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De Mirmont on Naval Construction in Apollonius *Le Navire Argo et la science nautique d'Apollonios de Rhodes*, H. de la Ville de Mirmont, professeur-adjoint à la facnlité des lettres de Bordeaux. Paris: Armand Colin et Cie. 1895.

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demonstrated that not only a man's clothes but anything in any way or degree associated with him may be regarded not merely as a vehicle of personal connection but actually as part of the man himself: his personalty is his personality. With this sure basis to go upon, Mr. Hartland then attacks the problem of the offerings made all over the world to sacred wells and trees. He begins by setting forth a vast collection of the facts which require explanation; and it soon becomes apparent that the gift-theory of sacrifice will only account for a relatively small number of them, viz. for those offerings which possess some value; whereas a satisfactory hypothesis 'must be equally applicable to sacred images, crosses, trees, wells, cairns and temples. It must account not merely for the pins in wells and the rags on trees, but also for the nails in trees, the pins in images, the earth or bricks hung on the sacred tree in India, the stones and twigs, flowers and coca-quids thrown upon cairns, the pellets which constellate Japanese idols, the strips of cloth and other articles which decorate Japanese temples, the pilgrims' names written on the walls of the temple of Kapilo on the banks of the Hugli, the nails fixed by the consuls in the Cella Jovis at Rome, and those driven into the galleries and floors of Protestant churches in the East of France. These are the outcome of equivalent practices, and the solution of their meaning, if a true one, must fit them all' (p. 212). Bearing in mind the savage conception of personality, viz. that it includes anything which is associated in thought with the person, however slight and transient its connection in fact, we can understand that anything which passes merely through a man's hands becomes part of the man; and that therefore benefits conferred upon it will be felt by the man. In a word, the nature or value (or want of value) of the offering is absolutely irrelevant: the one and only essential is that it shall be part of the person who through it is to be placed in permanent relation to the spirit to whom the offering is made: 'our examination of the practices of throwing pins into wells, of tying rags on

bushes and trees, of driving nails into trees or stocks, of throwing stones and sticks on cairns, and the analogous practices throughout the world, leads to the conclusion that they are to be interpreted as acts of ceremonial union with the spirit identified with well, with tree, or stock or cairn' (p. 228).

Robertson Smith exploded the gift-theory as far as animal-sacrifice is concerned. Mr. Hartland has made it for ever untenable as an explanation of the other forms of sacrifice. The sacramental theory of sacrifice is now the only one which has any claim to be considered a scientific hypothesis. But the theory that religion originates merely in fear is bound up with the gift-theory of sacrifice, and must share its fortunes. The importance therefore of Mr. Hartland's second volume to anthropology and the history of natural religion cannot easily be over-rated.

As anything that has once been connected with a man continues ever after to be part of that man, the unity of personality is compatible with its divisibility. *Per contra*, the divisibility of the clan and the individuality of its members does not prevent the savage from attributing to the clan a unity of existence as perfect and complete as that of any individual person; and the second half of this volume is occupied in demonstrating that 'the unity of the kin is a vital conception penetrating savage life to its core' (p. 442), and in deducing from it the explanation of various funeral rites and marriage ceremonies.

Perhaps it may be inquired what all this has to do with the legend of Perseus. The answer is that one incident in tales of the Perseus type is that the hero leaves behind him something by which his friends can tell whether he is alive or dead. That something is of course part of himself, on the savage theory of the self, and is called by Mr. Hartland the Life Token (*External Soul*). Another incident is that the death of the hero or of his adversary must be avenged by the whole of his clan—hence the need for Mr. Hartland to illustrate the solidarity of the clan.

F. B. JEVONS.

DE MIRMONT ON NAVAL CONSTRUCTION IN APOLLONIUS.

Le Navire Argo et la science nautique d'Apollonios de Rhodes, H. DE LA VILLE DE MIRMONT, professeur-adjoint à la faculté des lettres de Bordeaux. Paris: Armand Colin et Cie. 1895.

THIS is an elaborate dissertation of sixty pages marked by all the care and thoughtfulness which is characteristic of M. de Mirmont's writings. It is observed in a note that in my review of the same author's

translation of the *Argonautica*, about three and a half years ago, I have not criticized his interpretation of the passages referring to marine manoeuvres and seafaring matters generally. This is true enough, but it is obvious that a reviewer, in the limited space allowed him, cannot deal with everything, and it is difficult for a layman to avoid blunders amid the technicalities of marine affairs—a difficulty which is much increased when the reviewer is English, and the technical terms are in French. However on the present occasion no choice is left me, and I must do the best I can. The only general fault to be found with this dissertation is that it errs on the side of excessive minuteness and over-elaboration. There is hardly a marine phrase in the *Argonautica*—and there are a good many—that is not commented on. Thus the writer carefully notes all along the route the various places at which the Argonauts took in provisions and what these provisions consisted of. He carefully explains that in spite of various changes in the *personnel*, whether by death, or departure, or the addition of fresh heroes, the number of fifty rowers is always preserved. He chronicles every passage in the four books, amounting to about forty in number, where we read that the Argonauts used the oar. Sometimes he is ‘flogging a dead horse,’ as where he devotes a page to show that the *πρόροι* (forestays) were fastened on each side of the fore part of the ship, and not to the prow and poop respectively, or where he takes the trouble of proving that Argo was not the first ship. No one would care to deny either of these propositions. Again he digresses on the inferiority of Ancaeus to Tiphys as a steersman, the former having been chosen by Hera who ‘ne se connaît pas en hommes comme Athéné.’

M. de Mirmont considers that one of the main objects of Apollonius in writing the *Argonautica* was to reproduce the Homeric ship. Although his work could not command a large public, yet it was only a select audience that he desired to please, and this had its compensations, for he was thus at liberty to indulge in an archaeological exactness which was not possible for popular writers, such as dramatists. Assuming this to be the case—and I am not concerned to question it—we expect to find, and do find, many technical Homeric words, but we also find many words that are not in Homer such as *σκαλμός*, *λίον*, *λαῖφος*, *κεράλα*, *σέλμα*, etc. These terms however are not inconsistent with the theory of M. de Mirmont, because

they are only later names of things that are found in Homer. But I do not see how the theory can be maintained when we find, according to M. de Mirmont, Homeric words used in a sense in which they do not occur in Homer. I am therefore led to criticize some of M. de Mirmont’s interpretations as adverse to his own theory, which I hold to be, in the main, correct. It turns out then that I am sometimes defending his theory against himself. Apollonius, we are told, was well acquainted with the sea, having at any rate been to Rhodes and back, but it must be said that the latest German criticism, as represented by Busch, Gercke, and Susemihl, denies that Apollonius ever returned to Alexandria from Rhodes. Without assenting to this, it is an opinion that has to be met. M. de Mirmont draws a somewhat amusing but quite fanciful picture of Apollonius and his friends (like some ‘Innocent Abroad’) sauntering down to the quay to examine the ships, or to ‘assist at’ a launch. On his return home Apollonius draws up a *procès-verbal* of the launch, and imagines what it must have been like in heroic times. The naval authorities used by M. de Mirmont here are the same as those used by him in the notes to his translation, viz. Cartault’s *La Trière athénienne* and Vars’ *L’Art nautique dans l’antiquité et spécialement en Grèce* (which is an adaptation of Breusing’s *Nautik der Alten*), with a decided preference for Cartault. M. de Mirmont is apparently unacquainted with Mr. Cecil Torr’s excellent little book, *Ancient Ships*,—at any rate he makes no allusion to it. However it is now time to descend to particulars and note some of the interpretations here given, chiefly of those in which I differ from the writer.

1. *δρύοχοι*. There is a dispute as to whether this word means the ribs of the ship (*ἐγκοίλια*), or the cradle or framework made for the ship while it is in course of construction, i.e. whether they are or are not a part of the ship itself. M. de Mirmont, following Scheffer and Cartault, prefers the latter interpretation, which has some support from old commentators, but the express statement of Procopius (*de bell. Goth.* iv. 22), quoted by Mr. Torr, *τά τε παχέα ξύμπαντα ξύλα ἐς τὴν τρόπιν ἐναρμοσθέντα—ἅπερ οἱ μὲν ποιηταὶ δρύόχους καλοῦσιν, ἕτεροι δὲ νομέας—ἐκ τοῖχου μὲν ἕκαστον θατέρου ἄχρι ἐς τῆς νεὼς δέχκει τὸν ἕτερον τοῖχον*, is almost decisive in favour of the former. The schol. on Ap. Rh. i. 723 also maintains this view and I fail to see that there is any contradiction in his words, as M. de Mirmont asserts.

They are (Keil, p. 342, 13) δρυόχους· ἐν οἷς καταπήσεται ἡ τρώπις ξύλοις, ταῦτα οὕτως καλοῦσιν· Ὁμηρος (τ 574). δρυόχοι οὖν τὰ ἐγκοίλια τῆς νεώς. The line in Homer, and some other passages, do not prove anything as they are consistent with either interpretation.

2. In i. 533 it is said of Heracles, ἄγχι δὲ οἱ ῥόπαλον θέτο καὶ οἱ ἔνερθεν | ποσσὶν ὑπεκλύσθη νηὸς τρώπις. M. de Mirmont takes τρώπις to mean 'carlingue' (keelson) which the Greeks apparently called δευτέρα τρώπις. There is however no reason, as far as I see, why the ordinary sense of τρώπις, viz. 'keel,' should not be suitable here, the meaning simply is that the keel was sunk deep into the water under the weight of Heracles. In the three other places where τρώπις occurs in Ap. Rh. it has its ordinary sense, and M. de Mirmont admits that Cartault does not agree with him on this point.

3. ὀλκαῖον (ὀλκήιον). The precise meaning of this word cannot be determined. Cartault takes it to be the stern-post. M. de Mirmont, on the other hand, considers that a comparison in the fourth book (li. 1604 sqq.) proves it to be the prow, 'Quand Triton s'attache au ὀλκαῖον pour conduire Argo dans la mer, le dieu est comparé par Apollonios à un homme qui tient un cheval par la crinière pour l'entraîner à la course: si Triton poussait le navire par derrière, la comparaison ne serait pas juste.' No doubt if ὀλκ. meant the prow the comparison would be better, but we cannot always require exactitude in a simile, much less depend upon it for the interpretation of a word. The word ὀλκαῖον cannot, in my judgment, be separated from the Homeric ἐφόλκαιον which clearly denotes something at or near the stern. If Apollonius is reproducing the Homeric ship, it is not probable that he would use an Homeric word in a totally different sense.

4. κληῖς. It has been a subject of much dispute whether this word in Homer, as a naval term, means 'thole-pin' or 'bench' for rowers. The balance of evidence is, I think, in favour of the former interpretation, see e.g. θ 37. Apollonius however uses κληῖδες only in the sense of 'benches' (having the word σκαλμός for thole-pin), so it is probable that he so understood the word in Homer.

5. The lines i. 368 sqq. ζῶσαν πάμπρωτον εὐστρεφεῖ ἔνδοθεν ὄπλῳ | τεινόμενοι ἐκάτερθεν, κ.τ.λ. are generally quoted as a *locus classicus* for ὑποζώματα by commentators on Hor. *Od.* i. 14, 6, and elsewhere. It is

almost certain however, as M. de Mirmont points out, that the rope here mentioned has no reference to ὑποζώματα. Mr. Torr has made it clear that ὑποζώματα were used on board ships of war to strengthen them, and that they formed part of the regular equipment of an Athenian trireme. Ships of war are not mentioned in Homer, nor was Argo a ship of war. Mr. Torr thinks that the obscure expression in Acts xxvii. 17, ὑποζωννύντες τὸ πλοῖον, means 'that they used expedients which answered the purpose of the girding cables.' Nearly seventy years ago Wellauer wrote on Ap. Rh. *l.c.*: 'itaque dubitari vix potest, quin de alia quadam colligatione, in ipsa navi facienda, loquatur poeta, quae qualis fuerit non satis perspectum habemus,' and I am not aware that we know any more about it now. M. de Mirmont's opinion, that a rope is meant which was used in launching and in drawing the ship to land, scarcely suits the context.

6. μεσόδμη and ἱστοδόκη. The former of these words is generally (and I believe rightly) understood to mean a socket for the mast when erect in the centre bench of the ship, and the latter a receptacle at the stern for the mast when in a recumbent position. M. de Mirmont agrees with this, and it was certainly the opinion of Apollonius (i. 563, and ii. 1262—1264) as to the respective meanings of the two words. Mr. Torr, however, commenting on β 424, ἱστὸν δ' εἰλάτινον κοίλης ἔντοσθε μεσόδμης | στήσαν ἀείραντες, takes ἔντοσθε to mean *from within*, and to go with ἀείραντες, in other words he identifies μεσόδμη with ἱστοδόκη or nearly so. I cannot help thinking that he is mistaken about this, and the reference to Lucian *Am.* 6, where the word μεσοκοίλια is apparently equivalent to ἱστοδόκη, by no means proves his point.

7. From the fact that there were no spare oars on board Argo (for Heracles, having broken his oar, had to go on shore to make one from a young tree) M. de Mirmont argues 'à plus forte raison' that the νηίου ἐκ κοτίνου φάλαγξ set up to mark the grave of Idmon could not have been one of the φάλαγγες (rollers) used for launching the ship, but was the trunk of a wild olive, cut into the shape of a φάλαγξ, and he adds that such rollers would have been useless to them because they had not, like the Greeks before Troy, to draw their ship to land in view of a long stay. The point is a small one, but I do not think M. de Mirmont is right here—at any rate, his reasoning is unsound, for (1) it does not

follow that, because they did not take spare oars, they did not take the launching rollers with them, and (2) to attribute to the Argonauts a prophetic knowledge that they would never need the rollers again, seems to me unjustifiable and inartistic. Merkel, reading *νήος*, clearly refers the word *φάλαγξ* to one of the rollers they had with them, and so does the scholiast.

8. Referring to the drawing of lots for seats, M. de Mirmont remarks that this was not the heroic custom, and accounts for it by the consideration that the Argonauts were not ordinary rowers, and that therefore lot alone could distribute their places. I confess I do not see how the extraordinary character of the Argonauts could make it more necessary that their places should be assigned by lot than the places of ordinary rowers. But I am disposed to think that, although such assignment by lot is not mentioned in Homer, Apollonius would not have set it down without some authority. Virgil apparently alludes to this custom in *sortiti remos* (*Aen.* iii. 510)—as to the interpretation of which I entirely agree with Mr. Page—and so does Propertius (iv. 21, 11). If it be objected that Virgil is merely following Apollonius, I would reply that he does not follow blindly, and that he would probably not follow Apollonius in an anachronism.

9. In i. 566 we have ἐπ' ἱκρίοφιν δὲ κάλῳας | ἔστῃσιν περόνησι διακριδὼν ἀμφιβαλόντες.

There is certainly some difficulty here, for how could these ropes (halyards) be fastened to the small decks (*ἱκρία*) at the prow or poop? Accordingly M. de Mirmont in his translation suggested ἐπικριόφιν, 'to the yard.' He now returns to the usual reading, and follows Cartault in interpreting 'to the mast,' which he justifies by the statement of schol. (*ad loc.*) and of Eustathius that ἱκρίον = part of the mast. However that may be, Homer uses *ἱκρία* only in the sense of 'decks' and elsewhere Apollonius uses it only in this sense. It seems therefore in the highest degree improbable that Apollonius should also use ἱκρίον in the sense of 'mast.' They are two very different things—to use a non-Homeric word which Apollonius often does, and to use a Homeric word in a non-Homeric sense, a distinction which M. de Mirmont seems to overlook. For the present passage, I can suggest no better solution than that given by Vars, viz. that the *περόναι* (*cabillots*, belaying-pins) round which the ropes were fastened were attached to something of the nature of an ἱκρίον, such as a 'fife-rail' (*ratelier*). I feel it is not satisfactory, but I know no better at present.

There are several other points I should have liked to deal with, especially with the interpretation of the difficult lines i. 1276, 1277, but too much space has been already occupied.

R. C. SEATON.

HARRIS' PLATO AS A NARRATOR.

Plato as a Narrator. A Study of the Myths, by W. A. HARRIS. A Dissertation presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Johns Hopkins University, Richmond, Va. Pp. 48.

LIKE many other dissertations for the doctor's degree, this is meant to be written, not to be read. The composition of this thesis, with the research involved, was eminently useful to the author, and the work displays sufficient scholarship and acquaintance with philological methods to justify the university in conferring the desired degree. But the composition is crude, and the Platonic scholar will find little to interest him. Plato's originality in this matter consists, according to the

author, not in the use of the myth, but in the 'blending of *μῦθος* and *λόγος*.' 'For philosophical narrative we are dependent upon Plato, and since Plato is the department [*sic*], the study of the myth is a study of philosophic narrative.' Platonic myths are divided into two classes, Socratic and non-Socratic,—a division which does not prove particularly fruitful. To the second of these two classes the author assigns (only) the myths of *Protagoras* 320 f., *Symposium* 189 f., and *Republic* 359 f. The myth of the *Gorgias* is called 'the simplest and apparently the most naive,'—whatever the latter adjective may mean. The writer's familiarity with the contents of the Platonic dialogues does not seem perfect; at least his words with regard to