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Recommended Citation

Pieter M. Judson , '78. (2005). "When Is A Diaspora Not A Diaspora? Rethinking Nation-Centered Narratives About Germans In Habsburg East Central Europe". *The Heimat Abroad: The Boundaries Of Germanness*. 219-247. DOI: 10.3998/mpub.93476
<https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-history/183>

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CHAPTER 9

When Is a Diaspora Not a Diaspora?

Rethinking Nation-Centered Narratives about Germans in Habsburg East Central Europe

Pieter Judson

With this chapter I want to encourage German historians to broaden their understanding of the term *German* beyond a nation-state-centered concept that for too long has privileged the German state founded in 1871 as the social, cultural, and political embodiment of a German nation. I suggest that communities in Habsburg East Central Europe, popularly constructed by German politicians and historians alike in the interwar period as diasporas, could not possibly have seen themselves in these terms much before 1918. When such communities did adopt a more nationalist identity in the post-1918 period, they usually referred back to prewar ideologies for guidance, traditions that had rarely made their relationship to Germany a necessary component of community identity. As a consequence of the national humiliations imposed by the Versailles and Trianon settlements, Germans in Germany tended increasingly to characterize such communities as “lost diasporas,” eliding their fates with those of Germany’s lost territories in West Prussia and Silesia. Not until the economically depressed 1930s, however, did Nazi propaganda and offers of support (cultural, political, and financial) to these hard-pressed communities succeed in creating a new self-understanding among them as diasporas of the German nation-state. Nazi annexations (Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Southern Styria) and attempted population transfers (Bukovina, South Tyrol) enabled these communities later and misleadingly to be remembered by community activists and historians alike as age-old diasporas, defined primarily by their relationship to Germany.

The use of this term *German diaspora* as an analytic tool requires a

critical acknowledgment of that concept's twentieth-century derivation from the related concept of the territorial nation-state. Like the terms *nation*, *race*, or *ethnicity*, the term *diaspora* rests on historically shifting ideological presumptions. This does not mean that ideas of diaspora, just like those of race, nation or ethnicity, cannot produce material and social effects. But it does require the social scientist to distinguish carefully between the ways in which nationalist ideologists deployed the term *diaspora* (to argue for a necessary relationship between those communities and the German state) and the ways in which those communities understood their own identification as German. To use the concept *German diaspora* without interrogating its potentially normative and nationalist presumptions risks reading contemporary forms of self- and group identification back onto its innocent subjects, for whom such forms of self-identification may have held little meaning.¹

For German historians in the twentieth century, the concept of German diasporas in East Central Europe seems to have embodied a common-sense logic. Substantial populations of German-speaking people living outside of the German nation-state in Eastern Europe formed diasporic communities that looked to Germany to reinforce a sense of their own cultural identity, historical continuity, and sometimes political influence. Such communities were often understood both by themselves and by Germany as the product of successive waves of German migration or colonization reaching back into the medieval period. Local rulers, so the story went, had invited communities of German artisans, merchants, and farmers to settle in particular regions of the East, often giving these settlers a privileged legal position vis-à-vis local Slavic populations. The concept of historic colonization underlying much of the rhetoric about diasporas in the East often functioned to reassure Germans in the new German state that their national identity could be defined by a long history of economic success and cultural superiority.²

Other authors in this volume demonstrate that the ways communities around the world defined themselves as German reflected contingent and situational conditions that shaped their particular assertions of identity rather than some fundamentally authentic historic shared identity. We should remember this caveat as we examine German-speaking communities situated geographically much closer to Germany. Their very proximity to Germany made them useful pawns in the foreign political dreams of ideologists hoping to realize an expanded German nation-state after the defeat of 1918. In the post-1918

political landscape these communities may have occasionally flirted with a self-characterization as linked to the German nation-state. It was, however, their problematic place within new self-proclaimed nation-states, not their traditional ways of identifying themselves, that produced any such characterizations.

As difficult as it might be for us living in a globally nationalized world to imagine it, East Central Europeans who claimed membership in a German nation before 1918 often rejected any formal relationship to the German nation-state founded in 1871 and saw no contradiction in that choice. Confusion around this issue stems partly from the degree to which nationalists and their agendas in Germany itself dominated early writing about German diasporas, interpretations that were often unwittingly taken up by later historians. Confusion also results from the ways in which social scientists too often come to view their own categories for interpreting the past as having had significance for the contemporaries who lived them. When we consider those substantial communities of German speakers located in the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy, where categories unrelated to our contemporary understanding of nation often shaped personal and community identity, the concept of diaspora takes on far different meanings. Here we find German nationalists who did not define themselves in relation to Wilhelmine Germany, who imagined their links with Wilhelmine Germany as comparable to their relations to German communities in other parts of Imperial Austria.³

This chapter will examine two linked phenomena: the implicit assumption that Central and Eastern Europeans categorized by a census as German speakers actually shared a common German identity and the largely post-1918 nationalist presumption that such groups formed diasporic communities that sought a relationship to the self-proclaimed German nation-state. Such German speakers often did not think of themselves as Germans before 1918, and even for committed nationalists, the demands of living in the anational Austrian Empire made the issue of any relationship to Wilhelmine Germany largely irrelevant.⁴

Both the experience of wartime occupation in the East and the catastrophic outcome of the war for Germany and Austria-Hungary helped intensify the popular interest in the Weimar Republic for communities of Germans living outside Germany. It created an entirely new potential for imagining the future of these Germans specifically in terms of their relationship to the German state, something that would have been impossible as long as the Habsburg monarchy existed. This

popular obsession in Germany with the Germans of the East rapidly replaced interest in Germany's lost colonial empire, for example, as Lora Wildenthal has recently demonstrated in her work on German women's colonialist organizations. These groups, formerly devoted to the advancement of German settlement in Africa, often shifted their focus rapidly to the so-called lost German communities of Eastern Europe in the years following the war. The intensified promotion of *Ostforschung* in Germany and Austria, both in nationalist and academic circles after 1918, reflected a similar trend.⁵

The outcome of the war also produced a reconceptualization of the content and significance of German nationality among German-speaking communities in East Central Europe. At first German speakers often responded to the collapse of the Habsburg state by imagining that they could maintain their traditional community identity within the new states while shifting their loyalty from Vienna to rulers in the new capital. However, this option soon became impossible, given the ways that their new rulers conceptualized citizenship rights. German-speaking communities that had formerly existed within the multinational Habsburg state were absorbed, often forcibly, into new, self-styled nation-states that defined the term *nation* in narrow linguistic terms. Their new rulers quickly labeled these communities as either *Germanized nationals*—and capable of reintegration into the Czech, Polish, Slovene, or Italian nation—or as *German nationals*—and barred from membership in the new nation-state. This latter categorization often justified the forced expropriation of German community resources, the closing of German-language schools, and the banning of German voluntary associations, even if, as mentioned previously, those German-speaking communities offered declarations of loyalty to their new rulers.⁶

Several German-speaking communities found themselves forced for the first time to consider their own identities in terms of the German nation-state, a state that had meant little to them in the recent past. This was due less to some spontaneous growth in nationalist identity, loyalty, or renewed interest in *Heimat* among German speakers and more to the radical political, social, and economic structural changes brought about by the postwar order in Central and Eastern Europe. A reorientation of German speakers in the new Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, or Yugoslavia toward Germany was not automatic, and as an outcome it was in no way predestined. Several German speakers in these communities chose to emigrate or flee, and several also assimilated to the dominant language group of the new nation-state.⁷ It is

worth repeating that the policies of the new rulers, eager to create nations with which to people their new nation-states, produced a new sense of identity as "German diasporas" among these communities; this identity was not solely the initiative of the German speakers themselves. It was not foreordained that German speakers should in any way express a particular interest in, or feel any special relationship to, Germany, just as it was not foreordained that Czech or Polish nationalists should define national citizenship in their new states in narrow linguistic terms. Yet their sudden new status as second-class citizens, as *Germans* in Czechoslovakia, Italy, Poland, Romania, or Yugoslavia, made these German speakers more aware of possible links between their cultural forms of self-identification, a putative national identity, and the German nation-state.

Often at this moment after the war, German speakers in Habsburg East Central Europe became German nationals; their communities developed completely new identities that slowly reframed their interests in terms of their potential relationship to the German state.⁸ Several other populations in the region experienced a similar reorientation of identity, among them those now identified as Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia; Ukrainians in the Soviet Union and Romania; and Jews everywhere (to name but a few). All found themselves defined by hostile governments as minority subaltern populations. They lived uneasily within self-styled nation-states as second-class citizens or as objects of forceful policies of assimilation, despite the legal guarantees of the minority protection treaties imposed on the new nation-states by the victorious powers.⁹

These communities of German speakers did have a legacy of rhetorical and organizational tools at their disposal for making sense of their new situation. These tools stressed the commonalties of German-language minority communities in East Central Europe and not their relationship to the German state. For almost three decades German nationalist activists had worked tirelessly to promote a sense of nationalist self-identification among different language groups throughout the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy. Activists' efforts to promote national unity among Germans in Cisleithania, or even a serious belief in the importance of nation as such, had not always been successful, as we will see subsequently. Yet whatever their degree of success before the war, activists left a compelling potential legacy to those in the post-1918 world who sought strategies with which to understand their condition as national outsiders.

Nationalization and Its Limits in Pre-1918 Austria

The nationalization efforts that had dominated Austrian public life in the years before 1914 differed from apparently similar processes that characterized public life in self-styled nation-states like Germany, France, or Italy in the late nineteenth century. The Austrian state did indeed promote the kinds of administrative centralization and social integration associated with modernization processes elsewhere in Europe. Yet these policies did not involve the advancement of national identity to unify a disparate citizenry. Rather, the Habsburg state made Austrian identity dependent on the individual's (and later the group's) loyalty to the dynasty. Austrian patriotic symbols, rituals, and festivals served to highlight the overwhelming devotion of an admittedly culturally diverse population to its monarch. The state itself remained firmly anational, even as it worked to unify diverse populations. It did not wish to recognize the possible existence of nationalities either in statistical surveys or in policy-making.¹⁰

The liberal Austrian constitutions of 1848 and 1867 had recognized that differences in religion and in language constituted special cases for ensuring that institutions treat diverse individuals equally, and it was around the latter guarantee that nationalists built their movements.¹¹ Starting with Czech nationalists in the 1860s, each movement invoked the constitutional guarantee of linguistic equality for individuals both to define its own nationalist goals and to reform as many aspects of public life as possible. Language use both in the schools and in the bureaucracy provided the key legal fields for the activism pursued by a broad range of nationalist political movements. While their activism was designed to gain for each nation as large a share of state resources as possible (everything from the right to petition the civil service in one's own language to school funds for minority students to bilingual street signs), nationalists never sought to replace the Habsburg state with a series of nation-states. Indeed, nationalists often competed with each other rhetorically to assert their own nation's greater loyalty to the dynastic state. Ironically, by 1914, as Jeremy King has so aptly noted, anational Austrian law had been forced to recognize the existence of nations within Austria rather than the existence of individuals who spoke different languages. "In a trend with few European parallels," writes King, "the state began to become multinational."¹²

This "multinationalization" of society was the often unintended result of institutional agreements like the Moravian Compromise of 1905, which sought to diffuse conflict between Czech and German

nationalists by removing national issues from the realm of politics. Resources and political competencies in Moravia would now be divided between the two sides: Germans and Czechs gained separate school systems, and they voted in separate curias (Czech and German candidates for political office no longer ran against each other). The requirement that all citizens self-consciously declare their adherence to one nation or the other produced an enormous if unintended nationalization of public life. Where before they might have considered themselves to be "Moravian" (and demand a bilingual, or Utraquist, education for their children), now Moravian citizens were forced to assume a national identity as Czechs or Germans.¹³

Not surprisingly, German nationalist activism throughout Austria had assumed an especially defensive quality from the start. It originated in the 1880s largely as a reaction against perceived legal and institutional inroads made by other linguistic groups at the expense of German speakers. German nationalism asserted a privileged place for the Germans within the empire on the basis of their cultural, economic, and occasionally numeric superiority. To justify German linguistic privilege, nationalists pointed to statistical evidence that German speakers paid proportionally far more taxes than anyone else in Austria did. They also promoted a particular cultural understanding of historic Habsburg expansion in the East as a German colonial or civilizing mission. This German nationalism did not, however, include irredentist yearnings for *Anschluss* with the *kleindeutsch* German state founded in 1871. To the contrary, most German speakers in Austria who even considered the matter desired little more than a formal political alliance for Austria-Hungary with Germany. Given a belief in their own historical mission in the East, given their overwhelmingly Catholic cultural bent, and given their perceptions of Prussia as culturally Protestant, most nationalists who even thought about the matter rejected the irredentist (and anti-Catholic) ravings of a Georg von Schönerer.¹⁴

If Austro-German nationalists rejected an identity defined in terms of their relationship to the Wilhelmine German nation-state, other aspects of German nationalist culture in Austria also undermined the notion of a necessary relationship to Germany. Two apparently contradictory tendencies helped ensure that German nationalists in Austria left Germany out of any nationalist or political mental equation. First, the traditional Austro-German liberal view dominant from 1848 through the 1870s (which survived in many forms down to 1945 and complicated later Nazi policy in the Sudetenland and the Protectorate)

held that Germanness was an elite cultural quality that could in theory be adopted by other groups in Eastern Europe as they worked to improve themselves. In this view Germanness was linked neither to descent nor to a particular territory but rather to cultural capital. Liberals had expected that, even if other linguistic groups maintained their own folk traditions, they would educate their youth in German and that their education would assimilate these newcomers into the ranks of a larger German humanist elite. Although such a large-scale assimilation never came to pass, it meant that early German nationalism lacked the quality of territorialization found among some other nationalist movements in the empire.¹⁵ Austro-Germans who even considered the matter were used to thinking of their nation as a quality rather than as a place, thus relativizing the importance of the Wilhelmine state founded in 1871. Later German nationalists had to create a link between the specific territory they claimed and their concept of Germanness.

The second point is that the critical importance of regional loyalties for German nationalists in Austria before 1914 often tended to relativize any potentially unique role that Wilhelmine Germany might play. Several interregional nationalist associations worked hard after 1880 to foster a sense of unity among communities of German speakers (and their territories) spread throughout Austria, but there is little evidence to suggest that they came close to accomplishing their goal. As Laurence Cole has recently demonstrated for the Tyrol, concepts of German national identity often served highly regionalist ends, assuming specific qualities that gave them little in common with concepts of Germanness in other parts of the monarchy. In the Tyrol, for example, German nationalism was defined primarily by loyalty to church, to dynasty, and to the particular provincial interests of the Tyrol vis-à-vis the centralizing state in Vienna. This put Tyrolean German nationalists bitterly at odds, for example, with their counterparts in Styria, for whom liberal anticlericalism played a crucial role in self-definition, or with Bohemian German nationalists, who viewed the central state as critical to the maintenance of their minority rights against majority Czechs.¹⁶

Even within the same province nationalist organizations might disagree on the fundamentals of identity. The Union of Germans in Bohemia (*Bund der Deutschen in Böhmen*), for example, promoted a racially anti-Semitic definition of the German nation while the German Union of the Bohemian Woods (*Deutscher Böhmerwaldbund*) remained open to Jewish membership and even sported a Jewish exec-

utive board member. The interregional German School Association (*Deutscher Schulverein*) recognized at least tacitly the important role Jewish private schools played in educating German-speaking children, where their minority status meant that the state did not fund a German-language school. The interregional *Südmark*, however, constructed Jews as the racial enemies of Germans. Farther to the east, the world of German nationalists in Galicia and the Bukovina was almost completely alien in its concerns to that of German nationalists in the West. Yet even among such apparently isolated German-speaking communities as those in the East, to which I will return later, German community identity did not rest on a concept of diaspora.¹⁷

If regionalist differences slowed the construction of a common German national movement or even a common sense of self-identification, a challenge admittedly faced by nationalists in the new *Wilhelmine Reich* as well as by those in Austria, other obstacles also stood in the way of making populations national.¹⁸ Despite some twenty-five years of successful activism, by 1914 German nationalists consistently expressed frustration in their aim to achieve a unified and politically effective German identity among German speakers in Austria. What they had generally accomplished by 1914 was a considerable nationalization of white-collar professionals such as civil servants, teachers, service employees, and politicians at all levels of government, whose interests tended to be more directly impacted by nationalist legislation than those of other social groups.

This is particularly clear in the cases of teachers and civil servants. Changes over time in the state's linguistic requirements for positions in the local and regional civil service, for example, appeared adversely to affect the ongoing chances of educated German speakers to obtain such posts. German nationalists claimed that, as governments adopted new rules promoting bilingual administration in provinces like Bohemia, Moravia, or Styria—concessions, apparently, to Slav nationalist agitation—German-speaking candidates were increasingly disadvantaged. Slav candidates would more likely be selected for such posts, it was argued, because they were more likely to be competent in both their own languages and German, while Germans rarely learned a Slavic language.¹⁹ These kinds of concerns shaped political agendas in turn. After 1890 German nationalists increasingly demanded administrative autonomy for purely German-speaking districts within bilingual provinces like Bohemia and Moravia in order to free as many local civil servant posts as possible from the supposedly onerous dual language requirement. In multilingual regions where administrative

separation was not viable, nationalist organizations like the Südmark in fact changed their strategies by 1909 and began encouraging German speakers preparing for the civil service to take classes in a Slavic language.²⁰

If such issues worried some segments of the population considerably, they do not appear to have resonated to the same extent with the majority of German speakers in the empire. Nationalists of all stripes had far less success mobilizing rural populations or the industrial working classes for specifically nationalist ends. National identity, often defined in urban bourgeois terms, had less immediate relevance to these groups, although it appears to have held a marginally greater significance to Czech-speaking workers and peasants than to their German-speaking counterparts.²¹ German nationalists complained consistently about their inability to gain long-term support among both these social groups, although the nature of their own efforts made them more likely to succeed among peasants and the rural *Mittelstand* than among industrial workers.

In order to fortify existing rural German-speaking minorities against the gradual "incursions" of other populations, nationalists tried to strengthen existing minority communities by preventing the rise of conditions that promoted emigration or assimilation to another language group. It was not simply a question of avoiding foreclosures on Germans' farms by supplying cheap credit. It also meant promoting educational opportunities *in German* for rural youth and making sure that communities had a diverse population of artisans to serve their basic consumer needs. Several regional associations promoted the economic well-being of rural German-speaking populations by making cheap credit available to them, offering free classes on agricultural innovation, promoting job exchanges, and subsidizing the purchase of anything from fruit trees to farm implements. Yet for all of these efforts, it was not clear that nationalists had in fact succeeded in nationalizing the peasantry and the rural *Mittelstand* by 1914. In political terms their efforts did not always produce significantly greater numbers of nationalist voters in rural constituencies, for example. Nor did peasants necessarily understand the economic and educational efforts of the associations in primarily nationalist terms, though often in welfare terms.

Nationalists did not often attempt a comparable effort in majority German-speaking industrial regions, where, for example, Slav-speaking workers migrated in increasing numbers by 1900. The industrial working class in turn was largely politically loyal to the Austrian Social

Democratic Party, an organization theoretically opposed to the chauvinist interests of bourgeois nationalism. It was not so much their nationalism that may have prevented German nationalists from making inroads into socialist political support, however, but rather their unwillingness to address issues of concern to working-class Austrians. A series of articles published by the organization *Südmark* in 1909 recognized this nationalist inability to speak to the concerns of industrial workers and warned that, without a mass base to lend it credibility, German nationalism could not achieve the political influence it hoped to gain within the empire: "Whenever we demanded of the German worker that he subordinate his class to his *völkisch* interests . . . these so-called *völkisch* interests often proved to be the class interests of the mighty who [at that time] dominated the German parties."²² In the final years before the outbreak of war, a few initiatives to organize unions and parties that would bring German workers into the nationalist movement took shape, but their successes were limited to very specific regions.²³

German Identities

As previously noted, German nationalist activists rarely mentioned relations with Germany as a defining or even an important issue. Their self-identification did not flow from the explicit belief in a significant relationship to Germany but rather from the situation of German speakers in Austria. While there might exist a self-styled German nation-state to the north and west of Cisleithania, the fact remained that over ten million German speakers lived under Habsburg rule and many considered themselves part of a larger German nation that was not defined by the territory of Wilhelmine Germany. An examination of the way nationalist organizations defined their goals demonstrates that when German nationalists thought about the German nation it was in a way that did not privilege Germany. And as much as the wartime alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary sparked the collective imagination of Austro-German nationalists, causing them to reimagine their present and future relationship to the Wilhelmine Reich, this did not in most cases spur a revaluation of the special concerns of Austro-Germans.²⁴

In 1912 the combined membership of regional and interregional German nationalist associations in Austria (including Bosnia-Herzegovina) stood at some 560,000.²⁵ The largest and best known of these organizations was the interregional German School Association, which

counted some 200,000 members. Founded in 1880 the association saw its work very much in terms of updating, so to speak, a traditional German colonial or settler presence in Eastern Europe. Its mission statement deplored the recent losses by Germans to Slav and Italian peoples in an imagined demographic battle on the linguistic frontier. The German School Association proposed to minimize further losses by funding German-language schools for linguistically mixed communities whose German-speaking population was too small to qualify them for a state-funded German-language school.²⁶

German School Association literature spoke in terms of losses and gains for a larger German nation, but one that was rarely defined by political boundaries. Instead, the association focused its efforts on the issue that supposedly united all German speakers in Austria: their role as guardians of a cultural frontier. The association defined this frontier, however, in terms of its cultural and historic relationship to Vienna and not in terms of any relationship to the *Wilhelmine Reich*. Association writers occasionally analyzed *Wilhelmine* German attitudes or policies toward so-called Polish incursions in East Prussia, for example, but always for comparative purposes and never to suggest that Austro-Germans somehow *belonged* to Germany. Furthermore, when writers traced the historic origins of German communities in Bohemia, Galicia, or the Bukovina, among others, they referred to German migrations in terms that emphasized their regional origins (Swabia, Bavaria, Saxony) and played the notion of the *Wilhelmine Reich* as a point of origin. Thus, despite the very different linguistic composition of their respective populations, Germany and Austria were treated in the pages of the German School Association magazines as sibling German states with complementary missions in Europe.

Another issue helped shape the sense of Austro-German identity negatively as it might relate to *Wilhelmine* Germany. Several Czech nationalist organizations consistently accused their German nationalist opponents of constituting advance columns for *Reich* German penetration. *Reich* Germans, it was insinuated, funded the German School Association. Such accusations implied that any popularity enjoyed by the association was illusory, the creation of powerful foreign interests. Czech nationalists hoped to diminish any sense of legitimacy or popularity that might attach to the German School Association in Bohemia by implying that it was a foreign organization largely funded from across the border.²⁷

Over its almost forty-year existence the German School Association built or offered financial support to hundreds of kindergartens, pri-

mary schools, and advanced schools for boys and girls throughout the empire. The association was careful, however, to avoid any rhetoric that might imply a mission to Germanize. It always defined its purpose in defensive terms, to remedy losses, strengthening the nation through German-language schooling so that no German children would be lost to another nation. The association was happy to accept students of Czech or Slovene parentage who wished their children to obtain an education in German, but it refuted accusations that it proselytized or pressured parents to enroll their children in its schools.²⁸ Czech and Slovene nationalists who supported the work of similar organizations of their own in turn accused the German School Association of outright Germanization. Both German and Czech nationalists constantly battled over children in linguistically mixed communities, complaining that employers and landlords exerted undue pressure on parents to enroll their children in the wrong school. This competition had the unintended if salubrious effect of dramatically increasing the numbers of schools, particularly in rural areas, and raising the general level of literacy and education among those populations where nationalist competition was at its fiercest.²⁹

Other nationalist organizations focused their efforts on securing the economic survival of German communities as well. How these organizations defined both their purpose and the specific problems they hoped to address reveals a great deal about their imagined relationship to a larger German nation. In Habsburg East Central Europe the supposed language frontiers (*Sprachgrenze*) mentioned previously, where speakers of two or more languages lived in close proximity to each other, were usually imagined to be located in rural regions. Within these areas the towns tended to have a German-speaking plurality, while speakers of other languages dominated the surrounding rural areas (thus the German linguistic term *Sprachinsel*, or "language island," to describe such communities, which the editors of this volume have translated as "islands of Germanness"). In fact, *mixed-language regions* might be a more appropriate term for these areas, since their inhabitants generally could communicate in more than one language and families often included speakers of both languages. Such familial and social mixing was anathema to most nationalists, who saw it as a sign of demographic weakness. If an individual were bilingual, then what would prevent him and his children from crossing over to the other side?³⁰

Clearly an education in the appropriate language would help to prevent this national tragedy. So would the economic measures men-

tioned previously, those designed to keep rural communities viable and to prevent the enemy nation from practicing a kind of nationalist blackmail by means of boycotts or hostile housing policies. Both sides in such situations justified their own use of boycotts or selective housing in defensive terms, and both worked to prevent the other from gaining an economic upper hand. It is difficult to say with any certainty whether local populations paid much attention to nationalist exhortations to boycott. In addition to promoting economic stimulants (anything from local tourism to the fruit trees and farm implements), these associations also engaged in charitable activities, handing out Christmas presents to the poor, collecting clothing and food for the winter, or creating small local libraries. They constantly extended their realm of activism, attempting to nationalize all aspects of private and public life and thereby to realize the separation between cultures that they claimed already existed. These efforts became increasingly ambitious after 1900, so much so that in many cases the associations overstepped the very limits of their defensive origins in order to proclaim aggressive new projects.³¹

The Union of Bohemian Germans extended the demographic metaphor to the issue of German orphans supposedly raised in Czech orphanages and thus lost to the German nation. The union built private orphanages to save German children for the nation. Several other regional organizations followed the union's example, although most relied more on the less expensive option of "orphan colonies," villages where children were lodged with German foster parents. The Südmark, operating primarily in Styria, Carinthia, and Krain, targeted a series of villages to the north of the Styrian city Marburg for German settlement. A large majority of Marburgers spoke German, but the city itself was cut off demographically from the German-speaking territory to the north by a swathe of rural villages inhabited both by Slovene speakers and a minority of German speakers. The Südmark hoped eventually to use its settlement program to Germanize the area directly to the north of Marburg and thus connect the "island" city to the German "mainland." The organization bought properties as they became available and sold them at reduced rates to farmers and artisans (largely Protestants from Württemberg in the German Reich, a fact that created unanticipated problems in overwhelmingly Catholic villages). Other regional organizations, such as the Nordmark (operating in Silesia), attempted to emulate this settlement program.³²

In both these cases nationalist associations adapted the rhetoric of a tradition of German colonialism and settlement to more modern ends.

If, according to this rhetoric, Germans had been invited to colonize areas of Eastern Europe centuries ago because their economic habits and cultural superiority were recognized by local rulers, modern Germans too must pursue a similar cultural mission to prevent uncultured barbarians from ruining Austrian civilization. Here we must be careful to note the situational uses of colonial and settlement rhetoric on all sides. German historians may be surprised to learn that Slavic nationalist groups also engaged in discourses of colonialism and cultural superiority against the Germans when it suited their purposes. In particular, Czech nationalists portrayed Czech migrants to German areas as courageous colonizers, settling new regions within the lands of the Bohemian crown. Czech nationalists took every opportunity to tout their own cultural achievements and to contrast their own status as a modern *Kulturnation* to the often uncultured, loutish, and violent behavior of German nationalists.³³ At other times, Czech nationalists liked to characterize the activities of their German nationalist rivals in terms of a brutal colonial relationship between Germanizing colonizer and Czech colonized. Some German nationalists too constructed their mission, as we have seen, in terms of bringing culture to a benighted East. At other times Germans might lament the fate of helpless German minorities at the hands of invading Czech colonizers who overturned traditional existing social relations. The legacies of these tropes are particularly apparent among some Czechoslovakian Sudeten Germans in the 1930s and, interestingly, reemerge with particular vehemence after their annexation to Germany in 1938. Sudeten German leaders and organizations frequently demanded special treatment for their followers due to their recent history of colonization, both real and imagined, at the hands of the merciless Czech nation-state.³⁴

Every one of these claims reflected a strategic use of existing rhetorical opportunities, although it should be clear that both those opportunities and the significance of the rhetoric reflected changed realities after 1918. While those categorized as German nationals after 1918 may have suffered under their new rulers, we should not accept the often self-contradictory claims of either side on this issue as an accurate reflection of social, economic, and cultural relations in the Austrian Empire. Nor should we accept the ludicrous thesis that under the empire one side reproduced the kinds of relations that characterized European colonialism outside of Europe in its treatment of the other side. To do so would be to fall into the trap laid for us by nationalists themselves, to believe the myths about this earlier period propounded by German nationalists in post-1918 Germany or Slavic nationalists in

the successor states. We do not have to look far for evidence that social relations among so-called nations were not as simple as the nationalists implied. The testimony of the latter provides plenty of evidence for the challenges faced by nationalists in a frustratingly nonnationalist world. Both the Union of Germans in Bohemia and the Südmark, for example, experienced considerable difficulties in realizing their nationally more aggressive schemes, difficulties that suggest the fundamental chasm that separated nationalist claims about society from reality. When both the league and its Czech nationalist counterparts actually investigated their own orphan placement programs, they occasionally found that a supposedly reliable foster family was in fact raising the child in the wrong language or that the family's knowledge of the national language was woefully inadequate. Families needing the extra funds simply claimed to be German or Czech, without perhaps grasping the freighted meaning of such an assertion. Similarly, the Südmark experienced more than a little difficulty in determining whether a candidate for a farm was in fact an "authentic German" or simply a German-speaking opportunist looking for a good deal.³⁵

This set of problems reflects a larger contradiction faced by all nationalist organizations in the empire, one whose dimensions are illustrated by nationalist activism around the imperial census. Every ten years the empire carried out a census that included questions about language use. Nationalists liked to claim that language use as documented in the census indicated a form of national self-identification, and activists for each nation struggled to raise its census numbers relative to the others.³⁶ German nationalists claimed, for example, that those who listed German as their language of daily use in the census questionnaires *were* in fact Germans. More often than not, however, nationalist organizations spent their sizeable resources trying to convince German speakers themselves to *become* Germans. Their broad construction of German identity that included everyone who listed German on the census often papered over even deeper contradictions, since some nationalist organizations, for example, denied membership in the nation to Jews who claimed German as their language of daily use in the census. Nationalists might well refer to nations as if they were easily recognized and defined phenomena. Reality suggested that, to the extent that they existed at all, nations were remarkably ill-defined, unstable entities.

Although nationalist organizations claimed to strengthen the threatened border or island populations of Germans in particular, most of them functioned in regions that were geographically not very far

removed from majority German-speaking regions of Austria (and Germany). There were some exceptions to this norm, one of which is particularly instructive regarding the question of diaspora and identity: the Association of Christian Germans in the Bukovina (*Verein der christlichen Deutschen in der Bukovina*). This organization tells us something about how German nationalists on the eastern periphery of the empire understood their Germanness and in particular how they imagined a relationship to the rest of a German nation. Unlike German nationalists in the other contested regions, nationalists in the Bukovina, Galicia, or Bosnia-Herzegovina could trace their very existence to relatively recent migrations. In Galicia the power of the traditional Polish elite and its largely uncontested policy of Polonization, particularly in regard to education, meant that German nationalists there organized late and in relatively small numbers. German speakers had made up 5 percent of the Galician population in 1880, but by 1910 that number had shrunk to just over 1 percent. Local German nationalist efforts succeeded more easily among Galicia's German Protestant communities than among German-speaking Catholic ones, since Polish identity was intrinsically defined by a Catholic religious identity.³⁷

In the more interesting case of the Bukovina one could argue that no linguistic group was socially or historically dominant, although some were more dominant than others. The Bukovina was in fact Austria's "most multicultural" province. Once the Bukovina had gained administrative independence from Galicia after 1848 (and again in the 1860s), the former Polish elite became a tiny and relatively powerless minority (3.5 percent) next to a majority of Ukrainian (Ruthene) speakers (38 percent) and Romanian speakers (34 percent), followed by a significant German-speaking minority of over 20 percent. The German-speaking presence in the Bukovina dated from as recently as the 1780s, when under Joseph II German farmers had migrated east to regions recently annexed from Romanian boyars and divided by the Habsburgs with the Ottomans. Already in the early nineteenth century the cities and larger towns of the Bukovina had a particularly large German-speaking presence. In Czernowitz, the capital, 47 percent of the inhabitants reported German as their language of daily use in 1900. Here also the government established a German-speaking university, thanks to the tireless efforts of a (Romanian-speaking) parliamentary deputy from Czernowitz, Constantine Tomaszczuk. Both the new university and the provincial administration served as something of a magnet for an educated German elite. Once the administration of the Bukovina had been separated from that of Galicia, the German language became one of

the two official provincial administrative languages, next to Romanian (Ukrainian was later added to the official list of official provincial languages as well). Business in the Diet was generally conducted in German or Romanian.

These structural factors help to explain what may seem paradoxical: that in a place geographically so far removed from other German communities in the empire, German speakers felt little need for connection either with each other or with a possible imagined German homeland back in the West. Most German-speaking communities in the Bukovina had little sense of belonging to a larger national community at all, despite their relatively recent arrival there. This is partly because rural Bukovina remained relatively cut off from the towns until well into the twentieth century. German-speaking farmers lived in unconnected rural communities dispersed throughout the Bukovina. The more urbanized and educated German speakers were primarily Jews, who constituted well over half of those statistically categorized as German speakers in the province. Non-Jewish German speakers, university professors, white-collar workers, and some merchants formed more of a German social community in cities like Czernowitz but do not seem to have viewed themselves as constituting a diaspora. This resulted from the fact that German speakers exercised proportionally as much (if not more) influence in provincial political and social affairs as did any other group. And unlike the situation in the rest of Austria, a sense of pragmatism rather than ideology or mutual suspicion characterized political relations between Jewish and Gentile German organizations in the Bukovina. In fact, relations among nationalist groups in the Bukovina were generally more manageable than elsewhere in the monarchy. Since no one group held a majority in the Diet, the German speakers often played a pivotal role allied either with the Romanian nationalists (most of the time) or with the Ruthenes.

For this reason, an interesting tension seems to mark accounts by German nationalist writers in the West of the Association of Christian Germans in the Bukovina. The former often presented the organization to their readers as if its very *raison d'être* lay in a bitter conflict that divided Germans and Jews in a barbarous eastern setting. In writing about the origins of this organization, for example, the anti-Semitic German nationalist *Deutsche Volkszeitung in Reichenberg* saw the association's mission as the liberation of so-called Aryan Germans in the Bukovina from the financial thrall in which Jewish moneylenders held them. The organization itself, however, claimed that its appellation of Christian was meant to differentiate it from Jewish Germans as

much as its appellation of German functioned to differentiate it from Catholic Poles. It treated Jews as fellow German speakers who were, however, organized in a different set of social and cultural networks.³⁸

The efforts of the association, founded and led largely by professors at the university in Czernowitz, focused on raising the educational opportunities for German speakers in a region that suffered from some of the highest illiteracy rates in the empire. In particular, the association hoped to encourage rural Germans to send their children to higher institutions of learning by providing housing and social support to youth from the country who attended the urban middle and high schools and the university in Czernowitz. The association also founded a chain of rural credit unions to battle peasant indebtedness to usurers, which was indeed high, but as far as I have been able to determine, its literature never associated Jews explicitly with this particular problem. In fact, the literature published by the association makes no mention at all of Jews, Jewish associations, or anti-Semitism.

The association made clear that it wished to inculcate German speakers with an understanding of their place in a larger German nation. Viewed from the perspective of Czernowitz, Kimpolung, or Radautz, however, that larger German nation often seems to have referred to a collectivity of German speakers within the Bukovina itself, as the easternmost outpost of the German nation within Austria. The association's literature made no mention of Germany. Organizers did not conceive of themselves defensively as a threatened island of German culture in a sea of barbarous Slavs and Romanians the way German nationalists in the West often portrayed them. The association promoted a sense of German pride of place in the Bukovina, depicting the society as a microcosm of Austria, a community admittedly made up of several nations. This type of identification clearly grew out of the circumstances created by Imperial Austrian rule, a form of rule that did not define a privileged majority nation against minority populations in this region.³⁹

After World War I, when Romania gained control over the Bukovina, the organized German community attempted to deal with the new government in the familiar terms to which it had become accustomed under the Austrian Empire. German leaders expected that their schools and cultural and political organizations would continue to flourish in a multicultural province of Romania, and they saw no contradiction between their identities as Germans and their necessary loyalty to a Romanian state. Although the new regime officially accepted the written demands made upon it by elected representatives of the

German community in 1918, government policy toward minority schools and cultural organizations became increasingly repressive during the interwar period. It was largely as a result of this growing repression and of fears about the proximity of the Soviet Union that many in the Bukovina's German community turned to Nazi Germany for support. A growing factionalism in the 1930s divided German community institutions, pitting those who demanded a "völkisch renewal" of the community and political orientation toward Nazi Germany against those who continued to seek accommodation with the Romanian state. With the invasion of the region by the Soviet Union in June 1940, the German community largely agreed to its resettlement in occupied Poland and later Germany.⁴⁰

After 1918

When German nationalists in East Central Europe sought rhetorical and organizational models to deal with their new and unprecedented situation after 1918, they generally turned to the strategies that seemed to have served them well under the Habsburg monarchy. This required a renewal of self-help organization, appeals to the international community for justice, and implicit attempts at accommodation with the new national governments. Since they saw themselves more as legitimate players on the local political scene than as threatened outposts of an embattled Germany, they did not immediately redefine their activism in relation to Germany. Their adoption of prewar ways of thinking about the nation, derived from experience in a multicultural empire, made it difficult for these communities to redefine themselves successfully in terms of a necessary relationship to the Weimar or Nazi German state. So too did the apparent economic weakness and political isolation of that German state in the early 1920s. This was as much the case with a group as politically influential as the so-called Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia as it was with smaller minority communities in Yugoslavia, Poland, and Romania, although the latter were often subjected to greater violence and more punitive state measures than were the Sudetens.

Economic depression brought a greater nationalist radicalism in the successor states in the 1930s. Traditional conservative regimes found themselves pressured to assert their nationalist credentials more aggressively or face challenges from restive populist movements. To many German observers, with their minority status perspective in the successor states, the accession of the Nazis to power in Germany

seemed to reflect a powerful national renewal that might serve as a forceful ally in pursuing their minority rights. This suggested potentially new avenues of redress that had not previously been available. Nowhere was this more clearly the case than in Czechoslovakia, where under pressure from a badly failing economy German speakers deserted their traditional parties for Henlein's Nazis. And yet even here the old legacies of a different kind of nationalism continued to shape local concerns and demands made by German communities. Some Sudeten German activists in the 1930s who supported a full annexation of the Sudetenland claimed that the broader German-speaking population in Czechoslovakia had *so little understanding* of the importance of its German identity that within a generation all sense of its German national identity would be lost. Once Germany had annexed the Sudetenland and asserted protectorate status for the rest of Bohemia-Moravia, Sudeten leaders continued to cast their particular demands on the state in terms that referred to debates from the Habsburg past. Thus in demanding that schoolteachers in particular not be called up to the Wehrmacht, German nationalists in the Sudetenland maintained that the *Volk* was not yet fully German and required an education in its own identity. Echoing the nineteenth-century characterization of the schoolteacher as the instrument of the nation in the face of Czech attacks, activists claimed that, with German teachers serving in the ranks, the Volk would be left to the mercy of Czech-speaking teachers. As late as 1941, German nationalists in Bohemia still felt the nation had not adequately been forged!⁴¹

Is it possible that we can only truly speak of German diasporas in Habsburg East Central Europe as an important element of memory after the brutal expulsions of 1945? In a sense the expulsions created the German diaspora communities within Germany that had not previously existed as such. I have argued that the vibrant communities of German speakers that dotted the landscapes of pre-1918 Habsburg Europe did not constitute German diasporas in the narrow sense because they did not define themselves in terms of a relationship to a German state. While they often may have seen themselves as German by 1914, we must be careful to locate exactly what that appellation actually meant to them. It seems yet another irony that Imperial Austria, a state that produced so much German nationalist activism, also produced a sense of German identity so unconcerned with its potential relationship to its German nation-state neighbor.

The Habsburg state enabled battling nationalists to live in extreme tension with one another even as it offered a powerful guarantee for

the survival of each. This assertion has become something of a cliché, and it should not be confused with the notion that an idealized Habsburg state functioned justly in every situation or that despite all appearances to the contrary the state had somehow "solved" its nationalities problems. Still, in order to promote its own survival the Austrian state had no choice but to dispense a kind of proportional justice to the increasingly important nationalists who peopled its territories. In doing so it unknowingly legitimized the existence of nations in the public sphere. Yet it did so in a context that promised to protect the rights of each. This promise in turn fueled nationalist activism, since some remote area of public life always remained that required further reform. This promise also framed the terms of nationalist political activism in ways that would have been impossible in the context of a nation-state. An understanding of how people viewed the significance of *nation* within this kind of framework remains elusive to us. It is close to impossible for inhabitants of our own nationalized world either to recapture or to understand what "nation" might have meant in a nonnationalized world.

While nationalist activism appeared to dominate politics in the Austrian Empire by 1914, this had not necessarily produced a mass society of nationalized individuals. Outside the political system, which was admittedly awash in nationalist activism, it is simply not clear to what extent people adopted or acted upon nationalist forms of self-identification. The concept of an Austro-German border identity promoted by nationalist associations and popular authors, for example, did not necessarily reflect the actual experience of those who lived in linguistically mixed regions, unless political agitation had shaped the inhabitants' views of their own situation. Even where nationalism clearly dominated social and cultural life, as it did in Bohemia, regional concerns often shaped particular forms of German self-identification, and this made these forms different to the point of unrecognizable to Germans from different regions. National identity only made sense if cast in a way that highlighted regional concerns and traditions. Whether or not German speakers in Austria explicitly proclaimed it, their Germanness was fundamentally defined by their *Austrianness* as well as by their particular region, not by their imagined relationship to Wilhelmine Germany. After all, even the Bohemian German politicians who in 1918 opposed their annexation by the new Czechoslovakia demanded to remain a province of German Austria (Deutsch Österreich), and not Anschluss with Germany. To speak of the Germans in the Austrian Empire as constituting a

self-conscious unified group, therefore, is a problematic venture, to say the least. To speak of German diasporas before 1918 is even more problematic.

The term *German diaspora* as it is applied to communities in Habsburg East Central Europe (and perhaps others) must refer somewhat to the self-understanding of these communities. And these communities existed in a world where German identity, to the extent that it held meaning for people, did not refer to the German nation-state. If, therefore, interwar German nationalist politics in East Central Europe were constructed in Brubaker's triangular terms (diaspora–host nation—Germany), it is the rise of this new way of conceiving nationalist politics that requires further explanation. New attitudes and approaches to nationalist activism and identity management had to be forged. They were not simply given by the political situation. If Germans in formerly Habsburg Central Europe came to see their identities defined in terms of a relationship to the German state, then that development must be explained; it cannot simply be presumed. As German historians reexamine Germany's relationship to its Eastern neighbors, they will need to do this from a perspective of the East itself and not simply from the perspective of the West.

NOTES

1. Rogers Brubaker has usefully pointed to the dangers involved when we move from treating groups as descriptive or analytic categories to accepting them as something real. See "Ethnicity without Groups," *Archives Européennes de Sociologie* (May 2002): 163–89.

2. Interest in these German-speaking communities of Eastern Europe flourished within the limited boundaries of nationalist and sometimes specific religious circles in the Wilhelmine Kaiserreich. Ronald Smelser, *The Sudeten Problem, 1933–1938: Volkstumspolitik and the Formulation of Nazi Foreign Policy* (Middletown, Conn., 1975), 14–69; Michael Burleigh, *Germany Turns Eastwards: A Study of Ostforschung in the Third Reich* (Cambridge, 1988). A typical example of such writing in the 1930s is Erwin Barta and Karl Bell, *Geschichte der Schutzarbeit am deutschen Volkstum* (Dresden, 1930). Barta and Bell, both German nationalist activists from Austria, recounted the history of German nationalist organizing in communities in Habsburg Austria as a prelude to understanding these communities as diasporas of the larger German nation-state.

3. See the useful recent survey of German literary, cultural, and political texts by Jörg Kirchhoff, *Die Deutschen in der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie: Ihr Verhältnis zum Staat, zur Deutschen Nation und ihr Kollektives Selbstverständnis (1866/67–1918)* (Berlin, 2001).

4. The 1910 census counted 9,950,678 people in the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy who listed German as their preferred language of daily use (*Umgangssprache*), 35.58 percent of the total population. Peter Urbanitsch, "Die Deutschen in Österreich. Statistische-deskriptiver Überblick," in *Die Habsburger Monarchie, 1848–1918*, vol. 3, *Die Völker des Reiches*, ed. Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (Vienna, 1980), 38, table 1.

5. On the social, cultural, and political effects of German wartime occupation and activism on the Eastern front, see Vejas G. Liulevicius, *War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity, and German Occupation in World War I* (Cambridge, 2000); Paul Weindling, *Epidemics and Genocide in Eastern Europe, 1890–1945* (Oxford, 2000); and Lora Wildenthal, *German Women for Empire, 1884–1945* (Durham, N.C., 2001), especially 172–200. For the subtle transformations in ideological positioning after 1918, see Barta and Bell, *Geschichte der Schutzarbeit*.

6. See Irina Livezeanu's exemplary analysis of the Romanian takeover of the Bukovina in *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building, and Ethnic Struggle, 1918–1930* (Ithaca and London, 1995), 49–87. See also Arnold Suppan, "Untersteierer, Gottscheer, und Laibacher als deutsche Minderheit zwischen Adria, Karawanken und Mur (1918–1948)," in *Deutsche Geschichte im Osten Europas: Zwischen Adria und Karawanken*, ed. Arnold Suppan (Berlin, 1998); Helmut Rumpler and Arnold Suppan, eds., *Geschichte der Deutschen im Bereich des heutigen Slowenien 1848–1941* (Vienna and Munich, 1988); Jeremy King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848–1948* (Princeton and Oxford, 2002); and Johann Wolfgang Brügel, *Tschechen und Deutsche, 1918–1938* (Munich, 1967).

7. For examples, see King, *Budweisers*, 158–68; Arnold Suppan, "Lage der Deutschen," in *Geschichte der Deutschen*, ed. Rumpler and Suppan, 173–75.

8. Karl F. Bahm, "The Inconveniences of Nationality: German Bohemians, the Disintegration of the Habsburg Monarchy, and the Attempt to Create a 'Sudeten German' Identity," *Nationalities Papers* 27, no. 3 (1999): 377–99; Pieter M. Judson, "Frontier Germans: The Invention of the *Sprachgrenze*" in *Identität-Kultur-Raum: Kulturelle Praktiken und die Ausbildung von Imagined Communities in Nordamerika und Zentraleuropa*, ed. S. Ingram, M. Reisenleitner, and C. Szabo-Knotik (Vienna, 2001), 85–99; Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (New York, 1996). Brubaker examines the triangular quality that characterized the relationship of Eastern European German communities to Germany and to their host states in the interwar period. In an otherwise thoughtful book Brubaker's characterization of pre-war nationalism among those communities is badly flawed. He proposes that German nationalism in pre-1918 Austria was irredentist in nature, a commonly held belief about Austro-Germans that the sources do not confirm (115–16).

9. Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania had a strong sense of a diasporic relationship to the Hungarian state. The situation of formerly Austrian or Hungarian Jews in Poland or Romania was particularly complicated by the fact that their religious identity defined them out of the nation in those states. Especially in Romania but also in Poland, religious belief defined the

particulars of national identity. Many Austrian Jews in Galicia and the Bukovina considered their own identity in terms of allegiance to the anational imperial state that they rightly perceived had protected them from Polish, Romanian, or Ukrainian anti-Semitism. In Czechoslovakia Jews could choose to identify themselves as part of the Czech nation or they could even choose to list themselves simply as Jews in the census (often a means of diminishing the number of those who reported themselves as Germans in the interwar period). However, both the German and Czech nationalist movements were often characterized by anti-Semitism both before and after 1918, making national identification for Jews more difficult. On Jewish dilemmas in post-1918 Eastern Europe, see Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York, 1958), chapter 9; Marsha L. Rozenblit, *Reconstructing a National Identity: The Jews of Habsburg Austria during World War I* (Oxford and New York, 2001).

10. On imperial attempts to create dynastic patriotism, see Daniel Unowsky, "Reasserting Empire: Habsburg Imperial Celebrations after the Revolutions of 1848–1849," in *Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the Present*, ed. Maria Bucur and Nancy M. Wingfield (West Lafayette, Ind., 2001), 13–45.

11. See Gerald Stourzh, "Die Gleichberechtigung der Volksstämme als Verfassungsprinzip, 1848–1918," in *Die Habsburgermonarchie, 1848–1918*, vol. 3, *Die Völker des Reiches*, ed. Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (Vienna, 1980), 975–1206; see, more generally, Stourzh's excellent *Die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten in der Verfassung und Verwaltung Österreichs, 1848–1918* (Vienna, 1985). On the bureaucracy, see Karl Megner, *Beamte: Wirtschafts- und sozialgeschichtliche Aspekte des k.k. Beamtentums* (Vienna, 1986); Karl Hugelmann, ed., *Das Nationalitätenrecht des alten Österreich* (Vienna and Leipzig, 1934). On the conflict over schools, see Hannelore Burger, *Sprachenrecht und Sprachengerechtigkeit im österreichischen Unterrichtswesen, 1867–1918* (Vienna, 1995).

12. King, *Budweisers*, 114.

13. On the Moravian Compromise, see Horst Glassl, *Der Mährische Ausgleich* (Munich, 1967); Robert Luft, "Die Mittelpartei des mährischen Grossgrundbesitzes 1879 bis 1918: Zur Problematik des Ausgleiches in Mähren und Böhmen," in *Die Chance der Verständigung: Ansichten und Absätze zu übernationaler Zusammenarbeit in den böhmischen Ländern 1848–1918*, ed. Ferdinand Seibt (Munich, 1987), 187–244; T. Mills Kelly, "Taking It to the Streets: Czech National Socialists in 1908," *Austrian History Yearbook* 29 (1998): 93–112; Pieter M. Judson, *Exclusive Revolutionaries: Liberal Politics, Social Experience, and National Identity in the Austrian Empire, 1848–1914* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1996), 262–64.

14. For a full summary of the literature on literate Austro-German attitudes toward Wilhemine Germany, see Kirchhoff, *Die Deutschen*. For a careful statistical analysis of German speakers' tax contributions and so-called national property in Bohemia, see Heinrich Rauchberg, *Der nationale Besitzstand in Böhmen*, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1905). On Schönerer, see Andrew Whiteside, *The Socialism of Fools: Georg Ritter von Schönerer and Austrian Pan-Germanism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1975). While statistics on tax payment confirmed German preeminence in the economy, another form of statistic meant to measure cultural superiority; those

measuring literacy, for example, favored the Czechs. See, for example, Adelbert Rom, "Der Bildungsgrad der Bevölkerung Österreichs und seine Entwicklung seit 1880 mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Sudeten- und Karpathenländer," *Statistische Monatsschrift* 19 (1914): 589–642.

15. Czech states' rights nationalism, for example, insisted on the territorial integrity of Bohemia, Moravia, and Austrian Silesia. Peter Bugge, "Czech Nation-Building, National Self-Perception, and Politics, 1780–1914" (Ph.D. diss., University of Aarhus, 1994), especially 103–20; Bruce Garver, *The Young Czech Party, 1874–1901, and the Emergence of a Multi-Party System* (New Haven, 1978), 49–60.

16. Laurence Cole, "Für Gott, Kaiser und Vaterland": *Nationale Identität der deutschsprachigen Bevölkerung Tirols, 1860–1914* (Frankfurt am Main, 2000). On Bohemia, see Jan Křen, *Die Konfliktgemeinschaft: Tschechen und Deutsche, 1870–1918* (Munich, 2000).

17. Lawyer Israel Kohn of Budweis/Budějovice served on the Böhmerwaldbund's executive board from 1884 until his death in 1917. Deutscher Böhmerwaldbund, "Bundesleitungsmitglieder 1884–1934," in *Fünfzig Jahre Deutscher Böhmerwaldbund* (Budweis, 1934), 2. On the issue of Jewish schools and the German School Association, see Pieter M. Judson, "'Whether Race or Conviction Should be the Standard': National Identity and Liberal Politics in Nineteenth-Century Austria," *Austrian History Yearbook* 22 (1991): 76–95.

18. On the challenges of regionalism in Wilhelmine Germany, see Celia Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat* (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); Alon Confino, *The Nation as Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871–1918* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1997); Thomas Serrier, "'Deutsche Kulturarbeit in der Ostmark': Der Mythos vom deutschen Vorrang und die Grenzproblematik in der Provinz Posen (1871–1914)," and Günter Riederer, "'Zwischen 'Kilbe,' 'Coiffe,' und Kaisergeburtstag: Die Schwierigkeiten Nationaler und regionaler Identitätsstiftung in Elsass-Lothringen (1870–1918)," both in *Die Nationalisierung von Grenzen: Zur Konstruktion nationaler Identität in sprachlich gemischten Grenzregionen*, ed. Michael G. Müller and Rolf Petri (Marburg, 2002), 13–34, 109–36.

19. On the general problem of nationalism and the civil service, see Megner, *Beamte*, especially 245–58. By 1910 the number of Bohemian provincial civil servants of Czech-speaking background far outstripped their relative percentage in the Bohemian population. See Hugelmann, *Das Nationalitätenrecht*, 355.

20. See the articles "Mittel und Wege zur Erhaltung des deutschen Beamtenstandes in den bedrohten Gebieten" and "Deutscher Beamten-Nachwuchs im Kampfgebiete" in *Mitteilungen des Vereins Südmark (MVS)* 1909, 3–7.

21. For a suggestive comparison of the relative successes of Czech and German nationalists in appealing to working-class or peasant audiences, see Karl F. Bahm, "Beyond the Bourgeoisie: Rethinking Nation, Culture, and Modernity in Nineteenth-Century Central Europe," *Austrian History Yearbook* 29 (1998): 19–35.

22. *MVS*, Feb. 1909, 41–42. This and all other translations in this chapter are my own unless otherwise noted. See also Bahm, "Beyond the Bourgeoisie." In some industrialized regions (e.g., Marburg/Maribor in Styria) German nationalist strategies were clearly more effective than in others (Bohemia, Silesia), as comparative census data suggests.

23. On the German Workers Party (Deutsche Arbeiter Partei), which elected three deputies to the Austrian Parliament in 1911, see Lothar Höbelt, *Kornblume und Kaiseradler: Die deutschfreihheitliche Parteien Altösterreichs, 1882–1918* (Vienna and Munich, 1993), 242–47; Harald Bachmann, “Sozialstruktur und Parteientwicklung im nordwestböhmisches Kohlenrevier vor dem Zusammenbruch der Monarchie,” *Bohemia* 10 (1969): 270–86; and Andrew Whiteside, *Austrian National Socialism before 1918* (The Hague, 1962).

24. Kirchhoff, *Die Deutschen*, 171–202.

25. *Deutsches Jahrbuch für Österreich. Anschriftenwerk in Berufen selbstständig tätiger Deutschösterreicher* (Vienna, 1913). This edition describes each of the associations and lists membership and financial statistics.

26. Austrian school law required the presence of an average of forty school-age children over a three-year period in order to qualify that community for a government-funded school in a given language. Both the Czech and German School Associations built schools in communities with too few children and hoped that their efforts would eventually produce enough children to require the government to assume funding responsibilities for their schools. On policy and its administration, particularly where language was concerned, see Burger, *Sprachenrecht und Sprachengerechtigkeit*, especially 100–111.

27. Articles and reports in the publications of the Czech School Association or the Czech National Association for the Bohemian Woods consistently raise the issue of funding and suggest that the German School Association and other nationalist organizations were controlled by foreign (German) interests. See frequent examples from the *Zpráva o činnosti Národní Jednoty Pošumavské*, 1906, 1907, 1908, 26–27, and the *Věstník Ústřední Matice Školské* (Prague, 1908).

28. See the essay on the three different categories of children served by the German School Association in *Der Kampf ums Deutschum* 2 (1913): 24–29. For a similar essay see *Der getreue Eckart: Halbmonatschrift für das deutsche Haus*, 1908, 252. Attitudes among non-German speakers toward the issue of German schooling varied by region and occasionally by community. In Southern Styria and Carinthia, for example, Slovene-speaking parents often believed that a German-language education would bring greater social and employment opportunities for their children and the German School Association did little to discourage this belief. See Maria Kurz, “Der Volksschulstreit in der Südsteiermark in der Zeit der Dezemberverfassung” (BA thesis, University of Vienna, 1986).

29. Since nationalists worked so hard to delineate and prove the differences that separated their two imagined communities (one had culture, the other didn’t), they were unlikely to recognize the large number of schools created by their competition as a benefit. This competition created work for Austria’s highest administrative and supreme courts (*Verwaltungsgerichtshof* and *Reichsgericht*), whose judges constantly ruled on cases involving language, parents, and schools in the period 1890–1918. See Stourzh, “Die Gleichberechtigung,” and Burger, *Sprachenrecht und Sprachengerechtigkeit*.

30. On the dangers of bilingualism, see, for example, J. Zemmrich, *Sprachgrenze und Deutschum in Böhmen* (Braunschweig, 1902), 7–10. The concept of a language frontier was an ideological construction created by nationalists in the 1880s that imagined an uneasy coexistence of two cultures fundamentally opposed

to each other and engaged in a zero-sum struggle to the death. Cultural mixing among peoples within a given region (for many different reasons, such as personal or economic) in fact often constituted a norm that nationalists preferred not to recognize. See Judson, "Frontier Germans."

31. On the boycott movements, see Catherine Albrecht, "The Rhetoric of Economic Nationalism in the Bohemian Boycott Campaigns of the Late Habsburg Monarchy," *Austrian History Yearbook* 32 (2001): 47–67. On competitive charitable giving and Christmas gifts, see *Der Kampf ums Deutschtum*, 1913–12, 25.

32. On nationalist orphanages, see *Bericht über die Thätigkeit des Bundes der Deutschen in Böhmen* (Prague, 1907–10); *MVS*, 1910, 57. On the Südmark see Eduard Staudinger, "Die Südmark: Aspekte der Programmatik und Struktur eines deutschen Schutzvereins in der Steiermark bis 1914," in *Geschichte der Deutschen*, ed. Rumpel and Suppan, 130–54; Pieter M Judson, "Connect the Dots: The Südmark Frontier Settlement Program" in *Teachers, Tourists, and Terrorists: Nationalizing the Language Frontier in Habsburg Central Europe, 1880–1925*, manuscript. On other colonization efforts, see *Deutsches Jahrbuch für Österreich*. Most provincial organizations could not raise the enormous sums that a serious settlement program required.

33. On the Czech nationalist self-image as colonizers in German-speaking regions of Bohemia, see K. Vitvera, *Cous od Začátku České Kolonisace* (Prague, 1907) (Published by the Národní Jednota Severočeské); *České Menšiny a Menšinové Školství* (Prague, 1911); and Mark Cornwall, "The Struggle on the Czech-German Language Border, 1880–1940," *English Historical Review* (September 1994): 914–51.

34. On Sudeten Germans' demands for special treatment at the hands of the Third Reich because of disabilities suffered under the interwar Czech regime, see Volker Zimmermann, *Die Sudetendeutschen im NS Staat* (Munich, 1999); and Ralf Gebel, *Heim ins Reich! Konrad Henlein und der Reichsgau Sudetenland, 1938–1945* (Munich, 1999).

35. On the orphan problem, see Dr. Karl Schücker, *Waisenheim des Bundes der Deutschen in Böhmen. Jahrbuch der Deutschen Jugendfürsorge in Böhmen* (Prague, 1909), 21. On Südmark problems with settlers' authenticity, see *MVS*, 1907–8, 288–89.

36. For a detailed analysis of the politics of the census, see Emil Brix, *Die Umgangssprache in Altösterreich zwischen Agitation und Assimilation* (Vienna, 1982).

37. For population statistics (and for subsequent paragraphs) on Galicia and the Bukovina, see Wandruszka and Urbanitsch, eds., *Die Habsburger Monarchie, 1848–1918*, vol. 3, 38, table 1.

38. On the organization and its relations with Jews in the Bukovina, see *Deutsches Jahrbuch für Österreich*, 208; *Deutscher Kalender für die Bukowina*, 1903, 1904, 1910; and Franz Lang, ed., *Buchenland Hundertfünfzig Jahre Deutschtum in der Bukovina* (Munich, 1961).

39. The association promoted links to other Eastern (Hungarian) communities of German speakers, such as those in Transylvania and the Banat, founding the Association of Carpathian Germans in 1910. See Emanuel Turczynski, "Das

Vereinswesen der Deutschen in der Bukovina," in *Buchenland*, ed. Lang, 113.

40. Turczynski, "Das Vereinswesen," 118–19, reproduces the Germans' memorandum of November 17, 1918. A provisional Romanian government in the Bukovina agreed to fourteen of the fifteen demands (the exception was the demand to maintain the German-language status of the university in Czernowitz). A week later, representatives of the German Council (Deutscher Volksrat) voted overwhelmingly for annexation by Romania. Subsequent Romanian policy in the realm of education is analyzed superbly by Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics*, chapter 2. On the internal conflicts of the 1930s and the resettlement in 1940, see Turczynski, "Das Vereinswesen," 123–30.

41. On debates over Sudeten German identities, see Tara E. Zahra, "Custody Battles: Nationalizing Childhood in Bohemia and Moravia, 1900–1945" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 2005); see also Zahra, "Reclaiming Children for the Nation: Germanization, National Ascription, and Democracy in the Bohemian Lands, 1900–1945," *Central European History* 37 (2004): 499–541. For examples cited by Zahra of Sudeten Germans demanding teacher exemptions from Wehrmacht service, given the alleged need to recolonize a weakened German community, see *Meldungen aus dem Reich*, Nr. 37, Jan. 8, 1940; Bundesarchiv R 58/145 F. 1–1 SD Bericht, Dec. 1, 1939; *Meldungen aus dem Reich*, Nr. 333, Nov. 9, 1942, p. 5008; Karlsbad, June 12, 1941, an Herrn Reichsminister des Innern from Regierungspräsident in Karlsbad Bundesarchiv, R 1501 127122, *Reichsministerium des Innern, Grenzlandfürsorge Sudetenland*, Regierungsbezirk Karlsbad p. 128, 1/5 a. 1225/41.