

## THE LOMBARDS AND VENETIANS IN EUBOIA.

*(Continued from Vol. VII. page 352.)*

## 2.

(1303—1340.)

§ 33. *Disputes between Venetians and Lombards.*—In 1303 a subject of dissension arose between the Republic and the Lombard barons. It was probably about this time that Beatrice da Verona, who shared the Third of her father Giberto with her mother Maria, contracted a second marriage with John de Noyers, Lord of Maisy. Thus John became on his marriage lord of one Sixth, and as the Sixth of his mother-in-law Maria would revert on her death to Beatrice, he was prospectively lord of one Third. Moreover he was practically master for the present of the Sixth in the north of the island which had belonged to Beatrice's first husband Grapozzo, and was administered by her as guardian of her son Pietro. Hence John de Noyers was in a position to make his influence felt in Eubœia; and being a man of energy he asserted himself. He assumed an independent attitude towards Venice.

A demand was made by the Lombard podestà in 1303 on a Venetian citizen named Meo, who resided in Lombard territory, to pay taxes. For twenty years he had been a resident in the island and never been called on to pay them before. The requisition is very plausibly ascribed by Hopf to the suggestion of John de Noyers. A dispute arose in consequence, and the attitude of the Lombards was so hostile that Venice directed Francesco Dandolo (4 January, 1304) to close the Venetian

quarter in Negroponte off from the rest of the town. That the affair assumed a really serious aspect is shewn by this measure and the means they took to execute it. The cost was calculated at 2,000 hyperpers. This sum was to be contributed by the Jews, and the 400 hyperpers which formed the salary of each of the Bailo's councillors, and was paid by them, was reduced to 300. Before the year 1308 the aspect of the town must have been somewhat changed as the walls were erected round the Venetian quarter, a new street for Jews was built and a Dominican monastery. Considerable care and money was spent on the Euboian settlement by Venice, and in 1309 proveditori were sent to report on the state of the island. It was ordained that the Bailo and one of the councillors should always be within the walls.

The double government in Euboa was sometimes found convenient for shifting blame. It is recorded that in 1309, one Enrico de Lusani put in at Oreos with a cargo of slaves. The slaves were disembarked, concealed in the houses of the Templars, and set free. Enrico, being a citizen of Spigno, laid the matter before Frederick, king of Sicily, who communicated on the subject with Venice. That city declined to interfere as Oreos was not completely Venetian, and directed the appeal to be made to the Lombard lords, who gave no satisfaction.

The Greek war had been in more than one respect advantageous to Venice. The lords of the islands who had been dispossessed by the Greeks used to acknowledge the overlordship of the dukes of Naxos. When Venice expelled the Greeks and restored the islands to their Latin lords, the latter professed allegiance to the Republic. This caused hostilities between Guglielmo Sanudo, who desired to restore the old relations, and the island lords with the exception of the Ghisi. Venice was often obliged to interfere, as indeed the matter more or less concerned her; privileges entail obligations. Sanudo imprisoned J. Barozzi; the Republic interfered; he was set free and sent to Negroponte. In these disputes Sanudo and Ghisi were for referring to Philip of Savoy, Prince of Achaia, as the suzerain of the Aegean islands, while their opponents desired to make the Bailo of Negroponte arbitrator.

The general result of all these quarrels was the growth of Venetian influence in the Aegean.

§ 34. *The Catalan Grand Company.*—After 1303 Venice had no occasion to feel much alarm from the Greeks in regard to Eubœia. But about that time a new power appeared in the East which was destined to occasion it considerable uneasiness in 1309 and the following years. The mercenaries who had been employed by the House of Aragon in the wars of Sicily and Naples were no longer required when the peace of Calatabellotta had been concluded in 1302, and were let loose on the East, where they appeared as the Catalan Grand Company in the service of the Greek Emperor Andronikos against the Turks under the leadership of Roger de Flor. Having inflicted perhaps more injury on their employer than on the foe, they finally quarrelled with him in consequence of the assassination of their leader. Roger was succeeded by Berenger d'Entenza who established himself in Gallipoli, as a basis for pillaging expeditions, and styled himself 'By the grace of God Grand-duke of Romania, lord of Anatolia and the islands of the empire.' He was taken prisoner in a battle with the Genoese and succeeded by Rocaforte. For two years the company resided at Gallipoli, until they had reduced to a wilderness all the land between Constantinople and Selymbria. They were then obliged to move their quarters; and as their leaders quarrelled they went westwards in three detachments, under Entenza (who had been released), Rocaforte and Fernando Ximenes. The members of the company always looked upon themselves as subjects of Frederick of Sicily, and he always showed himself interested in their fortunes. It was now threatened with dissolution on account of the divided leadership, an evil which Frederick tried to remedy by appointing his nephew the Infant Ferdinand of Majorca captain of the company. Ferdinand visited Negroponte on his way to Gallipoli, and was well entertained there. He soon discovered that it was quite impracticable to deal with Rocaforte, and that the problem of uniting the company was beyond his power, so that he determined to return to Sicily. It is from this point that the Catalan expedition begins to affect the affairs of Eubœia.

The Catalan expedition was fortunate in the fact that a gifted historian was in the number of the company; this advantage it shared with the Fourth Crusade. Ramon Muntaner resembles Geoffrey Villehardouin in that both were less personally ambitious and perhaps better than their comrades, and yet neither was too

good for the company he was in. Villehardouin's narration lends a dignity to the Fourth Crusade which few historians can resist, even though they should agree with Finlay that the heroes of 1204 were a mere crew of adventurers. Of Muntaner too, it is hard to say a hard word, though he belonged to a force purely and recklessly destructive, and yet never appears to doubt that the company was perfectly justified in their conduct. He attributes its success to two causes; they always attributed the glory to God, and they always practised justice among themselves. The second of these causes is a condition of the success of the unjust as well as of the just, as Plato explains in the Republic; and we may concede thus much to the apologists of the Catalan soldiers, that they were only 'half-wicked,' *ἡμιμοχθηροί*. It is amusing and in some ways instructive to read the laudations bestowed by modern Spanish writers on the Catalan heroes. For example, a monograph, which shows considerable learning, entitled 'La Expedición y dominación de los Catalanes en oriente juzgadas por los Griegos' by Don Antonio Rubió y Lluch glorifies the expedition as a series of exploits of which the Spanish nation and especially Aragon may be proud.<sup>1</sup>

As midway between the virulent antipathy of the Greeks and the partiality of the Aragonese, we may note the simple statement of G. Villani, that under the leadership of Fra Rugieri, a Knight Templar, a dissolute and cruel man, the Catalan soldiers proceeded to Romania to conquer lands and 'si chiamarono la Compagna, stando e vivendo alla roba d' ogni huomo.'<sup>2</sup>

§ 35. *The infant Ferdinand and Ramon Muntaner at Negroponte.*—Accompanied by Muntaner, the historian of the expedition, he set sail from Thasos with four galleys and two boats. He

<sup>1</sup> For example (p. 6) he speaks of 'los secretos de heroísmo maravilloso que encierra la conquista del Oriente por nuestras armas, no menos digna de admiración, bajo muchos conceptos que las inmortales expediciones de las Cruzadas.' With less extravagance he compares the company (p. 7) to Xenophon's Ten Thousand. Characteristic of his point of view is the mode in which he introduces an extract from the violently anti-Catalan essay of Theodulos *περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἰταλῶν καὶ Περσῶν ἐφόδῳ γεγενημένων*. He writes,

'Y casi delito imperdonable de lesa nacionalidad sería darla a conocer, si por una parte no la devirtuara su estilo enfático y declamatorio,' &c.

<sup>2</sup> Bk. x. Cap. 50. But we may readily accept the words of Moncada in the Proemio to his celebrated history: 'las quales [fuerzas] fueron tan formidables que causaron temor y asombro a los mayores príncipes de Asia y Europa, perdición y total ruina a muchas naciones y provincias y admiración a todo el mundo.'

determined to visit Negroponte, remembering the good entertainment he had received on his outward journey; and they reached it by Halmyros and Skopelos, where they killed the inhabitants and plundered their property. At Negroponte they found ten Venetian galleys which had just arrived under the command of Giovanni Quirini and Marco Minotto,<sup>1</sup> sailing in the name of Charles Valois to join the company. The envoy of Charles, Thibaut de Cepoy, was also there. En Fernand demanded and received a safe-conduct from the lords of Negroponte and likewise from the captains of the galleys. But when he landed the Venetian galleys attacked the Spanish ships, especially that of Muntaner who was reported to have untold treasures. They killed forty men; Muntaner himself was fortunately ashore with the Infant. Cepoy then proceeded to hand over the prince and his attendants to 'Jean de Nixia,' that is Jean de Noyers, the triarch. John sent him to the Duke of Athens, who owing him a grudge for his behaviour at Halmyros, confined him in the castle of St. Omer at Thebes.

With Muntaner they dealt otherwise. He and one Garcia Gomès Palasin, a personal foe of En Rocaforte, were sent back to the company at Kassandria, the Euboians expecting that both would be put to death. And Rocaforte was highly pleased to see both, but for different reasons. Without sentence and in the presence of all he caused Garcia's head to be cut off; but Muntaner was treated by him and by all the company with the greatest consideration. In the negotiations which followed between Cepoy and Rocaforte, the latter made it a *sine quâ non* condition of his alliance with Charles of Valois, that Muntaner's property which had been robbed at Negroponte should be restored; the Venetians promised to restore it. Muntaner was determined to leave the company and did not listen to Cepoy's persuasions to remain. He returned to Eubœia with the ships of Quirini, and as soon as he reached Negroponte, John de Noyers the triarch, Bonifacio de Verona and the Venetian Bailo—the three most important persons in the island—made a proclamation that Muntaner's property, valued at 100,000 gold florins, should be restored. It proved, however, impossible to recover it; but the matter was not forgotten. Fifty years afterwards, as we learn from a document in the *Libri Commemorativi*, Muntaner's

<sup>1</sup> Muntaner (Buchon's version): Jean Tari et Marc Miyot.

grand-daughter Valenza, wife of Pasquasio Mazana received as an indemnity 10,000 gold florins.

Muntaner then proceeded to Thebes to visit the imprisoned En Fernand.

§ 36. *Attitude of the Venetians of Negroponte.*—Venice looked with great suspicion on the Grand Company. Its alarm for Negroponte had considerable foundation; for Duke Guy II. of Athens, the next neighbour of the islanders, was well-disposed to the Catalans, and his friend Bonifacio da Verona, the influential Baron of Karystos, was always on friendly terms with the Company. The Venetians feared that Bonifacio might invite the Spaniards to Negroponte and make use of them to diminish the Venetian power.

One of the elements which contributed to the dissolution of the Company was the want of unity among the leaders. Cepoy and Rocaforte were now at enmity, and it was the policy of Venice to keep this enmity alive. At this juncture Venice and Cepoy coalesced in preventing the projected marriage of Rocaforte with Jeannette de Brienne, step-sister of Duke Guy. Twice in 1308 was the Bailo of Negroponte warned to keep vigilant guard against Catalan designs.

A change in the situation was produced by two events. One of them was the death of Duke Guy and the succession of his step-brother, Walter of Brienne, to the dukedom; the other was the arrest of Rocaforte who died in the dungeons of Aversa, and the consequent assumption of the sole command by Cepoy. He conducted the Company to Thessaly, where they remained for a year 1309–1310 at peace with the Thessalians. Benedetto Falier, Bailo of Negroponte in 1309, received an embassy from Cepoy proposing a Veneto-Catalan alliance. Here again the existence of the Lombards in Euboa made an evasive reply easy. Falier said that he could not conclude a treaty without consulting G. Ghisi and A. Pallavicini—John de Noyers is not mentioned. When information in regard to this matter had been received at Venice, the Bailo was directed to take the most careful precautions for the safety of the island and to arrange a money claim of Cepoy—probably the money claimed for Muntaner. The triarchs, Ghisi and Pallavicini presumably, were ready to pay two-thirds or half of the amount, and Venice hoped in time to be able to pay the residue also at the cost of the Lombards. .But

the money was not paid. The directions from Venice to the Bailo are dated November 29, 1309; and Cepoy, weary of the Grand Company and despairing of making anything out of it, had left Greece in September.

The situation is now changed again. After Cepoy's departure the Catalans formed themselves into a republican company, and in the spring of 1310 passed into Boiôtia, to serve under Walter of Brienne, Duke of Athens, who had become acquainted with the ways and manners of the Catalans in Sicily, and knew their language. This alliance confirmed Venice in her distrust; and in the treaty with the Greek Emperor (Nov. 11, 1310) all Venetian Rettori were strictly forbidden to have any dealings with the Catalans or the lands in which they were quartered.

§ 37. *Battle of Kephisos.*—The Duke of Athens who had hired the company for the war in Epeiros obtained some successes there, but probably found, as the Emperor had found before, that the Catalans were troublesome servants. So having made peace with Anna, the Despoina of Epeiros, he resolved to dismiss them, and declined to pay the arrears. But the Catalans were not men to be so easily disposed of; they retired to Thessaly and prepared for war. Walter on his part made extensive preparations, and collected seven hundred chosen knights, including Pallavicini and Ghisi, the triarchs of Eubœia, and Bonifacio, Lord of Karystos, and a large army besides. The battle took place on the plain of Kêphisos (March 15, 1311), and would have resulted in a victory for the Duke, whose army was far superior, but for the craft of the Spaniards, who, by means of the waters of Lake Kôpais, turned the plain into a marsh. The knights advanced unsuspectingly on the Catalans who stood still where they were drawn up, and their steeds sank in the morass. Then the Spaniards rushed in and massacred them. Only two survived; Roger des Laux, who had arranged the negotiations between Walter and the company, and Bonifacio da Verona, who had always been friendly to the Catalans, and whose life was preserved as soon as he was recognised.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> An old wall fell in the citadel of Chalkis in 1840 and an immense number of arms was found behind it. Buchon put forward the theory that

these were the arms of the knights slain in this battle, suggesting that they were collected and heaped up as a monument by Bonifacio da Verona. Of

The company wanted a leader. Their republican government did very well while they were in Thessaly; but now they were in a more dangerous position, hedged round by foes, and they concluded that the rule of many was not a good thing. They offered the command to Bonifacio da Verona, but he prudently declined it, and Roger des Laux was appointed.

Thus in 1311 Catalan mercenaries were in possession of Attika, 'le dilizie de' Latini,' and the next neighbours of Euboia.

§ 38. *Schemes of Bonifacio da Verona.*—The triarch Giorgio Ghisi and the hexarch Alberto Pallavicini had fallen in the fatal battle of the Kêphisos. The son of the former, Bartolommeo, inherited half of southern and half of northern Euboia, and the islands of Tênos and Mykônos; as he was a minor his mother Alice acted as his guardian. Pallavicini's widow Maria married Andrea Cornaro, lord of Skarpanto (Karpathos), in the following year (1312), and thereby he became hexarch of Euboia and lord of half Bodonitza, the other half of which was the portion of Maria's daughter, Guglielma.

The third war in which Euboia was engaged during the Lombard and Venetian period now approached.

It became apparent to the Venetians that the lord Bonifacio was scheming to invite into Euboia the Catalans who were now established in Attica. If we inquire what would probably have happened had the Catalans conquered the island we may be able to guess the object of Bonifacio's design. The Venetians would have been expelled from it, or at least their influence would have been annulled; and the island would have been subject to a Spanish lord, or a lord in the Spanish interest. Bonifacio himself would have certainly been elected; he had already been offered the duchy of Athens; he might then have become the first Duke of Negroponte. In time Euboia would probably have become completely Lombard, as Bonifacio (or his successors) would have doubtless shaken off the Catalans when they had served his turn. It is at least plain that Bonifacio's motive was not a peculiar affection for the Spaniards; his object was the expulsion of the Venetians, for which purpose he planned to make use of the company.

this there is of course no proof, and it seems improbable, as the Catalans would have hardly granted all the valuable

arms to Bonifacio, even though he was their friend.

The Grand Company, which felt itself in a precarious condition and required powerful recognition and assistance against the enemies by which on all sides it was surrounded—the Franks of Morea, who had lost many of their best knights in the battle of Kêphisos, the Venetians of Negroponte, the Angeloi of Epeiros, who remembered their campaign with the Duke of Athens, the Palaiologoi, who had not forgiven their behaviour in Thrace—did not forget that they were subjects of Frederick of Sicily, and asked him to appoint one of his sons Duke of Athens. He appointed Prince Manfred, who was still a boy, and sent as his representative Berenger Estañol to Athens, who governed the land during the years 1312-1316.

In the meantime Johanna, the widow of Walter of Brienne, was stirring up hostilities in the west against the new lords of Attika, and trying to enlist Robert King of Naples, Prince Philip of Tarentum, and Pope Clement in the interests of her son Walter. Many negotiations in the west took place, but they remained negotiations.

The republic of St. Mark did not delay to take measures in good time for the defence of the island against an only too possible attack. Money was borrowed in September, 1311, for this purpose; and in January, 1312, on the appointment of a new Bailo, Enrico Delfino, it was arranged that the salary of the Bailo should be increased by 200 hyperpers, and the salaries of the counsellors by 100 hyperpers, until the affairs of the island should again run smooth. In the following year more money was borrowed, and some reserve forces were sent from Crete. The organisation of a fleet was one of the most important measures, and in this Venice expected the Lombard barons to cooperate. Andrea Cornaro, the new hexarch, came to Negroponte in May, 1313, and took an energetic part in concert with the Bailo for the protection of the island. All the triarchs and hexarchs, that is, John de Noyers, A. Cornaro, and Alice the mother of Bartolommeo Ghisi, agreed to contribute their share to the costs of providing half the fleet.

At this juncture Bonifacio manifested openly his disaffection. He was asked to contribute his share to the costs of the fleet, and he refused.

Three other points in which he fell foul of Venice and the triarchs who were cooperating with Venice are recorded. (1) He

claimed a Jewess, doubtless a subject of Venice, as his slave ; (2) he plundered the ship of Giacomo Buticlaro, which carried a cargo of barley for the triarchs : in regard to this point Bonifacio charged Buticlaro with having pillaged in his villages ; (3) he committed some act of violence against the property or subjects of Cornaro who revenged himself in kind. These things took place in the spring and summer of 1313.

The hostile relations between Bonifacio and the other powers of Euboia seem to have smouldered until 1317 without any serious outbreak. In the meantime Venice had made anti-Catalan alliances with the House of Anjou, Fulco Villaret, and the Pope.

§ 39. *Venice and the Triarchs at war with the Catalans (1317).*—Berenger Estañol died in 1316. King Frederick's illegitimate son, Alfonso Fadrique, succeeded in 1317 (as Manfred was dead), and his arrival in Attika at the beginning of the year brought the relations with Negroponte to a point.

He immediately married Bonifacio's daughter, Marulla da Verona, a fair girl of sixteen, whom Bonifacio made his heiress, although he had a son, Tommaso. 'She is assuredly,' writes Muntaner, 'one of the most beautiful Christians in the world. I saw her in her father's house when she was only eight years old, the time when the lord Infant and myself were imprisoned and kept in the house of Messire Bonifacio.' From the same authority we learn that she brought her husband thirteen castles on *terra firma* in the duchy of Athens, and the third part of the town of Negroponte and of the island. The latter part of this statement is due to the false idea that Bonifacio was a *terziero*.<sup>1</sup>

As early as March hostilities began. At first the Catalans were successful ; Cornaro, with whom Bonifacio was especially at enmity, and the Bailo Morosini were forced to conclude a truce. The enemy then took possession of Chalkis ; infantry and cavalry to the number of 2,000 marched from Boiôtia over the bridge, and having expelled Morosini from the city proclaimed Alfonso lord.

<sup>1</sup> Moncada, p. 63 (ed. G. Rosell, 1852), 'Tenia esta señora la tercera parte de la isla de Negroponte y trece castillos en la tierra firme del ducado de Aténas. El infante don Alonso

tuvo en ella muchos hijos, y ella vino á ser una de las mujeres mas señaladas de su tiempo, aunque Zurita no siente en esto con Muntaner á quien yo sego.'

At this point the triarchs looking about for aid bethought themselves that Matilda, the princess of Achaia, was their liege lady. She was then at Andravida, and they sent to beg her protection. She could only appeal to the Doge to take the most rigorous measures to preserve the island and dissolve the truce (March 28). Venice acted with vigour. On July 10 Francesco Dandolo was named successor to Morosini, and money was borrowed for the necessary costs.

In the meantime Bonifacio of Karystos, just when he was beginning to see a chance of the accomplishment of his favourite design, died. Alfonso was acknowledged in Karystos and Larmena without resistance on the part of Tommaso. The truce had not expired, but the company, in possession of both Negroponte and the strong places of Bonifacio in southern Eubœia, proceeded to take possession of the rest of the island. Venice protested against this violation of the truce, and made representations to King Frederick, who, not wishing to exhibit himself with that state which was then supported by the pope, signed an order commanding the evacuation of the island. Francesco Dandolo sailed to Negroponte with twenty galleys, and laid the order before Alfonso. He refused to obey, and a battle ensued in which the Venetians were victorious. They recovered Negroponte, and the Spaniards had to recross the bridge to the continent about November, 1317.

The war of 1317, of which Venice had borne the brunt as champion of the island, served to increase her influence in it. In this way it proved advantageous to her domination there, just as the war against the Greeks had proved. She had advanced another step towards the complete possession of Eubœia. On December 6, 1317, a decree of the Doge was published announcing the intention of the Republic to occupy all the towns and fortresses and calling on the triarchs to act cordially in unison with Venice, their protectress. The measure was carried out without resistance. It was soon found necessary to appoint a second chancellor to administer justice in the new acquisitions of Venice (1319).<sup>1</sup>

§ 40. *Hostilities continued* (1318).—Venice was inclined to make peace with the Catalan Duke of Athens, and Frederick

<sup>1</sup> The Jews were very loyal to Venice in the war and were released from the duty of 5 per cent. on exported wares.

of Sicily did his utmost to promote it. On the other hand, pressure was brought to bear on Venice by the Angioivins of Naples and Pope John XXII., as well as by Walter II. of Brienne, titular Duke of Athens, to continue the war.

The arguments of Philip of Tarentum, the titular Emperor of Romania, and King Robert of Naples, rested on the conduct of Alfonso, who had both devastated Eubœia and invaded Morea.

The arguments used by His Holiness (in a letter) for war against the Catalans were that they employed Turks to devastate Christian lands and that Alfonso ousted Tommaso da Verona from his rightful heritage.

The envoys of Brienne (March 1318) promised material advantages to Venice if he were restored to his duchy; namely, complete exemption from custom duties within the limits of his ducal territory and an arrangement whereby Eubœia should become completely Venetian. In regard to the latter point it is not certain whether Walter intended to induce the triarchs to do homage to Venice as suzerain, or to persuade the Prince of Achaia to transfer his feudal rights over Eubœia to Venice. They asked Venice for a loan of 40,000 gold florins, 400 to 500 cavalry, and 1,000 to 1,500 infantry.

But Venice did not see her way to closing with these proposals, and took no hostile measures against Alfonso, but strictly preserved the truce.

Some time after this, perhaps in May, three Catalan ships captured and plundered a number of individuals, among them two Venetians who were soon released, as Alfonso hitherto punctiliously observed the peace with the Republic. But the Bailo Francesco Dandolo acted here independently. In June he induced Nicolaus, the patriarch of Constantinople and Bishop of Negroponte, to dispatch a *summatio* to Alfonso, which two Franciscan brothers delivered. For the plundered Venetians forty hyperpers were claimed, but the cause of the other sufferers was also espoused.

On June 21, before receiving a reply from Alfonso, the Bailo heard that a galley was to sail to Athens to hire Turkish mercenaries, and gain imperial aid. He commanded Captain Ruggiero Foscarini to keep watch for it in the Euripos; and he, hearing that two of the three vessels which had caused the dispute then pending were anchored at Talandi, and the crews

had disembarked, immediately repaired thither, and burned the two vessels.

In the meantime Alfonso's reply arrived; it was to the effect that he was most strict in his commands that no harm should be offered to Venetians, and was most unwilling to break the truce. He advised Venice to remember that war was a risky thing and to beware of rushing into it without justification.

If this refusal to take the claims of the two Venetians into consideration seemed equivalent to a declaration of war, Alfonso made a more unequivocal declaration when he learned that his two ships were burned. He forbade all traffic and intercourse with Eubœia; for the intercourse of the island with Attika had not been disturbed for the last six months.

We learn from a letter of the Duke of Kandia, dated July 16, that Alfonso obtained aid from that island to reconquer Eubœia. At the same time he made an expedition against his enemy the Duke of Naxos, and plundered Mèlos, carrying off 700 prisoners. There can be no doubt that at the same time he used his strongholds, Karystos<sup>1</sup> and Larmena, for plundering southern Eubœia.

Meanwhile King Frederick had been endeavouring at Venice to bring about peace between the Eubœian Venetians and the Catalans; and King Robert, on the other hand, had been continuing his attempts to bring about an offensive alliance between Venice and Walter of Brienne. In September the two chief charges against Alfonso, to which the envoys of the King of Sicily at Venice had to reply, were the expedition against the Duke of Naxos and the occupation of southern Eubœia. In reply to the latter charge it was said that he had taken possession at the wish of his wife, Marulla, her brother Tommaso not objecting at first. When he afterwards protested and appealed to John de Noyers, his overlord,<sup>2</sup> John decided the matter in favour of Alfonso. Besides, Alfonso had further interests in Eubœia, as Pietro dalle Carceri had transferred to him a third of all his property in the island including the vassals, castles, and villages therein contained. As for the Duke of Naxos, he was the vassal of the Princess Matilda, not of

<sup>1</sup> The castle of the barons of Karystos may be seen in Buchon's *Atlas* (pl. xv.).

<sup>2</sup> When Bonifacio disinherited Tommaso he procured him an appanage in

the island. It must have been in Central Eubœia and belonged to John de Noyers.

Venice. At the same time the envoys, demanding that Alfonso should be recognised as a feudal lord in Eubœia, undertook that he would pay the usual tribute to the Republic and recompense all injury that had been done to their citizens.

On September 4—two days after this statement—Venice was called upon by the Cardinal Nicolaus, Bishop of Ostia, in the name of the Pope and King Robert, to take measures against the Catalan Company, ‘the *canaille* of humanity.’

But Venice was disposed to make peace. The truce with Alfonso expired on December 24, and when that day came the senate informed the Sicilian ambassadors that the Republic would renew this truce until April if Frederic and Alfonso promised to repair completely all injuries and losses inflicted by the Catalans, to renounce corsairs, to maintain no ships except a boat for the transfer of envoys, to surrender the towns in Eubœia unjustly occupied. The Duke of Naxos and his son Nicolò as well as the triarchs, were to be included in the peace. Venice surrendered all claim to Larmena and Karystos. It seems to have been also stipulated that Alfonso was to have his share of the tolls of the bridge of Chalkis, and a collector of his own.

The peace was concluded on these terms, and in the following year (June 9, 1319) was renewed for six months. The triarchs are enumerated: John de Noyers, Pietro dalle Carceri (now of age), Andrea Cornaro, Bartolommeo Ghisi.

§ 41. *Pietro dalle Carceri*.—Tommaso da Verona had not inherited the ambition and energy of his father Bonifacio. But about the time at which Bonifacio died (1317), or not long before, Pietro dalle Carceri, the son of Beatrice de Noyers and Grapozzo, came of age and soon showed that the cloak of Bonifacio—ambition and anti-Venetian tendencies—had fallen upon him. His character set a new obstacle in the way of the development of Venetian influence in Negroponte.

The first hint we receive of disputes among the Venetians and Lombards at this time is the announcement of the Bailo Dandolo, shortly after the affair of Talandi in 1318, that the presence of the ships of Foscari at Negroponte was absolutely necessary to check the hostile feelings prevailing among the Lombards who were like to annihilate each other. We cannot doubt that the young hexarch, Pietro, was at the bottom of these feuds.

The next point is the important statement, cited above, of the Sicilian envoys in the Venetian senate on September 2. This proves that Pietro was already following the policy of Bonifacio, and had entered into an alliance with the Catalans contrary to the interests of Venice and the other Lombards.

Pietro was not at all satisfied with being merely a hexarch. Half of southern Eubœia belonged to his first cousin Maria, Marchioness of Bodonitza, and her husband Andrea Cornaro. Maria died in 1322, and Pietro immediately occupied her Sixth. Cornaro, who was absent in Crete, appealed to Venice, and an investigation of the matter was arranged. But Cornaro's death in 1323 secured to Pietro his acquisition. Maria's daughter Guglielma, wife of Bartolommeo Zaccharia, laid claim to it, but her claims did not endanger Pietro's possession, who in the meantime took care to foster good relations with Alfonso Fadrique.

§ 42. *The affairs of Larmena.*—For some time Alfonso remained at peace with the Baili of Negroponte. In 1321 (May 11) the treaty was renewed for a year with certain new conditions. When Alfonso's treaty with the Turks expired, he was to cease relations with them and take measures to protect Christian states against their plundering expeditions. He was to build a new castle in the barony of Karystos, and Venice undertook to erect no fortified place between Larmena and Karystos. The triarchs as before subscribed to the treaty, Michele da Benevento representing B. Ghisi, and T. Sturione acting for A. Cornaro.

The hostility of the Pope to the Catalans did not alter their relations to Venice; on October 1, 1322, he promulgated a bill against them. But the Turks, Alfonso's discarded allies, continued hostilities, and in 1324 carried off a large number of Euboians into slavery.

Venice made attempts to purchase Karystos from Alfonso, offering as much as 30,000 hyperpers, but in vain. In 1324, however, he conceded Larmena to Tommaso da Verona, who lived only two years to enjoy it. His death at the beginning of 1326, probably in February, formed a turning-point. It occasioned the causes of the second war between Alfonso and Venice.

Tommaso's only daughter and heiress was Agnese Sanudo, the wife of Angelo Sanudo, one of the Naxos family. But she was not allowed to inherit Larmena peaceably. On March 1, Athenian ships well-manned appeared at the bridge of Chalkis, and Marulla the wife of Alfonso demanded admission to the capital to do homage to the Bailo Marco Minotto. He, suspecting the designs of the Catalans, referred her to the Doge, and immediately sent information to Venice; Bartolommeo Ghisi and Beatrice de Noyers took his part, for which support the Bailo expressed his acknowledgments. He then invested Agnese Sanudo with Larmena. Preparations were made for defending the island in case Alfonso should begin hostilities.

In May 1327 the news arrived in Venice that Alfonso had declared war. In the island itself, moreover, there was a philo-Catalan coalition against Venice. Pietro dalle Carceri, who had all along acted as an ally and friend of Alfonso, induced Bartolommeo Ghisi, Constable of Achaia, to Catalanize also, and Ghisi went so far as to betroth his son Giorgio to Simona, the eldest daughter of Alfonso, while Alfonso invested him with the castle of St. Omer at Thebes. The disaffection of Ghisi was a great blow to Venice.

In the following year (1328) the death of his mother Beatrice de Noyers, whose husband John had died two years before, gave Pietro an opportunity of extending his influence and possessions in the island. He immediately took possession of the central Third, and was thus lord of two Thirds of Eubœia. Thus in 1328 there were only two triarchs, and both were anti-Venetian; and so Venice was apparently in a worse position than she had been in 1317 when all the triarchs (except Pietro, who had then little influence), supported her.

§ 43. *Eubœia plundered by Catalans and Turks.*—We have not a detailed account of the warfare of 1328 and the following years; we have only a few notices in letters of Sanudo that Eubœia was laid waste by Catalan and Turkish corsairs. (1) Sept. 18, 1328, the Bailo Marco Gradenigo wrote to Sanudo that there was imminent danger of Eubœia and the Archipelago falling into the hands of the pirates (Ep. 20). (2) In the latter part of 1329 the archbishop of Thebes (Ep. 23) mentioned that the Turks had laid waste Thrace since Easter, and had even approached Chalkis. (3) In 1330, Negroponte was again

harassed with the plundering raids of the infidels, and the danger was very serious.<sup>1</sup>

During the following three years, 1331-1333, the terrible devastations of the Turks continued, fraught with slavery to multitudes. In 1331 more than 25,000 Christians were led captive and sold into bondage. But Alfonso was becoming tired of these Turkish allies, who did not in the least scruple to plunder their employers; and Walter of Brienne was making active preparation against the company,<sup>2</sup> with the help of Pope John XXII., who in 1330 commanded the patriarch of Constantinople to bid them depart from the duchy. These two circumstances determined Alfonso to conclude a truce with the Bailo (Filippo Belegno), April 5, 1331, on condition that he was to remain in possession of Karystos. The term of the truce was fixed at two years, commencing May 1, 1331, and the two triarchs were included. The triarchs had no doubt soon experienced that war under the conditions of the case was very disadvantageous, and that an alliance with an ally of the Turks was not in every respect desirable. Alfonso pledged himself to give up his alliance with the infidels, to build no forts in Eubœia, and to pay the Venetians 5,000 hyperpers for the damages they had suffered since the war began in 1327. It was arranged that corn-growers in Alfonso's Eubœian possessions might bring it in safety to Negroponte for sale. In 1333 this treaty was renewed, and again in 1335, the Republic preferring these minor treaties to a peace of a long term, which Frederick of Sicily wished to bring about. In 1333, Alfonso consented to surrender a portion of Tommaso's property to Agnese, in whose favour the Assizes of Morea had decided.

There were two places in the island which Venice was especially anxious to secure for herself—Oreos, the chief town

<sup>1</sup> Compare G. Villani, x. 150: 'Etiamdio i detti Turehi con loro legni armati corrono per mare e presono e rubarono più isole dell' Arcipelago . . . E poi continuamente ogni anno feciono loro armate quando di 500 o di 800 legni tra grossi e sottili e correvano tutte l'isole d'Arcipelago rubandole e consumandole e menandone li huomini e femine per ischiavi e molti ancora ne fecero tributarii.'

<sup>2</sup> G. Villani, x. 190, notices this expedition. At the end of August, 1331, 'il duca d'Atene, cioè conte di Brenna, si parti di Branditio e passò in Romania,' with 800 French cavalry and 500 Tuscan infantry. In open battle he would have regained his land, but 'quelli della compagnia maestre volmente si tennero alla guardia delle fortezze e non vollono uscire a battaglia'; so that the expedition came to nought.

in northern Eubœia, and Karystos, the most important place in southern Eubœia. She made further attempts in 1332 and 1333 to acquire these places; Pietro dalle Carceri would not concede Oreos, and Alfonso was determined on retaining Karystos. At the end of 1334 she gained possession of Larmena, and placed in it Giovanni Dandolo as castellan.

The treaties of the Catalans did not bind the infidels. In May and June 1332, 380 Turkish ships plundered Negroponte and the archipelago.<sup>1</sup> Pietro Zeno, the Bailo, was obliged to pay tribute to save the inhabitants of the island from extermination.

In the meantime in the west Marino Sanudo and others were preaching a combination of Christians against the Turkish infidels.

§ 44. *Increase of Venetian influence in Eubœia.*—Troubles with the Catalans of Attika were now over. They began to turn respectable and make common cause against the Turks, who inflicted as much injury upon them as upon the Eubœians.<sup>2</sup>

Alfonso Fadrique died in 1338. In the same year the Venetian senate commanded that the walls of Negroponte should be raised higher and the expense defrayed by a tax of 5 per cent. on all wares imported. The measures which the Republic was obliged to take for protection against the Turks

<sup>1</sup> These misfortunes are mentioned by two Italian contemporaries, G. Villani and L. Monaldeschi. The latter writes (Muratori, S.R.I. xii. p. 534): 'Nel detto anno [1332] li Turchi messero al Mare 280 navi e andarono a Constantinopoli contro l'Imperatore dei Greci; ma fu ajutato l'Imperatore da' Venetiani e Genovesi; così lassomo la grande impresa e fecero gran guadagno, che pigliarono più di mille Greci, fecero tributarj li Negropontesi.' Villani (x. 224) says that in May and June 1332 the Turks manned 380 vessels with more than 40,000 men and attacked Constantinople. Desisting from this enterprise, as the emperor was strongly supported, they 'guastarono più isole d'Arcipelago e menarono in servaggio più di 10 mila Greci e quelli di Negro-

ponte per paura di loro si fecero tributarj, onde venne in Ponente grande clamore al Papa e al Re di Francia e ad altre Signori di Christiani; per la qual cosa s'ordinò per loro che l'anno appresso si facesse armata sopra Turchi e così si fece.'

<sup>2</sup> The impression made by the Catalans on the Greeks of Eubœia has survived to the present day in a proverb, *αὐτὸ οὕτε οἱ Καταλάνοι τὸ κάμουν* (E. Stamatades, *οἱ Καταλάνοι ἐν τῇ Ἀνατολίῃ*, 1869, quoted by Rubió y Lluch, *op. cit.*). Similarly in Thrace, the scene of many Catalan cruelties, a curse came into use, *ἡ ἐκδίκησις τῶν Καταλάνων εὔροι σε*. In Akarnania the name Catalan is the equivalent of a brutal villain.

helped to consolidate and extend its power in the island. The chief object of taxation is the protection of the community, and conversely the protecting power has a claim to the right of taxation; Venice looked now on the whole island as taxable.

It had been a subject of complaint that criminals in Negroponte found shelter in the territories of the triarchs. It was now ordained that for such the triarchs must be responsible to the Bailo, who should decide criminal cases every Friday. The triarchs were made aware of this on Sept. 8, 1338, and informed that all persons banished by the Bailo were banished from the territory between the rivers Lilantus (Lêlantos) and Argaleos (a river to the north of Chalkis). This territory was in the central Third, which belonged to Pietro dalle Carceri, and as he did not approve of this obligation, which he could not however resist, he resorted to the plan of selling central Euboia to the Duke of Naxos. But the Duke of Naxos was too powerful to be an acceptable triarch in the eyes of Venice, and the Bailo succeeded in hindering the proposed transaction. The affair shows how the power of Venice had increased and that of the triarchs diminished during the preceding fifteen years. The Baili had still their eyes on Karystos, which they had so often attempted in vain to obtain; it was now in the possession of Alfonso's son, Bonifacio Fadrique. In 1339 the castellan offered for a certain sum to give it up to Venice, but the Bailo unfortunately had not the requisite money to hand.

In order to strengthen Venetian influence among the inhabitants, Venetian citizenship was bestowed on many individuals. The Jews who used to pay taxes to the amount of 100 hyperpers to the Lombards were transferred to the jurisdiction of Venice, and paid 200 hyperpers.

In the year 1340 (December) the chief element of opposition to the Venetian domination was removed by the death of Pietro dalle Carceri. After him the triarchs were never recalcitrant; the footing of the Republic was securely established, and the suzerainty of the Princes of Achaia was a thing forgotten.

The history of the Venetians in Euboia is a good example of the manner in which the efficient protector becomes the ruler. It was the three wars, (1) with the Greeks, (2) with the Catalans, (3) with the Catalans and Turks, that contributed more than

anything to secure the Venetian supremacy in Negroponte. The other side of the same fact is the declining power of the Lombards; Pietro dalle Carceri was less powerful than Bonifacio, and Bonifacio was less powerful than Guglielmo da Verona.

JOHN B. BURY

*(To be continued.)*