

**Demographic Change and the Future
of the United Kingdom: 2022-2122**

Professor Matt Goodwin


Senior Advisor, Prosperity Institute
Honorary Professor, University of Kent
Senior Visiting Professor, University of
Buckingham

www.mattgoodwin.org

Heterodox Centre Report No. 3

May 29, 2025

doi: 10.5281/zenodo.18151364



*Freedom, Courage,
Truth.*

Executive Summary/Key Statistics for Journalists

This paper presents projections for the UK population in terms of race and ethnicity, country of birth, and religious identity.

- Between the years 2025 and 2050, the share of the population that is White British will decline from 73% to 57%, then 44% by 2075, and 33.7% by the year 2100.
- Between the years 2025 and 2050, the share of the population that is non-White, will increase from 19.7% to 34.8%, 48% by 2075 and 59.3% by 2100.
- When White British is distinguished as a separate ethnic group from 'White Other', the White British will become a minority in the UK by the year 2063.
- Between the years 2025 and 2100, the share of the population that is UK-born and who are not second-generation migrants in the projection period will fall dramatically, from 81% to 39%, while the share of the population comprised of people who were born overseas will increase from 18% to almost 26%.
- When the foreign-born population is combined with their offspring, the combined proportion of the projected foreign-born and second-generation population will rise to 33.5% of the overall UK population in 2050, 47.5% by 2075 and 60.6% by 2100.
- In other words, by the end of the current century, by 2100, around six in ten people in the UK will either not have been born in the UK or born to UK-born parents.
- Between the years 2025 and 2050, the share of the UK population that is non-Muslim will fall from 93% in 2025 to 88.8% in 2050, to 84.8% by 2075 and then to 80.8% by the year 2100. At the same time, the share that is Muslim will rise from 7% in 2025, to 11.2% in 2050, 15.2% by 2075, and then to 19.2% by 2100. This means that by the end of the current century close to one in five of all people in the UK will be Muslim.

Professor Matt Goodwin, Senior Visiting Professor at the Centre for Heterodox Social Science, at the University of Buckingham, said: “*What these projections show is that the UK is currently on course to experience enormous and historically unprecedented changes in the composition of its population.*”

While the White British are set to become a minority in the country only 38 years from now, in the year 2063, by the end of the current century these islands will both look and feel profoundly different. By the year 2100, the White British will only comprise one-third of the population, people who were born in the UK and can trace their roots back over several generations will represent only around four in ten people, compared to eight in ten today, and one in five people will be Muslim, all of which raises profound questions about the capacity of the UK state to both absorb and manage this scale of demographic change”.

Professor Matt Goodwin can be contacted on 07929045857 or matt@mattgoodwin.org

Introduction

Recent years have witnessed considerable debate about the size and composition of the United Kingdom's population. Large-scale immigration increased illegal migration through the small boats in the Channel, and growing awareness about the country's declining birth-rate and looming demographic crisis have all fuelled intense debate about how the UK population will evolve in the years and decades ahead.

Yet much of this debate remains passionate and polarised and there remains a lack of reliable and rigorous empirical analysis of what is unfolding in the country.

Put simply, there is much heat but little light.

What is needed to inform this debate is dispassionate and rigorous analysis of the likely future evolution of the UK population, so citizens, policymakers and politicians are much better informed and better able to assess future challenges.

This is our aim behind this briefing paper: to draw on the most reliable and rigorous data available in the country to forecast the future demographic evolution of the UK over the next century, between 2022 and the year 2122.

Specifically, in this paper we project the evolution of the UK population in three areas: (1) *ethnic identity* (white British, versus other white groups, versus non-white groups); (2) *religious identity* (non-Muslim versus Muslim); and (3) *country of birth* (UK-born versus foreign-born). All three of these areas relate directly to ongoing debate over immigration, identity, multiculturalism, social integration, and the future of the United Kingdom.

Once again, before setting out our findings, our aim is not to make a normative judgement about the direction of the UK but, rather, to inform current debates by projecting likely changes in the years and decades ahead if the country remains on its current course.

We believe that making these data and information fully transparent to citizens and policymakers is a crucial prerequisite to restoring public trust in the system, especially given the failure of politicians on both the left and right to inspire this trust in recent years.

Analysis: Assumptions and Methodology

Our projections of the UK's population from 2022 to 2122 by ethnic identity (White British vs. White Other vs. non-White), religious identity (non-Muslim vs. Muslim), and country of birth (UK-born vs. foreign-born, including second-generation migrants) are built using the cohort-component method, a standard demographic approach.

This method projects populations forward by applying age- and sex-specific fertility, mortality, and migration rates to a 2022 base population derived from the latest UK census data (ONS Census 2021 for England, Wales, NISRA Census 2021 for Northern Ireland; NRS Census 2022 for Scotland).

These projections are calibrated to the 2022-based Office for National Statistics (ONS) National Population Projections (NPP) Principal Projection, ensuring consistency with national population trends. Subgroup-specific fertility rates are estimated using implied or live births data, mortality follows national ONS schedules, and migration levels are adjusted based on census-derived proportions (e.g., 87% non-White for ethnicity, 18% Muslim for religion, and net inflows for foreign-born).

The resulting projections are constrained to match ONS NPP totals annually, providing a robust framework to explore long-term demographic shifts across the UK and its constituent nations.

Our analysis in this briefing paper is also based on a number of assumptions regarding our three areas of interest: ethnicity, religious identity, and country of birth.

The full detail of these assumptions and our analysis can be found in the Appendix at the end of this briefing paper. Suffice to say for now that we assume the following.

Our projections rest on tailored assumptions for fertility, mortality, and migration across three demographic dimensions: ethnic identity, religious identity, and country of birth.

For ethnicity, we assume higher fertility for non-White populations compared to White populations, with all groups

following national mortality patterns and net migration predominantly comprising non-White individuals from non-EU countries.

For religion, Muslim populations are assigned higher fertility rates than non-Muslims, with uniform national mortality rates and a modest proportion of net migrants identified as Muslim.

For country of birth, foreign-born populations have higher fertility than UK-born populations, share national mortality schedules, and dominate net migration inflows, while UK-born groups experience slight net outflows.

These assumptions, which are grounded in census data and ONS national projections, are detailed further in Table 1 and the Appendix.

Table 1: Key Assumptions for UK Population Projections, 2022–2122

Demographic Group	Total Fertility Rate (Children per Woman, 2022)	Mortality Rate	Net Migration (Annual Inflow/Outflow)
Ethnicity			
White British	1.61	UK National	0% of net migrants are White British
White Other	0.91	UK National	13% of net migrants are White Other
Non-White	1.92	UK National	87% of net migrants are Non-White
Religion			
Non-Muslim	1.54	UK National	82% of net migrants are Non-Muslim
Muslim	2.35	UK National	18% of net migrants are Muslim
Country of Birth			
UK-Born	1.39	UK National	Slight net outflow (-1.1% of National figure)
Foreign-Born	1.97	UK National	Net inflow (101.1% of National figure)

Findings: Ethnicity, Religion, Country of Birth

Based on the assumptions above and the analysis in the Appendix, our ethnicity projections for the UK are as follows.

Between the years 2025 and 2050, the share of the population that is White British will decline from 73% to 57%, 44% by the year 2075, and to 33.7% by the year 2100.

Conversely, between the years 2025 and 2050, the share of the population that is non-White, will increase from 19.7% to 34.8%, 48.1% by the year 2075 and to 59.3% by 2100.

When non-Whites are combined with the ‘White Other’ ethnic groups (which include Irish, Gypsy, Roma and other European Identities), the share of the population that is non-White and ‘White other’ will increase from 27% in 2025, to 43% by 2050, to 56% by 2075, and then to 66.4% by the year 2100.

Our analysis suggests that Whites (i.e. both White British and White Other) will become a minority of the population in the year 2079, though clearly in many local areas that are already highly diverse this will happen sooner, a point we will return to in future work.

When White British is distinguished as a separate ethnic group from White Other, the White British group will become a minority in the UK by 2063.

Ethnicity Proportion Summary (All Ages), United Kingdom


White British, White Other, and Non-White, Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection

Year	White British (%)	White Other (%)	Non-White (%)
2025	73.0	7.3	19.7
2030	69.5	7.6	22.9
2040	63.0	8.0	28.9
2050	57.0	8.2	34.8
2060	51.3	8.3	40.4
2070	46.2	8.1	45.7

Figure 1: Proportion of White and Non-White Populations, 2022-2122

Proportion of White British, White Other, and Non-White Populations,
2022 - 2122, United Kingdom
Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection

— White British Population — White Other Population — Non-White Population




What about religious identity?

As above, based on the assumptions and analysis outlined in the Appendix, our projections are as follows. Between the years 2025 and 2050, the share of the UK population that is non-Muslim will gradually fall from 93% in 2025 to 88.8% in 2050, to 84.8% by 2075 and then to 80.8% by the year 2100.

The share that is Muslim will rise from 7% in 2025, to 11.2% in 2050, 15.2% by 2075, and then to 19.2% by 2100. This means that by the end of the current century close to one in five of all people in the UK will be Muslim.

Figure 2: Proportion of Non-Muslim and Muslim Populations, 2022-2122



Lastly, what about our projections regarding country of birth?

Here too, based on the analysis and assumptions that we set out in the Appendix, we are projecting considerable change in the years and decades ahead.


Between the years 2025 and 2100, our projections suggest that the share of the population that is UK-born (i.e. who are not second-generation migrants in the projection period) will fall dramatically, from 81% to 39%, while the share of the population that is comprised of people born overseas will increase from just above 18% to almost 26%.

When the foreign-born population is combined numerically with their offspring, the combined proportion of the projected foreign born and second-generation population will rise to 33.5% of the overall UK population in 2050, 47.5% by 2075 and 60.6% by 2100.

These figures exclude any UK-born second (or later) generation migrants who were born before 2022 and any third (or later) generation migrants who were born after 2022.

In other words, by the end of the current century, by the year 2100, based on current trends around six in ten people in the UK will not have been born in the UK or born to UK-born parents.

Figure 3: Proportion of UK-born and Foreign-born Population



Conclusions and Implications

Our aim in this paper, as stated at the outset, is to inform rather than polarise the already intense debate about the changing nature and future evolution of the UK population.

In writing and publishing this paper, we express our view that the general lack of reliable and rigorous research in this area is undermining, rather than strengthening, the quality of public discussion and policy debate in this country.

We hope this paper will contribute to a more realistic and informed discussion, and also one that begins to restore public trust in the expert class, institutions, and wider system.

We would also like to offer a few concluding thoughts about why we think these findings matter and in doing so would like to make three specific points.

Firstly, our projections make clear that unless the United Kingdom changes direction then the country is on course to witness considerable and unprecedented demographic change in a relatively short period of time—a pace of change that will be considerably greater than what the country has witnessed during the first two decades of the twenty-first century, when the political experiment with mass immigration commenced.

Specifically, our projection that the White British will become a minority in the UK by the year 2063—just 38 years from now—and will comprise just one-third of the population by the end of the current century reflects the sheer scale and pace of this change.

So too does our projection that *all* Whites will represent a minority by the year 2079, which again underlines the sheer speed of demographic change on these islands.

As academics such as Professor Eric Kaufmann have shown through detailed research¹, the decline in the share of the once dominant White pan-ethnic group will almost certainly spark a strong public and political reaction—and one that can already be seen in the rise of a more volatile politics. This response is likely to include many members of non-white groups, who possess an 'ethno-traditional' attachment to the nation's traditional ethnic composition. In Canada, for instance, minorities are more likely than whites to say there are too many 'visible minorities' among immigrants to Canada.²

As much research in the West over the last two decades has shown³, conservative and national populist voters, who represent large shares of electorates, instinctively favour lower rates of immigration and a much slower pace of immigration and demographic change to allow existing migrants to voluntarily assimilate into the wider majority.

Many voters, including a significant share of minority voters, see these goals of lowering immigration and slowing the pace of change as essential to maintaining the symbols, traditions, culture and ways of life of the traditional majority group, and so our projections point to trends and changes that will almost certainly spark a considerable degree of anxiety, concern, and political opposition among these voters.

Their concerns will need to be recognised, respected, and addressed if the UK is to avoid considerable political turbulence and polarisation in the years and decades ahead.

Secondly, our projections also point toward considerable change in the religious and cultural identity of this country, underlined by the finding that close to one in five people on these islands will be Muslim by the end of the current century.

This should be seen as part of a wider trend in Europe, with reliable research institutes such as the Pew Research Center, in 2017, forecasting that the share of the population that is Muslim by the year 2050, under a 'high migration scenario', will reach close to 31% in Sweden, 18% in France, 18% in Belgium, and 14% in Europe overall.⁴

Clearly, one implication of our projection in the UK is that recent debates about the compatibility of Islam with free speech, free expression, women's rights, and rights for same-sex communities, alongside the rise of sectarianism at UK elections, will intensify in the years ahead, powered by the general expansion of Muslim communities.

So too will the debate about how to unify different groups and religious communities around a shared sense of identity, culture, values, and ways of life.

Given polling evidence of significant support in British Muslim communities for things such as anti-Semitism, Hamas, Sharia law, and a 'Muslim-only' political party⁵, and also parallel concerns about the lack of social integration in Muslim communities⁶, political leaders will need to devote considerable effort to exploring how best to achieve this social integration and shared sense of identity, also discussing if it is even possible amid the speed and scale of current demographic shifts.

Third, our projections also point toward considerable demographic churn in terms of the share of people who were born in or outside of the UK.

Significantly, our projections suggest that between the years 2025 and 2100, the share of the population that is UK-born (i.e. not second-generation migrants in the projection period) will fall dramatically, from 81% to 39%, while the share of the population that is comprised of people born overseas will increase from 18% to almost 26%.

When the foreign-born population is combined with their offspring, the combined proportion of the projected foreign-born and second-generation population will rise to 33.5% of the UK population in 2050, above 47% by 2075, and to nearly 61% by 2100.

In other words, by the end of the current century most of the people on these islands will not be able to trace their roots in this country back more than one or two generations. By the year 2100, based on our projections, six in ten people in the UK will not have been born in the UK or born to UK-born parents.

This, too, raises enormous questions about the capacity of our country and leaders to unify people around a shared sense of identity, values, ways of life, and culture, and avoid the very real risk of us becoming what Labour Prime Minister Keir Starmer referred to, in 2025, as "an island of strangers".

As Harvard academic Robert Putnam warned more than a decade ago, in nations that experience rapid demographic change the result is often lower public trust, weaker social solidarity, and reduced public support for welfare.⁷ Transformation of a nation's ethnic composition also tends to polarise voters based on their psychology, with those who see diversity as disorder and change as loss turning toward national populism.⁸

This appears especially likely if a majority of people no longer have longer-term ties to the nation, its history, culture, and the once-dominant majority group. In such a scenario, how Britain's political and civic leaders will be able to cultivate a strong sense of national identity and shared culture, which are the building blocks of prosperity, remains an open question and one that few people in the UK currently have an answer for.

Appendix: UK Population Projections by selected characteristics, 2022–2122

This Appendix provides a detailed explanation of the methodologies, assumptions, and analytical framework underpinning a series of population projections for the United Kingdom and its constituent countries, spanning from 2022 to 2122.

These projections are calibrated to the 2022-based Office for National Statistics (ONS) National Population Projections (NPP) Principal Projection and have been adjusted to explore characteristic demographic dynamics across three key dimensions:

1. **Ethnic Identity:** White ethnic identities versus non-White ethnic identities
2. **Religious Identity:** Non-Muslim population versus Muslim population
3. **Country of Birth:** Foreign-born versus UK-born populations

The purpose of this note is to offer transparency into the projection process, ensuring that the methods and assumptions are clearly documented. These projections aim to provide insights into long-term demographic trends.

The ONS 2022-based NPP Principal Projection serves as the foundational dataset for this analysis, offering a baseline for total population estimates over a 100-year period. This principal projection incorporates assumptions about fertility, mortality, and net migration set by ONS, reflecting current trends and expert consensus as of 2022.

Although the ONS does not describe any of its projections as forecasts, the 2022-based NPP Principal Projection is generally interpreted as the most likely scenario based on prevailing demographic patterns. The ONS's philosophy underpinning these projections assumes that current trends will largely continue into the future without significant policy interventions, providing a consistent baseline for long-term analysis.

However, the ONS projections are aggregated at the national level and do not inherently disaggregate the population by ethnicity, religion, or country of birth. To address this gap, the present work applies subnational adjustments to disaggregate the total population into the specified categories, enabling a more granular examination of demographic shifts by the stated characteristics.

This analysis builds on established demographic modelling techniques, leveraging data from previous ONS publications, census records, and supplementary sources where available. All projections herein extend to 2122 to capture long-term trends, acknowledging the inherent uncertainties in such extended forecasts.

The projections cover the following demographic characteristics:

1. **Ethnicity:** Examines the evolution of White and non-White populations, reflecting changes in ethnic composition driven by differential fertility rates, migration patterns, and intergenerational shifts.
2. **Religion:** Disaggregates the population into non-Muslim and Muslim groups, accounting for religious identity as a key demographic marker influenced by birth rates, immigration, and cultural dynamics.
3. **Country of Birth:** Differentiates between foreign-born and UK-born populations, highlighting the impact of immigration and their descendants on the UK's demographic profile over time.

The three projection sets outlined in this document—ethnicity (White vs. non-White), religion (Non-Muslim vs. Muslim), and country of birth (foreign-born vs. UK-born)—are developed using a consistent methodological approach anchored to the 2022-based Office for National Statistics (ONS) National Population Projections (NPP) Principal Projection. This section describes the shared framework applied across all analyses.

Each projection employs the cohort-component method, a standard demographic technique also used by the ONS NPPs. This method projects the population forward by applying age- and sex-specific fertility, mortality, and migration rates to an initial base population, iterating annually from 2022 to 2122. To ensure coherence with the national baseline, the resulting characteristic projections are constrained back to the ONS NPP total population estimates for each year. This constraining process mirrors the approach used in ONS subnational projections, maintaining consistency with the principal projection's aggregate trends. Each component of the projection—fertility, mortality, and migration—has its assumptions constrained prior to being inputted into the projection model, ensuring alignment with the ONS baseline while allowing for subgroup-specific adjustments. Consistent with the ONS NPP methodology, a broader assumption is made that current demographic trends will either converge to a long-term value or be maintained as they are over the 100-year projection period, unless otherwise specified.

For each broad population characteristic group (ethnicity, religion, country of birth), separate assumptions are established for fertility, mortality, and migration. These assumptions are tailored to reflect the distinct demographic dynamics of each subgroup, drawing on available data and reasonable extrapolations where necessary.

For fertility, a Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is estimated for each characteristic group, followed by the calculation of an adjustment factor representing the TFR of the subpopulation relative to the population as a whole. These adjustment factors are then applied to amend the projected Age-Specific Fertility Rates (ASFRs) that feed into the projection model. It is assumed that there is no difference in the age-specific fertility rate distribution between either population characteristic subgroup within each projection set, meaning the shape of the fertility curve by age remains consistent across subgroups, with only the overall level adjusted via the TFR factors. Unless otherwise stated in the projection summary tables, an 'implied TFR' is used, where the TFR calculation employs the number of people in the age zero cohort (rather than the number of births in a given year) as the numerator. This method, often utilised in retrospective demographic analyses where complete birth registration data might be missing or unreliable, estimates fertility by examining the number of children who survive to the first age group (typically age 0 or 0–4) relative to the number of women in reproductive ages. While this approach inherently accounts for infant mortality, it remains sensitive to migration effects that could influence the age zero cohort size.

For mortality, although differentials in mortality rates between subpopulations are acknowledged, it is not practical to estimate these differences with sufficient precision at the subgroup level. Consequently, a UK total or UK country-specific total mortality rate is applied uniformly to both subpopulations within each characteristic group, relying on the ONS NPP's national or regional mortality assumptions. Where the Demographic Analysis and Population Projection System (DAPPS) has made an interpolated estimate of Mx rates (age-specific mortality rates) in the projection model, it adopts the Coale-Demeny "North" model life-table regional pattern consistently across all projections and population groups to ensure a standardised mortality age structure.

For migration, the absence of direct data on migration flows by ethnicity or religion poses a challenge. As a result, net migration flow estimates for these characteristics are crudely calculated using England and Wales census data from 2021, leveraging the relative size of migrant stocks to infer flows. For the country of birth characteristic, known flow data is utilised to adjust migration flows at the subpopulation level, providing a more refined estimate where possible. It is assumed that there is no difference in the age-specific migration rate distribution between either population characteristic subgroup within each projection set, implying that the age profile of migrants remains uniform across subgroups, with differences only in the total volume allocated to each group. These tailored assumptions ensure that each projection reflects the unique demographic profile of its respective subgroup while remaining anchored to the ONS baseline.

The following sections detail these assumptions for each projection set, beginning with ethnicity, to provide a transparent basis for the resulting outputs.

Assumptions: Ethnicity projections

This section outlines the methods and assumptions used to construct the ethnicity projections for the United Kingdom and its constituent countries, disaggregating the population into White and Non-White ethnic identities from 2022 to 2122. For projection 1F, ethnic groups have been disaggregated further to White British, White Other and Non-White. The following subsections detail the base population estimates, fertility rates, mortality assumptions, and migration patterns underpinning this analysis.

The initial population estimates for 2022 are derived from the most recent census data available for each UK nation, segmented by age, sex, and ethnic group:

- **England and Wales (EW):** Utilises the ONS Census 2021, providing single-year-of-age (SYOA) data by sex up to age 100+, rounded to the nearest 5. Ethnic groups 13–17 (including Irish, Gypsy, Roma, and other European identities) are classified as White, with all other groups categorised as non-White. For projection 1F, ethnic group 13 is classified as White British and 14–17 as White Other.
- **Scotland (Sco):** Based on the National Records of Scotland (NRS) Census 2022, offering unrounded data by age and sex up to age 85+ in abridged five-year age groups. The abridged proportions within these groups are applied to census single year of age (SYOA) distributions, with 2022 Estimates of the Very Old

(EVOs) used to extend estimates to age 100. Interpolation is employed for ages 85–89 to ensure consistency with finer age granularity.

- **Northern Ireland (NI):** Derived from the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA) Census 2021, providing age and sex data up to age 85+. Proportions from 2021 EVOs are used to extrapolate to age 90+, with further proportional adjustments extending estimates to age 100+. White European is classified as White British in NI as it's not possible to differentiate using publicly available census data.

A final base population is estimated by sex and SYOA to 100+ based on Census 2021 in EW and NI and Census 2022 in Sco. These are then aggregated to create a UK base population. The age- and sex-specific proportions for each ethnic group of this UK estimate are applied to the ONS NPP UK 2022 estimate to establish a base population for projections that aligns with the NPP totals.

Fertility assumptions are calculated using the implied TFR method unless otherwise stated. Projection 1A is an exception and an estimate of TFR is based on [2022 live birth data by ethnicity from the ONS](#), applied uniformly across the UK due to data availability constraints in Scotland and Northern Ireland.

- **Data Source:** Live births by ethnicity characteristic for EW in 2022 are used to establish the distribution of White versus non-White births. Births with non-stated ethnicity are redistributed proportionally according to known White and non-White shares.
- **Total Fertility Rates (TFR):** For projection 1A, TFRs are calculated using the ethnicity-specific base population estimates as denominators. For 2022, the White TFR was estimated to be 1.44, with the overall TFR estimated to be 1.57, and the non-White TFR estimated to be 2.02. Adjustment factors are calculated for the projected ASFRs, relative to the total TFR, are derived as 0.92 for the White population and 1.29 for non-White populations. TFRs for the UK constituent countries are calculated using the implied TFR method.
- **UK Application:** For projection 1A, The EW-derived TFRs and adjustment factors are assumed to apply to the UK as a whole, reflecting the lack of comparable ethnicity-specific fertility data for Scotland and Northern Ireland at the time of analysis.

These fertility rates are then constrained to the NPP fertility projection. Due to inter-race relationships between Whites and Non-Whites, a number of births to White parents are categorised as Non-White, typically classified as mixed-race using census ethnic classifications. This phenomenon is accounted for in the respective fertility rates inputted into the model for both White and Non-White groups across all projections. For projection 1F, which examines White subgroups, the same assumption is applied between Whites and Non-Whites, but it is assumed that no births from inter-race relationships occur between White subgroups, preserving distinct fertility rates within the White population.

Mortality assumptions are simplified due to limited ethnicity-specific life expectancy data:

- **National Pattern:** Both White and non-White populations are assumed to follow the national mortality schedules embedded in the ONS 2022-based NPP Principal Projection. This includes age- and sex-specific death rates projected forward to 2122.
- **Rationale:** While ethnic differences in mortality may exist, insufficient granular data precludes differentiation at this stage. Future iterations may incorporate such variations if supported by additional evidence.

Migration is a critical driver of ethnic composition, with assumptions reflecting current patterns of net migration:

- **Net Migration Composition:** As net non-EU immigration exceeds both emigration and EU immigration in recent years, all net migrants are assumed to originate from non-EU countries.
- **Ethnic Distribution:** Based on the EW Census 2021, approximately 13% of non-EU, non-British residents are classified as White (e.g. from North America, Oceania, or other non-EU European countries). Consequently, net migration is apportioned as 13% White and 87% non-White.
- **Application:** This ethnic split is applied to the ONS NPP net migration figures annually from 2022 to 2122, assuming continuity in the observed non-EU dominance and ethnic proportions.

Key limitations include the assumption of uniform fertility across the UK, the absence of ethnicity-specific mortality differentiation, and the static 13% White proportion in net migration. These could be revisited in future work as data become available.

Summary table: Ethnicity Projections Assumptions

Projection number	Geography	Fertility (ASFR adjustment factor)	Mortality	Migration	First year White <50%	Notes
1A	UK	White: 1.44 (0.92) Non-White: 2.02 (1.29)	UK, 2022-based NPP	White: 13% Non-White: 87% of all net migration	2079	TFR estimated from 2022 live births data by ethnicity for EW, applied to SC and NI.
1B	EN	White: 1.59 (0.94) Non-White: 1.93 (1.19)	EN, 2022-based NPP	White: 13% Non-White: 87% of all net migration	2074	As above
1C	WA	White: 1.54 (0.98) Non-White: 1.88 (1.20)	WA, 2022-based NPP	White: 13% Non-White: 87% of all net migration	2090	As above
1D	SC	White: 1.35 (0.97) Non-White: 1.73 (1.25)	SC, 2022-based NPP	White: 13% Non-White: 87% of all net migration	2091	
1E	NI	White: 1.78 (0.99) Non-White: 2.13 (1.19)	NI, 2022-based NPP	White: 13% Non-White: 87% of all net migration	After 2122	Non-White Net Migration manual adjusted negative values
1F	UK	White British: 1.61 (1.01) White Other: 0.91 (0.57) Non-White: 1.92 (1.20)	UK, 2022-based NPP	White: 13% Non-White: 87% of all net migration	2063 (vs White Other & Non-White)	1) TFR differs to 1A as uses implied TFR. 2) Note very low White other TFR, likely associated with some births to White Other parents in Britain

						reclassified as White British. 3) White British to be smaller proportion to Non-White by 2071. 4) White Other does not include White European in NI, so this is included as White British for NI.
--	--	--	--	--	--	---

Note: All assumptions apply to 2022, the base year of the projections.

Assumptions: Religion Projections

This section outlines the methods and assumptions used to construct the religion projections for the United Kingdom, disaggregating the population into Non-Muslim and Muslim religious identities from 2022 to 2122.

These projections are calibrated to the 2022-based ONS National Population Projections (NPP) Principal Projection, employing the cohort-component method as described in the "Methodological Framework for Projections" section.

The following subsections detail the base population estimates, fertility rates, mortality assumptions, and migration patterns specific to this analysis.

A key assumption in these projections is that Muslims and Non-Muslims are treated as two distinct and stable population groups throughout their life course.

This model assumes no religious conversion, meaning an individual identified as Muslim cannot become Non-Muslim, and vice versa, over time.

Additionally, it is assumed that all descendants of each religious group inherit the religious identity of their parents, maintaining the Non-Muslim or Muslim classification across generations without variation.

The initial population estimates for 2022 are derived from the most recent census data available for each UK nation, segmented by age, sex, and religious identity:

- **England and Wales (EW):** Utilises the ONS Census 2021, providing single-year-of-age (SYOA) data by sex up to age 100+, rounded to the nearest 5. The population is split into Muslim and Non-Muslim groups, with "Non-Muslim" encompassing all other religious affiliations and no religion.
- **Scotland (Sco):** Based on the National Records of Scotland (NRS) Census 2022, offering unrounded data by age and sex up to age 85+ in abridged five-year age groups. The abridged proportions within these groups are applied to estimate SYOA distributions, with 2022 Estimates of the Very Old (EVOs) used to extend estimates to age 100. Interpolation is employed for ages 85–89 to ensure consistency with finer age granularity.
- **Northern Ireland (NI):** Derived from the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA) Census 2021, providing age and sex data up to age 85+. Proportions from 2021 EVOs are used to extrapolate to age 90+, with further proportional adjustments extending estimates to age 100+.

A final base population is estimated by sex and SYOA to 100+ based on Census 2021 in EW and NI and Census 2022 in Sco. These are then aggregated to create a UK base population. The age- and sex-specific proportions

for each religious group of this UK estimate are applied to the ONS NPP UK 2022 estimate to establish a base population for projections that aligns with the NPP totals.

All fertility assumptions are estimated using the implied TFR method due to limited religion-specific birth data:

- **Data Source:** Total Fertility Rates (TFRs) are derived by comparing the number of age 0 individuals (as a proxy for births) to the female population aged 15–49 from the 2022 base population estimates. This approach uses the aggregated UK census-derived data.
- **Total Fertility Rates (TFR):** For 2022, the Non-Muslim TFR is estimated at 1.54, the overall TFR at 1.60, and the Muslim TFR at 2.33. Adjustment factors relative to the total TFR are calculated as 0.96 for Non-Muslim and 1.44 for Muslim populations.
- **UK Application:** These TFRs and adjustment factors are applied uniformly across the UK, constrained to the NPP fertility projection as outlined in the "Methodological Framework" section.

Regarding mortality:

- **National Pattern:** Similar to the ethnicity projections, both Non-Muslim and Muslim populations are assumed to follow the national mortality schedules embedded in the ONS 2022-based NPP Principal Projection. This includes age- and sex-specific death rates projected forward to 2122.
- **Rationale:** Insufficient religion-specific mortality data precludes differentiation at this stage, consistent with the approach taken for ethnicity.

Migration assumptions are informed by the religious composition of foreign-born populations:

- **Net Migration Composition:** Net migration follows the ONS NPP figures, with the religious split approximated using the proportion of foreign-born individuals in EW identified as religious in the Census 2021.
- **Religious Distribution:** Approximately 18% of overall net migrants are estimated to be Muslim, based on the prevalence of Muslim populations among foreign-born residents from countries of origin commonly associated with Islam. The remaining 82% are classified as Non-Muslim. An additional projection, 2F, has been provided to illustrate how a higher Muslim net migration assumption (30% Muslim, 70% Non-Muslim) affects the projected population size of the Muslim group.
- **Application:** This 18% Muslim and 82% Non-Muslim split is applied annually to the ONS NPP net migration totals from 2022 to 2122 in projections 2A–2E, while projection 2F uses the 30% Muslim and 70% Non-Muslim split, assuming stability in the religious composition of migrants within each scenario.

Key limitations include the reliance on an estimated TFR derived from population ratios rather than direct birth data, the absence of religion-specific mortality differentiation, and the static 18% Muslim proportion in net migration used in projections 2A–2E.

The 18% Muslim proportion was estimated using very crude assumptions regarding the religion of a person from a given country of birth and their application to the UK as a whole. To explore the sensitivity of these projections to migration assumptions, an additional projection, 2F, incorporates a higher Muslim net migration proportion of 30%, demonstrating the potential impact on the Muslim population size. These assumptions may be refined in future iterations if more granular data emerge.

Summary table: Religion Projections Assumptions

Projection number	Geography	Fertility (ASFR adjustment factor)	Mortality	Migration	Notes
2A	UK	Non-Muslim: 1.54 (0.96) Muslim: 2.33 (1.45)	UK, 2022-based NPP	Non-Muslim: 82% Muslim: 18% of all net migration	
2B	EN	Non-Muslim: 1.55 (0.96) Muslim: 2.33 (1.44)	EN, 2022-based NPP	Non-Muslim: 82% Muslim: 18% of all net migration	
2C	WA	Non-Muslim: 1.54 (0.99) Muslim: 2.33 (1.49)	WA, 2022-based NPP	Non-Muslim: 82% Muslim: 18% of all net migration	
2D	SC	Non-Muslim: 1.36 (0.98) Muslim: 2.28 (1.65)	SC, 2022-based NPP	Non-Muslim: 82% Muslim: 18% of all net migration	
2E	NI	Non-Muslim: 1.79 (1.00) Muslim: 2.32 (1.29)	NI, 2022-based NPP	Non-Muslim: 82% Muslim: 18% of all net migration	
2F	UK	Non-Muslim: 1.54 (0.96) Muslim: 2.33 (1.45)	UK, 2022-based NPP	Non-Muslim: 70% Muslim: 30% of all net migration	

Note: All assumptions apply to 2022, the base year of the projections.

Assumptions: Country of Birth Projections

This section outlines the methods and assumptions used to construct the country of birth projections for the United Kingdom, disaggregating the population into UK-born, foreign-born and second-generation UK-born groups from 2022 to 2122.

These projections are calibrated to the 2022-based ONS National Population Projections (NPP) Principal Projection, employing the cohort-component method as described in the "Methodological Framework for Projections" section. The following subsections detail the base population estimates, fertility rates, mortality assumptions, migration patterns, and additional considerations specific to this analysis.

Efforts were made to estimate the second-generation population born in the UK prior to 2022, defined as individuals born in the UK with at least one foreign-born parent.

However, only missing or, at best, partial data was available from existing sources, such as historical birth records and census data, which do not consistently track parental country of birth over time.

It is acknowledged that a substantial proportion of the UK population comprises second-generation migrants, reflecting the legacy of past immigration. Despite this, the lack of comprehensive and reliable data precludes a robust estimation of this group within the base population.

To address this limitation in part, the second-generation UK-born population born post-2022 could be disaggregated from the foreign-born projection using the projected birth data. By subtracting births from the foreign-born population and age-forwarding subsequent UK-born offspring, a projection of the second-generation cohort can be derived, offering a partial solution to their representation within the projection model.

The initial population estimates for 2022 are derived from the most recent census data available for each UK nation, segmented by age, sex, and country of birth:

- **England and Wales (EW):** Utilises the ONS Census 2021, providing single-year-of-age (SYOA) data by sex up to age 100+, rounded to the nearest integer. The population is split into UK-born (England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland) and foreign-born (all other countries).
- **Scotland (Sco):** Based on the National Records of Scotland (NRS) Census 2022, offering unrounded data by age and sex up to age 85+ in abridged five-year age groups. The abridged proportions within these groups are applied to estimate SYOA distributions, with 2022 Estimates of the Very Old (EVOs) used to extend estimates to age 100. Interpolation is employed for ages 85–89 to ensure consistency with finer age granularity.
- **Northern Ireland (NI):** Derived from the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA) Census 2021, providing age and sex data up to age 85+. Proportions from 2021 EVOs are used to extrapolate to age 90+, with further proportional adjustments extending estimates to age 100+.

A final base population is estimated by sex and SYOA to 100+ based on Census 2021 in EW and NI and Census 2022 in Sco. These are then aggregated to create a UK base population. The age- and sex-specific proportions for each country of birth group of this UK estimate are applied to the ONS NPP UK 2022 estimate to establish a base population for projections that aligns with the NPP totals.

Fertility assumptions are calculated using the implied TFR method unless otherwise stated. Projection 3A is an exception and an estimate of TFR is based on birth characteristics data, adjusted for country of birth:

- **Data Source:** TFRs are estimated using the distribution of [births by parental country of birth from the ONS 2023](#) birth characteristics estimate for EW, applied UK-wide due to data constraints elsewhere.
- **Total Fertility Rates (TFR):** For 2022, the overall UK TFR is estimated at 1.54, with the UK-born TFR at 1.39 and the foreign-born TFR at 1.97. Adjustment factors relative to the total TFR are calculated as 0.91 for UK-born and 1.28 for foreign-born populations. TFRs for the UK constituent countries are calculated using the implied TFR method.
- **UK Application:** These TFRs and adjustment factors are constrained to the NPP fertility projection, consistent with the approach outlined in the "Methodological Framework" section.

Regarding mortality assumptions:

- **National Pattern:** Similar to the ethnicity and religion projections, both UK-born and foreign-born populations are assumed to follow the national mortality schedules embedded in the ONS 2022-based NPP Principal Projection. This includes age- and sex-specific death rates projected forward to 2122.
- **Rationale:** Limited country of birth-specific mortality data precludes differentiation at this stage, aligning with prior assumptions.

Migration assumptions reflect the dominance of net inflows in the foreign-born population:

- **Net Migration Composition:** All net migration is assumed to contribute to the foreign-born group, with an adjustment factor of 1.011 applied to the ONS NPP net migration figures to account for how immigration affects the size of the foreign-born population more accurately. A negative net migration rate, with an adjustment factor of -0.011 of the overall net migration figure, is applied to the UK-born population to reflect the excess of UK born emigration over immigration.
- **Application:** These adjustment factors are used to estimate the immigration and emigration composition of both populations annually from 2022 to 2122. Individuals born in British Overseas Territories are excluded from the UK-born category.
- **Rationale:** The positive adjustment for foreign-born and negative for UK-born reflect current trends of net inflows from abroad and net outflows of UK nationals.

We also need to make a few points regarding UK-born second-generation migrants.

Pre-2022 second-generation migrants, defined as UK-born individuals with at least one foreign-born parent, are not included in this analysis due to significant data limitations.

Historical birth records and census data lack consistent tracking of parental country of birth over time, with usable data only available post-1997 and restricted to foreign-born mothers until 2008, alongside absent mortality and migration details for this group.

Consequently, pre-2022 second-generation migrants may be embedded within the UK-born base population.

For post-2022 projections, second-generation UK-born migrants are estimated using births data from the foreign-born population in the UK from 2022 onward. These cohorts are aged forward with age- and sex-specific mortality rates (converted to l_x values) from the ONS 2022-based NPP Principal Projection and UK-born age- and sex-specific migration rates (adjustment factor -0.011) applied. The resulting second-generation population is then subtracted from the foreign-born projection annually, isolating the true size of the foreign-born population attributable solely to net migration.

Key limitations include the use of 2023 birth estimates applied retrospectively to 2022, the absence of country of birth-specific mortality differentiation, and the simplified treatment of second-generation migrants due to data gaps.

Additionally, the static adjustment factors for migration (1.011 and -0.011) may not capture future shifts in migration patterns. These assumptions may be revisited as more detailed data become available.



Summary table: Country of Birth Projections Assumptions

Projection number	Geography	Fertility (ASFR adjustment factor)	Mortality	Migration (Net migration adjustment factors)	Notes
3A	UK	UK-Born: 1.39 (0.91) Foreign Born: 1.97 (1.28)	UK, 2022-based NPP	UK-Born (Inc. 2 nd Gen): -0.011 Foreign Born: 1.011	1) UK Born second generation migrants disaggregated from projected foreign born population. 2) TFR estimated from 2023 live births data by country of birth for EW, applied to SC and NI.
3B	EN	UK-Born: 1.33 (0.91) Foreign Born: 1.87 (1.28)	EN, 2022-based NPP	UK-Born (Inc. 2 nd Gen): -0.011 Foreign Born: 1.011	UK TFR adjustment factors applied.
3C	WA	UK-Born: 1.29 (0.91) Foreign Born: 1.81 (1.28)	WA, 2022-based NPP	UK-Born (Inc. 2 nd Gen): -0.011 Foreign Born: 1.011	UK TFR adjustment factors applied.
3D	SC	UK-Born: 1.17 (0.91) Foreign Born: 1.65 (1.28)	SC, 2022-based NPP	UK-Born (Inc. 2 nd Gen): -0.011 Foreign Born: 1.011	UK TFR adjustment factors applied.
3E	NI	UK-Born: 1.50 (0.91) Foreign Born: 2.11 (1.28)	NI, 2022-based NPP	UK-Born (Inc. 2 nd Gen): -0.011 Foreign Born: 1.011	UK TFR adjustment factors applied.

Note: All assumptions apply to 2022, the base year of the projections.


Appendix: Graphs and supporting tables for all projections

Projection 1A




Population Pyramid, United Kingdom, 2075

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection



Population Pyramids by Ethnicity, United Kingdom, 2025 - 2100

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection



Ethnicity Projection Summary, United Kingdom

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection (Selected Years)

Year Total Population White (%) Non-White (%)

2025	69,867,979	80.3	19.7
2050	77,201,483	65.2	34.8
2075	80,683,666	51.5	48.5
2100	81,447,095	39.9	60.1

Ethnicity Projection Summary (Age 40 and Younger), United Kingdom

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection (Selected Years)

Year Total Population White(%) Non-White (%)


2025	35,300,744	73.6	26.4
2050	34,701,020	56.5	43.5
2075	33,383,147	41.7	58.3
2100	32,456,315	30.6	69.4

Projections 1B-1E

Population Projections of White and Non-White Ethnic Identities,
2022 - 2122, UK Nations

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection


— Total Population — White Population — Non-White Population



Proportion of White and Non-White Populations,
2022 - 2122, UK Nations

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection


White Population Non-White Population



Population Pyramid, England, 2075


Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection

White Non-White




Population Pyramid, Wales , 2075

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection




Population Pyramid, Scotland , 2075

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection



Population Pyramid, Northern Ireland , 2075
Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection



Ethnicity Projection Summary, UK Nations

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection (Selected Years)

Year	Country	White(%)	Non-White (%)
2025	England	78.2	21.8
2050	England	62.8	37.2
2075	England	49.0	51.0
2100	England	37.4	62.6
2025	Wales	91.0	9.0
2050	Wales	73.6	26.4
2075	Wales	57.8	42.2
2100	Wales	44.3	55.7
2025	Scotland	90.1	9.9
2050	Scotland	74.3	25.7
2075	Scotland	58.8	41.2
2100	Scotland	45.4	54.6
2025	Northern Ireland	95.8	4.2
2050	Northern Ireland	92.2	7.8
2075	Northern Ireland	87.6	12.4
2100	Northern Ireland	82.0	18.0

Ethnicity Projection Summary {Age 40 and Younger), UK Nations

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection (Selected Years)

Year	Country	White{%)	Non-White {%)
2025	England	71.1	28.9
2050	England	53.8	46.2
2075	England	38.9	61.1
2100	England	28.0	72.0
2025	Wales	86.9	13.1
2050	Wales	66.2	33.8
2075	Wales	47.7	52.3
2100	Wales	34.3	65.7
2025	Scotland	85.0	15.0
2050	Scotland	65.2	34.8
2075	Scotland	48.1	51.9
2100	Scotland	35.6	64.4
2025	Northern Ireland	94.1	5.9
2050	Northern Ireland	90.1	9.9
2075	Northern Ireland	84.2	15.8
2100	Northern Ireland	77.1	22.9

First Year White Population Falls Below 50%, UK Nations

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection

Country	First Year White < 50%
England	2074
Wales	2090
Scotland	2091
Northern Ireland	After 2122 ⁷

⁷ White population remains above 50% through 2122.



First Year White Population Falls Below 50% (Age 40 and Younger), UK Nations

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection

Country	First Year White< 50%
England	2057
Wales	2072
Scotland	2072
Northern Ireland	After2122 ⁷

⁷ White population remains above 50% through 2122.


Projection 1F



Population Pyramids by Ethnicity, United Kingdom, 2025 - 2100

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection

White British White Other Non-White



Ethnicity Projection Summary (All Ages), United Kingdom

White British, White Other, and Non-White, Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection



Year	Total Population	White British(%)	White Other(%)	Non-White{%)
2025	69,867,979	73.0	7.3	19.7
2050	77,201,483	57.0	8.2	34.8
2075	80,683,666	44.0	7.9	48.1
2100	81,447,095	33.7	7.1	59.3

Ethnicity Projection Summary (Age 40 and Younger), United Kingdom

White British, White Other, and Non-White, Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection

Year	Total Population	White British(%)	White Other(%)	Non-White{%)
2025	35,300,744	65.2	8.3	26.4
2050	34,701,020	49.5	7.0	43.5
2075	33,383,147	36.1	6.2	57.7
2100	32,456,315	26.6	5.5	67.9


Projection 2A



Population Pyramids by Religion, United Kingdom, 2025 - 2100

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection

Non-Muslim Muslim



Religion Projection Summary, United Kingdom

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection (Selected Years)

Year	Total Population	Non-Muslim (%)	Muslim (%)
2025	69,867,979	93.0	7.0
2050	77,201,483	88.7	11.3
2075	80,683,666	84.7	15.3
2100	81,447,095	80.8	19.2

Religion Projection Summary (Age 40 and Younger), United Kingdom

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection (Selected Years)


Vear	Total Population	Non-Muslim (%)	Muslim(%)
2025	35,300,744	90.2	9.8
2050	34,701,020	85.4	14.6
2075	33,383,147	80.5	19.5
2100	32,456,315	76.0	24.0

Projections 2B-2E

Population Projections of Non-Muslim and Muslim Religious Identities,
2022 - 2122, UK Nations

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection


— Total Population — Non-Muslim Population — Muslim Population



Proportion of Non-Muslim and Muslim Populations,
2022 - 2122, UK Nations

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection


- Non-Muslim Population - Muslim Population



Population Pyramid, England, 2075


Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection

Non-Muslim Muslim




Population Pyramid, Wales , 2075

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection




Population Pyramid, Scotland , 2075

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection



Population Pyramid, Northern Ireland , 2075
Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection



Religion Projection Summary, UK Nations

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection (Selected Years)

Year	Country	Non-Muslim (%)	Muslim (%)
2025	England	92.2	7.8
2050	England	87.8	12.2
2075	England	83.8	16.2
2100	England	79.9	20.1
2025	Wales	97.1	2.9
2050	Wales	93.0	7.0
2075	Wales	89.1	10.9
2100	Wales	85.3	14.7
2025	Scotland	97.0	3.0
2050	Scotland	93.0	7.0
2075	Scotland	88.5	11.5
2100	Scotland	83.7	16.3
2025	Northern Ireland	99.3	0.7
2050	Northern Ireland	98.5	1.5
2075	Northern Ireland	97.4	2.6
2100	Northern Ireland	96.0	4.0

Religion Projection Summary {Age 40 and Younger), UK Nations

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection (Selected Years)

Year	Country	Non-Muslim {%)	Muslim{%)
2025	England	89.2	10.8
2050	England	84.4	15.6
2075	England	79.6	20.4
2100	England	75.1	24.9
2025	Wales	95.6	4.4
2050	Wales	90.8	9.2
2075	Wales	85.6	14.4
2100	Wales	80.7	19.3
2025	Scotland	95.6	4.4
2050	Scotland	90.0	10.0
2075	Scotland	83.9	16.1
2100	Scotland	78.0	22.0
2025	Northern Ireland	98.9	1.1
2050	Northern Ireland	98.0	2.0
2075	Northern Ireland	96.5	3.5
2100	Northern Ireland	94.5	5.5

First Year Muslim Population Reaches 15%, UK Nations

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection

Country	First Year Muslim ≥ 15%
England	2068
Wales	2102
Scotland	2094
Northern Ireland	After 2122 ¹

⁷ Muslim population remains below 15% through 2122.



First Year Muslim Population Reaches 15% (Age 40 and Younger), UK Nations

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection

Country	First Year Muslim ≥ 15%
England	2047
Wales	2079
Scotland	2071
Northern Ireland	After 2122 ¹

¹ Muslim population remains below 15% through 2122.

Projection 2F



Religion Projection Summary, United Kingdom

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection (Selected Years)



Year	Total Population	Non-Muslim (%)	Muslim (%)
2025	69,867,979	92.6	7.4
2050	77,201,483	86.5	13.5
2075	80,683,666	80.4	19.6
2100	81,447,095	74.5	25.5

Religion Projection Summary (Age 40 and Younger), United Kingdom

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection with 30% Muslim Net Migration (Selected Years)

Year	Total Population	Non-Muslim (%)	Muslim(%)
2025	35,300,744	89.6	10.4
2050	34,701,020	82.2	17.8
2075	33,383,147	74.8	25.2
2100	32,456,315	68.1	31.9

Projection 3A




Population Pyramids by Birthplace, United Kingdom, 2025 - 2100

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection

UK-Born

Foreign-Born

Second Generation Migrants, UK Born post-2022




Foreign-Born and Second-Generation Projection Summary, United Kingdom

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection (Selected Years)

Year	UK-Born (%)	Foreign-Born (%)	Second Generation Migrants, UK Born post-2022 (%)	Foreign-Born + Second-Gen(%)
2025	80.8	18.2	1.0	19.2
2050	66.3	24.3	9.5	33.8
2075	52.5	26.6	20.9	47.5
2100	39.4	25.8	34.8	60.6


Projection 3B-3E



Proportion of UK-Born, Foreign-Born, and Second-Generation Migrants, 2022 - 2122, UK Nations

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection


UK-Born Population Foreign-Born Population Second-Generation Migrants




Population Pyramid, England, 2075

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection


UK-Born Foreign-Born Second-Generation




Population Pyramid, Wales , 2075
Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection



Population Pyramid, Scotland , 2075
Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection



Population Pyramid, Northern Ireland , 2075
Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection



Country of Birth Projection Summary, UK Nations

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection (Selected Years)

Year	Country	UK-Born(%)	Foreign-Born (%)	Second-Generation (%)
2025	England	79.4	19.5	1.1
2050	England	65.2	25.0	9.8
2075	England	51.9	26.7	21.4
2100	England	39.2	25.4	35.4
2025	Wales	89.7	9.8	0.5
2050	Wales	70.7	22.7	6.6
2075	Wales	53.5	30.8	15.7
2100	Wales	38.6	33.4	28.0
2025	Scotland	87.0	12.4	0.5
2050	Scotland	71.2	21.8	7.0
2075	Scotland	57.7	26.3	16.0
2100	Scotland	46.9	25.8	27.4
2025	Northern Ireland	90.3	9.1	0.6
2050	Northern Ireland	86.5	9.7	3.8
2075	Northern Ireland	82.1	9.2	8.7
2100	Northern Ireland	76.0	8.1	15.9

Country of Birth Projection Summary (Age 40 and Younger), UK Nations

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection (Selected Years)

Year	Country	UK-Born(%)	Foreign-Born (%)	Second-Generation (%)
2025	England	77.8	20.1	2.1
2050	England	61.9	16.5	21.6
2075	England	42.7	15.4	41.9
2100	England	28.2	14.9	56.9
2025	Wales	87.6	11.4	1.0
2050	Wales	65.3	18.8	15.9
2075	Wales	43.3	19.7	37.1
2100	Wales	27.7	18.5	53.8
2025	Scotland	83.2	15.7	1.1
2050	Scotland	66.1	17.6	16.4
2075	Scotland	51.2	15.4	33.4
2100	Scotland	40.7	14.3	45.0
2025	Northern Ireland	89.7	9.1	1.2
2050	Northern Ireland	87.3	3.9	8.8
2075	Northern Ireland	79.7	3.5	16.7
2100	Northern Ireland	69.8	4.3	25.8

First Year Foreign-Born + Second-Generation Reaches 50%, UK Nations


Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection

Country	First Year Foreign-Born + Second-Gen \geq 50%
England	2079
Wales	2081
Scotland	2093
Northern Ireland	After 2122 ¹

¹ Foreign-Born + Second-Generation population remains below 50% through 2122.

First Year Foreign-Born + Second-Generation Reaches 50% (Age 40 and Younger), UK Nations

Calibrated to the 2022-based ONS NPP Principal Projection

Country	First Year Foreign-Born + Second-Gen  50%
England	2062
Wales	2065
Scotland	2078
Northern Ireland	After 2122 ⁷

⁷ Foreign-Born + Second-Generation population remains below 50% through 2122.

Notes

¹ Eric Kaufmann (2018) *Whiteshift: Populism, immigration and the future of white majorities*. Penguin

² EKOS, 'INCREASED POLARIZATION ON ATTITUDES TO IMMIGRATION RESHAPING THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE IN CANADA', April 15, 2019, https://www.ekospolitics.com/wp-content/uploads/full_report_april_15_2019.pdf

³ Roger Eatwell and Matt Goodwin (2018) *National populism: The revolt against liberal democracy*. Penguin; see also Matt Goodwin (2023) *Values, voice and virtue: The new British politics*. Random House

⁴ 'Europe's growing Muslim population', Pew Research Center. November 2017. Available online: [https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2017/11/29/europes-growing-muslim-population/#:~:text=Even%20with%20no%20future%20migration%2C%20Europe's%20Muslim%20population%20is%20projected,age%20patterns%20\(see%20here\)](https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2017/11/29/europes-growing-muslim-population/#:~:text=Even%20with%20no%20future%20migration%2C%20Europe's%20Muslim%20population%20is%20projected,age%20patterns%20(see%20here)) (accessed May 13 2025).

⁵ On polling evidence, see Matthew Goodwin. 'Shocking: What British Muslims Think', the Matt Goodwin Substack, April 10, 2024. Available online: <https://www.mattgoodwin.org/p/shocking-what-british-muslims-think> (accessed May 13, 2025).

⁶ On concerns over social integration see Ed Husain (2021) *Among the Mosques: A Journey Across Muslim Britain*. Bloomsbury Publishing.

⁷ Robert D. Putnam (2007) E pluribus unum: Diversity and community in the twenty-first century the 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture. *Scandinavian political studies*, 30(2), 137-174.

⁸ Stenner, K. (2005) *The Authoritarian Dynamic*.