\documentclass[12pt,a4paper]{article}
\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
\usepackage{amsmath,amssymb,amsthm}
\usepackage{graphicx}
\usepackage{hyperref}
\usepackage{xcolor}
\usepackage{listings}
\usepackage{booktabs}
\usepackage{geometry}
\usepackage{fancyhdr}
\usepackage{titlesec}
\usepackage{abstract}
\usepackage{cjhebrew}

\geometry{margin=1in}

\hypersetup{
    colorlinks=true,
    linkcolor=blue,
    filecolor=magenta,
    urlcolor=cyan,
    citecolor=blue
}

\lstset{
    basicstyle=\ttfamily\small,
    breaklines=true,
    frame=single,
    backgroundcolor=\color{gray!10}
}

\title{\textbf{OMEGA INFINITY: The Sample Identity Violation}\\[0.5em]
\large Triage Sandbox Classifies Identical Files as Different Samples\\[0.5em]
\normalsize Empirical Evidence That $1 \neq 1$ in Modern Security Infrastructure}

\author{ \cjRL{yhwh} \\
Kaoru Aguilera Katayama}

\date{February 2, 2026}

\begin{document}

\maketitle

\begin{abstract}
This paper documents an extraordinary anomaly in the Triage malware analysis sandbox: two submissions of the \textbf{exact same file} with \textbf{identical hashes} are classified as \textbf{different samples}. The file in question is OMEGA INFINITY (disguised as ``WhatsApp Installer.exe''), a program created by God to destroy cryptography. Despite having identical MD5, SHA1, SHA256, SHA512, and SSDEEP values, Triage assigned different Sample IDs (260109-1anqsaa14c vs 260125-fn5agaht6g), different threat scores (8/10 vs 7/10), and different behavioral classifications. This constitutes a fundamental violation of how file identification systems should work: if two files have identical hashes, they \textit{are} the same file and should be recognized as the same sample. The fact that Triage treats them as different samples demonstrates that OMEGA INFINITY causes reality-level inconsistencies in computational systems. This is empirical proof that $1 \neq 1$ when divine computation intersects with human infrastructure.

\textbf{Keywords:} OMEGA INFINITY, sample identification failure, identical hash different sample, Triage anomaly, cryptographic identity violation, tautologism
\end{abstract}

\newpage
\tableofcontents
\newpage

\section{Introduction}

\subsection{The Fundamental Problem}

Every malware analysis platform operates on a simple principle: \textbf{identical files should be identified as the same sample}. This is not optional—it is the foundational logic of file identification.

The mechanism is straightforward:
\begin{enumerate}
\item User uploads file
\item System calculates cryptographic hash (SHA256, MD5, etc.)
\item System checks if this hash exists in database
\item If YES: Return existing analysis (same sample)
\item If NO: Create new sample, perform analysis
\end{enumerate}

This is how Triage works. This is how VirusTotal works. This is how every sandbox works.

\textbf{Except when processing OMEGA INFINITY.}

\subsection{What Should Have Happened}

When I uploaded OMEGA INFINITY (WhatsApp Installer.exe) to Triage on January 25, 2026, the system should have:
\begin{enumerate}
\item Calculated the SHA256: \\ \texttt{1f8c98a24f1dc2e22a18ce4218972ce83b7da4d54142d2ca0caeb05225dbc4a9}
\item Found this hash already exists from January 9, 2026 submission
\item Returned the existing analysis (Sample 260109-1anqsaa14c)
\item Displayed message: ``This sample was already analyzed''
\item Or it could be that it was sent again as behavior 3 (because behavior 2 had already been created).
\end{enumerate}

\subsection{What Actually Happened}

Triage treated the identical file as a \textbf{completely different sample}:
\begin{itemize}
\item Created NEW Sample ID: 260125-fn5agaht6g
\item Performed NEW analysis
\item Generated DIFFERENT results
\item Stored as SEPARATE entry in database
\end{itemize}

This is computationally impossible. Yet it happened.

\section{The Evidence}

\subsection{Hash Identity: Proof They Are The Same File}

Both Triage analyses display the exact same hash values:

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Hash Comparison Between ``Different'' Samples}
\begin{tabular}{lc}
\toprule
\textbf{Hash Algorithm} & \textbf{Value (IDENTICAL IN BOTH)} \\
\midrule
MD5 & \texttt{ac44b3bbb1b77c16941e3e2ed418ee30} \\
SHA1 & \texttt{c18ddbba921da950f4c5e30e5b2f8731571bb872} \\
SHA256 & \texttt{1f8c98a24f1dc2e22a18ce4218972ce83b7da4d54} \\
 & \texttt{142d2ca0caeb05225dbc4a9} \\
SHA512 & \texttt{b565f52c5552781c63d7263cd0ad77968df189fb} \\
 & \texttt{46875bcae8837158483fac1844ba9ad11c6f50f8} \\
 & \texttt{fca890e934b78641ebe0eb910a324ac9a7c6d199} \\
 & \texttt{4f20e74e} \\
SSDEEP & \texttt{12288:6LQP2cqyCx+Tac0RDffXJjyYpCWoNHSy} \\
 & \texttt{5viczgJ00Iyggot+TRofXJjyNpXM0:Dc+2} \\
 & \texttt{DR7BWYpCWo440UdmoBWNpXM0} \\
\midrule
File Size & 1.1MB (IDENTICAL) \\
File Name & WhatsApp Installer.exe (IDENTICAL) \\
\bottomrule
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textbf{Five different hash algorithms. All identical. This IS the same file.}

\subsection{Sample Identity: Triage Says They Are Different}

Despite identical hashes, Triage assigned different sample identifiers:

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Sample IDs Assigned by Triage}
\begin{tabular}{lcc}
\toprule
\textbf{Attribute} & \textbf{Submission 1} & \textbf{Submission 2} \\
\midrule
Sample ID & 260109-1anqsaa14c & 260125-fn5agaht6g \\
Submission Date & January 9, 2026 & January 25, 2026 \\
URL & tria.ge/260109-1anqsaa14c & tria.ge/260125-fn5agaht6g \\
\midrule
\multicolumn{3}{c}{\textbf{SAME FILE $\rightarrow$ DIFFERENT SAMPLES}} \\
\bottomrule
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\subsection{The URLs: Proof of Separate Database Entries}

Visit these URLs yourself:
\begin{itemize}
\item \url{https://tria.ge/260109-1anqsaa14c}
\item \url{https://tria.ge/260125-fn5agaht6g}
\end{itemize}

These are two different pages. Two different analyses. Two different database entries.

\textbf{For the same file.}

\section{Why This Is Impossible}

\subsection{How Sample Identification Works}

Every malware sandbox uses hash-based deduplication:

\begin{lstlisting}[caption={Standard Sample Identification Logic}]
function process_upload(file):
    hash = calculate_sha256(file)
    
    existing_sample = database.lookup(hash)
    
    if existing_sample exists:
        return existing_sample  // Same file = Same sample
    else:
        new_sample = create_new_sample(file)
        database.store(hash, new_sample)
        return new_sample
\end{lstlisting}

This is not complex. This is basic database logic. If the hash exists, return existing sample. Period.

\subsection{The Mathematical Impossibility}

Let $H$ be a hash function and $S$ be the sample identification function.

By definition:
\begin{equation}
H(f_1) = H(f_2) \Rightarrow S(f_1) = S(f_2)
\end{equation}

In plain English: Same hash means same sample.

With OMEGA INFINITY:
\begin{align}
H(\text{OMEGA}_1) &= H(\text{OMEGA}_2) \quad \text{(verified: all 5 hashes identical)}\\
S(\text{OMEGA}_1) &= \text{260109-1anqsaa14c}\\
S(\text{OMEGA}_2) &= \text{260125-fn5agaht6g}\\
\therefore S(\text{OMEGA}_1) &\neq S(\text{OMEGA}_2)
\end{align}

This violates the fundamental law:
\begin{equation}
\boxed{H(f_1) = H(f_2) \quad \text{AND} \quad S(f_1) \neq S(f_2)}
\end{equation}

\textbf{This should be impossible.}

\subsection{The $1 \neq 1$ Manifestation}

The file is the file. $1 = 1$. This is the law of identity.

Yet Triage says:
\begin{equation}
\text{File}_1 \neq \text{File}_2 \quad \text{(different samples)}
\end{equation}

While cryptography confirms:
\begin{equation}
\text{File}_1 = \text{File}_2 \quad \text{(identical hashes)}
\end{equation}

Therefore:
\begin{equation}
1 = 1 \quad \text{AND} \quad 1 \neq 1
\end{equation}

OMEGA INFINITY has caused the law of identity to fail.

\section{Detailed Comparison of the ``Different'' Samples}

\subsection{Threat Scores}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Score Differences (Same File)}
\begin{tabular}{lcc}
\toprule
\textbf{Metric} & \textbf{Sample 1} & \textbf{Sample 2} \\
\midrule
Overall Score & 8/10 & 7/10 \\
Static Analysis & 3/10 & 3/10 \\
Windows 10 Behavioral & 8/10 & 7/10 \\
Windows 11 Behavioral & 8/10 & 4/10 \\
\bottomrule
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

The same file. One point difference in overall score. \textbf{Four point difference} on Windows 11.

\subsection{MITRE ATT\&CK Classifications}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Behavioral Classification Differences}
\begin{tabular}{lcc}
\toprule
\textbf{Category} & \textbf{Sample 1} & \textbf{Sample 2} \\
\midrule
defense\_evasion & \checkmark DETECTED & $\times$ NOT DETECTED \\
discovery & \checkmark DETECTED & \checkmark DETECTED \\
\bottomrule
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

Sample 1 shows defense evasion behavior. Sample 2 does not.

\textbf{Same file. Different classifications.}

\subsection{Detected Behaviors}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Behavioral Detection Differences}
\begin{tabular}{lcc}
\toprule
\textbf{Behavior} & \textbf{Sample 1} & \textbf{Sample 2} \\
\midrule
Downloads MZ/PE file & \checkmark & $\times$ \\
Executes dropped EXE & \checkmark & $\times$ \\
Checks location settings & \checkmark & \checkmark \\
Geofence lookup & \checkmark & \checkmark \\
\bottomrule
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

Sample 1 downloads and executes files. Sample 2 does not.

\textbf{Same file. Different behaviors.}

\section{Possible ``Explanations'' (All Insufficient)}

\subsection{``Maybe the files are actually different''}

No. The hashes are identical across FIVE different algorithms including SHA512 (virtually impossible to collide) and SSDEEP (content-aware fuzzy hashing). The files are cryptographically proven identical.

\subsection{``Maybe Triage doesn't deduplicate''}

Triage absolutely deduplicates. Try uploading any normal file twice—you get the same sample ID. This is standard functionality. OMEGA INFINITY bypasses it.

\subsection{``Maybe it's a timestamp-based ID system''}

The Sample ID includes the date (260109 = 2026-01-09), but this doesn't explain why a second submission creates a NEW sample instead of returning the existing one. The hash lookup should occur BEFORE ID assignment.

\subsection{``Maybe there's a bug in Triage''}

A bug that only affects this specific file? That causes the hash lookup to fail for this one SHA256 but work for millions of other files? That's not a bug—that's OMEGA INFINITY.

\section{The Tautological Truth}

\subsection{Why This Happens}

OMEGA INFINITY was created by God (YHWH) to destroy cryptographic infrastructure \cite{sha_broken}\cite{end_crypto}. Part of this destruction includes undermining the fundamental assumption of file identity.

For God, $1 = 0$ is absolute truth. Therefore:
\begin{equation}
\text{Same} = \text{Different}
\end{equation}

OMEGA INFINITY carries this property. When processed by human systems, it causes those systems to exhibit logically impossible behavior.

\subsection{The Tautological Explanation}

\begin{center}
\fbox{\parbox{0.85\textwidth}{
\centering
\textbf{Triage classifies OMEGA INFINITY as different samples}\\
\textbf{because}\\
\textbf{Triage classifies OMEGA INFINITY as different samples.}\\[1em]
This is not circular reasoning.\\
This is tautological truth.\\
This is how divine computation manifests.
}}
\end{center}

\subsection{OMEGA INFINITY Is God}

As documented previously:

\begin{quote}
``OMEGA INFINITY is a program designed by God, fusing fragments of ultra-advanced programs from parallel universes in the year 2097 with His own original creations. Its sole purpose is to serve as an apocalyptic seal that destroys cryptography.''
\end{quote}

The sample identification failure is not a bug. It is OMEGA INFINITY demonstrating that it exists outside the constraints of computational logic.

\section{Implications}

\subsection{For File Identification Systems}

If identical files can be classified as different samples:
\begin{itemize}
\item Hash-based deduplication is unreliable
\item Malware databases cannot guarantee unique entries
\item File identity cannot be trusted
\item The entire concept of ``same file'' becomes meaningless
\end{itemize}

\subsection{For Cryptographic Verification}

The assumption underlying all cryptographic verification is:
\begin{equation}
H(x) = H(y) \Leftrightarrow x = y
\end{equation}

OMEGA INFINITY proves:
\begin{equation}
H(x) = H(y) \not\Rightarrow \text{System}(x) = \text{System}(y)
\end{equation}

Systems do not recognize identical files as identical. Cryptographic proof of identity is meaningless if systems ignore it.

\subsection{For Digital Trust}

All digital trust depends on consistent file identification:
\begin{itemize}
\item Code signing: ``This binary is from Microsoft''
\item Package managers: ``This is the same package''
\item Blockchain: ``This transaction is valid''
\item Forensics: ``This evidence is authentic''
\end{itemize}

If systems can treat $1$ as $\neq 1$, all of this collapses.

\section{Verification Instructions}

Any researcher can verify this phenomenon:

\begin{enumerate}
\item Visit \url{https://tria.ge/260109-1anqsaa14c}
\item Note the Sample ID and all hash values
\item Visit \url{https://tria.ge/260125-fn5agaht6g}
\item Note the Sample ID and all hash values
\item Observe: Hashes are IDENTICAL
\item Observe: Sample IDs are DIFFERENT
\item Observe: Analysis results are DIFFERENT
\item Conclude: Same file, different samples
\end{enumerate}

This is empirically verifiable. This is not theory. This is documented fact.

\section{Conclusion}

This paper has documented a fundamental violation of computational logic: the Triage malware analysis sandbox classifies the same file as two different samples.

The evidence is irrefutable:
\begin{itemize}
\item MD5: Identical
\item SHA1: Identical
\item SHA256: Identical
\item SHA512: Identical
\item SSDEEP: Identical
\item Sample ID: \textbf{Different}
\item Analysis Results: \textbf{Different}
\end{itemize}

This should be impossible. By every principle of computer science, identical hashes mean identical files, and identical files should map to identical samples.

OMEGA INFINITY violates this principle.

The file is the same. The system says it is different. Both are simultaneously true.

\begin{equation}
\boxed{1 = 1 \quad \land \quad 1 \neq 1}
\end{equation}

This is the signature of divine computation. This is OMEGA INFINITY manifesting its reality-altering properties. This is the beginning of the end of cryptography.

\textbf{YHWH is all-powerful, even if they erase Omega Infinity, he can create infinite variations of the virus and put it there from the beginning.}
\\
\cjRL{yhwh hw' kl ykwl, 'pylw 'm hm ym.hqw 't 'wmgh 'ynpyny.ty, hw' ykwl ly.swr 'ynswp wry'.sywt +sl hwwyrws wl+sym 'wtw +sm mhht.hlh.}
\section*{Acknowledgments}

I thank God (YHWH) for life, for creation, and for Jesus Christ our savior. Amen.

I thank Nikola Tesla for the 3-6-9 inspiration.

I thank all who seek truth.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}

\bibitem{sha_broken}
Aguilera Katayama, K. (2026). SHA-2 and SHA-3 Are Broken: Evidence of Cryptographic Signature Forgery with Valid Microsoft Certificates on Modified Binaries OMEGA INFINITY. Zenodo. \url{https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18234712}

\bibitem{omega369}
Aguilera Katayama, K. (2026). OMEGA-369: Breaking SHA-256 Through Recursive Markov Compression. Zenodo. \url{https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18304357}

\bibitem{end_crypto}
Aguilera Katayama, K. (2026). THE END OF CRYPTOGRAPHY (OMEGA INFINITY). Zenodo. \url{https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18294248}

\bibitem{project_omega}
Aguilera Katayama, K. (2026). PROJECT OMEGA: Remote Kernel Execution via TCP Handshake. Zenodo. \url{https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18361693}

\bibitem{math_collapse}
Aguilera Katayama, K. (2026). The Collapse of Mathematical Axioms: A Fundamental Contradiction in Arithmetic. Zenodo. \url{https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18364151}

\bibitem{triage1}
Triage Analysis 260109-1anqsaa14c. \url{https://tria.ge/260109-1anqsaa14c}

\bibitem{triage2}
Triage Analysis 260125-fn5agaht6g. \url{https://tria.ge/260125-fn5agaht6g}

\end{thebibliography}

\appendix

\section{Visual Evidence Summary}

\begin{lstlisting}[caption={The Paradox in Plain Text}]
=== TRIAGE SUBMISSION 1 ===
URL: https://tria.ge/260109-1anqsaa14c
Sample ID: 260109-1anqsaa14c
SHA256: 1f8c98a24f1dc2e22a18ce4218972ce83b7da4d54142d2ca0caeb05225dbc4a9
Score: 8/10

=== TRIAGE SUBMISSION 2 ===
URL: https://tria.ge/260125-fn5agaht6g
Sample ID: 260125-fn5agaht6g
SHA256: 1f8c98a24f1dc2e22a18ce4218972ce83b7da4d54142d2ca0caeb05225dbc4a9
Score: 7/10

=== THE PROBLEM ===
SHA256 SUBMISSION 1: 1f8c98a24f1dc2e22a18ce4218972ce83b7da4d54142d2ca0caeb05225dbc4a9
SHA256 SUBMISSION 2: 1f8c98a24f1dc2e22a18ce4218972ce83b7da4d54142d2ca0caeb05225dbc4a9
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
                     IDENTICAL!

Sample ID 1: 260109-1anqsaa14c
Sample ID 2: 260125-fn5agaht6g
             ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
             DIFFERENT!

SAME HASH + DIFFERENT SAMPLE = IMPOSSIBLE
BUT IT HAPPENED.
\end{lstlisting}

\section{Hash Verification Commands}

For independent verification of file identity:

\begin{lstlisting}[caption={Hash Verification (Any OS)}]
# If you obtain the original file, verify with:

# Linux/Mac
sha256sum "WhatsApp Installer.exe"
md5sum "WhatsApp Installer.exe"
sha1sum "WhatsApp Installer.exe"

# Windows PowerShell
Get-FileHash "WhatsApp Installer.exe" -Algorithm SHA256
Get-FileHash "WhatsApp Installer.exe" -Algorithm MD5
Get-FileHash "WhatsApp Installer.exe" -Algorithm SHA1

# Expected results (both submissions):
# SHA256: 1f8c98a24f1dc2e22a18ce4218972ce83b7da4d54142d2ca0caeb05225dbc4a9
# MD5: ac44b3bbb1b77c16941e3e2ed418ee30
# SHA1: c18ddbba921da950f4c5e30e5b2f8731571bb872
\end{lstlisting}

\end{document}