

**BETTI'S PRINCIPLE OF COSMIC
NON-SURPRISE:**

**A CRITICAL–PROPOSITIONAL ANALYSIS
OF THE ORIGIN OF THOUGHT IN
CONFRONTATION WITH THE THEORY OF
OBJECTIVITY**

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1. Introduction

The problem of the origin of thought remains one of the most decisive themes in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and ontology. In its sharpest formulation, the question may be stated as follows: does the human mind produce something genuinely new in being, or does it merely reorganize, symbolize, and make explicit possibilities that already belong to the structure of the universe? This is a classical question, yet it acquires renewed force when articulated in terms of totality, part, limit, creativity, and ontological possibility.

It is within this horizon that Dirceu dos Santos Betti's article, *Betti's Principle of Cosmic Non-Surprise: A Philosophical Account of the Origin of Thought*, published on Zenodo in 2026, must be situated. The text argues that the universe, understood as the totality of all that exists, has existed, or can exist, cannot be "surprised" by one of its own finite parts. From this premise, the author concludes that human thought does not generate absolute ontological novelty, but rather reveals, recombines, or reorganizes possibilities already contained within the universe itself (Betti 2026).

This formulation has an immediate philosophical merit: it resists the metaphysical inflation of subjectivity by rejecting the idea that the human mind could introduce into reality something exterior to the totality to which it belongs. At the same time, this thesis demands rigorous critical examination, especially when confronted with a broader and explicitly modal ontological system such as the Theory of Objectivity (TO), formulated by Vidamor Cabannas and Denivaldo Silva in its foundational, recent, and dialogical bibliography (Cabannas and Silva 2016; 2018; 2025; 2026a; 2026b).

TO offers a particularly demanding framework for this confrontation. Rather than beginning with a universe already given as totality, the theory begins with Nothingness as a primitive and eternal mathematical essence. Rather than treating thought merely as a problem of subjective creativity, it articulates it with boundaries, relational observation, prior composition of elements, transcendent substance

beyond the quantum, Inductive Effects, atomic memory, the cosmogonic theorem, and the cosmological Eras. For this reason, the analysis of Betti's article under the modal discipline of TO does not consist merely in accepting or rejecting it, but in determining with precision its convergences, its tensions, and its insufficiencies.

The purpose of the present article is therefore to develop a critical–propositional analysis of Betti's thesis in confrontation with the Theory of Objectivity and in dialogue with the foundational, recent, and supportive bibliography indicated by the user. The guiding hypothesis is that Betti's proposal is philosophically relevant as a critique of the absolute creation of thought, but remains incomplete in light of the modal and cosmogonic requirements of TO. Methodologically, this study follows the Chicago author–date style and is organized into sections that reconstruct Betti's thesis, examine its conceptual architecture, confront it with the axioms of TO, and propose a reformulation of the problem of the origin of thought in light of phenomenic elements and relational regimes within the Theory of Objectivity.

2. Delimiting the Philosophical Problem: Thought, Novelty, and Totality

The question addressed by Betti is metaphysically decisive because it simultaneously touches philosophy of mind, ontology, and cosmology. The question is not merely psychological—that is, it does not concern only how human beings imagine, remember, or abstract. It is ontological: is the human mind capable of creating something absolutely new, or is all of its creativity already inscribed within the universe of which it is a part?

Betti's article answers negatively to the hypothesis of absolute creation. For him, if the mind could generate a reality not previously contained in the totality of the universe, then a part would exceed the whole to which it belongs, which would be contradictory. From this denial emerges the Principle of Cosmic Non-Surprise: the totality of the universe cannot be surprised by one of its own finite parts (Betti 2026).

The problem, however, requires conceptual precision. The term “new” may

refer to several distinct planes. There is psychological novelty, when something appears for the first time to a subject. There is historical novelty, when a certain configuration becomes unprecedented in a temporal context. There is formal novelty, when a new symbolic, conceptual, or aesthetic combination is produced. And there is absolute ontological novelty, which would be the irruption of a being or possibility radically not contained in the structure of the universe. Betti's article is directed above all against this last sense.

This distinction matters because denying absolute ontological novelty does not automatically imply denying every form of derived novelty. A theory of creativity may legitimately affirm that the mind does not create being out of nothing and still recognize that it produces new formal articulations, new symbolic organizations, new phenomenic arrangements, and new operational possibilities. The danger of any critique of absolute creation is that it may slide toward an excessive reduction of creativity to mere repetition.

It is precisely here that the Theory of Objectivity becomes a decisive interlocutor. In TO, thought is not the absolute creator of being, but neither is it a merely inert reflection. It constitutes a phenomenic mode of real reorganization of information, images, memories, and relations produced within the universe. This means that creativity may be both non-absolute and ontologically significant on derived planes.

Thus, the central philosophical problem may be reformulated as follows: how can one deny the absolute creation of mind without impoverishing the real status of creativity? Betti's answer emphasizes the containment of the part within the totality. TO adds the demand for a broader ontology, capable of explaining how the totality, the parts, the boundaries, the relations, and thought itself become possible.

3. The Conceptual Architecture of Betti's Article

One of the virtues of Betti's text is its explicit architecture. The author organizes his thesis through definitions, axioms, theorems, and objections, thereby

giving the article a clarity that is relatively rare in metaphysical writing. This formal choice does not transform the paper into a technical logical treatise, but it does grant it a noteworthy philosophical intelligibility.

The first step lies in its fundamental definitions. The universe is defined as the totality of all that exists, has existed, or can exist. A part is any entity, system, or structure contained within the universe. The human mind is characterized as a finite cognitive system belonging to the universe and subject to its ontological conditions. Thought, finally, is defined as a conceptual configuration produced by the mind, composed of relations, representations, or abstractions (Betti 2026).

On the basis of these definitions, Betti formulates five central axioms: the universe contains all that exists; the human mind is part of the universe; no part can exceed the totality to which it belongs; creating something absolutely new would require producing a reality not previously contained within the universe; and the human mind cannot create from nothing. From these, the author derives his principal philosophical theorems: the mind does not generate ontological novelty; imagination consists of recombinations; every conceivable thought corresponds to some possible configuration of the universe; creativity is discovery rather than absolute creation; and the universe cannot be surprised.

This argumentative economy has three merits. First, it avoids philosophical impressionism. The reader knows precisely from which definitions the author departs and what he seeks to demonstrate. Second, it makes the inferential dependence of each thesis explicit. Third, it allows criticism to be directed more accurately: one is not criticizing a diffuse intuitionism but an identifiable argumentative structure.

At the same time, this clarity also reveals the system's limits. The first limit lies in the very definition of the universe. By defining it as the totality of all that exists and can exist, Betti already incorporates all possibilities into his initial notion. As a result, part of his conclusion is built into the premise: if the universe already contains all that can exist, then nothing absolutely new can arise outside it. This move is philosophically defensible, but it must be recognized as a very strong definition.

The second limit lies in the absence of a differentiation among types of possibility. When the author states that every conceivable thought corresponds to a possible configuration of the universe, he does not adequately distinguish logical possibility, phenomenological possibility, cosmological possibility, and empirically operational possibility. Such indeterminacy makes the thesis suggestive but overly broad.

The third limit lies in the lack of a theory of individuation. Betti establishes the relation between part and totality effectively, but does not sufficiently develop the principle by which each part is objectively distinguished from others. The Theory of Objectivity, by insisting on the singularity of elements and the necessity of boundaries, makes this limit particularly visible.

Despite this, the conceptual architecture of the article should be recognized as philosophically significant. It constitutes a consistent effort to submit the question of mental creativity to an explicit ontological grammar, which makes it a suitable interlocutor for serious confrontation with TO.

4. The Principle of Cosmic Non-Surprise: Strength and Scope of the Thesis

The most original core of Betti's article is the so-called Principle of Cosmic Non-Surprise. In synthetic terms, it states that the totality of the universe cannot be surprised by one of its own parts. The intuitive force of this idea is considerable: if the universe is truly the totality of all that exists and can exist, then none of its parts can add to it something absolutely exterior.

This principle matters because it challenges an inflated conception of human creativity. In many romantic, existentialist, or technocultural formulations, imagination is presented as a sovereign power capable of creating *new worlds*. Betti reminds us that, in a strong ontological sense, such language is contradictory. A finite part cannot surpass the totality that contains it.

The thesis also bears implications against certain forms of metaphysical an-

thropocentrism. If the universe could be “surprised” by an act of human thought, then the human being would assume a role analogous to that of a creator of the cosmos itself. What appears to exalt the mind in fact dissolves the order between part and totality.

Yet the scope of the principle requires calibration. The force of the thesis depends on a robust definition of totality, and its conclusion is secure only if “novelty” is understood in an absolute sense. Once one moves to historical, phenomenic, symbolic, or operational planes, the situation changes. New configurations may emerge within the universe without implying a surpassing of its totality.

Here the contribution of TO is decisive. The modal discipline of the Theory of Objectivity allows one to affirm two things simultaneously: no part creates absolute being; and yet new real configurations may occur on derived planes. There is emergence, convergence, updating, and reorganization without *ex nihilo* creation. Thus, TO preserves the valid core of Betti’s principle while preventing it from sliding into an excessively static conception of reality.

In summary, the Principle of Cosmic Non-Surprise is philosophically strong as a critique of absolute creation by mind. Its limit lies in its failure to distinguish with sufficient precision between what cannot happen at the level of absolute ontology and what may happen at historical, phenomenic, or relational levels. TO provides precisely the tools for this differentiation.

5. Imagination, Creativity, and Recombination: A Critical Examination

One of Betti’s central theorems establishes that imagination consists of re-combinations of already existing elements. In other words, thought does not create from nothing but reorganizes contents, relations, and abstractions drawn from prior structures. This formulation is philosophically respectable and resonates with various traditions, from certain Aristotelian and empiricist approaches to contemporary views that emphasize the dependence of creativity upon prior materials.

The merit of this thesis lies in its refusal of the metaphysical fantasy of

absolute creation. No ordinary experience of mind authorizes the supposition that human thought produces being out of nothing. Perception, memory, abstraction, analogy, and language all operate upon traces, signs, images, and structures already available to the subject.

Yet reducing imagination to mere recombination may be insufficient. Human creativity is not simply mechanical rearrangement. It involves selection, condensation, displacement, synthesis, anticipation, and the construction of new formal articulations. A poem, a scientific theory, an artistic image, or a cosmological hypothesis does not ontologically create the universe, but it may establish unprecedented configurations on various levels.

It is therefore necessary to distinguish between trivial recombination and structurally productive recombination. The former would be simple superficial rearrangement; the latter involves the production of new phenomenic, conceptual, and operational articulations, even if without absolute creation. Betti's article suggests this difference, but does not develop it.

The Theory of Objectivity allows this issue to be deepened. In its vocabulary, imagination may be understood as the reorganization of phenomenic elements, relative images, atomic memories, and received inductions, thereby producing new configurations of intelligibility. This is richer than the simple word "recombination" because it recognizes degrees and regimes of creativity.

Thus, the key point should not be framed as an opposition between "creation" and "mere repetition". The proper opposition is between absolute creation and relational actualization. Human creativity does not create absolute being, but it may actualize, explicate, and reorganize real possibilities of the universe. This conceptual shift is one of the principal corrections that TO offers to Betti's text.

6. Structural Compatibilities Between Betti and the Theory of Objectivity

Despite the tensions that will be examined later, Betti's article presents significant structural compatibilities with the Theory of Objectivity. The first is the rejection of strong ontological chance. In both cases, the universe is not conceived as an arbitrary aggregate of occurrences without internal discipline. Betti claims that thought does not introduce into reality an absolute exteriority; TO maintains that the universe is logically structured and cannot be reduced to indifferent contingency (Cabannas and Silva 2016; 2025).

The second compatibility concerns the limitation of the finite part. Betti's argument that no part can exceed the totality to which it belongs converges with TO's effort to submit all ontology to a modal discipline. A coherent theory of reality cannot attribute to a derived entity a power that contradicts the fundamental conditions of the universe.

The third compatibility lies in the reinscription of thought within the cosmos. Betti denies that the mind stands outside the universe; TO also rejects any simplistic dualism that treats consciousness as a magical exception to reality. Thought, in both cases, is understood as an event internal to the universe.

The fourth compatibility appears in the recognition of structural anteriority. Betti's Axiom 5, according to which the mind does not create from nothing, approximates TO's Sixth Absolute Truth, which states that every element is composed of prior elements. In both frameworks, creativity depends upon prior conditions.

These convergences show that Betti's article is not alien to the objectivist horizon. On the contrary, it formulates, in its own language, intuitions that TO can receive: thought is not absolute, the part does not found the whole, the universe is intelligible, and creativity depends upon prior structures. The problem lies not in these core intuitions but in the insufficiency of their grounding in light of the broader system of TO.

7. Tensions Between Betti's System and the Modal Axioms of TO

If the compatibilities are real, the tensions with the Theory of Objectivity are even more decisive. They arise from the fact that TO does not merely affirm the intelligibility of the universe but seeks to deduce it from a set of Absolute Truths endowed with modal necessity.

7.1. Nothingness as Primitive and Eternal Mathematical Essence

The first and deepest tension emerges with the First Absolute Truth of TO: Nothingness is a primitive and eternal mathematical essence. Betti, by contrast, begins with the universe already defined as totality. This means that his ontology does not confront the most radical problem of all: the genesis of totality itself. TO, by beginning with Nothingness, demands a much deeper deduction of the emergence of the universe.

7.2. The Singularity of Elements

The Second Absolute Truth states that every element possesses a magnetic field, an aura, that makes it unique. Betti's text rightly emphasizes the inclusion of the part within the whole, but says comparatively little about the principle of individuation of parts. His system is stronger on totality than on singularity.

7.3. The Necessity of Boundaries

The Fourth Absolute Truth asserts that two distinct elements require at least one boundary line between them. Betti speaks of universe, part, mind, and thought, but does not develop a robust theory of the boundaries that make these terms ontologically distinguishable. Without a boundary, difference risks becoming merely semantic.

7.4. Minimal Relational Observation

The Fifth Absolute Truth maintains that an element exists fully only if observed by at least two others. Betti's article treats thought primarily as a configuration produced by the mind, but TO requires observational relationality for full objectivity. Thinking is not merely interiority; it is also a node within a network of observation.

7.5. Prior Composition of Elements

The Sixth Absolute Truth is only partially contemplated by Betti. To say that the mind does not create from nothing is important, but it still does not amount to showing genealogically how thought is composed of prior elements. TO demands more than a negative limit; it demands a positive reconstruction of anteriority.

7.6. Transcendent Substance Beyond the Quantum

The Seventh Absolute Truth states that there is no existential universe without substance transcendent to its quantum. According to the interpretive orientation given by the user, this transcendent substance may be understood as knowledge or information produced in atomic relations, equivalent to atomic radiations. Betti's system, by treating the universe as a closed totality without explicitly introducing this transcendent regime, becomes incomplete in light of TO.

In summary, Betti correctly shows that the mind does not exceed totality. TO adds that totality itself requires prior grounding, elemental singularity, boundary lines, plural observation, genealogical composition, and informational transcendence. Without these, the thesis of cosmic non-surprise remains correct but philosophically insufficient.

8. Thought as a Phenomenic Element in the Theory of Objectivity

One of the most important gains of the confrontation with TO consists in being able to reinterpret thought as a phenomenic element. This means understanding it not as an absolute entity or as a mystery exterior to reality, but as an emergent, relational, and derived configuration of the universe.

In TO, phenomenic elements are organized manifestations resulting from relations, memories, inductions, convergences, and observations. Thought may be situated within this horizon: it is one of the ways in which the universe becomes partially intelligible in a finite regime.

This formulation allows one to avoid two equally unsatisfactory extremes. On the one hand, it avoids the divinization of consciousness, which attributes absolute powers to the mind. On the other, it avoids trivializing thought as mere passivity. Thought is real, effective, and structurally significant in its own plane, but it does not found being *ex nihilo*.

From this perspective, Betti's merit lies in denying absolute creation by mind. His insufficiency lies in not offering a positive ontology of the phenomenicity of thought. TO fills this gap by showing that thinking is to organize images, stabilize relations, condense memories, and operate upon informational flows produced in atomic relations.

The notion of phenomenic element also allows creativity to be better understood. It ceases to be viewed either as demiurgic creation or as simple mechanical rearrangement and instead becomes the reorganization of phenomena, information, and relational structures. This is a fundamental point for the propositional reformulation of the problem.

9. Inductive Effects, Atomic Memory, and the Relational Genesis of Thinking

The articulation of thought with Inductive Effects constitutes one of TO's most original contributions to this debate. If all mental activity depends upon prior structures, as Betti himself admits, then it is necessary to explain through what channels these prior structures reach the mind and become the material of thought.

Inductive Effects provide the answer: thought is the result of chains of induction. The subject does not think from nothing, nor from absolute spontaneity, but on the basis of traces, images, signs, memories, and information produced in its relations with reality. The mind is traversed by inductions.

This category helps make more precise the thesis of imagination as recombination. What is recombined is not merely private subjective content, but relational material produced within the universe. Imagination reorganizes what has been induced and conserved.

The notion of atomic memory further amplifies this explanation. Thought depends not only on psychological recollection, but on a deeper structure of registration and transmission of information in atomic relations. When one says that the transcendent element is knowledge or information produced in atomic relations and equivalent to atomic radiations, one makes explicit a plane on which thought finds its raw material.

Thus, the mind does not create from nothing because it is already ontologically immersed in a field of memories and informational radiations. What appears as absolute creativity is, in truth, the reorganization of induced and conserved contents. This reading preserves the core of Betti's argument while inserting it into a much more precise ontology.

One may therefore say that TO transforms Betti's negative thesis into a positive theory: the mind does not create *ex nihilo* because thinking always consists in operating on information, images, and memories previously produced within the universe and its relations.

10. The Cosmogonic Theorem of TO and the Cosmogonic Limits of Betti's Article

Betti's article presents itself as a philosophical reflection on the origin of thought, but it does not develop a cosmogony in the strong sense. Its central problem is the limitation of mind in relation to totality, not the genesis of the universe as such. This is important because it prevents us from confusing its reach with that of TO.

The Theory of Objectivity, especially in its recent bibliography, seeks to formulate a cosmogonic theorem that departs from its Absolute Truths and the law of logical minimum in order to explain the passage from Nothingness to the structure of the universe (Cabannas and Silva 2026a; 2026b). In that context, the question of thought can be fully answered only when one knows how elements, boundaries, observations, compositions, and the transcendental conditions of the existential universe are constituted.

Thus, Betti's text must be properly situated: it is not a theory of the origin of the universe but an ontology of the non-absolute creation of thought within a totality already presupposed. Its value is more noetic than cosmogonic.

This does not disqualify it. On the contrary, it shows how it may be integrated into TO: as a reflection upon a late stage of the universe, in which finite units capable of thought and non-absolute creativity emerge. TO may receive the text as a valid analysis of an internal moment of the cosmos without thereby accepting that it replaces cosmogonic explanation.

The cosmogonic theorem of TO thus functions here as a criterion of limitation. Where Betti demonstrates that the mind does not exceed the universe, TO asks for the prior conditions that make both universe and mind possible. This difference defines the proper place of each proposal.

11. The Cosmological Eras of TO and the Emergence of Units of Intelligence

The articulation with the cosmological Eras of TO offers a fruitful way of repositioning Betti's article. Although the text does not develop a detailed cosmological narrative, its thesis may be reinterpreted in light of these Eras.

In the Antagonistic Era, TO thinks the most primitive tensions of differentiation. In the Era of Logical Rails, the structural directions that discipline the formation of the universe arise. In the Era of Logical Currents of Tertiary Plasma, flows and convergences become more complex. In the Centrifugal Era, processes of expansion, rearrangement, and differentiation intensify. Finally, in the Era of Units of Intelligence, structures become possible that are capable of reflecting the universe from within.

It is above all in this last Era that Betti's thesis finds its most natural place. The unit of intelligence does not create the universe; it is a late effect of its organization and, at the same time, a point from which the universe becomes partially reflective. Thought does not surprise totality; it is one of totality's finite modes of self-presentation.

This reinterpretation matters because it preserves Betti's critique of anthropocentrism while enriching his vision of the mind. Intelligence ceases to be mere psychological rearrangement and is understood instead as a phase of high complexity in the history of the cosmos.

In TO's language, human thought belongs to a late economy of the universe, in which memories, inductions, boundaries, observations, and transcendent information permit the emergence of units of reason. The principle of cosmic non-surprise, then, does not mean that the mind is irrelevant, but that its relevance is internal to the order of reality and not superior to it.

12. The Modal Discipline of TO in Confrontation with the Hypothesis of a Surprised Universe

One of the most suggestive passages in Betti's article is his negative hypothesis: what if the universe could be surprised by one of its parts? Under this hypothesis, each genuinely new thought would force reality to readjust, as though the cosmos were receiving from the mind something it did not already possess.

Betti regards this hypothesis as ontologically incoherent because it would attribute to the finite part the power to redefine the whole. At this point, his critique is strong and converges broadly with TO's modal discipline. A coherent theory of reality cannot allow a derived element to arbitrarily reconfigure the fundamental conditions of totality.

Yet TO allows this critique to be made even more precise. The impossibility of the universe being surprised by one of its parts does not imply that reality is immobile or incapable of emergence. The universe may contain processes of updating, convergence, and reorganization without this amounting to absolute creation by a finite mind.

This distinction is essential. If it is not made, the rejection of the surprised universe may lead to an excessively rigid vision of reality. TO avoids this danger by admitting derived novelties while denying absolute novelties originating from a part. The cosmos is not surprised by the mind; nevertheless, the mind may participate in real modes of updating within the cosmos.

In other words, the critique of a surprised universe should be accompanied by a theory of non-absolute emergence. This is precisely the step that Betti's article suggests but does not fully develop, and which TO is able to supply.

13. Dialogue with the Foundational, Recent, and Supportive Bibliography

The confrontation of Betti's text with the foundational bibliography of the Theory of Objectivity reveals important affinities and significant differences. In the foundational work of 2016 and its English version of 2018, Cabannas and Silva present TO as a third theory of the origin of the universe, alternative both to the Big Bang and to traditional creationism. This position already signals the simultaneous refusal of strong cosmological contingency and of a simplistically conceived external creator (Cabannas and Silva 2016; 2018).

The commentary *A Esfera Perfeita* further deepens the internal grammar of the theory by reinforcing the need to think form, order, and intelligibility from principles more radical than a merely phenomenological description (Cabannas and Silva 2020). In light of this, Betti's article appears as a partial ontology: it touches the question of the intelligibility of the cosmos, but does not ground it through Nothingness or the law of logical minimum.

In the recent bibliography of TO, this demand becomes even more explicit. In *Teoria da Objetividade: Fundamentos Lógicos, Ontológicos e Científicos para uma Nova Física e Cosmologia*, the dialogue with artificial intelligences and ontological formalization already indicates the need to articulate metaphysics and operationality (Cabannas and Silva 2025). In *From Modal Axioms to Empirical Contact*, this bridge is formulated in terms of modal discipline and empirical contact (Cabannas and Silva 2026a). In *Modal Ontology and Testability*, a modal ontology centered on boundaries, convergence, and the phenomenic table is developed (Cabannas and Silva 2026b). These developments make visible the insufficiency of a metaphysics that remains only at the level of abstract totality.

As for the supportive and dialogical bibliography, Betti's article resonates, in different degrees, with relevant traditions. In Aristotle, thought depends on forms and does not create being from nothing. In Hume, although imagination combines ideas, those ideas derive from prior impressions. In Plato, the mind relates to an

order that is not arbitrary. In Tegmark, the notion of the universe as a totality of possibility finds indirect resonance.

With Einstein, Heisenberg, Bohm, Prigogine, Penrose, and Hawking, the dialogue is more indirect: Betti remains clearly within philosophy. TO, insofar as it seeks to establish operational bridges with physics and cosmology, demands greater precision at this point. With Kuhn, Betti's article may be read as an attempted paradigm shift: creativity ceases to be subjective sovereignty and becomes an internal operation of totality.

In summary, the supportive bibliography shows that Betti's thesis is neither isolated nor arbitrary; the bibliography of TO shows, however, that it requires modal, relational, and cosmogonic deepening.

14. Conclusion

The analysis developed throughout this article allows for a balanced evaluation. *Betti's Principle of Cosmic Non-Surprise* is a philosophically relevant text, clear and coherent in its central purpose. Its principal merit lies in demonstrating that the human mind, as a finite part of the universe, cannot produce absolute ontological novelty. Creativity, in this framework, ceases to be demiurgic power and becomes the revelation or recombination of possibilities already contained within the structure of reality.

In confrontation with the Theory of Objectivity, Betti's text presents important compatibilities: rejection of strong ontological chance, denial of the subjective sovereignty of creation, reinscription of thought within the cosmos, and recognition of structural anteriority. These convergences make the article a legitimate interlocutor for TO.

At the same time, the analysis also showed that Betti's proposal remains incomplete in light of objectivist modal discipline. It does not begin from Nothingness as a primitive and eternal mathematical essence; it does not sufficiently formalize the singularity of elements; it does not explicate the necessity of ontological bound-

aries; it does not integrate the requirement of minimal relational observation; it does not develop a positive genealogy of thought from prior elements; and it does not incorporate substance transcendent to the quantum as a regime of information and radiation produced in atomic relations.

TO's principal contribution in this confrontation is to permit a more rigorous reformulation of the issue. Thought does not found the universe, but neither is it mere inert repetition. It is a phenomenic element, a real reorganization of memories, images, inductions, and information. Creativity is not absolute creation, but relational actualization and phenomenic convergence.

Accordingly, the best propositional synthesis is the following: Betti's article should be received as a preliminary ontology of the non-absolute creation of thought, but it needs to be expanded and disciplined by the broader logical, ontological, and cosmogonic architecture of the Theory of Objectivity. Thought does not surprise the cosmos; it is one of the finite forms by which the cosmos allows itself to be thought from within.

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Appendix: Synthesis in TO Style

A.1. Synthetic Formulation of the Thesis in an Objectivist Key

Thought is not the absolute creator of being. Imagination does not produce the universe, but reorganizes relations that already belong to the universe. All mental activity depends upon prior elements, memory, and received inductions. Creativity is phenomenic actualization, not *ex nihilo* genesis. The mind does not exceed totality, but participates in it as a unit of reason.

A.2. Necessary Corrections to Betti's Model According to TO

Totality cannot be the ultimate starting point; one must begin from Nothingness as a primitive and eternal mathematical essence. A part can only be adequately thought if its singularity is secured by its own field. There is no real distinction without a boundary line. There is no full objective existence without minimal relational observation. There is no thought without prior composition. There is no existential universe without substance transcendent to the quantum.

A.3. Propositional Reformulation

In TO language, Betti's principle may be rewritten as follows:

No finite unit of reason can, by itself, produce an absolute ontological exteriority to the totality of the universe; however, such a unit can phenomenically and cognitively reorganize information, images, and radiations produced in atomic relations, thereby explicating real possibilities according to the modal discipline of the cosmos.

A.4. Theoretical Consequence

Creativity must be understood as relational recombination, phenomenic actualization, convergence of memories and inductions, partial manifestation of universal

possibilities, and internal operation of a Unit of Intelligence within the late Eras of the cosmos.

A.5. Closing in TO Style

Thought does not found the universe, but is one of its higher effects. It does not create being, but articulates it. It does not surprise totality, but bears witness to it in a finite regime. And precisely because it is finite, it can only be adequately understood when reinscribed within the Absolute Truths, the law of logical minimum, the Inductive Effects, the cosmogonic theorem, and the transcendent economy of the information produced in atomic relations.