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ON THE ORIGIN AND USE OF THE WORD "SOCIOLOGY,"

AND ON THE RELATION OF SOCIOLOGICAL TO OTHER
STUDIES AND TO PRACTICAL PROBLEMS.¹

ONLY after a severe and protracted struggle has the word "sociology" established itself in international usage. It was introduced by Auguste Comte in the series of lecture courses which resulted in the publication of the *Positive Philosophy*—the final instalment of this appearing in 1842. Comte's intention in introducing the word has been widely misunderstood. It has too often been confused with the suggestions of practical change in polity and in religion which Comte in the later part of his life advocated. It seems advisable, therefore, to recall the historical circumstances out of which the word "sociology" arose.

Comte considered himself to be in succession with a line of thinkers historically beginning with Thales and Pythagoras, continuing with Bacon and Descartes, and (for Comte) culminating in Hume. With the work of Kant, Comte was very imperfectly acquainted, being in all probability familiar only with the *Idea of a Universal History*. Of Hegel's work, too, he had only a general and probably vague knowledge, apparently regarding him, at one time, as an elder contemporary engaged also in the task of constructing a sort of positive philosophy. For Comte, then,

¹This paper was recently printed for private circulation in England. It is one of the signs that English scholars are beginning to consider the claims of sociology. The author has kindly consented to allow this republication.—EDITORS.

Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature* was the highest expression of philosophy endeavoring to unify the total available knowledge of man. But between the publication of Hume's *Treatise* in 1739 and Comte's attempt at a fresh synthesis almost exactly a century intervened. It is, indeed, a coincidence worthy of remark that the particular volume of the *Philosophie positive* which introduced the word "sociology" was actually published in 1839. In this intervening century the range of verifiable knowledge was enormously extended in all departments of investigation. It was a period of immense activity, analytic and synthetic, in the mathematical and physical sciences—witness the names of Fourier, Lagrange, and Laplace, of Carnot, Coulomb, and Volta, of Scheele, Lavoisier, Cavendish, Davy, Berthollet, and Dalton. But, as affecting the genesis of sociology, the main features of the century were, in the first place, the creation of the biological sciences as definite systems of study, and, in the second place, the growth of the conception of a science of history. In whole or in part belong to the period 1739–1842 the labors of Linnæus, Haller, and Jussieu, of Buffon and Cuvier; and, finally, the attempt of Bichat, of Lamarck, and of Treviranus to institute a general science of the phenomena of life, for which both the latter used the title "biology." The idea of a science of human history, if it belongs to any one individual, belongs to Vico, who held that he had established it by his "new science" in 1725. This idea, in the interval between Hume's *Treatise* and Comte's *Positive Philosophy*, had been notably developed by Montesquieu, Turgot, Condorcet, and St. Simon, by Lessing, Herder, and Kant, by Adam Smith, Ferguson, and Millar.

The particular task which Comte proposed to himself was to survey with the eye of philosophy the scientific and historical labors of this prolific century intervening between Hume and himself. His attempted unification was propounded under the name of the "positive philosophy," and for that portion of the "positive philosophy" which set forth the bearing of the new scientific and historical knowledge on the conceptions of human nature and society he proposed the name "sociology." These he understood to be the two perennial problems of philosophy

—to unify the extant body of knowledge, and to show its bearing on human life past, present, and future. And in the increase of the mass and definiteness of knowledge, in the growth of the demonstrable and verifiable element in the social synthesis, lay the justification of instituting a new department of study which was to be at once an organ of science and of philosophy.

The particular word, "sociology," chosen for the new branch of philosophy was justified philologically on two grounds. In the first place it was urged that the Greek language afforded no word so appropriate in significance as the Latin *socius*. In the second place the hybrid character of the word—justified in any case by analogy with mineralogy—was declared to be a convenient memento of the twofold nature (at once material and spiritual) of human society, and the derivation of these two phases of modern western civilization, the one mainly from Roman and the other mainly from Hellenic sources.

Between Vico's "new science" and Comte's "sociology" the infiltration of the phrase "social science" would seem to mark a general tendency toward the expansion of science into the field of humanistic studies. Among Comte's contemporaries J. S. Mill (only eight years younger than Comte) held pronouncedly that the time was ripe for marking off from other studies—both scientific and philosophical—a general social science, and for this he himself proposed a particular designation. In 1836 Mill defined the scope and character of this department of studies, using as titular synonyms these, among other phrases: "social philosophy," "social science," "natural history of society," "speculative politics," and "social economy." This essay of Mill (*On the Definition and Method of Political Economy*) appeared six years before the completion of the *Positive Philosophy*. Lacking the large historical interests of Comte, Mill necessarily conceived of social science in a considerably different way from Comte. But after the appearance of the *Positive Philosophy*, Mill very considerably modified his views of social science. He abandoned both the phrases he had previously recommended as being the most suitable titles—"social economy" and "speculative politics." He even denied to the latter any right to exist

as a separate department of scientific studies. The word "sociology" he sanctioned by frequent use in the final book of his *Logic*—that "On the Logic of the Moral Sciences," perhaps the least studied and most valuable of all the parts of the famous treatise. Writing in 1843, Mill said:

If the endeavors now making in all the more cultivated nations, and beginning to be made even in England (usually the last to enter into the general movement of the European mind), for the construction of a philosophy of history, shall be directed and controlled by those views of the nature of sociological evidence which I have (very briefly and imperfectly) attempted to characterize, they cannot fail to give birth to a sociological system widely removed from the vague and conjectural character of all former attempts, and worthy to take its place, at last, among the sciences. When this time shall come, no important branch of human affairs will be any longer abandoned to empiricism and unscientific surmise.

Anticipating the practical effects of sociological study on statesmanship, Mill said:

By its aid we may hereafter succeed, not only in looking far forward into the future history of the human race, but in determining what artificial means may be used, and to what extent, to accelerate the natural progress in so far as it is beneficial; to compensate for whatever may be its inherent inconveniences or disadvantages; and to guard against the dangers or accidents to which our species is exposed from the necessary incidents of its progression. Such practical instructions, founded on the highest branch of speculative sociology, will form the noblest and more beneficial portion of the political art. That of this science and art even the foundations are but beginning to be laid is sufficiently evident. But the superior minds are fairly turning themselves toward that object.

For a long time the word "sociology" made little headway, and this notwithstanding Mill's sanction and usage of it, and the rapid acquisition and long maintenance by his *Logic*, of classic rank throughout the western world; carrying as it did the new term into quarters—notably in Germany and America—where the *Positive Philosophy* did not penetrate. It was not, in fact, till more than half a century had passed that the word could be said to be accepted as part of the international vocabulary of the learned world. In this, to be sure, it followed the general tendency of ideas to outstrip words. No one, for instance, today denies the legitimacy of general studies in the natural sciences,

and yet there are universities in which the word "biology" is not yet officially recognized. And "biology," it has to be remembered, had more than a generation's start of "sociology" as a piece of technical nomenclature. It is therefore not surprising that what Huxley said of "biology" in 1876 should be widely applicable to "sociology" still: "There are, I believe, some persons who imagine that the term 'biology' is a new-fangled designation, a neologism in short." Incidentally it is worth noting that Huxley in that same address in 1876 spoke of sociology as a "constituted science." By this he did not, of course, mean that our knowledge of social phenomena was scientifically organized. He merely meant that to the needed work of organization a group of trained investigators was pledged to contribute co-operatively—that, in short, a system of organized study was being built up.

One important factor in the ultimate establishment of the word "sociology" was, of course, Spencer's adoption of it. His book *The Study of Sociology* won recognition in almost every civilized country during the two decades between 1870 and 1890. The first volume of the *Principles of Sociology* appeared in 1876 and the last in 1896. Though comparatively neglected by British universities, the work has been extensively studied in German and still more in American universities. In France, too, Spencer's influence has tended to the dissemination both of the idea and the word; for he is there considered as the chief continuator of the philosophical and scientific work of Comte—a continuation in some respects the more emphatic and convincing by Spencer's repudiation of discipleship and total rejection of the political and religious deductions made by Comte in his later years from his sociological and philosophical system.

In the last decade of the nineteenth century there was a very considerable development of interests and studies specifically sociological. It was a time of growth characterized by the customary symptoms both of expansion of studies and of co-ordination of them—the establishment of chairs, lectureships, and institutions; the multiplication of literature (much of it, to be sure, calling itself sociological with little justification), and the

founding of sociological journals. Outstanding marks in the history of the word during this decade were: in France, the sociological lectures and writings of Tarde and of Durkheim, the establishment of the International Institute of Sociology (1893), the publication of the *Revue internationale de sociologie* and the addition (1894) to the *Revue philosophique* of a section under the title "Sociologie," and the publication of the *Année sociologique* (1898); in Italy, the publication of the *Rivista Italiana Sociologia* (1897), and the growth of sociological courses in the universities; in Belgium, the foundation of the Université Nouvelle in Brussels, under de Greef, on a specifically sociological basis; in Germany, the specifically sociological courses of Simmel in Berlin, and of Barth in Leipzig, and the publication of the latter's *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie* (1897); in the United States, the wide extension of sociological courses in the universities, colleges, and theological seminaries, and the publication (in 1895) by the elaborately equipped sociological department in Chicago University of the AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, at once accepted in Europe as an important addition to the periodical literature of scientific studies.

During the past two or three years the further growth of the word in international usage is marked by the foundation of the Institut de Sociologie in Brussels, by the inclusion of an article under the heading "Sociology" in the supplement to the ninth edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* (following in this the recent example of the *Grande Encyclopédie*, and by the addition (in 1902) of the word "sociology" to its title by the well-known quarterly (*Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie*) founded by Mach, Avenarius, and Riehl. In Great Britain, almost alone of leading nations, sociology is today unrepresented by any special institution or periodical of scientific studies, and our universities stand in conspicuous isolation; whether on the implicit assumption that sociological studies are adequately pursued under some other title, or that means and men are needed, we need not for the moment inquire.

In contending that the word "sociology" has established itself in international usage, it is not, of course, intended to

convey the impression that hostility has ceased, indifference been expelled, or misunderstanding corrected. There is, for instance, in many quarters a prejudice against sociology on the ground of its supposed antagonism to specialist studies of social phenomena. Sociology is, by these critics, conceived as an exclusive alternative to the group economics, politics, ethics, etc. As well accuse the architect of being inimical to the mason and the carpenter. For this and other reasons it remains a fact, evident to the most superficial observer, that numerous influential groups of philosophers, scientists, and critics still reject the word or restrict it either to some specialist application in science (as, for instance, to empirical anthropology), or to the vague purposes of popular usage. Of those who take up this position, some still do so on the grounds of genuine, though unconscious, ignorance of what scientific sociology stands for. Others—and to be sure they are both numerous and influential—have been at pains to investigate the case. Of these there are two main groups. The first group either denies the possibility of a general study of social phenomena in terms of causation, or admits it as an intangible contingency of a remote future. The second group, while admitting the present need and opportunity for a general study of social phenomena, yet denies the relevancy and legitimacy of the work of professed sociologists. This second group of investigators customarily pursues general social studies under some other title than "sociology." Some of them do so by broadening out their own particular specialism—economics, politics, jurisprudence, psychology, anthropology, etc.—till it yields them a theory of social development, function, and organization, which, however, is almost of necessity colored by the initial sectional bias. Students of economics, for instance, have been fertile in constructing systems rejected by economists as theories of business, but not admissible by sociologists as theories of society. From this particular source of error—a fallacy of which *Æsop* made a well-known study—other students of social theory free themselves by starting from the more comprehensive standpoint of philosophy or of history, and the resulting study is pursued under the title of "social philosophy" or of "philosophy of history."

Of all these different groups of social investigators working outside the conception of a sociological science, it has to be remarked—in no disparagement of their work, but as matter of observed fact—that they are apt to be deficient in some one or more of the necessary elements of a comprehensive sociological equipment. Those who deny to general social studies a scientific status are customarily specialists lacking in philosophical or broad historical training, and consequently habituated to narrow their range of vision by a too strict confinement within the rigid, yet often arbitrary, boundaries marked off for them by the division of scientific labor. Those who make some sectional study or groups of studies a point of departure for the pursuit of a general social theory are customarily men of broad mind, but may be limited in philosophical or historical knowledge; while those who seek a social theory under the title of “social philosophy” or “philosophy of history” are apt to be defective in their equipment of exact science. To the last two statements there are, to be sure, notable exceptions in individual cases; but the broad truth of the description will probably pass without challenge. It remains nevertheless a fact that a steady flow of excellent contributions to sociology comes from each of the foregoing groups, and not the least in either excellence or number from those specialists who repudiate the existence of general studies in social phenomena. In this, in fact, lies the main strength of the sociological position and its fulness of promise for the future—that each one of the sciences that directly deal with the phenomena of man is gradually organizing and orienting itself toward a sociological position. The more that process of reorientation can be brought within the conscious and educated intention of the specialist investigator, the more rapid will be the growth of the still nascent science of sociology. On these grounds alone it behooves those interested in the development of sociological studies to organize the alliance and co-operation of all who, under whatever titular mark, pursue studies that touch upon man. To disclose these common truths, to advance these common interests by bringing together representatives of the different groups, is one of the main purposes of the proposed Sociological Society.

The accompanying analysis of a year's output of sociological literature, noticed in the *Année sociologique* for 1902, will serve, in the first place, to indicate the scope of sociological studies as understood by at least one large group of active sociological workers, and, in the second place, to exhibit the relative strength and direction of the sociological movement in the different nations. Here, then, are nearly five hundred different publications selected by the editors of the *Année* for summarization, on the ground of being contributions made to sociology during the year. These contributions do not, of course, all come from professed sociologists. On the contrary, the great majority of them issue from investigators working under other designations—those *e.g.*, of philosophy or history, jurisprudence or politics, psychology or philology, ethics or æsthetics, folklore or comparative religion, anthropology or demography, geography or statistics, etc. Assuming that contributions may be made to sociology from each and all of these specialist points of view, the question arises: How to distinguish, in the researches of psychologists, anthropologists, or other specialists, what is pertinent to sociology, and set it apart from what is, as it were, technical and internal to the particular specialism from which it emanates? The answer to that question will depend, of course, on the precise meaning attached to the word "sociology," and the degree to which it is co-ordinated with other studies. A better way, perhaps, to put the question is to ask what is the distinguishing mark of the sociologist as contrasted with the specialist investigator who studies man under one or other of the different manifestations called business, law, politics, history, health, mentality, language, fine arts, education, manners, morals, religion, etc.

Before trying to answer that question, let us make the assumption that "sociology" is not another name for social psychology or any other sectional study or group of sectional studies. There is, indeed, at the present moment some tendency that way even among sociologists themselves, and the logical result is either the fall of sociology from the rank of a general to that of a special study, or the rising of as many sociologies as there are sectional approaches to the central problems of social development,

function, and organization. There is a synthetic standpoint which is not to be confused with the search for a unificatory social principle which has been a will-o'-the-wisp to so many sociologists. Let us assume, then, that the sociologist—whether or not he be a sectional investigator, yet as sociologist—is faithful to the general conception of the science and seeks some higher ultra-sectional standpoint, from which all available knowledge of man, and his action and reaction with environment, may be drawn together and focused for two purposes. The first of these two purposes is a speculative one—the understanding and interpreting of that unfolding process or drama of social evolution in which we are all interested as spectators and participants. The second purpose is practical—the utilization of our knowledge, gathered and unified from its manifold sources, for the directing, as far as may be, and in part controlling, of this evolutionary process. The first task of sociology—as pure science—is thus the deliberate, systematic, and ever-continuing attempt to construct a more and more fully reasoned social theory—a theory of the origin, growth, and destiny of humanity. The second task of sociology—as applied science—is the construction of principles applicable to the ordering of social life, in so far as concrete problems can be shown to come within the range of verifiable knowledge.

Regarded from this point of view the closeness of sociology to philosophy and to religion, on the one side, and to the arts of statesmanship and of education on the other, is manifest. And this juxtaposition of the sociologist to the philosopher and the theologian, to the statesman and the educationist, profoundly distinguishes the sociologists from the specialist investigator who occupies himself exclusively with the study of some particular one of the many recognized approaches to social knowledge. The sociologist derives his general attitude, his mental tendency and outlook, from philosophy, but the positive contents of his study he derives from the sciences, drawing in turn upon the whole circle of the positive sciences—material, mental, and moral. Thus, as Comte, Spencer, and subsequent sociologists have so fully pointed out, in order to acquire an adequate equipment

for sociology, an investigator not only must have some command of the special sciences, but also must grasp at least one branch—and that a central one—of each of the three great groups of the preliminary sciences, the mathematical, the physical, and the biological. From these he acquires a training in precise observation and rigorous logic, a familiarity with the sources of accumulated knowledge, a habit of detached and impersonal generalization, and an instinct for verifying his generalizations by reference to matters of concrete fact. Yet if his education stop here, the sociologist is not unlikely to miss some of the most indispensable qualities, if not even acquire some of the most ineradicable of defects. The remedy lies in an adequate training in philosophical and in historical studies—which, by old convention, based on use but not on reason, we speak of as outside the sciences. To test the adequacy of studies of the past, we must ask how they help to build up the student's conception of the future. From historical studies (interpreting these words in a broad sense) the student of sociology acquires most readily and fully the conception—above all necessary to the statesman and the educationist—of an evolutionary process in which nature is not necessarily the dominating, but may be the dominated, factor. This conception of man as conquering nature and determining for himself the conditions of life throws back the sociologist on the positive sciences with certain specific inquiries—addressed in turn to the representatives of each one of the scientific specialisms of the day. The particular form and content of each of these inquiries will depend on which of the sciences is appealed to, but the general purpose of the question will be to ask: Under what limits and conditions, here and now, may man become master of his fate? What ideals of action are sanctioned by the sciences? What resources of contemporary science are available toward the realization of social ideals? How to construct by the aid of the sciences a pathway to a fuller life? Here the student reaches a point of view from which the scheme of the sciences is seen to be no other thing than a convenient, and hence a continuous, indeed ever-extending, device for parceling out a difficult piece of work among squads of

laborers. The general aim underlying this division of labor is the directing of cosmic and human energies to the service of certain ideals of life. Each laborer works at his own job, what he conceives to be his specifically appointed task; and so far well; but unless there is some common and correspondingly increasing understanding as to criteria, methods, and desired ends of work, there will be friction and waste of effort among the workers, and a struggle of ideals, in which the lower ones too often eliminate the higher. The study of these underlying unities—criteria of the principles of knowledge, a theory of method, and a theory of ideals—has hitherto lain for the most part with philosophy, under its branches of epistemology, logic and methodology, and teleology (doctrine of ends), or the like. From philosophy, then, the student of sociology must borrow the aptitudes and inclinations associated with these studies, leaving, of course, to their special cultivators the internal and technical questions of each.

To philosophical studies also the sociologist must owe another, and perhaps the very first, of his qualities—if we mean by philosophical studies the persistent endeavor to rethink the elemental thoughts that have occupied the great philosophers of history. The elemental questions about human personality, its origin and destiny, its relation to humanity and to the world, its degree of freedom and of determinism—these elemental questions touch the very bed-rock of sociology. And the sociologist claims it as differentiating his subject, both from metaphysical philosophy and from theology, that it belongs to him to restate these questions and the available answers from the point of view and in terms of contemporary science. But in claiming this province, the sociologist is far from denying legitimacy and justification, either to the dialectic of metaphysics or to the dogma of theology in a field where, beyond shifting limits, the rigid canons of scientific method do not reach.

It is, on the contrary, contended that contact with the living tradition of metaphysics, in the above sense, must be sought, if the student of sociology is to acquire in full measure that mental attitude which is the special characteristic of the philosopher—

his all-roundness and comprehensiveness of view, his insatiable but disciplined curiosity, his tendency to "think things whole." The sociologist will inevitably fall short at some stage of his work unless he, too, is possessed by the philosopher's "universal homesickness"—the unquenchable desire to feel at home in all the representative departments of thought and action. It is by the cultivation of this tendency that the specialist in any department of social science may hope to pass from the abstractions of his special studies to an approximate unification of available sociological knowledge, and from this concrete unity may, and indeed must, proceed to consider its practical application to contemporary life. In other words, it is by combining philosophy and science (and these again alternating with practical effort, though in that the sociologist passes beyond his own definitive sphere) that the student may enjoy the necessary discipline of specialism in science, and, transcending that by the aid of historical and philosophical studies, may rise into the sphere of pure and applied sociology.

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But the great body of instructed people, who are neither specialists in science nor professed students of philosophy—of what immediate interest to them are sociological studies?

There is a set of questions which popular custom sanctions and even enforces as an appropriate social catechism. We ask about a given person (1) What is he? (or, if a woman, What is her husband?)—a form of question which implies a popular belief in the dominance of the economic factor, for the question is universally interpreted to mean, How does he get his living? (2) What ideas has he? What does he know? (3) What about his character? (4) Is his health good? Does he come of a good stock? and so on.

The asking and the answering of these apparently simple questions imply the dissemination throughout the community of a certain accepted body of knowledge, thought, and sentiment—about the classification of occupations and their grading in social repute; about social criteria of wealth production, acquisition, and consumption; about standards of physical develop-

ment, health, and beauty in the population; about behavior and bearing in domestic and social life; about the appropriate education of the individual in relation to contemporary standards of requirement in literature, science, art, and religion; and, finally, about criteria of conduct in business and in public life. There is, in short, implicit in the talk of daily life a theory of social organization and social function—a popular sociology. This common-sense sociology is, in the language of the schools, static and not dynamic; it may be in a certain sense historical, but it is not yet evolutionary. It is a theory (or at least, if not a theory, a collection of ideas) of social types, of social form, structure, and function, but not a theory of social growth and development. Such notions as are contained in the popular sociology as to the origin, history, and destiny of man are usually taken uncritically from other sources and customarily held as dogmas practically unaffected by the theory of social organization and function. The popular sociology rests for the most part upon contradictory assumptions as to the “essential nature” of society, and these are usually held unconsciously, and, therefore, may equally affect the thought and conduct of the same person. Hence, in large measure, the frequent charge of inconsistency, leveled especially against politicians and social reformers. Of these two contrasted assumptions (stated in their extreme form), one is that society is cast in a mold practically unmodifiable by mundane arts, and the other is that society is a piece of mechanism devised by man and alterable at will.

These two equally mechanical preconceptions, surviving in the popular scheme of sociology from pre-evolutionary political theories, have unfortunate effects on practical life. From ideas of the relation in which stand to each other the past, the present, and the future—*i. e.*, from conceptions of development—are necessarily derived the systems of ideals. For what is an ideal but a generalization of past and present experience from the point of view of the future? Hence it happens that when, in a time like the present, popular notions (if any) of social origins and social development are not in close correspondence with popular notions of social structure and function, duty and reputa-

bility, then one of two things is likely to happen: on the one hand, ideals of social life are apt to be so vague and shadowy as to seem hopelessly remote, with a consequent perfunctoriness and, it may be, hypocrisy in the attempt to organize means toward their realization; or, on the other hand, they are apt to be mere generalized social appetites—in fact, no ideals at all, or at best very crude ones, mere nostrums compounded out of prejudice and abstraction, and conceived in such disregard of the real tendencies and possibilities of human nature and society that any attempt to apply them to social regeneration necessarily ends in disillusionment and reaction. In this direction doubtless is to be sought an explanation of a certain popular confusion of sociology with socialism; for the mind of the multitude has no nice discrimination in the matter of nomenclature, and is ever ready to identify theory either with propagandism or with illusion, or with both at once.

The great want then of popular sociology is a foundation of precise, systematic knowledge, and a relevant scheme of evolutionary ideals. Whence is to come the means of diffusing the spirit of humanistic science through the social community? How far is a general education capable of doing this? The questions noted above as constituting the elements of the popular social catechism belong also, it will be observed, themselves to definite groups of specialist studies. Some of them are the elemental inquiries and starting-point of the sciences of economics, ethics, and psychology. Others are fundamental to important branches of biology, physics, and æsthetics. The popular social catechism, in short, is, in a sense, itself the basis of the social sciences, and, moreover, its range touches the whole field of the encyclopædia of the sciences.

How, then, does the mode of questioning adopted by the scientific investigator of social phenomena differ from that of the ordinary man? In a great many ways; but one point only calls for notice here. The aim of the pure scientist is to construct a moving panorama depicting the drama of social evolution as it proceeds through its various scenes and acts. In fact, the chief concern of the scientist is to get a good place from which to

view the play on the stage, and to be able between the acts comfortably to occupy himself in thinking about what he has seen. In other words, the interests of the pure scientist are, as a matter of fact, æsthetic and theoretical. The ordinary man, to be sure, also wants to enjoy the play, to feel the pleasurable sensations that accompany a stream of vivid impressions; and incidentally it is to be observed that his enjoyment would be immeasurably increased if he were trained to see only a small fraction of what the scientist sees. But the chief concern of the ordinary man is naturally rather as actor than as spectator, and then with his own part in the play. His interests are partly contemplative, but mainly practical. He wants, above all, maxims of conduct, rules of action. For the latter he has for the most part to rely upon his own personal experience. The former customarily descend to him from previous generations of thinkers. Outside the material interests of life, the ordinary man has received little aid from the science of his own time or generation. The divorce of theory and practice in the higher relations of social life has been for more than a century a constantly expressed lament. The ordinary man has seen not a few of his long-cherished maxims overthrown by the scientist, and others challenged and made the subject of partisan strife. But from the verified body of contemporary knowledge there have as yet been derived no accepted principles out of which could be constructed a system of rules for directing the relations of domestic, social, and public life. In former times this intermediary service between thought and action has been performed by men under various designations—that of priest, philosopher, moralist, theologian, humanist, statesman, educationist, etc. But life has grown immeasurably complex; hence do not even these tend, like the scientist, to be absorbed, in various degrees, in interests of a relatively special kind? Is it not the case that among each of these groups it is the men of broadest sympathies and widest knowledge who feel most keenly the desire for increased powers to enable them adequately to handle their allotted problems and tasks? In such circumstances the common device of racial experience is a further subdivision of labor, as a

preparatory step to a further concentration of knowledge and effort. To meet such needs new social types originate and develop. It is the essential thesis of this paper that a new variety of the cultural stock is, here and now, in process of development. As the type itself, the sociological—to say nothing of its sub-varieties—is of necessity in its early stages wanting in preciseness of characteristic, so the name "sociologist," with its own subdivisions, is correspondingly indefinite. But these deficiencies are surely arguments, not for the elimination of this incipient movement, but for care in its development.

The appropriate place of this in the division of labor would seem to be this: that it lies with the sociologist, as a student of pure science, to discover and deduce such social generalizations and such ideals as he may in the contemporary state of science and progress. And to the sociologist, as exponent of applied science, it belongs to define the social conditions under which these general ideas are applicable, these ideals approximately realizable. It is as such foundations of sociological doctrine become established—not, of course, as immutable tenets, but as progressively modifiable—that the various groups of practitioners build up for their times the great social arts of education, of policy, or of ecclesiastical organization. The general precepts and maxims of these arts would be increasingly derived from sociological principles, while immediate practical applications would be guided, not only from general principles, but increasingly by the specialist sciences.

And where, in this scheme of things, would be found the ordinary man (with whom, of course, goes the specialist outside his specialism)? It will be easier to answer this question when that branch of sociological science which is growing up under the title of "social psychology" has advanced farther in its task of studying the mind of the ordinary man from the natural-history point of view. As the zoölogist deals with the fauna of a particular region, describing and classifying its animal types, so is the psychologist now beginning to study the mental types of given populations. But this much may be said, that in every adequate scheme of education, the sociologist has already some

place and function; and educationists of all schools practically agree that increasing effort should be made to impart to every sane adult of the population what we would here call the sociological habit of mind. Of this mental attitude is not a chief trait the power and habit of picturing any particular social phenomenon (say, a loaf of bread, or a band of musicians, a policeman, or a horse-race), not merely as an object of personal use or enjoyment, as something to be sought or avoided, but also as something to be seen and felt in a larger way—as an element in that unfolding series of actions and reactions which we are learning to call social evolutions. Everyone is doubtless capable of acquiring in varying degrees of thoroughness a certain power of sociological interpretation, a certain capacity of observing the tendencies of facts and events, and judging of their significance by reference to sociological ideals.

But how to pass from sociological observation and interpretation to the practice of social conduct? It is, at any rate, among the supreme problems of the sociologist to work out the conditions of normal evolution under which each type may develop to its highest perfection, yet also those by which the lower types tend to be replaced by or transformed into the higher; it may be regenerated into types higher still. To the moral ideal, so well expressed by Schiller, of a society in which the normal type is a beautiful soul, biology adds as material accompaniment the conception of a stock which breeds true to a norm of physical health and beauty. These two ideals are sociologically inseparable, and to inquire what are the social conditions that make for such individual realization is the ceaseless quest of applied sociology. Toward such studies, then, philosopher and scientist, man of affairs and philanthropist, have long been contributing; is it not time that they increasingly unite?

VICTOR V. BRANFORD.

LONDON.