

concepts"—for which *a priori* intuition is required—and not, as philosophical knowledge, from concepts without such "construction". Mr. Adamson answered by suggesting that I (erroneously) "regarded the mathematical intuition as a single definite object and not as a schema". I replied that it is impossible that Kant should have made the difference between "*Philosophie*" and "*Mathematik*" to consist in the fact that the latter requires schemata; since "*Philosophie*"—at least "*der philosophische Theil der Naturwissenschaft*"—requires schemata no less, according to the fundamental doctrine of the '*Analytic*'. This seems to me a conclusive proof of the inadmissibility of Mr. Adamson's suggestion; and I am surprised that he does not perceive its relevance. I further pointed out that the mathematical intuition of which Kant speaks in the '*Methodology*' is expressly stated to be an "individual object," by means of which the "*Begriff*" is contemplated "*in concreto*," and an object which can be represented either in pure intuition or on paper; and that Kant certainly would not have applied any of these phrases to the schema. I thought that the briefest references to the section on Schematism in the '*Analytic*' would have made this clear to Mr. Adamson; but as this is not the case, and as I can hardly ask for space to quote the relevant paragraphs at full length with a commentary, I must content myself with referring the reader to the whole passage "*Das Schema ist an sich selbst . . . zusammenhangen sollten*" (pp. 142, 3, Hart.).

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HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISMS.

The question whether the so-called Hypothetical Syllogisms have, or have not, the character of Categorical Syllogisms, has been so much discussed that it may seem an impertinence to offer anything further on the subject. But, so far as I have observed, no one has brought into prominence a distinction which seems to me to be here of decisive importance, the distinction, namely, between what are called in Prof. Goodwin's *Greek Grammar* General and Particular Conditional Sentences. Examples of General Conditional Sentences are: 'If a man is dyspeptic, he is unhappy'; 'If salt is dissolved in water, the boiling point of the water is raised'; 'If an ancient Athenian was thought politically dangerous, he was liable to be ostracised'. Examples of Particular Conditional Sentences are: 'If A. is a victim of dyspepsia, he is to be pitied'; 'If this water is salt, it will not boil at 212°'; and so on. Now, whatever one may think of Mr. Venn's account of propositions of the former kind (*Symbolic Logic*, chap. xvi.), certain it is that these propositions are universally understood as stating general rules about matters of fact, and that they may be transformed, without appreciable difference of meaning, into Categorical Universals; e.g., 'All dyspeptics are unhappy'; 'All salt water has its boiling point above 212°'; 'All ancient Athenians believed to be politically dangerous were liable to be ostracised'. When a Hypothetical Syllogism starts off with a General Condition, the second premiss does not, properly speaking, 'affirm the antecedent' or 'deny the consequent'; it

affirms that a particular example of the class referred to in the antecedent has the character there referred to, or denies that a particular example of the class referred to in the consequent has the character there referred to. In other words, the relation of the two premisses to one another, and of course also the relation of premisses to conclusion are precisely what they are in Categorical Syllogisms of the First Figure; the two classes are only verbally distinguished from one another. Not so with the arguments whose major premiss, so-called, is a Particular Condition. These cannot be exhibited as Categorical Syllogisms except by substituting for the special or concrete condition a general rule said to be implied. Thus Mr. Venn (*Symbolic Logic*, p. 333) treats the proposition 'If the glass falls [to-morrow], it will rain,' as implying 'All falling barometers are followed by rain'. But, in the first place, the difference between expressing and implying a general rule is surely important enough to create a difference in the treatment of Hypothetical Syllogisms by Formal Logic; and, in the second place, in some cases (*e.g.*, 'If you offered me a dollar, the book shall be yours') it seems impossible to discover any tacit reference to a general rule, while in other cases where there is undoubtedly some such assumption, it may be difficult or impossible to say precisely what it is. Thus when I say, 'If the glass falls to-morrow, it will rain,' I may not mean to imply that all falling barometers are followed by rain, but that all barometers which fall a certain number of hours after the occurrence of such meteorological conditions as now exist are followed by rain. But on this point I need only refer to the remarks on concrete propositions in the paper contributed by Mr. Alfred Sidgwick to *MIND* XXIX.; though I cannot follow him when he appears to assume a class of abstract-concrete propositions as tolerably well marked off from the concretes. The concretes seem to me to shade into the abstract-concretes by imperceptible gradations. Both constitute, formally, one class, which is broadly distinguished from the class of true abstract or general propositions.

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