or pathologisation in another?

The issue is therefore not the assumption that everything is a question of communication, equal distribution, or access to education, but the question of the necessity of difference and, at the same time, the costs of that difference. This is more a view through morphogenesis than through the question of inclusion. At its centre lies the clarification of how different forms of world-binding can enter into relation with one another. Difference is understood here in a morphogenetic sense, as a category of form-formation rather than as a consequence of discourse. From this perspective, communication appears not as the origin of difference but as one of its later manifestations.

At this point, the present theory also differs from systems-theoretical approaches such as those of Niklas Luhmann. While social reality is there described primarily through communication and its operative closure, the theory of Eigenzeit relations begins at a prior level. It is not communication that generates difference, but different forms of world-binding. Forms of spatio-temporal relation generate those differences that may later also become articulated through communication. Eigenzeit does not refer here to a subjective experience of time, but to irreversibly bound morphogenetic pressure that unfolds existence directly while simultaneously constraining the space of possibilities.

The present work proposes to investigate these questions as relations between different Eigenzeiten. Eigenzeiten are therefore local forms of irreversible world-binding. Every Eigenzeit generates a specific resolution of what appears visible, relevant, plausible, or real at all. These local resolutions are referred to in the following as rasters. In this sense, existence itself is understood as a kind of filter. A level long before language, culture, or communication.

Different Eigenzeiten do not bind different worlds, but the same open reality in different ways. Their rasters therefore remain self-similar—we are all human beings—without being reducible to an “Ur-human,” an original, or a universal normativity. The source of these differences lies not in separate realities, but in different genealogical curvatures of the same open world. Reality therefore appears in different orders and morphologies depending on resolution, weighting, and developmental trajectory.

This simultaneity of commonality and incompatibility has been insufficiently considered in many theories. The spirit of the age demanded theories capable of making all human beings into a unity. The focus often lay on defending the unity of humanity against racist, biological, or cultural hierarchies. This was historically necessary and politically important. At the same time, other forms of difference disappeared from view: differences of world-binding itself.

If this perspective is overlooked, unity quickly becomes normativity, and deviation is read as pathological or inferior.

Difference was therefore often either moralised or problematised. In recent years it has increasingly returned to political debates, yet it often reappears in a reduced form—as identity, origin, or group affiliation—while the question of different forms of world-binding remains largely unnoticed.

Crises are explained through differences of identity, culture, or politics, yet these explanations again group and classify. What disappears in the process is the deeper core of difference itself: the necessity of a world that cannot be everything at the same time.

Within this framework, neurodivergence, autism, art, poverty, institutional conflicts, and artificial intelligence no longer appear as separate fields of inquiry. They appear instead as different contact zones between different forms of world-binding. They become different manifestations of the same fundamental problem: the relation between different *Eigenzeiten* within a shared, yet never fully resolvable, reality.

This constitutes a fundamentally different basis for understanding conflict, because the assumption of universally valid mutual understanding is recognised as structurally impossible, as a basic condition of existence itself. Incommensurability can thus be understood more deeply and separated from identity, culture, or opinion as explanatory models. It can become, precisely through the shared inability to understand one another completely, a source of liberation and greater humanity. What separates us initially is not the problem of communication, but the requirement of existence itself. By this is meant the distortion and displacement that accompanies existence. There is always a uniqueness in the moment, in space, in the individual, which, interwoven with everything else, can never be fully disclosed, measured, objectified, or isolated. Within this lies a barrier to complete understanding.

The following chapters therefore develop a general theory of *Eigenzeit* relations. Their aim is not the description of individual groups, diagnoses, or identities, but the investigation of those conditions under which different forms of world-binding give rise to overlap, glitch, morphogenetic pressure, emergence, or violence.

2. The Problem of *Eigenzeit* Relations

Modern society possesses numerous theories of the individual, communication, culture, identity, cognition, and social order. Yet to this day it possesses no general theory explaining why different forms of world-relation resonate with one another under certain conditions, learn from one another

under others, speak past one another under still others, and eventually transition into violence, pathologisation, or decoupling.

Instead, these phenomena are usually treated separately. In psychology they appear as communication problems, in sociology as conflicts between groups, in medicine as disorders or deviations, in politics as conflicts of interest, and in culture as differences of values, traditions, or worldviews. Each of these descriptions captures real aspects of the situation. At the same time, the impression arises that something common is being overlooked.

For the same basic structure appears again and again. An autistic person speaks with a neurotypical person and both leave the conversation with the impression that the other failed to understand something obvious. An artist recognises a problem in a social development that remains invisible to others until the same structure suddenly becomes generally visible years later. An institution regards a person as a case within a regulatory framework, while the affected person experiences the situation as a concrete lived reality that scarcely appears within the institutional categories. Political camps look at the same events and arrive at opposing assessments of what is actually taking place. Artificial intelligences generate answers that appear plausible and yet leave behind the feeling that something essential is missing.

These examples differ in their content. Structurally, however, they possess a striking similarity. In all cases the impression emerges that the same reality is being read differently. The participants are often not merely arguing about facts, but about the conditions under which facts acquire meaning in the first place. It is precisely at this point that classical models reach their limits. If such conflicts are understood exclusively as differences of opinion, it becomes difficult to explain why even good arguments often have little effect. If they are understood exclusively as power conflicts, it becomes difficult to explain why people with similar interests can nevertheless speak past one another. If they are understood exclusively as cognitive differences, it becomes difficult to explain why the same person can appear highly competent in one context and completely incompatible in another.

The problem seems to lie deeper.

The hypothesis of this paper is therefore that many of these phenomena do not arise primarily from different opinions, identities, or interests, but from different forms of world-binding itself. The participants do not simply see the same world differently. They bind the same world differently. It is not sufficient to say that they have different histories, different interests, or different opinions, because these categories alone obscure the interplay between these aspects. Even if one could bridge and resolve all of this, including culture, education, and the hundreds of other levels involved, a fundamental distinction would remain, together with the question of at what moment in time such a state of complete mutual understanding, of full congruence, could ever be reached, if each moment enables things that earlier or later moments no longer permit. There is something else essential. The world does not appear in its entirety, but only along those differences that can be bound. Different resolutions therefore emerge of what appears visible, relevant, plausible, or real at all.

A peace conference is therefore not merely a question of diplomacy or the balancing of interests, but also of the moment in history and ultimately of an endless list of factors, and this is the decisive point, factors that in the end touch the *Eigenzeit* of the whole, the existence of the conference itself.

One is then forced to recognise that this chain of factors cannot be closed, because Eigenzeit is characterised by two essential aspects: non-closure and, at the same time, the determination of the morphogenetic pressure it itself brings forth by existing.

The notion of a shared frame of relevance in any absolute sense is an illusion, but this is far more than the insight that different people want different things. We do not merely inhabit a space of non-identical interests. Conditions of existence themselves are attached to those interests, and thus conditions of world and world-binding.

Modern society possesses numerous concepts for the consequences of this problem. It speaks of misunderstandings, conflicts, prejudice, discrimination, diversity, inclusion, polarisation, disability, innovation, or cultural difference. What is largely missing is a common concept for the underlying structure.

Cultural differences, class struggles, and neurodivergence are external symptoms, but they remain confined to their respective fields. They always assume that a “more” of something can solve the problem. Yet this “more” is never neutral. It distorts, shifts, and irritates.

This paper proposes describing this structure, this underlying problem, as a relation between different Eigenzeiten. Eigenzeiten are understood here as local forms of irreversible world-binding through which the same open reality is stabilised and resolved differently.

Why is this important? It is important because this is the dominant level, one that points neither toward a final solution nor toward cynicism, but toward a form of proximity that emerges from accepting the unattainability of complete understanding. This is something different from tolerance, something different from diplomacy or realism. It is an understanding of a right to exist within difference. A right to crisis, as formulated in the author's earlier works. Or later, a right to ontological coexistence.

The following chapters develop this assumption step by step. First, they show why classical models of identity, communication, and cognition encounter certain limits. The concepts of Gap, Seinsverschiebung, Eigenzeit, and raster formation are then reconstructed in compressed form. Only on this basis can overlap, glitch, morphogenetic pressure, emergence, and violence be understood as different forms of Eigenzeit relations.

Language, culture, and psychology all possess words for difference, but what is difference on a pre-ontological level? A gap. That is a very important difference.

The theory of Eigenzeit relations possesses a decisive advantage over many existing interpretations of these phenomena. It allows the world to be thought as both open and stabilised at the same time. Differences therefore appear neither as mere disturbances of a shared order nor as completely separate realities. Rather, they emerge within the same open world and remain at the same time irreducibly different.

Many existing approaches capture only partial aspects of this situation. Class conflict describes real tensions within social order, but does not explain the general emergence of different forms of world-binding. Likewise, contemporary approaches within autism research often investigate

differences between people without considering difference itself as a fundamental relation of world-formation.

The same applies to scientific orders of knowledge. Science lives through the productive competition of different positions, yet possesses only limited means for dealing with enduring incommensurability. The expectation generally remains that better arguments, stronger evidence, or more precise models will eventually lead to a common resolution.

Concepts such as Fricker's epistemic injustice make important forms of structural invisibility visible. Yet they primarily explain the consequences of asymmetrical recognition. Less clear is why different forms of world-binding arise in the first place and why certain differences cannot be fully overcome.

It may therefore be that many institutions operate with an assumption that reaches too short, namely that differences can be overcome through communication, education, or enlightenment, often in the simplified Habermasian sense. Yet the historical consequences of almost all such assumptions have frequently been new closures that lead to new exclusions and new conflicts. Categorisation possesses no window, no grey zone. It excludes the gap. Reality does not.

3. Limits of Classical Models

Before a general theory of Eigenzeit relations can be developed, it is first necessary to clarify more precisely why existing models possess only a limited explanatory reach. The following critique is therefore not directed against individual disciplines. Psychology, neuroscience, sociology, anthropology, cultural studies, communication research, and cognitive science all describe real aspects of the world. The problem is rather that these descriptions often already operate within particular rasters and thereby presuppose precisely those conditions that ought first to be explained.

A particularly clear example can be found in many theories of communication. There it is often assumed that different people fundamentally share the same reality and that misunderstandings arise primarily because information is transmitted, interpreted, or processed incorrectly. Communication appears within such models as the transport of meaning between already existing subjects. Communication itself is largely treated as neutral. We learn in school to use a certain grammar, to set dialects aside, and to employ shared concepts. The problem is supposed to be solvable through standardisation.

This assumption does not explain why the same statement is often not merely understood differently by different people, but located within entirely different realities. Information also possesses an embodied side, a side of existence. The problem then lies not in the transmission of a message, but in the conditions of its legibility. Why does the same statement appear obvious to one person while appearing meaningless or even absurd to another? Communication theories often describe the transmission of meaning, yet frequently fail to reach the level at which it is decided what can appear as meaningful at all.

A large part escapes discourse because it is a condition of discourse itself.

Similar limits appear in psychological models. Many psychological theories describe differences between people as differences of abilities, traits, personality characteristics, or cognitive functions. The question then becomes why certain people recognise social signals more effectively, make decisions more quickly, or understand complex relations better than others. Such descriptions may be empirically correct. Nevertheless, it remains unclear why certain abilities are considered central while others remain invisible. Where do the weightings come from? And how does the weighting already alter the overall form within which something takes place? This cannot be understood psychologically alone, because the question of what is not there, of what does not exist, also plays a role. This too possesses morphogenetic effects. Evaluation therefore already takes place within a particular raster. What appears as competence is often inseparable from the conditions under which that competence becomes visible or comes into being in the first place.

This becomes particularly clear in the field of neurodivergence. For decades autistic people were described primarily through deficit models. Difficulties in social communication, non-verbal signals, or group-related interaction were regarded as central characteristics. At the same time, it often remained invisible that these same individuals could develop extraordinary forms of perception, pattern recognition, long-term binding, coherence work, or structural analysis in other areas. The question here is not whether deficits exist. The question is rather why certain differences appear as deficits while others appear self-evident. This is not merely a question of the historical development of autism diagnostics, but is shaped by infinitely many factors and at the same time is scarcely comprehensible from within other rasters. It is similar to the difference between having been present at something and merely having read about it. Being present is far more deeply connected to one's own existence and thus to *Eigenzeit*.

In recent years, increasingly relational models have emerged within autism research that attempt to overcome this one-sidedness of the deficit model. Particularly influential has been Damian Milton's Double Empathy Theory. It argues that many difficulties between autistic and non-autistic people cannot be understood as one-sided deficits but arise from mutual misunderstandings. The present theory agrees with this observation. It shifts the question, however, to a different level. The question here is not primarily why different people misunderstand one another, but why different forms of world-binding arise at all and why they can resolve the same reality differently. Double Empathy describes the consequences of different rasters. The theory of *Eigenzeit* relations investigates the conditions of their emergence.

The same applies to the Monotropism approach of Dinah Murray, Wenn Lawson, and Mike Lesser. Monotropism describes attention as a form of deep and selective binding to particular domains of concern and belongs among the strongest contemporary models of autistic cognition. The present theory does not contradict this approach. It regards monotropism rather as a possible manifestation of a more general dynamic. The decisive question is not why attention is organised monotonically, but why different forms of world-binding generate different spaces of relevance in the first place. Monotropism describes the structure of a particular form of attention. The theory of *Eigenzeit* relations investigates the conditions under which such forms of attention arise.

Models such as Predictive Processing or Bayesian Brain Theories likewise possess considerable explanatory power. They frequently describe perception as an ongoing process of prediction and

correction of prediction errors. The emphasis lies on the stabilisation of world-models. The theory of Eigenzeit relations begins elsewhere. It asks not primarily how systems generate stability, but why different systems generate different stabilisations and why certain differences cannot be completely neutralised. Whereas Predictive Processing investigates the minimisation of prediction errors, the interest here is directed toward the conditions of persistent non-resolvability.

It makes a considerable difference whether misunderstanding is negotiated on the level of objects (contents) or in negative topology, as a consequence of distortions responding to a Gap. For misunderstanding on the level of objects invites the thought of connection, of a common source. If the source, however, is difference itself, then there is no objectifiable common level, no level of objects and things. Clarification is an object category. One can clarify things, but not gaps. For that, they would have to become objects. Yet they never do. One merely peels away the next categorical layer of the onion from the Gap, and immediately one finds oneself once again within the confusion.

There are indeed approaches that move more in the direction described here. Related questions can be found within the tradition of enactivism in the work of Francisco Varela, Humberto Maturana, Evan Thompson, or Ezequiel Di Paolo. There, perception is not understood as the representation of a finished world but as an active process of bringing forth meaning within a relation between organism and environment. The theory of Eigenzeit relations shares this departure from classical representationalism. It goes further, however, by asking why different forms of world-binding can become structurally incommensurable and why both emergence and violence can arise from this incommensurability.

Emergence would be the acceptance and integration of difference, its becoming fruitful, whereas the attempt at pure closure quickly tips into violence.

Clear points of contact can also be found in systems theory, particularly in the work of Niklas Luhmann. Luhmann describes social systems as forms of complexity reduction. The present theory agrees that the world becomes actionable only through selective reduction. The difference is that the focus here lies not on the stabilisation of individual systems, but on the relations between different forms of unresolved existence. The central question is not how systems reduce complexity, but how different reductions (existences) of the same reality enter into relation with one another.

Similar affinities exist with complexity research, with Ilya Prigogine's work on dissipative structures, and with various philosophies of difference associated with Gilles Deleuze, Donna Haraway, or Karen Barad. These approaches emphasise the productive role of instability, openness, and difference. The present theory adopts this basic insight, yet shifts the focus. Emergence does not arise here from diversity alone. Emergence arises where different forms of world-binding can no longer fully neutralise their difference and yet must remain in relation. The decisive concept is therefore not diversity but viable incommensurability.

3.1 From the Problem of Difference to Eigenzeit Relations

The same problem of difference can be found in cultural and political models. There, conflicts are frequently understood as clashes between different values, interests, or worldviews. This too describes real aspects of social dynamics. At the same time, it remains unclear why the same arguments often possess entirely different meanings within different groups.

Similar difficulties appear in contemporary debates about artificial intelligence. Here too difference is a central theme, yet it is negotiated through categories rather than through the relations between unresolved existences.

It is often assumed that intelligence can be described primarily as information processing. Differences between humans and machines then appear as differences of complexity, speed, or computational power. This seems logical, but it is already a categorisation prior to the ontological question of existence itself. Here too it remains unclear why certain forms of world-relation, experience, meaning, or perspective do not simply disappear with increasing computational capacity. The problem may be that information processing already presupposes a particular raster form and therefore cannot explain the conditions under which different rasters emerge in the first place.

Neither can the scaling of computational power abolish difference, nor has it been clarified what AI existentially is, or how human beings, equally unresolved, stand within this relation beyond the available categorical discourses.

Despite their differences, many of these approaches share a common assumption. They begin with already stabilised forms: individuals, identities, cultures, systems, brains, communication partners, observers, or diagnoses. The investigation then concerns how these entities interact. What remains unaddressed is the Eigenzeit of the moment itself, and equally the pre-ontological dimension of existence. It makes a profound difference when, where, and how a phenomenon appears, because ultimately there are as many aspects of a phenomenon as there are existences bound to one another within it. This cannot simply be subsumed under subjectivity, as though it were irrelevant to the world. The world itself is built from precisely this. From difference. From the Gap.

The fractures are explained from the outside as deviations from a dominant order, but not as conditions of existence differentiating itself.

Difference does not disappear through education, political steering, technical optimisation, or institutional standardisation. New forms of difference and new conflicts concerning their visibility emerge everywhere. What remains absent is the complete mediation of all differences. This seems to point toward a more fundamental problem. Perhaps one of the deepest questions of all science is how the world can become a common whole at all. It may be that this question is fundamentally mistaken because it presupposes a world that is fully connectable within itself.

Yet because the phenomena of proximity and self-similarity also exist, this line of thought does not lead into relativism. Eigenzeit is not relative. It is unavoidable.

The present theory therefore does not ask how people communicate within an already shared world. It asks how a shared world becomes possible at all, even though it never fully coincides with itself.

If one derives from this the question of why conflicts emerge, a very different approach becomes possible. The preservation of the Gap then becomes essential for the preservation of existence itself.

4. From World-Binding to Eigenzeit Relations

The preceding considerations have shown that many conflicts, misunderstandings, forms of creativity, and social tensions do not arise primarily from different opinions, interests, or identities, but from different forms of world-binding itself. This immediately raises the question of how such differences arise in the first place.

The following considerations build upon the concepts of Gap, Seinsverschiebung, Eigenzeit, and negative topology developed in earlier works. These concepts will not be fully re-derived here, but only reconstructed to the extent required for the theory of Eigenzeit relations.

The point of departure is the assumption that the world is not given as a finished order. Every real form-formation emerges under conditions of operative non-closure. Wherever the world takes on concrete form, possibilities are excluded. Reality can therefore never fully coincide with itself.

This structural non-closure was described in previous works as the Gap. The Gap denotes neither emptiness nor nothingness, but the fact that every stabilisation generates a surplus of what did not become. Every form carries within itself traces of those possibilities that had to be excluded in order for it to emerge at all.

From this situation follows what has been described within the work as Seinsverschiebung. Since no stabilisation can completely neutralise its own openness, every order remains tied to the conditions of its emergence. The world does not remain identical with itself but shifts genealogically in relation to its lost openness. Every new form alters the conditions of further form-formation. Difference therefore produces not merely diversity. It produces history.

From this genealogical displacement emerges Eigenzeit. Eigenzeit denotes the irreversible curvature of a space of possibilities brought forth through real world-binding. Systems possessing Eigenzeit carry their history not merely as memory but as a structural transformation of their own conditions. They therefore cannot be neutralised, synchronised, or reproduced without loss. From this perspective, time does not appear as an external container of world-formation but as a consequence of irreversible world-binding.

Neither communication models, nor classical systems analyses, nor psychological frameworks possess this dimension. All of them can be simulated to a certain degree.

For the present investigation, however, another concept is decisive. Every Eigenzeit binds the world not completely but locally. It develops specific forms of attention, relevance formation, and stabilisation. Different resolutions of the same reality thereby emerge. These local resolutions will be referred to in the following as rasters.

A raster cannot be simulated. It is not a problem of complexity or data volume, but of existence as a response to a gap, whereby the path of emergence can never unfold in a measurably identical way.

The observer never measures neutrally, because measurement (closure) can only ever be an Eigenzeitly trace that, through the act of measurement itself, necessarily curves differently in Eigenzeit. What is measured can only be measured as a trace, but never read one-to-one as existence. Simply because time never repeats itself identically at any point and because time cannot be thought independently of space. This is precisely why Eigenzeit exists.

Rasters differ from imprints. An imprint primarily describes influences acting upon a system. A raster, by contrast, describes the concrete resolution through which a system responds to the world and through which existence itself has become world. Two individuals may be exposed to similar imprints and nevertheless develop different rasters. What matters therefore is not merely what acts upon a system, but how the world becomes visible within that system. Depending on whether reality encounters a coarse or a fine raster (and other distinctions would also be conceivable), different aspects of order become recognisable. Others disappear or appear merely as irritations, questions, or imperfections.

Rasters are neither mere perspectives nor subjective opinions. They denote the concrete resolution of an Eigenzeit. Through rasters it is decided which differences become visible, which relations acquire significance, which forms of order emerge, and which aspects of the world remain invisible. One may think of rasters as different resolutions of the same curvature arising from the non-closure of the world. Curvature is spoken of here because every real world-binding alters the conditions of further world-binding and thereby irreversibly deforms the space of possible developments. The underlying reality remains the same. The visibility of its structures changes, however, according to the resolution involved.

Here the decisive connection to the question of Eigenzeit relations emerges. Different Eigenzeiten do not inhabit different worlds. They bind the same open reality in different ways. They are simultaneously self-similar, because they emerge from the same negative topology, that is, from the same not fully closable difference that makes world-formation possible in the first place; and different, because each Eigenzeit binds the world along its own genealogical curvature and thereby produces different rasters.

The origin of creativity, cooperation, misunderstanding, foreignness, or violence therefore lies not primarily in the properties of individuals or groups. It lies in the relations between different rasters. Whenever different Eigenzeiten encounter one another, it is not simply different people or cultures that meet. Different resolutions of the same world meet.

The question of Eigenzeit relations therefore does not begin with communication. It begins with the manner in which the world becomes visible at all.

5. Raster Formation and the Resolution of the World

If different Eigenzeiten resolve the same reality differently, the question arises as to why different rasters emerge at all. Why does the same world appear differently ordered, differently relevant, and differently bindable for different systems?

The classical answer usually points to differences in perception, culture, socialisation, genetics, experience, or cognitive constitution. These factors undoubtedly play a role. For the present theory, however, they do not represent the point of departure but rather concrete manifestations of deeper processes of world-binding.

The point of departure is instead the fact that no Eigenzeit can fully resolve the entire curvature of an open reality. In the face of the Gap, this would be a contradiction in itself. Every world-binding is therefore necessarily selective. This does not mean, however, that it is arbitrary. The world is not freely invented. Rather, every Eigenzeit must prioritise within an open reality those differences that become relevant for its own stabilisation. The world therefore never appears in its entirety, but always as a local condensation of particular differences.

Rasters emerge from precisely this necessity. They are not errors of perception but conditions of perceivability. Without rasters there would be no world. The open complexity of reality would not be bindable, actionable, or stabilisable. This is important to understand, because one binding excludes another.

Every Eigenzeit must therefore reduce, select, and weight. It must make certain differences visible and conceal others. Yet this reduction does not produce deficiency but resolution. Visibility arises not through completeness but through differentiation.

There is no simultaneity of everything. Simultaneity would be the counter-model to Eigenzeit. Everything at once, instead of temporally and spatially bound differentiation. Here we encounter the greatest difference from simulation. Communication differences can be simulated almost arbitrarily, but the structural prevention of simultaneity, together with the irreversibility of Eigenzeit, reveals the limits of such categories within reality.

Depending on which differences are prioritised, different raster forms emerge. A raster may, for example, become particularly sensitive to social coherence and maintain visibility of fine differences in gesture, facial expression, status, group dynamics, or social expectation. Other differences recede into the background. Another raster may respond more strongly to patterns, contradictions, materiality, structural fractures, long-term relations, or logical tensions. Here too blind spots necessarily emerge. No resolution can make everything visible at the same time. Precisely here lies the origin of different forms of world-binding.

The question is therefore not primarily who is right. It is rather: Which differences become visible, and which disappear? In this way, the meaning of complexity also changes.

A common misunderstanding is the assumption that finer rasters are necessarily superior to coarse ones. In reality, both possess different strengths and weaknesses. Coarse rasters enable high synchronisability, rapid orientation, stable categories, institutional legibility, and comparatively low energetic costs. They form the basis of large social systems. Finer rasters, by contrast, can maintain

visibility of weak differences, transitions, contradictions, new patterns, open dynamics, and previously invisible relations. At the same time, however, instability increases. The more differences become visible, the more difficult rapid synchronisation becomes.

Every resolution therefore carries its own cost. High resolution produces epistemic gain, but also friction. Low resolution produces stability, but at the same time information loss. Neither form is fundamentally superior. What matters is the relation between them.

The same applies to subjectivity and objectivity. Objectivity cannot replace subjectivity without at least partially losing the world and its relation to reality.

For rasters never exist in isolation. They overlap, interpenetrate, compete with one another, reinforce one another, or render one another invisible. The world forms itself out of difference.

From this overlap emerges the actual dynamics of Eigenzeit relations. The conflict between different forms of world-binding therefore often does not arise merely because information is missing or because one side is irrational. It arises because different rasters resolve different regions of the same reality.

This is not neutral in the informational sense. It changes the conditions of existence and thereby produces both incommensurability and self-similarity. Yet one never appears without the other.

The participants do not observe different worlds. They observe the same world through different resolutions. This is something different from perspective, because perspective presupposes a common point of reference. Eigenzeit has a Gap instead.

Only on this basis do overlap, glitch, and morphogenetic pressure become intelligible: the pressure toward the formation and preservation of existence within ongoing difference. The focus now shifts to the manner in which different rasters come into contact with one another.


6. Overlap: The Emergence of a Shared World

If different Eigenzeiten resolve the same reality differently, the question immediately arises as to why understanding is possible at all. Why are people able to speak with one another, cooperate, build institutions, conduct science, or create shared cultures if their forms of world-binding are never fully identical?

The answer lies in the overlap of their rasters. No Eigenzeit exists in complete isolation. Every form of world-binding emerges within the same open reality. Even though different rasters make different aspects of this reality visible, they share certain regions of their resolution. These shared zones form the basis of what ordinarily appears as understanding, cooperation, or social reality.

If one takes a pixel image of a duck, the high-resolution version presents the duck as a photograph, while the coarse resolution appears as a graphical translation of the same animal. Both sides could say: "This is a duck." In reality, however, these are different resolutions of the same underlying order. If the pixels are enlarged further and further, the shared communicative framework eventually breaks down. The underlying order remains present, but becomes inaccessible to both

sides. The images become incommensurable. This process can proceed to the point where, for one side, the duck is no longer recognisable as a duck at all, but only as a different framework of order, as the following image illustrates:



One can also see here how patterns can be transferred from one raster to another, while the raster itself is never neutral.

Two Eigenzeiten therefore do not have to resolve the world in the same way in order to enter into relation with one another. Self-similar patterns nevertheless emerge, although the degree of incommensurability varies. At the same time, this is not merely a model of perception. It is also a model of how reality itself emerges morphogenetically: through the morphogenetic pressure of the respective raster, within the difference that has emerged through Eigenzeit.

Complete identity would even be problematic. How could one know what a duck is if one had never encountered swans, geese, or thousands of other variations? Where no difference exists, the possibility of new world-formation disappears as well.

Overlap therefore does not designate a state of equality, but a state of sufficient mutual resolvability. Rasters do not have to understand one another completely. They must resolve one another sufficiently. Shared world does not emerge from identity, but from sufficient overlap.

This also explains why people often possess the feeling that they share the same reality even though their Eigenzeiten are never fully identical. The differences remain largely invisible within the zone of overlap and usually emerge only at its margins.

Yet it is precisely there that many of the most productive developments of a society arise. Scientific innovations, artistic renewals, or social transformations rarely emerge from complete consensus. They emerge where different rasters can still resolve one another sufficiently, while remaining different enough to make new differences visible. Emergence therefore arises not primarily from agreement, but at the boundaries of sufficient overlap.

Many social conflicts arise, conversely, where relationality is imagined without difference, or difference without relationality. From the perspective of Eigenzeit relations, a different picture therefore emerges than in many classical models of integration or consensus. Difference does not threaten society. Society becomes possible through difference in the first place. Difference becomes dangerous only where overlap collapses.

The decisive question is therefore not how difference can be eliminated, but how much overlap is required for different Eigenzeiten to form a shared world without surrendering their differences. It is precisely at this boundary that the next problem begins. For overlap is rarely complete. Most Eigenzeit relations move within an intermediate zone. The rasters resolve one another partially, but not completely. Within this intermediate space emerges the phenomenon that will be referred to in the following as glitch.

7. Glitch: The Productive Instability of Partial Overlap

If overlap describes the condition of shared world-formation, the question immediately arises as to why misunderstandings, conflicts, and irritations continue to emerge even where people speak with one another, cooperate, or share the same institutions. The answer lies in the fact that overlap is rarely complete. Most Eigenzeit relations exist within an intermediate zone. The rasters involved resolve one another sufficiently to enter into relation, but not sufficiently to make their respective differences fully visible.

From this situation emerges glitch.

Glitch designates that zone of partial overlap in which different rasters must respond to one another without being able to resolve one another completely. The participants share enough common world to enter into relation. At the same time, part of their respective resolution remains invisible to the other side. Friction emerges precisely from this. Glitch is therefore neither merely a communication problem nor the fault of individual participants. It arises from the structural limits of mutual resolvability.

The participants bind the same reality, but with different resolutions. Certain differences therefore appear obvious to one side while remaining entirely invisible to the other. What appears central within one raster seems irrelevant within another. What appears as violence to one side appears as

normal order to the other. What appears as an obvious contradiction to one side appears as a necessary compromise to the other. Glitch emerges precisely at these transitions.

A central difference from many existing models of social integration becomes visible here. Shared world is not the solution to the problem. Shared world is rather the condition under which difference can become visible at all. The decisive question is therefore not how differences can be eliminated, but how societies deal with them. It is not the resolution of difference that is productive, but its cultivation.

One must, however, understand and accept the basic problem of the Gap. Otherwise one inevitably falls back into false categories and false solutions.

Glitch therefore possesses a double structure. On the one hand, it generates misunderstandings, frustration, conflict, exhaustion, and misattribution. On the other hand, it opens new possibilities of world-formation. Wherever rasters resolve one another only partially, differences remain visible that would long since have disappeared within homogeneous zones of overlap. New world rarely emerges within perfect agreement. It emerges where existing resolutions encounter their limits and other forms of world-binding become visible.

Glitch therefore constitutes both one of the most important sources of social development and one of the most important sources of social violence. Modern institutions, however, often respond to glitch not with openness but with simplification. Wherever different rasters encounter one another, uncertainty emerges. Institutions frequently attempt to reduce this uncertainty by privileging one resolution and interpreting other forms of world-binding as errors. Glitch is thereby transformed into deficit. Misunderstanding becomes disturbance. Difference becomes deviation.

Incommensurability becomes pathology.

This becomes particularly visible in areas such as neurodivergence, poverty, education, or bureaucracy. In such contexts it often remains unrecognised that different rasters are encountering one another. Instead, one side appears competent while the other appears deficient. The possibility that both sides may be resolving the same reality differently remains invisible within the dominant raster. What is in fact a relation between different forms of world-binding then appears as individual failure.

The theory of Eigenzeit relations proposes a different reading. Glitch is not an exceptional case. Glitch is the normal condition of complex societies. The more diverse the existing Eigenzeiten become, the more frequently zones of partial overlap emerge. The decisive question is therefore not how glitch can be eliminated. The question is rather how societies deal with glitch. For both emergence and violence can arise from the same structure.

Institutions often respond in ways that stabilise norms capable of producing internal majorities, while simultaneously generating larger extremes and conflicts at the margins. This is a natural consequence. A kind of apparent peace emerges, the kind we usually mean when speaking of society in a political, legal, or administrative sense. Yet this majority reality comes at a price even for those who belong to it. It weakens innovative capacity, reduces meaning and authentic relations of

relevance, and produces profound forms of alienation in favour of system preservation. The costs thereby become largely invisible.

At this point, a further concept becomes necessary. When different rasters encounter one another, not only conflicts or new possibilities emerge. A tension also emerges between the respective resolutions themselves. This tension will be referred to in the following as morphogenetic pressure.

8. Morphogenetic Pressure: The Operative Manifestation of Non-Neutralisable Difference

The preceding considerations have shown that different Eigenzeiten resolve the same reality through different rasters. Where these rasters overlap sufficiently, a shared world emerges. Where overlap succeeds only partially, glitch emerges. This still does not explain, however, why some of these relations are experienced as productive, while others are experienced as conflictual, exhausting, or violent. To understand this connection, a further concept must be introduced: morphogenetic pressure.

Morphogenetic pressure designates the operative manifestation of non-neutralisable difference. It is not a substance, a resource, or a material. It emerges wherever different rasters encounter one another and their differences can neither be completely resolved nor completely separated. The difference remains operative. Precisely for this reason, a pressure toward further form-formation emerges. This pressure is neither positive nor negative. Without it there would be neither learning, nor creativity, nor emergence. Where no difference exists, no new world emerges. Where no overlap exists, neither does a new world emerge. Morphogenetic pressure arises precisely between these two extremes. It arises where different rasters resolve one another sufficiently to enter into relation, while not losing their differences completely.

There is, however, a recurrence, a feedback relation with the tension field between everything and nothing (the absence of simultaneity), which continually places difference back into relation with everything, encouraging tendencies toward closure and a kind of holistic reassurance with itself and with the “whole world.” This recurrence is implied not only by the difference that seeks closure, but also by the reduction inherent in every raster, which always leaves open ends. In other words, structure that cannot be bound.

In this context, a connection to earlier works becomes visible. Within the concept of the Diversity Threshold, it was argued that systems become emergent only when they carry more difference than they are able to neutralise. Emergence arises there not despite incommensurability, but precisely through its maintenance. The Diversity Threshold therefore describes the structural condition of emergent systems. Morphogenetic pressure describes the operative dynamics of the same structure. Whereas the Diversity Threshold marks the critical point at which difference can no longer be neutralised, morphogenetic pressure describes the necessity of new form-formation that arises from this situation. The Diversity Threshold answers the question of when systems become capable of bringing forth new worlds. Morphogenetic pressure describes why this occurs. It is the operative manifestation of the situation that emerges when different forms of world can no longer be completely translated into one another and yet must remain in relation.

The concept of morphogenetic pressure must not be confused with energy or with physical pressure. No measurable force in the scientific sense is intended. Morphogenetic pressure instead designates the structural necessity of further form-formation that arises when differences can neither disappear nor be isolated from one another. Where no difference exists, no morphogenetic pressure emerges. Where difference remains completely separated, neither does morphogenetic pressure emerge. Morphogenetic pressure arises only where different forms of world-binding must remain simultaneously operative.

This applies at all levels of social and biological reality. Between individuals, institutions, cultures, scientific paradigms, neurodivergent and neurotypical forms of world-binding, as well as between biological and artificial systems, relations continually emerge in which different rasters encounter one another. Wherever this occurs, morphogenetic pressure emerges. It may appear as curiosity, irritation, enthusiasm, conflict, resistance, creativity, exhaustion, or scientific breakthrough. The manifestations differ. The underlying structure remains the same.

At this point another connection becomes visible. Earlier works introduced the concept of Developmental Distance in order to describe the difference that emerges between real effectiveness and its social visibility. Certain forms of work, care, knowledge production, or cultural practice generate real effects without becoming immediately visible within existing systems of valuation. Developmental Distance describes this structural non-coincidence between effectiveness and recognition. Morphogenetic pressure appears here as the operative consequence of this distance. Wherever forms of world-binding generate real effects that cannot become visible, or can become visible only partially, within a dominant raster, a permanent pressure of translation emerges. The difference does not disappear. It remains operative and generates the dynamics that may later become visible as conflict, exhaustion, marginalisation, or institutional contradiction. Morphogenetic pressure therefore describes on the relational level what Developmental Distance describes on the level of work and visibility.

The same applies to the Value Boundary. There it was argued that modern societies do not primarily decide which forms of work exist, but which forms of work are permitted to become visible. The Value Boundary functions as a threshold between effectiveness and social recognition. Certain forms of work cross this threshold and appear as achievement, success, or value. Others remain below the threshold despite carrying real world. The Value Boundary thereby systematically generates morphogenetic pressure. For the world-bindings rendered invisible do not disappear. They remain real conditions of social stability. The tension between their real effectiveness and their lack of visibility generates precisely that pressure toward further form-formation which may later manifest as poverty, exhaustion, insecurity, or social conflict. The Value Boundary therefore appears as a social mechanism for the distribution of morphogenetic pressure.

What is decisive is that morphogenetic pressure does not disappear when difference is suppressed. It merely changes its form of appearance. It is precisely at this point that the connection between morphogenetic pressure and violence becomes visible. When difference remains visible and is worked through productively, it can lead to emergence. When difference is systematically rendered invisible, an increasing pressure toward synchronisation emerges. The difference itself, however, remains. It is merely displaced from the visible domain. Where new forms are not permitted to

emerge, morphogenetic pressure is compensated through adaptation, conflict, exclusion, or violence.

Violence therefore appears, from this perspective, not as the opposite of order. It can instead be understood as a consequence of an order that can no longer allow certain differences to become visible. The more strongly a raster mistakes its own resolution for reality itself, the greater the probability of violent stabilisation becomes. Every difference now appears as disturbance, every deviation as error, and every other form of world-binding as a problem.

At this point it becomes visible why questions of neurodivergence, poverty, art, or institutional discrimination are structurally connected. In all cases different rasters encounter one another. In all cases morphogenetic pressure emerges. And in all cases the manner in which this difference is handled determines whether emergence or violence results.

This becomes particularly visible in the phenomenon of masking within neurodivergence. Within classical models, masking often appears as adaptation or as the concealment of certain traits. From the perspective of Eigenzeit relations it can be described more precisely. Masking designates the attempt to absorb morphogenetic pressure locally. Different rasters are temporarily adjusted to one another without actually resolving their difference. The underlying difference remains. Morphogenetic pressure does not disappear. It is shifted onto the level of individual persons. Long-term exhaustion emerges precisely from this. Not because social contact itself would consume energy, but because different rasters must be stabilised simultaneously over extended periods of time.

Morphogenetic pressure is therefore neither positive nor negative. It designates the fundamental dynamic of open world-formation itself. Without morphogenetic pressure there would be no creativity, no development, no history, no diversity, and no emergence. At the same time, however, there would also be no conflicts, no crises, and no transformation. The question is therefore not how morphogenetic pressure can be eliminated. The decisive question is rather which forms of working with it societies make possible. For it is precisely here that it is decided whether different Eigenzeiten will bring forth new worlds together or drive one another into invisibility, pathologisation, and violence.

8.1 Masking as the Management of Incompatible Rasters

Within classical models, masking often appears as adaptation, as the concealment of certain traits, or as the conscious imitation of socially expected behaviours. These descriptions capture real aspects of the phenomenon, yet they may not go far enough. They focus on visible behaviour, while the actual dynamics take place at a deeper level.

From the perspective of Eigenzeit relations, masking does not primarily designate the concealment of an identity. It designates the simultaneous stabilisation of different rasters within the same situation of action.

Where different Eigenzeiten encounter one another, different demands of world-binding emerge. One raster may treat certain differences as highly relevant, while another raster largely ignores those same differences. For shared interaction to become possible, it is often not enough to maintain one's own resolution of the world. The system must additionally keep visible those differences that are relevant within the foreign raster.

Masking can therefore be described as an attempt to absorb morphogenetic pressure locally. Two partially incompatible rasters must be kept simultaneously actionable even though their differences do not disappear. The person concerned thereby becomes the site of form-formation work that is not performed at the level of the system itself.

The person continues to bind their own world along their own Eigenzeit. At the same time, they must continuously model which differences are relevant for the other raster, which expectations apply there, which meanings are being generated, and which reactions appear likely. Their own world-binding is not replaced. It is overlaid.

Precisely here lies the source of many forms of exhaustion.

Within classical deficit models, the impression often arises that social situations are exhausting because certain social abilities are lacking, because social signals cannot be sufficiently recognised, and because these deficits must be compensated for. The theory of Eigenzeit relations proposes a different reading. Exhaustion does not necessarily arise from a lack of social competence or from compensation in the sense of copying another raster. It frequently arises because different rasters must be stabilised simultaneously. This is a crucial difference. Within the classical model, masking appears as the fee paid by the actor. What remains invisible is the duplication of system costs and the additional form-formation work required to maintain two different forms of world-binding at the same time. While the demands of one raster are reinforced, the stabilisation of one's own world-binding is partially neglected. This is why many autistic people experience masking not merely as an exhausting performance for others, but simultaneously as a loss of their own stabilisation.

In addition, the greater the difference between the resolutions involved, the greater the effort required for their mutual translation. The affected person must continually mediate between different systems of relevance. They must act within their own Eigenzeit while remaining legible within a foreign Eigenzeit. The morphogenetic pressure that emerges in this process does not disappear. It is managed permanently. The person thereby assumes a form of work that originally emerges from the relation between different rasters. Morphogenetic pressure is not removed. It is privatised.

This also explains why masking can be experienced in extraordinarily different ways. Not every form of social interaction generates the same effort. When rasters encounter one another that already possess large zones of overlap, the necessary work of translation remains comparatively low. When rasters encounter one another that prioritise different regions of reality, the necessary work of management increases considerably.

Autistic people therefore do not all mask in the same way.

Masking consequently no longer appears as a specifically autistic phenomenon. It becomes a general special case of Eigenzeit relations. Wherever different rasters must remain in lasting contact, forms of translation work emerge. Scientists move between specialised languages. Artists move between institutional and aesthetic logics. People from different social classes move between different forms of cultural legibility. Neurotypical people also mask within different social contexts.

The difference lies not in the existence of masking, but in its extent.

The greater the difference between the rasters involved, the higher the costs of their simultaneous stabilisation become. This is precisely why the same situation of action can have entirely different consequences for different people. What appears self-evident for one person may require considerable administrative effort between different forms of world-binding for another.

There is therefore also a form of intersectionality within masking itself. A neurodivergent artist masks not only as an autistic person, but simultaneously as an artist and, under certain circumstances, even in relation to other autistic people who are not artists. Poor people often mask just as intensely as autistic people. But what happens between wealthy autistic people and poor neurotypical people, or vice versa? With every additional raster difference, further layers of translation work emerge.

From this perspective, the meaning of so-called unmasking also changes. Unmasking does not simply designate a return to an authentic self. Such a notion would once again presuppose that different rasters could be clearly separated from one another. In reality, different rasters also operate within the same person. Eigenzeit relations remain field-like. Human beings do not live outside social zones of overlap. Unmasking therefore describes rather the reduction of that administrative effort required to remain permanently legible within foreign rasters.

The decisive question is therefore not whether masking exists or whether it should be avoided. The decisive question is under what conditions societies produce forms of world-binding that force certain Eigenzeiten to stabilise several incompatible rasters simultaneously over long periods of time.

At this point, the phenomenon of masking directly touches the question of structural violence. For if certain forms of world-binding remain socially legible only at the cost of permanent translation work, then this is no longer merely a matter of individual adaptation. It becomes an asymmetrical relation between different raster forms.

Masking therefore appears not as a marginal phenomenon of neurodivergence, but as a key example of the general dynamics of morphogenetic pressure. It makes visible that exhaustion, adaptation, creativity, and violence do not arise solely within individuals, but emerge from relations in which different forms of world-binding must be stabilised simultaneously. Masking does not reduce morphogenetic pressure. It displaces it. The real question is therefore not whether people mask, but who carries the morphogenetic pressure of a society and who is able to shift it onto others.

8.2 Neurodivergence as an Eigenzeit Constellation

The preceding considerations lead to a shift in how neurodivergence itself is viewed. Within classical models, neurodivergence frequently appears as a property of individual persons. The decisive question then becomes which traits, deficits, abilities, or neurological particularities a person possesses and how these differ from a statistical norm. Even many newer approaches that criticise deficit models often remain within the same basic structure. The differences are now evaluated more positively, yet they continue to appear primarily as properties of individual individuals.

The theory of Eigenzeit relations proposes a different perspective.

Neurodivergence appears here not primarily as a property of a person, but as a relation between different forms of world-binding. The focus shifts from the individuals involved to the relation between their rasters. Differences are not denied. They are, however, located differently. What matters is not merely which properties a system possesses, but which forms of world-binding become visible when different Eigenzeiten encounter one another.

From this perspective, many classical oppositions lose part of their explanatory force. The question is no longer whether autism should primarily be understood as a deficit or as a special ability. Both positions continue to assume that autism describes a property of persons. The theory of Eigenzeit relations instead treats the relation between different rasters as its primary object of investigation. One could almost dissolve the concept of autism within it.

Glitch does not emerge within autistic people.

Glitch emerges between raster forms.

Masking does not emerge within autistic people.

Masking emerges between raster forms.

Many forms of social exhaustion, misunderstanding, or pathologisation likewise do not necessarily arise within individual persons. They arise wherever different Eigenzeiten must remain in lasting relation without being able to resolve one another sufficiently.

This also changes the meaning of the concept of autism itself. Autism no longer appears exclusively as a medical category, but as a historical attempt to describe particular forms of Eigenzeit relations. The diagnostic features point to real phenomena. Yet they often capture only the visible consequences of deeper raster conflicts. What appears as a social difficulty may, from this perspective, also be understood as an expression of different forms of relevance formation. What appears as a lack of adaptation may become visible as the consequence of incompatible forms of world-binding. What appears as deficit may point toward the limits of mutual resolvability.

This does not mean that biological, neurological, or genetic factors are irrelevant. They may be understood as conditions of different Eigenzeiten. The present theory, however, shifts the explanatory level. Instead of deriving neurodivergence primarily from its biological preconditions, it investigates the relations that emerge from different forms of world-binding.

Neurodivergence therefore no longer appears as a marginal phenomenon within an otherwise homogeneous society. It becomes a particularly visible example of a more general structure.

This shift has far-reaching consequences. If neurodivergence is understood not primarily as a property of individual persons but as an expression of different forms of world-binding, then the question of why different *Eigenzeiten* emerge at all also changes. The present theory assumes that such differences are neither accidental deviations nor mere variations within an otherwise homogeneous order. They appear instead as necessary consequences of a reality that cannot be fully closed. If every stabilisation rests upon the Gap, and every act of form-formation generates new differences, then the world can never come to rest within a single mode of resolution. Different rasters emerge not despite this openness, but from it.

From this perspective, neurodivergence no longer appears as an exceptional case of biological development. It appears as one possible response to the same operative non-closure from which other forms of diversity also emerge. The emergence of different *Eigenzeiten* is not the expression of an error within the system. It is an expression of the conditions under which open world-formation remains possible at all. Diversity thereby appears neither as a moral addition nor as a socio-political ideal, but as a structural necessity. Wherever reality cannot be fully closed, different forms of binding necessarily emerge.

Autism, neurotypicality, artistic cognition, scientific specialisation, cultural differences, or other forms of world-binding can therefore be understood as different responses to the same open reality. None of these forms possesses a privileged access to the world as such. They emerge together within the same negative topology and remain related to the same operative openness. Precisely for this reason they can enter into resonance with one another, fail one another, learn from one another, or bring forth new forms of world.

The same dynamics of overlap, glitch, morphogenetic pressure, emergence, and violence can also be found between social classes, cultural traditions, scientific paradigms, institutions, or technological systems. Autism is not thereby relativised. Rather, it becomes visible that the experiences of neurodivergent people can provide access to fundamental mechanisms of open world-formation that extend far beyond the domain of neurodivergence itself.

In this sense, neurodivergence appears not primarily as an exception to social order. It appears as a making-visible of those differences upon which every form of world-formation rests.

9. Emergence: How New World Arises from Difference

The preceding considerations have shown that different *Eigenzeiten* resolve the same reality through different rasters. Where these rasters overlap sufficiently, a shared world emerges. Where they overlap only partially, glitch emerges. Morphogenetic pressure arises from this partial overlap. This raises the question of why some forms of morphogenetic pressure lead to creativity, learning, and social development, while others pass into conflict, exclusion, or violence.

The answer does not lie in difference itself. Difference alone does not yet generate emergence. Different rasters can exist alongside one another for long periods without bringing forth new worlds. What is decisive is how the resulting morphogenetic pressure is dealt with. As long as differences can be integrated into existing categories, harmonised, or rendered invisible, no new world emerges. The existing rasters remain intact. The difference is absorbed. Only where different forms of world-binding must remain in relation even though their differences can no longer be fully resolved does the situation change fundamentally.

At this point the connection to the Diversity Threshold becomes visible. There it was argued that systems become emergent only when they carry more difference than they are able to neutralise. Emergence does not arise because differences exist. It arises where different forms of world-binding must remain simultaneously operative even though their differences can no longer be translated into a common resolution. The tension involved does not disappear. It cannot be returned to existing categories. The system is thereby confronted with an alternative: either the difference is reduced, displaced, or violently synchronised, or a new form emerges that binds this difference in another way. Emergence therefore appears not as a creative possibility but as a structural necessity. It designates the formation of new world as a response to difference that can no longer be neutralised.

Morphogenetic pressure designates precisely this situation. It emerges where difference can neither disappear nor be separated. As long as this difference remains viable, it generates a pressure toward the formation of new forms. Emergence therefore appears not as the consequence of creative freedom, but as a response to a morphogenetic pressure that can no longer be worked through within existing rasters.

This is also why many artists and cultural workers speak of an inner pressure to bring something forth. This is not a decision in favour of a predefined product, but a process of balancing experienced differences. It is less self-realisation than world-preservation as a response to difference. It is not a luxury. It is a necessity.

The decisive difference is that emergence here does not arise from diversity itself, but from viable incommensurability. Difference alone generates variation. Only the simultaneous existence of incompatible yet inseparable forms of world-binding generates the morphogenetic pressure that makes new forms necessary. The source of emergence therefore lies not in the number of different positions, perspectives, or identities. It lies in a system's capacity to maintain difference without fully resolving it.

From this perspective, scientific paradigm shifts, artistic innovations, social transformations, or new forms of social cooperation do not appear as accidental events of creativity. They appear as responses to morphogenetic pressure that can no longer be processed within existing rasters. New world emerges where existing forms of stabilisation encounter their limits and where the non-coincidence of different forms of world-binding can no longer be kept invisible.

This also explains why emergent processes frequently appear first as disturbances. New rasters rarely fit into existing rasters. They generate irritation, contradiction, and uncertainty because they make visible differences for which the previous order possesses no place. What later appears as innovation is therefore often initially perceived as error, deviation, or incomprehensibility. Many

historical conflicts between science and religion, art and institutions, social movements and political orders, or neurodivergent and neurotypical forms of world-binding can be understood as expressions of this dynamic. Not because one side is right and the other wrong, but because different resolutions of the same reality are competing with one another.

Precisely for this reason emergence possesses a fundamentally ambivalent character. It expands the world while simultaneously destabilising existing forms of order. Every new resolution makes differences visible that were previously hidden. New possibilities emerge, but so do new tensions. Emergence and glitch therefore stand in a close relation to one another. Without glitch there would be no emergence. Without partial incommensurability there would be no new forms of world-formation. The morphogenetic pressure arising from this incommensurability is not the obstacle to emergence but its condition.

At this point it becomes visible why diversity possesses a much deeper significance than is assumed in many contemporary debates. Diversity is not primarily a moral category. Nor does it merely designate the coexistence of different groups within a society. From the perspective of Eigenzeit relations, diversity appears instead as the capacity of a system to carry differences that cannot be neutralised. A society that permits only one form of raster formation may generate stability. It loses, however, part of its capacity for emergence. Not because differences are absent, but because the differences that do exist can no longer be maintained productively.

This applies not only to societies, but to every system that binds world. Wherever different resolutions can enter into relation without completely absorbing one another, new possibilities of world-formation emerge. Wherever a single resolution is declared the general norm, the capacity for emergence diminishes. Stabilisation then becomes increasingly important, while openness recedes. Short-term order grows while long-term world-forming capacity shrinks.

It is precisely here that the connection between emergence and violence becomes visible. For the simplest way of reducing uncertainty is to render difference invisible. Yet the morphogenetic pressure of different rasters is not thereby removed. It is merely displaced. Violence therefore appears not as the opposite of order, but as a specific response to difference. It emerges where the openness of emergent world-formation is to be closed in favour of a single legitimate resolution. The more strongly a system depends upon confusing its own resolution with reality itself, the greater the probability of violent stabilisation becomes.

This leads to the next step in the theory of Eigenzeit relations: the question of how and why certain rasters confuse their own resolution with reality itself and thereby generate forms of structural violence.

10. Violence: When Rasters Confuse Their Own Resolution with Reality

The preceding considerations have shown that different Eigenzeiten resolve the same reality through different rasters. From the partial overlap of these rasters emerge glitch, morphogenetic pressure, and the possibility of emergent world-formation. This raises the question of why the same

structure that can produce creativity and development can, under other conditions, lead to exclusion, pathologisation, or violence.

The answer does not lie in the existence of difference itself, but in the way difference is dealt with.

From the perspective of Eigenzeit relations, violence does not arise primarily where differences exist. Differences are a necessary consequence of open world-formation. Violence emerges where a particular raster resolution no longer understands itself as a local resolution of the same reality, but as reality itself. Its own form of world-binding now becomes the measure of all other forms of world-binding.

It is precisely at this point that the function of difference changes.

As long as different rasters appear as different resolutions of the same open reality, difference remains productive. It generates glitch, morphogenetic pressure, and the possibility of emergence. Once a raster form confuses its own resolution with the world itself, difference loses its status as a source of possible world-formation. It now appears as error.

What was previously another form of resolution becomes deviation.

What was previously another form of world-binding becomes deficit.

What was previously another form of stabilisation becomes disturbance.

Violence therefore often begins long before physical violence becomes visible. It begins already at the level of visibility itself. For example, as representational violence, or as the violence of objectification when objectivity becomes the sole measure of reality.

Violence is often particularly severe at the margins because it is precisely there that the difference from the dominant raster is frequently underestimated. Not on the surface, where one can see that someone is different, but in the depth of the effort required to understand the other at the margins. Superficial differences may be recognised, while deeper affordances remain concealed. This is one reason why the middle classes often fail to understand poverty. They project themselves onto poor people who, with sufficient effort, could supposedly become successful as well. Yet in doing so they completely overlook the deeper differences that remain unresolved. Categories become profoundly confused. One speaks of motivation and incentives while simultaneously restricting preconditions and individual possibilities. A caricature of poverty is produced, while almost nothing is understood about the actual reality of poor people's lives. That reality is then read once again through the dominant raster, which further intensifies precisely those differences that were supposedly being overcome.

A raster form determines which differences may be perceived at all, which experiences count as real, which forms of knowledge are recognised, and which forms of world-binding appear legitimate. Everything lying outside this resolution is progressively rendered invisible.

A peculiar dynamic thereby emerges. The affected Eigenzeiten do not disappear. Morphogenetic pressure does not disappear either. What becomes invisible is only the possibility of understanding this difference as a legitimate form of world-binding. The remaining tensions now appear as irrationality, misconduct, illness, lack of adaptation, or social problem.

Because of Eigenzeit, self-determination is often a necessity. Yet from within foreign rasters it is condemned as an excessive claim.

Many forms of structural violence follow precisely this pattern.

Neurodivergent people are pathologised because their rasters do not coincide with dominant forms of social resolution.

Poor people are moralised because their lived realities become visible within economic rasters only as individual failure.

Artistic and scientific innovations are resisted because they make visible differences that destabilise existing rasters.

Political polarisation often follows the same structure. Different Eigenzeiten increasingly lose the ability to perceive one another as different resolutions of the same reality. The other side no longer appears different. It appears wrong.

Violence therefore does not primarily designate an action. Violence designates a process of raster narrowing. It is deeply structural and existential.

The more strongly a resolution identifies its own perspective with reality itself, the less capable it becomes of keeping other forms of world-binding visible. The diversity of possible world-formations is reduced. The shared world contracts.

From this perspective, violence appears as the counter-movement to emergence.

Where emergence maintains different rasters in productive tension, violence attempts to close that tension. Where emergence keeps difference visible, violence attempts to neutralise difference. Where emergence brings forth new world, violence attempts to stabilise the existing world against change.

The significance of this connection extends far beyond classical questions of discrimination or social exclusion. It concerns the fundamental capacity of societies to deal with difference. Every complex society faces the same challenge. It must generate sufficient stability to make shared world possible without destroying those differences from which new world can emerge.

It is precisely at this boundary that it is decided whether morphogenetic pressure passes into emergence or into violence.

The central political question is therefore not how difference can be eliminated or integrated. The decisive question is what forms of society are capable of keeping different Eigenzeiten visible without reducing them to a single legitimised resolution.

This also shifts the meaning of justice itself. Justice no longer appears primarily as equal treatment within an existing raster. It appears as the capacity of a society to recognise different forms of world-binding as real forms of world-binding.

This leads to the final concept of the present work: raster justice.

11. Raster Justice and Ontological Coexistence: The Conditions of Open World-Formation

The preceding considerations have shown that different Eigenzeiten resolve the same reality through different rasters. Shared world emerges from the overlap of these rasters. Glitch, morphogenetic pressure, and the possibility of emergent world-formation emerge from their partial overlap. At the same time, it has become visible that these same processes can, under certain conditions, pass over into exclusion, pathologisation, and violence.

This raises the question of which conditions must be fulfilled if different Eigenzeiten are to coexist over time without losing their differences.

The answer cannot lie in complete agreement. A society that resolves all differences simultaneously loses those very tensions from which new world emerges. Nor can the answer lie in complete separation. Where no overlap remains, the possibility of shared world-formation collapses. The challenge therefore does not consist in eliminating or maximising difference, but in creating conditions under which different rasters can enter into relation without destroying one another.

At this point a concept becomes necessary that extends beyond classical notions of equality, inclusion, or diversity.

Raster justice, much like ontological coexistence, designates the capacity of a society to keep different forms of world-binding visible as legitimate forms of world-binding. It does not demand that all rasters become the same. Nor does it demand that all differences be resolved. Its aim is rather to maintain the conditions of mutual visibility.

From the perspective of Eigenzeit relations, justice therefore appears not primarily as the distribution of goods, rights, or opportunities, important as these questions remain. Justice concerns first of all the conditions of perceivability itself. A society is just when different Eigenzeiten are not forced to abandon their own forms of world-binding merely in order to be recognised as real forms of the human.

This does not mean that all rasters are equally valid. Raster justice does not eliminate conflict. Different resolutions may compete with one another, contradict one another, or generate incompatible consequences. What matters is that such conflicts remain visible as conflicts between different forms of world-binding. Violence begins where this visibility is lost and where one raster form confuses its own resolution with reality itself.

Raster justice therefore possesses an epistemic, social, and political dimension simultaneously.

Epistemically, it means that knowledge cannot be reduced to a single form of resolution. Different Eigenzeiten can make different aspects of the same reality visible.

Socially, it means that belonging must not be made dependent upon complete adaptation to dominant rasters.

Politically, it means that institutions must understand their own resolutions as local stabilisations rather than as final descriptions of reality.

At the level of society as a whole, it means that the organisation of a country cannot be oriented solely toward material considerations. Possession then carries not only a monetary meaning but also an Eigenzeitly one. This is more than immaterial value. The issue concerns structural questions of existence itself, not morality or ethics.

The same structure can be found in conflicts between scientific paradigms, cultural traditions, political camps, social classes, artistic practices, or technological systems. Everywhere the same question arises: How much difference can a society keep visible without losing its shared world?

From the perspective of Eigenzeit relations, this does not appear as a marginal moral problem of modern societies. It appears as one of their central conditions of survival.

For societies do not fail only through too little order.

They can fail equally through too much order.

They can perish through a narrowing of their rasters that treats every difference as a threat and thereby destroys precisely those processes from which new world could emerge.

Raster justice therefore ultimately designates the capacity to maintain stability and openness at the same time. It does not protect particular groups, identities, or diagnoses. It protects the conditions of emergent world-formation itself.

This makes visible that neurodivergence, art, poverty, science, politics, and artificial intelligence do not constitute isolated topics. They appear as different contact zones of the same fundamental challenge: the relation between different Eigenzeiten within a shared, yet never fully resolvable, reality.

The question of how different Eigenzeiten can live together therefore proves not to be a specialised problem of particular groups. It proves to be one of the fundamental questions of open world-formation itself.

At this point it becomes visible that diversity, within the theory of Eigenzeit relations, cannot be understood as an accidental property of social systems. Diversity appears instead as a necessary consequence of a reality that cannot be fully closed, combined with irreversible binding. If the Gap designates the operative non-closure of all world-formation, then no stabilisation can ever become final. Every form generates new differences, new invisibilities, and new tensions, which in turn generate further forms of world-binding. Different Eigenzeiten therefore appear not as errors within an otherwise homogeneous system, but as necessary responses to the same operative openness.

The emergence of different rasters follows neither a plan nor a predetermined goal. It follows from the conditions of open world-formation itself. Every stabilisation generates new differences. Every difference generates new possibilities of binding. Every binding in turn alters the conditions of further world-formation. Diversity therefore appears neither as a moral value nor as a biological accident, but as a structural consequence of irreversible form-formation. The multiplicity of different Eigenzeiten thus becomes not a problem to be overcome, but an expression of that non-closure from which every real world emerges.

This relation was already described in 2005 in the book *Gesellschaft ohne Vertrauen* (*Society Without Trust*) through the concept of the Bran Spiral. The present theory reconstructs the same relation on a more general level. Every stabilisation generates new differences, every difference new possibilities of binding, and every binding new conditions of further world-formation. The Bran Spiral, a precursor of Seinsverschiebung, therefore appears not as a special case of social development but as an expression of the general dynamics of a reality that cannot be fully closed.

From this perspective, the question of social stability also acquires a new meaning. It is not the existence of different Eigenzeiten that threatens the stability of a system. Dangerous are rather those forms of hyper-stabilisation that attempt to reduce the diversity of possible world-bindings to a single legitimised resolution. Where difference is permanently suppressed, non-closure does not disappear. It returns in another form. The openness of the Gap remains and generates new tensions, new differences, and new forms of world-formation. Diversity therefore appears not as an exception to order, but as an expression of the conditions under which order can exist at all.

12. Conclusion: The Open World of Different Eigenzeiten

The point of departure of this paper was the observation that people share the same reality and yet often appear to live in different worlds. Modern society possesses numerous concepts for the consequences of this problem. It speaks of misunderstandings, conflict, polarisation, disability, diversity, discrimination, innovation, or cultural difference. What has largely been missing is a general theory of the relations from which these phenomena emerge.

The present work has proposed describing this structure as a relation between different Eigenzeiten. It has argued that different forms of world-relation should not primarily be understood as identities, psychological types, diagnoses, or cultural groups, but as different forms of irreversible world-binding. Every Eigenzeit binds the same open reality along its own genealogical curvature and thereby generates specific rasters of perceivability. Differences between people, institutions, or systems no longer appear exclusively as differences of opinion or interest, but as differences of resolution.

From this perspective, overlap, glitch, morphogenetic pressure, emergence, and violence emerge as different forms of Eigenzeit relations. Overlap makes shared world-formation possible. Glitch emerges where rasters remain only partially compatible. Morphogenetic pressure designates the effectiveness of non-neutralisable difference. Emergence arises when different resolutions of the same reality can enter into productive relation with one another. Violence emerges where one raster form confuses its own resolution with reality itself and increasingly renders other forms of world-binding invisible.

The significance of this perspective extends beyond the individual examples discussed in this work. Neurodivergence, art, poverty, scientific innovation, political polarisation, or artificial intelligence no longer appear as separate fields of inquiry. They become different manifestations of the same fundamental problem: the relation between different Eigenzeiten within a shared, yet never fully resolvable, reality.

This also shifts the meaning of diversity itself. Diversity no longer appears primarily as a moral demand or a socio-political goal. It appears as a structural condition of open world-formation. Different Eigenzeiten are not merely tolerable deviations within an already existing order. They form part of the conditions under which new world can emerge at all. A society that legitimises only one form of resolution may gain stability. At the same time, however, it loses part of its capacity for emergence.

The theory of Eigenzeit relations therefore leads to a fundamental revaluation of difference. Difference no longer appears primarily as a problem to be overcome. It appears as a condition of world-formation itself. The decisive question is therefore not how differences can be eliminated, but how different forms of world-binding can enter into relation with one another without losing their differences.

It is precisely at this point that ontology, epistemology, and politics touch one another. The question of how different Eigenzeiten can live together is not merely a question of social organisation. It concerns the conditions under which reality becomes visible, knowledge emerges, and shared world can be formed.

The present work therefore understands itself not as a conclusion, but as a point of departure for further investigation. If Eigenzeiten do not exist in isolation, but continually overlap, friction against one another, reinforce one another, destabilise one another, and transform one another, then world emerges not despite these relations, but through them. The open reality of the Gap appears from this perspective not as an obstacle to order, but as a condition of its continual renewal.

Human beings therefore live neither in completely separate worlds nor in a single, identically shared world. They live in overlapping Eigenzeiten. From their relations emerge understanding and misunderstanding, stability and change, emergence and violence. The question of Eigenzeit relations thus proves to be one of the fundamental questions of open world-formation itself.

Term	Function
Gap	non-closure
Seinsverschiebung	genealogical displacement / shift of being
Eigenzeit	irreversible world-binding
Raster	local resolution
Overlap	shared resolvability
Glitch	partial resolvability
Morphogenetic Pressure	operative effectivity of non-neutralisable difference
Emergence	new form-formation

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