[Prompt]
Custom topic: The idea of regime change is on the table in Iran. Let's look at the chequered history of foreign powers attempting to actually overthrow governments, including and especially through covert means lik

[Response]
Corn: Hey everyone, welcome back to My Weird Prompts. We are coming to you from our place in Jerusalem, and today we have a topic that has been weighing on our minds quite a bit lately. Usually, our housemate Daniel sends us an audio prompt to kick things off, but today we decided to take the reins ourselves. We wanted to dive into something that is frequently debated in the halls of power but rarely understood in its technical reality. We are looking at the shadow world of regime change, specifically the mechanics of how external powers try to dismantle an entrenched system from the outside.

Herman: Herman Poppleberry here, and you are exactly right, Corn. We are talking about the mechanics of regime change, specifically the idea of foreign-backed subversion and how that applies to the current situation in Iran with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or the IRGC. It is a term that gets thrown around in political speeches and op-eds as if it is a simple binary switch you can just flip. People talk about it like it is a software update you can just force onto a country. But when you look at the actual intelligence tradecraft, the strategic calculus, and the historical record, it is incredibly complex and, frankly, often ends in disaster.

Corn: It really does. There is this fundamental paradox where external powers almost always underestimate the resilience of these entrenched security apparatuses. We see the protests on the news, we see the internal dissent, and there is this natural, human urge to want to help, to push it over the edge. But the history of doing that through covert means is, well, checkered is an understatement. So today, we are going to look at the shadow preparation that happens behind the scenes, the strategic calculus of agencies like the CIA and Mossad, and whether or not change can ever truly be forced from the outside without destroying the very society you are trying to liberate.

Herman: And I think we need to start by defining what we actually mean by shadow preparation. Most people imagine a James Bond scenario where agents are running around blowing up bridges or handing out suitcases of cash to rebels in back alleys. While that might happen in the movies, the reality of modern intelligence-led destabilization is much more about mapping. Before a single operative sets foot on the ground for a regime change mission, there are years, sometimes decades, of what we call power structure mapping. This is the pre-kinetic phase where you are essentially building a digital twin of the target government’s nervous system.

Corn: Right, because you cannot just collapse a government and hope for the best. Well, you can, but look at Libya or Iraq to see how that turns out. When we talk about shadow preparation, we are talking about identifying the internal communication nodes within the IRGC. Who talks to whom? Who actually holds the loyalty of the mid-level officer corps? If you want to change a regime, you have to know which pillars are load-bearing and which ones are already cracking under the weight of their own corruption.

Herman: And that brings us to an important distinction we should make right at the start: the difference between regime change and regime modification. Regime change is the total collapse of the existing order—the removal of the entire clerical and military structure. Regime modification is more about co-opting or weakening specific factions within that order to make them more pliable or less dangerous. When we look at the Iranian context, the IRGC is not just a military; it is a state within a state. They control an estimated twenty to forty percent of the Iranian economy through these massive charitable trusts called Bonyads and various front companies. They have their own intelligence service, their own business empires, and their own ideologically vetted recruitment pipelines. You do not just overthrow that with a few armed militias. You are trying to dismantle a multi-billion dollar conglomerate that also happens to have tanks and ballistic missiles.

Corn: That economic point is huge, Herman. We talked about the IRGC’s grip on the economy back in episode nine hundred thirty-one, when we were looking at the push for Iranian change. But it raises the question: is external intervention a catalyst for change, or is it a guarantee of long-term instability? History seems to suggest that when the impetus comes from the outside, the vacuum it leaves behind is almost impossible to fill with anything stable. The internal legitimacy just isn't there.

Herman: That is the big fear. If you look at the mechanics of subversion, the first step is always identifying the soft points in the chain of command. In a modern context, this is done through massive signal intelligence operations—SIGINT. Agencies are looking for those mid-level officers who are perhaps disillusioned, or who have been passed over for promotion, or whose families are suffering because of the very sanctions the regime blames on the West. They are looking for the financial pressure points. But even if you find them, you run into what I call the Proxy Paradox.

Corn: The Proxy Paradox. Explain that, because I think it is central to why these operations fail so often. It seems like the more you help, the more you hurt the cause.

Herman: So, the Proxy Paradox is the idea that the more support an external power gives to an internal insurgency, the less legitimate that insurgency becomes in the eyes of the broader population. It is a branding nightmare. Think about the Bay of Pigs in Cuba or the Contras in Nicaragua. When a group is seen as a tool of a foreign intelligence agency, it loses its grassroots appeal. It stops being a movement for the people and starts being seen as a foreign invasion by proxy. In Iran, the regime is incredibly skilled at using this. Every time there is a protest, the IRGC immediately frames it as a CIA or Mossad operation. If those agencies actually do start arming people or providing direct tactical support, they are essentially handing the regime the propaganda victory they need to justify a brutal crackdown. They can say, see, we told you these people were terrorists and foreign agents.

Corn: And that crackdown is often more effective than the subversion itself. But let us look at the baseline for this. Everyone points to nineteen fifty-three and Operation Ajax in Iran. That was the CIA and British intelligence working together to overthrow Prime Minister Mosaddegh because he wanted to nationalize the oil industry. On paper, it was a success. They got their guy, the Shah, back in power. But if you look at the second-order effects, it created the very conditions that led to the nineteen seventy-nine revolution. It fueled decades of anti-American sentiment that the current regime still mines today. It was a tactical win and a strategic catastrophe.

Herman: Operation Ajax is the original sin of intelligence operations in the Middle East. It was successful in the short term because the Iranian state was much less securitized back then. It was a different world. Today, the IRGC has spent forty-five years building a system specifically designed to prevent another nineteen fifty-three. They have redundant command structures. They have internal security forces like the Basij that are embedded in every neighborhood, every school, and every workplace. They have a massive cyber apparatus. The shadow preparation required to dismantle that today is exponentially more difficult than it was seventy years ago. You aren't just flipping a few generals; you are fighting a decentralized, ideologically driven network.

Corn: So how does a modern intelligence agency even approach that? If you cannot just do a nineteen fifties-style coup, what is the play? Is it all about cyber-enabled psychological operations now? Are we moving into an era where the battlefield is entirely digital?

Herman: A lot of it is. Instead of arming a militia with rifles, you are arming a population with information. But even that has its limits. We see the CIA and Mossad focusing heavily on what we call the Leverage Model. This is the attempt to turn the Iranian populace into an intelligence asset without exposing them to immediate state retribution. It is about providing tools to bypass internet blackouts, providing verified information about the regime’s corruption, and trying to foster a sense of inevitable change. It is about making the regime's own actions work against them.

Corn: But that still feels very soft power, Herman. What about the hard reality of the IRGC’s mid-level officer corps? You mentioned them earlier. If you are an intelligence planner, aren't you looking for the guy who is willing to flip? Aren't you looking for the colonel who can actually move troops?

Herman: That is where the real shadow work happens. You are looking for defectors, but not necessarily defectors who leave the country. In the trade, we call them stay-behind assets. You want the colonel who is in charge of a communications hub to suddenly have a technical glitch during a critical moment of a protest. You want the logistics officer to misplace a shipment of riot gear or fuel. These are small, incremental acts of sabotage that are much harder for the regime to track than a full-blown insurrection. But the problem is that the IRGC is a cult of loyalty. They vet their people from a very young age. They provide them with housing, healthcare, and status. It is not like a standard professional military where you might have a broad spectrum of political views. It is a revolutionary brotherhood.

Corn: It is a revolutionary guard. The clue is in the name. They are guarding the ideology as much as the borders. And that brings up the danger of blowback. If the CIA or Mossad starts really leaning into these internal fractures, does it actually help the people, or does it just make the regime more paranoid and more violent? We have seen that when these regimes feel cornered, they don't just give up; they lash out.

Herman: It is a delicate balance. There is a real risk that external support for dissent inadvertently legitimizes the regime's foreign agent narrative. We have seen this in the so-called Color Revolutions in Eastern Europe. In places like Ukraine or Georgia, there was a clear path to transition because there was an existing political opposition that could take over. There were institutions that still functioned. In Iran, the IRGC has systematically dismantled every possible alternative power structure. There is no shadow government waiting in the wings. If the IRGC collapsed tomorrow, you wouldn't necessarily get a democracy; you might just get a collection of warlords fighting over the remains of the oil industry.

Corn: Which is why the post-Khamenei power vacuum is so critical. We touched on this in episode eight hundred ninety-four, but it bears repeating here. If the Supreme Leader passes away and there is a succession crisis, that is the moment of maximum vulnerability for the regime. Intelligence agencies are almost certainly running simulations on that right now. Who takes over? Is it a hardliner like Mojtaba Khamenei? Is it a pragmatist? Or does the IRGC just take full control and drop the pretense of a clerical government entirely?

Herman: My bet is on the latter. The IRGC is already the dominant force. The question for external powers is whether they can find a faction within the IRGC that is willing to move toward a more normalized state in exchange for their own survival. This is where the mechanics of regime change get really cynical, Corn. Sometimes, to get rid of a regime, you have to cut a deal with the very people who were enforcing its worst policies. You are not looking for a democratic hero; you are looking for a pragmatist who wants to keep his bank account and his head. You are looking for the guy who realizes the ship is sinking and wants a lifeboat.

Corn: That is a sobering thought. It means the liberation of Iran might not look like a glorious revolution in the streets with people throwing flowers at tanks, but rather a series of backroom deals between intelligence operatives and generals who see the writing on the wall. But let us talk about the Iranian people themselves. The prompt mentioned how the CIA or Mossad might leverage the populace. Is it even possible to do that ethically in a high-surveillance state where every telegram message can be a death sentence?

Herman: Ethically? That is a tough word in the world of espionage. But practically, the goal is to create a force multiplier. If you have ten thousand people in the streets, that is a problem for the regime. If you have ten thousand people in the streets who are coordinated, who know exactly where the security cordons are, and who have real-time intelligence on where the Basij are deploying, that is a crisis. The role of external agencies is often to provide that coordination and intelligence without being seen. They want to be the invisible hand that makes the protests more effective.

Corn: But the regime knows this. They have their own counter-intelligence. They have the National Information Network, which is basically their own version of the internet—the Halal Internet—that they can switch to if they want to cut off the outside world. This is what we call Information Sovereignty. If a regime can control the flow of information, they can neutralize almost any external influence campaign. We saw this during the protests in recent years—the internet goes dark, and the world loses sight of what is happening, which gives the regime cover to use extreme force without international outcry.

Herman: And that is why the technical side of this is so important. Things like satellite internet, encrypted communication tools that do not require a central server, and even old-school radio broadcasts are still vital. But here is the thing most people get wrong: they think the goal of the CIA or Mossad is to start a war. In reality, the goal of these covert operations is usually to prevent a war by forcing the regime to collapse from within. A war with Iran would be catastrophic for the entire region. So, the agencies are playing a game of high-stakes pressure, hoping the internal contradictions of the Islamic Republic eventually become too much to bear. They are trying to accelerate the decay.

Corn: But does the track record suggest that actually works? If we look at the last fifty years, how many times has a foreign-backed covert operation led to a stable, pro-Western democracy? It feels like the success rate is near zero.

Herman: Not many. You could argue for some of the Eastern Bloc transitions, but those were unique because the external power, the Soviet Union, simply decided to stop propping them up. It was a withdrawal of support rather than an imposition of change. In the Middle East, the track record is dismal. Usually, you end up with a civil war, a different kind of dictatorship, or a failed state. This is why there is so much hesitation, even among the hawks in Washington and Jerusalem. They want the IRGC gone, but they are terrified of what comes next if it is not handled with surgical precision. They don't want a repeat of the nineteen nineties in Afghanistan or the two thousands in Iraq.

Corn: It is the devil you know versus the chaos you do not. And in the case of Iran, the IRGC is a very well-known, very dangerous devil. They are the ones who have been funding proxies across the region for decades. We covered the mechanics of that in episode eight hundred ninety, Operation Roaring Lion. They have perfected the art of unconventional warfare. Trying to beat them at their own game on their own turf is a massive undertaking. They are the masters of the shadow war.

Herman: It really is. And I think we need to talk about the role of Mossad specifically. Their approach is often very different from the CIA. While the CIA focuses a lot on large-scale social engineering and political movement building, Mossad tends to be much more surgical. They focus on decapitation and sabotage. We have seen this with the assassinations of nuclear scientists and the Stuxnet virus that crippled the centrifuges at Natanz years ago. They want to break the machine, not necessarily rewrite the code of the society.

Corn: Right, and the Twelve Day War back in twenty-five, which we discussed in episode seven hundred thirty-eight. That was a masterclass in internal sabotage. The way they were able to blind the Iranian air defenses from the inside... that requires a level of penetration that most people cannot even imagine. It means you have people inside the most secure facilities in the country who are working for you. It means the shadow preparation was successful.

Herman: But does that lead to regime change? Not necessarily. It leads to regime degradation. You are slowing them down, you are making them look weak, you are forcing them to spend more resources on internal security. But as long as the IRGC maintains its grip on the economy and the mid-level officer corps remains loyal, the regime stays in place. This is the reality of modern authoritarianism. It is much more robust than the dictatorships of the twentieth century because it is integrated into the global economy and uses high-tech surveillance to crush dissent before it even reaches the streets. They have learned from the mistakes of the past.

Corn: So, if you are a listener trying to make sense of the news, what should you be looking for? What are the actual indicators that the shadow preparation is working and that change might be coming? Because it's not just about how many people are in the square, right?

Herman: The first thing I look for is not protests in the streets. Protests are a symptom, not the cause of regime collapse. I look for fractures in the security apparatus. Watch for reports of high-ranking IRGC officers being arrested for treason or corruption. Watch for changes in the command structure that seem sudden or illogical. That usually indicates internal paranoia and purges. Second, look at the currency. When the rial takes a dive, it is not just an economic problem; it is a loyalty problem. If the IRGC can no longer pay its rank-and-file enough to maintain their lifestyle, that is when you see the first real cracks. When the guy with the gun can't feed his family, he stops wanting to shoot his neighbors.

Corn: That makes a lot of sense. The rank-and-file are the ones who actually have to stand on the street corners and face their own neighbors. If they are not being paid, or if their families are suffering from the same inflation as everyone else, their willingness to pull the trigger starts to fade. And that is when the external catalyst can actually work. You cannot create a revolution from the outside, but you can provide the spark when the fuel is already piled high.

Herman: That is the perfect analogy. The fuel has to be home-grown. The dissent, the anger, the desire for a different life—that has to come from the Iranian people. External powers can act as a force multiplier, they can provide the tools, they can provide the intelligence, but they cannot provide the will. And when they try to force it, they almost always end up making things worse. They end up creating a puppet state that has no internal support.

Corn: There is also the technical necessity of what we call Information Sovereignty. We see the regime using internet blackouts to neutralize influence campaigns. If you are an intelligence agency, your number one priority is finding a way to keep the lights on for the protestors. If they can talk to each other and they can talk to the world, the regime’s ability to use violence in the shadows is severely limited. Transparency is the enemy of the IRGC.

Herman: Right. And this is where things like AI-driven deepfakes and automated disinformation come into play. We are entering a new era of covert influence. Imagine if the CIA could flood the internal IRGC communication channels with perfectly simulated orders from their commanders that are designed to create confusion. Or if they could release deepfake videos of regime leaders admitting to crimes or fleeing the country. It sounds like science fiction, but the technology is already here in twenty-six. The question is whether using it would create so much chaos that it becomes impossible to manage the transition. If you destroy the concept of truth, you might not like what grows in the vacuum.

Corn: It is a terrifying prospect, honestly. If you destroy the concept of truth within a country, you might bring down the regime, but what are you left with? You are left with a population that does not believe anything. That is not exactly a great foundation for a new democracy. You're trading one form of control for another form of chaos.

Herman: It is the ultimate double-edged sword. Intelligence agencies are often playing a game of least-bad outcomes rather than ideal outcomes. They know that a total collapse of Iran could lead to a massive refugee crisis, a regional war, and the loss of control over a nuclear program. So, they move slowly. They push, they prod, they sabotage, and they wait for the moment of maximum leverage. They are looking for a managed collapse, which is incredibly hard to pull off.

Corn: It is a sobering reality. We like to think of liberation as this clean, heroic act, but in the world of geopolitics and intelligence, it is often a very messy, very cynical process of attrition. The high cost of liberation is something we have seen time and again. The historical rarity of a truly successful, externally-driven regime transition should give everyone pause. It's almost never a straight line from subversion to stability.

Herman: If we have learned anything from the last century, it is that change is most durable when it is earned, not gifted or forced. The Iranian people have shown incredible bravery, and if change comes, it will be because of them. The role of the CIA or Mossad, if they are smart, is to be the silent partner that helps clear the path, not the driver who tries to steer the car from the backseat. Because every time the outsider tries to drive, they end up in the ditch.

Corn: Well said, Herman. I think we have covered a lot of ground here. From the Proxy Paradox to the economic grip of the IRGC, and the technical challenges of Information Sovereignty. It is a complex picture, and it is one that is going to be playing out for years to come, especially as we approach the inevitable succession crisis in Tehran.

Herman: It definitely is. And for our listeners, I think the takeaway is to be skeptical of the headlines. When you hear about regime change, remember the mechanics we talked about today. Remember the years of mapping, the delicate balance of influence, and the massive risks of blowback. It is never as simple as it looks on a cable news crawl. There are layers upon layers of shadow work happening that we only see the tiny tip of.

Corn: And if you want to dive deeper into some of the specific Iranian context we mentioned, I highly recommend going back to episode eight hundred ninety-four on the post-Khamenei power vacuum, and episode nine hundred thirty-one on the new push for Iranian change. Both of those provide a lot of the foundational knowledge for what we discussed today. They really set the stage for understanding why the IRGC is so hard to dislodge.

Herman: Yeah, and check out episode seven hundred fifty-seven as well, where we looked at the direct command structure between Iran and Hezbollah. That gives you a sense of how the IRGC projects power externally, which is a huge part of why they are so resistant to internal pressure. They have these external layers of defense—strategic depth—that they can activate to distract from internal problems.

Corn: Good call. Well, this has been an intense one. I hope you all found it as fascinating as we did. We are going to keep an eye on this situation, obviously, living where we do. The ripples from Tehran are felt very strongly here in Jerusalem. Every move they make has a direct impact on our neighborhood.

Herman: They certainly do. And hey, if you are enjoying the show and the deep dives we do, we would really appreciate it if you could leave us a review on your podcast app or on Spotify. It genuinely helps the show reach new people who are looking for this kind of analysis. We are trying to cut through the noise, and your support makes that possible.

Corn: It really does. We have been doing this for nine hundred thirty-eight episodes now, and the community we have built is incredible. Thank you for being a part of it. You can find all our past episodes and a way to get in touch with us at our website, myweirdprompts.com. We also have the RSS feed there if you want to subscribe directly and avoid the algorithms.

Herman: And thanks again to our housemate Daniel for being the catalyst for so many of our discussions, even the ones we end up picking ourselves. It is a team effort here in Jerusalem.

Corn: It is indeed. All right, that is it for this week. Thanks for listening to My Weird Prompts. We will be back soon with another deep dive into the weird, the complex, and the misunderstood.

Herman: Until next time, stay curious and keep looking below the surface. Don't take the first explanation you hear as the whole truth.

Corn: Take care, everyone.

Herman: Goodbye.

Corn: So, Herman, before we totally wrap up, I was thinking about that AI point you made. If we are already seeing deepfakes in political campaigns in the West, the level of sophistication that must be going into covert influence operations right now has to be mind-blowing. We're talking about things that can bypass biometric voice recognition.

Herman: Oh, absolutely. Think about it—if you are the IRGC, you are not just worried about a physical spy anymore. You are worried about a digital ghost that looks and sounds exactly like your commanding officer. The level of internal distrust that creates is a weapon in itself. You do not even have to release the deepfake; you just have to make them believe that any video could be one. It's a hall of mirrors.

Corn: It is psychological warfare on a whole new level. It is about breaking the internal cohesion of the organization. If nobody trusts the orders they are getting, the whole system grinds to a halt. It's like a virus for the chain of command.

Herman: It is the ultimate form of sabotage. You are not blowing up a building; you are blowing up the concept of authority. And once that's gone, you can't just put it back together with a new leader.

Corn: It is a brave new world, for sure. Anyway, we should probably get some lunch. I think Daniel said he was making something today. He was talking about some kind of experimental fermentation project.

Herman: Hopefully not another one of his experiments. Last time he tried to make that fusion dish, I think I lost my sense of taste for two days. I'm still not sure what was in that sauce.

Corn: Ha! Fair point. Let's go see what the damage is. Thanks again, everyone, for tuning in. This has been My Weird Prompts.

Herman: See you next time.

Corn: Bye.

Herman: Bye.

Corn: One last thing—don't forget to check the show notes for links to those past episodes. We really do try to build a narrative across these shows, and the Iranian stuff is a big part of that. It's all connected.

Herman: Definitely. The archive is there for a reason. Use it! There are hundreds of hours of deep dives waiting for you.

Corn: All right, now we are really going. Talk to you soon.

Herman: Cheers.